What changed

From · resolution motion joint · 9 Jul 2025 RC-10-2025-0324 on tackling China’s critical raw materials export restrictions

To · Adopted text · 10 Jul 2025 TA-10-2025-0166 Tackling China's critical raw materials export restrictions

✦ In short · AI narration of the differences below, generated 4 Sept 2026

The versions differ only in formal points: a spacing correction around a percentage sign. #1

0 changes of substance, plus 1 formal. Each change below carries a one-line ✦ note from the same model. Written from the two texts only — read the highlighted passages before relying on it.

The changes to the text itself, in document order. Cover page, citations (“having regard to …”), standard resolution paragraphs and punctuation-only edits are left out — they are in “Show every difference”.

Show:

Change #1 Formal

Fixes spacing around the percentage sign in the figure 98%.

D. whereas the EU’s dependence on China for critical raw materials has continued to grow or, at best, remains stubbornly high; whereas the global REE supply chain is heavily concentrated in China, which has control of around 75 % of mining output and of 85 % of processing capacity, reaching more than 95 % in the case of some REEs such as terbium, yttrium and dysprosium; whereas the EU remains overly reliant on non-EU countries for the supply of critical raw materials (CRMs) and is almost entirely dependent on China for the supply of heavy REEs; whereas the EU covers ~~98%~~98 % of its demand for permanent magnets, and 92 % of its demand for NdFeB magnets, with imports from China;