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B100463/2025
European Parliament resolution on the polarisation and increased repression in Serbia, one year after the Novi Sad tragedy
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Articles 2 and 6 thereof,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia, in particular those of 8 February 2024 on the situation in Serbia following the elections, and of 7 May 2025 on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia,
– having regard to the Commission staff working document of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Serbia 2024 Report’ (SWD)(2024)0695), accompanying the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690),
– having regard to the previous EU statements on Serbia, in particular the open letter on Serbia of 5 February 2025 by the Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos, and to her subsequent visit to Serbia in April 2025,
– having regard to the interim measure of 29 April 2025 issued by the European Court of Human Rights instructing Serbia to refrain from using sonic devices for crowd control,
– having regard to the statement made by several UN Special Rapporteurs on 4 August 2025 condemning the Serbian Government’s violent crackdown on peaceful protesters,
– having regard to the numerous reports and statements by domestic and international human rights organisations, independent media and civic groups documenting systemic abuses in Serbia,
– having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,
– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
– having regard to Serbia’s application for EU membership, submitted on 22 December 2009,
– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part, which entered into force on 1 September 2013,
– having regard to Serbia’s application for EU membership, submitted on 19 December 2009,
– having regard to the Commission opinion of 12 October 2011 on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2011)0668), the European Council’s decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,
– having regard to the European Council Presidency conclusions of December 2006, to the Council conclusions of March 2020 and to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,
– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 October 2011 on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2011)0668), the European Council decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia candidate status and the European Council decision of 27-28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia, in particular those of 8 February 2024 on the situation in Serbia following the elections, and of 7 May 2025 on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia,
– having regard to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) of 31 October 2003, to which Serbia is a signatory,
– having regard to Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos’s interventions in the European Parliament’s plenary debates on Serbia of 5 February 2025, of 6 May 2025 and of 9 September 2025,
– having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) election observation mission on the early parliamentary and presidential elections of 3 April 2022 in Serbia, published on 19 August 2022,
A. whereas on 1 November 2024, a newly renovated concrete canopy at Novi Sad railway station collapsed, killing 16 people and injuring others; whereas one year after the tragedy, the investigations have not progressed;
– having regard to the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the early parliamentary elections of 17 December 2023 in Serbia, published on 28 February 2024,
B. whereas China’s presence and influence in Serbia has significantly increased in recent years through large-scale infrastructure investments, raising concerns about transparency, adherence to EU standards and environmental compliance; whereas the station project formed part of the Belgrade-Budapest high-speed railway line and was carried out under a Serbia-China intergovernmental agreement, outside the scope of the EU’s ordinary public procurement legislative framework, by two Chinese companies; whereas the 2024 Commission report on Serbia had already warned about the circumvention of procurement rules via such agreements; whereas in March 2025, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office initiated an investigation into the potential misuse of EU funds allocated to the reconstruction of the Novi Sad railway station;
– having regard to the European Court of Human Rights order to Serbia of 29 April 2025 to refrain from using sonic devices for crowd control,
C. whereas the canopy collapse triggered unprecedented nationwide protests led by students demanding justice, institutional accountability, transparency, snap elections, electoral integrity, respect for civil liberties, the separation of powers, media freedom, an end to systemic corruption and investment in education; whereas the protests have since spread across Serbian society;
– having regard to the UN human rights experts’ statement of 4 August 2025 on the student protests in Serbia,
D. whereas from February to the end of September 2025 more than 10 700 protests took place across more than 630 communities and 1 200 local community assemblies, including the largest demonstration in Serbia’s history on 15 March 2025 and the secondlargest on 28 June 2025, making this the largest grassroots movement in decades;
– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
E. whereas the protests organised by the student movement have been largely peaceful, although there were unfortunately a few violent incidents over the summer of 2025;
A. whereas Serbia has been a candidate country for EU membership since 2012; whereas accession to the EU is a merit-based process in which each candidate country needs to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, in particular those of guaranteeing full respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law;
