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B90143/2024
B90149/2024
European Parliament resolution on the need for unwavering EU support forto Ukraine,Ukraine after two years of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine
(2024/2526(RSP))
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and on Russia, in particular its resolutions of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine, of 19 May 2022 on the fight against impunity for war crimes in Ukraine, of 19 January 2023 on the establishment of a tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine and of 15 June 2023 on the sustainable reconstruction and integration of Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic community,
– having regard to the UN Charter, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto and to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),
– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,
– having regard to the Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 5 December 1994 (Budapest Memorandum),
– having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),
– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 14 and 15 DecemberGeneva 2023,Conventions,
– having regard to the 2006 Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European Union on cooperation and assistance,
– having regard to the UN General Assembly resolutions of 2 November 2022 entitled ‘Report of the International Criminal Court’, of 14 November 2022 entitled ‘Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine’ and of 23 February 2023 entitled ‘Principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine’,
– having regard to the report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) of 12 December 2023 entitled ‘Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine – 1 August to 30 November 2023’,
– having regard to the report of 14 February 2024 by the World Bank, the Government of Ukraine, the European Commission and the United Nations entitled ‘Ukraine - Third Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA3) February 2022 – December 2023’,
– having regard to the report of 9 February 2024 of the High-Level Working Group on the Environmental Consequences of the War entitled ‘An environmental compact for Ukraine – A Green Future꞉ Recommendations for Accountability and Recovery’,
– having regard to the statement of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of 8 February 2024 on the situation in Ukraine,
– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas two years ago, on 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation launchedhas been waging an unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine;Ukraine whereassince the24 RussianFebruary aggression2022, againstin Ukrainecontinuation startedof inprevious 2014aggressions withsince the2014, occupationand ofcontinues partsto persistently violate the principles of the DonbasUN regionCharter andthrough its aggressive actions against the occupationsovereignty, independence and annexationterritorial integrity of Ukraine’sUkraine Autonomousand Republicto blatantly and grossly violate international humanitarian law, as established by the Geneva Conventions of Crimea;1949;
B. whereas since then, Russia’s forces have continued to carry out and have escalated indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure; whereas heavy and intense bombardments combined with ground fighting continued throughout 2023; whereas the UN has confirmed that more than 10 000 civilians, including hundreds of children, have been murdered since February 2022; whereas the actual civilian death toll is estimated to be in the tens of thousands; whereas many more civilians have been tortured, forcibly ‘re-educated’, harassed, raped, kidnapped or forcibly displaced; whereas this inhumane conduct by the Russian forces and their proxies is in total disregard of international humanitarian law;
B. whereas the UN General Assembly, in its resolution of 2 March 2022, immediately qualified the Russian war against Ukraine as an act of aggression in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and, in its resolution of 14 November 2022, recognised the need to hold the Russian Federation accountable for its war of aggression and legally and financially responsible for its internationally wrongful acts, including by making reparation for the injury and damage caused;
C. whereas millions of Ukrainians continue to be displaced inside and outside Ukraine, having fled from Russia’s aggression; whereas more than 3.3 million people, including 800 000 children, are living along the front line; whereas homes, schools and hospitals continue to be bombed every day; whereas, according to the International Organization for Migration, Russia’s campaign of destruction in 2023 left nearly 720 000 people in the worst-affected parts of Ukraine with no access to adequate and safe housing; whereas the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that indiscriminate attacks on Ukrainian populated areas spiked in December 2023, highlighting the persistent pattern of civilian death, destruction and humanitarian needs throughout 2023;
