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Updates financial figures for EU support to Ukraine, increasing the total since the Ukraine Facility's establishment to EUR 14 billion. #3 Adds concerns about a shadow fleet of Russian oil tankers in the Baltic Sea circumventing sanctions. #4 Strengthens calls on Hungary to end its blockade of the European Peace Facility and keep pledges. #6 Adds measures to prevent EU-made components from reaching Russia's military and to enhance sanctions enforcement. #8 The other changes are formal or wording: decimal separators updated and references to Hungary rephrased. #1#2#5#7
4 changes of substance, plus 2 formaland2 wording-only (marked below). Each change below carries a one-line ✦ note from the same model. Written from the two texts only — read the highlighted passages before relying on it.
European Parliament resolution on continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States
P10_TA(2024)0012
(2024/2799(RSP))
Continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States
PE762.612
European Parliament resolution of 19 September 2024 on continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States (2024/2799(RSP))
The European Parliament,
F. whereas Ukrainian President Volodymr Zelenskyy announced that a Russian missile had hit a bulk carrier carrying wheat in the Black Sea bound for Egypt on 12 September 2024, making food security a renewed target; whereas Russian drones and missiles targeting Ukraine are increasingly violating EU and NATO airspace, putting citizens in our eastern regions at risk;
Formal Replaces the decimal separator in the number 14.6 with a comma, aligning with EU formatting conventions.
G. whereas the humanitarian situation in Ukraine, especially near the front lines, has become increasingly critical; whereas, according to the UN, recent Russian attacks on critical civilian infrastructure have left tens of thousands of Ukrainians without essential services and more than 14.614,6 million people, around 40 % of the Ukrainian population, will need humanitarian aid in 2024; whereas the intensified hostilities in Kharkivska Oblast in May also caused the largest displacement in Ukraine since 2023; whereas, owing to a funding shortfall, the UN reports that humanitarian aid workers are currently unable to fully meet critical needs in the country; whereas the prolongation of the conflict will result in persisting and worsening urgent needs in the coming months; whereas the destruction of infrastructure in Ukraine is having disastrous consequences for the health of women, who are often doing the nursing, medical and care work;
Wording Rephrases the reference to Hungary, specifying 'the Hungarian Government' instead of just 'Hungary'.
H. whereas Hungarythe Hungarian Government issued a decree in breach of the Temporary Protection Directive, cancelling state-funded shelter for refugees from western Ukraine, leaving many, the majority women and children, homeless;
I. whereas the latest estimate in the joint Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA3) released by the Government of Ukraine, the World Bank Group, the Commission and the United Nations is that as of 31 December 2023 the total cost of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine will amount to at least USD 486 billion over the next decade, up from USD 411 billion estimated one year ago;
Updates the total EU support figure from EUR 12.2 billion to EUR 14 billion since the Ukraine Facility's establishment, reflecting a higher amount.
J. whereas the EU and its Member States have thus far contributed more than EUR 100 billion in financial, humanitarian, refugee and military assistance to Ukraine; whereas the EU provided over EUR 25 billion of macro-financial support to Ukraine in 2022 and 2023 and has established the Ukraine Facility, a dedicated financial instrument that will allow it to provide Ukraine with up to EUR 50 billion in predictable and flexible financial support from 2024 to 2027; whereas the EU made its first regular payment of approximately EUR 4.2 billion under the newly established Ukraine facility in July 2024; whereas this payment follows the previous bridge and pre-financing support, totallingwhich totals almost EUR 12.214 billion since the establishment of the Facility in March 2024;
K. whereas Russia has substantially increased its own military spending and production in 2024; whereas Russia is also using Belarus’s ammunition stockpile and relying on the military support of several countries, primarily Iran and North Korea; whereas there are reports indicating that China is providing Russia with substantial assistance to bolster its military capabilities, extending beyond dual-use technologies; whereas according to governmental sources Iran has recently transferred shipments of Fath-360 close-range ballistic missiles to Russia; whereas France, Germany and the United Kingdom have announced a new set of sanctions against Iran;
O. whereas since February 2022 the EU has adopted 14 packages of European sanctions aimed at undermining Russia’s ability to wage its illegal war of aggression;
Adds a new clause highlighting the operation of a shadow fleet of Russian oil tankers in the Baltic Sea, circumventing sanctions.
