What changed

B90151/2024

P9_TA(2024)0122

European Parliament resolution on the criticalCritical situation in Cuba

(2024/2584(RSP))

PE756.911

European Parliament resolution of 29 February 2024 on the critical situation in Cuba (2024/2584(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Cuba, in particular its resolution of 12 July 2023 on the state of the EU-Cuba PDCA in the light of the recent visit of the High Representative to the island,

– having regard to the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Cuba, of the other part (PDCA), signed in December 2016, which2016 hasand provisionally applied since 1 November 2017,

– having regard to theArticles reports4, of5 theand Cuban229 Observatoryof forthe HumanCuban RightsConstitution onand repressiveto actionsthe andCuban arbitraryPenal detentions,Code,

– having regard to the statement by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and its Special Rapporteurs on Economic, Social, Cultural, and Environmental Rights and Freedom of Expression of 15 July 2021,

– having regard to the definition of ‘civil society organisation’ in the Official Journal of the European Union,

– having regard to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1984, to which Cuba is a State Party,

– having regard to document ARES (2021) 2474104 by the European External Action Service (EEAS) Deputy Managing Director for the Americas,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which Cuba is a signatory,

– having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966 and other international human rights treaties and instruments,

– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

– having regard to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1984, to which Cuba is a State Party,

– having regard to the Cuban constitution and criminal code,

– having regard to reports by human rights organisations, such as Human Rights Watch, the Human Rights Foundation and Prisoners Defenders, to Chapter IV.B on Cuba of the 2020, 2021 and 2022 annual reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), to the communication of 6 November 2019 to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights from the UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences, and the UN Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, on Cuban medical brigades, to the communication of 2 November 2023 to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights from the UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences, on Cuban medical brigades, and to the conclusions of the UN Human Rights Council’s 2018 Universal Periodic Review of Cuba with regard to Cuban medical brigades,

– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the communication of 16 November 2023 issued to Cuba by the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues,

A. whereas Cuba is an authoritarian state which has imposed a communist system for decades, ruling out any prospects for democratic change; whereas the Cuban constitution directly establishes, in Article 5 thereof, that the ‘unique, Martí, Fidelista and Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Cuba’ is the superior political force and ruler of society and the state, and Articles 4 and 229 thereof establish this as an irreversible system;

– having regard to Rules 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

B. whereas the Cuban criminal code contains the definition of ‘dangerous state’ and ‘pre-criminal security measures’, for which thousands of people are sentenced to between one and four years of imprisonment every year, without there being any attributable crime, and for which more than 8 000 people have been imprisoned and more than 2 500 have been sentenced to forced labour without internment; whereas, according to the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Prisoners Defenders, more than 1 000 political prisoners were being held in detention in Cuba in December 2023;

A. whereas Parliament gave its consent to the PDCA on 5 July 2017, with clear conditions linked to the improvement of human rights and democracy in Cuba, including a suspension clause in the event of a violation of the human rights provisions; whereas the accompanying resolution asked the Cuban authorities to allow European Parliament delegations to enter the country and have access to their interlocutors;

C. whereas in October 2020, the UN Human Rights Council’s Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded that the arbitrary detentions that have occurred in recent decades in Cuba are not isolated cases, but are rather part of ‘a systematic practice ... in which ... the Cuban authorities have participated for decades’;

B. whereas several articles of the EU-Cuba PDCA, namely Articles 1, 2 and 3, establish clear principles on equality, reciprocity, mutual respect, strengthening of contacts, dialogue and cooperation between both societies; whereas Parliament has requested that the EEAS do everything possible to closely monitor the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba when applying the PDCA; whereas respect for human, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights is essential for the EU;

D. whereas the Organization of American States has denounced the fact that current attempts to destabilise Iberoamerican political systems have their origin in the strategy of the Bolivarian and Cuban dictatorships, which have financed, supported and promoted political and social conflict in the Latin American region;

