What changed

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0000/2026),(A10-0214/2026),

✦ Adds recitals on the euro's global position, the dollar's reserve share, euro invoicing, geopolitical tensions, US treasuries, European safe assets, financial infrastructure integrity and capital market depth.

A. whereas the stability and credibility of the European economic and institutional framework, based on the soundness of the EU’s economic policies, competitiveness and institutional predictability, overarchingly influence the global role of the euro;

B. whereas the international monetary system remains centred on the US dollar, which represented 57.8 % of global official foreign exchange reserves at the end of 2024; whereas the euro is firmly established as the world’s second most used currency; whereas it accounts for approximately 20 % of global foreign exchange reserves; whereas gold has reached 20 % of total official reserves at market prices and has thereby overtaken the euro, whose share stood at 16 % at the end of 2024;

C. whereas the euro accounts for more than 40 % of global export invoicing when trade within the euro area is included; whereas, once euro area countries are excluded, the US dollar accounted for around 60 % of export invoicing compared with around 25 % for the euro in 2023;

D. whereas current geopolitical tensions and international trade challenges – including the disruption of value chains, technological developments, digital transformation, the rise of China’s economic power and the challenges posed by the United States to multilateralism – are leading to a multipolar world economy, thus paving the way for a potential shift towards a multicurrency reserve system where the euro will offer additional currency choices for market participants globally, contributing to reducing global financial risks;

E. whereas, notwithstanding the continued structural demand for US treasuries, several recent episodes of geopolitical and trade-related stress have shown that treasury yields may rise rather than fall, thereby calling into question their automatic safe-haven function; whereas this shifting environment creates a window of opportunity for the euro;

F. whereas, despite recent growth in supranational issuance, the stock of European safe assets remains structurally limited, amounting, when combined with euro area sovereign bonds rated at least AA, to only around 33 % of the outstanding stock of US treasuries in the third quarter of 2025;

G. whereas the EU should protect the integrity of its financial infrastructures and the independence of its market operators against foreign policy unilateralism and potential extraterritorial sanctions by third country jurisdictions, and ensure, at the same time, the effective enforcement of EU sanctions policy;

H. whereas deep, liquid euro-denominated financial markets, and the progress towards an efficient savings and investments union, the completion of the banking union and the fulfilment of the One Europe, One Market roadmap, should play a fundamental role in strengthening the global role of the euro;

General considerations

✦ Adds that the EU should promote global interoperability and a more balanced, sustainable and resilient international monetary and financial system, and supports a stronger euro role within a more multipolar system.

1. Notes the gradual but profound transformation of the international monetary and financial system; calls for the EU to reduce its strategic dependencies and strengthen its capacity for autonomous action;action, while actively promoting global interoperability and a more balanced, sustainable and resilient international monetary and financial system; supports, in this context, that a stronger global role for the euro is about reinforcing its role within a more multipolar international monetary system;

✦ Adds that the EU should aim not only to absorb external shocks but also to strengthen its capacity for greater monetary, economic and geopolitical influence.

2. Notes that, in recent episodes of geopolitical turmoil, safe-haven inflows have contributed to appreciation pressures on the euro, thereby turning the euro area into a ‘passive safe haven’ that absorbs shocks instigated elsewhere without fully harnessing the corresponding benefits; stresses that the EU should aim not only to absorb external shocks, but also to strengthen its capacity for greater monetary, economic and geopolitical influence;

✦ Replaces paragraphs on EU dependence on foreign financial infrastructures and US dollar funding with text on payment infrastructure networks, existing Eurosystem systems, SEPA, extraterritorial leverage, sanctions exposure and economic resilience.