C. whereas the ICC has been conducting an investigation into the situation in Ukraine since 2 March 2022 and on 17 March 2023 issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, and Maria Lvova-Belova, so-called Commissioner for Children’s Rights in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation, for the war crime of unlawful deportation of Ukrainian children; whereas the ICC following two ad hoc declarations by Ukraine, has jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide when committed on the territory of Ukraine since November 2013, but does not have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression defined in Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute in this situation, as neither Ukraine nor the Russian Federation have ratified the Rome Statute and the amendments related to the crime of aggression; whereas the EU supports the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression;
D. whereas the Ukrainian authorities estimate that at least 19 546 Ukrainian children have been deported and forcibly displaced from their homes to Russia and Russian-occupied territories since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, and of those only 388 have returned home; whereas many of the abducted children reported having suffered physical and mental abuse to erase their Ukrainian identity;
D. whereas, as a reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has adopted 13 sanctions packages of unprecedented scope against the Russian Federation, has provided over EUR 80 billion of support to Ukraine in the form of humanitarian and emergency assistance, budget support, macro-financial assistance and military aid, has welcomed millions of refugees from Ukraine and has expressed its support for the people of Ukraine and their leadership by granting the country the status of a candidate country for EU membership;
E. whereas Russia’s war crimes will leave an entire population traumatised as 10 million people are estimated to be at risk of or living with a mental health condition, and 3.9 million people are estimated to be suffering from moderate to severe symptoms requiring treatment for mental distress, depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); whereas in 2023, 227 incidents affecting humanitarian operations in the country were reported, with 50 humanitarian workers killed or injured, including 11 killed in the line of duty;
E. whereas the EU and its Member States, together with international partners and NATO allies, continue to provide substantial military support to Ukraine in order to assist it in exercising its legitimate right to self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter against Russia’s aggression; whereas military support to Ukraine, however, is being delivered in an insufficiently coordinated manner and unevenly across Member States;
F. whereas women and girls are particularly at risk during humanitarian and displacement crises, as they continue disproportionately to be the victims of gender-based violence; whereas many women have stayed in Ukraine and are serving in combat roles; whereas there are indications that Ukrainian women soldiers in captivity have been tortured and subjected to sexual violence; whereas the OHCHR has reported that, because men represent the majority of victims of summary executions by Russian forces in occupied territories, surviving family members – many of them women – are left behind to cope, often on their own, with limited family income, increased caregiver burdens, and intense mental trauma and distress;
F. whereas Ukraine’s armed forces are currently facing an acute shortage of artillery shells and ammunition, which severely reduces Ukraine’s ability to deter Russian attacks and has led to withdrawals from strategic positions;
G. whereas Ukraine’s natural environment has been a specific target in the war, as Russia has been blatantly using massive environmental damage, such as burning fields and forests, illegally logging Ukrainian lumber, and contaminating water and soil with chemical waste, as a tactic aimed at destroying the country’s land, habitability and future generations’ ability to thrive and prosper; whereas the destruction of the Kakhovka dam on 6 June 2023 is a clear example of actions by Russia that will continue to cause ecological devastation in the years to come; whereas there is a proposed international legal definition of ‘ecocide’, which could be added to the Rome Statute of the ICC as a new Article 8 ter.; whereas ecocide is defined as ‘unlawful or wanton acts committed with knowledge that there is a substantial likelihood of severe and either widespread or long-term damage to the environment being caused by those acts’;
G. whereas the US Congress has failed to adopt a new USD 60 billion package of support to Ukraine for 2024 which has essentially led to a halt in US aid commitments and military deliveries to Ukraine; whereas to fully replace the US military support in 2024, the EU and its Member States would have to double their current level and pace of military support;
H. whereas Russia continues to knowingly pose threats to the security of nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes in Ukraine and their personnel, significantly raising the risk of an international nuclear accident; whereas Russia has seized and militarised the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), Europe’s largest nuclear power plant; whereas, after a recent visit to the site, the Director General of the IAEA expressed enormous caution as to the current state of the ZNPP, stressing the need to find a sustainable solution for an alternative source of cooling water after the June 2023 destruction of the downstream Kakhovka dam and for staff shortages;
H. whereas the EU is establishing the so-called Ukraine Facility, a EUR 50 billion package of economic and financial support for Ukraine for the years 2024-2027, which will help the Ukrainian State deliver essential services to its citizens such as maintaining schools, hospitals and social security, as well as support private investment and grant technical assistance in order to work towards Ukraine’s economic and social recovery from the war, and its modernisation and reconstruction;