F. whereas there were isolated cases of radical symbols being displayed and extreme nationalist, pro-Russian and chauvinistic rhetoric being used during the mass protests, which have faced significant criticism from abroad and from within Serbia;
B. whereas Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and his ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) have governed the country since 2012 with a heavy concentration of power, control over the media and a weak system of checks and balances, and have established a highly corrupt and nepotistic state and party apparatus; whereas in recent years, the ruling SNS has steadily eroded political rights and civil liberties, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition, and civil society organisations;
G.C. whereas since 2012, all parliamentary elections in Serbia but one have been early elections; whereas the December 2023 elections were the third parliamentary elections in less than four years; whereas previous elections, marred by pressure on voters, vote buyingbuying, and organised busing of voters within Serbia and from abroad, were heldconsidered underto unfairbe conditionsnot fair, and the decisive involvement of the president and the ruling party’s systemic advantages undermined the election process overall; whereas independent observers reported that the recent local elections in Zaječar and Kosjerić were neither freeoverall norelection fair;process;
H. whereas the Serbian authorities have resorted to violence against political opponents and the use of excessive force against demonstrators across the country; whereas by early 2025, the repression had escalated;
D. whereas Serbian society is marked by profound political polarisation and widespread discontent;
I. whereas in March 2025, during the largest protest in Serbian history, protesters were attacked by a sonic weapon according to independent sources, raising serious concerns about the proportionality and legality of the use of force; whereas human rights organisations collected testimonies from 3 400 attendees impacted by the incident, despite official denials by the authorities; whereas the Serbian Government invited Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) to investigate the incident; whereas the official investigation into the incident, which includes more than 170 witness statements, remains at an early stage, with no indictments;
E. whereas in recent years, Serbia has seen large and prolonged waves of predominantly peaceful anti-government protests, which have addressed various issues, including political violence, electoral fraud, President Vučić’s slide towards authoritarian governance, corruption, environmental concerns, police violence, and the broader ‘Serbia against Violence’ movement;
J. whereas since late 2024, protests have been met with repression, including beatings, arbitrary arrests, the use of tear gas, politically motivated detentions, deportations and mass surveillance; whereas more than 1 028 arrests and at least 340 violent incidents have been recorded, some of which caused serious injuries and involved high school students, while independent observers stress that this figure is not exhaustive;
E. whereas on 1 November 2024, the canopy of the newly renovated train station in Novi Sad collapsed, killing 16 people and injuring several others;
K. whereas since August 2025 violence has further intensified, including police brutality, torture and sexual violence against students, threats by the police protection service (JZO), politically motivated prosecutions by the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office, and smear campaigns by pro-government media;
F. whereas following this deadly incident, protests erupted over shoddy construction and suspected corruption, leading to the largest anti-government mobilisation in decades, which continues to this date;
L. whereas security agencies have unlawfully recorded and televised private conversations, some of which were then used to accuse students and activists of preparing attacks against the constitutional order and security of Serbia, while the Cobras elite military unit has been deployed to respond to domestic clashes, even firing live ammunition on one occasion;
G. whereas the physical attack by members of the ruling party on the students of the Faculty of Dramatic Arts commemorating the victims of the Novi Sad tragedy in Belgrade on 22 November 2024 was the starting point of the university blockades;
M. whereas pro-government mobs and prior convicts have been shielded by police during violent counterdemonstrations, while opposition figures, students and members of Serbia’s parliament have been beaten and abducted by plainclothes officers;
H. whereas these peaceful and creative protests were initiated by students and have since spread across Serbian society, with teachers, farmers, workers, taxi drivers, artists, cultural figures, veterans, and people of all ages throughout the country taking part, building unifying momentum and overcoming divisions, including across ethnic lines;
N. whereas between July and August 2025, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights urged the Serbian authorities to exercise restraint, halt their crackdown on the student movement and uphold human rights and academic freedom;
I. whereas the protesters’ demands included full respect for the rule of law and the system of checks and balances laid down in the Serbian Constitution, as well as accountability, justice, and transparency, and ultimately led to a call for early elections due to the authorities’ failure to address these demands in good faith; whereas the students’ demands, which remain unmet, are fully consistent with the reforms that Serbia is expected to implement in order to advance in the EU accession process;
