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From · report parliamentary committee draft · 2026-01-20 CONT-PR-778123 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2024, Section III – Commission and executive agencies and the ninth, tenth and eleventh European Development Funds

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To · Plenary report · 2026-04-10 A-10-2026-0085 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2024, Section III – Commission and executive agencies and the ninth, tenth and eleventh European Development Funds

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1. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

– having regard to the statement of assurance as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2024, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to the Council’s recommendation of ~~...~~17 February 2026 on discharge to be given to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2024 ~~(0000/2025~~(05749/2026 – ~~C100000/2025),~~C100037/2026),

– having regard to Articles 317, 318 and 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 101 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality,

– having regard to the letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control ~~(A100000/2026),~~(A10-0085/2026),

1. Grants the Commission discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year ~~2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Commission discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year~~ 2024;

2. Sets out its observations in the resolution forming an integral part of the decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2024, Section III – Commission and executive agencies and the ninth, tenth and eleventh European Development Funds;

2. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

– having regard to the Council’s recommendation of ~~...~~17 February 2026 on discharge to be given to the executive agencies in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2024 ~~(0000/2025~~(05752/2026 – ~~C100000/2025),~~C100050/2026),

– having regard to Articles 317, 318 and 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 101 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality,

– having regard to the letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control ~~(A10-0000/2026),~~(A10-0085/2026),

1. Grants the Director of the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Executive Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Director of the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Executive Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024;

3. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

– having regard to Articles 317, 318 and 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 101 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control ~~(A10-0000/2026),~~(A10-0085/2026),

1. Grants the Director of the European Education and Culture Executive Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Executive Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Director of the European Education and Culture Executive Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Executive Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024;

4. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

– having regard to Articles 317, 318 and 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 101 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control ~~(A10-0000/2026),~~(A10-0085/2026),

1. Grants the acting Director of the European Innovation Council and SMEs Executive Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Executive Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the acting Director of the European Innovation Council and SMEs Executive Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Executive Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024;

5. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

– having regard to Articles 317, 318 and 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 101 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control ~~(A10-0000/2026),~~(A10-0085/2026),

1. Grants the Director of the European Research Council Executive Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Executive Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Director of the European Research Council Executive Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Executive Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024;

6. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

– having regard to Articles 317, 318 and 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 101 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control ~~(A10-0000/2026),~~(A10-0085/2026),

1. Grants the Director of the European Health and Digital Executive Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Executive Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Director of the European Health and Digital Executive Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Executive Agency’s budget for the financial year 2024;

7. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

– having regard to Articles 317, 318 and 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 101 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control ~~(A10-0000/2026),~~(A10-0085/2026),

1. Grants the Director of the European Research Executive Agency discharge in relation to the implementation of the Executive Agency’s budget for the financial year ~~2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Director of the European Research Executive Agency discharge in respect of the implementation of the Executive Agency’s budget for the financial year~~ 2024;

8. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

– having regard to the Council’s recommendations of ~~...~~17 February 2026 on discharge to be given to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the operations of the European Development Funds for the financial year 2024 ~~(00000/2025 – C100000/2025, 00000/2025 – C100000/2025, 00000/2025~~(05886/2026 – ~~C100000/2025),~~C100051/2026),

– having regard to the Commission’s report on the follow-up to the discharge for the 2023 financial year (COM(2025)0373), and to the detailed replies to the specific requests made by the European Parliament,

– having regard to Rule 101 and the third indent of Rule 102 of, and Annex V to, its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the ~~opinions~~opinion of the Committee on ~~Foreign Affairs, the Committee on~~ Development, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality,

– having regard to the ~~letter~~report ~~from~~of the Committee on ~~Agriculture and~~Budgetary ~~Rural~~Control ~~Development,~~(A10-0085/2026),

~~– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0000/2026),~~

1. Grants the Commission discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the ninth, tenth and eleventh European Development Funds for the financial year 2024;

1. Grants the Commission discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the ninth, tenth and eleventh European Development Funds for the financial year 2024 / Postpones its decision on granting the Commission discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the ninth, tenth and eleventh European Development Funds for the financial year 2024;

9. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

– having regard to Articles 317, 318 and 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 101 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control ~~(A10-0000/2026),~~(A10-0085/2026),

1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year ~~2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year~~ 2024;

10. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

– having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou (Benin) on 23 June 2000 and amended in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) on 22 June 2010,

– having regard to Rule 101 and the third indent of Rule 102 of, and Annex V to, its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the ~~letter~~report ~~from~~of the Committee on ~~Agriculture and~~Budgetary ~~Rural~~Control ~~Development,~~(A10-0085/2026),

~~– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0000/2026),~~

1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the ninth, tenth and eleventh European Development Funds for the financial year 2024;

1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the ninth, tenth and eleventh European Development Funds for the financial year 2024 / Postpones the closure of the accounts of the ninth, tenth and eleventh European Development Funds for the financial year 2024;

2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Council, the Commission, the Court of Auditors and the European Investment Bank, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

11. MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

– having regard to Rule 101 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control ~~(A10-0000/2026),~~(A10-0085/2026),

A. whereas the eleventh EDF has reached its final stage as its sunset clause came into effect on 31 December 2020; whereas, however, specific contracts for existing financing agreements were signed until 31 December 2023, and the implementation of the ongoing projects funded by the EDF will continue until their final completion;

Political priorities

1. Stresses the importance of respect for the Union’s fundamental values and principles as defined in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); in the framework of the discharge process puts special emphasis on the ~~principles~~principle of the rule of law as set out in Article 2 TEU, the principle of sound financial management as set out in Article 317 TFEU and the combatting of fraud and the protection of the financial interests of the Union as set out in Article 325 TFEU;

2. Recalls that respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights is a precondition for sound financial management of the Union budget and that the Commission has a wide range of instruments at its disposal to ensure respect for these principles; notes with serious concern the continued backsliding with regard to the rule of law ~~backsliding,~~and systemic corruption and attacks on fundamental rights in several Member States, with direct implications for the sound management of Union ~~funds;~~funds, notes that the lack of Union funds has an alarming effect on the provision of public services; highlights in particular the deteriorating situation in Hungary, marked by widespread corruption and entrenched oligarchic ~~networks;~~networks, which requires continued attention; deplores that, while problems persist or worsen, the pressure exerted by the Commission to induce meaningful reforms has diminished as the amounts of funds that remain frozen are decreasing; stresses that the Commission needs to move beyond monitoring and to make full and consistent use of the available instruments to suspend or protect Union funding where rule of law deficiencies affect sound financial ~~management,~~management in ~~Hungary~~all ~~and~~Member inStates concerned; stresses that respect for the rule of law must apply to all ~~other~~participants ~~Member~~in ~~States~~Union ~~concerned;~~programmes, including third countries;

3. Welcomes that the European Court of Auditors (the Court) for the financial year 2024 has again issued a clean opinion concerning the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of revenue; at the same time, deplores that the Court has had to issue an adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of Union budget expenditure, for the 6th consecutive year, and a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of expenditure under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF);

4. Notes that the Court highlights several issues in ~~their~~its Annual Report for 2024 that give cause for serious concern; welcomes that the overall error rate has declined from 5,6 % for 2023 to 3,6 % for 2024; stresses, however, that this decrease should be interpreted with caution, as it may not necessarily reflect an improvement in the financial management or in the effectiveness of control systems but could also be influenced by contextual factors such as the end of COVID-19 related emergency spending, a comparatively low level of budgetary implementation in 2024 and the early stage of implementation of the 2021-2027 MFF; is particularly concerned that while the error rate for the heading ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’ has decreased from 9,3 % to 5,7 %, it is still ~~considerably~~well above the materiality threshold of 2 %;% with the Court continuing to identify weaknesses in control and detection systems on both the Commission’s and the Member States’ side; expresses concern that the recurrent nature of these findings risks normalising the current level of error in cohesion policy; expresses serious concern in this context about proposals to introduce a new spending model under the next MFF that would rely even more heavily on Member States’ control systems, while the underlying causes of persistently high error rates do not yet appear to have been adequately addressed; recalls that cohesion policy remains a fundamental instrument of the Union for promoting economic, social and territorial convergence and supporting balanced development across regions, and stresses that any future reform of spending models must preserve the objectives, predictability and dedicated budgetary framework of cohesion policy;

5. Expresses deep concern about the persistent shortcomings in the implementation of the RRF; notes that the Court has issued a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of RRF expenditure for the third consecutive year and that it estimates the minimum financial impact of its findings to be above the materiality threshold; underlines the serious audit and control deficiencies identified by the Court, which continue to undermine assurance over the regular use of RRF funds; is particularly concerned about the significant accountability gap resulting from the lack of reliable and complete information on final beneficiaries of Union funding, due in particular to the Commission’s interpretation of the concept of ‘final recipient’ under the RRF, which contradicts the existing legislation; considers that, taken together, these shortcomings in the RRF would justify a refusal to grant discharge for the implementation of the RRF in 2024 if the discharge authority were able to take this decision separately; recalls that Parliament has repeatedly raised serious concerns in previous discharge resolutions regarding the RRF, including on the transparency of final ~~beneficiaries, and therefore~~beneficiaries; ~~demands~~considers that the Commission ~~provide, within six months, a complete and meaningful list of final~~should ~~beneficiaries,~~start ~~excluding~~infringement ~~merely~~proceedings; ~~intermediary~~also ~~entities~~considers ~~such~~that asthe ~~ministries~~Commission orshould ~~managing~~act ~~authorities;~~without ~~states~~undue ~~that,~~delay ~~failing~~and ~~this,~~fully ~~Parliament~~exercise ~~will~~its ~~bring~~powers ~~the~~as ~~matter~~guardian ~~before~~of the ~~European~~Treaties ~~Court~~against ofMember ~~Justice~~States to ensure that citizens and stakeholders have full access to this information; should it fail to do so, Parliament will consider all appropriate measures within its prerogatives to ensure compliance, including legal action;

6. Notes with concern that the current implementation rate for the cohesion funds is significantly lower than the implementation rate during the previous MFF 2014-2020, which coincides with the fact that only around 50 % of funds under the RRF had been disbursed by the end of 2024, implying that the remaining 50 % of the funds must be disbursed before then end of the RRF implementation period in December 2026; notes with concern that the total amount of outstanding EUUnion bonds rose to EUR 578,2 billion at the end of 2024 and notes with concern the Court’s estimates that this amount could reach EUR 900 billion by the end of 2027, which ~~may~~will place a significant burden on future MFFs due to the associated interest payments and principal repayments; notes that the sustainability of Union debt must be factored into all future budgetary decisions;

7. Stresses that transparency is not an abstract governance principle but a core element of an effective control environment; underlines that incomplete documentation, inconsistent registration practices or reliance on informal communication channels directly weaken audit trails and hinder the discharge authority’s capacity to assess legality, regularity and sound financial management; in that regard regrets that there have been numerous examples over the last years where the Commission failed to live up to reasonable standards of transparency asand ~~also~~takes ~~stated~~note inof ~~the~~case ~~European~~T-36/23, ~~Court~~Stevi ofand ~~Justice~~The ~~case~~New ~~concerning~~York Times v Commission; recalls that under Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 text messages ~~between~~sent or received by Union officials will only be qualified as documents if they concern Union policy or decisions; emphasises that the Commission ~~President~~should ~~and~~ensure ~~the~~transparency ~~CEO~~practices ofmeet ~~Pfizer;~~high ~~recalls~~governance standards to guarantee that the ~~General~~discharge ~~Court~~authority ~~annulled~~can ~~the~~fully ~~Commission’s~~assess ~~refusal~~legality, ~~decision~~regularity, inand sound financial management of the ~~New~~Union ~~York~~budget; ~~Times/Stevi~~notes ~~case~~the ~~concerning~~importance ~~access~~of totimely ~~relevant~~responses ~~text~~to ~~messages,~~access-to-documents ~~underlining~~requests; encourages the ~~need~~Commission ~~for~~to ~~credible~~strengthen ~~searches~~its ~~and~~procedures ~~robust~~to ~~record-keeping~~ensure ~~for~~that ~~ephemeral~~oversight ~~communications;~~bodies iscan ~~similarly~~fully ~~concerned~~assess legality, regularity and sound financial management; considers that failures to ensure proper documentation and transparency at senior leadership level risk undermining public trust, institutional accountability and the credibility of the Commission onas ~~many~~guardian ~~occasions~~of ~~has~~the ~~not~~Treaties; ~~provided~~calls ~~answers~~on tothe ~~access~~Commission leadership to ~~document~~ensure ~~requests~~full ~~within~~compliance ~~stipulated~~with ~~deadlines,~~transparency ~~especially~~obligations, ~~concerning~~proper ~~cases~~registration ~~under~~of all work-related communications, including at the ~~confirmatory~~level ~~applications~~of ~~where~~the President and Members of the ~~European~~College, ~~Ombudsman~~and ~~has~~to ~~found~~strengthen ~~systemic~~internal procedures and ~~significant~~accountability ~~delays~~mechanisms in ~~the~~order ~~Commission~~to ~~administration’s~~prevent ~~response;~~similar shortcomings in the future;

8. Notes that ~~Andrej Babiš has resumed office~~a asformer Prime Minister of Czechia ~~since December 2025; recalls he had previously been~~was found to behave been in a situation of a conflict of interest ~~linked to~~during his ~~ownership~~previous ofterm ~~Agrofert~~in ~~while~~office ~~exercising~~which ~~that~~led ~~function~~to the suspension and ~~that~~financial ~~this~~correction ~~conflict~~of Union funding; takes note of ~~interest~~public ~~led~~statements toby the ~~suspension~~Prime ~~and~~Minister, ~~financial~~indicating ~~correction~~an intention to relinquish ownership and control of business interests potentially benefiting from Union ~~funding~~funds inthrough the ~~past;~~creation ~~notes~~of ~~with~~an ~~concern~~allegedly ~~that,~~irreversible attrust ~~present,~~arrangement; norecalls the importance of establishing verifiable legal arrangements ~~have~~to ~~been~~prevent ~~put~~any risk that Union funds could benefit private business interests of public office holders; underlines that Member States should ensure that effective safeguards are in place to ~~definitively~~uphold ~~eliminate~~transparency, ~~the~~including ~~risk~~on ~~that~~disclosure ~~Union~~of ~~funds~~beneficial ~~could~~ownership ~~benefit,~~information, ~~directly~~integrity orand ~~indirectly,~~sound ~~his~~financial ~~private~~management ~~business~~of ~~interests;~~Union funds;

9. Stresses that Members of the Commission must meet the highest standards of integrity, independence and accountability, both in their current functions and in their previous roles; notes with concern that several senior management positions remained vacant in DG NEAR during the period in which ~~Commissioner Várhelyi,~~the ~~now~~current Commissioner for Health and Animal ~~Welfare,~~Welfare was responsible for this Directorate-General in his capacity as Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement, and notes that athe ~~spy~~information ~~ring~~provided ~~allegedly~~by ~~operated~~the ~~out~~Commission in this regard during the exchange of views with the ~~Permanent~~discharge ~~Representation~~authority was inaccurate; stresses that the Commission must ensure that all Members of ~~Hungary~~the toCollege meet the ~~Union~~standards ~~while~~of heintegrity, ~~was~~independence and professional conduct required in ~~charge~~order ~~which,~~to exercise their responsibilities, particularly where those responsibilities involve the management of politically sensitive portfolios and significant Union funds; considers that, taken together, ~~undermine~~the ~~trust~~past serious and prolonged management failures in ~~his~~DG ~~ability~~NEAR, tothe ~~exercise~~provision ~~office~~of inaccurate information to Parliament in athe ~~manner~~context ~~fully~~of ~~consistent~~the ~~with~~discharge procedure, and the ~~Union’s~~additional ~~values~~concerns relating to conduct and independence outlined above demonstrate a pattern that is incompatible with the ~~requirements~~standards of accountability, reliability and sound ~~administration;~~administration required of a Member of the Commission;

10. Deplores that the Court in several Special Reports over the last years has repeatedly documented that the Commission systematically overestimates the positive climate effects of Union spending; at the same time regrets that the Commission methodologies for tracking climate and biodiversity effects of Union spending do not capture all of the effects of Union activities, for instance, the impact of some subsidies under the common agricultural policy that are harmful to climate and biodiversity; notes that only tracking the positive effects of the Union budget on climate and biodiversity leads to a systematic overestimation of the contribution of the Union budget to these objectives and provides an overly positive impression of the performance of the Union budget; stresses that these methodological shortcomings translate into concrete accountability gaps for the discharge authority; regrets in particular that the Commission was unable to provide traceable information on projects rejected or modified in 2024 on the basis of the Do No Significant Harm principle, despite its central role in the RRF and cohesion policy; underlines that the Parliament’s ability to exercise budgetary control also depends on verifiable, project-level evidence of environmental compliance and impact;

10. Stresses that the Commission must act in a fully impartial and transparent manner, which includes eliminating conflicts of interest, providing clear accountability for the management of Union funds and complying with its own guidelines on the rule of law; calls on the Commission to strengthen transparency and accountability regarding the appointment and activities of its special advisers by systematically publishing detailed information on their selection criteria, mandate, tasks, duration of assignment, remuneration, and declarations of interests; stresses that special advisers may exercise significant influence on policy development and therefore must be subject to clear governance standards, regular reporting obligations and proactive disclosure in line with the principles of sound financial management and Article 15(3) TFEU;

11. Recalls that the Commission’s 2024 review of NGO grant agreements confirmed the absence of breaches of the law; underlines that civil society organisations are legitimate beneficiaries of Union funding under the Treaties and often contribute to the delivery of Union objectives in a cost-effective and impact-oriented manner; stresses that budgetary control, safeguards and transparency requirements must be applied in a neutral, proportionate and evidence-based way, respecting legal certainty and that they must not single out NGOs as a risk category; emphasises that selective transparency undermines trust in the discharge process and that effective scrutiny requires the application of equivalent standards to all beneficiaries, including companies and consultancies;

11. Stresses that the Commission's follow-up actions cannot lead to an extension of its competences beyond the scope provided for in the Treaties,

12. Recalls that due to the urgent need to boost the Union's defence capabilities, the number and volume of Union defence funding instruments has increased since the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; underlines the need for a comprehensive Union approach to defence funding, with increased focus on countering hybrid threats, including those related to artificial intelligence, drones and cyber-attacks; underlines that democratic accountability, auditability and transparency must increase in parallel with expenditure and that security considerations cannot be used to justify weaker oversight, fragmented reporting or reduced access for the discharge authority; stresses the need for further improvement of the transparency of Union defence funding, including by ensuring audit arrangements equivalent in practical effect to those applicable to civilian spending, and that the discharge authority can exercise democratic scrutiny of all Union-funded activities, during the adoption, design and implementation phases;

12. Notes that, in several special reports over the last years, the Court has identified shortcomings in the Commission’s methodology for estimating the climate effects of Union spending which have led to systemic overestimation by the use of ex-ante tagging systems based on the expected effect of activities and which do not factor in actual results; stresses that limitations of current methodologies may affect the reliability of reported figures and have implications for the discharge authority’s assessment of performance; further notes that the current methodologies for tracking climate and biodiversity expenditure do not fully capture all effects of Union activities, including certain measures under the common agricultural policy; notes that the application of the Do No Significant Harm (DNSH) principle helps prevent the implementation of non-compliant measures; emphasises that such methodological limitations can create accountability challenges for the discharge authority; underlines that Parliament’s ability to exercise effective budgetary control depends on transparent, verifiable and project-level evidence of environmental compliance and impact;

13. Recalls that the Commission’s 2024 review of NGO grant agreements found no breaches of the law; nevertheless, underlines that any recipient of Union funding, including NGOs, should be subject to robust, proportionate and risk-based scrutiny and transparency requirements, in line with legal provisions and sound financial management; stresses that budgetary control, safeguards and transparency requirements must be applied in a neutral, proportionate and evidence-based way, ensuring that transparency and oversight apply effectively across all categories of beneficiaries and that the scrutiny is risk-based; emphasises that the lack of transparency undermines trust in the discharge process and that effective scrutiny requires the application of equivalent standards to all beneficiaries; takes note of the Court’s findings in its special report 11/2025 ‘Transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs’;

14. Notes that, under the Treaties, civil society organisations are legitimate beneficiaries of Union funding and frequently support the attainment of Union objectives; stresses that budgetary control, safeguards and transparency requirements must be applied in a neutral, proportionate and evidence-based way, with due regard for legal certainty; highlights that selective transparency can undermine confidence in the discharge process, and that effective scrutiny requires the consistent application of comparable standards to all beneficiaries; takes note of the Scrutiny Working Group established within Parliament in this regard;

15. Recalls the crucial role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in upholding democratic values to support a vibrant and lively democratic society, ensuring a sound basis for broad coverage of all relevant views in different debates and highlights that CSOs may receive support from Union funds, in compliance with the Financial Regulation, to exercise these functions, as provided in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union;

16. Welcomes that due to the urgent need to boost the Union's defence capabilities, the number and volume of Union defence funding instruments has increased since the start of Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; considers that defence and support for Ukraine must be treated as the budgetary priority in the current geopolitical context and that adequate resources should be allocated to meet this objective; underlines the need for a comprehensive Union approach to security and defence funding, responding to both conventional military threats and non-conventional threats, including hybrid threats, such as those related to artificial intelligence, drones and cyber-attacks; considers that technologies that provide the greatest operational advantage should be prioritised in the funding of technologies; underlines that democratic accountability, auditability and transparency must increase in parallel with expenditure, while recognising that legitimate security requirements may limit the disclosure of certain sensitive information, without reducing the overall capacity of the discharge authority to exercise effective oversight; stresses the need for further improvement of the transparency of Union defence funding, including by ensuring audit arrangements proportionate to the sensitivity of defence activities but fully ensuring effective oversight, and by guaranteeing that the discharge authority can exercise democratic scrutiny of all Union-funded activities, during the adoption, design and implementation phases;

17. Highlights that equality is a founding value of the Union and is enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter); recalls the commitment of the Union to gender mainstreaming in its policymaking and implementation of Union funds, including gender budgeting;

18. Recalls the Agreement establishing an interinstitutional body for ethical standards for members of institutions and advisory bodies referred to in Article 13 of the Treaty on the European Union;

19. Recalls the importance of ensuring that Union funds are allocated and implemented in full compliance with the Financial Regulation and the Union’s fundamental values; stresses the need for appropriate oversight, transparency and safeguards to prevent fraud, conflicts of interest, corruption, double funding, money laundering and misuse of funds, including by beneficiaries whose activities are incompatible with the Union’s values; highlights in this framework the key role played by the anti-fraud architecture of the Union as a whole and expresses some concerns about the refusal of some Member States to cooperate with one of its elements, notably the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO);

Key recommendations:

~~13.~~20. Calls on the ~~Commission~~Commission, in ~~particular~~particular, to:

(i) urgently reassess and address the deterioration of the rule of law and risks to the Union budget in Hungary, and take all necessary actions in accordance with the Conditionality Regulation and other available tools, including full suspension of Union funds;

(ii) consistently and accurately apply the provisions related to the ‘final recipients’, of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (the RRF Regulation), by revising its Guidance on RRPs, to communicate with Member States on the correct application of the definition of ‘final ~~recipients’ and~~recipients’, to ~~provide the discharge authority,~~ensure ~~within~~Member ~~six~~States ~~months,~~collect ~~with~~and aprovide ~~complete~~information ~~and~~on ~~meaningful~~the ~~list~~last ofentities ~~final~~receiving ~~beneficiaries,~~funds, excluding ~~merely~~ intermediary entities such as ministries or managing ~~authorities;~~authorities, and making this information available to the discharge authority by the last RRF payment disbursement submission deadline, and start infringement proceedings if necessary;

~~(iii) ensure full compliance with Union rules on access to documents, including regarding text messages and other electronic communications of the Commission President and Commissioners;~~

(iii) publish the list of final recipients and contractors across all instruments in a harmonised, machine-readable format;

(iv) ensure that no Union funds are paid, directly or indirectly, to Agrofert or any other business interests of Andrej Babiš if the identified conflict of interest has not been demonstrably and verifiably resolved;

(iv) ensure compliance with Union rules on access to documents, including text messages, while recognising that institutional communications of public interest should be made accessible in a proportionate manner and respecting the legal and security requirements, in order to safeguard democratic oversight and accountability;

~~(v) calls on the President of the Commission, pursuant to Article 17(6) TEU, to withdraw confidence in Commissioner Várhelyi;~~

(v) ensure that no Union funds are paid, directly or indirectly, to beneficiaries, including those related to members of the European Council, where a conflict of interest has been identified and has not been demonstrably and verifiably resolved, in accordance with the applicable Union rules and safeguards;

(vi) calls on the Commission to strengthen the existing control framework through independent ex-ante verification of climate and biodiversity coefficients, systematic publication of project-level climate data and transparent reporting on environmentally harmful expenditure, in line with the Court’s recommendations;

(vi) ensure that all Commissioners and senior officials exercise their functions in full compliance with Union rules on integrity, conflicts of interest and sound administration;

(vii) adequately apply the control framework for the Union expenditure related to climate and biodiversity objectives, including a proportionate verification mechanism, timely reporting of project-level climate data and transparent communication on environmentally impacts, in line with the Court’s recommendations and with due regard for operational feasibility and economic competitiveness; improve the monitoring and reporting of results, beyond mere spending targets, with a view to maximising the impact of Union climate and biodiversity funding;

(viii) examine, in line with the Financial Regulation, any potentially fraudulent or irregular beneficiaries; recalls the importance of appropriate oversight of Union funding, with particular attention to respect for the Union’s fundamental values, and the Commission’s legal obligation to ensure that beneficiaries uphold these values and refrain from professional misconduct;

(ix) ensure that the EPPO has adequate resources to investigate cases of fraud related to Union funding, including RRF expenditure, given the increasing number of investigations and high estimated damages;

(x) continue the efforts made in gender budgeting and in tracking the impact of the Union budget in fostering gender equality;

CHAPTER I - Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF)

Reliability of the accounts

~~14.~~21. Welcomes the Court’s conclusion in its annual report on the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2024, that the consolidated accounts of the European Union for that year are reliable; notes that the Court has issued a clean opinion on the reliability of the accounts every year since 2007;

~~15.~~22. Notes that on 31 December 2024, total liabilities amounted to EUR 827,3 billion, and total assets amounted to EUR 518,5 billion; notes that the resulting difference of EUR 308,8 billion represents the Union’s negative net assets, which reflects the debt and the share of expenditure already incurred by 31 December 2024 that must be financed by future budgets; further notes that the negative economic result for 2024 totalled EUR 97,2 billion, with amounts expensed for NextGenerationEU (NGEU) contributing significantly both to the negative net asset position and to the economic result;

~~16.~~23. Notes that at the end of 2024, the estimated value of incurred but not yet claimed eligible expenses due to beneficiaries, recorded as accrued expenses, was EUR 160,7 billion (2023: EUR 155,2 billion), of which EUR 7,9 billion is related to RRF forecasted future payments;

~~17.~~24. Welcomes the Court’s conclusion that the assets, liabilities, revenue and expenses, including those related to ~~NextGenerationEU (NGEU),~~NGEU, the estimate related to the UK’s withdrawal process, and the impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, are presented fairly in the consolidated annual accounts;

Legality and regularity of Union revenue

~~18.~~25. Notes the Court’s conclusion that the Union’s revenue is free from material error and that the managing systems examined by the Court were generally effective;

Legality and regularity of Union expenditure

~~19.~~26. Strongly regrets the adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of the Union budget expenditure issued by the Court for the sixth year in a row; ~~considers~~recalls ~~this~~that ~~increasingly~~the ~~problematic~~discharge ~~and~~authority ~~stresses~~continues to closely monitor developments and that ifit reassesses the situation ~~should~~in ~~continue~~the context of the discharge procedure; underlines the importance of continued and sustained efforts to ~~persist~~address orthe ~~even~~underlying ~~further~~weaknesses ~~deteriorate,~~and to strengthen the financial management and the control mechanisms of both the Commission and Member States; notes the difficulties for the discharge authority ~~cannot~~when ~~continue~~the toCourt ~~grant~~of ~~discharge~~Auditors toand the ~~Commission;~~Commission apply different legal and methodological definitions;

~~20.~~27. Welcome the decrease in the Court’s estimation of the level of error to 3,6 % in 2024 expenditure, a two percentage point decrease from 5,6 % in 2023; notes with concern that the Court continues to detect substantial issues in reimbursement-based expenditure which are the biggest contributor to the overall error rate where the estimated level of error is 5,7 %; notes that the effect of the errors found by the Court is estimated to be both material and pervasive;

~~21.~~28. Notes that the Commission’s 2024 estimates of the risk at payment, covering all MFF headings except Heading 3, are consistently lower than the Court’s confidence intervals, particularly for Headings 2 and 6, considers that this also reflects the significant methodological and mandate-related differences between the two institutions;

~~22.~~29. Notes that, unlike the Court, which must report all errors regardless of whether a financial correction is possible, the Commission only reports irregularities for which it considers recoveries are legally justified; recalls that in accordance with the ~~Commission’s~~Common ~~definition~~Provisions ofRegulation (CPR), the Commission considers by ‘irregularity’ ~~excludes~~any ~~irregularities~~breach ~~caused~~of applicable law, resulting from an act or omission by ~~weaknesses~~an ineconomic ~~national~~operator, ~~administrations~~which has, or inwould have, the ~~Commission~~effect ~~itself,~~of prejudicing the budget of the Union by charging unjustified expenditure to that budget, whereas the Court’s definition of ~~“error’~~‘error’ includes all payments made without meeting the required conditions; reiterates its concern that the Commission and the Court, owing to their distinct institutional roles, apply different legal interpretations and methodological definitions, which may create confusion; is concerned that the Commission may systematically underestimate the existing error level; expresses its support for the development of a common audit approach and methodology;

23. Reiterates its concern over the Court’s observation that the Commission’s risk assessment is likely to underestimate the actual level of risk in several areas; notes that the recurrent weaknesses identified in Member States’ management and control systems continue to limit the degree of reliance that can be placed on their work; welcomes that, as of 2025, the Court will discontinue the practice of selecting audit samples from transactions already reviewed by the Commission or national audit authorities, a change rendered necessary because this approach, though expected to reveal few or no errors, has repeatedly proven unreliable; underlines that this development raises serious doubts about the effectiveness of the Union’s control systems and reinforces Parliament’s longstanding call for reliable assurance mechanisms across all management modes;

30. Stresses the importance of ensuring that public authorities effectively recover amounts unduly lost through fraud, evasion, irregularities and administrative fragmentation, as an essential element of protecting public finances; calls on the Commission to enhance transparency by publishing clear, annual information on recoveries, financial corrections and confiscations linked to Union spending and enforcement cooperation, presented in a coherent and accessible manner that supports accountability while avoiding an unnecessary administrative burden;

24 Calls on the Commission to accelerate the deployment of interoperable anti-fraud and data-mining tools across management modes, enabling cross-checks on beneficial ownership, procurement risk indicators and double-funding signals; urges the Commission to report annually to the discharge authority on the coverage and effectiveness of these tools, including uptake by managing authorities;

31. Reiterates its concern over the Court’s observation that the Commission’s risk assessment is likely to underestimate the actual level of risk in several areas; notes that weaknesses identified in certain management and control systems may affect the overall reliability of audit conclusions; highlights the need to ensure robust oversight across management modes; welcomes that, as of 2025, the Court will discontinue the practice of selecting audit samples from transactions already reviewed by the Commission or national audit authorities, a change rendered necessary because this approach, though expected to reveal few or no errors, has repeatedly proven unreliable; underlines that this development raises serious doubts about the effectiveness of the Union’s control systems and reinforces Parliament’s longstanding call for reliable assurance mechanisms across all management modes;

25. Underlines that the estimated level of error in the Union’s expenditure, as reported in the Court’s statement of assurance, reflects amounts that were paid out without meeting all the applicable rules and conditions; considers that, although this is not an indicator of fraud or corruption and does not automatically imply a wasteful use of resources, it does indicate cases where corrective action is required and where the protection of the Union’s financial interests can be strengthened; regrets that persistent levels of error, while often technical in nature, may nevertheless undermine public confidence in the Union and expose the Commission to reputational risks regarding its capacity to ensure sound financial management of the Union budget;

32. Urges the Commission to accelerate the deployment of interoperable anti-fraud and data-mining tools across management modes, enabling cross-checks on beneficial ownership, procurement risk indicators and double funding signals; urges the Commission to report annually to the discharge authority on the coverage and effectiveness of these tools including uptake by managing authorities; reiterates the urgent need for the mandatory use of data mining and artificial intelligence tools to effectively combat fraud and irregularities;

26. Recalls that, as set out in the Treaties, the discharge authority needs a statement of assurance, provided by the Court, on the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions at year-end for its decision on discharge for that year; notes that Union spending programmes are multiannual and that their management and control systems cover multiple years, allowing for corrections and recoveries after year-end;

33. Underlines that the estimated level of error in the Union’s expenditure, as reported in the Court’s statement of assurance, reflects payments that, according to the Court’s assessment, did not fully comply with the applicable rules and conditions; considers that, although this is not an indicator of fraud or corruption and does not automatically imply a wasteful use of resources, rather it highlights areas where corrective measures can reinforce the proper application of rules and effectively protect the Union’s financial interest; regrets that persistent levels of error, while often technical in nature, may nevertheless undermine public confidence in the sound financial management of the Union budget;

27. Recalls that the Commission bears primary responsibility for preventing and detecting fraud affecting the Union’s financial interests; notes that the Court of Auditors, in line with its mandate, must report any cases of irregularity identified during its audit work; further notes that the Court refers suspicions of criminal offences falling under the competence of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and suspicions of fraud, corruption or other illegal activities to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF); notes that in 2024 the Court reported 19 cases of suspected fraud to OLAF and, in parallel, transmitted 7 of these cases to the EPPO, which have so far resulted in six OLAF investigations and seven EPPO investigations; commends the Court for its systematic reporting to OLAF and the EPPO, especially given that information stemming from audit activities carries a high degree of reliability; stresses that all cases of irregular expenditure identified by the Court should be reported to OLAF and the EPPO, leaving it to these competent bodies to assess whether there is fraudulent intent warranting further investigation;

34. Recalls that, as set out in the Treaties, the discharge authority needs a statement of assurance, provided by the Court, on the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions at year-end for its decision on discharge for that year; notes that Union spending programmes are multiannual and that their management and control systems cover multiple years, allowing for corrections and recoveries after year-end;

35. Recalls that the Commission bears primary responsibility for preventing and detecting fraud affecting the Union’s financial interests; notes that the Court of Auditors, in line with its mandate, must report any cases of irregularity identified during its audit work; further notes that the Court refers suspicions of criminal offences falling under the competence of the EPPO and suspicions of fraud, corruption or other illegal activities to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF); notes that in 2024 the Court reported 19 cases of suspected fraud to OLAF and, in parallel, transmitted seven of these cases to the EPPO, which have so far resulted in six OLAF investigations and seven EPPO investigations; commends the Court for its systematic reporting to OLAF and the EPPO, especially given that information stemming from audit activities carries a high degree of reliability; stresses that all cases of irregular expenditure identified by the Court should be reported to OLAF and the EPPO, leaving it to these competent bodies to assess whether there is fraudulent intent warranting further investigation; underlines the importance of continued coordination between the Commission, OLAF, EPPO and the Court to ensure timely and effective follow-up of all reported cases, in line with their respective mandates; reiterates the need for the Commission to equip these bodies with adequate resources to guarantee fully effective cross-border investigation and detection capabilities; recalls the importance of full operational independence of EPPO and OLAF;

Budgetary and financial management

~~28.~~36. Notes that the mid-term revision of the MFF, adopted in February 2024, introduced a revised technical adjustment which increased the 2024 ceiling for commitment appropriations from EUR 186,0 billion to EUR 186,8 billion, and raised the level of payment appropriations by EUR 7,1 billion, bringing the final payment appropriation budget to EUR 149,7 billion, while maintaining the overall payment ceiling at EUR 170,5 billion; further notes that the revision also established the Ukraine Reserve and the European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI) as new special instruments placed outside the MFF ceilings;

~~29.~~37. Notes that the budgetary authority initially approved a Union budget for 2024 of EUR 189,4 billion in commitment appropriations; notes that five amending budgets adopted during the year resulted in a net increase of EUR 5,9 billion, bringing total commitments to EUR 195,3 billion, thereby exceeding the MFF ceiling of EUR 186,8 billion; underlines that this was made possible through the use of MFF special instruments, which provide additional resources beyond the ceilings to address emerging or unforeseen needs;

~~30.~~38. Notes that the absorption of the 2014-2020 European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) has reached an advanced stage, with total payments amounting to EUR 475,2 billion, corresponding to 97,0 % of the EUR 489,9 billion available under the programmes; welcomes the fact that 21 Member States have exceeded a 95,0 % absorption rate for the 2014-2020 programming period, demonstrating strong implementation capacity as the period approaches closure;

~~31.~~39. Underlines that the cumulative absorption rates presented by the Commission, based on prefinancing and interim payments made to Member States, do not fully reflect the progress of project implementation on the ground, as they do not capture the total amounts disbursed by national authorities to final beneficiaries;

~~32.~~40. Notes with concern that, despite a notable increase in 2024 payments, absorption under the 2021–2027 Common Provision Regulation (CPR) remains low, with EUR 14,7 billion disbursed in 2024 compared to EUR 6,3 billion in 2023, which is still modest relative to overall allocations; further notes that RRF grant payments reached only EUR 55,9 billion in 2024, around half of the Commission’s June 2023 forecast, reflecting continued delays in submitting and processing payment requests;

~~33.~~41. Notes that in 2024 the Commission forecast decommitments of EUR 8,8 billion for the period 2025-2027, up from the EUR 8,1 billion estimated in 2023 for 2024-2027, with this increase driven primarily by cohesion policy programmes under the current MFF and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) as 2014-2020 programmes approach closure in 2026; the low implementation in 2024 puts important amounts at risk from 2025 onwards;

~~34.~~42. Notes with concern that for the ~~CF,~~Cohesion ~~ERDF~~Fund (CF), European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and ESF+ the Commission forecasts total decommitments of EUR 2,7 billion, a notable rise from the EUR 2,2 billion projected in 2023 and nearly seven times the EUR 0,4 billion forecast in 2022, despite the assumption of a sharp acceleration in implementation in 2026 and 2027; stresses that failure to achieve this accelerated implementation rate will further increase the amounts at risk of decommitment;

35. Notes that outstanding Union borrowing increased by more than 30,0 % in 2024, reflecting the Commission’s expanded use of capital markets to finance large-scale programmes such as Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) and NGEU; notes that by 2027 total outstanding borrowing could exceed EUR 900,0 billion, almost ten times the level recorded in 2020 prior to the launch of NGEU; notes that since December 2022 the Commission has applied a diversified funding strategy as its standard method for raising funds on capital markets, and that at the end of 2024 the nominal value of outstanding Union borrowing stood at EUR 601,3 billion, up from EUR 458,5 billion in 2023;

43. Warns that the different risks identified by the Court in the Union budget, including outstanding commitments, may jeopardise the achievement of Union objectives; calls on the Commission, in line with the Court’s recommendations, to act proactively to ensure that its mitigating risk tools (such as the Common Provisioning Fund) have sufficient capacity;

36. Notes that interest expenditure linked to the financing of the non-repayable NGEU support reached EUR 5,4 billion for the period 2021 to 2024, including EUR 3,4 billion in 2024 alone, which is almost 50,0 % higher than the initial forecast of EUR 3,7 billion; observes that total interest expenditure in the current MFF may range between EUR 29,0 and EUR 30,4 billion, approximately double the Commission’s original estimate of EUR 14,9 billion; notes that a 2024 briefing entitled ‘Management of debt liabilities in the EU budget under the post-2027 MFF’ requested by the Committees on Budgets estimated that interest payments for the non-repayable NGEU support in the next MFF could amount to EUR 70,9 and EUR 73,8 billion, underscoring the long-term budgetary impact of NGEU borrowing;

44. Notes that the outstanding nominal value of Union borrowing reached EUR 601,3 billion at the end of 2024, reflecting the use of capital markets to finance Union programmes, such as Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) and NGEU; notes that by 2027 total outstanding borrowing could exceed EUR 900 billion, almost ten times the level recorded in 2020, prior to the launch of NGEU; notes that since December 2022 the Commission has applied a diversified funding strategy as its standard method for raising funds on capital markets, underlines the importance of transparent reporting, fiscal responsibility and sound financial management in the context of increased borrowing and interest rate risk in order to safeguard fiscal sustainability and ensure full accountability as well as democratic oversight by the discharge authority;

37. Notes with concern that the Union budget’s exposure continued to increase in 2024, reflecting the growing volume of borrowing operations and associated guarantees; points out that the total exposure of the Union budget amounted to EUR 342,0 billion at the end of 2024, which amounts to an increase of 14,8 % compared with EUR 298,0 billion at the end of 2023; underlines that this trend underscores the importance of a robust system to ensure that the Union can meet its debt obligations under all circumstances; stresses that, in the context of rising debt levels, the development of genuine new own resources is essential to prevent debt servicing costs from crowding out priorities under future multiannual financial frameworks;

45. Notes that interest expenditure linked to the financing of the non-repayable NGEU support amounted to EUR 5,4 billion for the period 2021–2024, including EUR 3,4 billion in 2024 alone, nearly 50 % above the initial forecast of EUR 3,7 billion; observes that total interest expenditure in the current MFF could range between EUR 29,0 and EUR 30,4 billion, approximately double the Commission’s original estimate of EUR 14,9 billion; further notes that a 2024 briefing entitled ‘Management of debt liabilities in the EU budget under the post-2027 MFF’, requested by the Committee on Budgets, estimates that interest payments for non-repayable NGEU support in the next MFF could amount to EUR 70,9 and EUR 73,8 billion, highlighting the long-term budgetary implications of NGEU borrowing;

38. Notes with concern that, as highlighted by the Court in Special Report 18/2025 on EU budget flexibility, the Commission’s proposal for the 2021-2027 MFF was not sufficiently grounded in a thorough identification and analysis of the needs and risks the Union budget should be able to address; notes that, although the existing flexibility arrangements enabled the Union to react to emerging priorities, several flexibility tools were depleted repeatedly in the early years of the MFF, thereby limiting the margin for manoeuvre for the remainder of the period; underlines that the flexibility framework is overly complex with no clearly defined sequence for activating margins below the ceilings and special instruments above them; notes furthermore that certain flexibility tools overlap with one another and with thematic programmes targeting the same needs, resulting in unnecessary complexity in financial management and decision-making;

46. Notes that the Union budget’s exposure continued to increase in 2024, reflecting the growing volume of borrowing operations and associated guarantees; points out that the total exposure of the Union budget amounted to EUR 342,0 billion at the end of 2024, which amounts to an increase of 14,8 % compared with EUR 298,0 billion at the end of 2023; underlines that this trend underscores the importance of a robust system, fiscal responsibility and transparent reporting to ensure that the Union can meet its debt obligations under all circumstances; stresses that, in the context of rising debt levels, the development of genuine new own resources is essential to prevent debt servicing costs from crowding out priorities under future multiannual financial frameworks;

47. Notes with concern that, as highlighted by the Court in Special Report 18/2025 ‘EU budget flexibility’, the Commission’s proposal for the 2021-2027 MFF was not sufficiently grounded in a thorough identification and analysis of the needs and risks the Union budget should be able to address; notes that, although the existing flexibility arrangements enabled the Union to react to emerging priorities, several flexibility tools were depleted repeatedly in the early years of the MFF, thereby limiting the margin for manoeuvre for the remainder of the period; underlines that the flexibility framework is overly complex with no clearly defined sequence for activating margins below the ceilings and special instruments above them; notes furthermore that certain flexibility tools overlap with one another and with thematic programmes targeting the same needs, resulting in unnecessary complexity in financial management and decision-making;

Recommendations

~~39.~~48. Strongly supports the recommendations of the Court in its annual report on the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2024 as well as in related special reports; calls on the Commission to implement them without delay and to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress of the implementation;

~~40.~~49. Calls on the Commission, in ~~particular~~particular, to:

(i) strengthen the reliability and transparency of financial ~~reporting,~~reporting; in particular by further improving the clarity of the presentation of negative net assets and accrued expenses, and by ensuring that the long-term budgetary implications of NGEU borrowing are communicated clearly and systematically to the budgetary authority;