I. whereas, according to reports, Russia has dramatically reoriented its economy towards a ‘war economy’, combined with plans for very high defence spending estimated at well over EUR 100 billion; whereas Russia reportedly produces more than 2 million artillery shells per year domestically, which is significantly more than the quantity EU governments had promised to Ukraine;
I. whereas, despite broad international condemnation of its war of aggression against Ukraine and unprecedented sanctions, the Russian political and military leadership, with the support of its regular army and proxies, continues to terrorise the people of Ukraine through indiscriminate attacks on residential areas and civilian infrastructure, targeted attacks on critical infrastructure, forced deportations and adoptions of deported children, mass killings, torture and rape;
J. whereas the latest Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment by the World Bank, the Government of Ukraine, the Commission and the UN estimates that as at 31 December 2023 the total cost of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine will be at least EUR 452.8 billion over the next decade; whereas the EU is now implementing the Ukraine Facility, a EUR 50 billion package of grants and loans for the period 2024 to 2027; whereas this funding is in addition to the over EUR 85 billion of support, including military aid, which has already been provided to Ukraine; whereas additional resources under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) and the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA III) are expected, in particular for humanitarian aid;
1. Underlines that Russia’s crime of aggression against Ukraine is a brutal attack against the peaceful life of European citizens and a grave violation of international law which threatens the security and stability, democracy and prosperity of the entire European continent in an unprecedented manner and which therefore requires equally unprecedented actions and unwavering solidarity and unity in response;
K. whereas EU Member States have so far provided Ukraine with EUR 28 billion in military aid and have preliminarily committed a further amount of around EUR 21.2 billion for 2024; whereas there is a lack of burden-sharing and solidarity between Member States when it comes to military aid provided to Ukraine; whereas several large Member States with substantial defence industry capacity have contributed very little of the military aid Ukraine needs; whereas the EU Military Assistance Mission has trained 40 500 Ukrainian soldiers and plans to train an additional 20 000 by the summer of 2024; whereas it has become clear that the EU will only be able to send around half of the promised 1 million rounds of ammunition to Ukraine by March 2024 and is only expected to reach this target nine months later; whereas the latest U.S. aid package for Ukraine is blocked in Congress; whereas the leaders of Germany, Czechia, the Netherlands, Estonia and Denmark have called on the European Union to recommit to long-term support for Ukraine, describing this as ‘a joint European responsibility’;
2. Acknowledges that the two-year anniversary of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine highlights that efforts made so far have not yet been sufficient to end the aggression; recalls the lessons learnt from the devastation caused by World War II and therefore urges the EU and its Member States to again demonstrate their solidarity and capacity to act against the devastation caused by Russia in Ukraine, in particular by increasing their military support to Ukraine and their capacity to deter further aggressions by Russia;
L. whereas on 14 December 2023, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Ukraine; whereas despite the Russian aggression and precarious socio-economic situation, the Government of Ukraine has managed to achieve success in its continued decentralisation and democratisation reforms;
3. Urges the EU, its Member States and their international partners to undertake even more effective military, political and diplomatic efforts, and in particular to massively increase their military support to Ukraine in order to ultimately stop Russia’s war of aggression and allow Ukraine to liberate all its people, re-establish full control over its entire territory within its internationally recognised borders and deter any further aggression by Russia; insists that any peaceful solution to the war must be based on full respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principles of international law, accountability for war crimes and the crime of aggression, and Russian payments for the massive damage caused in Ukraine;
1. Condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as the involvement of Belarus in this war, and demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land and infrastructure;
4. Reaffirms its unwavering solidarity with the people of Ukraine who, two years after the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, continue to experience destruction, loss of life and home as well as human suffering to an unbearable extent, but continue to show remarkable courage and resilience in fighting for their right to freedom, personal safety, and respect for their fundamental freedoms, and democratic and human rights;