O. whereas concerns have been raised by civil society organisations regarding the proposed draft law on amendments to the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code and the Law of 2005 on Juvenile Offenders and Criminal Protection of Juveniles, which introduce new offences and harsher penalties that could disproportionately restrict freedom of expression and assembly; whereas such provisions risk criminalising forms of peaceful protest or everyday civic behaviour that do not endanger public safety or constitutional order;
J. whereas the Serbian students have been nominated and shortlisted among the final candidates for Parliament’s 2025 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought;
P. whereas President Vučić, who according to the Serbian Constitution has no formal authority over policing, has framed the protests as ‘colour revolutions’ organised and financed by foreign secret services of Western states, and has transmitted this via pro-government media; whereas Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) has supported this narrative and accused the EU of carrying out ‘subversive activities’ to fuel the protests; whereas a number of journalists have been assaulted or denied protection while reporting on the protests;
K. whereas in August 2025, former ministers Tomislav Momirović and Goran Vesić were arrested for alleged abuse of office and causing at least USD 115 million in damage to the Serbian budget during the reconstruction of the Hungarian-Serbian railway line, including the collapsed Novi Sad station, and were later released;
Q. whereas President Vučić has also been using dehumanising language towards EU politicians, including Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), who have expressed their support for the protesters;
L. whereas the highest state officials, including President Aleksandar Vučić and Speaker of Parliament Ana Brnabić, are actively spreading conspiracy theories about the collapse of the canopy being a terrorist attack, in a deliberate attempt to confuse the public about responsibility for the deadly incident;
R. whereas the government and the ruling elite have normalised repression through pardons for violent attacks committed by government supporters, the suspension of public transport to block protests, the politically motivated expulsion of foreign citizens and the occupation of central Belgrade by pro-government demonstrators;
M. whereas the protests organised by the student movement have been overwhelmingly peaceful, with only a few isolated violent incidents over the summer, which were preceded by violence by supporters of the ruling party;
S. whereas the Serbian authorities have repeatedly stated that Serbia remains committed to joining the EU and to implementing the necessary reforms, yet the pace of progress in key areas, such as the rule of law, media freedom, judicial independence and the fight against corruption, has rather backtracked;
N. whereas there are credible reports that during the protests on 15 March 2025, the Serbian authorities used an illegal sonic weapon against peaceful protesters, causing injuries to a number of them;
T. whereas Commission President von der Leyen visited Serbia on 15 October 2025;
O. whereas the speeches delivered during the protests on the Vidovdan holiday on 28 June 2025, which were marked by nationalistic rhetoric and chauvinistic undertones, have faced significant criticism from abroad, but also from participants in the protests themselves and from supporters of the protests;
1. Commemorates, one year after the tragedy, the 16 victims who lost their lives as a result of the collapse of the canopy of the Novi Sad railway station on 1 November 2024 and expresses its solidarity with those who were injured; reiterates its calls for full and transparent legal proceedings following the investigation by the authorities, in order to bring those responsible to justice, in accordance with the rule of law; calls for an independent technical examination of the structural failure, a comprehensive review of construction permits and oversight procedures, and a full assessment of potential corruption or negligence; urges the Serbian authorities to guarantee victims’ families effective access to justice and adequate compensation; underlines the need to examine more broadly the extent to which corruption led to the lowering of safety standards and contributed to this tragedy;
P. whereas since the summer, the regime has continued and intensified its violent crackdown against peaceful protesters and citizens supporting the protests, including by deploying thugs linked to the ruling party to escalate violence, destroying the property of innocent citizens, employing police brutality, conducting arbitrary arrests, subjecting detainees to inhumane treatment, threatening individuals with violence, including sexual violence, and publicly humiliating them on government propaganda channels;
2. Supports the right of Serbian students and citizens to peaceful protests calling for accountability and democratic reforms directly linked to the rule of law, which the EU expects from Serbia; stresses the importance of civic courage, commitment to non-violence and youth engagement for the advancement of Serbia’s European path; notes the shortlisting of Serbian students as a finalist for the 2025 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought; supports genuine attempts at dialogue about how the government can meet student demands; is deeply concerned that the situation in Serbia remains fraught with tension and polarisation that could easily lead to violence, which is a direct result of hate speech, promotion of violence, smear campaigns against opponents and anti-EU and pro-Russian propaganda widely spread via government-controlled media and also by government officials, as well as of a gross failure from the official side to face and come to terms with Serbia’s past; calls on all political and social actors in Serbia to refrain from such rhetoric and contribute to fostering a climate of mutual respect, democratic dialogue and de-escalation; urges the Serbian Government to promote inclusive political participation and guarantee equal access to media for all political parties and candidates; stresses the importance of depolarising public discourse and fostering a political culture rooted in tolerance, compromise and respect for democratic institutions; calls on civil society, media and educational institutions to play an active role in bridging societal divisions and strengthening democratic resilience;
