What changed

A. whereas, according to Eurostat, EU annual inflation stood at 2.42.5 % in August 2025 and euro area inflation at 2.22.1 % in SeptemberOctober 2025, as measured by the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP);prices;

B. whereas the ECB’s inflation target has shifted over time from a reference value of ‘below 2%’ to an objective of ‘below, but close to 2%’, to a symmetric target of ‘around 2%’;

B. whereas, according to the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey of October 2025, median expectations for inflation are still above 2 %;

C. whereas the marginal lending facility and deposit facility rate have formed a tight corridor around the interest rate on the main refinancing operations;

C. whereas the ECB’s inflation target has shifted over time from a reference value of ‘below 2 %’ to an objective of ‘below, but close to 2 %’, to a symmetric target of ‘2 %’ over the medium term;

D. whereas the ECB’s boundaries in purchasing government debt have been widening steadily, from the Securities Market Programme (SMP) to Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs), the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) and the Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI)1;

D. whereas the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility rate have formed a tight corridor around the interest rate on the main refinancing operations;

E. whereas reinvestments under the asset purchase programme (APP) were discontinued as of July 2023, and in the case of the PEPP as of December 2024;

E. whereas the ECB’s boundaries in purchasing government debt have been widening steadily, from the Securities Market Programme to Outright Monetary Transactions, as well as the Public Sector Purchase Programme, the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) and the Transmission Protection Instrument3;

F. whereas reinvestments under the asset purchase programme (APP) were discontinued as of July 2023, and in the case of the PEPP as of December 2024, thus setting a path for a reduction of the ECB’s balance sheet size;

G. whereas deflation can be a benign consequence of technological progress;

3. Highlights that the ECB is accountable to Parliament; stresses that the ECB must take decisions to fulfil its mandate without political interference; notes that central banks should be independent but not isolated;

4. Notes the importance of transparency for accountability; invites the ECB to make efforts to enhance instruments that improve transparency, such as benchmarks, insights in its model-based assumptions and the Governing Council’s assessments of inflation developments;

4. Notes the importance of transparency for accountability and that strong institutional design and accountability mechanisms are necessary; welcomes in this regard the arrangements in the form of an exchange of letters between the European Parliament and the ECB on structuring the practices for interaction in the area of central banking;

5. Emphasises that political independence requires that the ECB refrain from taking political actions;

5. Invites the ECB to make efforts to enhance instruments that improve transparency, such as benchmarks, insights in its model-based assumptions and the Governing Council’s assessments of inflation developments;

6. Welcomes the independence of the ECB as enshrined in Article 130 TFEU; emphasises that independence requires the ECB’s actions to remain apolitical;

7.8. Expresses concern at the high levels of inflation in recent years;the notesyears thatfollowing the ECBCOVID-19 reactedpandemic, tooinstigated slowlyby supply shocks; notes that a timely return to theprice surgestability in inflation;this period would have been warranted through ECB decisions; invites the ECB to thoroughly assess the causes of these high levels of inflation;inflation in its annual report, along with a set of policy recommendations to draw the right conclusions from any future inflationary crises;

8. Acknowledges the continued risk of a resurgence in inflation; underlines the importance of not easing monetary policy too rapidly;

9. Welcomes the decline in inflation from the rates of 2022-2023 as well as the recent inflation stabilisation; notes that the ECB has cut the deposit rate by 200 basis points between June 2024 and June 2025; acknowledges the continued risk of a resurgence in inflation; underlines that further steps towards easing monetary policy should be prudent, data-driven and guided by price stability;

9.10. Emphasises in particular the potentially distortive impact of geopolitical uncertaintyuncertainty, energy security risks and trade disruptions on price developments;

10. Notes that a symmetric target of around 2 % is adduced as a reason to encourage inflation in times of near-zero inflation;

11. Invites the ECB to assess the appropriateness of its symmetric target, also taking qualitative factors into account; notes the 2025 monetary policy strategy assessment and encourages the ECB to periodically conduct such assessments;

11. Invites the ECB to revise its symmetric target in favour of a more qualitative framework for protecting price stability, where price stability is defined as that state in which expected changes in the general price level do not effectively alter business or household decisions;

12. Stresses that the ECB’s purchase programmes are unconventional monetary policy tools that have side effects; notes in particular that asset purchase programmes can distort price signals; notes that the ECB started shrinking its balance sheet only very gradually; supports the ECB in further diminishing its direct role in purchasing securities; encourages the ECB to gradually phase out its government bond purchasing programmes; regrets the impact of the fiscal position on the ECB’s fulfilment of its primary mandate;

12. Indicates that price stability, as mentioned in the mandate, could be interpreted as stability of the price level as opposed to the current interpretation of inflation stability;

13. Regrets that the ECB’s short-term lending schemes have largely displaced the private interbank funding market since the financial crisis of 2008; calls on the ECB to avoid paying banks deposit rates that are above market rates, as this runs counter to the principle of an open market economy with free competition, and to remove any obstacle hindering the recovery of short-term unsecured interbank markets;

13. Notes that deflation can be the benign consequence of technological progress; recognises the ECB’s role in avoiding protracted periods of deflation due to deficient developments in the money supply;

14. Emphasises the importance of ensuring high standards on quality requirements for collateral in lending arrangements with the ECB; recognises that collateral standards can be used as a tool for monetary policy transmission;

14. Stresses that the ECB’s purchase programmes are unconventional policies applicable only during crisis periods; notes that the ECB started shrinking its balance sheet only very gradually; supports the ECB in further diminishing its direct role in purchasing securities;

15. Supports the ECB in its efforts to include owner-occupied housing in its monitoring of price indices for reasons of both representativeness and comparability across countries in the euro area, contingent on a harmonised and methodologically robust approach;

15. Regrets that the ECB’s short-term lending schemes have largely displaced the private interbank funding market; calls on the ECB to avoid paying banks deposit rates that are above market rates, as this runs counter to the principle of an open market with free competition;

Secondary objective: supporting the general economic policies in the Union

16. Emphasises the importance of ensuring high standards on quality requirements for collateral in lending arrangements with the ECB;

16. Notes that the ECB, pursuant to Article 127(1) TFEU, must support the general economic policies of the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 TEU, as long as its commitment to price stability remains unaffected;

17. Supports the ECB in its efforts to include owner-occupied housing in its monitoring of price indices for reasons of both representativeness and comparability across countries in the euro area;

Secondary objectives

19.18. Highlights, in the context of the Economic and Monetary Union and the EU economic governance framework, the importance of sound and sustainable public finances in withstanding a high interesthigh-interest rate environment;environment, in complementing the ECB’s efforts to keep inflation low, in maintaining a stable economy and in remaining resilient to future economic and financial shocks;

20. Calls on the ECB to drastically diminish its role in sovereign debt markets; regrets the inhibitive impact of the fiscal position on the ECB’s fulfilment of its primary mandate;

19. Takes note of diverging TARGET2 balances stemming from cross-border transactions; notes the potential risks of TARGET2 balances becoming structural and suggests that non-monetary policy adjustments should be considered;

21. Expresses concern about diverging TARGET2 balances as an unintended consequence of the ample reserve regime; notes that it is not the task of the ECB to finance capital outflows or persistent trade deficits;

20. Underlines that the ECB should consider the potential effects of climate change from a price stability perspective and from within its mandate;

22. Underlines the political nature of addressing climate change and protecting the environment;

21. Notes that the concept of market neutrality is related to the principle of ‘an open market economy with free competition’; invites the ECB, while respecting its independence, to address market failures and ensure the efficient allocation of resources over a long-term horizon, while remaining as apolitical as possible, respecting market neutrality in several instances; highlights that such decisions must not be made at the expense of achieving the ECB’s mandate;

24. Welcomes the ongoing short-term (Pontes) and long-term (Appia) tracks for distributed ledger technology projects for wholesale central bank money settlement;

25. Stresses the importance of maintaining the role of cash; takes note of the ongoing discussions on the proposal on the legal tender;

26. Calls on the ECB to intensify the monitoring of crypto-assets, such as stablecoins;

26. Expresses its concern at the consecutive losses made by the ECB in 2023 and 2024 due to interest rate risk;

28. Welcomes the Republic of Bulgaria as the 21st member of the euro area, as of 1 January 2026;

29. Expresses concern about the temporary outage of the ECB’s real-time gross settlement system T2 and T2S in February 2025; invites the ECB to closely monitor and ensure the proper functioning of the settlement systems;

30. Expresses its concern at the consecutive losses made by the ECB in 2023 and 2024 due to interest rate risk; notes that these losses have not compromised the operational capacity of the Eurosystem to implement its monetary policy;

28. Points to the need for a high degree of ambition in the work and the follow-up of the ECB High-Level Task Force on Simplification;

32. Supports the ECB in its efforts to improve financial literacy in the EU;

33. Welcomes the ECB’s commitment to simplification efforts, such as with the creation of the ECB High-Level Task Force on Simplification; points to the need for a high degree of ambition in the work and the follow-up of the task force and welcomes the ECB’s in-depth discussions with Parliament;

34. Calls on the ECB to foster open and constructive internal dialogue; calls for the further enhancement of staff representation frameworks and the ECB’s internal whistleblowing framework;

35. Reiterates that the nominations to the ECB’s Executive Board should be gender-balanced, merit and ability-based, with shortlists submitted to Parliament, and that people of all genders should have equal opportunities to serve as governors of their respective national central banks;

36. Invites the ESCB to continue and strengthen its dialogues with national parliaments, which it believes would strengthen the legitimacy and policies of the ESCB;