2. Expresses its undivided solidarity with the people of Ukraine, fully supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and underlines that this war constitutes a serious violation of international law;
5. Reiterates its condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its demands that the Russian Federation immediately, completely and unconditionally cease its attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure, terminate all military activities in Ukraine, withdraw all military forces, proxies and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine, end forced deportations of Ukrainian civilians, release and return all detained Ukrainians, and permanently cease violating or threatening the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine;
3. Strongly condemns the massive and grave violations of human rights and the war crimes committed over the past two years by the Russian armed forces and various occupation authorities in Ukraine, including summary killings, rape and other forms of sexual assault, torture, abductions and the targeted destruction of residential areas; insists that the responsible government officials and military leaders, media propagandists, and other perpetrators and enablers of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including intended genocide, must be held accountable; reiterates its full support for the work of the ICC in helping end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community; encourages Ukraine, to this end, to consider becoming a State Party to the Rome Statute;
6. Underlines that military support to Ukraine is a reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its breach of international law and the UN Charter and aims to stop the persistent violations of Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity that have been ongoing since 2014;
4. Stresses that over 14.6 million people in Ukraine are in need of humanitarian aid, while over 6 million Ukrainians have been displaced from Ukraine; notes that the number of affected people is expected to increase significantly if Russia makes further territorial gains; underlines the continued need for the EU to provide humanitarian aid to Ukraine, as well as to address the needs of the millions of displaced persons from and within Ukraine, in particular those belonging to at-risk groups; notes that the need for humanitarian support will likely continue in the years to come and stresses the need for the EU to be prepared to meet these needs with long-term planning and adequate funds; reiterates its call for the EU to step up its efforts to address the dire situation of those who have been forcibly deported to Russia and of the children who have been forcibly adopted in Russia;
7. Calls therefore on the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to ensure effective and sustainable long-term military support to Ukraine; calls on the Member States to take all necessary action to fulfil their commitment of March 2023 to deliver one million rounds of ammunition to Ukraine as swiftly as possible; recognises the efforts made, in particular by the Member States in providing military support and by the VP/HR in coordinating it; underlines, however, that insufficient deliveries of weapons and ammunition risk undermining the efforts made so far and therefore urges the Member States, especially those who are lagging behind, to substantially increase and significantly accelerate their military support with a view to not only allowing Ukraine to defend itself against Russian attacks but also to regain full control over its entire internationally recognised territory; welcomes the initial proposal by the High Representative for the creation of a EUR 20 billion Ukraine Assistance Fund within the European Peace Facility, dedicated to supporting the Ukrainian armed forces with up to EUR 5 billion per year between 2023 and 2027; regrets that the Member States have lowered this ambition to a EUR 5 billion top-up and urges them to reach a rapid agreement in this regard; welcomes the VP/HR’s proposal for an increased target of 60 000 Ukrainian soldiers to be trained in 2024; urges the Member States, however, to accelerate the development of military ammunition production capacities, with particular focus on joint projects with Ukraine; calls on the Member States to submit additional orders to ammunition industries in order to deliver the production to Ukraine and to ensure that manufacturers strictly prioritise the delivery of ammunition to Ukraine over exports to third countries; calls on the EU and its Member States to explore the possibilities for joint ventures and close cooperation with defence industries from like-minded third countries for the purposes of providing the necessary ammunition to Ukraine; welcomes the security agreements concluded between EU Member States and Ukraine as a signal of long-term military support to Ukraine;
5. Calls on Member States to facilitate the temporary stay of refugees from Ukraine in the EU through targeted programmes and policies that ensure affordable and adequate access to housing, food, healthcare, education and employment opportunities, allow for long-term residency and access to nationality, facilitate movement between their host community and Ukraine, and provide help to Ukrainians, particularly children, in preserving their culture and language while abroad;