Q. whereas Serbia’s media landscape is dominated by government-controlled propaganda outlets, such as Happy TV, Pink TV and Informer, that are spreading hate-speech, promoting violence, using dehumanisation, demonising non-Serb ethnic groups, violating minors’ rights, misleading the public, constantly violating journalistic standards, including disseminating disinformation and manipulative anti-opposition narratives, and spreading pro-Russian propaganda;
3. Condemns in the strongest terms the wave of state-influenced violence, intimidation and indiscriminate arrests against peaceful protesters, journalists, civil society organisations and opposition representatives in Serbia; condemns smear campaigns, intimidation of the media and the abusive use of personal data to discredit protesters, and urges the Serbian authorities to ensure media freedom; calls on senior officials to end inflammatory rhetoric that incites hostility or violence; condemns the use of unlawful surveillance against demonstrators, such as through the use of Pegasus, Cellebrite and NoviSpy; expresses particular concern about the deployment of long-range acoustic devices and the extensive use of tear gas against civilians; urges the adoption and implementation of clear protocols on lawful crowdcontrol technologies and independent oversight mechanisms; calls on the Serbian Government to fully guarantee and respect the people’s right of assembly and freedom of expression in line with the Serbian Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights; further condemns all forms of hate speech and incitement to hatred, particularly against national minorities;
R. whereas President Vučić and government propaganda media have continuously tried to portray the protesters as ‘violent’ and ‘terrorists’ and framed the protests as ‘colour revolutions’ organised and financed by foreign secret services of Western states, namely accusing Germany, the UK and Croatia and foreign foundations including the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the Heinrich Böll Foundation; whereas President Vučić has described as ‘scum’ democratic parties represented in this House and Members of the European Parliament who expressed their support for the protesters’ demands for the respect for rule of law, transparency, accountability and justice,
4. Holds the Serbian leadership politically responsible for escalating repression, normalising violence and weakening democratic institutions; deplores the fact that the highest state officials are actively spreading conspiracy theories about the collapse of the canopy being an act of sabotage or terrorist attack; is concerned about the lack of response from state institutions, including law enforcement and the judiciary, to refute these baseless claims;
S. whereas Serbia is the only country in the region that has not aligned with the EU sanctions against Russia and Belarus linked to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas Serbia continues to nurture close and friendly relations with Russia and China, including on the level of military and security cooperation; whereas President Vučić attended the Military parade in Moscow on 9 May 2025 and the Shanghai Cooperation Summit on 1 September 2025;
5. Warns against the misuse of criminal law to suppress civic participation; stresses that amendments to the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code and the Law of 2005 on Juvenile Offenders and Criminal Protection of Juveniles must not result in criminalising peaceful behaviour or non-violent forms of protest; recalls that the proportional application of criminal sanctions is a cornerstone of the rule of law and of Serbia’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights;
1. Expresses its sincere condolences to the families of the 16 victims who lost their lives and to those who were injured following the collapse of the canopy of the Novi Sad train station on 1 November 2024;
6. Is concerned about the illegal arrests made ahead of the protests of 15 March and 28 June 2025, which were preceded by leaked recordings of suspects’ conversations published by pro-government media; notes that several political activists and members of the Free Citizens Movement (PSG) opposition party were arrested on these grounds and that some remain under house arrest or in exile; calls for their immediate release;
2. Expresses its full solidarity with the peaceful protesters in Serbia and warmly welcomes the shortlisting of the Serbian students as finalists for the 2025 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought;
7. Calls for urgent, impartial and transparent investigations into all allegations of unnecessary and disproportionate use of force, arbitrary arrests, detentions, torture, sexual violence against detainees, politically motivated prosecutions and other grave human rights abuses, including spitting on and beating restrained detainees, verbal degradation and death threats; calls on the authorities to thoroughly examine the allegations that these violations originated from high-ranking officials of the JZO, particularly its commanding officer, Marko Kričak; reiterates that these actions could amount to inhumane and degrading treatment prohibited by international law and policing protocols;