3. Underlines the EU’s dependence on foreign financial market infrastructures, ranging from retail payments reliant on international card schemes to wholesale transactions dependant on systems provided by US corporations;

3. Considers that globally successful currencies are increasingly reliant not only on direct transactions, but also on well-developed networks and infrastructure, which is especially relevant regarding wholesale payment infrastructures, retail payment front ends and private sector innovation ecosystems; underlines that the euro area already benefits from a significant and mature public payment infrastructure, including the T2 real-time gross settlement system operated by the Eurosystem, the TARGET2-Securities securities settlement platform, and the TARGET instant payment settlement (TIPS) infrastructure; considers that strengthening the international role of the euro should address gaps by building on these existing foundations rather than assuming that the EU lacks the basic infrastructure on which to act; recalls that the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) is implemented through privately administered payment schemes operating within a public regulatory and oversight framework established at EU level, enabling customers to make cashless euro payments to anywhere in the EU and to a number of non-EU countries, currently covering 41 countries, in a fast, safe and efficient way, as in their own country; recalls that the supervision package aims to create a more integrated, efficient and competitive financial system, thereby enhancing the attractiveness of EU market infrastructures;

4. Underlines the reliance of euro area banks on US dollar wholesale funding; warns that this may expose the euro area in times of stress to a possible weaponisation of dollar swap lines;

4. Underlines the dominance of foreign financial market infrastructures, ranging from retail payments reliant on international card schemes to wholesale transactions dependant on systems provided by US corporations; stresses that a euro that relies on third-country payment rails remains structurally exposed to extraterritorial leverage;

5. Stresses that such dependencies expose EU citizens and firms to extraterritorial application of sanctions from non-EU countries, or to the threat thereof; considers the fact that members of the International Criminal Court have been blocked from accessing basic banking services to be a regrettable illustration of those vulnerabilities;

5. Underlines the reliance of euro area banks on US dollar wholesale funding; warns that this may expose the euro area in times of stress to a possible instrumental geo-economic use of US dollar swap lines;

6. Agrees, therefore, with the ECB President on the need for the euro to ‘move from being “in between” to being a full international currency’; underlines that a stronger role for the euro internationally would help insulate Europe’s economy from swings in foreign exchange rates, secure better financing conditions for the European economy and expand protections from foreign measures;

6. Stresses that the above dependencies expose EU citizens and firms to extraterritorial application of sanctions from non-EU countries, or to the threat thereof; considers the fact that European individuals, including members of the International Criminal Court, have been blocked from accessing basic banking services to be a regrettable illustration of those vulnerabilities; stresses the fact that strengthening the EU’s economic resilience and policy autonomy should become a strategic objective of the EU;

7. Considers, in this context, that the internationalisation of the euro is about strengthening its role within a more multipolar international monetary system;

7. Considers that strengthening the international role of the euro can generate benefits both in the short and long term; underlines that a stronger role for the euro internationally would help insulate Europe’s economy from swings in foreign exchange rates, secure better financing conditions for the European economy and for the green and digital transition, and expand protections from foreign measures, thereby increasing the EU’s macroeconomic autonomy;

8. Stresses that a stronger global role for the euro will not emerge through market forces alone, but requires a coherent strategy by which public authorities establish the conditions for its wider use; observes that the US and China are actively pursuing such strategies in support of their currencies;

8. Considers that the main levers for strengthening the euro’s international role would also mitigate the adverse appreciation effects of stronger euro demand by absorbing inflows more efficiently and reducing exchange rate risk and hedging costs;

9. Stresses that any strategy to strengthen the international role of the euro must be pursued on the basis of a clear-eyed assessment of both its benefits and its costs; notes the distinction between passive safe-haven currencies and full international currencies; stresses that passive safe-haven currencies may face appreciation pressures driven by external shocks rather than domestic economic fundamentals, with potentially adverse effects on competitiveness, inflation and monetary policy; recognises, by contrast, that full international currency status confers significant advantages, including, precisely, insulation from exchange rate volatility, lower borrowing costs, geopolitical leverage and seigniorage benefits, while also entailing structural obligations and constraints, notably the capacity to provide safe, liquid and credible assets at scale to global markets; agrees, therefore, with the ECB President on the need for the euro to ‘move from being an “in between” to being a full international currency’;