(ii) take all necessary measures to address the persistent weaknesses in the legality and regularity of expenditure, including by improving and clarifying guidance to managing authorities, ~~and accelerating~~continuing efforts to ~~remedy recurrent~~address shortcomings identified in reimbursement-based spending and ~~consistently~~ensuring ~~apply~~consistent application of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation where risks persist;

(iii) adjust its risk-at-payment methodology so that it ensures full alignment between its risk estimations and the control environment on which it relies;

(iv) strengthen monitoring of the implementation of 2021-2027 shared management ~~funds,~~funds including more active follow-up on low absorption rates, enhanced administrative support and targeted technical assistance to Member States, and the systematic identification of structural bottlenecks that slow down implementation;

(v) make full use of all available instruments to prevent decommitments and to ensure that allocated funds are fully and effectively absorbed;

(vi) clearly communicate onthe impact of expected interest expenditure on the Union’s borrowing operations, including its budgetary implications for future MFFs, and the sustainability of the current diversified funding strategy;

(vii) ~~urges the Commission to~~ review and simplify the Union budget’s flexibility ~~framework~~architecture for the next MFF, including by establishing a clear ~~sequencing~~sequence for mobilising margins and special instruments, ~~avoiding~~ensuring ~~overlaps~~complementarity between flexibility tools, and ~~improving the~~enhancing transparency ofand predictability in their ~~use;~~use while fully ensuring democratic oversight by the budgetary authority;

(viii) recommends that, in future MFF proposals, the Commission include a comprehensive analysis of needs, risks and crisis-response capacity, ensuring that flexibility instruments are sufficiently justified, adequately funded and capable of addressing unforeseen events without being depleted prematurely;

(ix) ~~calls~~ensure onthat the ~~Commission~~Union’s toanti-fraud ~~continue~~architecture, tonotably ~~ensure~~OLAF and the EPPO, is provided with sufficient and appropriate resources, and that robust cooperation ~~with~~between ~~OLAF~~them and with the ~~EPPO,~~Commission is facilitated; including through the timely transmission of suspected fraud cases and ~~reinforced~~the strengthening of fraud-prevention strategies, ~~especially~~in particular in high-risk expenditure areas and large-scale financial instruments;

(x) publish clear, user-friendly performance and spending summaries, including one-page overviews and interactive dashboards with machine-readable datasets;

Revenue

~~41.~~50. Welcomes that the overall audit evidence also for the financial year 2024 indicates that the level of error in revenue was not material; at the same time continues to point out that the problems with customs duties being incorrectly declared or not declared at all (the ‘customs gap’) leads to a shortfall in collected import duties, which has been a persistent problem for many years for the Union and for its Member States;

~~42.~~51. ~~Notes~~Underlines the importance of Member States’ responsibilities for the collection of value-added tax (VAT) and traditional own resources (TOR) in ensuring fair competition and fair taxation in the Single Market and in guaranteeing that the burden of financing Union expenditure is fairly shared among the Member States; notes with satisfaction that the revenue systems ~~that~~examined by the Court ~~examined~~ were generally effective; at the same time ~~asks~~urges the Commission to ~~address~~intensify efforts to improve the collection of existing own resources, including by addressing the remaining weaknesses identified by the Court, especially those related to long-outstanding issues concerning VAT reservations and open points concerning ~~traditional own resources (TOR);~~TOR;

~~43.~~52. Underlines that reform of the Union customs system ~~continues~~remains toimportant befor aboth ~~problem~~the ~~related~~modernisation toof own resources ~~but also~~and tofor the effective fight against organised ~~crime;~~crime ~~regrets~~at ~~that~~European ~~the~~and ~~Court~~national ~~has~~level; ~~observed~~notes that the ~~Commission has not~~Court’s ~~developed~~observation aon ~~detailed~~the ~~plan~~need for further implementation ofand operationalisation planning; underlines the ~~customs~~importance of achieving agreed reform ~~proposal~~elements ofin ~~May~~a ~~2023;~~timely and coordinated manner;

~~44.~~53. Stresses that fast adoption and implementation of all elements of the proposal for a customs reform ~~must~~should remain ana ~~absolute~~key priority; highlights that the establishment of the EU Customs Authority and the EU ~~Customs~~ Data Hub should ~~ensure~~contribute to real-time risk assessment, fraud detection, and uniform ~~rule~~application ~~application,~~of customs rules, replacing fragmented national systems for a stronger ~~and digitalized~~digitalised Customs ~~Union~~Union; ~~and~~underlines ~~should~~the ~~ensure~~importance of ensuring that reform helps to achieve a significant reduction of the customs gap and ~~should~~enhances ~~therefore~~the beeffectiveness ~~accelerated~~of asthe ~~much~~Union’s ascustoms ~~possible;~~controls; points to the importance of having real-time risk assessment and digitalised customs controls;

~~45.~~54. Commends the efforts ~~made~~of bythe EPPO and OLAF to ~~fight against~~combat the organised exploitation of weaknesses in Union customs controls; encourages the ~~current~~further ~~weaknesses~~strengthening of EPPO’s operational capacity and expertise in ~~the~~tackling organised crime patterns affecting Union ~~customs~~revenues ~~controls;~~and expenditure, including through specialised joint tasking, enhanced intelligence-sharing and risk-analysis capabilities;

46. Welcomes the proposals for new own resources presented by the Commission, including as part of the package of proposals for the next MFF, which should at the very least be able to cover the expenses related to the interest and repayment of loans under the RRF in order to ensure that such expenses do not limit Union funds available for regular Union spending programmes;

55. Underlines the importance of preventive and precautionary measures in combating VAT fraud; encourages the exploration of innovative approaches, such as risk-based sampling and statistical extrapolation of control results to wider transaction populations, in full respect of legal safeguards and proportionality;

56. Welcomes the proposals for new own resources presented by the Commission, including as part of the package of proposals for the next MFF, which should at the very least be able to cover the expenses related to the interest and repayment of loans under the RRF in order to ensure that such expenses do not limit Union funds available for regular Union spending programmes; recognises, that other revenue sources might also be considered should the existing proposals not materialise without compromising fiscal responsibility; considers that the revenue potential of a digital service tax and a financial transaction tax should be explored as possible solutions;

Recommendations:

~~47.~~57. Calls on the ~~Commission~~Commission, in ~~particular~~particular, to:

(i) ~~intensify~~take ~~its~~the ~~actions~~necessary steps to ~~ensure~~support the ~~fastest~~timely ~~possible~~and effective implementation of the customs ~~reform,~~reform , including the establishment and initial operation of the EU Customs Authority and the development, implementation, and maintenance of the EU Customs Data Hub;

(ii) intensify cooperation on customs with other countries outside the Union in order to facilitate trade and increase the fight against cross-border tax and customs fraud;

(iii) ~~address~~intensify efforts to improve the collection of the Union’s existing revenue sources, including those from e-commerce by addressing the remaining weaknesses identified by the Court especially those which concern long-outstanding issues concerning VAT reservations and open points concerning traditional own resources (TOR);

(iv) continue work towards the introduction of additional new own resources;

(v) continue to address the major custom gap challenges that the rapid growth of e-commerce poses to customs authorities; provide adequate human, technical and financial resources;

Single market, Innovation and Digital

~~48.~~58. Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 1 ‘Single Market, Innovation and Digital’ was EUR 25,9 billion (13,5 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: EUR 14,9 billion (57,6 %) for Research, EUR 4,1 billion (15,9 %) for Transport, Energy and Digital, EUR 3,1 billion (11,9 %) for the InvestEU Programme, EUR 2,3 billion (8,8 %) for Space, and EUR 1,5 billion (5,8 %) for other areas;

~~49.~~59. Notes that the Court has examined 127 transactions covering the full range of spending under this MFF heading; notes with concern that 32 (25 %) of the 127 transactions that the Court examined contained errors; regrets that, based on the 28 quantifiable errors the Court found, and additional errors detected in MFF heading 1 transactions implemented by EUUnion agencies, joint undertakings and the European Institute of Innovation and Technology, the Court estimates that the level of error in spending on ‘Single Market, Innovation and Digital’ in 2024 was material at 3,2 %; further notes that the Commission estimates the risk at payment as 1,6 % for this heading, which is in the lower half of the range of the Court’s estimate;

~~50.~~60. Notes the categorisation of errors by the Court, with ineligible direct personnel costs accounting for 76 % of errors, ineligible other direct costs (VAT, travel, equipment) accounting for 18 %, ineligible subcontracting accounting for 4 % and ineligible indirect costs for 2 %;

~~51.~~61. Notes with concern the Court’s observation that research ~~and innovation~~continues ~~expenditure~~to isbe ~~most~~a ~~affected~~high-risk byspending ~~error,~~area, particularly in the area of personnel costs; notes that the Court found quantifiable errors relating to 26 of the 99 research and innovation transactions it sampled; recognises that the way funds are disbursed has an impact on the risk of error and the complex rules associated with reimbursement-based funding generally used in the area of research; underlines, in this regard, the need to simplify rules governing Union research and innovation programmes with a view to reducing the risk of errors while facilitating access of beneficiaries, notably SMEs, to Union funding;

52. Welcomes that for its 2024 Annual Report, the Court also assessed the performance information on MFF heading 1 which was presented in the programme performance statements of the 2023 annual management and performance report prepared by the Commission; appreciates the Court’s overall conclusion that the design of performance indicators improved compared to the 2014-2020 programming period, including the balance of different types of indicators (input, output, result and impact) in the case of Horizon Europe, the EU Space Programme, and InvestEU; notes with concern that the 2021-2027 Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) legislation does not include result or impact indicators;

62. Observes that the Court has also identified several issues in Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) projects, including the reporting of indirect costs, discrepancies between declared and actual payments and non-compliant procurement procedures, and calls for strict compliance with cost eligibility rules and sound financial management by all partners; furthermore, emphasises the need to take these issues into account in the context of the upcoming CEF Regulation (2028–2034), in order to improve transparency in the implementation of CEF projects and to reinforce their EU added value;

53. Is concerned that the Court detected gaps in the traceability of reported results, particularly for Horizon 2020; considers it essential to verify and ensure the traceability and reliability of data used to establish performance indicators; notes with concern that, owing to the introduction and increasing use of simplified cost options and delivery models based on financing not linked to costs, weaknesses in the traceability and reliability of performance data can adversely affect Union financial interests;

63. Welcomes that for its 2024 Annual Report, the Court also assessed the performance information on MFF heading 1 which was presented in the programme performance statements of the 2023 annual management and performance report prepared by the Commission; appreciates the Court’s overall conclusion that the design of performance indicators improved compared to the 2014-2020 programming period, including the balance of different types of indicators (input, output, result and impact) in the case of Horizon Europe, the EU Space Programme, and InvestEU; notes with concern that the 2021-2027 Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) legislation does not include result or impact indicators;

54. Notes with concern the Court’s finding that the Commission could not provide project-level information for InvestEU, as it is implemented through indirect management, complemented by monitoring visits; regrets the Commission’s reply that InvestEU implementing partners are neither required by the guarantee agreements nor by the InvestEU Regulation to report key performance indicators (KPIs) at project level; considers that project-level data should be the basis for enhanced performance reporting for financial instruments implemented under indirect management, such as InvestEU;

64. Is concerned that the Court identified gaps in the traceability of reported results, particularly for Horizon 2020; underlines the importance of verifying and ensuring the traceability and reliability of data used to establish performance indicators; notes that, owing to the introduction and increasing use of simplified cost options and financing models not linked to costs, weaknesses in the traceability and reliability of performance data must be addressed to protect the Union financial interests;

55. Is concerned that the Court found that, in general, progress in achieving targets for KPIs was lower than assessed by the Commission; notes that MFF 2021-2027 programmes are mostly on track to achieve targets, while 2014-2020 programmes had only partially met their objectives; notes with concern the Court’s conclusion that less than half of the performance indicators of Horizon 2020 and of CEF 2014-2020 show that results have been achieved or are on track; notes that for InvestEU, 50 % of the indicators presented in the programme performance statements did not have a target; acknowledges the Commission’s reply that, owing to the market- and demand-driven nature of financial instruments such as InvestEU, the performance of such programmes depends on their take-up by the market, which limits the Commission’s ability to establish predefined milestones and targets;

65. Notes with concern the Court’s finding that the Commission could not provide project-level information for InvestEU, as it is implemented through indirect management, complemented by monitoring visits; regrets the Commission’s reply that InvestEU implementing partners are neither required by the guarantee agreements nor by the InvestEU Regulation to report key performance indicators (KPIs) at project level; considers that project-level data should be the basis for enhanced performance reporting for financial instruments implemented under indirect management, such as InvestEU; stresses that the European Investment Bank (EIB), as the main implementing partner of InvestEU, must be held to the highest standards of transparency and accountability;

56. Recalls the importance of Union research and innovation (R&I) funding programmes for the scientific, societal, economic and technological development of the Union, reducing inequalities, achieving the green and digital transitions and decreasing the Union’s energy dependency on Russia; underlines that in order to enhance the Union’s competitiveness and close the innovation gap, increased funding for R&I is needed, also with a view to addressing the Draghi report’s pertinent recommendations;

66. Is concerned that the Court found that, in general, progress in achieving targets for KPIs was lower than assessed by the Commission; notes that MFF 2021-2027 programmes are mostly on track to achieve targets, while 2014-2020 programmes had only partially met their objectives; notes with concern the Court’s conclusion that less than half of the performance indicators of Horizon 2020 and of CEF 2014-2020 show that results have been achieved or are on track; notes that for InvestEU, 50 % of the indicators presented in the programme performance statements did not have a target; acknowledges the Commission’s reply that, owing to the market- and demand-driven nature of financial instruments such as InvestEU, the performance of such programmes depends on their take-up by the market, which limits the Commission’s ability to establish predefined milestones and targets;

57. Notes that the ex-post evaluation of Horizon 2020 estimated that for each euro of costs linked to the programme, five euros worth of benefits would be generated for society by 2040; deeply regrets that 74 % of proposals assessed as high quality by independent experts could not be funded due to budget constraints; notes that an additional EUR 159 billion would have been needed to fund all high-quality proposals; stresses the importance of ensuring sufficient funding for Union R&I to boost the Union’s sustainable prosperity and competitiveness;

67. Recalls the importance of Union research and innovation (R&I) funding programmes for the scientific, societal, economic and technological development of the Union, adequately addressing emerging priorities and challenges, reducing inequalities, achieving the green and digital transitions and decreasing the Union’s energy dependency on Russia; underlines that in order to enhance the Union’s competitiveness, technological leadership and strategic autonomy and to close the innovation gap with global competitors, increased funding for R&I is needed and a stronger and more targeted investment effort in research and innovation, combined with reduced administrative burden for applicants and better mobilisation of private capital, is essential, also with a view to addressing the Draghi report’s pertinent recommendations; recalls that the Draghi report underlines that excellence in research and innovation is fundamental to the Union’s competitiveness and that within the Union research and innovation system, including the Horizon Europe programme, there should be one selection criterion, namely, excellence; reiterates, in this regard, its position that funding for research and innovation should continue to be determined by the principle of excellence and should remain merit-based;

58. Underlines the importance of simplifying the rules and procedures governing Union R&I funding to facilitate beneficiaries’ access to funding and programme implementation; is worried by the Court’s finding that despite the simplifications introduced under Horizon Europe to facilitate the beneficiaries’ cost reporting, the Court found no significant differences between Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe as regards the regularity of expenditure;

68. Notes that the ex-post evaluation of Horizon 2020 estimated that for each euro of costs linked to the programme, five euros worth of benefits would be generated for society by 2040; deeply regrets that 74 % of proposals assessed as high quality by independent experts could not be funded due to budget constraints; notes that an additional EUR 159 billion would have been needed to fund all high-quality proposals; stresses the importance of ensuring sufficient funding for Union R&I to boost the Union’s sustainable prosperity and competitiveness; highlights the importance of making full use of the Seal of Excellence and other complementary Union and national funding instruments, including those under cohesion policy, to support high-quality but unfunded research and innovation projects and to strengthen regional innovation ecosystems across the Union;

59. Notes the Court finding that the Commission has implemented most of its recommendations made in previous years; nevertheless, is concerned that the tool Personnel Costs Wizard, the use of which the Court strongly encourages, especially by certain categories of beneficiaries that are more prone to committing errors, such as SMEs and new entrants, was not yet ready at the time of the Court’s audit; notes the Court’s finding that for five of the 34 Horizon Europe transactions in its 2024 sample, beneficiaries either still calculated personnel costs using the method applicable to Horizon 2020 or did not fully follow the new rules applicable to Horizon Europe; considers that the development and use of tools such as the Personnel Costs Wizard could help beneficiaries apply the correct rules for calculating personnel costs, the major source of error under MFF heading 1;

69. Underlines the importance of simplifying the rules and procedures governing Union R&I funding to facilitate beneficiaries’ access to funding and programme implementation; stresses that simplification measures should be designed in a way to benefit applicants and beneficiaries, including first-time applicants, SMEs and universities, while promoting smaller and more flexible consortia, modular project structures and staged participation in order to facilitate broader participation and effective inclusion across the Union; is concerned by the Court’s finding that despite the simplifications introduced under Horizon Europe to facilitate the beneficiaries’ cost reporting, the Court found no significant differences between Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe as regards the regularity of expenditure;

60. Notes that in 2024 the Commission has continued the roll out of simplified cost options such as lump sums and unit costs in Horizon Europe, with lump sum funding accounting for 27 % of the total call budget in the work programmes for 2024; recalls the Court’s clarification that when lump sum grants are given, the beneficiaries are paid a pre-defined lump sum for each completed work package, regardless of the actual costs incurred; further notes that the Commission’s target is to provide by 2027 at least 50 % of the call budget in published work programmes in the form of lump sums; is concerned, that for the reasons explained in box 5.4 of its Annual report, the Court was not able to assess whether including a specific item of equipment in the budget proposal was necessary and justified in the case of a lump sum grant it audited;

70. Notes the Court finding that the Commission has implemented most of its recommendations made in previous years; nevertheless, is concerned that the tool Personnel Costs Wizard, the use of which the Court strongly encourages, especially by certain categories of beneficiaries that are more prone to committing errors, such as SMEs and new entrants, was not yet ready at the time of the Court’s audit; notes the Court’s finding that for five of the 34 Horizon Europe transactions in its 2024 sample, beneficiaries either still calculated personnel costs using the method applicable to Horizon 2020 or did not fully follow the new rules applicable to Horizon Europe; considers that the development and use of tools such as the Personnel Costs Wizard could help beneficiaries apply the correct rules for calculating personnel costs, the major source of error under MFF heading 1;

61. Acknowledges that the Horizon Europe interim evaluation found that lump sums provided real simplification for beneficiaries, as estimated savings range between 14 % and 30 % of their administrative costs; notes the findings of the Commission’s assessment of Lump Sum Funding in Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe 2018-2024, including that beneficiaries also reported to the Commission that they would welcome more clarity on how lump sum grants would be audited; appreciates that in 2024, the Commission put in place an ex-post control strategy for Horizon Europe grants, including a methodology for ex-post technical reviews in lump sum grants; notes that the Commission has launched the first 30 Horizon Europe ex-post technical reviews in the fourth quarter of 2024;

71. Notes that in 2024 the Commission has continued the roll out of simplified cost options such as lump sums and unit costs in Horizon Europe, with lump sum funding accounting for 27 % of the total call budget in the work programmes for 2024; recalls the Court’s clarification that when lump sum grants are given, the beneficiaries are paid a pre-defined lump sum for each completed work package, regardless of the actual costs incurred; further notes that the Commission’s target is to provide by 2027 at least 50 % of the call budget in published work programmes in the form of lump sums; is concerned, that for the reasons explained in box 5.4 of its Annual report, the Court was not able to assess whether including a specific item of equipment in the budget proposal was necessary and justified in the case of a lump sum grant it audited; calls on the Commission to ensure that future funding instruments include safeguards to avoid overcompensation for equipment that was not actually purchased although included in the lump sum budget, in line with the Court’s observations;

62. Notes the Court’s finding that there has been a significant increase in EU financial support to third parties in research, as under Horizon 2020 grants EUR 2,5 billion of such funding was provided for the whole programming period, whereas by the end of 2024, EUR 5,5 billion was provided under Horizon Europe; is concerned by the Court’s finding that for nine out of 11 transactions sampled relating to grants to third parties, the EUR 60 000 funding threshold set by Article 207 of the Financial Regulation had been exceeded without proper justification for derogation in the work programme or the call; notes that in the Commission’s view, the need for higher grant amounts is inherent to certain types of actions; is alarmed by the Court’s finding that third parties are not required to demonstrate the effectiveness of their controls to ensure the regularity of Union spending; agrees with the Court that this poses a risk to sound financial management and the protection of the Union’s financial interests;

72. Acknowledges that the Horizon Europe interim evaluation found that lump sums provided real simplification for beneficiaries, as estimated savings range between 14 % and 30 % of their administrative costs; notes the findings of the Commission’s assessment of Lump Sum Funding in Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe 2018-2024, including that beneficiaries also reported to the Commission that they would welcome more clarity on how lump sum grants would be audited; appreciates that in 2024, the Commission put in place an ex-post control strategy for Horizon Europe grants, including a methodology for ex-post technical reviews in lump sum grants; notes that the Commission has launched the first 30 Horizon Europe ex-post technical reviews in the fourth quarter of 2024; recognises, at the same time, the Court's observation that although lump sums are appropriate for clearly defined work packages, difficulties in the implementation of such schemes would arise in situations where work packages are delayed, partially completed or some of the activities stipulated in the work package are replaced;

63. Notes that Union research and innovation programmes, including Horizon Europe, support the development of advanced technologies for civil applications, but acknowledges that certain technologies may carry inherent dual-use risks; notes the Commission’s reply that it is currently not monitoring specifically after the end of a project if the results of Union-funded R&I projects are taken forward for dual use, military or defence applications; underlines the importance of ensuring that Union funding is fully consistent with the Union’s values and obligations under international law; stresses at the same time the need for the Commission to strengthen the follow-up of Union-funded research results, including their transition to commercial use, in order to maximise societal impact and ensure an adequate return on investment for taxpayers;

73. Notes the Court’s finding that there has been a significant increase in Union financial support to third parties in research, as under Horizon 2020 grants EUR 2,5 billion of such funding was provided for the whole programming period, whereas by the end of 2024, EUR 5,5 billion was provided under Horizon Europe; is concerned by the Court’s finding that for nine out of 11 transactions sampled relating to grants to third parties, the EUR 60 000 funding threshold set by Article 207 of the Financial Regulation had been exceeded without proper justification for derogation in the work programme or the call; notes that in the Commission’s view, the need for higher grant amounts is inherent to certain types of actions; is alarmed by the Court’s finding that third parties are not required to demonstrate the effectiveness of their controls to ensure the regularity of Union spending; agrees with the Court that this poses a risk to sound financial management and the protection of the Union’s financial interests;

64. Recalls that on 10 March 2022 the European Parliament decided to set up the PEGA Committee to investigate alleged infringement or maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus and equivalent spyware surveillance software and the European Parliament recommendation of 15 June 2023 to the Council and the Commission adopted following PEGA Committee’s work; expresses its profound concern about media reports alleging that Union funding has directly supported companies implicated in the development, deployment and export of spyware by entities whose technologies have been linked to unlawful surveillance of journalists, human rights defenders and political actors in the Union and in third countries; notes the Commission’s reply that the proper use of Union funds is ensured by various contractual provisions related to, for example, the obligation to respect the highest ethical standards and applicable law when implementing the action, and the obligation to ensure the respect of basic Union values and that failure to respect these obligations can result in various contractual measures, including suspension of contract or payments and contract termination; notes also the Commission’s written reply that it considers that it has put in place several measures to address the risk that spyware falls into the wrong hands and increase protection for the potential victims of spyware, including European Media Freedom Act, e-Privacy Directive, Cyber Resilience Act and Dual-use regulation and that its annual Rule of Law reports also cover developments regarding the allegations of illegal use of spyware;

74. Notes that Union research and innovation programmes, including Horizon Europe, support the development of advanced technologies for civil applications, but acknowledges that certain technologies may carry inherent dual-use risks; considers that strengthening Union defence requires enhanced support for research and innovation under Horizon Europe; highlights the significant potential of emerging technologies, particularly in areas such as artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and quantum computing, to contribute to the Union’s security and resilience; considers that civilian research and innovation programmes should therefore be appropriately supported and strategically aligned, including, where relevant, by enabling their results to be used for dual-use purposes in order to safeguard the EU’s defence capabilities; notes with concern however, the Commission’s reply that it is currently not monitoring specifically after the end of a project if the results of Union-funded R&I projects are taken forward for dual use, military or defence applications; calls on the Commission to ensure appropriate monitoring of the follow-up of Union-funded R&I projects with potential dual use, military or defence applications in line with Union requirements; underlines the importance of ensuring that Union funding is fully consistent with the Union’s values and obligations under international law; stresses at the same time the need for the Commission to strengthen the follow-up of Union-funded research results, including their transition to commercial use, in order to maximise societal impact and ensure an adequate return on investment for taxpayers;

65. Notes the Commission’s reply to CONT that the companies in question have received a total of EUR 12,77 million from the Union budget since 2021; regrets that despite the discharge rapporteur’s repeated requests, the Commission only shared with the CONT committee partial information on the total amount of Union funding allocated to spyware or intrusive surveillance software firms, as the reply it provided is limited to information already publicly available in the Financial Transparency System (FTS), which currently only publishes information on beneficiaries and contractors under direct management and on implementing partners under indirect management; considers that based on media reports, it cannot be excluded that the companies in question might have also received Union funding from programmes under shared management and that additional spyware companies may have benefitted from Union funding; deplores the fact that the discharge authority received an incomplete reply to its request;

75. Recalls that the EIB Group has been allocated 75 % (EUR 19,6 billion) of the Union budgetary guarantee under the InvestEU Regulation; recalls also the discharge authority’s recommendations in its previous reports on the control of the financial activities of the EIB; notes the accountability and audit gaps in relation to the EIB’s operations, as identified in the Contact Committee statement CC 1/2025; stresses the need to align and adapt the audit framework to the EIB’s expanded mandate; urges the Commission to actively support the granting of full audit access for the European Court of Auditors to the EIB’s activities; underlines the need for comprehensive information on the EIB’s portfolio quality and risk management practices to enable meaningful democratic oversight of its operations; calls on the Commission to engage with the EIB in order to provide reporting on its portfolio quality to the discharge authority, ensure that risk assessment profiles for large-scale investments are subject to independent review and that the EIB discloses the lessons learned from cases where significant lending has resulted in default; stresses that public confidence in the sound management of Union-backed lending depends on the highest standards of institutional integrity; urges, therefore, the Commission to require the EIB to strengthen conflict-of-interest prevention mechanisms;

66. Highlights the importance of Union investments in the development of high performing, sustainable and efficiently interconnected trans-European networks in the fields of transport, energy and digital services and notes that the CEF, with EUR 4,1 billion of expenditure in 2024, is a key Union instrument in delivering these objectives;

76. Underlines the strategic importance of research in the field of defence for strengthening the Union’s security and long-term resilience; emphasises that defence and security research requires close and trusted cooperation among Member States to ensure a more cost-effective and efficient use of Union taxpayers’ money, avoid unnecessary duplication and foster synergies; underlines that research activities in this domain necessarily involve highly sensitive data, technologies and information which must be subject to the highest standards of protection against external interference or malicious manipulation; stresses, in this context, the urgent need to develop a common and robust protective architecture at Union level to counter hybrid threats and safeguard critical knowledge, infrastructure and innovation ecosystems;

67. Recalls that to achieve the Union’s ambition of reaching climate neutrality by 2050, the Union needs to transform its energy system; notes the Commission’s written reply that since 2021, EUR 12,63 million was spent on renewable hydrogen production and related infrastructure from the CEF -renewable energy and EUR 187,21 million of CEF-Transport funding was spent on refuelling stations; notes further that between 2021 and 2024 the Commission allocated EUR 791,13 million in grants under the Innovation Fund to e-fuel projects; calls for caution in the allocation of Union funds to technologies with an uncertain or limited long-term role in the decarbonisation pathway such as e-fuels, in order to ensure that scarce public resources are prioritised for solutions with the highest climate impact and scalability;

77. Recalls that on 10 March 2022 the European Parliament decided to set up the PEGA Committee to investigate alleged infringement or maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus and equivalent spyware surveillance software and the European Parliament recommendation of 15 June 2023 to the Council and the Commission adopted following PEGA Committee’s work; expresses its dissatisfaction that the Commission still has not presented enforcement measures and legislative follow-up to Parliament’s recommendations regarding the use of Pegasus and equivalent spyware; takes note of media reports alleging that Union funding may have directly supported companies implicated in the development, deployment and export of spyware by entities whose technologies have been linked to unlawful surveillance of journalists, human rights defenders and political actors in the Union and in third countries; notes the Commission’s reply that the proper use of Union funds is ensured by various contractual provisions requiring respect of the applicable law and Union values and that failure to respect these obligations can result in various contractual measures, including suspension of contract or payments and contract termination; notes also the Commission’s written reply that it considers that it has put in place several measures to address the risk that spyware falls into the wrong hands and increase protection for the potential victims of spyware, including European Media Freedom Act, e-Privacy Directive, Cyber Resilience Act and Dual-use regulation and that its annual Rule of Law reports also cover developments regarding the allegations of illegal use of spyware;

68. Recalls that the Digital Markets Act (DMA) aims to ensure fair and innovation-friendly digital markets in Europe, preventing any single actor from dominating it at the expense of consumers, competitors, or democratic oversight; notes that during 2024, the Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP)faced serious understaffing, as reported in its Annual Activity Report (AAR) 2024; notes that DG COMP reallocated staff to units responsible for the enforcement of the DMA which created staff shortages in other departments;

78. Notes the Commission’s reply to the Committee on Budgetary Control that the companies in question have received a total of EUR 12,77 million from the Union budget since 2021; regrets that the Commission only shared with the Committee on Budgetary Control partial information on the total amount of Union funding allocated to spyware or intrusive surveillance software firms, as the reply it provided is limited to information already publicly available in the Financial Transparency System (FTS), which currently only publishes information on beneficiaries and contractors under direct management and on implementing partners under indirect management; deplores the fact that the discharge authority received an incomplete reply to its request;

79. Highlights the importance of Union investments in the development of high performing, sustainable and efficiently interconnected trans-European networks in the fields of transport, energy and digital services and notes that the CEF, with EUR 4,1 billion of expenditure in 2024, is a key Union instrument in delivering these objectives;

80. Notes the Commission’s written reply that since 2021, EUR 12,63 million was spent on renewable hydrogen production and related infrastructure from the CEF renewable energy funding and EUR 187,21 million of CEF transport funding was spent on refuelling stations; notes further that between 2021 and 2024 the Commission allocated EUR 791,13 million in grants under the Innovation Fund to e-fuel projects; underlines the importance of allocating Union funds to support solutions with potential for long-term decarbonisation and scalability and of taking an evidence-based approach to emerging solutions in order to ensure the efficient use of public resources, maximise climate impact and ensure that public resources are used efficiently; stresses that all technologies need to be assessed on their effectiveness and scalability; calls for caution in the allocation of Union funds to technologies with an uncertain or limited long-term role in the decarbonisation pathway; stresses that achieving climate neutrality by 2050 is of decisive importance; emphasises the need to ensure a reliable, affordable and resilient Union energy supply; notes, in this context, that the Commission should promote a technology-neutral approach to research and innovation; calls in particular for the support of cross-border projects to foster genuinely European solutions in the field of energy supply, ensure the cost-efficient use of Union funds, strengthen the internal market, and create EU added value; calls on the Commission to ensure that funding criteria are based on measurable emissions reduction outcomes rather than prescriptive technology preferences;

81. Recalls that the Digital Markets Act (DMA) aims to ensure fair and innovation-friendly digital markets in Europe, preventing any single actor from dominating it at the expense of consumers, competitors, or democratic oversight; stresses the significant negative effects that digital market dominance pose to fundamental rights and the spread of information manipulation and disinformation and the need for joint Union action in these areas; notes that during 2024, the Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP) faced serious understaffing, as reported in its Annual Activity Report (AAR) 2024; notes that DG COMP reallocated staff to units responsible for the enforcement of the DMA which created staff shortages in other departments;

Recommendations

~~69.~~82. Calls on the Commission to:

(i) fully address the Court’s recommendations concerning legality and regularity and performance reporting;

(ii) introduce requirements for implementing partners to provide performance reporting based on project-level data also for financial instruments implemented under indirect management, such as InvestEU;

(ii) secure the provision of significantly increased Union funding for research and innovation, determined by the principle of excellence and merit;

~~(iii) conduct a review of the simplification measures introduced for Horizon Europe to assess whether they provide genuine simplification for project beneficiaries and applicants;~~

(iii) introduce binding requirements for implementing partners, including the EIB, to provide performance reporting based on project-level data also for financial instruments implemented under indirect management, such as InvestEU; demands that such reporting should rely on a balanced mix of output, result, and impact indicators;

~~(iv) develop and encourage the use of tools, such as the Personnel Costs Wizard, that help beneficiaries apply the correct rules for calculating personnel costs;~~

(iv) conduct a review of the simplification measures introduced for Horizon Europe to assess whether they provide genuine simplification for project beneficiaries and applicants, including their impact on administrative burden, participation rates, geographical balance and ease of access for new applicants, in particular from less performing regions, and fostering synergies with other Union instruments, including cohesion policy and the Seal of Excellence;

~~(v) evaluate the lessons learned from the ex-post technical reviews for lump sum grants launched in 2024 and in 2025, and report back to the discharge authority;~~

(v) develop and encourage the use of tools, such as the Personnel Costs Wizard, that help beneficiaries apply the correct rules for calculating personnel costs;

(vi) conduct a comprehensive review of Union funding for the development, deployment and export of spyware or intrusive surveillance software across all management modes since 2021, and share it with the discharge authority;

(vi) evaluate the lessons learned from the ex-post technical reviews for lump sum grants launched in 2024 and in 2025, and report back to the discharge authority;

(vii) ensure that Union research funding, including under Horizon Europe and through agreements with non-EU partners, does not contribute to the development of spyware or equivalent intrusive surveillance technologies in line with the Parliament’s relevant recommendations adopted on 15 June 2023;

(vii) ensure that future funding instruments include safeguards to avoid overcompensation for equipment that was not actually purchased although included in the lump sum budget;

(viii) review a representative sample of lump sum grants, and analyse the lessons learnt from their implementation and the methods used to establish Union financial support, before further extending the use of lump sum grants to future funding instruments;

(ix) conduct a comprehensive review of Union funding for the development, deployment and export of spyware or intrusive surveillance software across all management modes since 2021, and prepare an action plan to prevent the abuse of spyware in the Union, and share them with the discharge authority;

(x) pursue a technology-neutral approach to research and innovation, including by promoting cross-border projects, in order to support the achievement of climate neutrality by 2050 and foster a stable, resilient and affordable Union energy supply, while guaranteeing cost-effectiveness, accelerating progress towards Union climate goals and enhancing competitiveness;

(xi) reinforce cooperation among Member States in defence- and security-related research through Union-funded R&I programmes, while promoting synergies, ensuring the robust protection of sensitive data and protection of technologies against foreign interference and hybrid threats, and where appropriate, enabling the responsible use of research results for dual-use purposes in order to support the Union’s resilience, defence capabilities, and strategic independence;

(xii) ensure that Union research funding, including under Horizon Europe and through agreements with non-Union partners, is allocated in a manner consistent with Union values and does not contribute to the support of spyware or intrusive surveillance technologies, in line with the Parliament’s relevant recommendations adopted on 15 June 2023;

Cohesion, Resilience and Values

~~70.~~83. ~~Notes~~Underlines the role of Union cohesion policy in reducing economic, social and territorial disparities within the Union, as established by the Treaties, as well as for supporting the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights; insists on continued support for cohesion in the post-2027 MFF, following the principles of partnership and multilevel governance, and with the involvement of local and regional authorities and relevant stakeholders; notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF-Heading 2 ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’ was EUR 61,4 billion (32,1 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 47,7 % for the ~~European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)~~ERDF and other regional operations, 16,4 % for the European Social Fund (ESF), 6,7 % for the ~~Cohesion Fund (CF),~~CF, 6,6 % for Erasmus+, 2,2 % for CEF Transport, 3,6 % for EU Recovery, and 3,1 % for other schemes;

~~71.~~84. Notes that the Court has examined a sample of 223 transactions covering the full range of spending under MFF Heading 2; notes with concern that the Court’s estimated overall level of error in expenditure under this heading in 2024 is again significantly above the materiality threshold at 5,7 %; reminds that the Court’s error rate includes the errors that remained undetected by the Member States and the Commission and demonstrate that the Commission’s error rates are underestimated;

~~72.~~85. Notes the Court’s categorisation of errors found in cohesion expenditure, with ineligible costs accounting for 49 % of errors, serious non-compliance in public procurement and state aid rules accounting for 23 %, ineligible projects for 18 %; notes, furthermore, that ERDF and CF related expenditure account for the largest share of errors (54 %);

~~73.~~86. Notes that overall, the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy (DG REGIO) concluded in its AAR that a material level or irregular expenditure remained in the 2024 accounts for the ERDF/CF, despite the results of the controls and corrections already applied at Member State level, and that the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL) concluded the same for the ESF/YEI and FEAD;

~~74.~~87. Reiterates its concerns about the Court’s conclusion in its Review 03/2024 ‘An overview of the assurance framework and the key factors contributing to errors in 2014-2020 cohesion spending’ that the Commission underestimates the level of errors it reports;

~~75.~~88. Is concerned about the persistent shortcomings observed by the Court in the work of national audit authorities as visible in the weaknesses identified in the assurance packages, with a residual error rate above the materiality threshold in assurance packages that account for more than 60 % of the total value of assurance packages audited in 2024; stresses with concern that managing authorities consistently do not effectively succeed in preventing or detecting irregularities in expenditure declared by beneficiaries and that this reduces the extent to which the Commission can rely on their work;

~~76.~~89. Is concerned about the Court’s observation that the errors the Court found could, and should, have been detected by the audit authorities when they conducted their checks; notes that this reduces the extent to which the Commission can rely on the results of their work; highlights with concern the Court’s observation that, since 2017, the proportion of assurance packages with residual error rates of above 2 % had not dropped below 39 % of the expenditure in its samples, indicating that shortcomings remain in the work of the audit authorities, which are not sufficiently addressed by the Commission’s assurance work; however, welcomes the launch by the Commission of an Action Plan aiming at improving the authorities’ detection capacity in the 2021-2027 period;

~~77.~~90. Notes that the Court, in its Review 04/2025 ‘The Future of EU Cohesion Policy: Drawing lessons from the past’ recalled the longstanding challenge related to the complexity of the regulatory framework, and that, despite efforts to simplify rules and procedures, the complexity of Union regulation and the coexistence of national and regional requirements continues to impose significant administrative burdens and contributes to a high error rate; recalls, however, the important role that cohesion policy has played in reducing economic, social and territorial disparities and promoting convergence and stability across the Union, thereby demonstrating its added value for Union taxpayers, which can be further strengthened by addressing persistent weaknesses; notes that, while simplified cost options have been introduced to reduce reporting obligations, their use remains limited, especially in the ERDF; ~~stresses~~recalls ~~that~~the persistent weaknesses in Member States’ management and control systems; calls into question the Commission’s plan for increased reliance on national systems and stresses that they must be remedied before the introduction of any such future spending model under the next ~~MFF~~MFF; stresses the need to define clear and binding supervisory and control responsibilities for both the Commission and the Member States prior to the beginning of implementation; considers that ~~increases~~the ~~reliance~~Commission should not rely solely on Member States’ control systems, but should define minimum requirements and verification mechanisms, similar to those provided for under shared management, in order to avoid any non-compliance with national ~~controls;~~and Union rules, as requested by the Court;

~~78.~~91. Notes that the Court’s findings, in its Special Report ~~04/2025~~22/2025 ‘Financial corrections in cohesion policy funds’ that the Commission does not apply financial corrections as it should to protect the Union budget from irregular expenditure in cohesion policy, and that, despite cohesion spending being affected year after year by a significant number of errors, the Commission took more than a decade to adopt its first financial correction in September 2025 for the 2014-2020 period; points out that the legal framework governing the correction mechanism is complex that guidance and criteria for assessing serious deficiencies is not clear enough, and is not applied consistently, and that there is no well-defined timeframe for the procedure;

~~79. Notes that the discharge authority is considering introducing an acceptable level of error rate in cohesion policy above which annual discharge would be postponed;~~

92. Notes with concern that the Court identified shortcomings in the planning and preparation of the authorities’ audit work, such as weaknesses in the sampling approaches and incomplete checklists;

~~80. Notes with concern that the Court identified shortcomings in the planning and preparation of the authorities’ audit work, such as weaknesses in the sampling approaches and incomplete checklists;~~

93. Recalls that, following a discharge-related access to documents request concerning contracts with 30 economic operators, the Commission had to undertake a broad and resource-intensive identification exercise due to limitations in its internal data systems, which resulted in the identification of hundreds of entities with similar or related names; acknowledges the efforts made by the Commission services to respond promptly and transparently; further recalls that, as of the next MFF, the Commission will be required to use data stored in the Arachne data-mining and risk-scoring tool to feed a centralised transparency website, with Member States obliged to provide automated access to relevant data, an obligation which will apply from 2027 onwards and on which the Commission has already begun preparatory work; urges the Commission to implement an interoperable system to allow a European tracing of funds with the start of the new MFF;

81. Recalls that, following a discharge-related access to documents request concerning contracts with 30 economic operators, the Commission had to undertake a broad and resource-intensive identification exercise due to limitations in its internal data systems, which resulted in the identification of hundreds of entities with similar or related names; acknowledges the efforts made by the Commission services to respond promptly and transparently; further recalls that, as of the next MFF, the Commission will be required to use data stored in the Arachne data-mining and risk-scoring tool to feed a centralised transparency website, with Member States obliged to provide automated access to relevant data, an obligation which will apply from 2027 onwards and on which the Commission has already begun preparatory work; stresses, however, that the Commission should assess, ahead of the rollout of the new compulsory system, whether more efficient interim solutions can be put in place to enable the rapid and reliable identification of contractual relationships with specific economic operators, at least under direct and indirect management where it does not depend on data input from Member States;

94. Notes that the Court, in its Special Report 24/2025 ‘Financial instruments in EU cohesion policy: A revolving use of funds materialised partially’ found that, while one of the advantages of financial instruments in cohesion policy over grants is that reflows can be used to support additional final recipients, leading to more efficient use of public financing, only a limited reuse of reflows materialises during eligibility periods, partly due to acceptable reasons, such as the long-term nature of investments; notes that after the eligibility period, reflows are generally reused for cohesion purposes but with limitations; deplores that the legal framework on the reuse obligation is insufficiently clear and ambiguous, and that the Commission lacks oversight, leading to varying practices among Member States’ managing authorities;

82. Notes that the Court, in its Special Report 24/2025 ‘Financial instruments in EU cohesion policy: A revolving use of funds materialised partially’ found that, while one of the advantages of financial instruments in cohesion policy over grants is that reflows can be used to support additional final recipients, leading to more efficient use of public financing, only a limited reuse of reflows materialises during eligibility periods, partly due to acceptable reasons, such as the long-term nature of investments; notes that after the eligibility period, reflows are generally reused for cohesion purposes but with limitations; deplores that the legal framework on the reuse obligation is insufficiently clear and ambiguous, and that the Commission lacks oversight, leading to varying practices among Member States’ managing authorities;

95. Is concerned about the Court’s observation that implementation of the cohesion policy funds (ERDF, CF, ESF+), accounting for over 90 % of the shared management funds under the CPR for 2021-2027, remained low; notes that when the Court compares their implementation (prefinancing and interim payments) with the previous programming period, the overall absorption rate of these three funds was only 5 % by the end of 2024 compared to 14 % at the equivalent point of the previous MFF (end of 2017); underlines that the current programming period has been implemented in an exceptionally challenging context marked by successive crises, inflationary pressures, supply chain disruptions and evolving geopolitical and economic conditions; acknowledges, at the same time, that the 2021-2027 programmes were adopted seven months later than those of the 2014-2020 programming period and that the pre-financing rates under the 2014-2020 programmes were higher and cleared at a different moment than those under the current MFF; notes, in this regard, that the absorption rate at the comparable implementation stage, at the end of June 2017, for the ERDF, the CF and the ESF+ stood at 3,49 %, which is comparable to the rate at the end of 2024; notes with concern that as the end of the eligibility period for the underlying expenditure and the deadline for payment of the final balance for the 2021-2027 MFF are set one year earlier than in the previous programming period, the pressure to absorb Union funds will increase further;