3. Strongly condemns all forms of violence, including physical attacks, smear campaigns, police brutality, arbitrary arrests, mistreatment of detainees, legal harassment, and the misuse of personal data to retaliate against peaceful protesters and their supporters;
8. Takes note of the resignation of Prime Minister Vučević, which was confirmed by the National Assembly on 19 March 2025, and of the subsequent appointment of the new government led by Đuro Macut on 16 April 2025;
4. Urges the Serbian authorities to immediately end the crackdown and all forms of violence against peaceful protesters, to release all those detained and to end all legal proceedings against them; strongly urges the immediate release of the PSG (Movement of Free Citizens) activists who have been detained for more than seven months in Novi Sad; calls on the authorities to prosecute all individuals, including members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and other pro-regime thugs, who are responsible for violence or incitement to violence against participants in peaceful demonstrations and against any detainees;
9. Notes the August 2025 arrest, and subsequent release, of former government ministers Tomislav Momirović and Goran Vesić on charges of abuse of office and suspicion of damaging the Serbian state budget by at least USD 115 million in relation to the reconstruction of the Belgrade-Budapest railway line, including the collapsed canopy of the Novi Sad railway station; deeply regrets the obstruction of justice that has prevented those responsible for the railway station canopy collapse from being held accountable; condemns the smear campaigns disseminated through pro-government channels against judges and prosecutors working to enforce the rule of law;
5. Urges the EU and Member State diplomatic missions to closely monitor all ongoing legal proceedings related to the protests;
10. Strongly condemns the government’s retaliation against employees in the education and cultural sectors for supporting the protests, including job losses, salary reductions, the presence of police on university campuses and the withdrawal of funding for public universities;
6. Is concerned by the arbitrary and politically motivated use of presidential pardons for individuals convicted or prosecuted for violence against students and other citizens participating in peaceful protests;
11. Calls on the Serbian authorities to immediately restore financing to universities; calls on the competent institutions to ensure the unhindered participation of the academic and research community in projects funded by the EU;
7. Calls for targeted sanctions against individuals responsible for human rights violations against protesters, notably within the ranks of the SNS party, the security services, the police, pro-regime thugs and the judiciary;
12. Condemns the actions of the members of the ruling party in organising an illegal encampment in Pionirski park in front of the presidency building and its subsequent expansion into the square overlooking the National Assembly; is gravely concerned about multiple reports of individuals with criminal backgrounds being mobilised by the ruling party in counter-protest activities, attacking protesters with pyrotechnics, further escalating tensions, violence and polarisation in the country; condemns the targeting of members of national minorities and the use of ethnic slurs by pro-government media;
8. Expresses deep concern about the systemic failings highlighted by the student protests in Serbia, notably issues relating to civil liberties, separation of powers, institutional and financial transparency, especially when it comes to infrastructure projects, and accountability;
13. Condemns the arbitrary use of presidential pardons for individuals convicted of or prosecuted for violence against students and other citizens participating in peaceful protests, considering such actions to be a direct interference with justice and seriously undermine the rule of law;
9. Expresses serious concern that corruption is prevalent in many areas, particularly related to ‘projects of interests for the Republic of Serbia’; considers that the level of corruption in Serbia is a significant obstacle to its EU accession process; notes with concern that even after several years, Serbian authorities have failed to deliver convincing results in many corruption cases of high public interest, such as the long-standing cases of Krušik, Jovanjica and Savamala;
14. Calls on the Serbian authorities to enable the safe return of all citizens who have fled the country as a result of political repression, intimidation or fear of persecution, and to guarantee their full protection and reintegration in accordance with the law and Serbia’s international obligations;
10. Considers that there is still a need for a thorough investigation into the deadly infrastructure collapse in Novi Sad and for the necessary full and transparent legal proceedings to bring all those responsible to justice; underlines the need to examine more broadly to what extent corruption led to the lowering of safety standards and contributed to the collapse, including out of concern for the safety standards of other infrastructure projects; calls, therefore, on the Serbian authorities to conduct a comprehensive, technical, safety-related and fully transparent inspection of all infrastructure facilities along the railway line from Belgrade, through Novi Sad, to the border with Hungary, in order to ensure their structural integrity, safety and compliance with international standards; calls on the Serbian authorities not to put into operation any infrastructure facilities that lack the necessary permits and certificates for safe and uninterrupted use, particularly those located on international and regionally important transport corridors; calls, in that respect, for thorough investigation and monitoring of all EXPO 2027-related investments and projects as it lacks proper procedures and permits;