C. whereas the number of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience in Cuba has risen dramatically, reaching 1 066 on 31 January 2024, including 33 who were minors at the time of detention, an eightfold increase since 2018, rising by 170 in the last 12 months, equivalent to a monthly average of more than 14 politically motivated detentions; whereas human rights organisations have also documented more than 11 000 cases of ‘pre criminal’ convictions with average sentences of 2 years and 10 months without any crime having been committed or attempted , a number reported by the Speaker of the UN Committee Against Torture (CAT) in April 2022 in the Concluding verbal observations at the 73rd Session of the CAT Periodic Review on Cuba; whereas in the past decades, Article 72 of the Cuban Civil Code has permitted an average of 3 850 new ‘pre-criminal’ detentions every year; whereas Articles 434.1 and 189.3 of Cuba’s new Penal Code build on the ‘pre-criminal’ measures contained in the Civil Code;

E. whereas the Cuban regime has persistently violated human rights for decades, including extrajudicial killings; arbitrary arrests and detentions; torture and inhuman treatment of political dissidents, detainees and prisoners by security forces; life-threatening prison conditions for political prisoners; lack of independence of the judiciary; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, censorship, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and enforcement or threat to enforce criminal laws to limit expression; transnational repression against individuals in other countries; interference with the right of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws on the organisation, funding and operation of non-governmental and civil society organisations; and severe restrictions on religious freedom; whereas in 2023 more than 200 incidents of internet restrictions were documented, including hacking into the accounts of journalists in order to silence them and curb free speech;

D. whereas the UN previously expressed its concern to Cuba about the detention and imprisonment of religious leaders in the country; whereas on 16 November 2023, five mandate-holders and rapporteurs of the UN Special Procedures sent Cuba a communication in which they described and condemned Cuba’s systematic pattern of persecution, imprisonment and torture of evangelical pastors and Catholic priests, Muslim imams and Yoruba/Santería religious leaders;

F. whereas in 2021 the people of Cuba took to the streets to oppose communist rule in the biggest protests since the 1959 communist revolution;

E. whereas the Institute for Crime and Justice Policy Research updated in January 2024 the World Prison Brief reporting an increase in the number of prisoners on the island, placing Cuba second in the world in terms of its incarceration rate; whereas the Cuban Government continues to use arbitrary detention to harass and intimidate critics, independent activists, political opponents and others;

G. whereas many different independent NGOs in Cuba, such as the Council for the Democratic Transition in Cuba, of which the Patriotic Union of Cuba is a part, Cuba Decide, the Cuban Observatory for Human Rights, the Women’s Network of Cuba and Cuban Prisoners Defenders, have denounced the fact that both Decree-Law 35/2021 and Resolution 105 criminalise counter-revolutionary actions that oppose, question, criticise and/or try to modify the model of the dictatorial regime prevailing in the country;

F. whereas human rights organisations continue to document the ongoing crackdown on the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association in the country and the Cuban authorities’ stifling of dissenting voices and targeting of human rights defenders; whereas in 2023 more than 200 incidents of internet restrictions were documented, including hacking into the accounts of journalists in order to silence them and curb free speech;

H. whereas in June 2023, the IACHR found the Cuban Government responsible for the deaths of democracy activists Oswaldo Payá and Harold Cepero in a 2012 car accident; whereas the IACHR concluded that state agents were directly involved in their deaths and that the Cuban regime had violated Oswaldo Payá’s and Harold Cepero’s rights to life, honour and freedom of expression;

G. whereas the human rights situation in Cuba is deeply concerning, particularly with regard to vulnerable populations, such as women, ethnic minorities and the LGBTIQ+ community; whereas non-governmental organisations and independent observatories report an increase in femicides in Cuba, with the number of femicides rising to 89 in 2023 and eight new cases being reported so far in 2024; whereas despite this, the regime has not implemented a system for registering femicides in Cuba using up-to-date public data, and a comprehensive law against gender-based violence, guaranteeing the involvement of civil society representatives, has not yet been adopted;

I. whereas in May 2022, the Committee against Torture urged Cuba to adopt measures to prevent or stop arbitrary detentions, harassment, intimidation, threats and actions to discredit human rights defenders, as well as to investigate all the deaths that occur during any deprivation of freedom and to ensure the independence and impartiality of the Prosecutor’s Office and the judiciary;