10. Stresses that a stronger global role for the euro will not emerge through market forces alone, but requires a coherent strategy by which public authorities establish the conditions and policies for its wider use; observes that the US and China are actively pursuing such strategies in support of their currencies; stresses, however, that the EU should develop its own distinct approach without emulating the specific models of those countries;

11. Is concerned that the economic and monetary union’s lack of ability to speak as a unified voice with international institutions can hold back the international role of the euro;

Strengthening the economic foundations of the euro

12. Notes that deep, liquid and competitive financial markets are key to strengthening the international role of a currency; stresses, accordingly, that the internationalisation of the euro depends on the further development of EU capital markets and genuine cross-border equity market integration; considers that European savings should be channelled more effectively towards investment within the Union rather than being predominantly intermediated through US capital markets; regards deeper and more integrated capital markets as a prerequisite for the euro internationalisation strategy; calls for the timely completion of the savings and investments union and related policy initiatives that will deliver a globally competitive toolbox;

13. Stresses that European savings should be mobilised towards productive investments in the EU through integrated and competitive capital markets, greater retail investor participation, appropriate investment incentives and a stable regulatory framework; considers, however, that the EU’s core challenge is not a shortage of financial capital, but a lack of state capacity to direct it towards common strategic priorities at the necessary pace and scale; stresses that this requires a framework that provides not only incentives, but also the necessary discipline;

14. Calls, in line with the ECB President’s and the Bundesbank President’s statements, for the development of a deep and liquid common European safe asset to help strengthen the euro’s international role; points out that EU safe assets can provide high-quality collateral in international repo markets and offer a euro-denominated liquidity buffer alongside public backstops; agrees with Mario Draghi that, within the EU, such assets would reduce financing costs, weaken the bank-sovereign nexus and help create a genuine European bond yield curve, which would deepen capital market integration by providing a reliable benchmark for price formation in financial products;

15. Stresses that an EU safe asset can only fulfil these functions if issuance reaches a scale sufficient to create a deep and liquid market; underlines that this could be achieved through new common issuance to finance genuine European public goods; emphasises the need for such financing to be allocated and managed at EU level, with a clear repayment mechanism established from the outset, through predictable and credible EU own resources without mutualisation of national debt; stresses that any discussion on potential EU safe assets must fully respect Member States’ fiscal responsibilities, avoid permanent debt mutualisation and minimise moral hazard risks;

16. Stresses that the international role of the euro is underpinned by sustainable and sound fiscal and structural growth-enhancing policies based on a commitment to credible fiscal rules to maintain the stability and integrity of the euro; acknowledges that high sovereign debt levels can weaken fiscal credibility, causing investors to become more sensitive to the fundamentals of the economies concerned and thereby act as a catalyst for potential financial crises;

17. Encourages EU initiatives that facilitate the inclusion of EU supranational bonds in major sovereign bond indices, thereby lowering their yield premium and supporting a deeper and more liquid market; advocates integrating the European Stability Mechanism into the EU legal and budgetary framework as a step towards strengthening the EU’s financial architecture and reinforcing the international role of the euro;

Trade, international payments and settlement

✦ Adds hedging to the activities market participants should be able to carry out in euro across cross-border value chains.

9.18. Considers that strengthening the international role of the euro requires its wider use across cross-border value chains, meaning not only trade invoicing, but also the ability of market participants across jurisdictions to borrow, lendlend, hedge and settle in euro throughout those chains;

✦ Replaces calls on the Commission and ECB with paragraphs on trade and the euro, linking EU investment programmes to euro invoicing, incentives for clean technology exports and energy and defence procurement, digital payments infrastructure, the digital euro, swap lines and EU safe assets.