8. Calls on the EU and its Member States to fulfil the commitments of the 2022 Versailles Declaration and to accelerate the full implementation of the Strategic Compass by enhancing European military cooperation at industrial and armed forces level, in order to make the EU a stronger and more capable security provider that is interoperable and complementary with NATO; welcomes Member States’ and EU institutions’ increased budgets and investments in defence, and calls for an increase in targeted spending, joint procurement and joint investment in defence research and development; stresses that concrete steps should be taken towards Ukraine’s integration in EU defence and cybersecurity policies and programmes during the EU membership process;
6. Welcomes the support provided to Ukrainian culture through the Creative Europe Programme in the form of a dedicated call for proposals and urges that this support be extended and enhanced, given the importance of safeguarding the cultural and linguistic identity of Ukrainians in the EU and in Ukraine; welcomes, in this context, the work of the Commission’s expert sub-group dedicated to the safeguarding of cultural heritage in Ukraine and stresses the importance of implementing the experts’ recommendations;
9. Expresses its support for Ukraine’s peace plan, which lists important elements that will need to be addressed in establishing a just peace and calls on the EU and its Member States to actively support the efforts at increasing international support for re-establishing peace and justice;
7. Condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the use of sexual and gender-based violence as a weapon of war and stresses that this constitutes a war crime; calls on the EU and host countries to guarantee access to sexual and reproductive health and rights services, particularly emergency contraception, including for survivors of rape, and to support the provision of these services in Ukraine;
10. Calls on the Council to maintain its sanctions policy against the Russian Federation, but to continue enhancing its effectiveness and impact with a view to ultimately undermining Russia’s ability to continue waging the war; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure and monitor swift implementation and strict enforcement of all sanctions and to continuously review their effectiveness; welcomes the thirteenth sanctions package of 24 February 2024, and calls for consideration to be given to including persons identified by Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation and to continue preparations for further sanctions, including sanctions against individuals and entities and sectoral sanctions, in particular on imports of all Russian fossil fuels, including fossil and liquefied natural gas transported by pipeline or shipment, as well as on the uranium and nuclear energy industry, and also to fully align the sanctions against Belarus with those against Russia;
8. Calls on the Commission and Ukraine to prepare to address the significant (mental) healthcare needs which are expected to arise after the war in regions that were formerly occupied, especially for those who were detained, tortured, raped or otherwise abused by the Russian occupying forces, including in Crimea; demands, in this regard, that Russia immediately release all political prisoners in the occupied territories of Ukraine;
11. Calls on the Council to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention by third parties and third countries and to adopt and strictly implement restrictive measures against all entities facilitating the circumvention of sanctions and providing the Russian military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment; calls, in this regard, on the Council to consider the introduction of secondary sanctions based on a step-by-step approach;
9. Reiterates its condemnation of the destruction of the Kakhovka dam in the Russian-occupied area of southern Ukraine, using a man-made disaster as a weapon of war; stresses that this atrocious act of aggression by Russia constitutes ecocide as it caused massive damage and destroyed ecosystems and the livelihoods of millions of Ukrainians living in the region; emphasises that Russia’s destruction of the dam was a clear attack on critical civilian infrastructure and thus amounts to a war crime; encourages the Prosecutor of the ICC to consider the case of the Kakhovka dam collapse for prosecution under Article 8;
12. Reiterates that the Russian Federation’s deliberate attacks on the civilian population of Ukraine, destruction of civilian infrastructure, use of sexual violence and rape as a weapon of war, deportation of thousands of Ukrainian citizens to the territory of the Russian Federation, forced transfer and adoption of Ukrainian children, and other serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law all constitute war crimes for which all perpetrators must be held accountable;
10. Is deeply concerned about the long-term environmental impact of the conflict and condemns all of Russia’s acts of ecocide against Ukraine’s flora and fauna and its poisoning of the atmosphere and water resources through its military actions; calls on the Member States and EU institutions to ensure targeted long-term assistance to mitigate the long-term ecological impact of the war as much as possible; further calls on the Commission and the Member States to do all they can to protect Ukraine from further acts of ecocide by Russia;
13. Expresses its full support for the ongoing investigation by the Prosecutor of the ICC into the situation in Ukraine based on alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide; urges Ukraine to ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC and its amendments and formally become a member of the ICC in order to support international efforts to establish accountability for serious international crimes; calls for the EU to make further diplomatic efforts to encourage the ratification of the Rome Statute and all its amendments globally;