H. whereas Parliament has repeatedly reminded the EEAS that the participation of representatives of independent civil society in political dialogues and the agreement’s cooperation projects is an essential part of the PDCA, as stressed in its Article 36, and that excluding representatives of independent civil society from cooperation funds and/or participation in the agreement while, on the contrary, allowing participation and access to cooperation funds exclusively for companies in which the state participates or which it controls, as has been the case since the signing of the agreement, should be remedied immediately;

J. whereas in its resolution of 10 June 2021, Parliament reminded the European External Action Service (EEAS) that the participation of civil society in the political dialogues and cooperation projects under the PDCA is a fundamental element of the agreement; whereas civil society is being excluded from accessing cooperation funds and participating in the PDCA; whereas, meanwhile, only companies that the Cuban state controls or in which it participates are exclusively allowed to participate in the PDCA and access cooperation funds, as has been the case since the agreement’s signing; whereas the EEAS should decisively address this unacceptable situation;

I. whereas on 2 January 2024, the UN publicly disclosed the letter of indictment sent to the Cuban regime accusing it of forced labour, one of the forms of modern slavery denounced by the Special Rapporteurs on Human Trafficking and Slavery; whereas several international organisations have denounced the fact that Cuban civilian workers serving abroad, including doctors, teachers, sailors, engineers, artists or athletes, are subjected to human trafficking by inherently coercive laws and regulations affecting very explicit basic freedoms, including Article 176 of the Penal Code, Mincex Resolution 368 of 2020, the Migration Law and Decree 306 of 2012;

K. whereas Parliament has awarded its Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought on three occasions to Cuban activists: Oswaldo Payá in 2002, the Ladies in White in 2005 and Guillermo Fariñas in 2010; whereas Sakharov Prize winners and their families continue to be systematically persecuted and intimidated and those living on the island are systematically prevented from leaving the country to participate in international events and events organised by the European Parliament; whereas political prisoners suffer from worrying health conditions, for example Félix Navarro Rodríguez (69 years old), Lázaro Yuri Valle Roca (61 years old), Carlos Manuel Pupo Rodríguez (68 years old), Miguel Díaz Bauza (80 years old) and Fredy Beirut Matos (65 years old);

J. whereas the regime gradually imposed on Cuba rules out any prospect of democratic change, as Article 5 of the Cuban Constitution states that the ‘unique, Martí, Fidelista and Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Cuba’ is the highest political force and ruler of society and the state, and as Articles 4 and 229 establish the current political system as irrevocable;

L. whereas despite the fact that Parliament’s resolution of 28 November 2019 on the José Daniel Ferrer case urged ‘the EEAS and the Commission to actively support civil society groups and individuals defending human rights in Cuba, including through arranging prison visits, trial monitoring and public statements’, in no case has there been a visit to any political prisoner in prison or the observation of any trial of opponents, dissidents, human rights activists or independent civil society activists;

K. whereas despite years of insisting on the need to visit the island, the Cuban authorities systematically refuse to allow official committees, delegations and some political groups from the European Parliament, international human rights organisations and other independent observers of the human rights situation, including UN special rapporteurs, to enter Cuba or to visit prisons;

M. whereas authoritarian allies of the Cuban regime, such as Russia, Venezuela, China and Belarus, maintain close cooperation with Cuba in military and security matters; whereas this cooperation also involves the Wagner Group;

L. whereas on 23 November 2023, the Conference of Presidents of the European Parliament authorised the sending of an ad hoc delegation to Cuba following a letter of invitation from the Ambassador of Cuba to Belgium and the European Union dated 20 September 2023; whereas on 19 December 2023, the Vice President of the Cuban Parliament informed the EU ambassador in Cuba of its refusal to receive Parliament’s delegation with the justification that it did ‘not wish to receive the visit of Members of the European Parliament who work against Cuba’s interests and are completely aligned with the United States’; whereas the Ambassador of the Republic of Cuba, in a letter dated 25 January 2024, addressed to the President of the European Parliament, referred to the President of the ad hoc delegation of the European Parliament to Cuba and two other members, as ‘maintaining links and supporting citizens and organisations included in the National List of persons and entities ... based on acts of terrorism’; whereas in November 2023, a delegation of the Cuban Parliament was received at the European Parliament’s premises;

N. whereas Cuba and Russia maintain very close, not only diplomatic, but also political, economic, strategic and military relations, as demonstrated by the meeting held in Moscow in November 2022 between Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel and Russian President Vladimir Putin, at which they stated that their bilateral ties were ‘significant’;