10. Calls on the Commission to make access to EU investment programmes conditional on euro invoicing across value chains, promote the use of the euro in trade agreements, and work with industry actors to strengthen its use in invoicing, procurement and payments;

19. Notes that the global prominence of a currency is directly linked to the role that the issuing country has in global trade; stresses that the EU, as one of the world’s largest trading blocs, would benefit from its currency having a strengthened international role; underlines that stimulating the choice of the euro in trade will reduce exchange rate risk and other currency-related costs, especially for European small and medium-sized enterprises;

11. Emphasises that borrowing, lending and settling in euro requires a sovereign European public digital payments and settlement infrastructure ensuring interoperability and speed in cross-border, cross-currency transactions, with a European central bank digital currency (CBDC) lying at its core;

20. Calls on the Commission to link EU investment programmes with euro invoicing across value chains, actively promote the use of the euro in a way compatible with EU State aid rules in trade agreements and public procurement, and work with industry actors to strengthen its use in invoicing, procurement and payments;

12. Strongly supports the establishment of a European CBDC designed without undue restrictions on its retail use and without precluding its wholesale functionality; welcomes, in this regard, the ECB’s wholesale initiatives, notably Pontes and Appia; supports their more rapid implementation;

21. Encourages the Commission to explore targeted incentives for the pricing and settlement in euro of exports of clean technology capital goods, in particular where this can support strategic clean technology value chains and the EU’s climate and industrial objectives; points out that a higher share of energy and defence public procurement contracts denominated and settled in euro could enhance the international role of the single currency; is therefore supportive of policies furthering that goal;

13. Stresses that reinforcing the euro’s role across cross-border value chains requires the further development of bilateral swap lines with EU Member States, which remain currently restricted; points out that expanding the Eurosystem’s international liquidity backstops to partner jurisdictions, including in the Global South, can help safeguard euro liquidity abroad and thereby enhance the offshore use of the euro;

22. Emphasises that borrowing, lending and settling in euro requires a sovereign European public digital payments and settlement infrastructure ensuring interoperability and speed in cross-border, cross-currency transactions, with a European central bank digital currency (CBDC) in its wholesale functionality lying at its core; considers that the digital euro is the foundational infrastructure layer upon which euro internationalisation depends, and reaffirms its full support for its rollout as a priority instrument of European monetary sovereignty; calls on the ECB to ensure an adequate balance between financial innovation and stability; welcomes, in this regard, the ECB’s wholesale initiatives, notably Pontes and Appia; supports their orderly and more rapid implementation;

Towards EU safe assets

23. Underlines the importance of interoperability with other international settlement and payment systems; recognises that the digital euro in its retail function could also contribute to strengthening the euro’s international role by eliminating frictions and undue costs in remittance flows, creating a significant bottom-up economic incentive for resident and foreign households to adopt it and organically expanding the euro’s global footprint;

14. Calls for the development of a deep and liquid common European safe asset as a key precondition for strengthening the euro’s international role; points out that EU safe assets can provide high-quality collateral in international repo markets and offer a euro-denominated liquidity buffer alongside public backstops; underlines that, within the EU, such assets would reduce financing costs, help create a genuine European bond yield curve, which would deepen capital market integration, and weaken the bank-sovereign nexus;

24. Stresses that reinforcing the euro’s role across cross-border value chains requires the further expansion of bilateral swap lines with EU Member States and internationally, which remain currently restricted; points out that expanding the Eurosystem’s international liquidity backstops to partner jurisdictions can help safeguard euro liquidity abroad, as well as financial stability within the euro area, and thereby enhance the offshore use of the euro; highlights that liquidity lines, such as repo lines, are not substitutes for permanent foreign currency swap lines, which are essential for fostering deep-seated trust in the euro’s global availability; welcomes the ECB’s enhanced Eurosystem repo facility for central banks (EUREP), which provides standing access to euro liquidity lines, in principle, for all international central banks, while noting that it benefits central banks already holding euro reserves rather than those in the process of building them; calls on the ECB to better address, in its annual report to Parliament, the criteria applied to determine eligibility for swap line arrangements, and to assess whether those criteria adequately serve the objective of euro internationalisation, including, where relevant, with respect to the Global South countries; acknowledges that Ukraine has no ECB swap line and that a swap line would help reduce Ukraine’s foreign exchange strains;

