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What changed
B90235/2024
P9_TA(2024)0382
European Parliament resolution on Iran’s unprecedented attack onagainst Israel, the need for de-escalation and thean EU response
(2024/2704(RSP))
PE762.546
European Parliament resolution of 25 April 2024 on Iran’s unprecedented attack against Israel, the need for de-escalation and an EU response (2024/2704(RSP))
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on Iran,
– having regard to the UN Secretary-General’s statement of 13 April 2024 regarding attacks by the Islamic Republic of Iran targeting Israel,
– having regard to its previous resolutions and recommendations on the Middle East conflict, in particular its resolutions of 19 October 2023 on the despicable terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel, Israel’s right to defend itself in line with humanitarian and international law and the humanitarian situation in Gaza and of 18 January 2024 on the humanitarian situation in Gaza, the need to reach a ceasefire and the risks of regional escalation,
– having regard to the G7 Leaders’ statement of 14 April 2024 on Iran’s attack against Israel,
– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,
– having regard to the statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU of 14 April 2024 on Iran,
– having regard to the statement of 3 April 2024 by the Spokesperson of the European External Action Service (EEAS) on the attack in Damascus,
– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1532 of 20 July 2023 concerning restrictive measures in view of Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine,
– having regard to the EU terrorist list and Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP laying down the criteria for listing persons, groups and entities,
– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 17 April 2024,
– having regard to the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly,
– having regard to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961,
– having regard to the press statement of 16 April 2024 by the experts from the Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights Council,
– having regard to the EU statement to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of 12 September 2023 on verification and monitoring in Iran in light of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),
– having regard to allthe EUTreaty sanctionson andthe restrictiveNon-Proliferation measuresof adoptedNuclear againstWeapons Iran,of 1970,
– having regard to the EU terrorist list and Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP laying down the criteria for listing persons, groups and entities,
– having regard to Rules 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment,
A. whereas on 13 April 2024, Iran attacked Israeli territory for the first time, firing over 300 drones and missiles; whereas most were intercepted by Israel, the US, the UK and France, who also provided aerial reconnaissance and defence from Jordanian soil; whereas five missiles still impacted Israeli territory, hitting the Nevatim Israeli Air Force Base and seriously injuring a seven-year-old girl from Israel’s Arab Bedouin community; whereas all 170 drones and 30 cruise missiles were intercepted before entering Israeli territory, while 105 out of 110 ballistic missiles were intercepted by Israel’s missile defence systems; whereas preceding and during the attack, Hezbollah also launched rockets towards the Golan Heights and the Houthis attacked Israeli territory;
– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 17 April 2024,
B. whereas on 1 April 2024, Iran’s consulate in Damascus, Syria was bombed in an air strike widely attributed to Israel that killed seven officers, including two senior Iranian generals from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and injured 13 others; whereas Iran’s consulate in Damascus has been reportedly used to stage 150 attacks on American and Israeli targets in the region; whereas following the bombing, Iran called for ‘punishment and revenge’; whereas the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and on Consular Relations grant protection to diplomatic premises; whereas all UN Security Council members expressed concerns and called for de-escalation; whereas US officials confirmed that, during the night of 19 April 2024, Israel carried out some retaliatory military operations with drone attacks in the central province of Isfahan;
– having regard to the Council conclusions of 12 December 2022 on Iran,
C. whereas the EU, the UK, the US and others have unanimously condemned the attacks and called on both sides to de-escalate;
– having regard to the joint statement of 16 April 2016 by then Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, and then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mohammad Javad Zarif,