M. whereas Parliament has awarded its Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to Cuban activists on three occasions: Oswaldo Payá in 2002, the Ladies in White in 2005 and Guillermo Fariñas in 2010; whereas Sakharov laureates and their relatives are still being regularly harassed, intimidated and prevented from leaving the country and participating in international events; whereas on June 2023, the IACHR concluded that state agents were directly involved in the deaths of democracy activists Oswaldo Payá and Harold Cepero in a 2012 car accident; whereas there should be a fully transparent investigation to bring to justice those responsible for the killing of Oswaldo Payá and Harold Cepero;

O. whereas Cuba defines the Cuban-Russian Intergovernmental Commission for economic-commercial and scientific-technical collaboration as essential; whereas the Cuban regime has always publicly appreciated Moscow’s vote at the UN in favour of a Cuban resolution against the embargo imposed by the United States on the island;

N. whereas the PDCA has failed in its core aim of improving fundamental freedoms in Cuba;

P. whereas in May 2023, the Cuban regime signed an agreement with Belarus to send special forces troops there, as a show of solidarity with one of Russia’s main allies in its war against Ukraine; whereas through this, the Cuban military will receive training, which implies that Cuba and Belarus will be strengthening their ties in terms of military cooperation;

1. Regrets that despite the time that has elapsed since the entry into force of the PDCA, the situation of a lack of democracy and freedoms in Cuba has not improved, and that on the contrary, there has been a further deterioration and aggravation of the human rights situation on the island, in clear and systematic violation of the basic provisions of the PDCA;

Q. whereas in January 2021, the US Secretary of State denounced the Cuban regime’s support for international terrorism and the subversion of the US justice system;

2. Stresses the obligation for all parties to fulfil the binding provisions of the PDCA and to uphold the principle of the universality of human rights;

R. whereas vast regions of Latin America are being held hostage by non-democratic regimes inspired by communism and operating under the umbrella of Cuba and initiatives such as the São Paulo Forum and the Puebla Group, which are hubs of drug production and trafficking;

3. Condemns in the strongest terms the systematic human rights violations and abuses perpetrated by the Cuban regime against protesters, political dissidents, religious leaders, human rights activists and independent artists, among others; urges the Cuban authorities to immediately put an end to the policy of repression; condemns the lack of religious freedom in Cuba;

S. whereas on 5 July 2017, Parliament granted its approval to the PDCA between the EU and Cuba; whereas its approval of the PDCA was based on the clear intention to improve the dire human rights situation in Cuba; whereas monitoring and control of compliance with the PDCA are inconsistent with the current actions of Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Josep Borrell;

4. Is concerned at the alarming increase in the number of political prisoners, which has risen more than eightfold since 2018, making Cuba the biggest prison for political activists and dissidents in Latin America; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of individuals detained solely for exercising their human rights, including the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly; further calls for the dismissal of unjust criminal charges and supports the facilitation of the return of those in exile;

T. whereas the PDCA includes a so-called human rights clause, which is a standard, essential element of the EU’s international agreements, allowing it to be suspended in the event of violations of the provisions on human rights;

5. Declares it unacceptable that the EEAS and the EU Delegation in Havana agreed to exclude the Cuban democratic opposition and independent and legitimate civil society organisations, both European and Cuban, from political dialogues because of the lack of endorsement by the Cuban authorities; recalls its resolution of July 2023 in which it deeply regretted the fact that the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) squandered the chance to support democracy through Cuban civil society and the political prisoners and to send a clear message about the EU’s concerns regarding human rights violations in Cuba;

U. whereas Parliament’s approval of the PDCA was linked to the commitment by the Commission and the EEAS to guarantee the establishment of a regular exchange with Parliament on the application of the agreement and on the fulfilment of the mutual obligations contained therein, especially those relating to the implementation of all provisions on human rights; whereas Parliament has also requested that the EEAS do everything possible to closely monitor the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba when applying the PDCA;

6. Reiterates its firm and unconditional support for the Cuban people, for all human rights defenders in Cuba and for their commendable dedication to freedoms and all rights which the Cuban regime has denied for decades;

