What changed

J. whereas the EU and its Member States have thus far contributed more than EUR 100 billion in financial, humanitarian, refugee and military assistance to Ukraine; whereas the EU provided over EUR 25 billion of macro-financial support to Ukraine in 2022 and 2023 and has established the Ukraine Facility, a dedicated financial instrument that will allow it to provide Ukraine with up to EUR 50 billion in predictable and flexible financial support from 2024 to 2027; whereas the EU made its first regular payment of approximately EUR 4.2 billion under the newly established Ukraine facility in July 2024; whereas this payment follows the previous bridge and pre-financing support, totallingwhich totals almost EUR 12.214 billion since the establishment of the Facility in March 2024;

P. whereas EU Member States continue to purchase fossil fuels and uranium from Russia, contributing to the Russian economy and bolstering its war chest; whereas sales of Russian fossil fuels to the EU since the outbreak of the full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine have exceeded EUR 200 billion, which is double that of the total funding provided to Ukraine over the same period; whereas the EU has granted an exemption for Russian crude oil imported through the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary, Slovakia, and Czechia; whereas increased Russian gas imports by Azerbaijan are a cause for concern about Azerbaijan’s role as an alternative gas supplier instead of Russia, as Baku, unable to meet European demand, may relabel Russian gas as Azerbaijani for European consumption; whereas a shadow fleet of environmentally hazardous and uninsured Russian oil tankers is still operating in the Baltic Sea and circumventing the sanction regime;

14. Urges the Member States to actively pressure Hungarythe Hungarian Government to end its blockade of the EPF, including the newly established Ukraine Assistance Fund;Fund, and thus keep the pledges made since February 2022 and agreed by all Member States;

18. Calls on the Council to maintain and extend its sanctions policy against Russia and Belarus and non-EU countries and entities providing the Russian military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment, while monitoring, reviewing and enhancing the policy’s effectiveness and impact; condemns Iran’s recent transfer of ballistic missiles to Russia; urges the Member States to further broaden and strengthen the sanctions regime against Iran and North Korea in view of these countries’ military support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and to add additional Chinese entities and individuals to the EU sanctions list for their support to Russia’s defence and security sector; underlines the need to prevent critical components produced in EU countries from reaching the Russian military industry and considers it is essential to strengthen controls on the export and maintenance of high-tech equipment produced in the EU, as well as to increase law enforcement measures and cooperation to prevent sanctions circumvention; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the circumvention of sanctions by EU-based companies, third parties and non-EU states; calls on the Council to design a new horizontal sanctions regime to counter this circumvention, which will require a more general and holistically applicable instrument to target circumvention in all regimes implemented by the EU; invites the Council and the Member States to address, in particular, the issue of Western-designed components being used in Russian weapons and military equipment;