D. whereas Hamas’s despicable terrorist attacks in Israel on 7 October 2023, during which its operatives brutally killed mostly civilians, abducted 253 people as hostages and took them to the Gaza Strip, with 112 of them having since been released, has had profound and detrimental effects on the stability of the entire Middle East; whereas Israel’s subsequent war against the Hamas terrorists in the Gaza Strip has entailed a disproportionate military response that has killed tens of thousands of civilians, including many humanitarian workers and journalists, and caused a catastrophic humanitarian situation, including unprecedented levels of famine, due to the population’s lack of safe, unhindered access to humanitarian aid; whereas the events since 7 October 2023 have had profound and detrimental effects on the stability of the entire Middle East;
– having regard to the press statements of 14 April 2024 by the High Representative on behalf of the EU and by Commission President Von der Leyen,
E. whereas in the occupied Palestinian territories, Iran has been supporting the terrorist organisation Hamas financially and logistically;
– having regard to the joint declaration of the G7 leaders following Iran’s attack against Israel, adopted on 14 April 2024,
F. whereas hundreds of rockets and air strikes launched by Hezbollah and its allies and Israel have hit southern Lebanon and northern Israel since 7 October 2023, displacing 60 000 Israelis and 30 000 Lebanese; whereas Israel’s air strikes in Lebanon have targeted Hezbollah and Hamas members;
– having regard to all press releases and statements on Iran and the region by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR), Josep Borrell,
G. whereas Iran has brought militias from Lebanon, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan to Syria to quell dissent and control the Syrian regime’s territory; whereas since 7 October 2023, Iran-backed militias in Syria have stepped up the firing of drones and rockets at Israel;
– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
H. whereas Iran’s ally in Syria, the Assad regime, besieged, shelled and starved Yarmouk Camp, the largest Palestinian refugee camp in Syria, between 2011 and 2015, killing hundreds of civilians and displacing over 200 000 Palestinian refugees;
A. whereas on 13 April 2024, Iran fired over 300 missiles and drones at Israel; whereas about half of the Iranian ballistic missiles fired at Israel reportedly failed to launch or crashed before reaching their targets; whereas approximately 95 % of the drones and rockets launched by Iran at Israel, including 120 ballistic missiles and over 30 cruise missiles, were intercepted by Israel and partners’ air defence systems;
I. whereas in Iraq, Iranian-backed militias have exerted nefarious political and military influence, acting outside the control of national defence authorities; whereas they have specifically targeted US military bases, as well as the Iraqi Kurdistan region; whereas a pro-Iranian militia in Iraq claimed responsibility for the strikes on 1 April 2024 against an Israeli naval base in Eilat;
B. whereas these attacks severely injured a seven-year-old Israeli child from the Arab Bedouin community and damaged the Nevatim airbase located in the Negev desert; whereas the family of this child was refused a housing permit by the Israeli authorities;
J. whereas in Yemen, Iran provides substantial support and is closely linked to the Houthi movement; whereas the Houthis’ attacks have targeted international commercial shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait since October 2023, heavily disrupting maritime traffic in the Red Sea and threatening global economic stability; whereas they have been holding Japan’s Galaxy Leader vessel and its crew, including three EU nationals, hostage since 19 November 2023; whereas the US and its European allies have intercepted Houthi drone attacks; whereas EU Naval Force Operation ASPIDES was created in February 2024 to protect international maritime passage; whereas the UN-led peace process in Yemen has been stalled since October 2023; whereas previous Iranian attacks, such as the seizure of the MSC Aries, a Portuguese-flagged container ship with an Estonian crew on board, in the Strait of Hormuz, pose a danger to international maritime security;
C. whereas the missiles and drones launched by Iran originated from Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen; whereas Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates provided intelligence on the planned strikes; whereas Jordan cooperated in intercepting the missiles and drones alongside the air defence systems of Israel and ‘western allies’, including the US, France and the UK;
K. whereas Iran’s nuclear programme has consistently breached the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), by exceeding the limit on its uranium stockpile, elevating enrichment activities to 60 %, resuming JCPOA-restricted operations at nuclear facilities and effectively obstructing IAEA oversight; whereas on 13 September 2023, France, Germany, the UK and the US expressed grave concerns about these developments to the IAEA Board of Governors; whereas Iran warned Israel that it could review its nuclear doctrine following speculation that Israel would target Iran’s nuclear facilities;
D. whereas Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had warned that the attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus would not go unanswered and of the significant response to deter Israel from repeating or escalating such attacks;