V. whereas, despite years of Parliament insisting on the need to visit the island, the Cuban authorities systematically refuse to allow committees, delegations and political groups from Parliament, international human rights organisations and other independent observers of the human rights situation, including UN special rapporteurs, to enter Cuba;

7. Expresses its deep concern over the existence of forced labour in Cuba and condemns Cuban state-driven forced labour, in particular in medical brigades, but also involving teachers, sailors, engineers, artists, athletes and others, whose salary is mostly appropriated by the Cuban Government; denounces the fact that most of the ‘volunteers’ in international missions stated that they were deployed against their will or had to participate under coercive structural conditions;

W. whereas on 23 November 2023, the Conference of Presidents of the European Parliament authorised the sending of an ad hoc delegation to the Republic of Cuba following a letter of invitation from the Ambassador of Cuba to Belgium and the European Union dated 20 September 2023; whereas paragraph 45 of its non-legislative resolution of 5 July 2017 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Cuba, of the other part, refers to requesting entry to Cuba of an official delegation of Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, which is part of the PDCA;

8. Notes that in November 2023, members of the Cuban Parliament, including the Secretary of the Cuban National Parliament, Homero Acosta, were accorded respectful treatment and warmly received at the European Parliament; declares the continued exclusion of the European Parliament, which is the sole European institution denied access to Cuban territory, to be unacceptable and in violation of the PDCA; rejects Cuba’s decision to refuse a visit by an ad hoc delegation from Parliament and urges the Cuban authorities to adhere to the principles of the PDCA and grant Parliament access to the country; requests that, in accordance with the PDCA’s principles of equality, reciprocity and mutual respect, similar measures be adopted, denying access to Parliament’s premises to any representative of the National Assembly of People’s Power or of the Cuban regime;

X. whereas the current political system in Cuba is incompatible with the EU’s demands to conclude cooperation agreements; whereas respect for human, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights is essential for the EU;

9. Demands that, in accordance with the PDCA, the Cuban authorities grant access to a European Parliament, EU and Member State delegation, as well as to independent human rights organisations, in order to monitor trials and visit the hundreds of activists and ordinary Cubans who remain imprisoned for exercising their right to freedom of expression and assembly; calls on the HR/VP, in any contact with the Cuban authorities, to raise the fact that Parliament has yet again been denied access and to urge them to reverse this decision immediately;

Y. whereas on 16 September 2021, Parliament overwhelmingly10. approvedReiterates aits resolutioncall on the government repression of protests and citizens in CubaCouncil callingto forapply the EU to activate ArticleGlobal 85(3)bHuman ofRights theSanctions PDCARegime to(the suspendEU theMagnitsky agreementAct) becauseand ofadopt thesanctions Cubanagainst regime’sthose violationsresponsible offor the provisions relating topersistent human rights, whichrights constitutedviolations ain ‘specialCuba, urgencystarting case’;by whereassanctioning ParliamentMiguel recalledDíaz-Canel, thatas the PDCA’s human rights clause was anmost essentialsenior elementfigure ofin the agreement; whereaschain itof calledcommand onof the Council toCuban makesecurity useforces, ofalong thewith humanother rightshigh-ranking provisionsofficials inwithin the general EU sanctionsCuban regimeGovernment and to adopt sanctions againstall those responsible for human rights violations in Cubathe asimprisonment soonof aspolitical possible,prisoners;

1. Condemns in the strongest terms the systematic violation of the fundamental rights of the Cuban people during the more than six decades of rule by the Communist Party of Cuba; condemns the systematic and increasing violation of the fundamental rights of political prisoners, human rights defenders and other citizens by authoritarian regimes all around the world, especially following the recent killing of Alexei Navalny by the Russian regime, a like-minded partner of the Cuban regime;

11. Reiterates its call for the EU to trigger Article 85(3)(b) of the PDCA to request an immediate meeting of the joint committee owing to the Cuban Government’s breaches of the agreement, which constitute a ‘case of special urgency’, underlines that these breaches involve persistent and substantial violations of democratic principles, as well as a disregard for the basic human rights and fundamental freedoms outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and emphasised in Article 1(5) of the PDCA, and stresses that the Cuban regime’s failure to address such transgressions despite repeated calls from Parliament to do so should lead to the suspension of the agreement;

2. Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all those arbitrarily detained solely for exercising their human rights, especially of the political prisoners José Daniel Ferrer, who is currently being held in an unknown location, and Roberto Pérez Fonseca, who was sentenced to ten years in prison in July 2021;

12. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Government and National Assembly of People’s Power of Cuba, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the governments of the members of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.