83. Is concerned about the Court’s observation that implementation of the cohesion policy funds (ERDF, CF, ESF+), accounting for over 90 % of the shared management funds under the CPR for 2021-2027, remained low; highlights that when the Court compares their implementation (prefinancing and interim payments) with the previous programming period, the overall absorption rate of these three funds was only 5 % by the end of 2024 compared to 14 % at the equivalent point of the previous MFF (end of 2017); notes with concern that as the end of the eligibility period for the underlying expenditure and the deadline for payment of the final balance for the 2021-2027 MFF are set one year earlier than in the previous programming period, the pressure to absorb Union funds will increase further;

96. Expresses its concern that in 2024, the Commission forecast decommitments for the period 2025-2027 increased at EUR 8,8 billion compared to the 2023 forecast of EUR 8,1 billion for the same period and that this increase in estimated decommitments was mainly driven by the cohesion programmes under the current MFF and by the EAFRD; notes that EAFRD decommitments are expected when the programmes of the previous MFF close in 2026, while cohesion programmes for the 2021-2027 MFF face significant risks of decommitments from 2027 onwards;

84. Expresses its concern that in 2024, the Commission forecast decommitments for the period 2025-2027 increased at EUR 8.8 billion compared to the 2023 forecast of EUR 8.1 billion for the same period and that this increase in estimated decommitments was mainly driven by the cohesion programmes under the current MFF and by the EAFRD; notes that EAFRD decommitments are expected when the programmes of the previous MFF close in 2026, while cohesion programmes for the 2021-2027 MFF face significant risks of decommitments from 2027 onwards;

97. Recalls that in 2024, several amendments to the cohesion policy and legal framework, namely STEP and RESTORE, entered into force; highlights the importance of these instruments in enhancing Union competitiveness and addressing the consequences of natural disasters; reiterates, nevertheless, that constant amendments to the cohesion policy framework lead to legal uncertainty and instability and risk undermining the long-term structural cohesion policy objectives of reducing disparities across the Union; stresses that cohesion policy needs a stable regulatory framework in order to provide predictability for beneficiaries;

85. Highlights the Commission Internal Audit Service’s (IAS) recommendation, in its audit carried out in 2024 on assurance building processes for the funds implemented under shared management, that the single audit strategy of the DG REGIO, DG EMPL and the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE) needs to be updated as certain elements were not sufficiently clear or have not been sufficiently developed at this stage of the programming period; also notes the IAS’ recommendation that DG REGIO, which also implements the EU Solidarity Fund under shared and indirect management, needs to further improve its design and effective management;

98. Reiterates its deep concern over the disproportionate impact that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine continues to have on the Union's eastern regions bordering Russia and/or Belarus; draws attention to the costs borne by these regions as a result of their shared border with hostile neighbouring countries, notably the respective Member States' need to direct public funding into security, defence and preparedness, while facing dramatically reduced resources due to a disruption in economic activities, cross-border trade and other exchanges; is concerned, further, about the loss in Union financial support experienced by some border regions as a result of amendments to cohesion funds under the current programming period, notably to ERDF funds initially earmarked for cross-border cooperation with Russia and Belarus and funds reallocated in the context of the 2025 cohesion mid-term review (MTR);

86. Notes that, following the establishment of its framework for reduction and recoveries in case of fraud, corruption, and conflict of interests affecting the financial interests of the Union that have not been corrected by the Member State, the Commission undertook the first such reduction on 8 May 2025, when, following an OLAF recommendation, it adopted its first implementing decision reducing support to Slovakia by EUR 1,225 million in relation to an uncorrected irregularity; notes, however, the Court’s finding in Special Report 26/2025 that the Commission lacks a mechanism to monitor whether amounts ordered to be recovered by national courts following criminal proceedings are actually repaid in full to the Union budget;

99. Underlines that territorial cohesion requires strengthening local economic resilience, for example through sustainable tourism, protection of cultural assets, youth employment and vocational skills development, including in green reconstruction, energy efficiency and civil protection services; stresses the importance of Union cohesion policy for economic and territorial convergence and development in the regions of the Union, as well as for supporting the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights; stresses the need to safeguard access to essential services in rural and remote areas and calls on the Commission to assess whether Union spending effectively contributes to reducing depopulation pressure;

87. Expresses deep concern over the findings in the 2025 Rule of Law Report regarding the rule of law situation in Hungary, particularly the persistent and systemic challenges in the judiciary and the media sectors; notes with alarm that the transparency of case allocation in lower courts has not been improved, and that undue pressure on some judges continues within the judiciary, notably in relation to internal debates on key issues related to judicial independence; notes with concern in the same vein that the implementation of the 2024-2025 National Anti-Corruption Strategy lags behind, with the decrease of the number of convictions for corruption crimes, the absence of progress in establishing a robust track-record on high-level corruption, and the continuous reporting by the Hungarian Integrity Authority of obstacles in fulfilling its oversight tasks effectively;

100. Highlights the increasing exposure of certain regions, including Mediterranean coastal and inland territories, to climate-related risks such as storms, floods, coastal erosion and drought stress; stresses that prevention and adaptation measures are more cost-effective than post-disaster reconstruction; stresses the necessity of frontloading investments in risk prevention, hydraulic safety, slope stability, nature-based solutions and climate-resilient infrastructure, including sustainable ports, intermodal logistics, rail connectivity and resilient water systems, leakage reduction, resilient irrigation and smart water management, in order to ensure rapid and measurable resilience outcomes, enhance territorial resilience and safeguard the effectiveness of Union spending;

88. Notes that from the EUR 20,9 billion allocations under the CPR initially blocked due to fundamental rights concerns, only EUR 8,6 billion remain blocked for the Hungarian government in January 2026; further notes that from the EUR 6,3 billion initially blocked under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation because of rule of law and corruption concerns, EUR 1 and 1,1 billion have been decommitted at the end of 2024 and 2025 respectively; expresses deep concern that, while the rule law continues to deteriorate and corruption flourishes through entrenched oligarchic networks in Hungary, the amount of Union funds that remains frozen due to rule of law and corruption concerns decreases, and consequently, the pressure applied by the Commission on the Hungarian government to make reforms shrinks constantly;

101. Highlights the Commission Internal Audit Service’s (IAS) recommendation, in its audit carried out in 2024 on assurance building processes for the funds implemented under shared management, that the single audit strategy of DG REGIO, DG EMPL and the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE) needs to be updated as certain elements were not sufficiently clear or have not been sufficiently developed at this stage of the programming period; also notes the IAS’ recommendation that DG REGIO, which also implements the EU Solidarity Fund under shared and indirect management, needs to further improve its design and effective management;

89. Notes that MOL, a publicly listed Hungarian petrochemical conglomerate, is effectively controlled through three so-called public interest trusts affiliated with the Hungarian Government, each holding a 10 % share; recalls that Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 prohibits the Commission from entering into new legal commitments, under direct or indirect management, with Hungarian public interest trusts and entities maintained by them when implementing the Union budget; notes with concern that at least one funding agreement appears to have been concluded between the Commission and MOL after the adoption of that Decision; takes note of the Commission’s reply that it is investigating the matter, and expects the Commission to provide the discharge authority without delay with a clear explanation of how such a commitment could have been signed;

102. Notes that, following the establishment of its framework for reduction and recoveries in case of fraud, corruption, and conflict of interests affecting the financial interests of the Union that have not been corrected by the Member State, the Commission undertook the first such reduction on 8 May 2025, when, following an OLAF recommendation, it adopted its first implementing decision reducing support to Slovakia by EUR 1,225 million in relation to an uncorrected irregularity; notes, however, the Court’s finding in Special Report 26/2025 that the Commission lacks a mechanism to monitor whether amounts ordered to be recovered by national courts following criminal proceedings are actually repaid in full to the Union budget;

90. Notes that the Hungarian government is set to receive the third-largest allocation under the SAFE instrument, amounting to EUR 16,2 billion, intended to support major defence-industry investments; recalls that the Commission has the power to withhold approval of national defence investment plans under SAFE where there are concerns regarding the protection of the Union’s financial interests; notes that the Hungarian government recently sold a controlling 75 %+1 stake in its state defence-industry holding to 4iG, a company widely seen as close to the government; strongly warns that, in light of the continued deterioration of the rule of law, persistent corruption risks and systemic weaknesses in oversight as described above, the Union’s financial interests cannot be considered adequately protected if SAFE funding were to be disbursed to Hungary without, at the very least, setting strict conditions that must be met prior to any disbursement of funds;

103. Expresses deep concern over the findings in the 2025 Rule of Law Report regarding the rule of law situation in Hungary, particularly the persistent and systemic challenges in the judiciary and the media sectors; notes with alarm that the transparency of case allocation in lower courts has not been improved, and that undue pressure on some judges continues within the judiciary, notably in relation to internal debates on key issues related to judicial independence; notes with concern in the same vein that the implementation of the 2024-2025 National Anti-Corruption Strategy lags behind, with the decrease of the number of convictions for corruption crimes, the absence of progress in establishing a robust track-record on high-level corruption, and the continuous reporting by the Hungarian Integrity Authority of obstacles in fulfilling its oversight tasks effectively;

91. Highlights with alarm that since the 2024 Rule of law Report, Slovakia adopted a series of amendments to the Criminal Code, passed in the second half of 2024, including the closure of specialised anti-corruption entities, National Crime Agency and Special Prosecutor’s Office, which resulted in delays in investigations transferred to other bodies and significant drops in the number of corruption cases; notes with concern Slovakia’s Government plan to replace the current office for whistleblowers with an institution whose chair would be appointed directly by the parliamentary speaker, which risks politicising the office, aligning its work with the Government’s priorities, scaling back protection of whistleblowers, and undercutting scrutiny of how the Government handles Union funds; stresses that these developments pose an increased, substantial risk to the sound financial management of the Union budget; emphasises that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation is not limited to last-resort measures, but also allows for early action with partial suspensions, where rule of law breaches are identified that pose a serious risk to the sound financial management of the Union budget;

104. Reiterates its serious concerns about the Commission's decision of 13 December 2023, concluding that the Hungarian government had satisfied the Charter requirements in relation to judicial independence and lifting the suspension on the disbursement of funds for related programmes, resulting in Hungary becoming eligible to receive approximately EUR 10,2 billion from various funds governed by the CPR; reminds that on 25 March 2024, the European Parliament brought an action before the Court of Justice in order to review the legality of the Commission decision, as well as to bring legal certainty to the implementation of the rule of law mechanism; notes that while the CJEU ruling is still pending, the Advocate General proposed on 12 February 2026 that the Court of Justice annul the Commission's decision lifting the suspension on the disbursement of funds to Hungary;

92. Notes, in this context, that following the Committee on Budgetary Control mission to Bratislava on 26–28 May 2025, unfounded public statements by the Prime Minister of Slovakia and members of the National Council led to threats against the Leader of the mission, necessitating police protection; considers that such incidents further illustrate the deteriorating rule of law environment and the risks it poses to the Union’s financial interests;

105. Notes that from the EUR 19,8 billion allocations under the CPR, initially blocked due to fundamental rights concerns, only EUR 7,6 billion remain blocked for the Hungarian government in January 2026; further notes that from the EUR 6,4 billion initially blocked under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation because of rule of law and corruption concerns, EUR 1 and 1,1 billion have been decommitted at the end of 2024 and 2025 respectively; expresses deep concern that, while the rule law continues to deteriorate and corruption flourishes through entrenched oligarchic networks in Hungary, the amount of Union funds that remains frozen due to rule of law and corruption concerns decreases, and consequently, the pressure applied by the Commission on the Hungarian government to make reforms shrinks constantly;

93. Deplores that, according to civil society’s analysis, the vast majority of recommendations from the Rule of Law Report repeat the previous ones; considers that this raises concerns as to whether the recommendations are taken sufficiently seriously by Member States and whether the Commission is applying adequate pressure to ensure their effective implementation; stresses that, many of the shortcomings listed in the Rule of Law Report have a direct impact on the sound financial management of the Union budget and therefore considers it essential from a budgetary control perspective that the exercise produces tangible and measurable results;

106. Notes the requests by the Hungarian government on 28 and 29 March 2025 to transfer EUR 545 million from two cohesion programmes to new priorities under the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), of which EUR 395 million from funds frozen due to the failure to meet the horizontal enabling condition under the Charter of Fundamental Rights; deeply regrets the Commission’s approval of the amendments on 25 September 2025, that despite again blocking reimbursements for the new STEP priorities due to non-compliance with Charter requirements, nevertheless gave the Hungarian government access to EUR 317,3 million in pre-financing; reaffirms that the reallocation or reshuffling of frozen appropriations to other programmes or objectives would signal to governments non-compliant with Union values and with their obligations to protect the Union’s financial interests that losses can be offset elsewhere; recalls its position that funds suspended pursuant to the Conditionality Regulation or due to non-fulfilment of horizontal enabling conditions should not be eligible for programme amendments or transfers; calls, therefore, on the Commission to exercise its right of initiative and propose measures to close any existing loopholes in the Union's legislative framework that may enable governments to transfer funds suspended due to breaches of their rule of law or other Charter of Fundamental Rights obligations, and ensure that any future funding instruments are proofed for circumvention;

94. Notes the Commission reply that the Secretariat-General (SG) coordinates between the use of three different instruments of the Conditionality Regulation, the Rule of Law Report, the RRF and of the CPR horizontal enabling conditions to ensure consistency across all programmes, instruments and Member States, and that within each instrument, there is a lead service entrusted with the implementation and relevant associated services also feed into this work; further notes that the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers (DG JUST) and SG jointly lead the work on the Rule of Law Report, DG EMPL leads for the work on the Charter horizontal enabling condition, SG REFORM with the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) for the work on the RRF and the Directorate-General for Budget (DG BUDG) for the work on the Conditionality Regulation; deplores, however, that the role of the Commission President on the decision-making behind frozen funds remains opaque; notes that, despite a solid framework on paper, the decision-making process remains insufficiently transparent in practice; regrets that in the past, the Commission only provided the bare minimum of information, without key details, and did not share the full documentation, even after Parliament had requested it; stresses that clear and transparent decision-making structures are essential to avoid any perception of the freezing of funds being subject to political considerations;

107. Notes that MOL Plc, a publicly listed Hungarian petrochemical conglomerate, is effectively controlled through three so-called public interest trusts affiliated with the Hungarian Government, each holding a 10 % share; recalls that Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 prohibits the Commission from entering into new legal commitments, under direct or indirect management, with Hungarian public interest trusts and entities maintained by them when implementing the Union budget; notes with concern that at least one funding agreement appears to have been concluded between the Commission and MOL after the adoption of that Decision; takes note of the Commission’s reply that it is investigating the matter, and expects the Commission to provide the discharge authority without delay with a clear explanation of how such a commitment could have been signed;

95. Regrets that the Commission took more than two years to open infringement proceedings against Malta for the non-application of Union law in the field of online gambling; notes with serious concern that, as a result of Malta’s legislation preventing the enforcement of valid judgments from other Member States, around 100 000 Union citizens entitled to repayments have been unable to obtain redress; notes further that several gambling companies licensed in Malta have begun transferring assets to other entities, thereby risking the effective enforcement of thousands of court judgments even if the contested legislation were to be withdrawn; deeply regrets, in this context, the Commission’s delay in initiating infringement proceedings;

108. Notes that the Hungarian government is set to receive the third-largest allocation under the SAFE instrument, amounting to EUR 16,2 billion, intended to support major defence-industry investments; recalls that the Commission has the power to withhold approval of national defence investment plans under SAFE where there are concerns regarding the protection of the Union’s financial interests; notes that the Hungarian government recently sold a controlling 75 %+1 vote majority stake in its state defence-industry holding to 4iG, a company widely seen as close to the government; strongly warns that, in light of the continued deterioration of the rule of law, persistent corruption risks and systemic weaknesses in oversight as described above, the Union’s financial interests cannot be considered adequately protected if SAFE funding were to be disbursed to the Hungarian government without, at the very least, setting strict conditions that must be met prior to any disbursement of funds;

109. Highlights with alarm that since the 2024 Rule of Law Report, Slovakia adopted a series of amendments to the Criminal Code, passed in the second half of 2024, including the closure of specialised anti-corruption entities, the National Crime Agency and the Special Prosecutor’s Office, which resulted in delays in investigations transferred to other bodies and significant drops in the number of corruption cases; notes with concern Slovakia’s Government plan to replace the current office for whistleblowers with an institution whose chair would be appointed directly by the parliamentary speaker, which risks politicising the office, aligning its work with the Government’s priorities, scaling back protection of whistleblowers, and undercutting scrutiny of how the Government handles Union funds; stresses that these developments pose an increased, substantial risk to the sound financial management of the Union budget; emphasises that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation is not limited to last-resort measures, but also allows for early action with partial suspensions where rule of law breaches are identified that pose a serious risk to the sound financial management of the Union budget; fully supports the Commission’s decision and calls on the Commission to start the first step of the conditionality mechanism and to launch an infringement proceeding regarding this matter;

110. Notes, in this context, that following the Committee on Budgetary Control mission to Bratislava on 26–28 May 2025, unfounded public statements by the Prime Minister of Slovakia and members of the National Council led to threats against the Leader of the mission, necessitating police protection; considers that such incidents further illustrate the deteriorating rule of law environment and the risks it poses to the Union’s financial interests;

111. Deplores that, according to civil society’s analysis, the vast majority of recommendations from the Rule of Law Report repeat the previous ones; considers that this raises concerns as to whether the recommendations are taken sufficiently seriously by Member States and whether the Commission is applying adequate pressure to ensure their effective implementation; stresses that, many of the shortcomings listed in the Rule of Law Report have a direct impact on the sound financial management of the Union budget and therefore considers it essential from a budgetary control perspective that the exercise produces tangible and measurable results; invites, therefore, the Commission to translate the country-specific recommendations from its annual Rule of Law Reports into concrete milestones to be systematically acted upon by the Member States, and to trigger the Conditionality Regulation where systematic rule of law breaches, identified under the pillars of the Report, have a sufficiently direct link to the protection of the Union budget;

112. Notes the Commission reply that the Secretariat-General (SG) coordinates between the use of three different instruments of the Conditionality Regulation, the Rule of Law Report, the RRF and of the CPR horizontal enabling conditions to ensure consistency across all programmes, instruments and Member States, and that within each instrument, there is a lead service entrusted with the implementation and relevant associated services also feed into this work; further notes that the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers (DG JUST) and SG jointly lead the work on the Rule of Law Report, DG EMPL leads for the work on the Charter horizontal enabling condition, SG REFORM with the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) for the work on the RRF and the Directorate-General for Budget (DG BUDG) for the work on the Conditionality Regulation; invites the Commission to further clarify the role of all decision-makers in these procedures; underlines that while a solid framework exists on paper, the practical application of procedures could be further enhanced; regrets that the Commission in the past only provided the bare minimum amount of information, without key details, and did not share the full documentation even after Parliament had requested it; stresses that timely, comprehensive and proactive information sharing is essential for it to exercise its budgetary and oversight responsibilities effectively and for citizens to maintain trust in the Union institutions and the EU’s credibility as a whole;

113. Regrets that the Commission took more than two years to open infringement proceedings against Malta for the non-application of Union law in the field of online gambling; notes with serious concern that, as a result of Malta’s legislation preventing the enforcement of valid judgments from other Member States, around 100 000 Union citizens entitled to repayments have been unable to obtain redress; notes further that several gambling companies licensed in Malta have begun transferring assets to other entities, thereby risking the effective enforcement of thousands of court judgments even if the contested legislation were to be withdrawn; deeply regrets, in this context, the Commission’s delay in initiating infringement proceedings;

114. Recalls the findings of the Court’s Special Report on the Digitalisation of Healthcare, which concluded that Union support to Member States has been overall effective in fostering the digital transformation of healthcare systems; notes, however, that Member States have faced difficulties in utilising Union funds allocated for this purpose and regrets that while the Commission monitors the progress achieved by Member States in the digitalisation of healthcare, it does not yet possess a comprehensive overview of how Union funds are being used to support these activities; calls on the Commission to implement in full the Court’s recommendations, in particular by improving guidance to Member States, strengthening monitoring and performance-based oversight of Union funds used for digital health and ensuring that digital health investments uphold the highest standards of data protection, cybersecurity and interoperability;

115. Acknowledges that the EU4Health programme has contributed to the InvestEU programme through blending with the Union guarantee, thereby mobilising additional investments; notes in particular the contribution of EUR 110 million via an InvestEU top-up supporting EIB investments in innovative life-science projects related to medical countermeasures; underlines the importance of ensuring transparency, efficient coordination with national and Union funding instruments, and broad access to Member States so that these investments deliver strong European added value and strengthen the resilience of the Union’s health systems; recalls the importance of investing in medical innovation and technologies at a European level and the importance of strengthening the cooperation between research institutions, private medical companies and public authorities to better serve the public interest;

116. Regrets the Commission’s decision to discontinue operating grants supporting the health sector which represented just over 1% of the EU4Health budget in 2024; observes that these changes have affected a continuity contribution to European public health objectives; stresses the importance of predictable and stable support mechanisms for stakeholder and civil society organisations active in health; suggests that future funding continues to be based on clear criteria of European added value, transparency, political neutrality, and measurable impact, to ensure resources are directed where they provide the greatest benefit for patients and health systems; highlights the role of stakeholder and civil society actors in contributing to Union health policy objectives and implementation;

117. Notes that the Commission allocated EUR 8 million in 2024 and EUR 20,9 million in 2025 for calls for proposals for the production of content on Union affairs by consortia of news media organisations, and that three media consortia currently receive Union funding; recalls that a free, independent and pluralistic press is a cornerstone of democratic accountability; considers that Union support for media can contribute to strengthening media pluralism and informed public debate across the Union, provided that strict safeguards are in place to ensure full editorial independence and transparency; underlines the importance of transparency regarding all financial support, including grants, contracts and indirect funding provided to media organisations, and that such information should be easily accessible and clearly presented;

118. Regrets that the Commission had not performed interim evaluations of the flagship programmes Erasmus+, European Solidarity Corps, and Creative Europe before the legally defined deadline; stresses that evaluations should inform decision-making for the current programming period, as well as for the future one;

Recommendations

~~96.~~119. Calls on the Commission to act on the Court’s recommendations from its Annual Report to ensure that:

(i) audit authorities strengthen their control and detection capacity by verifying that they plan properly the sampling, confirm that compliance with eligibility criteria is proven, and keep proper documentation to support the audit trail;

(ii) when systematic weaknesses have been detected in operational programmes and a flat rate has been imposed, Member State authorities do not use the flat rate correction mechanism to avoid their responsibility to check the eligibility of the expenditure before declaring it to the Commission, and make individual recoveries as necessary;

~~97.~~120. Furthermore, calls on the Commission to:

(i) continue to address the systemic issue of non-detection of errors at Member State level in cohesion policy spending with the effective implementation of the action plan, aimed at increasing detection capacity at Member State and Commission level;

(ii) develop a methodology to measure the overall financial impact of EPPO and OLAF investigations, including amounts recovered following national court decisions in criminal proceedings, and to obtain regular information from Member States on asset recovery and the share returned to the Union budget as recommended by the Court;

(ii) further strengthen guidance, coordination and monitoring in order to ensure greater legal certainty and more effective reuse of reflows across Member States;

(iii) link recommendations from the Rule of Law Report to the implementation of concrete measures by the Member State concerned to have a stronger impact and at best contribute to protecting the Union’s financial interests, and refers in this regard to the recommendations made in Parliament’s resolution of 18 June 2025 on the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report;

(iii) work closely with Member States, in particular those facing structural or capacity constraints, to provide technical assistance, administrative simplification and sufficient flexibility in implementation in order to ensure the full and effective absorption of cohesion funds;

(iv) step up its monitoring of the horizontal and thematic enabling conditions in all Member States to identify potential threats to the protection of the Union Budget and ensure enhanced transparency and stakeholder participation in the application of this tool;

(iv) develop a methodology to measure the overall financial impact of EPPO and OLAF investigations, including amounts recovered following national court decisions in criminal proceedings, and to obtain regular information from Member States on asset recovery and the share returned to the Union budget as recommended by the Court;

(v) closely align the rule of law report with the Conditionality Regulation and report in more detail on the breaches of the principles of the rule of law that can be used as input to trigger the Conditionality Regulation;

(v) link recommendations from the Rule of Law Report to the implementation of concrete measures by the Member State concerned to have a stronger impact and contribute to protecting the Union’s financial interests, and refers in this regard to the recommendations made in Parliament’s resolution of 18 June 2025 on the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report;

(vi) urgently reassess and address the deterioration of the rule of law and risks to the Union budget in Hungary and take all necessary actions in accordance with the Conditionality Regulation and other available tools, including full suspension of Union funds;

(vi) step up its monitoring of the horizontal and thematic enabling conditions in all Member States to identify potential threats to the protection of the Union Budget and ensure enhanced transparency and stakeholder participation in the application of this tool;

(vii) closely align the rule of law report with the Conditionality Regulation and report in more detail on the breaches of the principles of the rule of law that can be used as input to trigger the Conditionality Regulation;

(viii) exercise its right of initiative and propose measures to close any existing loopholes in the Union's legislative framework that could enable governments to transfer funds suspended in accordance with the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation or on account of non-fulfilment of horizontal enabling conditions, and ensure that any future funding instruments contain adequate safeguards against circumvention;

(ix) urgently reassess and address the deterioration of the rule of law and risks to the Union budget in Hungary and take all necessary actions in accordance with the Conditionality Regulation and other available tools, including full suspension of Union funds;

(x) carry out an ex-post evaluation of the financial impact of cohesion policy amendments on eastern border regions, notably the ERDF funds initially earmarked for cross-border cooperation with Russia and Belarus as well as funds reallocated in the context of the 2025 cohesion mid-term review, covering the extent to which Union funds originally intended for regions sharing a border with Russia and/or Belarus have ultimately remained in them or conversely been directed elsewhere, share its evaluation with the discharge authority, and urgently propose targeted financial support for these regions to counter the disproportionate impact of Russia's war of aggression, including remedying losses suffered as a result of the amendments during the current programming period;

(xi) reconsider the single audit approach until the weaknesses identified in the managing and audit authorities in Member States have been tackled;

(xii) ensure operating grants are provided under the EU4Health programme;

Natural resources and environment

~~98.~~121. Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 3 ‘Natural resources and environment’ was EUR 64,4 billion (33,7 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 59,2 % of this expenditure went to the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) – direct payments (EUR 38,1 billion), followed by EAFRD (EUR 15,5 billion, 24,0 %), Just Transition Fund (EUR 6,2 billion, 9,5 %), European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) – market-related expenditure (EUR 2,7 billion, 4,1 %), Maritime and Fisheries (EUR 1,3 billion, 2,0 %), Environment and Climate (LIFE) (EUR 600 million, 0,9 %) and other (EUR 200 million, 0,3 %);

~~99.~~122. Underlines that in 2024 the common agricultural policy (CAP) represented the main share (87,3 %) of Union spending on natural resources and environment; recalls that 2024 was the second year of the CAP 2023-2027, which introduced a new delivery model incorporating performance-based elements, agreed with the Member States in Strategic Plans, as the basis for payments;

~~100.~~123. ~~Welcomes~~Notes that at the end of 2024, payments from EAFRD ~~2021-2027~~2023-2027 amounted to EUR 6,3 billion (in 2023: EUR 700 million), representing an absorption rate of 9,5 % (compared to 1 % in 2023); ~~also~~stresses ~~welcomes~~that delayed payments undermine farmers’ income stability; notes the 32 % absorption rate of the Just Transition Fund; notes with concern the low absorption rate of European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF), which reached only 3 % by the end of ~~2024,~~2024;

~~101.~~124. Notes that the Court has examined a sample of 228 transactions covering the full range of spending under this MFF heading in 19 Member States and the United Kingdom; notes with concern that the Court estimates the level of error for this heading to be 2,6 % (in 2023: 2,2 %); further notes that the Court found eight quantifiable errors (i.e. errors with a direct financial impact on the Union budget) in rural development, eight in eco-scheme transactions, a new type of intervention introduced under the 2023-2027 CAP to support agricultural practices that contribute to the climate and the environment goals and animal welfare, three in direct payments excluding eco-schemes, two in market measures, and one in a shared management transaction under the EMFAF; observes that the Court also detected 19 other compliance issues with no financial impact on the Union budget;

~~102.~~125. Notes the categorisation of errors by the Court, with administrative errors accounting for 44 % of errors, ineligibility issues for 28 %, non-respect of agri-environmental, climate, or eco-scheme commitments for 16 % and provision of inaccurate information on areas or animals for 12 %;

~~103.~~126. Expresses its concern that in case of 13 quantifiable errors, the Court considers that the Member State authorities ~~and the Commission~~ had sufficient information to prevent, or to detect and correct the error before accepting the expenditure and that, had the Member State authorities made proper use of all the information at their disposal, the estimated level of error for this heading would have been 2,2 percentage points lower;

104. Is reassured by the Court’s conclusion that the direct payments under CAP, excluding eco-schemes remained free of material error in 2024; acknowledges the Commission’s assessment that this confirms the important role the Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS) plays in preventing and reducing the risk of errors, as direct payments are managed by each Member State through IACS, which interlinks databases of holdings, aid applications, animal registries and agricultural areas;

127. Draws attention to the need for simplification, further development and promotion of digital tools, and stronger controls to reduce the level of ineligible expenditure; stresses the importance of reducing administrative burdens on farmers to strengthen sound financial management;

105. Recalls that under the performance-based model of CAP 2023-2027, Member States set the rules to be complied with by final beneficiaries in accordance with the general framework of the Union, while the Commission focuses on performance results and the functioning of the systems that Member States put in place to ensure the respect of those conditions and no longer on the individual transactions; further recalls that accordingly for CAP 2023-2027, Member States are obliged to report to the Commission on output and result indicators related to policy performance, and not on control statistics;

128. Is reassured by the Court’s conclusion that the direct payments under CAP, excluding eco-schemes remained free of material error in 2024; acknowledges the Commission’s assessment that this confirms the important role the Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS) plays in preventing and reducing the risk of errors, as direct payments are managed by each Member State through IACS, which interlinks databases of holdings, aid applications, animal registries and agricultural areas;

~~106.~~129. ~~Notes~~Recalls ~~the~~that ~~Commission’s~~under ~~replies~~the toperformance-based ~~the~~model ~~Court~~of ~~that~~CAP it2023-2027, ~~considers~~Member ~~that~~States set the ~~audit~~rules ~~work~~to ofbe ~~the~~complied ~~Certification~~with ~~Bodies~~by ~~continues~~final tobeneficiaries bein aaccordance ~~key~~with ~~element~~the general framework of ~~assurance~~the ~~for~~Union, while the ~~CAP~~Commission ~~expenditure~~focuses ~~under~~on ~~the~~performance ~~Strategic~~results ~~Plans;~~and ~~notes,~~the ~~furthermore,~~functioning ~~that~~of ~~for~~the ~~CAP~~systems ~~2023-2027,~~that Member States ~~are required~~put toin ~~report~~place to ensure the ~~Commission~~respect ~~their~~of ~~assurance~~those ~~packages,~~conditions ~~including~~and ~~the~~no ~~new~~longer ~~annual~~on ~~performance~~the ~~reports~~individual ~~and~~transactions; ~~the~~further ~~Certification~~recalls ~~Body’s~~that ~~opinion~~accordingly ~~and~~for ~~accompanying~~CAP ~~reports,~~2023-2027, ~~which~~Member ~~the~~States ~~Commission~~are ~~then~~obliged ~~uses,~~to ~~together~~report ~~with~~to the ~~results of~~Commission ~~its~~on ~~own~~output ~~audit~~and ~~findings~~result ~~and~~indicators ~~those~~related ofto ~~the~~policy ~~Court,~~performance, toand ~~conclude~~not on ~~the~~control ~~assurance~~statistics; ~~for~~notes ~~CAP~~the ~~expenditure;~~Court's ~~underlines~~observation ~~that~~in ~~the~~its ~~Commission~~special ~~does~~report ~~not~~07/2024 ~~calculate~~‘The anCommission’s ~~error~~systems ~~rate~~for orrecovering ~~risk~~irregular atEU ~~payment~~expenditure’ ~~for~~that ~~expenditure~~recoveries ~~under~~concerning ~~the~~agricultural ~~CAP~~expenditure ~~Strategic~~have ~~Plans;~~been ~~acknowledges~~relatively ~~the~~successful, ~~Commission’s~~attributed ~~explanation~~in ~~that~~part ~~since~~to ~~74,8~~the %so-called of50/50 ~~the~~rule ~~expenditure~~that ofincentivised ~~the~~Member ~~MFF~~States ~~heading~~to 3recover infunds; ~~2024~~notes ~~corresponded~~that tothis ~~performance-based~~rule ~~expenditure~~has ~~under~~not ~~CAP~~been ~~Strategic~~retained ~~Plans,~~in nothe ~~risk~~2023-2027 atCAP ~~payment~~and ~~could~~the beCourt's ~~determined~~warning ~~for~~that this ~~heading~~might ~~and,~~lead asto a ~~consequence,~~deterioration ~~for~~of the ~~Union~~rate ~~budget~~of asrecovery afor ~~whole;~~agricultural expenditure;

107. Observes that for 2024, Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI) assessed 82 % of CAP 2023-2027 spending as low-risk, 11 % as medium-risk, and the remaining 7 % as high-risk; notes the Court’s clarification that low-risk spending corresponds to interventions unaffected by potential serious deficiencies in their governance systems and that most low-risk spending relates to direct payments and other support covered by the IACS; further notes that in its Annual Activity Report for 2024, DG AGRI combined the result of the performance-based and compliance-based payments and concluded that overall 77 % of CAP spending in 2024 was low-risk (compared to 69 % of CAP spending in 2023 and 72 % in 2022), 10 % was medium-risk, and 13 % was high-risk;

130. Notes the Commission’s replies to the Court that it considers that the audit work of the Certification Bodies continues to be a key element of assurance for the CAP expenditure under the Strategic Plans; notes, furthermore, that for CAP 2023-2027, Member States are required to report to the Commission their assurance packages, including the new annual performance reports and the Certification Body’s opinion and accompanying reports, which the Commission then uses, together with the results of its own audit findings and those of the Court, to conclude on the assurance for CAP expenditure; underlines that the Commission does not calculate an error rate or risk at payment for expenditure under the CAP Strategic Plans; acknowledges the Commission’s explanation that since 74,8 % of the expenditure of the MFF heading 3 in 2024 corresponded to performance-based expenditure under CAP Strategic Plans, no risk at payment could be determined for this heading and, as a consequence, for the Union budget as a whole;

108. Notes with concern the reservations issued in DG AGRI’s 2024 AAR, namely, ten reservations for nine Member States for IACS expenditure under CAP Strategic Plans due to potential serious deficiencies identified in the functioning of the governance systems, 6 reservations for five Member States concerning non-IACS expenditure under CAP Strategic Plans due to potential serious deficiencies identified in the functioning of the governance systems, six reservations for four Member States concerning market measures due to the significant occurrence of weaknesses in the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions, with the amount at risk estimated as EUR 14,92 million, one reservation for one Member State concerning direct payments under programme of options specifically relating to remoteness and insularity (POSEI) due to the significant occurrence of weaknesses in the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions, with the amount at risk estimated as EUR 28,83 million, 12 reservations for ten Member States concerning rural development due to the significant occurrence of weaknesses in the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions, with the amount at risk estimated as EUR 209,80 million;

131. Observes that for 2024, Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI) assessed 82 % of CAP 2023-2027 spending as low-risk, 11 % as medium-risk, and the remaining 7 % as high-risk; notes the Court’s clarification that low-risk spending corresponds to interventions unaffected by potential serious deficiencies in their governance systems and that most low-risk spending relates to direct payments and other support covered by the IACS; further notes that in its Annual Activity Report for 2024, DG AGRI combined the result of the performance-based and compliance-based payments and concluded that overall 77 % of CAP spending in 2024 was low-risk (compared to 69 % of CAP spending in 2023 and 72 % in 2022), 10 % was medium-risk, and 13 % was high-risk;

109. Welcomes that as part of its 2024 audit, the Court also collected and analysed information on the introduction of annual performance reports for CAP 2023-2027; is reassured by the Court’s overall conclusion that that annual performance reporting has, for the most part, been introduced as planned and that it has not identified any issues with the reported data; is reassured by the Court’s finding that for the nine paying agencies it reviewed, correspondence can be established between the payments made and the outputs recorded in their IT systems for producing annual performance reports;

132. Notes with concern the reservations issued in DG AGRI’s 2024 AAR, namely, ten reservations for nine Member States for IACS expenditure under CAP Strategic Plans due to potential serious deficiencies identified in the functioning of the governance systems, 6 reservations for five Member States concerning non-IACS expenditure under CAP Strategic Plans due to potential serious deficiencies identified in the functioning of the governance systems, six reservations for four Member States concerning market measures due to the significant occurrence of weaknesses in the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions, with the amount at risk estimated as EUR 14,92 million, one reservation for one Member State concerning direct payments under programme of options specifically relating to remoteness and insularity (POSEI) due to the significant occurrence of weaknesses in the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions, with the amount at risk estimated as EUR 28,83 million, 12 reservations for ten Member States concerning rural development due to the significant occurrence of weaknesses in the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions, with the amount at risk estimated as EUR 209,80 million;

~~110. Notes~~133. ~~the~~Welcomes ~~Court’s~~that ~~finding,~~as ~~based~~part onof its ~~survey of~~2024 19audit, ~~Member~~the ~~States,~~Court ~~that~~also ~~paying~~collected ~~agencies’~~and ~~performance~~analysed ~~reporting~~information ~~systems~~on ~~were~~the ~~still~~introduction ~~under~~of ~~development~~annual inperformance ~~2024,~~reports ~~with~~for 18CAP ~~paying~~2023-2027; ~~agencies~~is ~~having~~reassured ~~automated~~by the ~~production of~~Court’s ~~performance~~overall ~~indicators~~conclusion ~~and~~that ~~two~~that ~~using~~annual aperformance ~~manual~~reporting orhas, ~~partly~~for ~~automated~~the ~~approach~~most topart, ~~produce~~been ~~some~~introduced ~~key~~as ~~output~~planned ~~indicators~~and ~~for~~that ~~their~~it ~~2024~~has ~~annual~~not ~~performance~~identified ~~reports;~~any ~~notes~~issues with ~~concern that~~ the ITreported ~~systems~~data; ~~used~~is ~~for~~reassured ~~producing~~by the ~~annual~~Court’s ~~performance~~finding ~~reports,~~that atfor the ~~time~~nine ofpaying ~~Court’s~~agencies ~~audit~~it ~~work,~~reviewed, ~~had~~correspondence ~~not~~can ~~yet~~be ~~undergone~~established ~~full~~between ~~testing~~the topayments ~~check~~made ~~their~~and ~~compliance~~the ~~with~~outputs ~~the~~recorded ~~international~~in ~~information~~their ~~security~~IT ~~standards~~systems ~~(ISO~~for ~~27001);~~producing annual performance reports;

111. Recalls that CAP 2023-2027 is built around ten key objectives, including ensuring a fair income for farmers; considers that direct income support under CAP should be provided only to active farmers whose main activity is agriculture, with a specific focus on those most in need, such as family-sized and small farms, farms in areas with natural or other specific challenges, young and female farmers; considers that the Commission should take measures to increase the effectiveness of Union agricultural funds and ensure that only active farmers receive direct income support, and not landowners;

134. Notes the Court’s finding, based on its survey of 19 Member States, that paying agencies’ performance reporting systems were still under development in 2024, with 18 paying agencies having automated the production of performance indicators and two using a manual or partly automated approach to produce some key output indicators for their 2024 annual performance reports; notes with concern that the IT systems used for producing the annual performance reports, at the time of Court’s audit work, had not yet undergone full testing to check their compliance with the international information security standards (ISO 27001);

112. Is concerned by the allegations of large-scale fraud affecting Union agricultural funds, which were first reported in the media in February 2025, concerning the Greek Payment and Control Agency for Guidance and Guarantee Community Aids (OPEKEPE); recalls that EPPO published a press release in May 2025 confirming that they were conducting an investigation into an alleged organised fraud scheme involving agricultural funds and corruption involving public officials of OPEKEPE; recalls that EPPO has, according to press reports, handed over information to the Greek Parliament with a view to investigating two former ministers; notes that the OPEKEPE scandal has led to the resignation of several ministers and deputy ministers over their alleged involvement in the scandal; notes with concern EPPO’s press release of 22 October 2025 that explains that in the course of EPPO’s preliminary investigation, an organised criminal group, allegedly involved in a systematic large-scale subsidy fraud scheme and money-laundering activities, has been identified;

135. Recalls that CAP 2023-2027 is structured around ten key objectives, including ensuring a viable, fair and stable income for farmers, safeguarding food security and strengthening the resilience of the agricultural sector; considers that direct income support under CAP should be better targeted to farmers actively engaged in agricultural production, while preserving legal certainty and avoiding excessive administrative constraints, with a specific focus on supporting those most in need, such as family-sized farms, small farms, farms located in areas facing natural constraints or other specific challenges, young farmers and female farmers; calls on the Commission to improve the efficiency and targeting of Union agricultural funds and ensure that only active farmers receive direct income support, while at the same time ensuring proportionality and maintaining robust controls;

113. Acknowledges that DG AGRI issued in its AAR 2024 four reservations related to expenditure managed by OPEKEPE; notes that one such reservation covers all the IACS interventions under the CAP Strategic Plans, as DG AGRI’s conformity audit and the work of the certification body revealed a number of potential serious deficiencies in relation to the implementation of the identification system for agricultural parcels, as well as in the design and functioning of the management and control system; notes another reservation was issued concerning non-IACS expenditure under the CAP Strategic Plans covering the wine sector and apiculture due to potential serious deficiencies in relation to the design or set-up of the systems not covering the principles of economy, efficiency and measures to avoid double funding; notes that the third reservation for OPEKEPE concerns 2014-2022 rural development programmes, for which the adjusted error rate is estimated to be 7,45 %, due to DG AGRI’s audits in 2023 and 2024 that identified several weaknesses related to land parcel identification system, weaknesses in the OPEKEPE’s on-the-spot checks, serious deficiencies with regard to the supervision and checks of the local action groups, procedures to verify the potential creation of artificial conditions, checks on double financing and public procurement and deficiencies in the evaluation of the reasonableness of costs and verification of SME status; notes the fourth reservation concerning market measures outside of CAP Strategic Plans was issued covering fruit and vegetable producer organisations and exceptional measures, for which an adjusted error rate of 10 % is estimated following DG AGRI’s audit in 2024 that identified deficiencies in administrative and on-the-spot checks impacting exceptional measures and due to fact that, based on the Certification Body’s assessment, adjustments were made to the error rates for fruit and vegetable producer organisations and promotion;

136. Notes the Court’s 2025 conclusions on Union funding for forest-fire-related action: while Member States increasingly used Union funds for prevention, the Commission had an incomplete overview of total forest-fire spending and monitoring of results was weak, an issue with clear agricultural and rural implications; calls on the Commission to improve aggregation of forest-fire related spending and to strengthen monitoring of outcomes and long-term sustainability of preventive measures;

114. Acknowledges the Commission’s written replies that in 2023 and again in June 2024, DG AGRI requested that the Greek competent authority places OPEKEPE’s accreditation under probation; notes the explanation in DG AGRI’s AAR that deficiencies affecting several accreditation criteria were identified by the Certification Body and by DG AGRI, and as a result, Greek authorities put the accreditation of OPEKEPE under probation in September 2024 and drew up an accreditation action plan; further notes that the Commission is following the progress of the implementation of this remedial action plan; insists that the Commission share the latest revised action plan and its assessment with the discharge authority;

137. Stresses that in the context of growing natural-disaster risks the Commission and Member States must ensure that Union-funded prevention measures are well-targeted, based on up-to-date risk assessments, and sustained beyond one-off project cycles so that investments deliver lasting benefits for agriculture and rural communities;

115. Notes the Commission’s reply that in June 2025, the Commission applied a financial correction of EUR 415 million for the deficiencies identified in the management and control system in Greece during the years 2015-2022; notes with concern that the Commission was aware of serious deficiencies related to OPEKEPE since at least 2021, as a then ongoing accreditation related conformity enquiry was already reported in DG AGRI’s AAR for 2021; regrets the fact that the Commission has not taken action earlier to thoroughly investigate the serious deficiencies found in relation to OPEKEPE’s work, mitigate risks and better protect the Union budget;