L. whereas Iran has provided significant military assistance, including by constructing a drone factory in Russia and delivering several thousand drones (unmanned aerial vehicles), (artillery) ammunition and surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, to support Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas these weapons have been used indiscriminately against Ukraine’s population and civilian infrastructure; whereas on 20 July 2023, the European Council established a new framework for restrictive measures targeting Iranian military assistance to Russia;
E. whereas the Iranian attacks were a retaliatory measure against the Israeli strike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus on 1 April 2024, in which seven officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were killed, including two senior commanders; whereas since 7 October 2023, Israel has attacked Iranian officials and assets in five airstrikes, in addition to multiple previous attacks; whereas Israel’s latest strike marked an unprecedented escalation against Iran in response to the country’s alleged involvement in the 7 October terrorist attack, as well as a shift in Israel’s strategy towards directly eliminating IRGC leadership;
M. whereas human rights defenders, peaceful protesters, journalists, artists, the LGBTIQ community, unionists and sports champions have suffered under Iran’s brutal domestic and transnational repression, including on EU soil, particularly opponents to the Iranian regime, such as former European Parliament Vice-President Alejo Vidal-Quadras, who was shot, presumably by the IRGC; whereas thousands of political prisoners are currently being held in horrendous detention conditions, many on death row; whereas Iran is one of the world’s top offenders with regard to capital punishment, as it executed at least 853 people in 2023, according to Amnesty International; whereas ethnic, religious and sexual minorities in Iran continue to face violent repression;
F. whereas Israel weighed its response to the Iranian attacks of 13 April 2024; whereas Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, had indicated that Israel would decide on its own when and how to respond to Iran’s attacks; whereas, according to polls, a large majority of the Israeli population had expressed opposition to further retaliation;
N. whereas the issue of gender apartheid in Iran has been raised by UN special rapporteurs; whereas since September 2022 and the killing of Jina Mahsa Amini, historical protests for women’s rights have taken place in Iran; whereas the 2023 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought was awarded to Jina Mahsa Amini and Iran’s ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ movement; whereas the Iranian regime has responded with an even harsher legal environment, further restricting women’s clothing and expanding gender segregation;
G. whereas US officials confirmed that, during the night of 19 April 2024, Israel carried out some retaliatory military operations with drone attacks in the central province of Isfahan; whereas explosions were heard near the Shekari army airbase in the north-west of the Isfahan province; whereas the US administration had been informed that the attacks were coming in the next 24 to 48 hours; whereas Israel assured that Iran’s nuclear facilities would not be targeted; whereas according to media reports, Iran has no immediate plans for retaliation against Israel;
O. whereas the US designated the IRGC a foreign terrorist organisation in April 2019; whereas the European Parliament has been requesting that the IRGC be added to the EU terrorist list since early 2023; whereas the IRGC have been implicated in the planning and/or execution of dozens of operations, assassinations and terrorist attacks on EU soil over the past 30 years, including the ‘Mykonos Plot’ in Berlin in 1992, the bus bombing and killing of five Israeli citizens and one Bulgarian national in Bulgaria in 2012, the murder of Iranian dissidents in the Netherlands in 2015 and 2017, a planned bomb attack on Iranian dissidents in Paris in 2018, a planned assassination of three Iranian dissidents in Denmark in 2018 and an attempted arson attack against a synagogue in Bochum, Germany in 2022; whereas some EU foreign affairs ministers made a request for sanctions against the IRGC during the Foreign Affairs Council meeting of 16 April 2024;
H. whereas Tehran has been establishing and supporting terrorist proxies in the region for decades as part of an overall strategy to threaten Israel and its right to existence and to destabilise the region;
P. whereas an estimated two dozen innocent EU nationals have been arbitrarily detained as part of Iran’s hostage diplomacy to extort political wins; whereas Iran has abducted dissidents outside of its own territory in order to detain or execute them in Iran;
I. whereas on 7 October 2023, Hamas terrorists committed an attack on Israel, murdering 1 139 Israeli and foreign citizens; whereas Hamas took over 240 people hostage, of which 136 are still being held captive in the Gaza Strip; whereas Iran allegedly financed and supported Hamas in preparation for the 7 October attack against Israel;