15. Strongly condemns the unlawful arrest and expulsion of EU citizens who made statements in support of protesting students, and the public disclosure, by convicted war criminals, of the personal data of EU citizens; expresses concern about the rising number of detention cases involving EU citizens at Serbia’s borders;
11. Expresses serious concern about the deep societal polarisation in Serbia, which is a direct result of hate-speech, promotion of violence, smear campaigns against opponents, anti-EU/pro-Russian propaganda widely spread via government-controlled media and also by government officials, and of a gross failure on the official side to face and come to terms with Serbia’s past; underlines that primary responsibility for disseminating Russian narratives in the country lies with the ruling party and state authorities that spread them;
16. Condemns in the strongest possible terms the verbal attacks on MEPs by the highest Serbian officials because of their participation in, or statements made in the context of, the student protests, the most prominent example of which is President Vučić’s attack on the MEPs from the Green/EFA Group on 5 September 2025;
12. Is deeply alarmed by reports about the government trying to take control over Serbia’s few remaining critical media outlets, which respect journalistic ethical standards, namely N1 and Nova;
17. Condemns the overt Russian Federation interference in the Serbian protests through disinformation spread by its officials, including Vladimir Putin, alleging that the protests form part of a Western-backed ‘colour revolution’; rejects all allegations by Serbian officials and pro-government media that the EU and some of its Member States were involved in organising the student protests with a view to triggering a ‘colour revolution’; calls on the Serbian authorities to take action against such malign propaganda in domestic media, instead of participating in its dissemination; remains concerned about the nationalist narratives present in parts of the protest movement; deplores the continued use of nationalist narratives, such as the ‘Greater Serbia’ and ‘Serbian World’ concepts, which have in the past been promoted by certain members of the Serbian Government; recalls that such rhetoric has no place in EU-Serbia relations and undermines regional stability;
13. Calls on the Serbian authorities to refrain from using the majority state-owned Telekom Srbija and its subsidiaries to undermine media pluralism or distort the media market in Serbia; condemns the actions of Telekom Srbija’s subsidiaries for dismissing journalists who refused to follow mandated pro-government editorial policies;
18. Notes with concern that, in parallel to the ongoing protests, the Serbian Government appears to have been negotiating with the owners of the United Media company, to ‘weaken’ independent media outlets operating under it; warns that, if confirmed, this would represent a serious attack on the already endangered media pluralism in Serbia; calls on Serbia to align with EU policies in countering foreign interference and disinformation campaigns;
14. Is equally concerned by the proposed amendments to the Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Law on Juvenile Offenders, which have been introduced without meaningful public debate, as they risk further restricting and criminalising public protest and lowering human rights standards in Serbia; calls on the Serbian authorities to withdraw the proposed amendments until an inclusive and transparent consultation process is ensured and future proposals reflect Serbia’s commitments under international human rights standards;
19. Calls for the immediate and full implementation of all recommendations of the international election observation missions of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights to ensure free and fair elections in Serbia, in particular those concerning an independent audit of the voter register, the transparent and pluralistic appointment of members of the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM) Council and the provision of fair and equal access to airtime on public broadcaster RTS for all political actors;
15. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to closely follow these developments and use their leverage and power to ensure that these structural problems will not further deteriorate;
20. Calls on the Serbian authorities to conduct a fully transparent comprehensive technical safety inspection of all infrastructure facilities, including those on the railway line from Belgrade, through Novi Sad, to the border with Hungary, in order to ensure their structural integrity, safety and compliance with international standards; urges the Serbian authorities not to put into operation any infrastructure facilities that lack the necessary permits and certificates for safe and uninterrupted use, particularly those located on international and regionally important transport corridors;
16. Condemns the Serbian Government’s retaliation against teachers, professors and academics for supporting protests, including dismissals, salary cuts and funding withdrawals from universities, and condemns the vilification and smear campaigns against them in pro-government media; urges the authorities to restore full university financing and ensure free academic participation in EU projects;
21. Encourages Serbia to strengthen cooperation with the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and to fully implement its UNCAC obligations; calls for enhanced transparency of ownership and financing in public procurement for infrastructure projects; stresses that Serbia must safeguard environmental standards and the rights of local and national minority communities when approving such projects;