11. Deplores Russia’s attempts to deny Ukraine and its people their ethnic, linguistic and historical identity by erasing signs of Ukrainian identity in occupied and annexed territories, banning the use of the Ukrainian language and symbols, and the repeated attempts by the Russian President and other officials to rewrite history;
14. Reiterates its call for the establishment of a special tribunal to investigate and prosecute the crime of aggression committed by the leadership of the Russian Federation against Ukraine; reiterates its call on the Commission, the Council and the EEAS to provide all necessary political, financial and practical support necessary for the establishment of a special tribunal; expresses its support for the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression in Ukraine, which will support the ongoing efforts of the Joint Investigation Team and be based in The Hague, as a first concrete step towards the establishment of the special tribunal;
12. Strongly condemns Russia’s eradication, destruction and looting of Ukraine’s cultural artefacts, such as churches, artworks, museums and universities; takes note of the damage, as verified by UNESCO, that has been caused to 341 sites since the start of the full-scale invasion, including 126 religious sites, 150 buildings of historical and/or artistic interest, 31 museums, 19 monuments, 14 libraries and one archive; reiterates that deliberate destruction and looting of Ukrainian cultural heritage sites may amount to war crimes;
15. Reiterates its firm conviction that the Russian Federation must pay for the massive damage caused in Ukraine; welcomes therefore the Council’s decision to set aside, as a first step, extraordinary revenues generated by assets and reserves of the Central Bank of Russia immobilised under EU sanctions, which will allow them to be used to make a financial contribution to the EU’s support for the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine through the Ukraine Facility; calls on the Commission and the Council to urgently take the work forward and propose legislation to enable the confiscation of immobilised state-owned Russian assets for the purpose of Ukraine’s reconstruction;
13. Welcomes the establishment of the Ukraine Facility while, at the same time, referring to the estimate in the latest Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment that Ukraine will need at least EUR 452.8 billion over the next decade for its recovery and reconstruction; stresses therefore, that the funds provided for under the Ukraine Facility will not be sufficient and calls on the EU and the Member States to commit to additional long-term financing for Ukraine, in particular given that the latest US aid package for Ukraine remains blocked in Congress; calls on the Commission to continue to mobilise international partners and funds for Ukraine’s reconstruction, as well as to continue cooperating closely with local self-governments and the central government of Ukraine, while insisting on ambitious democratic and institutional reforms in areas such as media freedom, the rule of law, decentralisation and the fight against corruption; welcomes the decisions of the G7 and the EU which pave the way towards using the profits generated by confiscated Russian assets for Ukraine’s reconstruction; reiterates its call to explore legal avenues for using the frozen assets of Russian individuals and the Russian Central Bank for Ukraine’s reconstruction, in accordance with international law;
16. Emphasises the need to support Ukraine in re-establishing the conditions that will allow its people to resume a safe and prosperous economic and social life and to recover from the profound consequences of the war on mental health, for internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their homes, and in particular for the country’s younger generation to develop personal, educational and entrepreneurial projects in their home country of Ukraine; welcomes therefore the EU’s commitment to providing, together with international partners and in close cooperation with the authorities of Ukraine, support to Ukraine’s economic and social recovery and reconstruction, in particular through the establishment of the EU’s Ukraine Facility and its EUR 50 billion package of economic and financial support for the years 2024-2027; encourages the Ukrainian authorities, together with international donors, to put to use the successes of the country’s 2014 decentralisation reform and to empower local authorities and communities in the reconstruction and recovery process, inter alia by giving them a prominent role in decision-making about reconstruction projects and by continuing their capacity-building with a view to strengthening public financial management and project management capacities; in addition, underlines the need to take into account the concerns, needs and expertise of internally displaced persons and refugees as their reintegration into local communities will be crucial for strengthening Ukraine’s societal and institutional resilience, and unity;