Q. whereas, in response to the sanctions imposed on Iran by the EU, Iran has taken retaliatory measures against Members of the European Parliament (MEPs); whereas in response, in November 2022, Parliament decided that its delegations and committees will no longer engage with Iranian authorities;
J. whereas the rising tensions between Iran and Israel come against the backdrop of Israel’s war on the Gaza Strip, which began after Hamas’ 7 October 2023 attack on Israel and has led to a complete blockade of the Gaza Strip, repeated attacks against civilians and humanitarian facilities and a catastrophic humanitarian situation, including the risk of imminent starvation of the population;
R. whereas on 17 April 2024, the Council decided to expand its sanctions regime against Iran to include Iran’s missile and drone production; whereas the US administration has imposed new sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programmes;
K. whereas the G7 leaders stressed the need to be united and called for coordinated sanctions against Iran; whereas the US has already announced new sanctions on Iran; whereas the US administration has notably imposed new sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programmes;
S. whereas despite support among part of the Iranian population being displayed by state media, the attacks by the Iranian regime have been heavily criticised by many Iranians within and outside the country; whereas measures were allegedly taken to suppress dissenting voices from expressing criticism following the attack; whereas the Iranian regime does not legitimately represent the people of Iran;
L. whereas the EU already has a full set of sanctions in place against the Iranian regime, including trade restrictions, travel bans and asset freezes; whereas the European Council and EU Foreign Affairs Ministers have requested that VP/HR Borrell start the preparatory work for the expansion of the EU sanctions framework, notably the existing Iran/Russia drone-related sanctions regime, and for the regional framework to include deliveries from Iran to proxies in the Middle East and Russia;
1. Condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the unprecedented drone and missile attack carried out by Iran on Israel on the night of 13 to 14 April 2024, as well as the serious escalation and threat to regional security that this represents; reiterates its full support for the security of the State of Israel and its citizens; conveys its sympathy to the family of the victim from Israel’s Arab Bedouin community, a seven-year-old girl who was seriously injured by shrapnel; condemns the simultaneous attacks perpetrated by Iran’s proxies, namely Hezbollah in the Golan Heights and the Houthi movement off the coast of Yemen;
M. whereas some EU Foreign Affairs Ministers made a request to the VP/HR for sanctions against the IRGC during the informal Foreign Affairs Council meeting of 16 April 2024;
2. Deplores the attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus on 1 April 2024, which resulted in several casualties; recalls the importance of the principle of the inviolability of diplomatic and consular premises, which must be respected in all cases under international law;
N. whereas the ambassadors of Iran were summoned in various EU capitals following the unprecedented Iranian attacks;
3. Calls on all parties to avoid any further escalation and calls for maximum restraint and de-escalation;
O. whereas Iran has heavily supplied Yemen’s Houthi militia, which is backed by Iran, with arms to destabilise both Yemen and commercial shipping off the coast of Yemen; whereas a Japanese-registered vessel, Galaxy Leader, with two Romanians and one Bulgarian on board and a Portuguese-flagged container ship, the MSC Aries, with an Estonian crew on board were seized by Iran’s IRGC on 19 November 2023 and 13 April 2024 respectively for ‘violating maritime laws’ in the Strait of Hormuz; whereas Iran’s Foreign Ministry indicated that there was no doubt that the Portuguese vessel was linked to Israel; whereas Iranian authorities have threatened to close the crucial shipping route; whereas the EU launched the EUNAVFOR ASPIDES naval operation to safeguard the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea;
4. Welcomes the EU’s decision to expand and broaden the current sanctions regime established in July 2023, including by sanctioning Iran’s supply and production of unmanned drones and missiles to Russia and the wider Middle Eastern region; demands that these sanctions be urgently put in place; calls for more individuals and entities to be sanctioned, such as the Baithe Rahbari (Office of the Supreme Leader of Iran), the General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Khatam-al Anbiya Central Headquarters and its commander Gholam Ali Rashid, the IRGC’s navy, Iran’s Defence Minister Brigadier General Mohammad-Reza Ashtiani, and Director of Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organisation Seid Nooshin; notes that the current EU sanctions only include six individuals and five entities responsible for Iran’s nuclear programme; underlines that these sanctions will need to be prolonged after July 2024; calls on the Council to prepare additional sanctions in the banking, oil and aviation sectors to be imposed in the event that the Iranian regime unacceptably escalates the situation further, and to communicate these preparatory measures in advance to the Iranian authorities; urges the Council to evaluate the latest US sanctions on Iran and consider the added value of synchronising the EU and US sanctions regimes wherever relevant and possible; underlines that these abovementioned sanctions should be coordinated with the US, the UK, the G7 and other allies to the extent possible;