3. Demands full transparency in an investigation to bring to justice those responsible for killing Oswaldo Payá and Harold Cepero;

4. Regrets that, since 2015, when the dialogue on human rights between the EU and Cuba was restarted, the Cuban regime has systematically refused to recognise the monitoring of human rights as a legitimate activity and has denied legal status to local human rights groups;

5. Disapproves of the passive and irresponsible attitude of the EEAS under the direction of VP/HR Josep Borrell, as it has ignored or trivialised the outcry of the Cuban people and the systematic violation of human rights by the regime in Cuba; considers that this attitude has indirectly contributed to a dramatic worsening of the human rights situation, in flagrant violation of the provisions contained in the PDCA between the EU and Cuba that was signed in 2016;

6. Objects to the fact that the EEAS has systematically infringed the terms of the PDCA referring to cooperation projects that establish civil society as an essential part of this cooperation; disapproves of the fact that since the signing of the PDCA, the EEAS has made it possible for the cooperation funds to end up exclusively in the hands of companies owned or controlled by the Cuban state or organisations of the Communist Party of Cuba, leading to the illegitimate conversion of these funds into a means of financing the Cuban dictatorship;

7. Disapproves of the fact that, in May 2022, despite the constant violation of human rights by the Cuban regime, VP/HR Josep Borrell misused his participation in the third bilateral meeting that took place in Cuba under the PDCA, putting his goal of diplomatically approaching the regime above the fate of the people of Cuba, in particular the political prisoners, of whom several were on hunger strike, and ignoring all those oppressed by the communist dictatorship; regrets that the visit contributed to whitewashing President Díaz-Canel and the Cuban dictatorship; regrets that the VP/HR’s statements have avoided mentioning the serious and systematic violations of human rights, have not condemned Cuba’s support for Russia in its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and therefore have not reflected the Council’s conclusions and the EU’s positions and policies which he is obliged to represent and implement;

8. Requests that VP/HR Josep Borrell place his position at the disposal of the Council, and tasks the Commission President and the Council with carrying out a thorough assessment of how his actions have seriously harmed the people of Cuba; is of the opinion that implementing such harmful policies, which contravene the EU’s values and founding documents, should be met with proper reactions from the Council, the Commission and Parliament and that VP/HR Josep Borrell should therefore fully bear responsibility for his actions;

9. Deplores the fact that, despite the time that has elapsed since the entry into force of the PDCA, the lack of democracy and freedoms in Cuba has not improved at all; notes that, on the contrary, the human rights situation on the island has been further aggravated and has further deteriorated, in clear and systematic violation of the basic provisions of the PDCA;

10. Reiterates its firm and unconditional support for the Cuban people, for all human rights defenders in Cuba and for their commendable dedication to freedoms and all rights which the Cuban regime has denied for decades;

11. Urges the EU to live up to its values by applying Article 85(3)b and immediately suspending the PDCA between the EU and Cuba;

12. Urges the Council to strongly condemn Cuba’s permanent interference in the internal affairs of other Latin American countries and its clear cooperation with other totalitarian regimes, as well as with drug cartels and terrorist forces, during the past six decades;

13. Urges the Council to make use of the human rights provisions in the general EU sanctions regime and to adopt sanctions, as soon as possible, against those responsible for human rights violations in Cuba and abroad who assist other dictatorships and rogue states in carrying out torture and strategies of social terror, in view of the systematic violation of human rights by the Cuban regime, which constitutes a ‘case of special urgency’;

14. Invites the EU Member States to demand the immediate revocation of Cuba’s place on the UN Human Rights Council;

15. Demands the immediate cessation of all financial aid from the EU to Cuba, which has been consistently maintained without taking into account the continuing serious human rights violations and which fuels the regime instead of providing relief to and serving the people of Cuba;

16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Government and National Assembly of People’s Power of Cuba, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the Commission, the College of Commissioners, the European Union Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the governments of the members of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.