138. Is concerned by the allegations of large-scale fraud affecting Union agricultural funds, which were first reported in the media in February 2025, concerning the Greek Payment and Control Agency for Guidance and Guarantee Community Aids (OPEKEPE); recalls that EPPO published a press release in May 2025 confirming that they were conducting an investigation into an alleged organised fraud scheme involving agricultural funds and corruption involving public officials of OPEKEPE; recalls that EPPO has, according to press reports, handed over information to the Greek Parliament with a view to investigating two ministers who later stepped down; notes with concern EPPO’s press release of 22 October 2025 that explains that in the course of EPPO’s preliminary investigation, an organised criminal group, allegedly involved in a systematic large-scale subsidy fraud scheme and money-laundering activities, has been identified; acknowledges the measures taken by Greek authorities without delay, including inter alia the decision to establish a special investigative task force, comprising the Financial Police and the Independent Authority for Public Revenue; underlines, in this context, that the assets of several individuals suspected of involvement in the alleged criminal activities have been seized;

116. Expresses its concerns over the number of irregularities and allegations of fraud related to Union-funded guesthouses; notes the Commission’s written replies that for the 2014-2022 programming period, guesthouses were financed, together with other types of investments, under Rural Development sub-measure 6.4 (investments in creation and development of non-agricultural activities) and the Leader programme; finds it regrettable, that since the Member States are not reporting to the Commission the number and type of investments supported by these measures, the Commission could not provide to the discharge authority an overview of Union-funded guesthouse projects; notes that the Commission’s audits on rural development measures are system-based and do not assess the legality and regularity of individual transactions; acknowledges the Commission’s written reply that findings on the management and control system implemented by the Member States in connection with guesthouses have been raised in Hungary, Slovakia (measure 6.4) and in Greece (Leader); considers that given the number of fraud allegations connected to guesthouses, the Commission should also monitor and audit individual guesthouse projects, including their use beyond the project implementation period and consider extending the durability period for these kinds of projects to prevent further misuse as well as to introduce strict conflict of interest checks as a prerequisite for the allocation of Union funds to build guesthouses;

139. Acknowledges that DG AGRI issued in its AAR 2024 four reservations related to expenditure managed by OPEKEPE; notes that one such reservation covers all the IACS interventions under the CAP Strategic Plans, as DG AGRI’s conformity audit and the work of the certification body revealed a number of potential serious deficiencies in relation to the implementation of the identification system for agricultural parcels, as well as in the design and functioning of the management and control system; notes another reservation was issued concerning non-IACS expenditure under the CAP Strategic Plans covering the wine sector and apiculture due to potential serious deficiencies in relation to the design or set-up of the systems not covering the principles of economy, efficiency and measures to avoid double funding; notes that the third reservation for OPEKEPE concerns 2014-2022 rural development programmes, for which the adjusted error rate is estimated to be 7,45 %, due to DG AGRI’s audits in 2023 and 2024 that identified several weaknesses related to land parcel identification system, weaknesses in the OPEKEPE’s on-the-spot checks, serious deficiencies with regard to the supervision and checks of the local action groups, procedures to verify the potential creation of artificial conditions, checks on double financing and public procurement and deficiencies in the evaluation of the reasonableness of costs and verification of SME status; notes the fourth reservation concerning market measures outside of CAP Strategic Plans was issued covering fruit and vegetable producer organisations and exceptional measures, for which an adjusted error rate of 10 % is estimated following DG AGRI’s audit in 2024 that identified deficiencies in administrative and on-the-spot checks impacting exceptional measures and due to fact that, based on the Certification Body’s assessment, adjustments were made to the error rates for fruit and vegetable producer organisations and promotion; acknowledges that the Greek Authorities drew up an Action Plan, which has been accepted by DG AGRI as a sufficient basis for remedying the above mentioned deficiencies; recalls that all corrective measures are subject to ongoing monitoring by the Commission; insists that the Commission report to the discharge authority on the implementation of the action plan and on measurable improvements in control performance;

117. Recalls that the current Prime Minister of Czechia was found to be in a situation of conflict of interest during his previous mandate and the related the European Parliament resolution of 13 December 2018; notes the Commission’s written replies concerning the measures taken in response to the conflict of interest due to Andrej Babiš's ownership of Agrofert while serving as Prime Minister of Czechia; in particular notes that the Commission suspended in March 2020 the payment of one Agrofert project worth EUR 30 606,96; notes that in June 2022, the Commission applied a financial correction of EUR 3,3 million to Czechia, part of which (EUR 30 606,96) concerned the situation of conflict of interest of the Prime Minister during his mandate that ended in 2021; insists that the Commission should continue to monitor possible conflicts of interests that might affect Union funds, especially in relation to elected officials, and take action to protect the Union budget;

140. Acknowledges the Commission’s written replies that in 2023 and again in June 2024, DG AGRI requested that the Greek competent authority places OPEKEPE’s accreditation under probation; notes the explanation in DG AGRI’s AAR that deficiencies affecting several accreditation criteria were identified by the Certification Body and by DG AGRI, and as a result, Greek authorities put the accreditation of OPEKEPE under probation in September 2024 and drew up an accreditation action plan; further notes that the Commission is following the progress of the implementation of this remedial action plan; insists that the Commission share the latest revised action plan and its assessment with the discharge authority; acknowledges that Greek authorities have taken corrective measures without delay to address the identified structural weaknesses, enhance transparency of beneficiaries and reinforce controls and anti-fraud measures; welcomes in this context, the reform recently introduced by law to fully transfer OPEKEPE to the Independent Authority for Public Revenues (AADE);

118. Notes that Andrej Babiš has been re-elected and assumed the office of Prime Minister of Czechia in December 2025; takes note of his public announcement that he intends to relinquish ownership and control of Agrofert through the creation of an allegedly irreversible trust arrangement; notes, however, that no concrete legal documentation has so far been made public, that the trust structure has not yet been established as of 15 January 2026, that its jurisdiction, governance and trustees remain unknown and that Mr Babiš continues, at present, to own Agrofert and other business interests which could potentially benefit from Union funds; notes, further, that, even under the arrangement as described, Agrofert would ultimately be transferred to his children, thereby maintaining a clear long-term economic interest; stresses that the mere announcement of future arrangements is insufficient to dispel concerns of conflict of interest;

141. Notes the Commission’s reply that in June 2025, the Commission applied a financial correction of EUR 415 million for the deficiencies identified in the management and control system in Greece during the years 2015-2022; notes with concern that the Commission was aware of serious deficiencies related to OPEKEPE since at least 2021, as a then ongoing accreditation related conformity enquiry was already reported in DG AGRI’s AAR for 2021; regrets the fact that the Commission has not taken action earlier to thoroughly investigate the serious deficiencies found in relation to OPEKEPE’s work, mitigate risks and better protect the Union budget;

119. Recalls that climate and biodiversity are two of the horizontal policy priorities for the 2021-2027 Union budget; notes that the Commission defines climate and biodiversity mainstreaming as the systematic consideration of climate and biodiversity objectives in the design, preparation, implementation and evaluation of each spending programme;

142. Expresses its concerns over the number of irregularities and allegations of fraud related to Union-funded guesthouses; notes the Commission’s written replies that for the 2014-2022 programming period, guesthouses were financed, together with other types of investments, under Rural Development sub-measure 6.4 (investments in creation and development of non-agricultural activities) and the Leader programme; finds it regrettable, that since the Member States are not reporting to the Commission the number and type of investments supported by these measures, the Commission could not provide to the discharge authority an overview of Union-funded guesthouse projects; notes that the Commission’s audits on rural development measures are system-based and do not assess the legality and regularity of individual transactions; acknowledges the Commission’s written reply that findings on the management and control system implemented by the Member States in connection with guesthouses have been raised in Hungary, Slovakia (measure 6.4) and in Greece (Leader); considers that given the number of fraud allegations connected to guesthouses, the Commission should also monitor and audit individual guesthouse projects, including their use beyond the project implementation period and consider extending the durability period for these kinds of projects to prevent further misuse as well as to introduce strict conflict of interest checks as a prerequisite for the allocation of Union funds to build guesthouses;

120. Recalls that the 2020 Interinstitutional Agreement established a binding 30 % target for climate spending, but only an annual ‘ambition’ of 7,5 % in 2025 and 10 % in 2026 and 2027 for biodiversity spending; notes that the Commission tracks Union spending on climate and biodiversity-related activities by means of dedicated methodologies; stresses that the climate and biodiversity tracking methodologies are ex-ante tagging systems based on the expected effect of activities and do not factor in results; recalls that the mainstreaming of priorities in the Union budget entails the consideration of that priority in all stages of the budgetary cycle; underlines, therefore, that the tracking of spending related to climate or biodiversity objectives is only one step in a comprehensive green budgeting cycle, in which climate and biodiversity objectives are considered throughout the whole lifecycle of the budget;

143. Recalls that a former Prime Minister of Czechia was found to have been in a situation of conflict of interest during his previous term in office and the related European Parliament resolution of 13 December 2018; notes the Commission’s written replies concerning the measures taken in response to the conflict of interest arising from his ownership of a private holding company while holding public office and that the Commission suspended in March 2020 the payment of one project worth EUR 30 606,96; notes that in June 2022, the Commission applied a financial correction of EUR 3,3 million to Czechia, part of which (EUR 30 606,96) concerned the situation of conflict of interest of the Prime Minister during his mandate that ended in 2021; insists that the Commission should continue to monitor possible conflicts of interest that might affect Union funds, especially in relation to elected officials, and take action to protect the Union budget;

121. Notes that applying its climate and biodiversity tracking methodologies, the Commission calculates that the Union is on track to meet its 30 % climate spending target for 2021-2027 and its biodiversity spending ambition of 7,5 % for 2024; regrets that it is not on track to meet its biodiversity spending ambition of 10 % for 2026 and 2027;

144. Notes that following national elections, a new government took office in Czechia in December 2025; takes note of public statements by the Prime Minister, indicating an intention to relinquish ownership and control of business interests potentially benefiting from Union funds through the creation of an allegedly irreversible trust arrangement; notes, however, that as of mid-January 2026, no publicly available legal documentation has been provided to demonstrate the effective establishment and operational safeguards of such arrangements and that the Prime Minister of Czechia continues, at present, to own Agrofert and other business interests which could potentially benefit from Union funds; stresses that the mere announcement of future arrangements is insufficient to dispel concerns of conflict of interest; insists that any future arrangements must ensure the effective removal of economic interests and influence, in line with Union rules on conflict of interest; welcomes recent media reports that the Commission has formally requested detailed information from the Czech authorities on the measures put in place to prevent potential conflicts of interest in relation to companies owned or controlled by the Prime Minister, and has sought assurances that no further Union funds are directed to Agrofert until the situation is fully clarified;

122. Is concerned that in several audits, the Court found that Union funds’ contribution to climate objectives was unclear and potentially overestimated due to weaknesses in the Commission tracking methodologies; recalls that in its special report 09/2022 on climate spending in the 2014-2020 Union budget, the Court found that the climate contribution of the Union budget had been overstated by EUR 72 billion under the 2014-2020 MFF, as reported spending was not always relevant to climate action, particularly under the CAP; looks forward to receiving the Court’s assessment of the Commission’s follow-up of its recommendations made in special report 09/2022 in 2026;

145. Recalls that climate and biodiversity are two of the horizontal policy priorities for the 2021-2027 Union budget; notes that the Commission defines climate and biodiversity mainstreaming as the systematic consideration of climate and biodiversity objectives in the design, preparation, implementation and evaluation of each spending programme;

123. Notes the Court’s Special Report 20/2024 on Common Agriculture Policy Plans and the Commission’s reply, in particular that the Court’s overall conclusion that the CAP Strategic Plans 2023-2027 are ‘greener’ than in the previous CAP period, but do not match the Union’s ambitions for the climate and the environment, and that key elements for assessing performance are missing; welcomes that the Court also recommends the Commission to estimate the CAP’s contribution to the Green Deal targets and strengthen the future CAP monitoring framework for the climate and the environment;

146. Recalls that the 2020 Interinstitutional Agreement established a binding 30 % target for climate spending, but only an annual ‘ambition’ of 7,5 % in 2025 and 10 % in 2026 and 2027 for biodiversity spending; notes that the Commission tracks Union spending on climate and biodiversity-related activities by means of dedicated methodologies; stresses that the climate and biodiversity tracking methodologies are ex-ante tagging systems based on the expected effect of activities and do not factor in results; recalls that the mainstreaming of priorities in the Union budget entails the consideration of that priority in all stages of the budgetary cycle; underlines, therefore, that the tracking of spending related to climate or biodiversity objectives is only one step in a comprehensive green budgeting cycle, in which climate and biodiversity objectives are considered throughout the whole lifecycle of the budget;

124. Notes the Court’s special report 14/2024 ‘Green transition – Unclear contribution from the Recovery and Resilience Facility’ and the Commission’s reply; is disappointed by Court’s overall conclusion that weaknesses in the design and implementation of the RRF call into question the achievement of its climate and environmental objectives and that the RRF’s contribution to the green transition is not clear; is concerned that the Court found that tracking climate expenditure involves a high level of approximation and some coefficients were leading to potential overestimations; welcomes that the Court also recommends the Commission to better estimate climate spending under future funding instruments and ensure adequate design of future funding instruments that are to support the climate and environmental objectives and targets;

147. Notes that applying its climate and biodiversity tracking methodologies, the Commission calculates that the Union is on track to meet its 30 % climate spending target for 2021-2027 and its biodiversity spending ambition of 7,5 % for 2025; regrets that it is not on track to meet its biodiversity spending ambition of 10 % for 2026 and 2027; notes, furthermore, that there is an average annual financing gap of EUR 21,4 billion to achieve Union biodiversity goals; underlines that increased budgetary allocations must be accompanied by improved effectiveness, better monitoring of biodiversity outcomes, while making sure that these changes to do not create disproportionate administrative burdens for farmers and local authorities;

125. Notes the Court’s Special report 15/2024 on climate adaptation in the Union and the Commission’s reply; appreciates the Court’s conclusion that the overall Union framework for adaptation policy was sound; is concerned by the finding that Member States sometimes used outdated scientific data for their national adaptation strategy documents and that the Member States’ reporting on climate adaptation was insufficient and added little value in terms of tracking progress; is disappointed by the Court’s findings that a third of the sampled projects had little or no impact on increasing adaptive capacity and that there is a risk that two projects (out of 36) might result in maladaptation; welcomes that the Court also recommends that the Commission improve reporting on climate adaptation through common indicators to measure progress and follow up on the weaknesses identified;

148. Is concerned that in several audits, the Court found that Union funds’ contribution to climate objectives was unclear and potentially overestimated due to weaknesses in the Commission tracking methodologies; recalls that in its special report 09/2022 on climate spending in the 2014-2020 Union budget, the Court found that the climate contribution of the Union budget had been overstated by EUR 72 billion under the 2014-2020 MFF, as reported spending was not always relevant to climate action, including under the CAP; is aware that in response to above special report the Commission commissioned a study with a view to establishing a more scientific approach to quantify the CAP climate contribution and considers that the study should be made public; looks forward to receiving the Court’s assessment of the Commission’s follow-up of its recommendations made in special report 09/2022 in 2026;

126. Recalls that all Union spending must comply with the horizontal ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) principle, laid down in point 16 of the Interinstitutional Agreement, which stipulates that Union spending must not cause harm to the six environmental objectives set out in Article 17 of the Taxonomy Regulation, namely climate mitigation and adaptation, sustainable use and protection of water resources, the circular economy, pollution prevention and control, and biodiversity protection; considers that, in light of the Court’s recurrent findings, the negative environmental effects of Union spending should also be tracked and reported on;

149. Notes the Commission’s written reply that from 2021 to 2023, agricultural greenhouse gas emissions in the Union decreased by 3 %, while those for energy supply and industry decreased by 16 %; considers all policy areas and activities must contribute fairly to reducing emissions; notes the Court’s Special Report 20/2024 on Common Agriculture Policy Plans and the Commission’s reply; in particular, notes the Court’s assessment that the CAP Strategic Plans 2023-2027 represent an improvement compared to the previous programming period, including with regard to climate and environment considerations, though the monitoring and performance framework could be further strengthened; welcomes that the Court also recommends the Commission to estimate the CAP’s contribution to the Green Deal targets and strengthen the future CAP monitoring framework with a view to improving its contribution to the Union's climate and environmental objectives; considers that improvements to the monitoring and performance framework should not result in additional administrative burden for farmers or managing authorities;

127. Recalls that EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is a key component of the European Green Deal and one of the main instruments for achieving the Union’s climate ambition; notes the finding of 2024 IAS audit on the implementation and monitoring of the EU ETS that despite the heavy workload, complex legal framework and scarce resources they operate with, the Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA) staff showed commitment to perform their tasks and willingness to improve the efficiency of the EU ETS related processes; appreciates the Commission’s written confirmation that DG CLIMA intends to address most internal audit recommendations by 2025 and all by mid-2028;

150. Notes the Court’s special report 14/2024 ‘Green transition – Unclear contribution from the Recovery and Resilience Facility’ and the Commission’s reply; takes notes of Court’s findings highlighting weaknesses and limitations in the design and implementation of the RRF as regards the measurement of its contribution to climate and environmental objectives; notes that the Court found that tracking climate expenditure involves a high level of approximation and some coefficients were leading to potential overestimations; welcomes that the Court recommends that the Commission further refine methodologies for estimating climate spending in future funding instruments and to incorporate the lessons in the design of future funding instruments supporting the climate and environmental objectives and targets;

128. Recalls that since 2010, DG CLIMA has issued a reservation in all of its AARs on reputational, legal and/or financial grounds related to security weaknesses identified in the Union Registry for the EU ETS, which was maintained in the AAR 2024; deplores the fact that the underlying weaknesses have not been addressed since 2010; is alarmed by the Commission’s written clarification that the level of risk is closely linked to the value of the assets handled by the EU ETS, which have increased tenfold since 2017, and is also further aggravated by the deteriorating geopolitical context; underlines, that while the financial impact of the reservation for 2024 cannot be quantified, at the time of DG CLIMA’s AAR 2024 the Union Registry held allowances in the value of over EUR 200 billion at current prices;

151. Notes the Court’s Special report 15/2024 on climate adaptation in the Union and the Commission’s reply; appreciates the Court’s conclusion that the overall Union framework for adaptation policy was sound; is concerned by the finding that Member States sometimes used outdated scientific data for their national adaptation strategy documents and that the Member States’ reporting on climate adaptation was insufficient and added little value in terms of tracking progress; is disappointed by the Court’s findings that a third of the sampled projects had little or no impact on increasing adaptive capacity and that there is a risk that two projects (out of 36) might result in maladaptation; welcomes that the Court also recommends that the Commission improve reporting on climate adaptation through common indicators to measure progress and follow up on the weaknesses identified;

129. Notes with concern the Commission’s written reply that the evolution of the risk landscape has systematically outpaced the speed by which the Commission was able to improve security measures; understands that in the Commission’s assessment the security risk identified in the Union Registry for the EU ETS can only be resolved with an increased level of spending and, ultimately, by externalising the Union Registry; is appalled that the proposal to address the security weaknesses of the Union Registry is stalled primarily by the non-availability of appropriate human and financial resources; notes with concern the Commission’s written reply that those resources should come from the introduction of fees per services to the Member States to finance the operation of the EU ETS, but as a suitable legal basis for the introduction of a service fee needs to be first proposed in the ETS Directive, the Commission considers that a solution cannot be found before 2028; considers it imperative that appropriate resources be made available without delay to address the major financial, legal and reputational risks to the Union that the security weaknesses of the Union Registry entail;

152. Recalls that all Union spending must comply with the horizontal ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) principle, laid down in point 16 of the Interinstitutional Agreement, which stipulates that Union spending must not cause harm to the six environmental objectives set out in Article 17 of the Taxonomy Regulation, namely climate mitigation and adaptation, sustainable use and protection of water resources, the circular economy, pollution prevention and control, and biodiversity protection; considers that, in light of the Court’s recurrent findings, the negative environmental effects of Union spending should also be tracked and reported on;

130. Recalls that democracy and pluralism are fundamental values of the Union enshrined in Article 2 TEU; further recalls that, in line with Article 11 TEU, Union institutions shall provide citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action in order to maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue;

153. Recalls that EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is a key component of the European Green Deal and one of the main instruments for achieving the Union’s climate ambition; welcomes that according to the Directorate-General for Climate Action’s (DG CLIMA) 2024 AAR, the EU ETS generated EUR 43,6 billion of revenue for climate-action investments in the previous year, out of which EUR 7,4 billion was supplied to the ETS Innovation Fund and the Modernisation Fund and EUR 2,8 billion was supplied to the RRF, which Member States use to advance the clean energy transition and boost energy security; notes the finding of 2024 IAS audit on the implementation and monitoring of the EU ETS that despite the heavy workload, complex legal framework and scarce resources they operate with, the DG CLIMA staff showed commitment to perform their tasks and willingness to improve the efficiency of the EU ETS related processes; appreciates the Commission’s written confirmation that DG CLIMA intends to address most internal audit recommendations by 2025 and all by mid-2028;

131. Recognises the importance of the LIFE programme, the Union’s only standalone programme for the environment and climate action, to funding nature conservation, circular economy, climate action and clean energy transition projects and more broadly, to promoting sustainable development across the Union; recalls the provisions of the LIFE+ Regulation, including Article 11(6), which indicates that providing operating grants to support the functioning of non-profit making entities which are involved in the development, implementation and enforcement of Union legislation and policy, and which are primarily active in the area of the environment or climate action, including energy transition, is an eligible action for LIFE funding; notes that operating grants allocated to NGOs under the LIFE Programme represent only 1 % of the programme’s total budget;

154. Recalls that since 2010, DG CLIMA has issued a reservation in all of its AARs on reputational, legal and/or financial grounds related to security weaknesses identified in the Union Registry for the EU ETS, which was maintained in the AAR 2024; deplores the fact that the underlying weaknesses have not been addressed since 2010; is alarmed by the Commission’s written clarification that the level of risk is closely linked to the value of the assets handled by the EU ETS, which have increased tenfold since 2017, and is also further aggravated by the deteriorating geopolitical context; underlines, that while the financial impact of the reservation for 2024 cannot be quantified, at the time of DG CLIMA’s AAR 2024 the Union Registry held allowances in the value of over EUR 200 billion at current prices;

132. Regrets the allegations of undue lobbying made against non-governmental organisations whose activities were supported by LIFE operating grants; notes that the reply of the Commission’s Executive Vice-President for a Clean, Just and Competitive Transition to CONT on 2 December 2025 in the discharge hearing confirms that the activities by non-governmental organisations supported by LIFE operating grants did not breach any legal framework and that the implementation of LIFE programme fully respected the Financial Regulation;

155. Notes with concern the Commission’s written reply that the evolution of the risk landscape has systematically outpaced the speed by which the Commission was able to improve security measures; understands that in the Commission’s assessment the security risk identified in the Union Registry for the EU ETS can only be resolved with an increased level of spending and, ultimately, by externalising the Union Registry; is appalled that the proposal to address the security weaknesses of the Union Registry is stalled primarily by the non-availability of appropriate human and financial resources; notes with concern the Commission’s written reply that those resources should come from the introduction of fees per services to the Member States to finance the operation of the EU ETS, but as a suitable legal basis for the introduction of a service fee needs to be first proposed in the ETS Directive, the Commission considers that a solution cannot be found before 2028; considers it imperative that appropriate resources be made available without delay to address the major financial, legal and reputational risks to the Union that the security weaknesses of the Union Registry entail;

133. Notes that a review of a number of funding contracts between the Commission and economic operators, requested in the framework of this discharge procedure, shows that activities aimed at influencing public policy or decision-making are not limited to NGOs but also appear in contracts with other categories of beneficiaries; expresses concern that, in some cases, companies receiving Union funding for such activities may simultaneously have EU decision-makers sitting on their boards and receiving remuneration; further notes that the IAS performed a targeted engagement focussed exclusively on NGO funding under the LIFE programme to verify compliance with the guidance on funding for activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy but did not verify compliance with that guidance of agreements signed with other beneficiaries;

156. Recalls that democracy and pluralism are fundamental values of the Union enshrined in Article 2 TEU; further recalls that, in line with Article 11 TEU, Union institutions shall provide citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action in order to maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue;

157. Recognises the importance of the LIFE programme, the Union’s only standalone programme for the environment and climate action, in supporting nature conservation, circular economy initiatives, climate action and the clean energy transition, and more broadly in promoting sustainable development across the Union; recalls that the provisions of the LIFE Regulation, including Article 11(6), provide that operating grants may support the functioning of non-profit making entities active in the development, implementation and enforcement of Union legislation and policy; stresses, however, that such operating grants must be implemented in strict compliance with Union legal, financial and transparency requirements; stresses, furthermore, the importance of clear safeguards to ensure that Union funds are used exclusively for the objectives defined in the programme; notes that operating grants allocated to NGOs under the LIFE Programme represent approximately 1 % of the programme’s total budget; calls on the Commission to ensure robust monitoring, full accountability and transparency in the use of the Union funds, including advocacy activities;

158. Takes note of concerns raised by certain MEPs regarding the use of LIFE operating and action grants by certain beneficiaries, such as civil society organisations and companies; stresses the importance of full transparency with regard to both beneficiaries and the activities financed, continued monitoring and, where necessary, further clarification of the safeguards in place to ensure that Union funds are used exclusively for the objectives defined in the programme;

159. Notes that a review of funding contracts under the discharge procedure indicates that activities related to influencing public policy or decision-making may occur across different categories of beneficiaries, including NGOs; expresses its concern that, in some cases, companies receiving Union funding for such activities may simultaneously have Union decision-makers sitting on their boards and receiving remuneration; stresses that safeguards must ensure that any potential conflicts of interest are prevented and that Union funds are managed transparently, independently of the type of beneficiary; highlights the need to ensure consistent oversight and verification across all beneficiaries to guarantee compliance with the Commission’s 2024 guidance on activities supporting the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy; encourages, therefore, the creation of a standardised review process for applications to operating grants including having at least two members of the Commission or agency staff reading and reviewing application proposals and the creation of a standardised set of rules in the selection of external experts for the evaluation board of operating grants;

Recommendations

~~134.~~160. Calls on the Commission to:

(i) in cooperation with Member States, make available the financial and human resources necessary to urgently resolve the remaining significant security weaknesses identified in the Union Registry of the EU ETS;

(iii) support Member States with testing and upgrading the IT systems used for producing the annual performance reports, to ensure their compliance with the applicable international information security standards;

(iv) improve the sound financial management of the current and future CAP by ensuring that direct income support is provided only to active farmers, with a specific focus on those most in need, such as family-sized and small farms, farms in areas with natural or other specific challenges, young and female farmers;

(iv) keep the discharge authority informed about the recovery rates of agricultural expenditure under the 2023-2027 CAP, and consider the introduction of new incentives for Member States to recover funds;

~~(v) conduct financial and compliance audits of Union-funded guesthouse projects on a risk basis;~~

(v) together with Member States, accelerate disbursements of the EAFRD and mobilise measures to increase absorption where delays persist, ensuring balanced support across all regions;

(vi) closely monitor the use of Union-funded guesthouse projects beyond the project implementation period and consider extending the durability period for these kinds of projects to prevent continued misuse as well as introduce strict conflict of interests checks as a prerequisite for the allocation of Union funds to build guesthouses;

(vi) support Member States in targeting funds to high-value preventive measures (e.g. landscape management, maintenance of agricultural firebreaks, restoration of degraded soils, purchase and supply of veterinary vaccines) and promote the dissemination of best practices and effective agriculture projects across Member States;

(vii) collect data from Member State authorities on the number of guesthouse projects funded by Union budget since 2021, indicating also any irregularities detected, and share this information with the discharge authority;

(vii) improve the sound financial management of the current and future CAP by ensuring that direct income support is provided only to active farmers, with a specific focus on those most in need, such as family-sized and small farms, farms in areas with natural or other specific challenges, young and female farmers;

(viii) monitor possible conflicts of interests affecting Union funds, and ensure that conflicts of interests are actually resolved, including for Members of the European Council and ensure, in particular, that no Union funds are paid, directly or indirectly, to Agrofert or any other business interests of Andrej Babiš as long as the identified conflict of interest has not been demonstrably and verifiably resolved;

(viii) conduct financial and compliance audits of Union-funded guesthouse projects on a risk basis;

(ix) share with the discharge authority all relevant documents concerning the Commission’s follow-up of the OPEKEPE case, including the up-to-date action plan and its assessment by the Commission, under specific confidential modalities, if necessary;

(ix) closely monitor the use of Union-funded guesthouse projects beyond the project implementation period and consider extending the durability period for these kinds of projects to prevent continued misuse as well as introduce strict conflict of interests checks as a prerequisite for the allocation of Union funds to build guesthouses;

(x) draw lessons learnt from the OPEKEPE case, strengthen the control system of the EU agricultural funds, reinforce the Commission’s control activities accordingly and report back to the discharge authority on the measures taken;

(x) collect data from Member State authorities on the number of guesthouse projects funded by Union budget since 2021, indicating also any irregularities detected, and share this information with the discharge authority;

(xi) improve its methodology used to track Union spending on climate and biodiversity-related activities of 2021-2027 MFF, including by addressing the relevant recommendations made in the Court’s special reports and also tracking the negative effects of Union spending on the environment and biodiversity objectives;

(xi) monitor possible conflicts of interests affecting Union funds, and ensure that conflicts of interests are actually resolved, including for Members of the European Council and ensure, in particular, that no Union funds are paid, directly or indirectly, to any beneficiaries where conflict of interest has been identified and has not been demonstrably and verifiably resolved;

~~(xii) develop and implement a comprehensive green budgeting methodology in the next MFF by integrating climate, biodiversity and environmental considerations into all steps of the budget cycle;~~

(xii) share the letter addressed to the Czech authorities to clarify the conflict of interest situation of the Prime Minister with the discharge authority and keep it fully informed of any follow-up steps, including the possible launch of an audit procedure;

(xiii) continue to verify that funding agreements with all types of beneficiaries comply with the Commission guidance of May 2024 on funding for activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy;

(xiii) share with the discharge authority all relevant documents concerning the Commission’s follow-up of the OPEKEPE case, including the up-to-date action plan and its assessment by the Commission, under specific confidential modalities, if necessary;

(xiv) ensure strict compliance with Article 61 of the Financial Regulation by effectively preventing, identifying and managing conflicts of interest when concluding grant agreements in particular with beneficiaries that employ or remunerate EU decision-makers;

(xiv) draw lessons learnt from the OPEKEPE case, strengthen the control system of the Union agricultural funds, reinforce the Commission’s control activities accordingly and report back to the discharge authority on the measures taken;

(xv) improve its methodology used to track Union spending on climate and biodiversity-related activities of 2021-2027 MFF, including by addressing the relevant recommendations made in the Court’s special reports as well as improving the monitoring and reporting of actual results of investments and negative effects of Union spending on environment and biodiversity objectives;

(xvi) ensure that climate and environmental considerations are taken into account in the next MFF;

(xvii) propose a dedicated, detailed plan to ensure that the biodiversity spending target set for the years 2026 and 2027 is met, foster financial tools to close the financing gap and fully implement environmental legislation and mainstreaming biodiversity action into key sectors in order to reach policy targets, including with the view of providing financing for the implementation of the Nature Restoration Regulation;

(xviii) continue to verify that funding agreements with all types of beneficiaries comply with the Commission guidance of May 2024 on funding for activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy;

(xix) ensure strict compliance with Article 61 of the Financial Regulation by effectively preventing, identifying and managing conflicts of interest when concluding grant agreements in particular with beneficiaries that employ or remunerate Union decision-makers;

(xx) ensure that all grant agreements, including operating grants, respect the necessary requirements related to transparency, traceability and visibility of funds;

(xxi) incorporate in its checks and systems a risk-based verification of recipients’ compliance with Union values, in order to detect potential breaches;

Migration and Border management

~~135.~~161. Notes that in 2024 the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 4 ‘Migration and Border Management’ was EUR 3,4 billion (1,8 % of the Union budget spending) distributed as follows: EUR 1,4 billion (40,1 %) for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), EUR 1,3 billion (37,7 %) for three decentralised agencies, the European Border and Coast Agency (FRONTEX), the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) and the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (EU- LISA); and EUR 0,8 billion (22,2 %) for the Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF), which is composed of the Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) and the Customs Control Equipment Instrument (CCEI);

~~136.~~162. Recalls that AMIF funding for 2014-2020 had to be spent by June 2024 and the final accounts had to be submitted by 31 December 2024; notes the Court’s finding that, at the time of their audit, a material amount of AMIF 2014-2020 funding remained to be cleared (12 % or EUR 528 million) pending acceptance of these final accounts by the Commission; acknowledges the Commission’s reply that the total expenditure declared by the Member States during the period 2014-2020, including the submission of the final accounts, amounted to 94 % of AMIF;

~~137.~~163. Notes that the Court examined a sample of 23 transactions, which it considered not large enough to be representative of the spending under MFF headings 4 and 5 and, thus, it cannot provide a separate estimate of the error rate for these headings; further notes that the Court’s audit results show that the expenditure under MFF headings 4 and 5 is affected by errors due to eligibility and procurement issues and the absence of supporting documents and that thus it is deemed a high-risk area (8 out of 23 transactions audited were affected by errors); is concerned that the Court detected three quantifiable errors which had a financial impact on the Union budget, seven cases of non-compliance with legal and financial provisions (which had no direct financial impact on the Union budget) and two transactions that did not comply with the principles of sound financial management due to inadequate protection of Union-funded equipment and reimbursement of value added tax to public bodies above incurred costs contrary to Commission guidance; notes that the Commission estimates that the risk at payment in 2024 is 1,3 % for the expenditure on migration and border management;

~~138.~~164. Welcomes the Court’s conclusion that the Commission has fully addressed two recommendations the Court made in its 2021 Annual Report and one recommendation made in its 2022 Annual Report, which relate to providing further guidance to the beneficiaries of Union action and emergency assistance and to conducting better targeted ex ante checks; appreciates the adoption of the revised control strategy for Emergency Assistance projects implemented under direct and indirect management in the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) in December 2024;

~~139.~~165. Expresses its dissatisfaction with the fact that the Court continues to experience difficulties with obtaining the documentation necessary to carry out its mandate from international organisations implementing Union-funded projects; notes with concern that some international organisations restricted the Court’s access to documents to a temporary electronic consultation in a view-only environment and the Court’s conclusion that this indicates a lack of precision in the Commission’s contractual arrangements with international organisations; notes the Commission’s reply that they consider that the existing contractual agreements with the international organisations already provide a framework to ensure document accessibility in a manner that permits the required checks; regrets the fact that the Commission has not fully accepted the Court’s recommendation to address this recurring issue, especially given that the Court’s difficulties with auditing international organisations implementing Union-funded projects have persisted since their audit of the 2018 financial year; insists that the Commission’s contractual arrangements with partners must guarantee the Court’s full audit rights, including the ability to download and retain evidence necessary for audit, review, quality control and follow-up;

~~140.~~166. Notes with concern that two reservations on the declaration of assurance were issued in DG HOME’s Annual Activity Report for 2024; notes that one reservation concerns the implementation of 2014-2020 AMIF and ISF programmes in several Member States due to serious deficiencies in management and control systems for these programmes detected by DG HOME; further notes that the other reservation concerns 2021-2027 AMIF, BMVI and ISF programmes in several Member States due to serious deficiencies in the management and control systems for these programmes;

~~141.~~167. Notes that Member States submitted their first national annual accounts for the 2021-2027 AMIF and BMVI programmes in 2024; further notes that the Court has reviewed five audit authorities’ work in relation to their annual control reports and audits of AMIF and BMVI expenditure; welcomes the Court findings that the audit authorities had developed and implemented detailed procedures of sufficient quality to report on their work in the annual control report;

~~142.~~168. Further notes the Court’s conclusion that the audit authorities it has reviewed had detailed audit programmes and used the checklists to support their conclusions; notes with concern that the Court has also observed some weaknesses in the audit authorities work; acknowledges the Commission’s acceptance of the Court’s recommendation to follow up the shortcomings in audit authorities’ work;

143. Notes the 2024 adoption of the Pact on Migration and Asylum in 2024 and the allocation of an additional EUR 2 billion to MFF heading 4 for 2024-2027 in the context of the mid-term revision of the MFF 2021-2027, also with a view to enabling the full implementation of the new rules of the Pact; appreciates the Commission’s written replies that confirm that it has made available additional EUR 3 billion under the AMIF and BMVI for the years 2025–2027 to, inter alia, support Member States hosting persons fleeing the war in Ukraine;

169. Expresses its concern that detailed and comprehensive data on Union home affairs spending, especially under shared management by Member States, is difficult to obtain, impeding sound oversight by the budgetary and discharge authority; calls for increased transparency in this regard;

144. Stresses that managing the Union’s external borders is a pillar of the Pact on Migration and Asylum; maintains that the Union needs to better protect vulnerable people from smuggling and trafficking networks; notes that following the adoption of the Commission Communication of 11 December 2024, the Commission has allocated approximately EUR 520 million to Union Member States bordering Russia and Belarus through the BMVI;

170. Welcomes the adoption of the Pact on Migration and Asylum in 2024 and recalls that its implementation is a corner stone for the new system of migration and asylum management in the EU, which will be in application mid-2026 in all Member States; welcomes, further, the allocation of an additional EUR 2 billion to MFF heading 4 for 2024-2027 in the context of the mid-term revision of the MFF 2021-2027, also with a view to enabling the full implementation of the new rules of the Pact and addressing the growing challenges in migration and border management resulting from the current geopolitical context; stresses the importance of ensuring sufficient funding for its effective implementation, including new border procedures, and thus appreciates the Commission’s written replies that confirm that it has made available additional EUR 3 billion under the AMIF and BMVI for the years 2025–2027 to, inter alia, support Member States hosting persons fleeing the war in Ukraine;

145. Recalls that solidarity and fair responsibility-sharing are core principles underpinning the Union’s migration and asylum policy; highlights in this context the role of the AMIF in supporting Member States in reception, asylum procedures, integration measures and resettlement, including for persons fleeing conflicts and humanitarian crises; underlines that the effective implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum requires sufficient, well-managed and timely funding to support solidarity measures across the Union;

171. Stresses that managing the Union’s external borders is a pillar of the Pact on Migration and Asylum and an essential precondition for a functioning Schengen area of free movement; recognises that EU-funded projects that support the protection of the external border serve to ease the pressure on internal border protection, as stated by the Commissioner for Budget, Anti-Fraud and Public Administration in his hearing in the Committee on Budgetary Control on 8 December 2025; acknowledges that while the overall number of migrants arriving irregularly in the Union decreased by 38 percent in 2024, patterns shifted across the continent with certain routes seeing significant increases, notably the Eastern Borders route, where a threefold increase in crossings was reported in 2024; observes that the BMVI can support frontline Member States to ensure they have the resources for infrastructure, facilities and installations necessary to secure the external borders of the Union, including electronic border security enhancements and other tools for border surveillance as provided for in annex III of the BMVI regulation;

146. Observes that in 2024, 37,7 % of Union funding for migration and border management was allocated to decentralised agencies in the area of migration and Home Affairs; recalls that while decentralised agencies are independent from the Commission legally, financially, and in the execution of their obligations, the Commission has oversight responsibility over their activities; reminds that migration must be managed in full compliance with Union law, including fundamental rights; expresses its deep concern regarding reports of pushbacks at the Union’s external borders, including by Frontex in Greece and the related European Court of Human Rights judgement of 7 January 2025; appreciates the Commission’s written replies that more monitoring of Frontex’ activities in Greece is needed;

172. Maintains that the Union needs to better protect vulnerable people from smuggling and trafficking networks, address hybrid attacks and the instrumentalisation of migration by third countries or hostile non-state actors; notes that following the adoption of the Commission Communication of 11 December 2024, the Commission has allocated approximately EUR 520 million to Member States bordering Russia and Belarus through the BMVI, in order to strengthen border management capacities and address security and migration-related challenges; highlights, in particular, the need for supporting frontline Member States for the purposes of securing the EU’s external borders;

173. Acknowledges the Commission’s ongoing efforts to strengthen meaningful cooperation with third countries of origin and transit, in particular those neighbouring the Union in view of addressing irregular migration at the source; underlines the need for adequate oversight and due diligence when allocating funds to partners involved in migration management outside the EU, in order to ensure that migration is managed in a mutually beneficial manner and in alignment with European Asylum and Migration Strategy, including on fundamental rights; urges the Commission to reinforce the transparency and accountability of Union home affairs funds in third countries;

174. Recalls that solidarity and fair responsibility-sharing, in line with the Treaties, are core principles underpinning the Union’s migration and asylum policy; acknowledges the Commission's ongoing efforts to enhance solidarity and responsibility sharing between Member States, in particular towards those most affected by migration and asylum challenges, including the instrumentalisation of migration; highlights in this context the role of the AMIF in supporting Member States in reception, asylum procedures, integration measures and resettlement, including for persons fleeing conflicts and humanitarian crises; underlines that the effective implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum requires sufficient, well-managed and timely funding to support solidarity measures across the Union;

175. Observes that in 2024, 37,7 % of Union funding for migration and border management was allocated to decentralised agencies in the area of migration and Home Affairs; recalls that while decentralised agencies are legally and financially independent from the Commission, the Commission retains an oversight responsibility over their activities; reiterates that migration management must be carried out in full compliance with Union law, including fundamental rights; welcomes the Commission’s written replies highlighting the need to further strengthen monitoring and accountability mechanisms, including with regard to Frontex’s activities;

Recommendations

~~147.~~176. Invites the European Court of Auditors to provide an estimate of the error rate for MFF heading 4;

~~148.~~177. Calls on the Commission to:

(i) fully implement the Court’s recommendations, including ensuring that its contractual arrangements with international organisations fully respect the Court’s audit rights;

(ii) address system deficiencies, together with Member State authorities, related to the reservations issued in DG HOME’s Annual Activity Report 2024, and if necessary, also launch conformity clearance procedures and issue recovery orders for the amounts paid to Member States and considered as irregular by the Commission;

(iii) continue to monitor and scrutinise the steps required by Member States and Union agencies for the full and timely implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum by 2026, and report to the Parliament on progress towards its ~~implementation;~~implementation and grant the Parliament access to all relevant documents to facilitate effective democratic oversight of the implementation process;

~~(iv) closely monitor Union-funded actions for border management, in particular with a view to ensuring full compliance with the fundamental rights in the Union and the principle of non-refoulement;~~

(iv) provide support to frontline Member States for the purposes of securing the external borders of the EU;

(v) increase the transparency and accountability of the programming and implementation of the Union home affairs funds by ensuring detailed and comprehensive data, including as regards funds spent in third countries, while safeguarding the role of Parliament in ensuring democratic scrutiny of Union spending;

(vi) enforce transparent and independent human rights monitoring mechanisms of Union home affairs funds in third countries;

(vii) closely monitor Union-funded border management actions, in particular to ensure full compliance with Union fundamental rights obligations and the principle of non-refoulement;

Security and Defence

~~149.~~178. Notes that in 2024 the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ was EUR 2,1 billion (1,1 % of the Union budget spending) distributed as follows: EUR 800 million (36,9 %) for the European Defence Fund (EDF), EUR 300 million (15,9 %) for military mobility, EUR 300 million (13,3 %) for Defence instruments and Union Secure Connectivity; EUR 300 million (12,1 %) for decentralised agencies, namely the European Union Drug Agency (EUDA), European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), and European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), EUR 300 million (11,9 %) for nuclear safety, decommissioning and other areas, and EUR 200 million (9,9 %) for the Internal Security Fund (ISF);

~~150.~~179. Recalls that ISF funding for 2014-2020 had to be spent by June 2024 and the final accounts had to be submitted by 31 December 2024; notes the Court’s finding that, at the time of their audit, a material amount of ISF funding remained to be cleared (16 % or EUR 505 million) pending acceptance of these final accounts by the Commission; acknowledges the Commission’s reply that the total expenditure declared by the Member States during the period 2014-2020, including the submission of the final accounts, amounted to 94 % of ISF;