P. whereas Israeli forces and Lebanon’s armed group, Hezbollah, have been trading fire since the beginning of the war in the Gaza Strip, representing the most intense hostilities between the two groups since their major war in 2006;
5. Reiterates its long standing call for the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) to add the IRGC to the EU list of terrorist organisations and stresses that this decision is long overdue; highlights the fact that there have been dozens of IRGC assassinations and attempts on European soil in the past few years;
Q. whereas Iran has provided Russia with a large number of powerful surface-to-surface ballistic missiles and drones, deepening their military cooperation; whereas at least four shipments of missiles were transferred via the Caspian Sea and by plane to Russia; whereas the UN Security Council restrictions on Iran’s export of some missiles, drones and other technologies expired in October 2023; whereas the US and the EU have retained sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile programme; whereas these ballistic missiles would pose a serious threat to Ukraine and give Russia a greater advantage;
6. Highlights the strong links among Iran/the IRGC, its proxies such as the Houthis, Iraqi and Syrian militias and organisations on the EU terrorist list, namely Hamas and Hezbollah’s military wing; calls on the Council and the VP/HR to add Hezbollah in its entirety to the EU list of terrorist organisations; condemns Iran’s export of drones and ammunition to support Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;
R. whereas since 2006, the UN Security Council has adopted a number of resolutions requiring Iran to stop enriching uranium for nuclear proliferation purposes, as well as restrictive measures to persuade Iran to comply; whereas the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2231(2015) on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), agreed by Iran and the ‘E3/EU+3’; whereas the deal has been in jeopardy since former US President Donald Trump withdrew the US from it in 2018; whereas Tehran warned Israel that it could review its nuclear doctrine following speculation that Israel would target Iran’s nuclear facilities;
7. Is highly concerned by the spiralling escalation in the region and the destabilising role that the Iranian regime and its network of non-state actors play in the Middle East; is alarmed by the severe risk of a widening regional escalation; condemns all acts by state and non-state actors that provoke or feed an intensifying escalatory cycle; urges all parties to de-escalate and to refrain from the threat or use of force in line with their international obligations, in particular under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and to exercise the utmost restraint; urges all actors to fully respect and uphold international law and international humanitarian law at all times;
1. Condemns, in the strongest terms, the Iranian attacks on Israel; considers these attacks an unprecedented escalation and a threat to regional security; reiterates its full solidarity with the people of Israel and its commitment to Israel’s security and regional stability; welcomes, in this respect, the European Council conclusions of 17 April 2024; deplores the fact that a young Arab girl was severely injured in the Iranian attacks; underlines that Iran’s attacks targeted empty warehouses and roads around Israel’s Nevatim airbase; highlights that Iran warned the US of its attacks well in advance, and provided enough time for the Israeli and other regional air defence systems to intercept 99 % of the drones and missiles, in an attempt to send a limited response to Israel’s bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus on 1 April 2024;
8. Calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to continue and step up their diplomatic efforts with international partners, including with the Gulf countries, building on recent initiatives and in particular on the first EU-Gulf Cooperation Council High-Level Forum at ministerial level held on 22 April 2024, and to encourage urgent de-escalation and meaningful dialogue;
2. Condemns the Israeli attack against the Iranian consulate in Damascus, which infringed international law and the Vienna Convention, and led to Iran’s disproportionate response to Israel;