14. Calls on the Member States and the relevant EU institutions to increase and accelerate their military assistance to Ukraine as a matter of the utmost urgency, in particular the provision of weapons and ammunition in response to clearly identified needs; expresses concern that the target of one million rounds of ammunition will not be met as promised; calls on the Member States and the EEAS to present to Parliament information about the volume and value of past deliveries of military aid to Ukraine, including the audit conducted by the EEAS, and the amount of aid Member States are willing to commit during 2024;
17. Welcomes the European aspirations of the people of Ukraine and calls on Ukraine’s political leaders and authorities to vigorously pursue the EU-related reform agenda and the priorities set out in the Commission’s report of November 2023 in order for the Council to adopt the negotiation framework for accession negotiations as soon as possible;
15. Urges in particular the largest Member States with substantial defence industry capacity, such as France, Spain and Italy, to significantly and urgently increase military assistance to Ukraine; stresses that there is a need to link the amount and quality of military aid that a Member State delivers to Ukraine to the level of subsidies its defence companies receive under the European Defence Fund in order to strengthen solidarity and security both within the EU and for Ukraine;
18. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to significantly increase their measures aimed at countering the complex hybrid threat posed by the Russian Federation; calls in particular for efforts to enhance education and awareness-raising among European citizens, and for sufficient resources to be allocated to counteract disinformation, and to develop and implement countermeasures to mitigate the increased use of artificial intelligence technologies in disinformation, in particular with a view to protecting European democratic processes and societal cohesion ahead of the upcoming European elections;
16. Urges the governments of the Member States to immediately enter into dialogue with defence companies in order to guarantee that the production and delivery of, in particular, ammunition, shells and missiles for Ukraine are prioritised over orders from other third countries; stresses the need to make the European Peace Facility (EPF) a tool that focuses more on incentivising the delivery and joint procurement of state-of-the-art military technology for Ukraine, and on medium-term predictability when it comes to a sufficiently high budget for deliveries to Ukraine; supports, in this respect, the proposal by the VP/HR for the creation of a EUR 20 billion Ukraine assistance fund within the EPF over four years;
19. Urges the Russian people to protest against the war crimes being perpetrated in the name of the Russian Federation by the country’s leadership and its proxies and thereby to contribute to ending Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to increase support to civil society, anti-war opposition and independent media in and from Russia and to continue to provide protection and temporary shelter to those Russians who are being prosecuted due to their opposition to the regime;
17. Reiterates its support for the Member States’ decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine, in accordance with Article 49 TEU and as the start of a merit-based process; calls on the Member States to muster the political will to re-energise the enlargement process and to deliver on their promises with concrete positive steps in the accession processes of countries that seek to join the Union and deserve to be part of the European family; underlines the crucial need for countries that wish to accede to the EU to implement the necessary reforms, in particular regarding the rule of law, democracy, fundamental freedoms and human rights;
20. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the President, Government and Parliament of Ukraine.
18. Welcomes the adoption of the 13th package of EU sanctions on Russia, which will target additional individuals as well as entities from Russia, China and other countries deemed to be helping Moscow’s war effort; calls on all partners, in particular EU candidate countries and potential candidates, to align with the sanctions packages; asks the Commission and the Member States to consider measures against third countries that try to help Russia and Belarus to circumvent the sanctions imposed;
19. Reiterates its call for further restrictions on imports of goods from Russia, including raw materials, such as metals, and agricultural and fishery products; stresses the need for an immediate and full embargo on imports of fossil fuels and uranium from Russia, for the price cap on Russian petroleum products to be further decreased in coordination with G7 partners in order to stop the financing of Putin’s war with EU money; calls, in addition, for punitive measures to be imposed against Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’, which transports oil without insurance on precarious vessels through EU and international waters, and for sanctions against companies from China and other countries helping Russia to circumvent sanctions; calls to expand the current military and dual-use licensing regime to include a much larger group of war-relevant goods, including digital components;
20. Calls for sanctions on Russia’s nuclear sector, including individual sanctions against Rosatom’s leadership, in order to reduce and phase out Russia’s presence in Europe’s nuclear energy sector, to prevent technology transfers to Rosatom, to prevent vessels from Atomflot, a Rosatom subsidiary, from entering EU ports and to increase international pressure to end the occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and more broadly ensure the safety of conflict-affected nuclear power plants;