~~151.~~180. Notes with concern that, for the reasons explained in the section on migration and border management, the Court cannot provide a separate estimate of the error rate for MFF heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ and that, based on its audit results, the Court considers expenditure from this heading to be high-risk; notes that the Commissioner for Defence and Space has clarified during his hearing in ~~CONT~~the Committee on Budgetary Control on 6 November 2025 that the Court’s Annual Report 2024 does not include any errors found on defence projects; further notes that the Commission estimates that in 2024 the risk at payment was 0,5 % for expenditure on security and defence;

~~152.~~181. Recalls that the highly unstable geopolitical situation in the Union’s neighbourhood is giving rise to greater security and defence challenges, including hybrid ~~threats;~~threats, ~~stresses~~and ~~that~~thereby ~~Russia~~to ~~poses~~greater ainvestment ~~considerable~~needs ~~threat~~in security, defence and preparedness, since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; draws attention to the fact that MFF heading 5, dedicated to security and defence, is the smallest of all MFF headings and regrets that the ~~Union;~~Union’s current budget for ensuring the security and defence of its citizens is not equal to the challenges to be met either in the short or the long term; reaffirms its position that Russia represents the primary and most significant threat to the Union and its Member States; recalls that the European Parliament has called on the Union and its Member States to put in place a legal framework enabling Russia to be classified as a state sponsor of terrorism;

~~153.~~182. Recalls that defence capabilities in the Union suffer from decades of under-investment and that, according to the Commission, the defence spending gap for the next decade currently stands at EUR 500 billion; ~~notes~~welcomes that due to the urgent need to boost defence capabilities, the number of Union defence funding instruments has increased since Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; notes that Union defence instruments include extra-budgetary ones such as the European Peace Facility (EPF), and the Security Action for Europe (SAFE), a temporary defence loan instrument; stresses, furthermore, that in addition to defence funding programmes, other Union programmes can serve dual-use purposes, notably the Military Mobility component of the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and the Union Secure Connectivity programme, established in 2023 primarily to provide Union Member States with guaranteed access to highly secure, sovereign and global connectivity services; also notes that after its mid-term review in September 2025, cohesion policy funds can also be used to improve military mobility and develop defence infrastructure, especially in the Eastern border regions;

~~154.~~183. Appreciates the Commission’s written replies that acknowledge that the multitude of defence-related instruments resulted in a fragmented funding landscape, with certain overlaps and gaps; underlines the need for a comprehensive and long-term Union approach to security and defence funding, responding to both conventional military threats and non-conventional threats; stresses the need for further improving the transparency of Union defence funding, including by guaranteeing the Court's audit rights for all instruments and ensuring that the discharge authority can exercise democratic scrutiny of all Union-funded activities; highlights the need for increasing the user-friendliness of information on Union defence funding published, with a view to also benefiting applicants and beneficiaries, especially SMEs; underlines that the participation of SMEs across all Member States should be facilitated and promoted, and their fair and equitable access to Union-funded projects ensured; encourages sustained investment and support for SMEs;

~~155.~~184. Stresses that the rapid increase in Union defence and security expenditure in 2024 requires ~~audit arrangements equivalent in practical effect to those applicable to~~proportional ~~civilian~~audit ~~spending,~~arrangements, ~~including~~allowing effective access for the European Court of Auditors, OLAF and the EPPO to all relevant documentation, ~~even where~~including projects ~~involve classified or~~with dual-use technologies; recalls that the Commission itself acknowledged that access to classified deliverables can be delayed ~~or prevented~~ where Member States are ‘originators’ of classification and ~~that~~underlines ~~corrective~~that, ~~measures,~~where ~~including~~audit ~~suspension~~access oris ~~termination~~limited for duly justified reasons such as the classified nature of ~~funding,~~projects, ~~may~~appropriate measures and constructive solutions should be ~~necessary~~pursued ~~where~~to ~~audit~~ensure ~~access~~full iscompliance ~~obstructed;~~with financial oversight requirements and the sound management of Union funds;

~~156.~~185. ~~Reiterates~~Expresses ~~its~~deep concern over the Commission’s decision to proceed with the adoption of the ~~‘Rearm~~“Rearm ~~EU’~~EU” initiative without prior consultation of the European Parliament; regrets that such a decision bypasses the principle of institutional balance and undermines Parliament’s role as co-legislator in shaping strategic and budgetary priorities; ~~insists that~~urges the Commission ~~should~~to refrain from initiating substantial policy instruments that impact the Union’s financial and strategic architecture without ensuring full respect for the prerogatives of the Parliament;

~~157.~~186. Recalls that the EDF’s general objective is to foster the competitiveness, efficiency and innovation capacity of the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) throughout the Union; notes that, as outlined in the Commission’s written replies, EDF funding amounting to EUR 227,9 million was allocated to 20 projects related to artificial intelligence and further EUR 171,1 million was allocated to 18 projects focused on aerial-drone technologies, while 50 projects focused on what can be classified as traditional defence equipment, relating to ground, air and naval combat, underwater, air missiles defence and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risk mitigation, were supported with a total of EUR 1,49 billion from the EDF; ~~expresses its concern~~notes that since 2021, less than EUR 400 million from EDF was spent on projects related to artificial intelligence and drone technologies, despite the fact that experience from ongoing and recent conflicts ~~clearly demonstrates the rapidly growing role~~suggests ofthat cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence and unmanned systems, including drones, can play an increasingly important role in modern warfare; considers that in the funding of technologies those that provide the greatest operational advantage should be prioritised;

~~158.~~187. Notes the Court’s Special Report 04/2025 on EU military mobility and the Commission’s replies; is concerned by the Court’s overall conclusion that the second EU action plan on military mobility, published in November 2022, was not built on sufficiently solid foundations and that progress towards its objective, namely ensuring swift and seamless movement of personnel, materiel and assets at short notice and on a large scale, has been variable due to design weaknesses and obstacles to implementation; notes with concern the Court’s observation that the Commission had not carried out a robust assessment of the overall funding required to make its objectives and targets achievable; ~~regrets~~notes the fact, highlighted by the Court, that parliamentary oversight of all Union military mobility activities is not ~~possible,~~always asfeasible due to the fact that not all projects are funded through the Union ~~budget; notes that the European~~budget, ~~Parliament~~as ~~lacks~~is the ~~power to oversee military mobility activities~~case offor the European Defence Agency ~~(EDA), which is an intergovernmental agency,~~(EDA) or ~~that of PESCO, which is a Member State-driven cooperation framework;~~PESCO;

~~159.~~188. Expresses its concern that following three calls for proposals organised in 2021, 2022 and 2023, the entirety of the military mobility envelope under the CEF for the current programming period has already been exhausted, while at least EUR 100 billion investment is estimated to be needed for addressing the 500 hotspots identified in the Union as needing urgent upgrading; notes the Commission’s written reply that the 2024 revision of the TEN-T Regulation introduced elements to integrate military mobility into Union transport policy; further notes that the European Commission and the High Representative adopted the Military Mobility Package 2025; reiterates ~~its concern~~the ~~about~~importance ~~the~~of ~~current~~further ~~lack~~strengthening ofthe responsiveness and efficiency ~~in military mobility,~~of ~~which~~Union ismilitary ~~hampered~~mobility by reducing regulatory and procedural ~~complexity~~complexity, ~~and~~enhancing ~~lack~~harmonisation ofand ~~harmonisation~~streamlining ~~resulting~~coordination into ~~slow~~reduce ~~coordination~~delays and ~~time~~improve ~~loss;~~operational readiness;

Recommendations

~~160.~~189. Invites the ~~European~~ Court ~~of Auditors~~ to provide an estimate of the error rate for MFF heading 5;

~~161.~~190. Calls on the Commission to:

(i) ~~take~~continue ~~measures~~its efforts to ~~improve~~enhance the transparency of Union spending on defence across all relevant instruments, including by ~~guaranteeing~~facilitating the ~~Court's~~Court’s audit ~~rights~~work ~~for~~in ~~all~~line ~~instruments~~with the applicable legal framework and by ensuring that the discharge authority ~~can~~is appropriately informed so as to exercise democratic scrutiny of ~~all~~ Union-funded ~~activities, not only~~activities during ~~negotiation but~~the ~~also~~adoption, ~~during~~design ~~the~~and implementation ~~phase;~~phases;

(ii) provide the discharge authority with ~~annual~~regular consolidated reporting ~~covering~~on the budget execution and performance of all defence-related expenditure from the Union budget, off-budget instruments and all other relevant instruments, such as military mobility and security-related programmes, in order to enable democratic ~~scrutiny and avoid fragmentation;~~scrutiny;

(iii) provide to the Parliament more systematic follow-up and reporting on Union defence and military mobility measures, implementation and funding, including those relating to EU-NATO cooperation, EPF, EDA and PESCO;

(iv) strengthen the EDF’s contribution to a comprehensive European defence approach by increasing support for projects addressing hybrid threats, including artificial intelligence, cyber and drone technologies;

(v) ~~repeats its call to~~ further strengthen Union security and defence measures by substantially increasing the funding available to improve dual-use transport infrastructure corridors and by taking action to eliminate administrative, procedural and regulatory barriers to cross-border military movements, including through the harmonisation of joint and common defence procurement, as referred in the Regulation (EU) 2025/2643 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2025 ("EDIP Regulation"), and related procedures among Member States in order to enhance interoperability, efficiency and strategic coherence, while prioritising Union funding to projects that best respond to the current European threat landscape;

(vi) take further action to ensure a level playing field for all defence industry actors across the Union and simplify access to Union funding, including SMEs and Member States most vulnerable to external threats;

Neighbourhood and the world

~~162.~~191. Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 6 ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ was EUR 15,4 billion (8,0 % of the Union budget expenditure excluding RRF;) distributed as follows: 62,4 % for the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument - Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe), 15,9 % for Humanitarian Aid (HUMA), 14,9 % for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III), 2,7 % for Ukraine Macro-Financial Assistance Plus and 4,1 % for other actions and programmes;

~~163.~~192. Welcomes that in 2024 the Court examined a statistically representative sample of 137 transactions covering all spending under this MFF heading, enabling it for the first time to calculate an error rate; notes with concern the estimated error rate of 4,9 %, significantly exceeding the 2,0 % materiality threshold; further notes that 56 of the 137 transactions (40,9 %) contained quantifiable errors that have a financial impact on the Union budget; observes that these errors concerned ineligible costs, serious breaches of public procurement rules, missing essential supporting documentation, ineligible beneficiaries, and expenditure not actually incurred; considers that these issues may indicate weaknesses in the functioning and reliability of control systems;

~~164.~~193. Is struck by the fact that in ten of the cases involving quantifiable errors, the Commission already had sufficient information at its disposal to prevent the error or to detect and correct it before accepting the expenditure; notes that, had the Commission effectively used this information, the estimated level of error would have been reduced by 1,4 percentage points;

~~165.~~194. Notes that, as in previous years, a significant share of the errors detected by the Court concerned contracts implemented under indirect management by pillar-assessed organisations, including international institutions; observes that for these contracts the Commission accepted expenditure on the basis of a financial report and a management declaration, the latter being a self-issued certification by the pillar-assessed organisation attesting to the completeness, accuracy and compliance of the financial information provided; notes with concern that 26 of the 42 quantified errors detected by the Court related to such contracts, contributing 3,1 percentage points to the estimated level of error, thereby highlighting persistent vulnerabilities in the assurance framework for indirect management with pillar assessed entities;

~~166.~~195. Expresses concern that, once again, the Court encountered delays in obtaining requested documentation from certain international organisations and international financial institutions, thereby hindering the timely conduct of its audit work, despite its previous recommendation from 2020; notes that in 19 audited transactions these entities limited access to documents to temporary, view-only electronic consultations, without allowing the Court to retain copies, which impeded proper planning, execution and quality control of the audit; regrets that these obstacles persisted despite the Commission’s efforts to resolve the issue through sustained communication with the organisations concerned, as also highlighted in the report of the 2024 annual report on the EDFs;

~~167.~~196. Expresses serious concern that no Results-Oriented Monitoring (ROM) missions took place in 2024, owing to the termination of the two existing ROM service contracts in 2025; highlights with concern that the planned 2024 restricted tender for the new generation of ROM contracts had to be cancelled due to the unavailability of NDICI support expenditure credits, forcing DG INTPA to rely on operational credits and to prepare a standalone NDICI Support Measure to finance ROMs; notes that a new restricted tender procedure was relaunched in October 2025 under a suspensive clause, with the new three-year ROM contract expected to be signed only in April 2026; underlines that this funding and procurement disruption has resulted in a full suspension of the ROM system since early 2025, delaying independent performance monitoring of programme implementation and weakening the overall results-orientation of external action;

~~168.~~197. Notes that, EUUnion investment in trade-related assistance to the world’s least-developed countries (LDCs) has declined, with only 12,0 % of Aid for Trade (AfT) flows reaching LDCs in 2022 compared to 18,0 % on average between 2010 and 2015; notes with concern that this underperformance persists despite the 25,0 % spending target for LDCs set in the revised 2017 EU Aid for Trade strategy; takes note of the findings of the European Court of Auditors in Special Report ~~17/2025,~~17/2025 ‘EU aid for trade to least developed countries’, which concluded that EU Aid for Trade is not on track to meet the 2030 target; welcomes the Commission’s acceptance of the Court’s recommendation to analyse the underlying causes of this decline and notes that this assessment is planned for 2026, stressing the need for timely corrective action to ensure that Union trade assistance reaches those most in need;

169. Stresses that Union aid must under no circumstances, directly or indirectly, finance terrorism, and therefore must not support any entity linked to Hamas or to any other terrorist or extremist organisation; recalls that, to this end, it is both legitimate and essential to clearly identify all final beneficiaries of Union assistance, also in third countries; emphasises the need for rigorous oversight of the distribution and use of aid to ensure that no funds are misused;

198. Notes that budget support reported in 2024 by INTPA and DG NEAR to countries outside of the Union amounted to EUR 1,56 billion; regrets the absence of publicly available data identifying beneficiary countries, as published statistics refer only to regions or country groupings; further regrets the lack of transparency regarding the use of these funds and the identification of final recipients; emphasises that budget support should be aligned with partner countries’ needs and the Union’s strategic policy objectives;

170. Welcomes the Commission’s continued engagement with the Palestinian Authority on curriculum reform and acknowledges the tangible progress reported in 2025, including the ongoing review and amendment of textbooks by the Palestinian Ministry of Education and Higher Education to ensure alignment with UNESCO standards; notes in particular that the revised Grade 12 textbooks were finalised and made public in early October 2025 and are currently undergoing review by the Union;

199. Stresses that Union aid must under no circumstances, directly or indirectly, finance terrorism or any activities incompatible with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, and therefore must not support any entity linked to Hamas or to any other terrorist or extremist organisation; recalls that, to this end, it is both legitimate and essential to clearly identify all final beneficiaries of Union assistance, also in third countries; emphasises the need for rigorous oversight of the distribution and use of aid to ensure that no funds are misused; further calls on strengthening due diligence, monitoring and control mechanisms in order to prevent any form of ideological infiltration in programmes financed by the Union; underlines that anti-terror safeguards and transparency requirements must be applied rigorously without undermining humanitarian principles and the delivery of life-saving assistance;

171. Notes that, as in previous years, no Union funding in 2024 has been used to support the production of Palestinian textbooks, and that Union assistance under both the 2024 Emergency Support package and the Multiannual Comprehensive Programme for Palestinian Recovery and Resilience (2025-2027) is strictly limited to traceable expenditure items such as salaries, social allowances and arrears to hospitals; notes that this multiannual programme is conditional upon an ambitious Reform Matrix agreed with the Palestinian Authority, which includes a systematic review of learning materials;

200. Recalls that education is a central pillar of peacebuilding, coexistence and preparation for a negotiated two-state solution, and a key mean of countering extremism, intolerance and radical ideologies; recalls that Union financial assistance and political engagement should support education that promotes peace, tolerance and coexistence; welcomes the Commission’s continued engagement with the Palestinian Authority on curriculum reform and acknowledges the tangible progress reported in 2025, including the ongoing review and amendment of textbooks by the Palestinian Ministry of Education and Higher Education to ensure alignment with UNESCO standards; notes in particular that some revisions were made to Grade 12 and more comprehensive revisions to Grades 1-4, and new learning material has been published in December 2024 and October 2025 respectively and is currently undergoing review by the Union; recalls the necessity for the Palestinian Authority to remove all educational materials and content that fail to adhere to UNESCO standards, in particular those containing antisemitism, incitement to violence, glorification of jihad and martyrdom, and the rejection of peaceful conflict resolution; reminds the Commission to base its review on public and verifiable evidence and to publish the result of its reviews;

172. Urges the Commission, in the context of delivering support and humanitarian aid to the Palestinian population, to enhance support to UNRWA as well as to all trusted partners, including local CSOs; recalls the importance for the Commission to guarantee independent controls of UNRWA by external experts, the Court and experienced international partners;

201. Notes that, as in previous years, no Union funding in 2024 has been used to support the production of Palestinian textbooks, and that Union direct financial assistance provided to the Palestinian Authority via the Union mechanism PEGASE under both the 2024 Emergency Support package and the Multiannual Comprehensive Programme for Palestinian Recovery and Resilience (2025-2027) is strictly limited to traceable expenditure items such as salaries, social allowances and arrears to hospitals; notes that this financial support to the Palestinian Authority is partially linked to the achievement of reforms agreed in an ambitious Reform Matrix with the Palestinian Authority in 2024, which includes a progressive and systemic review of learning materials; recalls the necessity for the Palestinian Authority to remove all educational materials and content that fail to adhere to UNESCO standards, particularly those encouraging antisemitism and including violence, to which Palestinian children should not be exposed; stresses that financial support from the Union for the Palestinian Authority in the area of education should be provided on the condition that textbook content is aligned with UNESCO standards; calls on the Commission to ensure that no Union funds are allocated, directly or indirectly to educational materials that contain antisemitic references or examples which incite hatred and violence;

173. Expresses grave concern over serious shortcomings in the management of DG NEAR under the responsibility of Commissioner Várhelyi during his mandate as Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement (2019–2024); notes that, during this period, an unprecedented number of senior management positions remained vacant for exceptionally long durations, severely undermining the Directorate-General’s leadership capacity; notes in particular that the post of Director-General remained vacant for 28 months, Director A for 25 months, Director NEAR B (Southern Neighbourhood) for 48 months, Director NEAR D (Western Balkans) for 35 months, Director of the Support Group for Ukraine for 32 months, and Director R for 22 months; underlines that these prolonged vacancies affected some of the Union’s most politically sensitive and operationally critical portfolios, including during the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Hamas terrorist attack against Israel; further notes the results of the April 2022 DG NEAR staff survey showing significant declines in confidence in senior management’s leadership, the worst results of the DG’s staff survey ever recorded; considers that leaving DG NEAR without stable senior leadership for years cannot be reconciled with the duty of sound administration and effective management expected from a Commissioner;

202. Urges the Commission, in the context of delivering support and humanitarian aid to the Palestinian population to cooperate with reliable partners on the ground to guarantee the uninterrupted and secure delivery of humanitarian assistance and to ensure that no Union funds are allocated to individuals or organisations linked to terrorist or extremist movements opposed to the Union’s fundamental values; recalls that there have been allegations that 19 of 13 000 UNRWA employees in Gaza were involved in the despicable terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel on 7 October 2023; acknowledges the United Nations' response to those allegations including the investigations launched by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), after which nine staff members had their employment formally terminated in the interest of the Agency and the recommendations issued through the Colonna Report; notes that the Commission has been working with UNRWA, to enhance the neutrality processes and control systems in the Agency, in line with findings of the investigations by the UN OIOS and to monitor the application of the action plan presented by UNRWA; notes the Commission’s assessment that UNRWA remains committed to implementing the agreed recommendations as well as the fulfilment of all conditions agreed with the Union for continued funding in 2024; encourages, in this regard, the Commission’s continued engagement and close monitoring to ensure that funding is met with solid guarantees on neutrality, transparency and accountability;

174. Notes the statements made by Commissioner Várhelyi during the exchange of views in the Committee on Budgetary Control on 12 January 2026, in which he claimed that the post of Director of the Support Group for Ukraine had only been created in 2022 and filled immediately thereafter; deplores that this information provided to Parliament was inaccurate, as the Support Group for Ukraine was established in 2014 and, between 2020 and 2023, its leadership was ensured on an interim basis by the Deputy Director-General of DG NEAR in addition to her many other functions;

203. Notes that during the period between 2019–2024 six out of nine senior management positions in DG NEAR remained vacant for extended periods; notes in particular that the post of Director-General remained vacant for 28 months, Director A for 25 months, Director NEAR B (Southern Neighbourhood) for 48 months, Director NEAR D (Western Balkans) for 35 months, Director of the Support Group for Ukraine for 32 months, and Director R for 22 months; underlines that these prolonged vacancies affected some of the Union’s most politically sensitive and operationally critical portfolios, including during the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Hamas terrorist attack against Israel; further notes the results of the April 2022 DG NEAR staff survey showing significant declines in confidence in senior management’s leadership;

175. Notes recent investigative reporting published in October 2025 by several European media outlets alleging that Hungarian intelligence services engaged in espionage activities in Brussels, including attempts to recruit Hungarian nationals working in Union institutions; notes that these activities reportedly intensified during the period 2015–2019, when Mr. Várhelyi served as Hungary’s Permanent Representative to the Union and was formally the superior of intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover; underlines that, while these allegations concern a period prior to his appointment as Commissioner, they further contribute to serious concerns regarding his conduct and independence; notes that the Commission has confirmed that it is examining these allegations internally and it expects to be informed of the outcome of this examination as soon as it is concluded;

204. Notes that between 2020 and 2023 the Support Group for Ukraine, leadership was provided on an interim basis by the Deputy Director-General of DG NEAR in addition to her many other functions, further notes that the Ukraine Support Group was dissolved in 2023 with portfolios redistributed to the Ukraine Facility and other units; notes that the information provided by the Commission in this regard during the exchange of views with the discharge authority was inaccurate and calls on the Commission to ensure clear and accurate reporting to Parliament by all Members of the Commission;

176. Considers that, taken together, the serious and prolonged management failures in DG NEAR, the provision of inaccurate information to Parliament in the context of the discharge procedure, and the additional concerns relating to conduct and independence outlined above demonstrate a pattern that is incompatible with the standards of accountability, reliability and sound administration required of a Member of the Commission; concludes therefore that Commissioner Várhelyi cannot be considered fit to exercise the responsibilities of a Commissioner entrusted with the management of politically sensitive portfolios and significant Union funds;

205. Notes recent investigative reporting published in October 2025 by several European media outlets alleging that Hungarian intelligence services engaged in espionage activities in Brussels, including attempts to recruit Hungarian nationals working in Union institutions; notes that these reports refers to the 2015-2019 period and that the Commission has confirmed that it is examining these allegations internally; expects the Commission and competent authorities to conduct a thorough analysis and investigation based on evidence and to inform the Parliament as soon as the investigation has been finalised;

177. Notes with concern that Union funding to Ukraine is spread across numerous instruments and facilities, creating a fragmented and complex financing landscape; underlines that the absence of a consolidated and transparent overview of how these funds, including loans guaranteed by the MFF headroom, are allocated and spent hinders effective democratic oversight, accountability and the ability to assess the overall impact of Union support;

206. Notes that Commissioners exercise significant political and regulatory authority and their conduct must therefore reflect the highest standards of independence, transparency, accountability, and ethical behaviour; stresses that strict adherence to the Code of Conduct for Members of the European Commission is essential to safeguarding the integrity, credibility, and democratic legitimacy of the Union’s executive; underlines that full compliance with the Code of Conduct is also indispensable to preventing conflicts of interest, avoiding undue influence, and ensuring that decisions are taken solely in the European interest; considers that, taken together, the past serious and prolonged management failures in DG NEAR, the provision of inaccurate information to Parliament in the context of the discharge procedure, and the additional concerns relating to conduct and independence outlined above demonstrate a pattern that is incompatible with the standards of accountability, reliability and sound administration required of a Member of the Commission;

178. Notes that Ukraine’s anti-corruption specialised bodies (NABU, SAPO and HACC) continue to deliver investigations, prosecutions and judgments in high-level cases, demonstrating that independent anti-corruption institutions are starting to function and that recent resignations of accused ministers show a degree of governmental responsiveness and accountability; regrets, however, that progress remains limited, that investigations by other law-enforcement bodies have stagnated, and that legislative initiatives adopted or tabled in 2024, including attempts to place NABU and SAPO under the authority of the Prosecutor General, risked undermining the independence and effectiveness of the anti-corruption framework; welcomes the swift reversal of these amendments following domestic and international pressure, but expresses concern at reports from anti-corruption institutions and civil society of growing pressure from state authorities, reduced transparency, and attempts to limit liability for corruption offences; calls on the authorities to prevent backsliding, address procedural delays and obstructions in high-level cases, and revise statutes of limitation in line with European standards;

207. Notes with concern that Union funding to Ukraine is spread across numerous instruments and facilities, creating a fragmented and complex financing landscape; underlines that the absence of a consolidated and transparent overview of how these funds, including loans guaranteed by the MFF headroom, are allocated and spent hinders effective democratic oversight, accountability and the ability to assess the overall impact of Union support;

179. Notes with concern the recent fraud allegations in Ukraine’s energy sector, including suspected large-scale misappropriation, procurement manipulation and illicit enrichment involving state-owned energy companies and regulatory bodies; underlines that these allegations, if confirmed, point to structural vulnerabilities in governance, oversight and internal control systems; stresses that such cases risk undermining public trust, weakening Ukraine’s reform credibility and jeopardising EU financial support;

208. Notes that Ukraine’s anti-corruption specialised bodies (NABU, SAPO and HACC) continue to deliver investigations, prosecutions and judgments in high-level cases, demonstrating that independent anti-corruption institutions are starting to function and that recent resignations of accused ministers show a degree of governmental responsiveness and accountability; commends the reforms undertaken by Ukraine in the midst of a full-fledged invasion; notes that the attempts to place NABU and SAPO under the authority of the Prosecutor General, risked undermining the independence and effectiveness of the anti-corruption framework; welcomes the swift reversal of these amendments following domestic and international pressure, but expresses concern at reports from anti-corruption institutions and civil society highlighting challenges in maintaining the effectiveness and independence of the anti-corruption framework; calls on the authorities to prevent backsliding, address procedural delays and obstructions in high-level cases, and revise statutes of limitation in line with European standards;

180. Notes that, to ensure sound financial management of the Ukraine Facility, the Commission established in June 2024 a dedicated Audit Board through Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1697, composed of independent experts appointed by the Commission; notes that the Audit Board’s mandate is to detect systemic weaknesses in Ukraine’s management and control of Facility funds, including deficiencies in fraud prevention, anti-corruption safeguards and conflict-of-interest systems, and to report such issues directly to the Commission;

209. Notes the recent fraud allegations in Ukraine’s energy sector; underlines that these allegations, if confirmed, point to structural vulnerabilities in governance, oversight and internal control systems; stresses the need to build public trust to strengthen Ukraine’s reform credibility through robust public procurement and internal control systems;

181. Underlines that, beyond its oversight role, the Audit Board may issue recommendations to the Ukrainian authorities on addressing financial irregularities or structural shortcomings in the management of Union funds; stresses that Ukraine, represented by the Ministry of Economy, must provide a written response to each recommendation, either outlining implementation measures or providing a justified explanation for non-implementation; highlights that the Audit Board’s findings may carry significant financial consequences, as its reports, similarly to those of OLAF, may constitute grounds for the Commission to reduce, suspend or withhold Union funding under the Ukraine Facility;

210. Notes that, to ensure sound financial management of the Ukraine Facility, the Commission established in June 2024 a dedicated Audit Board through Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1697, composed of independent experts appointed by the Commission; notes that the Audit Board’s mandate is to detect systemic weaknesses in Ukraine’s management and control of Facility funds, including deficiencies in fraud prevention, anti-corruption safeguards and conflict-of-interest systems, and to report such issues directly to the Commission;

182. Recalls that, under the Ukraine Facility, regular payments are conditional on the Commission verifying the implementation of Ukraine’s recovery and reform plan and the continuous respect of democratic mechanisms, the rule of law and human rights; notes that, to date, the Commission has on five occasions concluded that individual reform steps were not fulfilled under instalments one to five, leading to the suspension of corresponding amounts, one of which has since been remedied; welcomes in this regard the Commission’s strict conditionality approach and its demonstrated willingness to verify implementation thoroughly and to withhold funds where conditions are not met;

211. Underlines that, beyond its oversight role, the Audit Board may issue recommendations to the Ukrainian authorities on addressing financial irregularities or structural shortcomings in the management of Union funds; stresses that Ukraine, represented by the Ministry of Economy, must provide a written response to each recommendation, either outlining implementation measures or providing a justified explanation for non-implementation; highlights that the Audit Board’s findings may carry significant financial consequences; underlines that sustained Union financial support must be accompanied by sound financial management, transparency and performance monitoring in order to ensure effective use of Union funds and maintain the credibility of the enlargement policy;

183. Welcomes that OLAF provides targeted anti-fraud assistance to authorities and supports the accession of Ukraine to the Union Anti-Fraud Programme; notes that the Framework Agreement for the Ukraine Facility, which entered into force in June 2024, provides for legally binding arrangements for the management, control, supervision, monitoring, evaluation, reporting and audit of funds under the Facility, as well as measures to prevent, investigate and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest, and provisions on the roles of OLAF and EPPO;

212. Recalls that, under the Ukraine Facility, regular payments are conditional on the Commission verifying the implementation of Ukraine’s recovery and reform plan and the continuous respect of democratic mechanisms, the rule of law and human rights; notes that, to date, the Commission has on five occasions concluded that individual reform steps were not fulfilled under instalments one to five, leading to the suspension of corresponding amounts, one of which has since been remedied; welcomes in this regard the Commission’s strict conditionality approach and its demonstrated willingness to verify implementation thoroughly and to withhold funds where conditions are not met;

184. Is concerned about the allocation of EFSD+ under the new flexible ‘Support to Investments’ envelope in favour of benefiting countries where the Global Gateway investments are easier to implement at the expense of prioritising LDCs and fragile and conflict-affected countries;

213. Welcomes that OLAF provides targeted anti-fraud assistance to authorities and supports the accession of Ukraine to the Union Anti-Fraud Programme; notes that the Framework Agreement for the Ukraine Facility, which entered into force in June 2024, provides for legally binding arrangements for the management, control, supervision, monitoring, evaluation, reporting and audit of funds under the Facility, as well as measures to prevent, investigate and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest, and provisions on the roles of OLAF and EPPO;

185. Notes that despite longstanding Union funding to strengthen Libyan border and migration controls reports indicate that such assistance has not prevented the continuation of systemic violations, including forced returns, inhumane detention conditions and deaths, and may have made the Union vulnerable to reputational damage; underlines that the discovery of mass graves in Libya in 2025 and continued allegations from civil society and human rights organisations about the treatment of migrants heighten concerns about whether Union funding in this context aligns with fundamental Union values, including respect for human rights, and stresses the need for rigorous monitoring, transparency and accountability mechanisms to ensure that migration-related assistance does not indirectly contribute to further harm;

214. Expresses concern that allocation under the EFSD+ new flexible ‘Support to Investments’ envelope benefits countries where the Global Gateway investments are easier to implement at the expense of prioritising LDCs and fragile and conflict-affected countries;

186. Notes that, as of 1 February 2025, the European Commission reorganised the former DG NEAR, dividing its responsibilities between two newly established directorates: the Directorate-General for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood (DG ENEST), responsible for candidate countries and the Eastern Neighbourhood, and the Directorate-General for the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Gulf (DG MENA), which now covers the Mediterranean region;

215. Notes that despite longstanding Union funding to strengthen Libyan border and migration controls, reports indicate that such assistance continues to raise serious operational and humanitarian concerns as well as concerns with regard to fundamental rights and governance, potentially exposing the Union to reputational risks; stresses the need for rigorous monitoring, transparency and accountability mechanisms to ensure that migration-related assistance does not indirectly contribute to further harm;

216. Notes that, as of 1 February 2025, the European Commission reorganised the former Directorate-General for DG NEAR, dividing its responsibilities between two newly established directorates: the Directorate-General for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood (DG ENEST), responsible for candidate countries and the Eastern Neighbourhood, and the Directorate-General for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf (DG MENA), which now covers the Mediterranean region;

European Development Funds (EDF)

~~187.~~217. Notes that to audit the regularity of transactions, the Court examined a sample of 85 transactions, representing the full range of spending from the EDFs; notes, furthermore, that this comprised 16 transactions related to the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, 54 transactions authorised by 14 EUUnion delegations, 14 transactions approved by Commission headquarters and 1 transaction related to the Bêkou Trust Fund;

~~188.~~218. Notes with concern that, out of the 85 transactions examined, 34 (40,0 %) contained errors, compared to 62 (44,3 %) in 2023 for the same number of transactions; stresses, moreover, that the Court quantified 27 errors (52 in 2023), on the basis of which it estimated the level of error for the financial year 2024 to be 6,5 % (8,9 % in 2023);

~~189.~~219. Highlights with concern that the three most frequent types of errors detected in the 2024 financial year were: ineligible expenditure (40,0 %), the absence of essential supporting documentation (32,0 %) and the over-clearing of pre-financing (14,0 %);

~~190.~~220. Notes with bewilderment that, as of 31 December 2024, the full accounting closure of the 9th European Development Fund, covering the period 2000-2007, had still not been completed, more than 17 years after the introduction of the sunset clause, with eight contracts still ongoing, illustrating the exceptional complexity and duration of certain EDF programmes;

~~191.~~221. Notes positively that the Commission has improved the calculation of cut-off estimates by systematically taking into account extensions of contract implementation periods occurring after the reporting year, following a recommendation made by the Court in its 2023 annual report;

~~192.~~222. Notes with concern that, as in previous years, significant pre-financing balances remain uncleared for excessively long periods, including EUR 446,0 million outstanding for more than 10 years, largely linked to the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund, whose long-term operations result in very slow clearing of pre-financing;

~~193.~~223. Notes that the expected outcomes of DG INTPA’s ongoing review of its control strategy include the reinforcement of guidance on financial reporting and on enhanced ex-ante controls so as to prevent errors including on excess clearing;

~~194.~~224. Notes that the Director-General’s declaration of assurance in DG INTPA’s 2024 Annual Activity Report contains no reservations, continuing a trend in which the Directorate-General reduced the scope of reservations from 16,0 % of expenditure in 2017 to 1,0 % in 2018 and to zero from 2019 onwards; notes further that DG INTPA estimates the amount at risk at payment at EUR 89,7 million (1,1 % of 2024 expenditure) and the amount at risk at closure at EUR 78,6 million (0,97 %), and that it expects EUR 11,1 million (12,4 % of the amount at risk at payment) to be corrected in subsequent years through its own checks; observes however that, of the EUR 5,0 million reported as recovered in 2024, the Court’s testing showed that EUR 0,2 million should not have been counted as implemented corrective capacity, raising concerns about the reliability of the DG’s reporting;

~~195.~~225. Notes that DG INTPA commissioned its 13th Residual Error Rate (RER) study in 2024, an important component underpinning the Director-General’s declaration of assurance and the regularity information disclosed in the Annual Management and Performance Report; observes that the 2024 study, based on a sample of 401 transactions, estimated a residual error rate of 0,48 %, remaining for the ninth consecutive year below the Commission’s 2,0 % materiality threshold; recalls, however, that the Court has repeatedly identified methodological shortcomings that may underestimate the true residual error rate, particularly concerning the treatment of high-value items; notes that while the Commission has revised the RER methodology as of 2025 to clarify certain aspects and limit reliance on management checks and other auditors’ work, the updated methodology still permits the exclusion of ‘isolated’ errors from extrapolation; expects the Commission to implement the revised methodology rigorously and looks forward to the Court’s verification of its application in the next audit cycle;

226. Recalls that the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, established to address the root causes of displacement and irregular migration, has mobilised over EUR 5 billion, of which 88 % from the EDF and the Union budget; regrets the lack of transparency in the management and allocation of these funds and the difficulty in verifying compliance with Official Development Assistance principles, as highlighted by the Court’s Special Report 17/2024; calls for the EUTF to sufficiently support the agreed priorities; also notes with concern the findings of the Court’s Special Report 20/2025 on the Commission’s support to fight hunger in sub-Saharan Africa, which identified weaknesses in cost assessment and project planning, including insufficient scrutiny of budgets and cases of unused or inappropriate equipment; stresses that such shortcomings undermine sound financial management and calls on the Commission to strengthen cost analysis, procurement planning and needs-based implementation;

Recommendations

~~196.~~227. Calls on the Commission to:

(i) strengthen preventive and corrective controls under heading 6,6 by addressing recurrent weaknesses such as ineligible expenditure, procurement ~~breaches,~~irregularities, missing supporting documentation and expenditure not actually incurred; calls for reinforced guidance to delegations and implementing partners;

(ii) perform a comprehensive review of the assurance framework for indirect management, particularly with pillar-assessed organisations and international financial institutions;

(vi) ensure impartial and evidence-based assessments in enlargement reporting so that political considerations do not override objective evaluation criteria;

(vii) ensure that no Union assistance to third countries benefits entities that are involved in human rights violations, repression or democratic backsliding, and apply conditionality rigorously, including through suspension of assistance where fundamental Union values are undermined; provide a detailed outline of the safeguards, monitoring mechanisms and corrective measures implemented to uphold the integrity and accountability of Union external assistance;

(viii) continue ~~support UNRWA~~to ~~and~~support reliable humanitarian partners, coupled with independent oversight by external experts and the Court, to ensure effective control and confidence in the use of Union funds;

~~(ix) calls on the President of the Commission, pursuant to Article 17(6) TEU, to withdraw confidence in Commissioner Várhelyi;~~

(ix) provide a consolidated and transparent overview of all Union financial support to Ukraine, including grants, loans and guarantees under multiple instruments and facilities, in order to strengthen democratic scrutiny and ensure full accountability;

(x) provide a consolidated and transparent overview of all Union financial support to Ukraine, including grants, loans and guarantees under multiple instruments and facilities, in order to strengthen democratic scrutiny and ensure full accountability;

(x) monitor closely the serious fraud allegations in Ukraine, and continue to apply conditionality where systemic risks or misuse of funds are identified; to keep the European Parliament regularly informed about the activities and findings of the Audit Board in order to ensure proper parliamentary oversight;

(xi) monitor closely the serious fraud allegations in Ukraine, and continue to apply conditionality where systemic risks or misuse of funds are identified; to keep the European Parliament regularly informed about the activities and findings of the Audit Board in order to ensure proper parliamentary oversight;

(xi) report on the volume of EFSD+ amounts allocated and contractualised in LDCs and for transparency on how the quota of allocations within country MIPs is respected;

~~(xii) report on the volume of EFSD+ amounts allocated and contractualised in LDCs and for transparency on how the quota of allocations within country MIPs is respected;~~

(xii) report to the discharge authority on the remedial measures taken upon finalisation of DG INTPA’s ongoing review of its control strategy;

~~(xiii) report to the discharge authority on the remedial measures taken upon finalisation of DG INTPA’s ongoing review of its control strategy;~~

(xiii) accelerate the closure of the 9th EDF, noting that it remains open 17 years after the sunset clause, and review the reasons that contributed to the prolonged implementation cycle;

~~(xiv) accelerate the closure of the 9th EDF, noting that it remains open 17 years after the sunset clause, and review the reasons that contributed to the prolonged implementation cycle;~~

(xiv) engage with the EIB to ensure that its lending operations in non-EU countries are aligned with the Union’s external policy objectives and accompanied by effective cooperation frameworks with partner countries;

(xv) increase transparency by publishing accessible dashboards tracking high-value external action contracts, performance indicators and the status of the Court’s recommendations;

(xvi) reinforce financial due-diligence and procurement safeguards under Global Gateway;

(xvii) ensure that implementing partners strictly comply with visibility rules to present transparent information for the public and requests stricter follow-up in cases of repeated non-compliance;

Administration

~~197.~~228. Notes that MFF heading 7 ‘European public administration’ accounted for EUR 13,3 billion equal to 6,9 % of Union budget spending in 2024; notes that the European Commission spends EUR 8 billion equal to 60,6 % of the total amount; notes with satisfaction that also for 2024 the Court concludes that administrative spending is a low-risk spending area; stresses that the Commission should without hesitation follow-up on the issues identified by the Court in their Annual report 2024 concerning the payment for IT services;

~~198.~~229. Continues to be critical of the process whereby the Commission in 2023 decided to sell 23 of its office buildings in Brussels and lease 17 of them back for a period until 2029; notes that apparently the decision to do this was taken without clear impact assessments of all transactions; finds it especially worrying that the Commission only received one bid for the transaction from a Belgian state-owned company, which had submitted an indicative offer before the Commission launched the call for applications and that the offer did not fulfil the requirements in the call for tenders concerning the time period for the validity of a bank guarantee; expresses its deep concern that the Commission’s evaluation committee lacked independence since all members were subordinates of the authorising officer; notes with concern in this context the recent evidence-collecting activities carried out by the EPPO in relation to this transaction, which further reinforce serious doubts regarding the handling and governance of the sale;

~~199.~~230. Notes that the Commission reports that 54 requests for article 24 assistance under the Staff Regulation were submitted in the period 2021-2024 and that only 8 have been followed up on with the opening of an administrative inquiry; finds that this number is worryingly low, as it means that 85 % of the requests have been dismissed without any follow-up; welcomes that the office of the Chief Confidential Counsellor has been strengthened, taking into account that around 300 Commission staff asked her for help in harassment related cases within one single year; further notes that 14 complaints were submitted directly to the Investigation and Discipline Office of the Commission (IDOC), where four cases were closed as non-cases after assessment, two cases were closed without follow-up after administrative inquiry; pre-disciplinary proceedings led to one warning, one written warning, and three reprimands, one case is still in pre-disciplinary phase and two cases are currently with the Disciplinary Board, while two case were reported directly to OLAF both of which were dismissed on grounds of insufficient suspicion; stresses that these numbers seems to be very low for an organisation with more than 30.000 employees and encourages the Commission to improve the possibilities for employees to come forward with cases of harassment in a safe environment; regrets that the Commission has not come up with a self standing report analysing the reasons for the apparent dysfunctionality of the formal harassment procedure as requested in the context of the 2023 discharge exercise;

~~200.~~231. Notes that, in the period 2021–2024, no cases were reported to OLAF by Commission staff members where the source qualified as a whistleblower; regrets that the Commission did not provide information on whether, or how many, cases were instead reported through internal hierarchical channels or to the Secretary-General; considers that, in the absence of comprehensive data on the number of cases raised, the channels used, and the follow-up actions taken by the Commission in each case, it is not possible to assess whether the whistleblowing system is effective; notes in this context that the Commission is currently reviewing its Whistleblowing Guidelines in light of case law and practical experience with the implementation of the Directive (EU) 2019/1937 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law in the Member States, with a view to aligning them as closely as possible with the Directive;

~~201.~~232. Notes with interest that the Commissioner for Budget, Anti-Fraud and Public Administration in his mission letter was tasked to carry out a large-scale review of the Commission’s organisation and operations; agrees in principle that it is important for all organisations to examine periodically whether their organisation and procedures are up to date; underlines that it is important that the process remains transparent and that relevant organisations representing the Commission’s staff and other relevant actors are fully involved in the process, also to foster trust and acceptance of the review’s outcome by all stakeholders, including in particular the staff affected;

~~202.~~233. Underlines that transparency in the administration and access to information and documents are key elements ~~in ensuring~~of asound, ~~just~~accountable, and ~~democratically sound~~democratic ~~society;~~governance; in that regard regrets that there have been numerous examples over the last years where the Commission has not lived up to reasonable transparency ~~standards~~standards; astakes ~~also~~note ~~evidenced~~of byEuropean ~~the~~Court ~~lost~~of ~~court~~Justice case ~~concerning~~T-36/23, ~~text~~Stevi ~~messages~~and ~~between~~The ~~the~~New ~~Commission~~York ~~President~~Times v Commission; considers that informal exchanges must not replace official communication and ~~the~~that ~~CEO~~any information related to decision-making or workflow must be transmitted through official channels in full respect of ~~Pfizer;~~transparency requirements; stresses that it is important for the credibility of the Commission that it ensures a strict ~~and trustworthy~~ implementation of the ~~new~~ guidelines concerning the use of text messages in relation to ~~workflows~~workflows; ~~and~~recalls that ~~at least two~~under ~~qualified~~Regulation ~~persons~~(EC) ~~check~~No ~~whether~~1049/2001 text messages ~~exchanged in relation to work convey~~sent ~~important~~or ~~information~~received ~~before~~by ~~they~~Union ~~are~~officials ~~deleted,~~will inonly ~~particular~~be ~~those~~qualified ~~text~~as ~~messages~~documents ~~exchanged~~if bythey ~~Commissioners~~concern ~~and~~Union ~~the~~policy ~~Commission~~or ~~President;~~decisions;