9. Highlights the profound effects of the war in the Gaza Strip on the stability of the region; deplores the terrorism and war crimes committed by Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups against Israel and against the Israeli and Palestinian people; calls for all Israeli hostages held in the Gaza Strip to be immediately and unconditionally released and for the International Committee of the Red Cross to be given immediate access to all Israeli hostages being held in the Gaza Strip, so that it can provide them with medical care; underlines Israel’s obligation to comply with international law when exercising its right to self-defence, as enshrined in the UN Charter; condemns the disproportionate Israeli military response, which has caused a civilian death toll of unprecedented scale; urges Israel to provide the Gaza Strip’s starving population with full, unhindered and safe access to humanitarian aid and to comply with orders from the International Court of Justice; highlights that finding a long-lasting political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would significantly improve the region’s stability and prospects; reiterates its unwavering support for a negotiated two-state solution on the basis of the 1967 lines with two sovereign, democratic states living side by side in peace and guaranteed security, with Jerusalem as the capital of both states, and in full respect of international law;
3. Condemns equally in the strongest terms Israel’s retaliatory actions of 19 April 2024 targeting the Shekari army airbase in the north-west of the Isfahan province in response to the Iranian attack on Israel of 13 April 2024; welcomes the reports that Iran has no immediate plans to respond to Israel’s attack; warns that a further escalation by Israel would benefit Iran’s interests in the region in the context of Israel’s military operation in the Gaza Strip; recalls, in this respect, that Iran had indicated, immediately after the Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, that it would not retaliate if Israel were to accept a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip;
10. Notes that Iran, Russia and China have been increasingly sharing critical intelligence and cooperating through front companies, efforts to link their banking systems and oil transfers at sea with location devices turned off, making EU sanctions less effective; calls for improved enforcement of EU sanctions, for an urgent upgrade of automatic identification systems to counter sanctions and embargo evasion, and for increased surveillance and inspections of suspected Iranian ships;
4. Urges Israel and Iran to prevent any further escalation of the conflict and any worsening of the security situation and regional stability; urges both parties to put an immediate end to their tit-for-tat strategy and calls on all parties involved to cease their attacks and exercise the utmost restraint to prevent fuelling further tensions and increasing any escalation of the conflict in the region;
11. Condemns Iran’s persistent non-compliance with its legal safeguard obligations under the JCPOA and the advancement of its nuclear programme beyond all credible civilian justification; stresses that multiple credible sources have stated that Iran’s current ‘breakout time’ – the time Iran needs to produce sufficient weapons-grade plutonium – is a matter of weeks; urges the Iranian authorities to immediately abide by their obligations and address all related outstanding issues; urges the E3 (France, Germany, the UK) and its partners to consider imposing a deadline on Iran to comply with its obligations under the JCPOA and, in the event of non-compliance, to invoke collectively the snapback sanctions mechanism under UN Security Council Resolution 2231;
5. Recalls that Israel and Iran have the right to defend themselves within the limits of international law; supports the position of the UN experts of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, stressing that retaliatory military attacks between Israel and Iran violate the right to life and must therefore cease immediately; notes that the UN experts further qualify both the Israeli and Iranian strikes as possibly constituting an international crime of aggression by the civilian and military leaders responsible;
12. whereas the US is incredibly concerned about the military cooperation between Iran and North Korea, in particular on nuclear and ballistic missiles; whereas there are also legitimate concerns regarding Iran’s military cooperation with Russia and Pakistan, and its enhanced cooperation with China on military technology; whereas the UN Security Council has reported on the exchange of long-range missile technologies and weaponry between North Korea and Iran, which have also been delivered to Iran’s proxies in the Middle East; whereas North Korea has supplied Iran with critical missile components, enabling the development of ballistic missiles that are capable of striking targets much further away, in effect, helping Iran turn into a missile powerhouse;
6. Welcomes the EU’s commitment to contribute to the de-escalation and security of the region; calls, therefore, on the VP/HR and the 27 EU Foreign Affairs Ministers to engage, as a matter of urgency, with key partners and influential regional and global actors in de-escalation efforts; takes note of the decision by some Member States to suspend their arms exports to Israel in the context of its military operation in the Gaza Strip, in compliance with Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP on the control of exports of military technology and equipment; encourages all Member States to comply with Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP; underlines that this should not affect Israel’s ability to defend itself, notably its air defence capabilities, against attacks by state and non-state actors;