21. Expresses its deep concern regarding ongoing trade in sanctioned war-critical goods between EU countries and Russia; deplores the serious lack of compliance culture regarding EU sanctions against Russia; condemns the practice in which sanctioned goods from the EU are sold to companies or individuals from third countries, while the goods are still in the EU, and then shipped directly to Russia; condemns companies, including those in the EU, that deliberately evade sanctions, yielding massive profits, and thereby undermine the EU’s efforts to support Ukraine; insists that circumventing an EU restrictive measure, including by transferring goods to a destination where their import, export, sale, purchase, transfer, transit or transport are restricted, should be criminalised at EU level; stresses that it is critical for enforcement that the EU quickly criminalises direct sanctions violations, including when committed with serious negligence, as well as indirect sanctions violations through the circumvention of EU restrictive measures;
22. Calls for continued EU-wide solidarity with Ukraine, including by supporting its ability to trade its agricultural products as a vital way to boost its resources; deeply regrets the repeated border blockades by farmers and truckers along the Polish-Ukrainian border and other sections of the EU-Ukrainian border, causing serious damage to Ukraine’s economy at a critical time in its struggle against Russia as well as complicating or even impeding border crossings for civilians; urges the Commission and Member States to resolve such disputes and animosity while ensuring that Ukraine is able to make full use of Solidarity Lanes; calls on the Commission to consider launching infringement procedures against those Member States that are still maintaining illegal import bans against Ukrainian agricultural products; calls for investigations into the alleged involvement of the Russian Government and their proxies in creating obstacles for the export of goods from Ukraine;
23. Highlights the excellent work of Ukrainian diplomats and individual members of the Verkhovna Rada in consolidating the support of democratic countries for Ukraine; stresses that in the face of Russian hybrid warfare, it is essential to further enhance relations with international partners, including by removing obstacles for representatives of the Ukrainian Government and the opposition to travel abroad for such purposes;
24. Urges the EU and the Member States to combat disinformation and other forms of hybrid warfare employed by Russia, its allies and sympathisers in the EU, its neighbourhood, and the Global South, by strengthening the resilience of local communities, building fact-based narratives, strengthening digital and democratic infrastructure, and holding online platforms accountable for spreading harmful content;
25. Reiterates that it is in the vital interest of the EU and its Member States to ensure Ukraine’s victory as, according to Russia’s leadership, its allies and EU military intelligence, Russia might plan to invade other EU candidate countries and Member States in the event of military success in Ukraine;
26. Urges Member States to urgently shift towards European cooperation as a rule for the armed forces and industry, in order to increase the efficiency of European military production and defence spending, guarantee interoperability, standardisation and better transfer of expertise, with the aim of building the military capabilities that would enable the EU to achieve effective defence readiness and reliable aid, and solidarity with like-minded partners, while remaining ready to act autonomously in deterring external threats;
27. Reiterates its call for the establishment of a special tribunal to investigate and prosecute the crime of aggression committed by the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation and Belarus against Ukraine; urges the EU and its Member States to provide political and financial support for the establishment of such a tribunal, and ensure the coordination and complementarity of all ongoing efforts to hold to account the perpetrators of internationally recognised crimes against Ukraine and its people; believes that the EU must show leadership in this fight against impunity and for peace;
28. Calls on the UN General Assembly to keep Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine on its agenda and calls on the EU’s partners around the world to continue to provide political and humanitarian support for Ukraine as it defends its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; calls on the EEAS and EU Member States to increase their engagement with world leaders from other regions with regard to support for Ukraine and to strengthen international pressure on the Russian regime;
29. Expresses its utmost appreciation for the continued and tireless work of the local staff of the Delegation of the EU to Ukraine in circumstances that remain very difficult for them and their relatives; urges the EEAS and the Commission to adopt contingency plans and interim solutions for the local staff of the EU Delegation, including teleworking and flexible working arrangements and temporary relocation solutions, which are tailored to meeting the actual needs and challenges of the staff; stresses, in addition, the importance of taking adequate care of the mental health of the EU Delegation’s staff;
30. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and the President, Government and the Parliament of the Russian Federation.