203. Stresses that access to documents is a key principle to ensure transparency in public administration; points out that unfortunately the Commission in many situations has not provided answers within stipulated deadlines especially concerning cases under the confirmatory applications where the European Ombudsman has found systemic and significant delays in the Commission administration; highlights that it is essential for the credibility of the Commission that journalists and the general public can have access to documents within the legally applicable deadlines;

234. Notes with concern that in 2024 the Commission revised its internal rules on public access to documents; considers that these changes are incompatible with the right of access to documents as developed in Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001; stresses that, for example, the rules state that only “content that constitutes important information that is not short-lived shall be registered” and require the automatic disappearance of text messages; notes that the legality of these rules is currently being challenged before the European Court of Justice;

204. Recalls that the European Ombudsman has found cases of maladministration in relation to several legislative proposals that the Commission has presented in 2025; notes with great concern that these cases include the Omnibus I package where the consultation time between Commission departments had been reduced to less than 24 hours over a weekend and where there were no clear internal records of a climate consistency assessment being carried out; stresses the importance of adhering to the rules about better law-making; underlines that the European Union will not win any global competitive race by destroying some of the very foundations the Union is built on including principles on how to ensure robust, durable and legally sound legislation that ensures a stable regulatory business environment for the private sector to operate in;

235. Stresses that access to documents is a key principle to ensure transparency in public administration; points out that unfortunately the Commission in many situations has not provided answers within stipulated deadlines especially concerning cases under the confirmatory applications where the European Ombudsman has found systemic and significant delays in the Commission administration; highlights that it is essential for the credibility of the Commission that journalists and the general public can have access to documents within the legally applicable deadlines; stresses, furthermore, that transparency requires not only timely access but also that the documents themselves are drafted in clear, comprehensible language, as overly technocratic communication might hinder citizens’ meaningful access to information even when documents are available;

205. Deplores the technical, organisational and procedural shortcomings of the functioning of EPSO over the last years which have led to serious reputational damage to the general Union recruiting process and have had severe negative consequences for many candidates who have invested time and resources in trying to participate in selection procedures that have been cancelled, delayed or have had serious technical shortcomings;

236. Recalls that the European Ombudsman has found cases of maladministration in relation to several legislative proposals that the Commission presented in 2025; notes with great concern that these cases include the Omnibus I package; stresses the importance of adhering to the rules regarding better law-making; underlines the importance of robust, durable and legally sound legislation that ensures a stable and predictable regulatory environment, also with a view to strengthening the Single Market and boosting the Union’s global competitiveness;

206. Encourages the Commission and EPSO leadership to evaluate all aspects of the selection procedure in order to ensure that the Commission and other Union institutions can rely of EPSO for the identification and selection of highly qualified and motivated candidates for all types of jobs in the institutions; at the same time encourages the Commission to address persistent imbalances in geographical representation throughout the services;

237. Expresses its deep concern that there has been a number of allegations of corruption linked to the Commission, including former Members of the Commission and senior officials; notes in particular that, following the opening of a criminal investigation into corruption allegations involving a senior Commission official by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office in late 2024 and further to the recommendation issued by OLAF in 2024, the Commission launched its own disciplinary procedure concerning that official; notes that the Commission recently announced that it had concluded the procedure, finding that the official concerned had breached the applicable rules of the Staff Regulations, including provisions relating to conflicts of interest, transparency, gift acceptance and document disclosure; recalls that the disciplinary procedure followed the findings by OLAF, which examined allegations that confidential information concerning a major aviation agreement with the State of Qatar had been exchanged in return for gifts; notes that, given the senior official’s position as Director-General at the Commission’s Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport at the time, he exercised significant influence over the negotiation process and, consequently, over the resulting Agreement on Air Transport between the European Union and its Member States and the State of Qatar, signed on 18 October 2021; in light of the nature of the facts which led the Commission to initiate a disciplinary procedure and of the nature of the measures decided upon by the College of Commissioners in respect of that senior official, considers that the application of that Agreement should be evaluated and, if necessary, suspended;

238. Recalls that the Code of Conduct for the Members of the European Commission provides for a two-year scrutiny period for former Members of the Commission for professional activities following the end of their term; considers it vital to ensure that former Members of the College only undertake post-term activities that are compatible with Article 245 of TFEU; recalls also that the Code of Conduct stipulates that Commissioners must avoid any activity that could compromise their independence or the perception thereof, particularly during politically sensitive periods such as election campaigns;

239. Notes with serious concern the recently reported exchanges between staff from the Commission’s Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security (DG TRADE) and tobacco industry representatives, which suggest that DG TRADE staff may have acted in ways benefiting a company in the sector by encouraging third countries to weaken regulatory restrictions and tax policies on certain tobacco products; notes that, in its decision of 19 December 2023, the European Ombudsman found that the Commission’s failure to ensure a comprehensive approach across all departments to transparency in meetings with the tobacco industry constituted maladministration; recalls that, as a Party to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), the Union must protect its policies from the commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry and limit interactions to what is strictly necessary for regulatory purposes; stresses, therefore, that no interactions concerning third country tobacco control policies should be permitted; regrets that the meetings reportedly held were not disclosed; calls for full implementation of Article 5.3 of the FCTC, ensuring interactions are strictly limited and fully transparent;

240. Deplores the persistent and critical technical, organisational and procedural shortcomings of the functioning of EPSO over the last years which have led to serious reputational damage to the general Union recruiting process and have had severe negative consequences for many candidates who have invested considerable time and resources in trying to participate in selection procedures that have been cancelled, delayed or have had serious technical shortcomings; recalls that the European Ombudsman has concluded, in several separate inquiries, that EPSO committed maladministration in its handling of candidate complaints, particularly in relation to remote testing procedures, platform deficiencies and inconsistent communication regarding technical issues; stresses that these deficiencies risk undermining the attractiveness, credibility and long-term administrative capacity of the Union's institutions and therefore require urgent corrective action;

241. Urges the Commission and EPSO leadership to evaluate all aspects of the selection procedure, including governance, digital infrastructure, communication with candidates and handling of candidate complaints, in order to ensure that the Commission and other Union institutions can rely fully and without delay on EPSO for the identification and selection of highly qualified and motivated candidates for all types of jobs in the institutions; at the same time encourages the Commission to address persistent imbalances in geographical representation throughout the services;

European Schools

~~207.~~242. Notes that the overall budget for the European Schools for 2024 was EUR 439,5 million, representing an increase of 5,3 % from 2023; recalls that European Schools are primarily funded by the European Commission, other European Institutions, Member States and fees from parents;

~~208.~~243. Notes with satisfaction that neither the IAS nor the Internal Control Capability unit (ICC) have found critical issues in their audits and controls in 2024; notes however that identified weaknesses in human resource management and public procurement procedures should be addressed as a matter of priority;

Observations concerning the discharge procedure

~~209.~~244. Stresses that the Parliament would expect the Commission to provide the detailed replies to the discharge resolution ahead of the initiation of the discharge hearings for the following year, which normally start in early November; finds it regrettable that it received the Commission’s detailed replies to the specific requests made by the European Parliament in the discharge report for the 2023 financial year only in the beginning of December 2025; stresses that such delays undermine the efficiency of the discharge process by increasing the workload for both institutions and reducing the focus of parliamentary scrutiny;

~~210.~~245. Underlines that when oral questions cannot be answered by the responsible Commissioner directly during a discharge hearing in Parliament, follow-up answers in writing should be provided to Parliament within the agreed timeframe; recalls that the provision of timely and substantive replies constitutes a core component of effective parliamentary scrutiny and democratic accountability;

~~211.~~246. Notes with satisfaction that most Commissioners respect the discharge procedure and take part in the hearings as requested by the budgetary control committee; underlines that the Commission President in her role as head of the Commission has a decisive role in the formulation and the implementation of all major Commission initiatives and policy proposals; considers that in that function the Commission President should actively participate in the discharge procedure and underlines in this context the importance of the President of the European Commission taking part in the plenary discharge debate;

Recommendations:

~~212.~~247. Calls on the ~~Commission~~Commission, in ~~particular~~particular, to:

(i) ensure that any future decisions concerning sale and sale and lease back operations concerning buildings are done on basis of thorough impact assessments, that more than one offer should be received and that evaluation committees must be independent from the authorising officers;

(ii) design the future phases of the large-scale review of the Commission’s organisations and operations in a transparent way and ensure that relevant organisations representing the Commission staff and other relevant actors are fully involved in the process;

(iii) commission an external study by independent experts under the auspices of the Chief Confidential Counsellor analysing the functioning or malfunctioning of the formal harassment procedure and proposing means to make it more effective;

(iii) provide the discharge authority with all relevant information and documentation concerning the 2023 sale of 23 of its buildings, including a detailed account of all procedural steps taken such as the valuation methodology used and the assessment of competing bids, in full transparency and in due respect of the ongoing EPPO investigation;

(iv) provide the discharge authority with a comprehensive overview, for the period 2021–2025, of whistleblowing cases raised by staff members, including the number of cases, the reporting channels used (including the respective hierarchy, Secretary-General and OLAF), the follow-up actions taken in each case, and the employment status of the reporting persons;

(iv) commission an external study by independent experts under the auspices of the Chief Confidential Counsellor analysing the functioning or malfunctioning of the formal harassment procedure and proposing means to make it more effective;

~~(v) in the context of its review of the Whistleblowing Guidelines, take all necessary measures to align them with the standards set out in the Directive;~~

(v) provide the discharge authority with a comprehensive overview, for the period 2021–2025, of whistleblowing cases raised by staff members, including the number of cases, the reporting channels used (including the respective hierarchy, Secretary-General and OLAF), the follow-up actions taken in each case, and the employment status of the reporting persons;

(vi) guarantee strict and trustworthy implementation of the new guidelines concerning the use of text messages in relation to workflows, in particular in relation to Commissioners and the Commission President, so as to avoid future justified critique of the Commission’s handling of such texts;

(vi) in the context of its review of the Whistleblowing Guidelines, take all necessary measures to align them with the standards set out in the Directive;

~~(vii) ensure timely and correct handling of applications for access to documents, at all stages of the process;~~

(vii) implement the guidelines concerning the use of text messages in relation to workflows, in order to ensure that any information related to decision-making, or workflow is transmitted through official channels, in full respect of transparency requirements;

~~(viii) speed up work in order to ensure that EPSO functions properly in order to provide Union institutions with sufficient and highly qualified candidates;~~

(viii) revise the 2024 changes to the Commission’s Detailed Rules of application of Regulation 1049/2001 and amend its Rules of Procedure to ensure full compliance with Regulation 1049/2001;

(ix) ~~continue to~~ensure ~~explore~~timely ~~all~~and ~~possibilities~~correct tohandling ~~correct~~of ~~significant~~applications ~~geographical~~for ~~and~~access ~~gender~~to ~~imbalances~~documents, inat ~~different~~all ~~categories~~stages of ~~staff;~~the process;

(x) ensure a predictable, consistent and non-arbitrary application of its Better Regulation rules, by defining ‘urgent’ situations that justify a derogation from the requirements set out in the rules and establish, where derogations are granted, a procedure to ensure that the urgent preparation of legislative proposals still complies with the principles of a transparent, evidence-based and inclusive law-making process;

(xi) ensure that the principles of independence and integrity, as set out in the Code of Conduct for the Members of the European Commission, are upheld in observance of the highest standard of ethical conduct;

(xii) speed up work in order to ensure that EPSO functions properly in order to provide Union institutions with sufficient and highly qualified candidates;

(xiii) in cooperation with EPSO and the other Union institutions, ensure the full and timely implementation of the Ombudsman’s recommendations concerning EPSO and restore confidence in the fairness, accessibility and reliability of EPSO selection procedures, and report on the progress to the discharge authority;

(xiv) continue to explore all possibilities to correct significant geographical and gender imbalances in different categories of staff;

(xv) adopt measurable plain language standards for all of its public communications and develop an action plan to improve the accessibility of its publications, including press releases, programme documents, annual reports and annual activity reports, to citizens in all of the official languages of the Union, and report on its implementation to the discharge authority;

(xvi) liaise with the Joint Sickness Insurance Scheme (JSIS) to ensure that it provides coverage for a broader range of illnesses, including further autoimmune diseases, and to reimburse a wider range of testing and treatments;

(xvii) evaluate, and if necessary, suspend the 2021 Agreement on Air Transport between the European Union and its Member States and the State of Qatar;

(xviii) follow up the Ombudsman’s findings and urgently investigate the exchanges between DG TRADE staff and tobacco industry representatives, and report its findings to the discharge authority;

CHAPTER II - Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)

Court’s observations

~~213.~~248. Notes that the Court issued a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of the RRF expenditure for the third consecutive year, following similar conclusions in 2022 and 2023; notes that in 2024, the Court sampled 395 milestones and targets (M&Ts) across 28 grant payments, covering EUR 53,5 billion out of a total EUR 59,9 billion disbursed in 2024 and, while the Court does not provide an error rate due to the RRF’s specific spending model, it estimates that the minimum financial impact of its findings exceeds the materiality threshold; notes with alarm the increasing trend in the overall financial impact of quantitative findings; expresses concerns that, according to the Court’s conclusion, six out of 28 RRF grant payments made in 2024 were affected by quantitative findings, and that five of these payments were affected by material error; notes that in the Court’s opinion, aside from these matters, the RRF expenditure accepted in the 2024 accounts is legal and regular in all material respects;

~~214.~~249. Notes with concern that the Court identified six milestones in five payments that had not been satisfactorily fulfilled; notes that in these cases, the missing elements represented more than a minimal acceptable deviation and that the Commission nevertheless proceeded with the corresponding payments; further notes that in one of the six cases, the Commission in its preliminary assessment relied on data and checks provided by the Member State without performing additional testing to verify their reliability;

~~215.~~250. Notes furthermore that the Court identified an additional 12 cases of weaknesses in the Commission’s assessment which, although they did not impact the satisfactory fulfilment of the milestone or target concerned, revealed that the Commission had not carried out sufficient checks to assess the reliability of data and checks provided by Member States;

~~216.~~251. Notes that, under the ~~Court~~RRF, ~~also~~payments ~~identified~~by ~~four~~the ~~cases~~Commission ofto ~~vaguely~~Member ~~defined~~States are conditional on the satisfactory fulfilment of agreed milestones orand targets, ~~which~~rather ~~had~~than ~~also~~on ~~been~~the ~~acknowledged~~verification of compliance of individual expenditures with Union and ~~documented~~national byrules, ~~the~~which ~~Commission~~makes init ~~its~~challenging ~~preliminary~~to ~~assessment;~~assess ~~notes~~compliance ~~that~~with ~~when~~the ~~M&Ts~~applicable ~~are~~legal ~~defined~~requirements; inalso ~~vague~~notes ~~terms,~~that the RRF Regulation does not specify criteria for ~~assessing~~interpreting ~~their~~the ~~fulfilment~~term ~~inevitably~~“satisfactory” ~~become~~in ~~vague~~relation asto ~~well,~~the ~~undermining~~fulfilment ~~the~~of ~~robustness~~milestones and ~~clarity~~targets, ofand that, in the case of qualitative criteria, this assessment ~~process;~~depends ~~notes~~on ~~the~~multiple ~~Commission~~judgments, ~~acknowledges~~leading ~~that~~to invarious ~~some~~possible ~~cases~~interpretations ~~M&Ts~~as ~~set~~to bywhether ~~the~~milestones ~~Council~~or ~~Implementing~~targets ~~Decisions~~have ~~could~~been satisfactorily met; further notes that cases of vaguely defined milestones or targets, which have been ~~drafted~~identified, ~~more~~result ~~clearly;~~in the criteria for assessing their fulfilment remaining unclear;

217. Recalls that the RRF super milestones for Poland mandated specific reforms in the field of justice including first, the dismantling of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court and its replacement by an independent Chamber of the Supreme Court, and second, that all judges affected by the rulings of the Disciplinary Chamber had the right to have their case reviewed by the new Chamber within a clear timeframe; notes that, in an attempt to achieve compliance with that super milestone, the PiS Government abolished the Disciplinary Chamber and created a new Chamber of Professional Responsibility in June 2022, and highlights that no Union funds were disbursed as this represented a cosmetic change; notes that, after Donald Tusk’s cabinet came to power in 2023, however, the Commission used those same reforms passed by the PiS Government over one year earlier to declare that the super milestones had been fulfilled; highlights that this sequence raises serious doubt as to whether Poland’s judicial-independence milestones is fully and durably met, and that the release of RRF funds may have been premature, given that core elements of the super milestones remain unfulfilled; highlights that also the Court found serious weaknesses in the appointment of judges in Poland but, due to the ongoing Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case C-517/24 regarding a request for preliminary ruling directly related to this matter, the Court decided, in its 2024 annual reports, to refrain from concluding on the satisfactory fulfilment of these two milestones; underlines that the outcome of case C-517/24 will be decisive for assessing the regularity of the RRF payments concerned;

252. Notes the Court also identified four cases of vaguely defined milestones or targets, which had also been acknowledged and documented by the Commission in its preliminary assessment; notes that when milestones and targets are defined in vague terms, the criteria for assessing their fulfilment inevitably become vague as well, undermining the robustness and clarity of the assessment process; notes the Commission acknowledges that in some cases milestones and targets set by the Council Implementing Decisions could have been drafted more clearly;

218. Notes with particular concern that the Court has found that projects relating to one milestone and three targets in two payments had begun before the eligibility period; notes that the Regulation stipulates that only measures which started from 1 February 2020 onwards may be financed under the RRF, but does not further define what constitutes the ‘start’ of a measure; notes that, in October 2024, the Commission issued guidance interpreting the ‘start’ of a measure as the beginning of its implementation on the ground, when costs materialise; recalls, however, the Court’s view that the start of a measure should be considered the date of the first legal commitment (e.g. a contract, purchase order, or financing decision), as this constitutes the start of the first activity related to the measure; does not share the Commission’s interpretation that the eligibility period concerns only the date of start of works on a specific project rather than the beginning of the preparatory or projection phase;

253. Recalls that the RRF super milestones for Poland mandated specific reforms in the field of justice including firstly, the dismantling of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court and its replacement by an independent Chamber of the Supreme Court, and secondly, that all judges affected by the rulings of the Disciplinary Chamber had the right to have their case reviewed by the new Chamber within a clear timeframe; is concerned by the continued refusal of the Polish president to sign into law the reforms proposed in 2025 by the Polish Government and adopted by the Polish Parliament concerning the rule of law which aim to implement the recommendations of the European Commission regarding the fulfilment of the judicial milestones under the Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP); stresses that the fulfilment of judicial-independence milestones, in line with Union law, including the case-law of the European Court of Justice, is essential to ensure legal certainty and protect the Union budget;

219. Notes that outstanding Union borrowing increased by more than 30 % in 2024, reflecting the Commission’s expanded use of capital markets to finance large-scale programmes such as SURE and NGEU; notes that by 2027 total outstanding borrowing could exceed EUR 900 billion, almost ten times the level recorded in 2020 prior to the launch of NGEU; notes that since December 2022 the Commission has applied a diversified funding strategy as its standard method for raising funds on capital markets, and that at the end of 2024 the nominal value of outstanding Union borrowing stood at EUR 601,3 billion, up from EUR 458,5 billion in 2023; is concerned that the rising level of debt and the associated increase in interest costs will have long-term implications for the Union’s fiscal stability, potentially resulting in greater financial strain and reducing the Union’s capacity to respond to future challenges or invest in key strategic priorities;

254. Notes that the Court has found that projects relating to one milestone and three targets in two payments had begun before the eligibility period; notes that the Regulation stipulates that only measures which started from 1 February 2020 onwards may be financed under the RRF, but does not further define what constitutes the ‘start’ of a measure; notes that, in January 2021, the Commission issued guidance interpreting the ‘start’ of a measure as the beginning of its implementation on the ground, when costs materialise; acknowledges that the Court considers the start of a measure to be the date of the first legal commitment (e.g. contract, purchase order, or financing decision), which constitutes the start of the first activity related to the measure, while the Commission considers the start as the beginning of implementation on the ground when costs materialise; recognises the existence of different interpretations of what constitutes the ‘start’ of a measure under the RRF;

220. Notes with concern that annual NGEU-financed RRF grant payments amounted to EUR 55,9 billion in 2024, reaching only around half of the level expected by the Commission in June 2023 (EUR 96,0 billion), reflecting persistent delays in the submission and processing of payment requests; notes, however, that momentum increased toward the end of the year, with 15 Member States submitting payment requests totalling EUR 58,5 billion in December 2024;

255. Notes that outstanding Union borrowing increased by more than 30 % in 2024, reflecting the Commission’s expanded use of capital markets to finance large-scale programmes such as SURE and NGEU; notes that by 2027 total outstanding borrowing could exceed EUR 900 billion, almost ten times the level recorded in 2020 prior to the launch of NGEU; notes that since December 2022 the Commission has applied a diversified funding strategy as its standard method for raising funds on capital markets, and that at the end of 2024 the nominal value of outstanding Union borrowing stood at EUR 601,3 billion, up from EUR 458,5 billion in 2023; is concerned that the rising level of debt and the associated increase in interest costs will have long-term implications for the Union’s fiscal stability, potentially resulting in greater financial strain and reducing the Union’s capacity to respond to future challenges or invest in key strategic priorities;

221. Notes that by the end of 2024, payments under the RRF amounted to EUR 197,5 billion out of EUR 358,9 billion in committed grants, leaving up to EUR 161,4 billion still to be disbursed by the end of 2026; notes that this substantial volume of outstanding payments, concentrated in the final two years of the instrument, increases the risk of implementation bottlenecks and further delays, particularly in Member States facing structural capacity constraints; stresses that the timely absorption of the remaining RRF grants will depend on the quality and maturity of reforms and investments, the stability of national governance systems, and the Commission’s ability to process a high volume of payment requests efficiently within a compressed timeframe;

256. Notes with concern that annual NGEU-financed RRF grant payments amounted to EUR 55,9 billion in 2024, reaching only around half of the level expected by the Commission in June 2023 (EUR 96,0 billion), reflecting persistent delays in the submission and processing of payment requests; notes, however, that momentum increased toward the end of the year, with 15 Member States submitting payment requests totalling EUR 58,5 billion in December 2024;

~~222.~~257. Notes ~~the~~that ~~Court’s~~by ~~finding~~the ~~that~~end ~~RRF~~of ~~grant~~2024, ~~implementation~~payments ~~was~~under ~~lower~~the ~~than~~RRF ~~expected,~~amounted ~~while~~to ~~NGEU~~EUR ~~top-up~~197,5 ~~absorption~~billion ~~accelerated~~out inof ~~2024;~~EUR ~~notes~~358,9 ~~that~~billion ~~annual~~in ~~payments~~committed ofgrants, ~~RRF~~leaving ~~grants~~up ~~totalled~~to EUR ~~55.9~~161,4 billion ~~in 2024,~~still ofto ~~which~~be ~~EUR~~disbursed ~~7.9~~by ~~billion~~the ~~was~~end ~~financed~~of ~~from~~2026; ~~REPowerEU~~notes ~~and~~that ~~EUR~~this ~~48.0~~substantial ~~billion~~volume ~~from~~of ~~NGEU~~outstanding ~~grants,~~payments, ~~and~~concentrated ~~that~~in the ~~annual~~final ~~payments~~two ~~for~~years ~~NGEU-financed~~of ~~RRF~~the ~~grants~~instrument, ~~were~~increases ~~only~~the ~~half~~risk ~~what~~of ~~the~~implementation ~~Commission~~bottlenecks ~~had~~and ~~expected~~further delays, particularly in ~~June~~Member ~~2023~~States ~~(EUR~~facing 96structural ~~billion);~~capacity ~~highlights,~~constraints; ~~however,~~stresses that 15the ~~Member~~timely ~~states~~absorption ~~had~~of ~~submitted~~the ~~payment~~remaining ~~requests~~RRF ~~totalling~~grants ~~EUR~~will ~~58.5~~depend ~~billion~~on inthe ~~December~~quality ~~2024;~~and ~~notes~~maturity ~~that~~of ~~with~~reforms ~~payments~~and byinvestments, the ~~end~~stability of ~~2024 of~~national ~~EUR~~governance ~~197.5~~systems, ~~billion~~the ~~out~~availability of ~~EUR 358.9~~administrative ~~billion~~capacity ofand ~~commitments~~technical ~~made,~~support, ~~RRF~~and ~~grants~~the ofCommission’s upability to ~~EUR 161.4~~process ~~billion~~a ~~remain~~high ~~available~~volume toof bepayment ~~paid~~requests byefficiently ~~the~~within ~~end~~a ofcompressed ~~2026;~~timeframe;

223. Notes with concern the Commission’s acknowledgment, in its report of 8 October 2025 on the implementation of the RRF, that the pace of implementation differs significantly among Member States, with only six Member States having received payments corresponding to more than 65 % of their total RRF envelope and another four Member States having received more than 50 % of their allocation; expresses concern about the substantial disparities in the absorption of RRF grants to date; stresses that, with less than six months remaining until the August 2026 deadline, the timely and effective implementation of reforms and investments by Member States has become increasingly urgent;

258. Notes the Court’s finding that RRF grants implementation was lower than expected, while NGEU top-up absorption accelerated in 2024; notes that annual payments of RRF grants totalled EUR 55,9 billion in 2024, of which EUR 7,9 billion was financed from REPowerEU and EUR 48,0 billion from NGEU grants, and that the annual payments for NGEU-financed RRF grants were only half what the Commission had expected in June 2023 (EUR 96 billion); highlights, however, that 15 Member states had submitted payment requests totalling EUR 58,5 billion in December 2024; notes that with payments by the end of 2024 of EUR 197,5 billion out of EUR 358,9 billion of commitments made, RRF grants of up to EUR 161,4 billion remain available to be paid by the end of 2026;

224. Stresses its concern about the Court’s findings in Special Report N°22/2024 on double funding resulting from the RRF model’; highlights that Member States national plans may include so-called ‘zero cost measures’, i.e. measures estimated to have no costs to be financed by the RRF, and for which no checks for double-funding are carried out, as the Commission considers that measures receiving no RRF funds pose no such a risk; notes that, in 2024, the Court nevertheless identified a case of double funding in Croatia; further notes that the Commission does not collect confirmed data on double funding cases under the RRF in 2024 and relies primarily on Member States’ systems, despite the Court identifying double funding as a structural blind spot;

259. Notes with concern the Commission’s acknowledgment, in its report of 8 October 2025 on the implementation of the RRF, that the pace of implementation differs significantly among Member States, with only six Member States having received payments corresponding to more than 65 % of their total RRF envelope and another four Member States having received more than 50 % of their allocation; expresses concern about the substantial disparities in the absorption of RRF grants to date; stresses that, with less than six months remaining until the August 2026 deadline, the timely and effective implementation of reforms and investments by Member States has become increasingly urgent;

225. Recalls that the Regulation stipulates that, measures and actions relating to previously fulfilled M&Ts must not have been reversed, and that Member States are required to confirm this non-reversal in the management declarations accompanying their payment requests; notes with concern that the Court found one case of reversal of a Greek target relating to the establishment and full operation of 50 mental health care establishments, which was deemed in the Court’s 2023 annual report as not satisfactorily fulfilled as five of the 50 establishments were found not operational; deplores the RRF legal framework does not allow the Commission to effectively address reversals after 31 December 2026;

260. Stresses its concern about the Court’s findings in Special Report 22/2024 on double funding resulting from the RRF model; highlights that Member States national plans may include so-called ‘zero cost measures’, i.e. measures estimated to have no costs to be financed by the RRF, and for which no checks for double funding are carried out, as the Commission considers that measures receiving no RRF funds pose no such a risk; notes that the Court reported potential cases of double funding in relation to RRF measures; recalls that the reported finding in Croatia concerns such a zero-cost measure, and that neither the Commission nor the Member State consider that any RRF funds were duplicated; underlines that the Court’s finding reflects a different interpretation of what constitutes “funded” rather than actual double funding; nevertheless stresses that ‘zero-cost measures’ and the absence of systematic cross-checks create a structural blind spot which requires strengthened monitoring and guidance; calls on the Commission to continue monitoring and providing guidance to Member States on the application of the double funding rules, while acknowledging the legal and methodological framework established in the RRF Regulation;

226. Underlines that, in line with Article 12(1) of the Financing Agreement and Article 21(1) of the Loan Agreement, the Commission ‘may carry out verifications, reviews, checks and audits for the implementation of the RRP regarding the information and justification regarding the satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts in a payment request’, and that such verifications, reviews, checks and audits may be carried out for a period after the RRF has expired and could help identify cases where information underlying the payment request as submitted by a Member State was not correct;

261. Recalls that the Regulation stipulates that, measures and actions relating to previously fulfilled milestones and targets must not have been reversed, and that Member States are required to confirm this non-reversal in the management declarations accompanying their payment requests; deplores the RRF legal framework does not allow the Commission to effectively address reversals after 31 December 2026;

227. Notes that, under the European Semester, the implementation of measures set out in the medium-term fiscal-structural plans is monitored annually, with Member States submitting progress reports to the Commission; notes that, in line with the guidance to Member States on the information requirements for the medium-term fiscal-structural plans and for the annual progress reports, for the lifetime of the RRF, these reports are required to include information on progress in implementing any of the RRP reforms and investments included in the medium-term fiscal-structural plans;

262. Underlines that, in line with Article 12(1) of the Financing Agreement and Article 21(1) of the Loan Agreement, the Commission ‘may carry out verifications, reviews, checks and audits for the implementation of the RRP regarding the information and justification regarding the satisfactory fulfilment of milestones and targets in a payment request’, and that such verifications, reviews, checks and audits may be carried out for a period after the RRF has expired and could help identify cases where information underlying the payment request as submitted by a Member State was not correct;

228. Notes that since 2021, the Commission has issued 20 final audit reports covering milestones and targets, containing 591 recommendations to 15 Member States; expresses particular concern that for most (64 %) of the 136 recommendations related to critical and very important findings, the implementation deadline set in the audit report had already passed; notes the Commission acknowledgement that such delays in implementation by some Member States represent 22 % of the total recommendations related to critical and very important findings;

263. Notes that, under the European Semester, the implementation of measures set out in the medium-term fiscal-structural plans is monitored annually, with Member States submitting progress reports to the Commission; notes that, in line with the guidance to Member States on the information requirements for the medium-term fiscal-structural plans and for the annual progress reports, for the lifetime of the RRF, these reports are required to include information on progress in implementing any of the RRP reforms and investments included in the medium-term fiscal-structural plans; underlines that these reports are essential to ensure transparency, accountability, and the effective use of Union funds, and calls on the Commission to verify that Member States provide complete, timely, and accurate information in line with the objectives of the RRF;

229. Notes the Court’s observation that Member State control systems to ensure compliance with public procurement and state aid are insufficiently effective; notes the Court identified weaknesses in 22 individual public procurement procedures including lack of checks to prevent/detect conflict of interest; weakness in justifying the use of urgent procedure; and weakness in estimating the procurement value and project duration leading to significant differences between the tender documents and the actual contracts signed;

264. Notes that since 2021, the Commission has issued 20 final audit reports covering milestones and targets, containing 591 recommendations to 15 Member States; expresses particular concern that for most (64 %) of the 136 recommendations related to critical and very important findings, the implementation deadline set in the audit report had already passed; notes the Commission acknowledgement that such delays in implementation by some Member States represent 22 % of the total recommendations related to critical and very important findings; notes, further, the Commission’s acceptance of the Court’s recommendation to analyse the reasons for delays in implementation by Member States and its ongoing review of the status of all outstanding recommendations; expects it to urgently address delays in implementing the Commission’s recommendations from the ex-post audits;

230. Notes the Court identified weaknesses, for five Member States, in their management declarations, which are to provide assurance that the information submitted with the payment requests is complete, accurate and reliable; notes the Court’s finding that the five Member States, including Czechia, Spain, France, Croatia and Slovakia, were aware of insufficient evidence for the satisfactory fulfilment of some M&Ts when submitting the payment request, but that none of them included any reservation in their management declaration highlighting that a milestone/target was only partially fulfilled at the time of the payment request;

265. Recalls that control milestones continued to be added by the Commission following the detection of Member States’ weaknesses in their control systems; notes the Court’s observation that while the Commission has enhanced its checks on public procurement and state aid, Member States’ control systems remain insufficiently effective to ensure compliance; notes the Court identified weaknesses, which pose a risk to the protection of the Union’s financial interests, in 22 individual public procurement procedures including lack of checks to prevent or detect conflicts of interest, weaknesses in justifying the use of urgent procedures and weaknesses in estimating the procurement value and project duration leading to significant differences between the tender documents and the actual contracts signed; notes that the Commission is reviewing its guidance to Member States with a view to improving the related controls at national level; underlines that while compliance with public procurement and state aid rules generally has no bearing on the regularity of RRF payments made by the Commission to Member States, these rules are crucial for ensuring a fully functioning internal market; considers, therefore, that funding must be subject to compliance with applicable internal market rules; recognises the acknowledgement by the Commissioner for Budget, Anti-Fraud and Public Administration during his hearing in the Committee on Budgetary Control on 8 December 2025 that one of the weaknesses which cannot be repeated is the fact that rules on public procurement and state aid are not included as conditions for payment, and the Commission’s commitment to correct this under the next MFF;

231. Expresses concern about the Court’s findings in Special Report n° 21/2025: on RRF support for an improved business environment; highlights that reforms set out in the national plans differ in scope, nature and ambition, and may not always translate into structural changes in the business environment; also expresses disappointment that M&Ts are generally limited to measuring legal ‘outputs’, mostly the adoption of laws, rather than their results, and therefore, the payment conditions were fulfilled once the laws were adopted, not when the laws have shown their effects; notes that many reforms were already envisaged before the RRF, but that the RRF’s financial support helped ensuring that the reforms were implemented at that moment in time;

266. Notes the Court identified weaknesses, for five Member States, in their management declarations, which are to provide assurance that the information submitted with the payment requests is complete, accurate and reliable; notes the Court’s finding that the five Member States, including Czechia, Spain, France, Croatia and Slovakia, were aware of insufficient evidence for the satisfactory fulfilment of some milestones and targets when submitting the payment request, but that none of them included any reservation in their management declaration highlighting that a milestone/target was only partially fulfilled at the time of the payment request;

267. Expresses concern about the Court’s findings in Special Report 21/2025 ‘RRF support for an improved business environment’; highlights that reforms set out in the national plans differ in scope, nature and ambition, and may not always translate into structural changes in the business environment; also expresses disappointment that milestones and targets are generally limited to measuring legal ‘outputs’, mostly the adoption of laws, rather than their results, and therefore, the payment conditions were fulfilled once the laws were adopted, not when the laws have shown their effects; notes that many reforms were already envisaged before the RRF, but that the RRF’s financial support helped ensuring that the reforms were implemented at that moment in time;

Audit and control

~~232.~~268. Notes the Court’s observation that, as regards serious irregularities not corrected by the Member State, the Director-General of DG ECFIN qualified its assurance with a reservation following the high risk identified in one ~~member~~Member ~~state~~State, ~~(Czechia)~~namely Czechia, due to two individual cases of conflict of interest for which there is no information on further corrective action taken by Czechia at this stage and for which the ~~Member~~Commission ~~State~~had ~~refused~~not toyet ~~take~~launched corrective actions; notes that this reservation concerns two RRF payments, and that the Commission also assessed 2022 payments as medium risk and ~~five~~six payments as low risk of serious irregularities; notes with concern the Court’s view that, as the risk assessment criteria are ~~similar~~broadly toaligned with those ~~used~~applied byfor ~~Member~~checks ~~States~~in ~~for~~areas ~~checks~~such onas public procurement and state aid, the ~~Court considers~~overall ~~that~~assessment ~~this~~may ~~assessment~~not ~~also~~fully ~~underestimates~~capture the level of underlying risk;

~~233.~~269. Is concerned by the Court reporting that information available to the Commission on detected fraud is ~~limited;~~limited and underlines the need to improve information flows with a view to ensuring the protection of the financial interests of the Union, particularly through enhanced precautionary measures; highlights that, at the end of 2024, the EPPO was handling 311 active cases related to NGEU, and that all but four of these concerned the RRF, representing approximately 17 % of all active expenditure fraud investigations; notes that the estimated damage to the Union’s financial interests is EUR ~~2.8~~2,8 billion, representing 30 % (2023: 25 %) of the overall estimated damage resulting from all EUUnion expenditure fraud; ishighlights, ~~worried~~however, ~~that,~~that inthe ~~2024,~~EPPO had only officially notified the ~~Member~~Commission ~~States’~~of ~~management~~75 ~~declarations~~cases ~~had~~related ~~reported~~to ~~only~~the ~~five~~RRF, ~~cases~~and that 80 % of ~~detected~~these ~~suspected~~notified ~~fraud,~~cases ~~meaning~~related to one measure in a ~~very~~single ~~limited~~Member ofState, Italy; also notes the EPPO ~~open~~finding ~~cases~~that ~~were~~national ~~reported~~law byenforcement authorities remained the main source of reporting, with 90 % of the new investigations opened based on their information; also notes from the Court’s Special Report 06/2026 ‘Tackling fraud in the RRF’ that Member States ~~themselves,~~had ~~casting~~reported ~~doubts~~51 cases of suspected fraud to DG ECFIN from the start of the RRF in 2021 until end of 2024; is concerned that reports from Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including the Commission, account for less than 1 % of the new EPPO investigations opened in 2025, raising further concerns on ~~Member~~the ~~States’~~Commission’s ability to ~~detect~~oversee ~~and~~the ~~fight~~RRF; ~~fraud;~~is also alarmed that since the RRF implementation is less than halfway to completion, EPPO expects the number of cases will continue to grow; stresses that the figures presented by the EPPO confirm that the risk of fraud is present in the ~~RRF,~~RRF; ~~and~~stresses that ~~they~~this ~~call~~situation ~~into~~showcases ~~question~~the need to further strengthen national detection and reporting capacities, the ~~ability~~cooperation ofwith ~~Member~~the ~~States~~EPPO toand ~~identify~~the Commission, and ~~report~~the ~~suspected~~overall ~~fraud~~effectiveness and consistency of anti-fraud systems across the ~~remedial~~Union; ~~measures~~emphasises ~~taken;~~that protecting the Union's funds and taxpayers’ money requires a robust, coordinated and well-resourced anti-fraud framework at both Union and national level;

~~234.~~270. ~~Notes~~Welcomes the reforms carried out by Bulgaria and the progress achieved in 2025, during which the country received approximately 31 % of its total allocated RRF funding through two tranches amounting to EUR 1,91 billion; acknowledges key reforms in the area of public procurement and judicial transparency; notes that, on 3 November 2025, the Commission adopted an Implementing Decision on the partial suspension of the disbursement of the second instalment of the non-repayable support for Bulgaria as one ~~control~~ milestone related to the anti-corruption reform had not been deemed ~~satisfactorily~~fulfilled ~~fulfilled;~~satisfactorily; ~~notes~~acknowledges ~~that~~the efforts undertaken by the Bulgarian government ~~had passed~~to aintroduce ~~reform~~reforms aiming to ensure a politically independent appointment of the Anti-corruption ~~Commission,~~Commission; ~~and~~notes that the Commission’s Implementing Decision further ~~notes~~acknowledges that the National Assembly retains a predominant role in both the nomination and appointment of the management of the Anti-corruption ~~Commission, notably its three members, and the Nomination Committee in itself cannot mitigate this role;~~Commission; notes that Bulgaria has six months to ~~find a way to~~ revise the legislative framework ~~and demonstrate it meets the required threshold of political independence~~ to ~~receive the second instalment of~~reach the ~~RRF non-repayable support; reminds~~required ~~the~~threshold; ~~Commission~~underlines that the suspension should only be lifted ~~where~~when Bulgaria has taken the necessary measures to ensure a satisfactory fulfilment of the milestone;

235. Considers that the RRF constitutes a constitutional test for democratic accountability, given its size, speed and exceptional delivery model; stresses that Parliament’s role as discharge authority is meaningful only if transparency, traceability and verification standards are applied rigorously and consistently across all Member States;

271. Notes the Court’s repeated findings of certain national audit authorities’ shortcomings in terms of scope, quality, documentation and reporting; stresses the need for a clear framework of responsibilities to guarantee quality and consistency; insists that audit bodies in Member States comply with internationally accepted audit standards; warns that failure to do so undermines the reliability of their work and poses risks to the Single Audit approach;

272. Regrets the incomplete audit trails observed by the Court in the RRF, which weaken traceability and limit the ability of Parliament and the Court to exercise scrutiny; stresses that all Commission databases and information systems used for the collection, exchange and monitoring of data between the Commission and the Member States must be accessible to the Court; underlines that the Court should have direct and prompt access to the original data as recorded in the system, without prior modification, aggregation or editing by national authorities or Commission services; emphasises that such access is essential to ensure the independence, reliability and effectiveness of audits and to uphold transparency and accountability in the implementation of the Union budget;

273. Expresses concern that audits of RRF and other performance based instruments focus on system audits rather than controls on actual expenditure incurred; warns that such system audits may not reveal underlying issues which can spill over and seriously undermine the sound financial management of the Union budget and the protection of the financial interest of the Union; calls on the Commission to take decisive corrective measures, strengthen audit and accreditation procedures, and ensure that similar systemic failures cannot recur, while respecting the principle of proportionality regarding reporting and documentation duties;

274. Considers that the RRF constitutes a constitutional test for democratic accountability, given its size, speed and exceptional delivery model; recalls that the RRF is financed through substantial common European borrowing and therefore requires the highest standards of financial responsibility, transparency and value for money for Union taxpayers; stresses that Parliament’s role as discharge authority is meaningful only if transparency, traceability, objective application of the rules and verification standards are applied rigorously and consistently across all Member States and if the assessment of milestones and targets is carried out in a fully objective and non-politicised manner ensuring equal treatment of Member States; considers that any shift towards performance-based instruments must be accompanied by parliamentary scrutiny in order to guarantee democratic accountability; opposes any proposal that would upset the institutional balance and undermine Parliament’s role as discharge authority;

Transparency

~~236.~~275. Notes that for 2024 the Court assessed the national systems of five Member States to assess whether they were capable of tracking RRF funds from the national budget down to final recipients and beyond, as well as providing data on expenditure incurred by final recipients; notes the Court’s observation that traceability of RRF funds is not systematic across Member States, and that the systems in place in two Member States did not ensure the systematic collection of data on expenditure incurred by final recipients of RRF funds; ~~deplores~~regrets the Court’s finding that, despite the Commission’s guidance on the methodology to be followed by Member States for publishing the 100 biggest final recipients, significant variations in the type of information published occur; expresses serious concern that such shortcomings in transparency and traceability risk undermining public trust and effective democratic scrutiny of RRF expenditure; also notes that two Member States reported amounts allocated (i.e. budgeted) or disbursed but in some cases only to the level of intermediate bodies, and in some cases combined with national funding, and that one Member State only reported data related to measures with ~~M&Ts~~milestones and targets submitted for payment to the Commission, which did not fully reflect implementation of ongoing measures;