13. Recalls that Hezbollah must disarm in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1701; condemns its active role in repressing opposition voices within Lebanon and Syria, including through its assassination of several whistleblowers who reported on the explosion of the port of Beirut in August 2020; condemns Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel and Israeli air strikes in Lebanon; urgently calls on both parties to show restraint and cease hostilities so as not to further escalate tensions; calls on the Council to designate Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organisation;
7. Calls on the US to maintain pressure on Israel to show restraint and avoid a regional conflagration; is nevertheless concerned about reports indicating that the US agreed to Israel’s Rafah operation plan in return for Israel’s limited response on 19 April 2024; calls, furthermore, on the Russian and Chinese authorities to exert their full influence over Iran and its allies to ensure they play their part in the de-escalation efforts of the international community;
14. Urges the EU and its Member States to consolidate and intensify all efforts to ensure the secure and immediate release of all hostages taken from the Galaxy Leader vessel, including two Bulgarian, one Romanian and three Ukrainian citizens, who have been held by the Houthis since 19 November 2023; urges the VP/HR and the Member States to step up their diplomatic outreach to this end and engage with all relevant stakeholders in order to guarantee the safe return of the captured Europeans without further delay; strongly condemns the unlawful interception, boarding and detention of the Portuguese-flagged vessel MSC Aries, along with its crew, by entities operating under the direct or indirect control of the Iranian Government; urgently requests their immediate release; welcomes the EU Council’s decision to launch the EU Naval Force Operation ASPIDES to safeguard freedom of navigation off the coast of Yemen, in close cooperation with regional actors;
8. Condemns the destabilising role of Iran in the region and globally in recent decades; acknowledges that the current crisis is the culmination of decades of tensions between Iran and Israel; notes, with great concern, that close allies of Iran are present in Israel’s immediate neighbouring countries and are increasingly involved in the wary actions threatening Israel and the stability of the region;
15. Condemns Iran’s hostage diplomacy; demands the immediate and unconditional release of Johan Floderus, a Swedish citizen and EU official who was arbitrarily detained in Tehran and who remains imprisoned in Iran under inhumane conditions; urges the EU to launch a strategy to counter it with a dedicated task force to better assist detainees’ families and effectively prevent further hostage-taking; calls for all non-essential travel by EU citizens to Iran to be discouraged; calls on Iran to immediately and unconditionally release all EU nationals, including the European External Action Service official Johan Floderus, as well as all other political prisoners;
9. Reiterates its call for any de-escalation measures to diffuse the current tensions along the Israeli-Lebanese border; underlines the importance of applying UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) of 11 August 2006; expresses support for the work of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) along the Lebanese-Israeli border; condemns the Israeli airstrikes in southern Lebanon on 17 April 2024, in which three people were killed including a Hezbollah field commander, and the launch of missiles and drones by Hezbollah at a military facility in northern Israel that left 14 soldiers wounded; urgently calls on both parties to show restraint and cease hostilities so as not to further escalate tensions;
16. Condemns the sanctions imposed by the Iranian authorities against MEPs; reaffirms that as long as these sanctions on European parliamentarians persist, interparliamentary dialogue must remain suspended;
10. Welcomes the EU’s commitment to implement further restrictive measures and sanctions against Iran, notably related to the unmanned aerial vehicles and missiles; calls on the EU Member States to swiftly expand the existing restrictive measures in order to respond adequately to the current crisis and risks; urges the EU Member States to also consider enforcing a set of comprehensive and innovative sanctions, notably including a cessation of global oil exports by Iran; acknowledges, in this regard, the US House of Representatives’ recently adopted legislation aimed at countering China’s purchase of Iranian crude oil;
17. Calls on the Commission to launch a broad strategy to address transnational repression by the Iranian regime in the EU and considers that the strategy should promote technical tools to prevent such repression; calls for sanctions against the family members of prominent IRGC members who study or work in the EU and for measures to prevent any harassment or intimidation of the Iranian diaspora in the EU, including on campuses; calls on the European intelligence services, CSIRTs, the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre, the EU Agency for Cybersecurity and the East StratCom Task Force to actively cooperate in countering and deterring online Iranian / IRGC / Iranian Ministry of Intelligence disinformation and cyber and intimidation operations directed against the Iranian diaspora; calls on the EU Member States to actively counter Iran’s attempts to spread its revolutionary ideology on EU soil;