17. Recalls that Serbia has temporarily closed Chapters 25 and 26 of the EU accession negotiations, and calls on the Commission and the Council to consider reopening these chapters in the light of the recent developments affecting academic freedom and labour rights;
22. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to closely monitor the implementation of reforms through the EU accession process and the Reform Agenda adopted under the Reform and Growth Facility; acknowledges Serbia’s progress in certain areas, including economic growth, regional infrastructure connectivity and cooperation with the EU on migration management and energy security; welcomes Serbia’s participation in EU-funded projects under the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans and the Green Agenda; encourages Serbia to continue advancing reforms in alignment with EU standards, and reaffirms the EU’s readiness to support the Serbian people in their efforts towards a democratic, prosperous and European future;
18. Is concerned that the violent activities of persons allegedly connected to the ruling party increased the risk of ethnic tensions in the Bosniak-majority city of Novi Pazar and Slovak-majority municipality of Bački Petrovac over the summer; notes that during the July protest in Novi Pazar, pro-government media used ethnic slurs to target the protesters;
23. Underlines its long-standing commitment to Serbia’s European perspective and future EU membership, while clearly underlining that progress on EU accession depends on full respect for the EU’s values, a genuinely merit-based process, and adherence to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, which are among the Copenhagen criteria;
19. Strongly condemns the unfounded accusations by state officials, politicians and government propaganda channels portraying civil society organisations as traitors or state enemies, as well as the unlawful pressure and warrantless police raids against organisations such as the Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability, Civic Initiatives, the Trag Foundation, and the Center for Practical Politics; underlines the essential role of a vibrant and independent civil society and independent cultural actors in promoting democracy, pluralism, good governance, and Serbia’s EU integration process; regrets the lack of an enabling environment allowing civil society organisations to operate freely and participate meaningfully in policymaking;
24. Reiterates that EU accession negotiations with Serbia should only advance on the basis of measurable and sustainable progress in the fundamentals cluster, particularly on the rule of law, the fight against corruption and organised crime, judicial independence, media freedom, public administration reform, full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), and sanctions against Russia; recalls that Serbia remains a notable exception in the Western Balkans regarding alignment with the CFSP; emphasises that progressive alignment with the CFSP is a key requirement for all EU candidate countries; calls on the Serbian authorities to foster a fact-based and open discussion on accession to the EU;
20. Is deeply alarmed by reports from Amnesty International and the SHARE Foundation of the use by the Serbian authorities of illegal spyware surveillance, such as Pegasus, Cellebrite and Novi Spy, against activists, journalists and members of civil society organisations; urges the Serbian Government to immediately end such practices, investigate all cases, and hold those responsible accountable; calls on the Commission to follow up and press the Serbian authorities for a thorough investigation;
25. Reiterates its strong support for Serbian civil society organisations, human rights defenders and independent activists working to strengthen democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; calls on the Commission to ensure adequate and accessible funding and effective protection mechanisms for civil society actors; condemns any form of intimidation, harassment or administrative pressure against non-governmental organisations and activists; emphasises the vital role of civil society in promoting transparency, monitoring democratic standards and holding public authorities accountable;
21. Rejects allegations that the EU and some of its Member States were involved in organising the student protests with a view to triggering a ‘colour revolution’; strongly condemns, in this context, the unlawful arrests and expulsions of EU citizens and the public disclosure, by convicted war criminals, of EU citizens’ personal data, as well as hate speech against national minorities; expresses concern about the rising number of detention cases involving EU citizens at Serbia’s borders;
26. Supports the prompt deployment of an ad hoc EU fact-finding mission to Serbia, with the participation of the European Parliament, in order to assess, on the ground, the state of democracy, the ongoing protests, attacks on demonstrators and repression targeting students, academics, educators and public-sector employees;
22. Condemns in the strongest possible terms the verbal attacks on the Members of the European Parliament by the highest Serbian officials, the most prominent example of which includes President Vučić’s attack on the MEPs from the Green/EFA Group on 5 September 2025;
27. Calls on the most senior EU officials to refrain from making unfounded statements praising the reform process in Serbia; welcomes the shift in the Commission President’s tone during her recent visit to Serbia, which reflects a more accurate assessment of Serbia’s underlying problems and negative track record on fundamental reforms; notes the announced agreement in relation to independent verification of the voter registry and the REM Council media regulator, while underlining that progress is assessed based on implementation of reforms;
23. Tasks its Committee on Foreign Affairs with sending a fact-finding mission to Serbia in order to assess, on the ground, the state of democracy, the ongoing protests, attacks on demonstrators, and repression targeting students, academics, educators and public-sector employees;
28. Invites the Commission to launch an initiative for targeted individual sanctions to be imposed against those responsible for serious violations of law and human rights in Serbia, in line with the EU global human rights sanctions regime;
24. Supports genuine attempts at dialogue about how the government can meet students’ demands; notes, however, that students and protesters remain convinced that the recent calls for dialogue by the ruling party were not genuine;
29. Calls on the EU Member States to strengthen protective measures for those at risk, including emergency visas and relocation programmes; urges the EU and Member State diplomatic missions to closely monitor all ongoing legal proceedings related to the protests; urges the EU Member States to adopt a united response to Serbia’s democratic backsliding, including by considering targeted sanctions against individuals responsible for serious violations of law and human rights in Serbia;
25. Supports the call for early elections as a viable way out of the deep political and societal crisis in Serbia;
30. Calls on all countries participating in the upcoming Expo 2027 in Serbia to take into account the serious concerns and evidence of widespread corruption linked to the ruling authorities, as well as the reported lack of compliance with basic construction standards and legal requirements in the organisation and construction of the exhibition;
26. Underlines the critical importance of implementing all outstanding and recent recommendations on electoral reform issued by the OSCE/ODIHR and the Council of Europe bodies, as part of a transparent and inclusive process, and ahead of the needed new elections; highlights the importance of reforming and depoliticising the Regulatory Body for Electronic Media with a view to guaranteeing its political independence and ensuring its proper functioning, including during the election campaign, as well as of reforming the Law on the Electoral Roll to enable full and independent oversight of voter registration;
31. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice‑President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Serbia, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
27. Urges the Commission and the Member States to focus, in their engagement with the Serbian authorities, including on the highest level, on ending the violent crackdown on the protest, on supporting free, fair and early elections as a viable solution to the current crisis and of making any cooperation and financial support to the government conditional on respect for rule of law, fundamental rights, including media freedom, and democratic values, which are at the core of the EU accession process, thus supporting citizens and the country on its way forward;
28. Calls on the Commission to apply strict and fair conditionality in accordance with the enlargement methodology, ensuring that no funds are disbursed under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance or the Growth Plan until the Serbian authorities fully implement crucial reforms in the rule of law, democracy and the media, in particular regarding the Regulatory Body for Electronic Media and voter registration; reiterates its call for relevant EU funding, including funds from the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, to be reprogrammed to redirect funds towards supporting judicial reforms, anti-corruption measures, independent media, civil society organisations and the independent cultural sector, in order to support their critical work;
29. Considers that Serbia no longer complies with the conditions set out in Article 2(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) 2024/823 which grants Serbia almost full duty-free and quota-free access to the EU market, as a result of the persistent and serious erosion of the rule of law and fundamental democratic principles, including free and fair elections; calls, therefore, on the Commission to activate the suspension mechanism;
30. Calls on the President of the Commission to refrain from making unfounded or premature statements praising the reform processes in Serbia; calls on the Commission, including at the highest political level, to adopt clearer and more consistent language in its public communication towards Serbia, explicitly addressing the country’s significant shortcomings, lack of progress, and continued backsliding on the rule of law, thereby upholding the Union’s fundamental values and safeguarding public support for pro-European and pro-democratic forces;
31. Urges the Commission and the Member States to finally put an end to their appeasement politics towards Serbia, given the country’s years-long roll-back in the areas of the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, its deeply destabilising influence on the wider region, its continuing friendly and close relations with Russia, and its strategic engagement with Russia and China on military and security matters;
32. Reiterates that Serbia’s progress in its accession process depends on tangible advances in the rule of law, commitment to European values, constructive engagement in the Belgrade–Pristina Dialogue leading to a legally binding agreement based on mutual recognition, and full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy; stresses that negotiations should advance only once Serbia aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes substantial progress on key EU-related reforms, especially in the area of fundamental values;
33. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Serbia.