~~237.~~276. Recalls that Article 22(2)(d)(ii) of the RRF Regulation (EU) 2021/241 ~~provides for the obligations of the~~obliges Member States, for the purpose of audit and ~~control and~~control, to ~~provide~~collect comparable information on the use of RRF funds, ~~to collect name of contractor and sub-contractor,~~including ~~where~~on the ~~final recipient~~names isof afinal ~~contracting~~recipients, ~~authority,~~contractors and ~~that~~sub-contractors, ~~Article~~and ~~25a(2)~~beneficial ofowners; ~~Regulation~~recalls, ~~(EU)~~further, ~~2023/435~~that ~~amending~~while the ~~RRF~~ Regulation ~~requires~~does not oblige Member States to collect and publish information onabout ~~the~~expenditure ~~100~~incurred by final recipients ~~receiving the highest~~in ~~amount~~pursuit of ~~funding~~milestones ~~under~~or ~~the~~targets ~~RRF,~~nor ~~and,~~to inprovide ~~the~~such ~~case~~information ofwith atheir ~~legal~~RRF ~~person,~~payment ~~the~~requests, ~~recipient’s~~they ~~full~~are ~~name~~however ~~and~~required ~~VAT~~to ~~identification~~publish ~~number~~this orinformation ~~tax~~about ~~identification~~the ~~number,~~100 or‘final ~~another~~recipients’ ~~unique~~receiving ~~identifier~~the ~~established~~largest atamounts ~~national~~of ~~level~~funding ~~shall~~under bethe ~~published;~~RRF; notes that the Commission position, presented in its Guidance on Recovery and Resilience Plans, describes a final recipient as the ‘last entity receiving funds that is not a contractor or subcontractor’; expresses deep concern over this interpretation of the concept of ‘final recipient’, ~~which~~and reiterates its view that this contradicts the existing legislation; stresses ~~that,~~that ~~should~~it expects the Commission ~~continue~~to enforce compliance with existing legislation and to ~~refuse~~use all means at its disposal to ensure ~~full~~that Member States provide, a complete and meaningful list of final recipients, excluding merely intermediary entities such as ministries or managing authorities; underlines that, to ensure transparency, the Parliament will consider all available measures to enforce compliance, and to prevent a similar interpretation from being applied to the transparency provisions in other financial regulations; considers that persistent failure to ensure meaningful publication of final recipients seriously calls into question the Parliament’s ability to grant discharge on an informed ~~basis;~~basis recalls that the Parliament has repeatedly raised serious concerns in previous discharge resolutions regarding the RRF, including on the transparency of final ~~beneficiaries, and therefore~~recipients; ~~demands~~considers that the Commission ~~provide,~~should ~~within~~start ~~six~~infringement ~~months,~~proceedings aand ~~complete~~that ~~and~~it ~~meaningful~~should ~~list~~act ofwithout ~~final~~undue ~~beneficiaries,~~delay ~~excluding~~to ~~merely~~fully ~~intermediary~~exercise ~~entities~~its ~~such~~powers as ~~ministries~~guardian orof ~~managing~~the ~~authorities;~~Treaties ~~states~~against ~~that,~~Member ~~failing~~States ~~this,~~to ~~Parliament~~ensure ~~will~~that ~~bring~~citizens ~~the~~and ~~matter~~stakeholders ~~before~~have ~~the~~full ~~European~~access ~~Court~~to ofthis ~~Justice~~information; should it fail to do so, Parliament will consider all appropriate measures within its prerogatives to ensure compliance, including legal action; stresses that ~~citizens~~full and ~~stakeholders~~reliable ~~have~~information ~~full~~on ~~access~~the final recipients is essential in order to ~~this~~prevent ~~information;~~misuse of funds, detect fraud and ensure equal standards of accountability across all Member States;

~~238.~~277. Reminds the Commission that the letter and spirit of the RRF Regulation must be strictly followed, and that the adoption of guidelines or other internal documents must be fully in line with the results of the negotiations between the co-legislators; believes that this has not been the case when the Commission adopted the provisions related to the interpretation of what a ‘final recipient’ is in its Guidance on RRPs;

~~239.~~278. Highlights furthermore that, on 4 February 2025, ~~CONT~~for the purposes of discharge under Article 319 TFEU, Members of the Committee on Budgetary Control requested that the Commission to provide for each Member State the list of the 100 largest natural persons or entities receiving funds under the RRF, including contractors and subcontractors; finds it unacceptable that only six Member States shared the requested data with the Commission services, and that a Member State expressed its intention to share the list in the future, while three other Member States indicated they would not submit the data, claiming that the request was not in line with the reporting requirements under the RRF Regulation, while the remaining 17 Member States failed to react to the Commission’s request;

279. Highlights the RRF's crucial contribution to preventing a severe economic downturn and social crisis following the COVID-19 pandemic and its ability to provide a strong crisis response tool;

Recommendations

~~240.~~280. Calls on the Commission to act on the Court’s recommendations from its 2024 Annual Report to ensure that the Commission:

(i) perform sufficient substantive testing to ensure the reliability of the information supporting the Member States’ compliance with the Council Implementing Decisions requirements when assessing ~~M&Ts~~milestones and targets supported primarily by monitoring or implementation reports, instead of relying on Member States’ data and checks;

(ii) analyse the reasons for delays for the implementation by Member States of recommendations linked to critical or very important findings and consider applying flat rate reductions;

~~241.~~281. Furthermore, calls on the Commission to:

(i) closely monitor the continued fulfilment of ~~M&Ts,~~milestones and targets, in particular those related to audit, monitoring and control, and ensure an adequate monitoring of the state of implementation of various ~~M&Ts~~milestones and targets at different point in time after the expiry of the RRF with the options provided under the Financing and Loan Agreements and the European Semester;

(ii) work closely with Member States to ensure that ~~M&Ts,~~milestones and targets, in particular those of a structural nature or linked with CSRs, are fully and diligently implemented;

(iii) implement stricter verification mechanisms to prevent the inclusion of pre-existing projects that do not provide added value under the RRF framework;

(iv) ~~consider suspending payments to Poland~~ensure iffull compliance with the ~~two super~~RRF milestones ~~aimed at strengthening the independence~~ and ~~impartiality~~only ofdisburse ~~the~~funding ~~judiciary~~if ~~backslides~~milestones orcontinue ~~remains~~to ~~partial;~~be met;

~~(v) urgently reinforce fraud detection mechanisms, including the use of a mandatory fraud risk assessment for all large-scale RRF projects;~~

(v) establish, without any further delay, a binding interinstitutional arrangement ensuring the Court’s full, systematic and real-time access to all the relevant databases including Arachne and Fenix;

(vi) consistently and accurately apply the provisions related to the ‘final ~~recipients’,~~recipients’ of the RRF ~~Regulation,~~Regulation by revising its Guidance on RRPs, to communicate with Member States on the correct application of the definition of ‘final recipients’, ~~and~~ to ~~provide the discharge authority,~~ensure ~~within~~Member ~~six~~States ~~months,~~collect ~~with~~and aprovide ~~complete~~information ~~and~~on ~~meaningful~~the ~~list~~last ofentities ~~final~~receiving ~~beneficiaries,~~funds, excluding ~~merely~~ intermediary entities such as ministries or managing ~~authorities;~~authorities, making this information available to the discharge authority by the last RRF payments’ deadline, and start infringement proceedings if necessary;

(vii) ensure consistent performance information, in the post-2027 MFF, by establishing a single set of clearly defined policy areas and a consistent methodology to link challenges, objectives, measures, funding and performance indicators to one or more policy areas;

(vii) ensure greater transparency in the RRF through the timely publication of Commission assessments, national reports, audits and recovery actions in an accessible and verifiable format, enabling proper scrutiny by Parliament, the Court and citizens; supports a layered approach to access—full real-time access for the Court, unrestricted information rights for Parliament, and transparent public access in line with CJEU rulings—while ensuring compliance with GDPR and Union data protection rules; stresses that published data must reflect actual project implementation and results;

(viii) strictly apply the provisions of the RRF Regulation, including those regarding suspension of payments or recoveries of amounts, in particular if the protection of the financial interests of the Union is not ensured;

(viii) ensure consistent performance information, in the post-2027 MFF, by establishing a single set of clearly defined policy areas and a consistent methodology to link challenges, objectives, measures, funding and performance indicators to one or more policy areas, including through the use of harmonised reporting frameworks and measurable, comparable indicators across all Member States, enabling a clear assessment of results, efficiency and value for the Union's funding;

~~(ix) mandate interoperable, automated cross-checks across RRF, cohesion and direct management instruments and to report annually to the discharge authority about detected double-funding cases;~~

(ix) strictly apply the provisions of the RRF Regulation, including those regarding suspension of payments or recoveries of amounts, in particular if the protection of the financial interests of the Union is not ensured;

(x) propose, for post-2026 instruments and regulation revisions, an obligation for Member States to report suspected fraud and irregularities using a harmonised taxonomy aligned with OLAF/EPPO standards and needs and to include penalties for systemic under-reporting.

(x) mandate interoperable, automated cross-checks across RRF, cohesion and direct management instruments and to report annually to the discharge authority about detected double funding cases;

(xi) work closely with Member States, in particular those facing structural capacity constraints, by providing targeted technical assistance, guidance and administrative support in order to ensure the full and effective implementation of RRF investments and reforms across all Member States;

(xii) strengthen monitoring mechanisms and ensure that reforms and investments financed under the RRF remain operational and deliver durable impact beyond the disbursement period, in order to protect the Union’s financial interests and taxpayers’ money;

(xiii) propose, for post-2026 instruments and regulation revisions, an obligation for Member States to report suspected fraud and irregularities using a harmonised taxonomy aligned with OLAF/EPPO standards;

(xiv) perform a macroeconomic evaluation with the objective of assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of Union support to Member States through the RRF, including the extent to which support has been timely and proportional to the intended objectives of the Facility, notably recovery from the COVID-19 crisis, and share it with the discharge authority;

(xv) call for the introduction of predictive analytic tools powered by AI as well as machine learning capabilities that would enable auditors to conduct real-time risk assessments and identify anomalies more effectively.

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he included in his report input on matters pertaining to the subject of the file that he received, in the preparation of the ~~draft~~ report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee, from the following interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register, or from the following representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies:

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament's Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

26.1.2026

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

for the Committee on Budgetary Control

on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the EU – Commission for the financial year 2024

(2025/2145(DEC))

Rapporteur for opinion: Evin Incir

OPINION

The Committee on Foreign Affairs calls on the Committee on Budgetary Control, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

1. Notes that the current audit year is marked by continued geopolitical instability and global challenges; recalls that since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU has provided economic, humanitarian and military support to Ukraine worth over €177 billion; highlights the importance of the €50 billion Ukraine Facility adopted in 2024 and calls on the Commission to ensure the transparent, timely and efficient implementation of the Facility, supported by strengthened monitoring, auditing and reporting mechanisms to guarantee proper use of funds, underlining the need to improve procurement efficiency; underlines, however, that the measures taken must be accelerated given the gravity of the situation and urgently expedite both military and reconstruction aid to Ukraine; emphasises the importance of increased EU financial support to Republic of Moldova in order to bolster its resilience and counteract destabilising actors; calls on the Commission to ensure that such support is accompanied by robust risk-management, strict conditionality and regular reporting, particularly in the fields of resilience, energy security, public administration reform and strategic communication;

2. Underlines the essential role of the EU's external policies under heading 6 (Neighbourhood and the World) in upholding and promoting EU values, democracy, equality, security and stability amid Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine and other global challenges; emphasises the need for reinforced and robust rule of law and merit-based conditionality in pre-accession assistance and NDICI-Global Europe firmly placing democratic fundamentals at the centre of the EU's approach linking disbursements to tangible progress on rule of law, judiciary reforms, media freedom and alignment with EU foreign and security policy; stresses that the principle of “more for more and less for less” must be consistently applied to ensure credibility and effectiveness; stresses that backsliding must trigger immediate reprogramming towards civil society and democratic local pro-reform stakeholders; welcomes, in this perspective, the Commission’s decision to pause the adoption of the draft implementing decision concerning Tanzania and calls on the Commission to withdraw its draft implementing decision and to submit a new draft that respects the concerns raised, while ensuring that any new changes do not adversely affect funding directed to support NGOs and civil society; highlights the importance of the €6 billion Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, adopted in 2024; calls for the access and funding of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to be reinstated in full, with strong oversight and accountability to help the humanitarian situation in Palestine and across the region while insisting on the continuation of transparency and compliance mechanisms for all EU funded implementing partners; welcomes UNRWA’s fulfilment of all conditions set by the Commission for continued funding in 2024 and the recent Commission’s assessment that the Agency remains fully committed to implementing the recommendations of the ‘Colonna report;

3. Stresses that EU financial assistance to Georgia must strictly follow NDICI-Global Europe conditionality; calls for the continued suspension of all financial bilateral assistance directly benefiting Georgian authorities until further notice, and simultaneous increase in funding for Georgian civil society and independent media; calls for increased support to independent civil society where state-level conditions are not met;

4. Calls for closer examination of China’s and Russia’s influence in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe, noting the importance of understanding how these external actors shape developments on the ground; calls on the Commission to integrate these risks into its financial programming, fraud risk assessments and project-level due-diligence.

5. Calls on the Commission to increase rapid-response funding for human rights defenders, independent journalists, women’s rights NGOs and democratic activists in partner countries, ensuring flexible, low-bureaucracy access to support where government-level conditionality cannot be met.

6. Calls on the Commission to ensure that external funding dedicated to addressing the root causes of irregular migration and improving border management fully in line with international law delivers measurable results and adheres to strict performance indicators; calls for stronger oversight of EU-funded anti-smuggling, return cooperation and capacity-building programmes, ensuring efficient use of resources and full respect for human rights.

7. Calls on the Commission to ensure rigorous financial oversight in the implementation of EU defence-related instruments, including EDIRPA and EDIP, by improving procurement transparency, strengthening audit trails and facilitating reporting to Parliament on budget execution and performance.

8. Notes the 4.9% material error rate under heading 6 in 2024, mainly linked to ineligible costs and procurement issues; welcomes the Commission's effective controls over the clearance of pre-financing paid to international organisations; calls for the prompt implementation of the ECA's recommendations, including the elimination of ambiguity in contract conditions and beneficiary guidelines, as well as ensuring compliance with contractual limits on indirect costs;

9. Encourages the Commission to increase transparency by publishing accessible dashboards tracking high-value external action contracts, performance indicators, and the status of ECA recommendations;

10. Calls on the Commission to deepen cooperation with OLAF and EPPO in external financing and to systematically inform Parliament on cases where EU external funds may have been misused;

11. Reiterates that Global Gateway should contribute to global stability and security, enhancing democracy and rule of law, while strengthening Europe's resilience; stresses, further, that to align political commitment and geopolitical ambitions as well as to ensure high levels of transparency, sustainability and accountability, expanded cooperation with like-minded partners, including countries in Latin America and through well-defined private sector engagement, and a renewed commitment to timely delivery is needed; calls on the Commission to involve civil society organisations more systematically in Global Gateway initiatives; calls on the Commission to accelerate the realisation of projects and to streamline the amount of flagship projects with the aim of maximising the impact of the initiative;

12. Calls on the Commission to reinforce financial due-diligence and procurement safeguards under Global Gateway to prevent EU-funded infrastructure projects from creating or deepening strategic dependencies on China; stresses the need for transparent procurement, risk mitigation and consistent application of EU standards.

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur for opinion declares that he included in his opinion input on matters pertaining to the subject of the file that he received, in the preparation of the opinion, prior to the adoption thereof in committee, from the following interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register, or from the following representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies:

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur for opinion.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur for opinion declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament's Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

28.1.2026

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPMENT

for the Committee on Budgetary Control

on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2024, Section III – Commission, executive agencies and the ninth, tenth and eleventh European Development Funds

(2025/2145(DEC))

Rapporteur for opinion: Charles Goerens

OPINION

The Committee on Development calls on the Committee on Budgetary Control, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

1. Is very concerned about the consequences of severe budget cuts in development and humanitarian aid from countries that have been leading donors; insists that, against this background, the fully transparent, effective and efficient use of EU funds becomes more important than ever; stresses that, in time of constrained public finances, EU development spending must be firmly grounded in principles of fiscal responsibility; reiterates that it would be a serious mistake to decrease development funding in favour of defence and security spending, since fragile states and societies are a source of instability and insecurity which often reach beyond their borders;

2. Reminds the Commission to respect the budget allocations as defined in Regulation (EU) 2021/947 (NDICI - Global Europe), in particular the financial envelope for Sub-Saharan Africa, which should be at least EUR 29,181 billion for the seven years 2021 – 27; is concerned that 348 million are lacking to reach this minimum amount, as the financial envelope for Sub-Saharan Africa has been reduced, following the MFF revision in February 2024; urges the Commission to present measures to close this gap and to prioritise actions delivering measurable results;

3. Welcomes the fact that the European Court of Auditors (ECA), unlike for previous years, provided a specific assessment of the regularity of underlying transactions for MFF heading 6 ‘Neighbourhood and the world’, and estimated the level of error to be 4.9 %; points out that this level of error is still considerably above the materiality threshold of 2.0%; whilst noting the Commission's explanation in its replies to the ECA's annual report, calls on the Commission to make decisive and sustained efforts to decrease this error rate; invites the Commission, furthermore, to provide the European Parliament with concrete examples where errors identified by the ECA were resolved in subsequent accounting years, due to controls and corrections by the Commission, as claimed in its response to the ECA;

4. Notes with concern that serious transparency problems persist with regard to ECA's access to documents of some international organisations and international financial institutions, leading to delays and hindering the proper execution of the ECA's audit tasks; reiterates that full and unconditional audit access is essential for credibility and accountability commends the Commission for its efforts to address these problems and underlines the need to continue developing a strong and trustful EU-UN partnership to counter the risk of erosion of the multilateral order and to work towards the Sustainable Development Goals; stresses that cooperation with multilateral bodies must remain transparent and efficient;

5. Notes with concern that a large proportion of the errors identified concerned contracts implemented by international organisations, international financial institutions, state agencies and decentralised actors under indirect management; calls for concrete, time-bound measures to bring that error rate down and ensure full transparency and accountability of indirect management; stresses the need for clearer guidance for implementing partners;

6. Reiterates its demand that implementing partners strictly comply with visibility rules in order to ensure transparent information for the public; requests stricter follow-up in cases of repeated non-compliance;

7. Insists that it is of paramount importance that the Commission ensures that supported projects have a lasting impact, in line with the ECA recommendations on project durability; underlines that, to achieve this durability, meaningful and inclusive local ownership is essential, with particular consideration for the role of local authorities and institutions complemented by meaningful presence on the ground of, and monitoring of project implementation by, the relevant EU delegation, which needs to be adequately staffed; recalls the importance of close cooperation with local communities, organisations and civil society to ensure legitimacy, sustainability and effectiveness of EU support;

8. Recalls the importance of making EU funds accessible also to local implementing partners which often lack proper information and struggle with cumbersome administrative requirements; calls on the Commission to adapt rules, procedures and grant volume to their size, capacity and operating context and to guarantee adequate and sustained funding for NGOs and other local partners and civil society organisations active in development cooperation and humanitarian aid; encourages, moreover, the participation of local evaluators and evaluation organisations, to reinforce their assessment capacities; calls for further simplification of administrative procedures for small local actors;

9. Notes the ECA's observation, in its special report 17/2025, that the share of joint EU and member states Aid for Trade (AfT) directed towards least developed countries (LDCs) is moving further away from the target of 25 % of total AfT by 2030, and has dropped to 12% only; welcomes that the Commission accepts the ECA's recommendations to systematically assess this situation and looks forward to seeing improvements; invites the Commission to set interim milestones to monitor progress toward the 2030 target; stresses the importance of free and fair trade and entrepreneurship that respects the economic sovereignty of partners and improved governance in partner countries to ensure sustainable results; underlines that AfT is an important tool to build the trade capacity and infrastructure of LDCs to benefit from trade opening, including access to regional and global trade; recalls that LDCs are not a homogenous group, as some prioritise agricultural production in order to achieve food security, whilst others seek to diversify production to develop exports; notes with concern that LDCs generally do not have sufficiently strong institutional frameworks to be able to express their AfT needs at regional level; recalls that AfT is part of overall official development assistance (ODA), with grants and concessional loans targeted at trade-related programmes and projects, thereby improving economic opportunities and reducing the structural causes of poverty, therefore also of forced irregular migration in the long term; notes that, in light of the decline in the LDCs share and the growing importance attributed to the Global Gateway strategy, which focusses on mobilising private sector investment, the EU needs a special approach and strategy for fragile contexts;

10. Emphasises that efficient and transparent use of funds is a prerequisite for EU-funded measures to enable sustainable human and inclusive economic development and decent job creation at local level; calls on the Commission to systematically monitor and publish this impact in the future, particularly in the context of aid for trade, infrastructure programmes, vocational training and other investment aid.

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

The rapporteur for opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not include in his opinion input from interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register, or from representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies, to be listed in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

6.2.2026

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS

for the Committee on Budgetary Control

on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2024, Section III – Commission and executive agencies and the ninth, tenth and eleventh European Development Funds

(2025/2145(DEC))

Rapporteur for opinion: Romana Tomc

OPINION

The Committee on Employment and Social Affairs calls on the Committee on Budgetary Control, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

– having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2024, together with the institutions’ replies, and to the Court of Auditors’ special reports;

1. Welcomes the European Court of Auditors’ clean opinion concluding that the EU’s 2024 consolidated accounts present fairly, in all material respects, the Union’s financial position at year-end;

2. Notes that total outstanding commitments amounted to EUR 507.4 billion at the end of 2024, including NextGenerationEU (NGEU), a decline from the record high of EUR 543 billion in 2023, and notes that this level stands at EUR 33.5 billion above the Commission’s June 2024 estimate;

3. Observes that the Court of Auditors’ estimated error rate for MFF heading 2 ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’ fell to 5.7% in 2024, down from 9.3% in 2023, yet still exceeds the 2% materiality threshold resulting in the Court issuing an adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of budget expenditure; notes that spending under this heading remains high-risk due to its reimbursement-based nature and complex rules, and that the main types of error quantified were ineligible costs and projects, irregularities in public procurement procedures and absence of essential supporting documents; calls for strengthened efforts to reduce the error rate especially for the new funding period, and notes the Court’s observation that the complexity of the way funds are disbursed has an impact on the risk of error;

4. Strongly regrets that the Commission forecasts EUR 2.7 billion in decommitments for cohesion policy funds over 2025–2027, nearly seven times higher than in forecasted 2022; notes with concern that the overall absorption rate of these funds was only 5 % by the end of 2024 compared to 14 % at the equivalent point of the previous MFF; reiterates that this reflects persistently low absorption and calls, therefore, for Member States to ensure faster implementation of these funds; stresses the Commission should identify ways to help Member States accelerate the use of EU funds, in particular shared management funds under the Common Provisions Regulation to improve absorption, while respecting sound financial management; notes, in this regard, the recently adopted legislative proposals in respect of the cohesion policy funds regulations for the 2021- 2027 programming period which could help to reduce the risk of these funds being decommitted;

5. Recalls that spending under the subheading 2a “Economic, social and territorial cohesion” focuses on reducing disparities between Member States and regions of the EU; stresses the importance of EU cohesion policy in supporting the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights and its Action Plan and headline targets; underlines that EU cohesion policy provides an important contribution to the EU’s employment, social, education and skills policies, including structural reforms in these areas;

6. Recalls the importance of the ESF+ which aims to achieve high employment, fair social protection, a skilled and resilient workforce, and inclusive societies as key to eradicating poverty; notes that despite easing, inflation continued to affect the 2024 Union budget, raising costs and eroding the real value of appropriations and the effectiveness of ESF+; underlines that the current budget for the ESF+ is in any case not sufficient to meet the 2030 targets of the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan; stresses the need to provide the ESF+ with the continued financial and political support of the EU, national and regional institutions in the delivery of its objectives and targets in the years to come; stresses the importance of involving civil society organisations and social partners working on the ground in the implementation of ESF+ funded activities; calls on the Commission to bring crèche staff in-house, ensuring good working conditions and contractual stability;

7. Welcomes the fact that in line with its binding commitments, and following Parliament’s repeated calls, the Commission has developed a pilot methodology to track and measure expenditure related to gender equality at programme level in the 2021-2027 MFF, with a view to improving gender mainstreaming in the Commission’s budget process and enhancing how policy design and resource allocation advance gender equality objectives;

8. Asks the Commission to implement as soon as possible all outstanding Court of Auditors' recommendations.

9. Recalls the importance of monitoring the use of EU funds to ensure the protection of the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to make full use of the tools available to address the clear risk of a serious breach of the EU’s values and the rule of law; recalls in this context the Commission statement attached to the mid-term review revision of the cohesion policy on the matter;

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

The rapporteur for opinion declares under her exclusive responsibility that she did not include in her opinion input from interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register, or from representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies, to be listed in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

30.1.2026

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ENVIRONMENT, CLIMATE AND FOOD SAFETY

for the Committee on Budgetary Control

(2025/2145(DEC))

Rapporteur for opinion: Antonio Decaro

OPINION

The Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety calls on the Committee on Budgetary Control, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its proposal for a decision:

1. Is satisfied with the Commission's overall implementation of the budget in the areas of environment, climate action and food safety in 2024; reminds that for implementation to be effective it requires continuous attention to performance indicators, value for money and the correction of weaknesses identified in some specific recommendations by the European Court of Auditors (ECA) in its Annual Report for the financial year 2024;

2. Stresses that, given the scale and importance of their tasks, adequate funding and staffing must be guaranteed while ensuring that staffing and financial resources are aligned with clearly defined priorities, measurable objectives and performance indicators, and that administrative expansion remains justified for the Commission Directorates-General working in the areas of environment, climate action and food safety; calls on the Commission to adopt and implement effective mitigation strategies to address the identified risks associated with budget implementation, including conflicts of interest and greenwashing in project management; recalls the need to assign sufficient resources for the implementation of the 2030 Biodiversity Strategy, the Farm to Fork Strategy, the Circular Economy Action Plan, the Chemical Strategy for Sustainability and the Zero-pollution Action Plan; Stresses the importance of focusing available resources on actions with proven environmental and economic added value, and on measures to support innovation in as well as the resilience and competitiveness of the European Union;

Climate Action

3. Recognises that in 2024 about EUR 60.6 billion, approximately 32% of the annual budget under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), was spent towards climate objectives; in line with the commitment in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 20201 to dedicate at least 30 % of both the 2021-27 MFF budget and the European Union Recovery Instrument to climate-relevant expenditure; calls for a recalibration of mainstreaming targets in light of changing policy priorities in a new geopolitical context;

4. Notes the progress made in the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RFF) by the end of 2024, with 47% of milestones and targets assessed as fulfilled by the Commission and an additional 29% reported by the Member States to be completed, and a total of EUR 306.1 billion disbursed; recognises that 42.6% of the total RRF allocation is calculated to finance investments and reforms supporting the green transition, including energy efficiency, renewable energy, electricity grids and other green investments;

5. Reminds that the RRF was originally introduced as targeted funding under the Green Deal communication primarily aimed at industrial decarbonisation and the energy transition; stresses that the decarbonisation targets of the Green Deal, notably the Climate Law and the reforms under the Fit for 55 package, still need to be financially addressed, including, and not necessarily exclusively through the funds that have not yet been borrowed up to the maximum borrowing limit of the RRF;

6. Highlights that REPowerEU chapters under the RRF contribute a total of EUR 64.75 billion in support for reforms and investments in Member states to save energy, substitute fossil fuels, diversify energy supplies, produce clean energy and address security-of-supply needs; insists that RePowerEU investments should prioritise diversification of energy sources, and should support a technology-neutral and cost-effective approach to decarbonisation; notes that in 2024, the Innovation Fund provided an additional EUR 4,6 billion in grants for projects advancing innovative low-carbon technologies; calls on the Commission to ensure that funding also benefits the regions most vulnerable and exposed in the energy transition;

7. Observes that in the period 2021-2024, 64% of overall climate expenditure was dedicated to climate change mitigation, 21% to climate change adaptation and 14% contribute to both goals; is of the opinion that expenditure labelled as climate spending should be falling into one of the three abovementioned categories, and in this context the 1% climate expenditure representing in the period covered a few bln EUR being ‘not attributable’1a, raises questions;

8. Notes that the RRF contributes significantly to the climate-relevant spending; in this context, is concerned about the Court of Auditors’(the ‘Court’) annual report for 2024 as well as Special Report No 14/2024 , which, similar to previous reports, revealed multiple shortcomings of the RRF framework and the national recovery and resilience plans, a high level of approximation in tracking climate expenditure, leading to potential overestimations, and concluded that the contribution of the RRF to the green transition is not clear; agrees with the ECA’s conclusion in Special Report No 14/2024 that ‘the green transition reporting presented in the RRF Scoreboard is confusing’ and ‘does not provide users with complete and reliable information about the actual amounts spent on the green transition’; is concerned about these shortcomings and the actual achievement of the RRF’s climate and environmental objectives; stresses that a credible climate-tracking methodology is essential for maintaining public trust; calls on the Commission to ensure systematic overestimation of climate expenditure is avoided as well as to reduce coefficient-based approximations in favour of a more evidence-based data collection;

9. Reiterates the importance of proper scrutiny of climate expenditure in the Union budget, and holds the Commission accountable for the implementation of a robust and reliable methodology, in line with the commitments undertaken in the MFF agreement and the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020; calls on the Commission to follow the Court’s recommendations in the relevant reports to enhance the performance of green transition measures and to ensure comprehensive, consistent, reliable and transparent reporting on climate spending under the RRF;

10. Is aware that in response to ECA Special Report 09/22 the Commission commissioned a study with a view to establishing a more scientific approach to quantify the CAP climate contribution; Notes that although the study was concluded in August 2025 it has not been presented; calls on the Commission to make public the study;

11. Recognises that according to the Directorate-General for Climate Action’s 2024 Annual Activity Report (AAR), the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) generated EUR 43.6 billion of revenue for climate-action investments in the previous year; in that respect reiterates its concern that the significant risks related to the security and protection of the registry/operating mechanism of the ETS against cyberattacks still has not been satisfactorily addressed; to mitigate those risks, requests the Commission to report on the measures planned to be undertaken in the immediate future;

Biodiversity

12. Notes that in 2024, about EUR 14.4 billion, approximately 7.6% of the annual budget under the multiannual financial framework, was dedicated to biodiversity objectives, under various programmes e.g. the CAP, cohesion policy programmes, Horizon Europe and the LIFE programme; acknowledges that this expenditure slightly exceeds the target, as provided for in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020, for biodiversity expenditure of 7.5% of the annual spending for 2024; underlines that increased budgetary allocations must be accompanied by improved effectiveness, better monitoring of biodiversity outcomes and avoidance of measures that lead to disproportionate administrative burdens for farmers and local authorities;

13. Regrets that projections for 2026 and 2027 predict that the target of 10% of the annual budget allocated to biodiversity will not be achieved; notes that there is an average annual financing gap of EUR 21.4 billion to achieve biodiversity goals ; calls on the Commission to propose a dedicated, detailed plan to close this gap and to make further efforts to ensure that the biodiversity spending target set for the years 2026 and 2027 is met, to foster financial tools to close the financing gap and to fully implement environmental legislation and mainstreaming biodiversity action into key sectors in order to reach policy targets, including with the view of providing financing for the implementation of the Nature Restoration Regulation;

14. Notes that the programme for the environment and climate action (LIFE) contributed EUR 769 million in 2024 to support the shift towards a sustainable economy, protect, restore and improve the quality of the environment and halt and reverse biodiversity loss and degradation of ecosystems, financing about 700 projects since 2021; underlines the central role of the LIFE programme in delivering concrete environmental protection actions, including the expected avoidance of 1.4 million tonnes of CO2 emissions and the halted or reversed loss of 176 species thanks to LIFE projects awarded in 2022 and 2023; acknowledges the good progress made towards achieving the performance targets for the 2021-2027 LIFE programme;

15. Highlights the ECA’s finding that, while the green transition objective has a broader scope than climate action and includes biodiversity and environment, the RRF tracks only climate-related measures whilst the tracking system for environmental objectives is not used; insists on the need to accurately track environment and biodiversity-related expenditure; welcomes the progress made in the tracking methodology for the contribution of the common agricultural policy to biodiversity for the EU budget 2024; calls for full respect of the structure and spirit of the Treaties, ensuring that Treaty objectives are pursued strictly within their respective mandates and that no single objective is prioritised over others without a clear constitutional basis, thereby safeguarding balanced budgetary governance;

16. Regrets the findings of the European Environment Agency in its report on Europe’s environment 2025 that Europe’s terrestrial, freshwater and marine biodiversity is in a poor state and that the outlook for biodiversity is negative, as efforts to protect and restore nature require time to deliver and persistent pressures remain, such as over-exploitation, intense land and sea use, and pollution;

17. Notes that the number and severity of forest fires has increased markedly over the past two decades, driven by climate change; joins the ECA in welcoming the Commission’s increased focus on fire prevention; regrets, however, the ECA’s finding, that many EU-funded prevention projects were not sufficiently targeted to the specific fire-risk factors in the regions concerned and were not always informed by up-to-date national risk assessments; calls on the Commission to address these shortcomings to ensure that forest-fire prevention funding is strategic, risk-based and climate-resilient;

18. Stresses the need for continuous work towards the achievement of climate and biodiversity mainstreaming targets.

Food Safety

19. Calls on the Commission, in cooperation with EFSA and Member States, to strengthen horizon scanning and early-warning systems for emerging risks in the food and feed chain, particularly those linked to climate change and increasingly complex global supply chains;

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

The Chair in his capacity as rapporteur for opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not include in his opinion input from interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register, or from representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies, to be listed in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

29.1.2026

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC HEALTH

for the Committee on Budgetary Control

on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2024, Section III – Commission

(2025/2145(DEC))

Rapporteur for opinion: Kateřina Konečná

OPINION

The Committee on Public Health calls on the Committee on Budgetary Control, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

1. Regrets that the budgetary expenditure entered in the accounts for the year 2024 is materially affected by error; notes furthermore that the European Court of Auditors (ECA) estimated the overall level of error affecting such expenditure at 3.6%, thus evidencing that a considerable proportion of the expenditure recorded in the accounts is subject to material irregularities; stresses that Union health spending must be assessed not only in terms of legality and regularity, but also with regard to its effectiveness, efficiency and European added value, in particular its capacity to deliver measurable improvements in access to healthcare, including for vulnerable groups; and aligning with the Union's One Health approach;

2. Recalls the findings of the ECA’s Special Report on the Digitalisation of Healthcare, which concluded that Union support to Member States has been overall effective in fostering the digital transformation of healthcare systems; notes, however, that Member States have faced difficulties in utilising Union funds allocated for this purpose and regrets that while the Commission monitors the progress achieved by Member States in the digitalisation of healthcare, it does not yet possess a comprehensive overview of how Union funds are being used to support these activities; calls on the Commission to implement in full the ECA’s recommendations, in particular by improving guidance to Member States, strengthening monitoring and performance-based oversight of EU funds used for digital health and ensuring that digital health investments uphold the highest standards of data protection, cybersecurity and interoperability;

3. Calls on the Commission to take corrective action addressing the shortcomings identified by the ECA and the concerns expressed by the European Parliament, with particular attention to EU4Health and health-related digitalisation and crisis-preparedness spending; emphasizes that budgetary planning and execution should complement national plans on public health, deliver tangible public health benefits to citizens and foster competitiveness in the Union, so that digitalisation results in effective improvements in healthcare delivery;

EU4HEALTH

4. Strongly regrets the disproportionate €1 billion cut to the EU4Health programme schedule for the 2025-2027 period; recalls the importance of the public health policies and the clear political commitment in the Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (2020 MFF agreement) to prioritise health funding; emphasizes that health funding should be used as efficiently as possible and targeted at areas with the European added value; recalls that EU4Health 2021–2027, as a standalone programme, has a transformative role in supporting public health and advancing the Union’s public health policy objectives; considers that recent funding reductions undermine the Union’s capacity to invest in prevention, health-system resilience and mental health; calls on the Commission and the Council to reverse these cuts in the next multiannual financial framework and in the annual budgetary procedure; calls for a stronger focus within EU4Health on health promotion and disease prevention, including dedicated funding for mental health, non-communicable diseases, and gender sensitive health approach; further calls on the Commission to strengthen coordination mechanisms and ensure that actions financed under EU4Health complement, rather than duplicate, other Union programmes, thereby maximising efficiency and public health impact;

5. Recalls the Commission’s overall implementation of the budget under the EU4Health programme, noting that 64.5% of commitments and 29.3% of payments were executed; takes note of the level of budget implementation under the EU4Health programme, with execution remaining partial for both commitments and payments; highlights the importance of continued efforts to improve implementation, particularly in light of ongoing and significant public health challenges; calls on the Commission to improve transparency, streamline procedures and provide targeted support, particularly to smaller Member States and civil society organisations, in order to ensure more effective and equitable use of EU4Health resources across the Union; calls on the Commission to improve the absorption rate of EU4Health funds by simplifying procedures and by providing technical support to Member States if needed;

6. Notes that investments in crisis preparedness and response represented approximately 64% of the EU4Health annual budget for 2024; acknowledges that these investments have significantly strengthened the Union’s capacity to respond to health emergencies including medical countermeasures, enabling timely interventions;

7. Notes the importance of transparent and objective allocation of EU4Health funds, ensuring their effective use in line with the programme’s overarching goal of improving healthcare and public health outcomes for European citizens, and in accordance with clear, verifiable and measurable objectives; welcomes the significant progress made in the implementation of the EU4Health programme, noting that several milestones set for 2024 have been met or exceeded across various strands; highlights the advances achieved towards the 2027 targets in key areas, including crisis preparedness and response, health promotion and disease prevention, cancer initiatives, and support for patients with rare diseases through the European Reference Networks (ERNs);

8. Acknowledges that the EU4Health programme has contributed to the InvestEU programme through blending with the EU guarantee, thereby mobilising additional investments; notes in particular the contribution of EUR 110 million via an InvestEU top-up supporting European Investment Bank (EIB) investments in innovative life-science projects related to medical countermeasures; underlines the importance of ensuring transparency, efficient coordination with national and EU funding instruments, and broad access to Member States so that these investments deliver strong European added value and strengthen the resilience of the Union’s health systems; recalls the importance of investing in medical innovation and technologies at a European level and the importance of strengthening the cooperation between research institutions, private medical companies and public authorities to better serve the public interest;

9. Highlights that special attention was devoted to antimicrobial resistance (AMR), notably through cooperation on antibiotics’ innovation with the Global Antibiotic Research and Development Partnership;

10. Notes that direct grants to Member States aimed at strengthening national surveillance systems, attracted 23 proposals, launched between October 2024 and January 2025, with a Union contribution of approximately EUR 87 million; further notes that the joint action on counteracting antimicrobial resistance, supported by EUR 50 million, engaged all Member States and a broad consortium of beneficiaries; recalls the programme’s contributions to international coordination with the World Health Organization (WHO) and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), supporting efforts to respond to recent Ebola, mpox, and Marburg virus outbreaks in Africa;

11. Observes the continued investment in the EU Early Warning and Response System and in three waves of new European reference laboratories for human pathogens; notes that nine laboratories have been appointed to date, with funding secured for the next seven years;

12. Notes with satisfaction that implementation of the health promotion and disease prevention strand (representing 9.7% of the annual budget) is on track; welcomes the 142 pilot projects under the joint action on cardiovascular diseases and diabetes, as well as the wide participation of Member States in public health interventions across all stages of life; stresses, however, that major inequalities persist in access to prevention and screening between and within Member States, and calls on the Commission to use EU4Health to support targeted interventions for disadvantaged regions and persons in vulnerable situation;

13. Welcomes the broad involvement in the Mental Health Together joint action, with 20 Member States adopting a comprehensive approach to mental health, and the European Programme for Mental Health Exchanges, Networking and Skills, enabling the participation of around 300 professionals; calls on the Commission to dedicate more resources in future work programs to community-based mental health services, with a particular focus on children and young people, LGBTIQ+ persons and people in precarious work or housing situations; underlines the need to address psychosocial risks at work, including stress and burnout and to consider the impact of digitalization and social media on mental health;

14. Notes the launch of new grants for European Reference Networks (ERNs) for rare diseases, with a total budget of EUR 77.4 million and a funding rate of 100%; welcomes the introduction of harmonised work packages and indicators to improve comparability, synergies, and best-practice exchange among ERNs; notes furthermore the joint action on the integration of ERNs into national healthcare systems, launched in January 2024, involving 58 partner institutions across all Member States, Norway and Ukraine, with total funding of EUR 18.75 million;

15. Welcomes the health systems and healthcare workforce strand (representing 5.4% of the annual budget) for delivering tangible results, including the publication of Health at a Glance: Europe 2024 and progress under the new regulatory framework for medical devices; takes note that by October 2024, 10 554 certificates for medical devices and 1 273 certificates for in-vitro diagnostic devices had been issued; welcomes the creation of an IT platform to support the implementation of the Health Technology Assessment Regulation, involving nearly 500 users from EU and EEA countries, as well as the training of 350 patients to contribute to joint work on assessments; expresses concern about chronic staff shortages and burnout in the health and care workforce across the Union; calls on the Commission to fully leverage EU4Health and other EU programmes to make healthcare careers more attractive, notably through continuous training, fair working conditions, and to encourage sustainable staffing and robust retention policies for health workers, particularly in underserved regions;

16. Acknowledges EU4Health support for Member States in implementing the new Substances of Human Origin Regulation, and notes funding for studies on pricing and reimbursement and on the Clinical Trials Regulation;

17. Welcomes the digital strand’s contribution (3% of the annual budget) to the digital transformation of healthcare, particularly through the expansion of MyHealth@EU and HealthData@EU, both key enablers of the forthcoming European Health Data Space; stresses that 22 countries launched 44 key projects to improve interoperability and access to health data; stresses that investments in the digital transformation of healthcare must deliver tangible benefits for patients and healthcare professionals, notably by ensuring interoperability, robust cybersecurity and user-friendly solutions across all Member States; highlights the need to provide targeted support to smaller health systems in island, remote, peripheral and outermost regions, which often face limited administrative and technical capacity; insists that all such projects fully comply with EU data protection legislation, uphold high security and anonymisation standards, prevent the commercial exploitation of health data without meaningful patient consent, and guarantee that patients retain control over their personal data;

18. Welcomes the implementation progress under the cancer strand (21.5% of the annual budget) contributing to Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan, with 74 initiatives launched; regrets, however, that only 18 Member States participated in the CanScreen-ECIS project, underscoring persistent gaps in national data collection capacities and the need for further EU support and funding in this area; acknowledges the advances made under Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan, including actions on vaccine-preventable cancers and cancer screening; encourages Member States to strengthen HPV and HBV vaccination efforts, supported by the EU4Health initiative with particular focus to have equal access for vulnerable populations;

19. Regrets the Commission’s decision to discontinue operating grants for health civil society organisations under the EU4Health 2025 Work Programme, noting that such grants represented only a small share of the programme’s budget; notes the concerns expressed by many organisations regarding the impact on staffing, project continuity and support for patients and communities; emphasises the importance of stable and predictable support mechanisms for health civil society organisations, where appropriate and in full respect of the principle of subsidiarity; takes note of findings from the external evaluation of the EU4Health Programme confirming that organisations receiving operating grants meet their objectives, use public funds responsibly and provide valuable expertise and community input to EU health policy; underlines the need for future funding to continue to be based on clear criteria of European added value, transparency, neutrality and measurable impact, in order to sustain meaningful civil society contributions to Union health objectives;

HERA

20. Notes that DG HERA, established in 2021, has reached a consolidated and stable staffing level, with 107 staff members recruited by the end of 2024 compared to the 120 initially foreseen at its creation; welcomes the maintenance of a 50% gender balance in middle management and deputy positions; acknowledges the progress made by HERA in implementing actions within its mandate, strengthening the Union’s preparedness and crisis-response capacity for health emergencies, and expanding cooperation with international partners to enhance global preparedness, prevention and detection of health threats;

21. Acknowledges the Commission’s report on HERA’s three years of operation and its central role within the EU’s reinforced health security framework in strengthening the Union’s capacity to develop, produce and deploy medical countermeasures in response to health threats; notes, however, that further improvements are needed to fully realise HERA’s potential in protecting citizens and enhancing preparedness; recalls the Commission’s commitment to conduct a comprehensive review of HERA’s implementation by 2025, including possible adjustments to its structure and governance, and calls on the Commission to ensure that the findings of this review are effectively addressed in order to enhance HERA’s capacity;

22. Notes the measures taken to reinforce the Union’s manufacturing preparedness capacities, including the establishment of EU FAB, an “ever-warm” network for vaccine production; underlines the importance of further developing flexible and rapidly deployable production capacities for vaccines and medical countermeasures to ensure better preparedness for future health emergencies; notes the EU’s strengthened action against antimicrobial resistance (AMR), including the joint action co-funded through EU4Health with a €50 million investment engaging all Member States and a broad consortium of partners; underlines that AMR remains a major cross-border health threat and stresses the importance of continued support for prevention, surveillance, stewardship and responsible antimicrobial use as essential elements of the Union’s health security;

23. Recalls that Parliament advocated for enhanced parliamentary oversight of its activities; reiterates its call for regular, public reporting by HERA to Parliament;

24. Notes that the targeted revision of the MFF in 2024 resulted in reductions across several programmes, including EU4Health and Horizon Europe, which had a direct impact on the resources available for health preparedness; welcomes the Commission’s decision to mitigate the impact of these reductions by postponing the majority of the budgetary adjustments to 2027, when the budget for preparedness will reach its peak level; warns, however, that preparedness funding must not come at the expense of investments in prevention, health promotion and health system strengthening; calls for better coordination to ensure a balanced and coherent use of limited health resources;

25. Observes that, because DG HERA was created in the middle of the 2021-2027 MFF, its activities had to draw upon existing Union programmes, they are subject to multiple legal frameworks and governance arrangements, each involving different stakeholders and reflecting broader policy objectives beyond DG HERA’s specific mandate; stresses, therefore, the need for the continuation of current efforts on effective coordination among the relevant Commission services, as well as for close cooperation between DG HERA’s stakeholders and Member States’ representatives participating in the governance and programme committees of the respective funding instruments to prevent inefficiencies, duplication of efforts and overlapping mandates;

26. Calls on the Commission to improve the quality of communication, by clearly defining communication roles, in order to strengthen stakeholders' engagement and public support;

27. Notes that concerns have been raised about potential overlaps and a lack of clarity regarding HERA’s role within the Union’s broader health security framework, including in relation to DG SANTE, which has at times led to confusion among external stakeholders; underlines the importance of effective coordination and complementarity between HERA and other Union bodies involved in health emergency preparedness and response, including ECDC, EMA and relevant advisory and coordination structures; welcomes the clarifications provided through the Union Prevention, Preparedness and Response plan;

28. Emphasises that greater coherence in governance, operational coordination, external communication and institutional representation will enhance transparency, strengthen stakeholder engagement and improve the Union’s resilience and preparedness for future health crises

Conclusion

Is of the opinion, based on the data and reports available, that discharge can be granted to the Commission in respect of expenditure in the areas of public health for the financial year 2024.