11. Condemns the Iranian supply of ballistic missiles and drones to Russia; urges the EU Member States to take measures to prevent the reciprocal transfer of weapons by Russia to Iran, such as fighter jets, attack helicopters and pilot training aircraft; calls on the Iranian authorities to immediately stop arms trading and providing supplies to its affiliated proxies in the region; calls on the EU Member States to take any appropriate measures in this respect;
18. Calls for the EU and the Member States to provide cybersecurity support and free and accessible virtual private networks (VPNs) or other circumvention tools to civil society and the opposition in Iran;
12. Reiterates its unwavering call on the Council to designate the IRGC a terrorist organisation and to impose further EU sanctions on officials and entities, including the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the President Ebrahim Raisi and Prosecutor-General Mohammad Jafar Montazeri; takes notes of the VP/HR’s commitment to task the legal service of the European External Action Service with re-evaluating the legal grounds for this designation; welcomes the stance of some Member States advocating for the IRGC’s designation as a terrorist organisation; urges the EU Member States to take legal action against the IRGC at national level;
19. Condemns the massive nationwide crackdowns by the Iranian authorities on women who violate the outrageous hijab law; notes with grave concern the recent escalation in the use of the death penalty in Iran and reiterates its call for its abolition;
13. Condemns the Iranian-backed Houthi attacks on commercial shipping off the coast of Yemen; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of the crew of the Japanese-registered vessel, Galaxy Leader, including two Bulgarians and one Romanian, and the crew of the seized Portuguese-flagged container ship, the MSC Aries, including Estonian nationals; calls on the Commission and the Member States to intensify their efforts and enhance collaborative endeavours, including by deploying all available diplomatic channels and engaging with international partners and relevant stakeholders, to expedite the prompt and secure liberation and ensure the safe return of the captured European citizens to their respective countries without further delay;
20. Expresses its full support and solidarity with Iran’s civil society and democratic forces; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase support for human rights defenders who need to leave Iran, including through rapid access to visas and asylum, and to provide technical support to those helping Iranian civil society, while ensuring Iranian ownership of these activities;
14. Welcomes the decision by the Member States on the launch of the EUNAVFOR ASPIDES naval operation to safeguard the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, in close cooperation with regional actors and international partners; further welcomes the US-led ‘Operation Prosperity Guardian’ to safeguard shipping in the Red Sea and freedom of navigation, which must be ensured at all times;
21. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Government and Parliament of Iran and the Government and Parliament of Israel.
15. Is firmly convinced that there will be no regional stability nor any possibility to build enduring peace in the region if the war in the Gaza Strip continues and, more fundamentally, if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not resolved; reiterates its calls for an immediate and permanent ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, and for all parties to immediately and unconditionally release all hostages;
16. Reiterates its unwavering support for a negotiated two-state solution on the basis of the 1967 lines with two sovereign, democratic states living side by side in peace and guaranteed security, with Jerusalem as the capital of both states, and in full respect of international law; emphasises, therefore, the absolute necessity of immediately relaunching the peace process; welcomes, in this respect, the Peace Day Effort for Middle East Peace launched just before the attacks by the EU and Arab partners;
17. Calls on Israel to respect the provisions of international humanitarian law and to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 2712 (2023) demanding the use of ‘all available routes to and throughout the entire Gaza Strip’ to facilitate the delivery of aid; takes note of the positive steps taken by Israel in the delivery of humanitarian aid; urges Israel nevertheless to further ramp up the humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip;
18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, the Knesset and the Government of Israel, the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Legislative Council, the Supreme Leader and the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Members of Iran’s Majles.