15. Stresses that an EU safe asset can only fulfil these functions if issuance reaches a scale sufficient to create a deep and liquid market amounting to 20% of the EU's GDP; underlines that this requires both new common issuance to finance European public goods and the exchange of part of the outstanding stock of national sovereign debt into common EU bonds;

16. Supports the establishment of a European debt agency, anchored in the EU's budgetary framework, that would consolidate existing borrowing programmes and future common issuance under one roof; considers that this would lower issuance costs across different legal regimes and help develop a more liquid market;

Financial stability

✦ Replaces a warning about US dollar-backed stablecoins with a warning about stablecoins backed by third-country currencies reinforcing those currencies' dominance.

17.25. Underlines that USstablecoins dollar-backedbacked stablecoinsby third-country currencies actively reinforce the international dominance of thethose dollar,currencies by increasing demand for USrelated debt instruments and further boosting thetheir use of the dollar in international transactions;

✦ Drops the call for the Commission to clarify that multi-issuance stablecoin schemes are not permissible under the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation, and adds that such schemes create potential new financial stability risks.

18.26. Warns that the circulation in the EU of fully fungible US dollar-denominated stablecoins issued by both EU and non-EU entities creates potential new financial stability risks by incentivising the concentration of reserves in the United States while shifting redemption pressure to the EU; strongly urges the Commission to clarify that such multi-issuance schemes are not permissible under the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation1;

✦ Adds that the EU should pursue a balanced approach safeguarding financial stability while enabling responsible innovation and competitive European digital financial markets.

19.27. Warns of the risks to the EU'sEU’s financial stability that could arise from a correction in highly leveraged markets, including the AI sector in the United States; stresses that such shocks may be amplified through EU banks’ reliance on short-term US dollar wholesale funding; underlines the need to monitor closely, beyond net current account balances, gross capital flows as a source of macroeconomic imbalances; stresses that the EU should pursue a balanced approach that safeguards financial stability while enabling responsible innovation and the development of competitive European digital financial markets;

✦ Drops paragraphs on industrial policy, an EU sovereignty fund and a joint euro internationalisation strategy for approval, and adds a call for a joint strategy to Parliament and the Council by the end of 2026.

Investment for an EU industrial policy

28. Calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the ECB, to present, by the end of 2026, a joint euro internationalisation strategy to Parliament and the Council;

20. Considers that the EU's core challenge is not a shortage of financial capital, but a lack of state capacity to direct it towards common strategic priorities at the necessary pace and scale; stresses that this requires an industrial policy that provides not only incentives, but also the necessary discipline;

21. Supports the establishment of an EU sovereignty fund as an effective instrument to reduce reliance on US asset managers and redirect European savings from US equity markets towards strategic investment in the EU;

22. Calls on the Commission and the ECB to present, by the end of 2026, a joint euro internationalisation strategy to Parliament and the Council for approval;

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29. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

✦ Adds an explanatory statement on the report's aims, the euro's passive safe haven role, EU dependencies, the need for a strategy, safe assets, payments infrastructure, stablecoins and financial stability.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The international monetary and financial system is undergoing a gradual yet profound transformation. This report argues that the time has come for EU public institutions to play an active role in strengthening the global position of the euro, with the ambition—echoing the words of ECB President Lagarde—of transforming it from an “in-between” currency into a fully fledged international one.

The report seeks to identify the conditions under which that transition can succeed.

The rapporteur contends that one of the euro’s core weaknesses lies precisely in its current role as a passive safe haven: it absorbs shocks without Europe fully capturing the corresponding economic, financial and geopolitical benefits. By contrast, the principal levers for strengthening the euro’s international role—most notably a larger and more continuous supply of common EU safe assets and the wider use of the euro in international transactions—would also help mitigate the adverse appreciation pressures resulting from stronger global demand.

Europe’s dependencies are stark, and their consequences are increasingly being felt by European citizens. The fact that individuals in Europe, including members of the International Criminal Court, have been denied access to basic banking services is a regrettable illustration of these weaknesses.

An overarching objective of the report is therefore to overcome the current lack of strategic direction in the EU’s approach to euro internationalisation, particularly when contrasted with the coordinated strategies pursued by the United States and China. Although the Commission and the ECB have launched a range of initiatives, none of them—individually or collectively—amounts to a strategy. A genuine strategy requires more than an inventory of measures: it must set clear priorities, match instruments to objectives, make explicit policy choices, and include a governance framework that ensures accountability for delivering results. Accordingly, the report calls on the Commission, in close cooperation with the ECB, to develop a comprehensive strategy for strengthening the international role of the euro and to submit it to the European Parliament and the Council for political scrutiny and regular review.

Turning to the substantive conditions for strengthening the euro’s international role, the report starts from the premise that this requires its wider use across cross-border value chains. This means moving beyond a thin layer of trade invoicing towards a system in which market participants across jurisdictions can borrow, lend, hedge and settle in euro throughout those chains.

No currency can achieve that without an abundant supply of safe and liquid assets denominated in that currency. Safe assets can serve as high-quality collateral in international repo markets and provide a euro-denominated liquidity buffer alongside public backstops. This is a foundational lesson of the dollar’s dominance: the depth and liquidity of the US Treasury market are inseparable from the dollar’s international role.

We are therefore particularly pleased that, for the first time in an ECON report, the text includes a political call for the large-scale issuance of common EU debt to finance European public goods. This reflects an emerging agreement among pro-European political forces that a genuine common EU safe asset is not merely a financial instrument, but a precondition for European sovereignty.

Building on this objective, the report also supports bringing the ESM within the EU legal but also importantly budgetary framework. Doing so would strengthen the perceived permanence and creditworthiness of its obligations, contribute to the depth and liquidity of the European safe-asset market, and provide a clearer institutional template for future joint financing operations.

Beyond common public debt issuance, a genuinely sovereign and interoperable European payments and settlement infrastructure remains essential. The adoption of the EP position on Digital Euro has been a milestone. Yet Europe has not developed a cross-border wholesale central bank digital currency platform comparable to China’s initiatives. Developing interoperable arrangements between the euro area and other major monetary jurisdictions will therefore be an important strategic challenge for European policymakers over the coming decade. The report accordingly places particular emphasis on interoperability and wholesale functionality and calls for a more rapid completion of the Appia and Pontes initiatives.

Financial stability considerations run throughout the report. The rapid growth of US dollar-backed stablecoins is not a neutral technological development: it reinforces the dollar’s international dominance by increasing demand for US debt and extending the currency’s reach into new forms of digital transactions. A particular concern is the circulation within the EU of fully fungible, multi-issued dollar-denominated stablecoins. Because tokens issued by different entities are interchangeable and redeemable at par in the EU, reserves may be concentrated in the United States while redemption pressures fall disproportionately on EU-based issuers in periods of stress.

At the same time, European investors have substantial exposure to highly leveraged and potentially overvalued markets, including the US artificial-intelligence sector, while euro-area banks have become increasingly reliant on US dollar wholesale funding. The report therefore calls for financial-stability surveillance to focus not only on net current-account positions, but also on gross capital flows and the vulnerabilities arising from large cross-border financial exposures.

No single proposal in this report can, on its own, transform the euro’s international standing. Progress will depend on the combined effect of sovereign digital payments infrastructure, a deep and liquid common safe asset, the Savings and Investments Union, a coherent regulatory approach to stablecoins, and a genuine European industrial and investment strategy. We therefore look forward to the presentation, by the end of 2026, of a joint strategy for the internationalisation of the euro to the European Parliament and the Council, ensuring that this agenda receives the political ownership, coordination and follow-up it requires.