P. whereas EU Member States continue to purchase fossil fuels and uranium from Russia, contributing to the Russian economy and bolstering its war chest; whereas sales of Russian fossil fuels to the EU since the outbreak of the full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine have exceeded EUR 200 billion, which is double that of the total funding provided to Ukraine over the same period; whereas the EU has granted an exemption for Russian crude oil imported through the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary, Slovakia, and Czechia; whereas increased Russian gas imports by Azerbaijan are a cause for concern about Azerbaijan’s role as an alternative gas supplier instead of Russia, as Baku, unable to meet European demand, may relabel Russian gas as Azerbaijani for European consumption; whereas a shadow fleet of environmentally hazardous and uninsured Russian oil tankers is still operating in the Baltic Sea and circumventing the sanction regime;
1. Condemns, in the strongest possible terms, Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine, and the involvement of Belarus in this war, and demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land, nature and infrastructure;
8. Calls on the Member States to immediately lift restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against legitimate military targets on Russian territory, as this hinders Ukraine’s ability to fully exercise its right to self-defence under international public law and leaves Ukraine exposed to attacks on its population and infrastructure;
Formal Replaces the decimal separator in the percentage 0.25 with a comma, aligning with EU formatting conventions.
9. Underlines that insufficient deliveries of ammunition and weapons and restrictions on their use risk undermining efforts made so far and deeply deplores the declining financial volume of bilateral military aid to Ukraine from Member States, despite the strong statements made at the beginning of this year; reiterates, therefore, its calls on the Member States to fulfil their commitment of March 2023 to deliver one million rounds of ammunition to Ukraine, to accelerate weapons deliveries, in particular of modern air defence systems and other weapons and ammunition in response to clearly identified needs, including Taurus missiles; calls for the swift implementation of the commitments made in joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine; reiterates its position that all EU Member States and NATO allies should collectively and individually commit to supporting Ukraine militarily, with no less than 0.250,25 % of their GDP annually;
10. Underlines the need for enhanced air defence cooperation between Member States to ensure protection from threats that reach into EU and NATO airspace;
13. Commends the Ukraine Defence Contact Group for its vital role in coordinating international support and urges the EU Member States to increase their contributions to bolster Ukraine’s defence capabilities;
Extends the call on Hungary to end its blockade of the European Peace Facility, adding that it should keep pledges made since February 2022.
14. Urges the Member States to actively pressure Hungarythe Hungarian Government to end its blockade of the EPF, including the newly established Ukraine Assistance Fund;Fund, and thus keep the pledges made since February 2022 and agreed by all Member States;
15. Strongly condemns the use of sexual and gender-based violence as a weapon of war and stresses that this constitutes a war crime; calls on host and transit countries to guarantee access to sexual and reproductive health and rights services, particularly emergency contraception, post-exposure prophylaxis and abortion care, including for survivors of rape;
16. Reiterates its call for the EU to step up efforts to address the dire situation of those forcibly deported to Russia and children forcibly adopted in Russia, including by sanctioning persons directly responsible for and involved in the forced transfer and unjustified detention of Ukrainian children;
Wording Rephrases the reference to Hungary, specifying 'the Hungarian Government' instead of just 'Hungary'.
17. Urges Hungarythe Hungarian Government to withdraw the decree cancelling state-funded shelter for refugees from western Ukraine and uphold its responsibilities under the EU Temporary Protection Directive;
Adds a call to prevent EU-produced critical components from reaching Russia's military industry and to strengthen export controls and law enforcement.
18. Calls on the Council to maintain and extend its sanctions policy against Russia and Belarus and non-EU countries and entities providing the Russian military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment, while monitoring, reviewing and enhancing the policy’s effectiveness and impact; condemns Iran’s recent transfer of ballistic missiles to Russia; urges the Member States to further broaden and strengthen the sanctions regime against Iran and North Korea in view of these countries’ military support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and to add additional Chinese entities and individuals to the EU sanctions list for their support to Russia’s defence and security sector; underlines the need to prevent critical components produced in EU countries from reaching the Russian military industry and considers it is essential to strengthen controls on the export and maintenance of high-tech equipment produced in the EU, as well as to increase law enforcement measures and cooperation to prevent sanctions circumvention; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the circumvention of sanctions by EU-based companies, third parties and non-EU states; calls on the Council to design a new horizontal sanctions regime to counter this circumvention, which will require a more general and holistically applicable instrument to target circumvention in all regimes implemented by the EU; invites the Council and the Member States to address, in particular, the issue of Western-designed components being used in Russian weapons and military equipment;
19. Stresses that the impact of existing sanctions and of financial and military support to Ukraine will continue to be undermined as long as the EU allows Russian fossil fuels to be imported; calls for a ban on importing Russian grain, potash and fertilisers, as well as raw materials, including aluminium, steel products, uranium, titanium, nickel, wood and wood products, and gas and oil; calls for the EU and the Member States to introduce a full ban on re-exported Russian refined oil products; calls, furthermore, for the implementation of ‘rules of origin’ documentation, which would ensure the true origin of oil products imported to the EU;