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

27.1.2026

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT AND TOURISM

for the Committee on Budgetary Control

on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2024; Section III — Commission

(2025/2145(DEC))

Rapporteur for opinion: Gheorghe Falcă

OPINION

The Committee on Transport and Tourism calls on the Committee on Budgetary Control, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions into its motion for a resolution:

1. Welcomes the opinion of the European Court of Auditors (‘the Court’) that the consolidated accounts of the Union for 2024 present fairly, in all material respects, the Union’s financial position, the results of its operations, its cash flows and the changes in its net assets; however, is concerned that, despite revenue transactions being free from material error and the expenditure error rate dropping from 5.6 % in 2023 to 3.6 %, the latter remains above the 2 % threshold, noting that the Court assesses these errors as both material and pervasive; points out that eligibility and procurement errors remain the primary drivers of the high expenditure error rate and calls on the Commission to introduce more effective error detection and prevention systems to curb it;

2. Commends the strong budget performance by DG MOVE in 2024, having completed all of its commitments and 99 % of payments; welcomes the 2024 budget implementation results of the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency (CINEA), with 98 % of commitments and 96 % of payments executed;

3. Reiterates that in 2024, as in the past few years, DG MOVE’s main budget management mode was indirect management (90.4 % of the expenditure, including the contributions to CINEA as well as to the decentralized agencies and joint undertakings under its purview); points out that direct management (9.6 % of the expenditure) applied to research grants under Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe, transport grants and Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) support actions as well as procurements, studies and other operational expenditure, including the Single European Sky (SES) advisory bodies;

4. Acknowledges the findings of DG MOVE’s control activities related to the operational and financial implementation of its spending programmes under the direct and indirect management in order to provide the necessary assurance regarding its budget execution; furthermore, observes that in 2024, non-expenditure items remained stable for DG MOVE, with a positive result of EUR 32.05 million from its share in the CEF Debt Instrument, as reported by the EIB;

5. However, points that the Court has identified several issues in CEF projects – including the reporting of indirect costs, discrepancies between declared and actual payments and non-compliant procurement procedures – and calls for strict compliance with cost eligibility rules and sound financial management by all partners; furthermore, emphasises the need to take these issues into account in the context of the upcoming CEF Regulation (2028–2034), in order to improve transparency in the implementation of CEF projects and to reinforce their EU added value;

6. Highlights that, in the 2021–2027 period, performance indicators were improved to more accurately reflect the full spectrum of programme performance, noting that the CEF still does not include result or impact indicators and, in certain cases, indicators were difficult to interpret; calls on the Commission to establish clearer reference values and improve traceability of indicators to enable realistic assessment of progress on EU strategic transport projects;

7. Takes notice that in 2024, DG MOVE and CINEA awarded further financial support, with a budget of EUR 7 billion, and launched the last call for proposals under the Connecting Europe Facility Transport (CEF-T) programme, with a budget of EUR 2.55 billion, which will exhaust the entire 2021–2027 budget, for creating sustainable and smart transport infrastructure and fostering interoperability and resilience within the TEN-T network; recognises an overall good progress of the ongoing projects despite some delays due to tendering procedures and the war in Ukraine, observing that with the legacy CEF-Transport programme (CEF 1) entering its final year of implementation in 2024, several projects were closed, with this process expected to intensify in 2025;

8. Points out in this context that CINEA received three times as many applications compared to the total budget of EUR 7 billion, highlighting the importance of robust selection processes, especially in such cases, and clear project prioritisation; points out that, with most of the CEF-T budget already committed, funding shortages are expected by the end of the current MFF;

9. Welcomes that, with 2024 being the mid-term year for Horizon Europe, DG MOVE was actively involved in several activities, notably in two major transport calls under the Horizon Europe Cluster 5 Work Programme 2023-2024 and the EU Missions, with the total budget of EUR 324.5 million, in the areas of automated vehicles and infrastructures, smart logistics and multimodal network/traffic management; acknowledges the work of DG MOVE on the preparation of the Horizon Work Programme 2025 as well as preliminary work of the final Horizon Work Programme 2026-2027 and the next Framework Programme 10;

10. Highlights that the Commission fully accepted and implemented the Court’s 2023 recommendation, which called for further guidelines on ex ante controls for CEF project procurement to ensure consistency between the selection and award criteria published in the contract notice and those actually applied; welcomes that, as an early response to the recommendations in the Court’s Special report 11/2024, the Commission adopted guidance on the consumption targets for renewable fuels of non-biological origin in the industry and transport sectors and published the Clean Hydrogen Partnership programme review report;

11. Welcomes the transfer of tourism staff from DG GROW to DG MOVE; recognises that this shift maximises synergies between the transport and tourism sectors, particularly with regards to destination connectivity and tourism sustainability; at the same time, takes note of the Court’s observation that EU-supported tourism actions still lack clear, measurable objectives and coherent performance frameworks, and calls on DG MOVE, now responsible for tourism policy, to strengthen accountability and policy coherence;

12. Welcomes DG MOVE’s 2024 performance against its strategic goals and encourages the Commission to ensure proper follow-up on the implementation of the related legislation, notably in the following areas:

 Sustainable transport, underlining the crucial role of CEF-T in building a connected, resilient and future-proof European Transport system, with 80 % of CEF-T funding invested in sustainable transport modes: groundwork for the implementation of the ReFuelEU Aviation and FuelEU Maritime Regulations as well as the Regulation on Alternative Fuel Infrastructure, including support to the Renewable and Low-Carbon Fuels Value Chain Alliance in advancing sustainable alternative fuels in the aviation and maritime sectors; making headway in inter-institutional negotiations on the Greening freight package; conclusion of the negotiations on the reform of the Single European Sky and on tackling illegal discharge from ships;

 Smart and innovative transport: preparatory work on the development of common European mobility data space and on multi-modal digital mobility services; presentation of the proposal on River Information Services and work on electronic tools for inland waterway vessels; setting the implementation framework for the full roll-out of electronic Freight Transport Information and of the European Maritime Single Window across logistic chains; implementation of the package on the revision of the Technical Specifications for Interoperability to support the rail system’s digital transformation; continuous implementation of initiatives aimed at reinforcing the drone ecosystem in line with the Drone Strategy 2.0;

 Fully integrated and connected Trans-European Transport network: effective implementation of the revised TEN-T Regulation, which entered into force in 2024, with the new governance system, including a new mandate for the European Coordinators of the nine European Transport Corridors and the European Maritime Space, and the establishment of cooperation structures for the new corridors;

 Efficient and accessible internal market for transport: focus on the transposition and implementation of the key Directives for the rail market; support and guidance to operators and authorities in the implementation of rules regarding the road and rail market; new interpretative guidelines on air passenger rights, including for persons with disabilities and reduced mobility;

 Cooperation with key partners and neighbours: continuous support to Ukraine and Moldova through Solidarity Lanes and efforts to address bottlenecks at border crossings; facilitation of economic exchanges through the extended Road Transport Agreements with the both countries; investment in infrastructure to better anchor the two countries into the European transport network; continuous engagement with the Western Balkan Partners under the Transport Community Treaty for their further alignment with the EU transport policy – stressing the importance of these actions in enhancing regional connectivity, economic resilience, and integration into the Single European Transport Area, propelling the EU’s broader enlargement and neighbourhood policy objectives;

 Transport safety and security: completing negotiations on the maritime safety package and on cross-border exchanges of information on road safety related traffic offences; continuous work on the implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0 to boost military deployment capacity in cooperation with the European Defence Agency, EEAS (including EU Military Staff) and NATO, to improve long-term infrastructure planning and enable short-notice, large-scale troop and equipment movements, stressing that these actions reinforce the EU’s capacity to adapt its transport infrastructure for dual use – serving, both civilian and defence purposes – and contribute to the establishment of a robust, interoperable, and secure European transport area, in line with the objectives of the revised TEN-T policy and the EU’s strategic autonomy agenda;

13. Furthermore, welcomes DG MOVE’s continued support for Black Sea connectivity, building on DG NEAR-funded actions and regional cooperation; acknowledges the growing strategic importance of the Black Sea as a vital maritime corridor supporting trade, energy supply, transport diversification, regional stability and anchoring the Union’s presence and maritime role in Eastern neighbourhood – particularly in the evolving geopolitical context; encourages the Commission to extend similar attention to the North and Baltic Seas, emphasising that strengthened east-west connectivity contributes directly to the Union’s security and strategic autonomy, including via port modernisation, green transition efforts and enhanced hub interoperability, and helps safeguard the Union’s solidarity with Ukraine; in this context, calls for the establishment of European Maritime Security Hubs in the Black, North and Baltic Seas, as essential platforms for enhancing maritime situational awareness, early warning and the protection of commercial routes, including against the growing threats posed by the Russian shadow fleet; encourages the Commission to maintain strong coordination with Member States to ensure stable logistics chains, fair competition and adequate investment in cross-border infrastructure;

14. At the same time, welcomes the Commission’s initiatives to advance digitalisation and strengthen cybersecurity across the Union’s transport systems; underlines the particular importance of these efforts for the eastern transport corridors, where increasing hybrid threats, GNSS interference and the strategic role of transport infrastructure demand enhanced resilience; encourages the Commission to further support Member States in deploying interoperable digital tools, improving cross-border information exchange and ensuring that critical transport infrastructure is protected against cyberattacks and other emerging risks;

15. Recognises DG MOVE’s active contribution to the implementation of transport-related restrictive measures against the Russian Federation and Belarus, ensuring the full enforcement of EU sanctions and preventing their circumvention; commends DG MOVE’s continued cooperation with Member States, EU institutions, and international partners to maintain consistent and vigilant enforcement of sanctions across all transport modes; further to this, notes DG MOVE’s diplomatic outreach to third countries to promote alignment with EU restrictive measures and foster a coordinated response to Russia’s war of aggression; underlines that these efforts are crucial for protecting the integrity of the EU’s transport system, strengthening its geopolitical resilience, and upholding the credibility of its foreign and security policy;

16. Regrets that DG MOVE’s leadership in advancing international efforts at the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), notably in support of a global greenhouse gas levy and the IMO Net-Zero Framework for shipping, was undermined by the decision to postpone the vote by one year following pressure from the US;

17. Highlights the challenges for transport employment and increased sectoral vulnerabilities stemming from Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, in particular due to disrupted connectivity between the Baltic Member States, Russia and Central Asia; acknowledges the Commission’s efforts to address labour shortages in the transport sector and further calls on the Commission to intensify cooperation with national authorities, relevant stakeholders and educational providers; in this context, welcomes DG MOVE’s study on Safe and Secure Parking, which recommends strategic investments across the EU, and the follow-up CEF funding to expand the network of certified safe and secure parking areas; notes that such investments will make the working environment more attractive and accessible to diverse groups, including women, for whom lack of safe parking and adequate sanitary facilities remains a barrier;

18. Welcomes the Commission’s work on promoting inclusive mobility and addressing transport poverty; in particular, welcomes DG MOVE’s role, through the Transport Poverty Recommendation, in encouraging Member States to adopt strategic, long-term plans to tackle transport poverty; regrets, however, that most Member States are delayed in delivering their national plans under the Social Climate Fund, which is intended to enable support for the more vulnerable throughout the sustainable transition; underlines that ensuring affordable and accessible transport services carries particular importance for peripheral and sparsely populated regions, where limited connectivity can exacerbate social and regional disparities; calls on the Commission to continue supporting Member States in improving public transport links, developing sustainable rural mobility solutions, and ensuring that the green transition in transport remains socially fair and leaves no region behind.

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

16.2.2026

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

for the Committee on Budgetary Control

on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2024: Section III – Commission

(2025/2145(DEC))

Rapporteur for opinion: Gabriella Gerzsenyi

OPINION

The Committee on Regional Development calls on the Committee on Budgetary Control, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions into its motion for a resolution:

1. Notes that, according to the Court of Auditors annual report for 2024, the estimated level of error in spending in the area of ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’ amounts to 5,7 %, down from 9.3 % in 2023; notes that the Commission estimates the risk at payment for this spending area at 2.9 %; acknowledges the different methodologies of each of the institutions and the conclusion of a recent study1 that the error rate and risk at payment are not directly comparable; is concerned, however, at the weaknesses and limitations of the Commission's method for calculating the overall error rate for cohesion that have been reported by the Court; notes that, nevertheless, both institutions agree that spending in this area is materially affected by errors;

2. Underlines that the main types of errors indicated in the Court’s report were ineligible costs and projects, irregularities in public procurement procedures and absence of essential supporting documents; notes that these are persistent and prevalent weaknesses in this spending area and underlines the need to strengthen Member States’ administrative capacity and preventive control in these respects; urges the Commission and the Member States to apply, in particular, the Court’s recommendations regarding the need for individual verifications in cases where flat-rate financial corrections have been applied;

3. Stresses, that error is not synonymous with fraud; underlines therefore the importance of strengthening the single audit principle, reducing duplication, and clearly distinguishing between unintentional errors and fraud; calls on the Commission and relevant institutions at the national level to provide appropriate advisory support and trainings for beneficiaries and local authorities in order to avoid and, where relevant, to correct errors prior to the imposition of any financial corrections; stresses, at the same time, the importance of enhancing the control and detection capacity of the audit authorities, fully implementing the recommendations made by the Court regarding sampling, audit trail and checklists;

4. Notes that there is insufficient detection capacity, as shown by the significantly reduced detection rates (0.22 % for fraud and 0.76 % for irregularities) and the fact that risk analysis still contributes only marginally to the detection of fraud; reiterates the need to strengthen risk analysis systems and support for whistle-blowers and civil society, whose role has remained crucial for the exposure of fraud;

5. Stresses the critical role of digitalisation in the management of EU funds and utilization of Artificial Intelligence (AI) for detecting frauds in financial transactions; points out that in the new NRPPs simplification should not come at the expense of anti-fraud safeguards;

6. Notes that both the Commission and the Court of Auditors have repeatedly stated that the complexity of the rules governing cohesion policy is responsible for a large share of the errors in this spending area; points out to the issue of gold-plating and additional layer of rules created by Member States at national level; reiterates its previous calls for further simplification and for the adoption of a single set of eligibility rules for all cohesion policy funds, as well as for the further expansion of simplified cost options); insists that this would improve the efficiency of the cohesion policy, reduce the risk of errors and bureaucracy for all stakeholders and, at the same time, ease beneficiaries’ access to funding; strongly warns, however, that such simplification must in no way result in deregulation that undermines the effectiveness of controls; reiterates that the partnership principle, subsidiarity, shared management and decentralisation must be at the heart of any future simplification and reform of the cohesion policy;

7. Underlines that, as highlighted in the Court of Auditors (ECA) annual report, the complexity of public procurement procedures contributes to the occurrence of errors on the part of both beneficiaries and national audit bodies; notes, in particular, that in one case the complexity and lack of clarity of the procurement legislation led ECA experts to conclude — contrary to the assessment of the managing authority and the national audit services — that a beneficiary should have cooperated with its competitors in the implementation of an infrastructure project; calls for a simplification of public procurement procedures and for the provision of clear and consistent guidance to stakeholders, managing authorities and auditors;

8. Notes with concern the slow rate of implementation of cohesion policy programmes and contracting of projects in several Member States; stresses that this situation will result in increased pressure on managing authorities and control systems in the remaining years of the programming period; calls on the Commission to step up the support granted to Member States to speed up implementation, including through targeted technical assistance, the standardisation of procedures and the promotion of simplification measures, so as to avoid decommitment risks and ensure an efficient and predictable absorption of funds in the coming years; reiterates the need of strengthening the administrative ability and capacity of local, regional and national authorities, together with civil society organizations and all relevant stakeholders, to ensure an effective and efficient implementation of the policy in the future;

9. Recalls that in 2024, several amendments to the cohesion policy framework, namely STEP and RESTORE, entered into force; highlights the importance of these instruments to enhance EU competitiveness and addressing the consequences of natural disasters; reiterates, nevertheless, that constant amendments to the cohesion policy framework lead to legal uncertainty and instability, do not help the simplification process, and could undermine the long-term structural cohesion objectives of reducing disparities across the EU; stresses that the cohesion policy needs a stable regulatory framework in order to provide predictability for beneficiaries and all stakeholders, as well as to preserve its proven approach, which has delivered results and earned public trust;

10. Highlights the role of the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office in protecting the financial interests of the Union, and defending the rule of law and ensuring the efficient implementation of the Union budget in accordance with the principles enshrined in the Treaties; reiterates the need to provide these EU bodies with sufficient resources and calls for immediate review and strengthening their cross-border investigation and detection capabilities; calls for good and sincere cooperation between the Member States’ judicial bodies and the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office;

11. Points out to the necessity of making difference between the beneficiaries and final recipients in order to improve transparency;

12. Notes that the rights of persons with disabilities must be fully respected in all EU-funded projects; calls on the Commission to cooperate closely with the Member States in the implementation of the Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and to ensure a more thorough assessment of whether projects comply with these rights;

13. Is deeply concerned about the current EU budget proposals for 2028-2034, which intend to deliver cohesion policy through 27 separate national and regional plans; rejects the proposed merging of cohesion, agricultural and fisheries funds, that undermines their political autonomy and visibility, and puts in a direct competition both local and regional authorities and all the sectoral policies covered by the fund; underlines that the merger of the funds can be particularly harmful for Member States with strong regional disparities and geographical specificities, and for the less developed regions firmly rejects any attempt to nationalise cohesion policy planning; is concerned about the impact of the proposed model on the placed-based approach and multilevel governance of cohesion policy; stresses that the involvement of local and regional authorities, civil society organisations as well as social and economic partners (including SMEs) in the design, adoption and implementation of the national and regional partnership plans should be mandatory; strongly opposes the discontinuation of the Just Transition Fund in the next programming period as well as reduced support to outermost regions;

14. Stresses the need for continuous work towards the achievement of climate and biodiversity mainstreaming targets and asks for increased efforts in the new budget to the targets of spending and in particular to achieve the intended impact;

15. Warns that making access to funding conditional on milestones, targets and reforms, based on the model of the RRF, poses a major risk to cohesion policy as it does not contribute to the achievement of the Treaty-based cohesion objective i.e. the reducing of territorial disparities; stresses that local and regional authorities must not be deprived of funding because of the failure of national authorities to carry out reforms;

16. Stresses that, as the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery plan has been financed through the issuance of a joint debt on the markets, from 2028 the EU will have to pay interest on these loans, which could reach up to EUR 222 billion over the entire duration of the NGEU borrowing scheme, or 0.6 % of average annual EU GDP;

17. Is preoccupied about the proposed performance-based delivery model for cohesion policy post 2027 and its likely impact on irregularities and error rates since a focus on results and the related need to improve data quality and evaluations has proved a challenge for Member States and regions in the past; considers it imperative that any future application of the ‘cash for reforms’ model be supported by a sufficiently robust compliance framework, and one which defines the payment criteria unequivocally and ensures respect for national and EU rules; calls also for the introduction of mechanisms that enable full traceability of funding and its recovery in cases where the funds disbursed are disproportionate to the results achieved or have not been spent in accordance with the rules, as would be the case in the traditional management of funds;

18. Stresses the need to define clearly and in a binding manner the supervisory and control responsibilities of both the Commission and the Member States prior to implementation beginning; considers that the Commission should not rely solely on Member States’ control systems, but should define its own minimum requirements and verification mechanisms, similar to those provided for under shared management, in order to avert any non-compliance with national and EU rules, as requested by the Court.

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

27.1.2026

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON CULTURE AND EDUCATION

for the Committee on Budgetary Control

on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2024, Section III – Commission and executive agencies

(2025/2145(DEC))

Rapporteur for opinion: Hélder Sousa Silva

OPINION

The Committee on Culture and Education calls on the Committee on Budgetary Control, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

1. Notes the significant acceleration of the budget execution of the programmes implemented by DG EAC in 2024 as compared to the initial years of the MFF; confirms that this demonstrates a capacity to absorb additional funding;

2. Notes that the increased Erasmus+ budget for 2024 was not adequately reflected in individual mobility allowances, which remained inadequate to cover living expenses for recipients, affecting in particular students and teachers, thereby exacerbating disparities in access and the exclusion of vulnerable groups; further notes that demand for mobility opportunities continues to exceed capacity across the programme;

3. Recognises the strategic importance of continued investment in European culture and sport; highlights the key role of Erasmus+ in providing opportunities for learning and skills development and reiterates that youth engagement and mobility are essential for building a cohesive European society; notes positively the continued implementation of the European Solidarity Corps and its contribution to volunteering; welcomes the high rate of inclusion of participants with fewer opportunities into all activities, reaching 57%; notes the difficulties in reaching key performance indicators regarding the number of participants in solidarity projects;

4. Welcomes the improvements in the IT landscape of DG EAC and the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA), enabling more efficient processing of applications and grants; calls for further optimisation and simplification of the IT tools and processes, ensuring and assessing accessibility for smaller organisations and persons with fewer opportunities to ensure a fair, transparent and inclusive implementation of the programmes, while respecting the data protection and cybersecurity principles; notes, in this context, the central role of the European Youth Portal and encourages continued improvements to its usability, accessibility and information architecture; alongside these efforts, acknowledges the need for streamlining of application procedures, including through the lump sum approach;

5. Notes with approval EACEA’s excellent performance across its five KPIs, including a complete budget execution (100% transactions of the operational budget), a reduced estimated risk at closure (down to 0.49%, well below the 2% materiality threshold), and particularly the Erasmus+ indicator, with an increase of Higher Education Institutions participating in the European University alliances from 436 in 2023 to 571 in 2024;

6. Welcomes EACEA’s continued reduction of carry-overs to 7% for 2024, compared to 8% in 2023; further welcomes the Agency’s corrective actions addressing the irregularities identified by the Court of Auditors in its management, control systems and the processing of payment requests, including overstated personnel costs detected in actions funded under Creative Europe and Erasmus+; stresses the need for clear guidelines, as well as strengthened and systematic oversight of the management of EU funds when programme implementation is outsourced to national authorities and/or private companies;

7. Regrets that DG EAC and DG CONNECT had not performed interim evaluations of the flagship programmes Erasmus+, European Solidarity Corps, and Creative Europe before the legally defined deadline; stresses that evaluations should inform the decision-making still for the current programming period, not only for the future one;

8. Welcomes the positive examples of DG EAC’s continued support to Ukraine through its programmes and policy initiatives, such as inclusion of displaced children from Ukraine in the EU education systems, supporting learners and researchers fleeing from Ukraine, providing financial support to Ukrainian artist and cultural organisations, as well as safeguarding Ukrainian cultural heritage; supports the Commission in continuing and broadening aid for Ukraine and its citizens;

9. Is pleased to learn that in 2024 the popularity of the DiscoverEU initiative, which originated as a preparatory action proposed by the EP, has reached an all-time high, with the budget fully absorbed, and more than 70000 young people receiving a travel pass, noting, however, that this makes up less than 25% of valid applications received;

10. Is pleased to see the strong demand for Creative Europe in 2024, in particular that the European Cooperation call received almost 1000 proposals, twice as many as in 2021; yet notes that the budget did not rise accordingly, leading to lower success rates and a stronger need to safeguard access and diversity in the cultural and creative sectors.

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

5.12.2025

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL LIBERTIES, JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS

for the Committee on Budgetary Control

on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2024, Section III – Commission

(2025/2145(DEC))

Rapporteur for opinion: Evin Incir

OPINION

The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs calls on the Committee on Budgetary Control, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

1. Recalls that the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum (the Pact) is a corner stone for the new system of migration and asylum management in the EU, which will be in application mid-2026 in all Member States; highlights its highest political priority in order to ensure a credible EU policy in this area and to respond to the commitments made to the citizens; calls therefore on the Commission to ensure sufficient staff availability for the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, including appropriate staffing to support Member States in their course towards implementation of all aspects of the Pact; emphasises that this should be the sole focus of the Commission in the area of asylum and migration and human resources and working time should not be wasted on ill-advised revisions of the Pact so close to its entry into application; notes the importance of consistent and effective monitoring and enforcement in the area of migration and asylum management across all Member States; underlines that the implementation of the Pact offers an opportunity to strengthen the coherent application of EU law, including fundamental rights obligations; emphasises that successful implementation of the Pact requires not only legal transposition but also practical cooperation with Member States on returns, border management, and readmission agreements with third countries;

2. Recalls its commitment to the principles of evidence-based, transparent policy making; notes in that regard the absence of impact assessments for several legislative proposals introducing significant and systemic amendments to the EU’s legal framework on migration and asylum management; notes that the EUAA Factsheets that served as the basis for its proposal creating a common list of safe countries of origin at the Union level have not been made publicly available;

3. Welcomes the Common Implementation Plan for the Pact on Migration and Asylum as presented on 12 June 2024; at the same time, reminds the Commission to the role of the Parliament as co-legislator in this process; and calls the Commission to grant the Parliament full access to the Parliament to the National implementation plans, National contingency plans and Member States’ National strategies to ensure effective oversight of the implementation process, further recalls that when the Commission discusses matters related to implementation of the Pact with the Member States in the Council, it should – in accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation – share relevant documents with the Parliament;

4. While welcoming progress in the absorption of AMIF and ISF funds, expresses concern over the lack of detailed public data on national spending and calls for the creation of a single EU-level online transparency portal for home affairs funds; is concerned however that detailed and comprehensive data on spending, especially under shared management by Member States, is difficult to obtain, impeding sound oversight by the Budgetary Authority; welcomes the increase provided in the annual budget for the year 2025 to border management and to ensuring sufficient funding for the full implementation of the Pact and strongly encourages the continuation of this approach in the following year;

5. Stresses the need to ensure adequate and timely Union funding for Member States and Union agencies to facilitate the smooth implementation of Union law in the areas of asylum and migration; calls on the Commission to monitor and assist in the timely progress of the administrative, operational and legal steps required by Member States and Union agencies for the full implementation of the Pact by Summer 2026;

6. Notes that the number of migrants arriving irregularly in the Union decreased in 2024 as compared to previous years; acknowledges the Commission’s ongoing efforts to liaise with third countries neighbouring the Union in view of addressing irregular migration at the source and in successfully integrating legally residing third-country nationals; underlines the need for careful oversight and due diligence when allocating funds to partners involved in migration management outside the EU, in order to ensure alignment with EU standards, including on fundamental rights; urges the Commission to reinforce the transparency and accountability in programming and implementation of the Union home affairs funds in third countries; calls for the establishment of a transparent and independent human rights monitoring mechanism of EU home affairs funds in third countries; welcomes the Commission's effort to enhance solidarity and responsibility sharing between Member States, in particular towards those most affected by migration and asylum challenges; renews its call on the Commission to support the Union agencies and the Member States in coordinating effective search-and-rescue operations in the Mediterranean, ensuring that such actions are carried out in accordance with international and Union law;

7. Welcomes the Commission’s ongoing monitoring of rule of law benchmarks through the rule of law toolbox, including the annual rule of law report, whose chapters detail individual and systemic issues regarding the rule of law in the different member states and allow for a comprehensive analysis of the situation and its evolution in each Member States and which in 2024 included four enlargement countries for the first time; remains concerned that the annual rule of law report, by taking an overly diplomatic tone and not distinguishing clearly between individual and systemic problems, may risk downplaying some of the most serious violations of the rule of law; urges the Commission to work towards fully implementing Parliament’s recommendations on creating an EU mechanism for democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights, as outlined in its resolution of 25 October 2016[], and to ensure that assessments of rule of law benchmarks become more accurate and qualitative, drawing not only on legislative amendments but also on concrete and independent evidence of their practical application; emphasises that while the toolbox available to the Union has been significantly expanded, its effectiveness depends on the coherent and consistent application across all EU institutions; calls for a greater focus on implementing country-specific recommendations, with timelines and measurable benchmarks; calls on the Commission to detail the possible consequences in the event of non-compliance, including by referring to specific instruments, including budgetary tools and funding conditionality; reiterates its position that the report should cover the full scope of the values of Article 2 TEU, as these cannot be seen in isolation; stresses the need to establish a European Rule of Law Semester, featuring a clear structure with fixed milestones and active contributions from all EU institutions; underlines that this annual cycle must be based on solid, objective indicators and make clear that breaches of the rule of law are never trivial, and that any failings should lead to measures analogous to those applied within the European Semester framework;

8. Regrets the Commission’s decision concluding that, in Hungary, the horizontal enabling condition of the Charter had been fulfilled in relation to judicial independence which decision enabled the Hungarian authorities to start claiming reimbursements of up to approximately EUR 10,2 billion from Union funds; reiterates that the Commission’s decision is illegal, as alleged in Parliament’s pending action against the Commission in Case C-225/24; calls on the Commission to uphold the principle of conditionality rigorously and ensure that no Union funds are released where systemic breaches of judicial independence or rule of law persist;

9. Is concerned over the delays in the Commission’s procedures for granting access to documents; reminds for the Commission to address these deficiencies promptly, in line with Parliament’s recommendations expressed in its resolution of 13 July 2023;

10. Is deeply concerned that the Commission still has not presented enforcement measures and legislative follow-up to Parliament’s recommendations regarding the use of Pegasus and equivalent spyware; reminds the Commission to respect the principle of sincere cooperation between Union institutions and to comply with the obligations set out in the Framework Agreement and the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making, and to present, without undue delay, an action plan to prevent the abuse of spyware in the Union, making full use of all available legislative and non-legislative means provided by the Treaties.

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur for opinion declares that she included in her opinion input on matters pertaining to the subject of the file that she received, in the preparation of the opinion, prior to the adoption thereof in committee, from the following interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register, or from the following representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies:

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur for opinion.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur for opinion declares that she has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament's Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

28.1.2026

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND GENDER EQUALITY

for the Committee on Budgetary Control

on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2024, Section III – Commission

(2025/2145(DEC))

Rapporteur for opinion: Raquel García HermidaVan Der Walle

OPINION

The Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality calls on the Committee on Budgetary Control, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

A. whereas gender equality is a founding value of the Union enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union; whereas the Union is committed to promoting equality in all activities under Article 8 TFEU, establishing gender mainstreaming and gender budgeting in all policies; whereas budgets are not gender neutral and must be drawn up and discharged with the objective of gender equality; whereas the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union not only enshrines gender equality but also protects human dignity and prohibits all forms of discrimination, including those based on sexual orientation and gender (identity);

B. whereas Parliament has repeatedly called on the Commission to promote and implement gender mainstreaming, including gender budgeting, across all Union policies; whereas gender budgeting must integrate an intersectional perspective;

C. whereas the EU has significantly increased allocations for militarisation, including arms, infrastructure, security research, military mobility, border surveillance and externalisation; whereas these shifts risk diverting resources away from gender equality, social cohesion and the fight against gender-based violence;

D. whereas Gender Equality Index 2025 score for the EU is 63.4, with a 10.5-point increase since 2010; whereas achieving gender equality in the EU remains at least another 50 years away; whereas gender equality in the Union has been negatively impacted by growing anti-gender movements, sexism and strong prejudiced trends against women and the backlashes against gender equality, especially around sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) in several Member States, whereas gender equality is further impacted by the wars, ongoing climate, energy, social crises and cost of living crisis which affect women disproportionately;

E. Whereas one in three women experience violence; whereas globally 140 women and girls die at the hands of a partner or relative every day; whereas on 7 May 2024, the Directive on combating violence against women and domestic violence was adopted and entered into force on 14 June 2024; whereas intolerance towards LGBTIQ+ people, specifically trans people, has tragically increased sharply compared to 2019; whereas violence and hate-motived crimes against LGBTIQ+ people have increased compared to 2019; with the sharpest increase in attacks on trans women and men; whereas the Daphne Programme, aimed at protecting victims of violence, including women and children, represents a crucial EU instrument to combat gender-based violence and uphold fundamental rights, and its continued funding and support should be ensured within the Union’s budgetary and policy framework;

F. Whereas investing in gender equality strengthens economic growth, resilience and social cohesion across the EU; whereas a dynamic and competitive economy requires gender equality, entrepreneurship and innovation; whereas also economic policy requires gender mainstreaming ensuring that the European economy works for all women; whereas supporting women to start and run their own businesses contributes to economic diversification and reduces gender gaps in access to entrepreneurship and leadership;

1. Stresses that a gender equality perspective should be integrated and ensured into all policy areas particularly in light of the multiple gendered impacts of various ongoing climate, energy, social crises, wars and cost of living crisis with a focus on SRHR and the backlash against gender equality and women’s rights in the EU; reiterates therefore its call for the implementation of gender budgeting at all relevant and appropriate stages of the budgetary process; calls on the Commission to improve mainstreaming gender from the start of programme design and to set an horizonal gender equality provision with general equality objective;

2. Acknowledges the Union’s commitment to gender mainstreaming and improving the methodology for tracking gender expenditure; regrets that the Commission’s current methodology does not reflect potential negative consequences and results in uncertainty in 20% of cases regarding gender impact; urges the Commission to improve its assessment tools to ensure clearer outcomes and to track potential negative impacts; considers that the tracking methodology could be complemented with mandatory minimum criteria such as gender impacts assessments that should be linked to the tracking systems;

3. Welcomes the update of the better regulation guidelines and toolbox; regrets the lack of progress in conducting gender analyses of needs and impacts for EU funding programmes; calls on the Commission to use competitive impact assessments, including gender-sensitive analyses, when designing and implementing EU programmes and funding instruments, to ensure effective and equitable policy outcomes; and calls on the Commission to execute such analyses consistently ; calls on the Commission to fully integrate gender mainstreaming into the next MFF in order to include the gender perspective into all policy areas and budgets and alleviation measures, and where relevant gender budgeting with the objective to advance women’s rights and gender equality;

4. Notes that information on the EU budget’s gender impact remains insufficient; highlights shortcomings in manual collection, reporting and evaluation of gender-disaggregated data and including an intersectional approach; calls on the Commission to improve data quality; points out that the key learning of the application of the pilot methodology was the limited possibility of assigning concrete scores due to a lack of required data; calls for all data to be comparable so as to be useful for policymaking; stresses therefore the importance of data collection requirements to enable comprehensive collection of gender-disaggregated data in the context of all relevant EU policies and urges the Commission to treat this as a priority; urges the Commission to treat this as a priority;

5. Calls on the Commission to analyse what percentage of the EU budget should support gender equality; further calls for objectives and performance indicators in all future legislation, including the next MFF.

6. Calls on the Commission to dedicate an appropriate percentage of the total EU budget, of the Equality and Rights Strand of the CERV programme and the Daphne programme; regrets the lack of specific budget lines for measures dedicated to gender equality; reiterates its call for a dedicated budget line for the Daphne programme to increase transparency and accountability in fund distribution; calls for a stable financing framework to ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of the Daphne Programme to support the protection of women and children against violence; regrets the merger of Creative Europe and CERV in the proposed MFF as it diminishes the visibility of the Daphne programme; urges the EU to consider the programme a priority;

7. Welcomes the directive on combating violence against women and domestic violence; urges Member States to swiftly implement the directive and calls on member states to increase the number of shelters for victims of domestic violence, with specific reference to the quotas established in the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, so called as the Istanbul Convention (one family place per 10.000 heads of population); stresses that femicide, defined as the gender-related killing of women and girls, constitutes one of the most extreme forms of gender-based violence and represents a grave violation of fundamental rights; strongly condemns the absence of a harmonised definition and the persistent inconsistencies in data collection and reporting on this crime; calls for a European definition of this crime;

8. Highlights that due the increase in intolerance towards LGBTIQ+ people , it is necessary to allocate sufficient budget to measures combating LGBTIQ+-phobia such as among others telephones lines for counselling and attention emphasises the importance of the full recognition of trans women as women, noting that their inclusion is essential for the effectiveness any gender-equality and anti-violence policies; calls for recognition and equal access for trans women to protection and support services; calls on the Member States to ensure full and effective protection of LGBTIQ+ persons against discrimination, harassment and violence, including by strengthening national legal frameworks, improving reporting mechanisms and ensuring that hate-motivated crimes are properly investigated and prosecuted; further calls on the Council to continue work on the EU anti-discrimination directive; urges the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ compliance with EU values and to initiate infringement procedures where necessary;

9. Recalls the commitment of the Commission in its political guidelines to step up its engagement with civil society organisations that have expertise and play an important role in defending specific societal issues and upholding human rights; Reminds it is fundamental that civil society organisations, through EU funding can engage in an “open, transparent and structured dialogue with EU institutions” as enshrined in article 11 TEU through activities such as advocacy activities, demonstrations, or judicial actions and these should remain eligible in the relevant funding programs and have sufficient dedicated funding available;

10. Highlights the importance of boosting economic growth across the Union, including through initiatives that foster women’s participation in the labour market, entrepreneurship, and leadership;

11. Reiterates its concern at the interrelation between the attacks on the rule of law, democracy and human rights and the backlash against gender equality and women’s rights; emphasises that independent and well-resourced women’s rights organisations are indispensable actors in the promotion of gender equality, the advancement of sexual and reproductive health and rights, and the protection of democracy and human rights; underlines that, in the context of the growing influence of anti-gender movements defined as movements seeking to undermine gender equality as a core value of democracy and the shrinking space for civil society, these organisations face increasing financial and operational challenges; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds are not awarded to any entity that contributes to the backlash against women’s rights, increasing inequalities, or acting against gender equality, including SRHR and women’s rights to bodily integrity, autonomy, and self-determination; urges the Commission to take into account the changing global funding landscape and to ensure that EU funding mechanisms remain accessible, flexible and responsive to the specific needs and security requirements of women’s rights organisations, in particular those operating in high-risk contexts;

12. Reiterates that sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) are fundamental human rights, and their realisation is a fundamental aspect of human dignity and a prerequisite for achieving gender equality; calls for a strong European effort to protect our fundamental values such as equal rights to bodily autonomy and access to sexual and reproductive health and rights including safe and legal abortion; stresses the need to reinforce budgetary allocations that support universal respect for and access to sexual and reproductive health rights including safe and legal abortion; expresses deep concern that women and girls in conflict zones and wars who, have been subjected to sexual and gender-based violence, for example women and girls in Ukraine as a result of Russia’s ongoing war of aggression; condemns these acts as grave violations of international humanitarian and human rights law; stresses the urgent need for comprehensive support services for survivors, such as medical support, sexual reproductive healthcare services, psychological and legal support, and socio-economic assistance.

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

04.12.2025

LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr Niclas Herbst

Chair

Committee on Budgetary Control

BRUSSELS

Subject: Opinion on 2024 discharge: General budget of the EU - Commission (COM (2025) 824 final (COM(2025)0359 – C100145/2025 – 2025/2145(DEC))

Dear Chair,

Under the procedure referred to above, the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development has been asked to submit an opinion to your committee. At its meeting of 24 September 2025, the AGRI coordinators decided that the Committee should issue its opinion in the form of a Chair’s letter.

The Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development adopted this letter on 12 January 2026 and asks the Committee on Budgetary Control, as the responsible committee, to take the following points into account when preparing the motion for a resolution.

1. Welcomes the Commission’s overall assessment that the EU budget continued to deliver across priorities in 2024 despite multiple crises and transitions, with total payments executed amounting to EUR 182.6 billion and commitment appropriations executed at 97.2 % of the budget;

2. Draws attention to the continuing centrality of agriculture and rural development for the EU budget: expenditure under Heading 3 (‘Natural resources and environment’), overwhelmingly CAP-related, remains a major budgetary item and requires continued monitoring in the discharge exercise;

3. Welcomes the Commission’s move to a risk-categorisation approach for performance-based expenditure and the reported high share of low-risk expenditure for natural resources in 2024 and stresses the need to maintain transparency on how this new approach is applied to CAP expenditure;

4. Notes with concern the low absorption of European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development payments in the early years of the 2023-2027 programming period and stresses that delayed payments undermine farmers’ income stability; calls on the Commission and Member States to accelerate disbursements and mobilise measures to increase absorption where delays persist, ensuring balanced support across all regions;

5. Welcomes the Commission’s emphasis on annual performance reporting (APRs) under the new CAP delivery model and calls on the Commission to support Member States in finalising APR systems and to foster comparability of indicators across Member States;

6. Notes the European Court of Auditors’ (ECA) 2025 conclusions on EU funding for forest-fire-related action: while Member States increasingly used EU funds for prevention, the Commission had an incomplete overview of total forest-fire spending and monitoring of results was weak, an issue with clear agricultural and rural implications; calls on the Commission to improve aggregation of forest-fire related spending and to strengthen monitoring of outcomes and long-term sustainability of preventive measures;

7. Stresses that in the context of growing natural-disaster risks the Commission and Member States must ensure that EU-funded prevention measures are well-targeted, based on up-to-date risk assessments, and sustained beyond one-off project cycles so that investments deliver lasting benefits for agriculture and rural communities;

8. Draws attention to the ECA’s 2025 assessment of EU budget flexibility which found that, although flexibility tools have allowed the EU to respond to major shocks, the framework is complex, and some instruments have been rapidly depleted; stresses that predictable and coherent budgetary arrangements are essential for long-term agricultural resilience and for funding multi-year preventive actions in rural areas;

9. Calls on the Commission to ensure that the post-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework proposal takes account of the need for adequate funding as well as clearly prioritised flexibility to address recurrent natural-disaster risks affecting agriculture (e.g. fires, droughts, floods), while safeguarding long-term programme funding;

10. Notes the ECA’s findings that rural development measures and eco-schemes are more exposed to material error, often due to scheme complexity and national “gold-plating”; welcomes the conclusion that direct payments (excluding eco-schemes) remain free of material error while acknowledging that eco-schemes involve a higher degree of inherent complexity and that their correct implementation proved challenging; highlights that most errors are administrative in nature; underlines that, according to ECA, the estimated level of administrative error (44% of all errors) would have been significantly lower had Member State authorities made full use of available information;

11. Highlights the ECA’s recommendation that the Commission provide additional support to Member States in designing less complex schemes, without compromising their ambition; calls on the Commission, notably through knowledge sharing, to assist Member States in improving governance systems and implementing eco-schemes;

12. Draws attention to the need for simplification, the use of enhanced digital tools, and stronger controls to reduce ineligible expenditure, and stresses the importance of reducing excessive administrative, reporting and regulatory burdens on farmers to strengthen sound financial management, as the occurrence of errors often results from overly complex procedures, without compromising the EU environmental objectives;

13. Calls on the Commission to support Member States in targeting funds to high-value preventive measures (e.g. landscape management, maintenance of agricultural firebreaks, restoration of degraded soils, purchase and supply of veterinary vaccines) and to promote the dissemination of best practices and effective projects across Member States.

Yours sincerely,

Veronika Vrecionová

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

The Chair declares under her exclusive responsibility that she did not include in her opinion input from interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register, or from representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies, to be listed in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE