What changed

B90127/2024

B90124/2024

European Parliament resolution on Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its resolution of 13 July 2023 on Recommendations for reform of the European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia,

– having regard to its resolution of 1 Juneprevious 2023resolutions on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, includingand disinformation,corruption,

– having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on EU-Russia relations, in particular its resolution of 231 NovemberJune 20222023 on recognisingforeign theinterference Russianin Federationall asdemocratic aprocesses statein sponsorthe ofEuropean terrorism,Union, including disinformation,

– having regard to its resolution of 113 MarchJuly 20222023 on therecommendations Russianfor aggressionreform againstof Ukraine,European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption,

– having regard to its Rulesdecision of Procedure13 andSeptember the2023 Codeon ofamendments Conductto forParliament’s MembersRules of theProcedure Europeanwith Parliament,a view to strengthening integrity, independence and accountability,

– having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2829 of 12 December 2023 on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union and enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the elections to the European Parliament,

– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas there is evidence of Russian interference and manipulation in many Western liberal democracies, as well as of its practical support for extremist forces and radical-minded entities to promote the destabilisation of the Union;

A. whereas reports by independent media outlets on 29 January 2024 presented concrete evidence asserting that MEP Tatjana Ždanoka may have acted as an informant for the Fifth Service of the Russian Federation’s Federal Security Service (FSB) from at least 2004 to 2017; whereas the case has been referred to the European Parliament’s Advisory Committee on the Conduct of Members for investigation; whereas the Latvian security services have also announced their own investigation;

B. whereas Russia seeks to establish contacts with parties, personalities and movements in order to rely on actors within the Union’s institutions to legitimise Russian positions and proxy governments and to press for the easing of sanctions and mitigate the consequences of international isolation;

B. whereas the Russian Federation is known to use an array of different methods of interference, as part of a larger strategy to harm, confuse, frighten, weaken and divide the EU’s Member States and to attack their democratic functioning, as well as that of the EU institutions; whereas subverting support for Ukraine within the EU has become another explicit goal of the Russian Federation’s interference in EU countries’ democratic spaces;

C. whereas thorough investigative work conducted by Russian, Latvian, Estonian and Swedish media outlets published on 29 January 2024 reported that a Latvian non-attached Member of the European Parliament could have provided far-ranging assistance to Russian intelligence services from at least 2004 to 2017;

C. whereas journalists and experts have continued to reveal Russia’s funding of political activities and connections to politicians in the EU before and after 24 February 2022, which puts at risk the integrity of the democratic functioning of the EU Member States and institutions and necessitates a thorough investigation to hold those complicit accountable;

D. whereas said assistance was described as including political advocacy on behalf of the Russian Federation, through the organisation of events, as well as the provision of information on the inner workings of Parliament; whereas the investigative report suggests that the MEP concerned at least once requested payment from her counterparts to cover expenses incurred in relation to services rendered;

D. whereas there is concrete evidence that the EU’s polity, media and electoral processes are being targeted and interfered with through disinformation campaigns, corruption schemes and other tactics aimed at undermining democratic ideals and fundamental rights; whereas the 2024 European elections are likely to be a special target for disinformation campaigns at local, regional and EU level;

E. whereas these allegations rely, among other things on what are described as leaked email conversations between the Member concerned and two case-handlers at the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) Fifth Service, dating from 3 October 2005 and onwards;

E. whereas foreign interference, information manipulation and disinformation gravely undermine and threaten the fundamental freedoms of expression and information, as laid down in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights; whereas they also undermine democratic processes in the EU and its Member States, including the holding of free and fair elections;

F. whereas the Member concerned repeatedly expressed views which can be considered as pro-Russian, including opposing the existence of Latvia as a sovereign country and the refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; whereas the MEP is further known to engage in highly questionable political conduct, among other things through the participation in a referendum observation visit in Russian-occupied Crimea in 2014 and a visit to Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in 2016; whereas the MEP deliberately gave the impression that these trips were made on behalf of the European Parliament or the EU;

F. whereas the European Parliament’s response to foreign interference has become more vigilant, first with the Special Committee for foreign interference in all democratic processes in the EU and later following the 2022 Qatargate and Moroccogate scandals; whereas Parliament’s Rules of Procedure were amended on 13 September 2023 to strengthen integrity, independence and accountability in Parliament; whereas, however, more robust measures have yet to be taken to ensure effective protection against undue external influence;

G. whereas the MEP concerned has close relations with members of the Catalan pro-independence party ERC, including its president;

1. Condemns all attempted Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union; insists that the Russian authorities and any individual or entity acting on its behalf must end these practices; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Council to take appropriate measures against Russian individuals and should the allegations of interference be confirmed in order to safeguard the security of our Union and its democratic processes;

H. whereas representatives of a group of Catalan secessionists in Spain who maintained relations with personalities close to the Kremlin – including the MEP concerned –are demanding that the Spanish prime minister, Pedro Sánchez, grant them an amnesty from all responsibility for their alleged crimes;

2. Expresses deep concern over reports that MEP Tatjana Ždanoka may have acted as an informant for the FSB’s Fifth Service while also serving as a Member of the European Parliament; stresses that it is imperative that the European Parliament, as well as the Latvian authorities, investigate this matter thoroughly in order to determine, without delay, the appropriate sanctions and criminal proceedings;

I. whereas recent inquiries suggest that a sitting Catalan MEP had a close personal relationship with Russia and engaged in actions aimed at building political and economic influence to destabilise democracy in the European Union;

3. Stresses that an FSB informant having access to benefits and information as a Member of the European Parliament would be a severe threat to our Union’s security and democracy; calls for an immediate investigation into these matters, including any other potential cases of Russian or other foreign interference or other kinds of malicious interference in the work of the European Parliament;

J. whereas the MEP concerned is not the only Member of the European Parliament to have engaged in activities including taking part in fake electoral observation missions in various countries and fostering confusion with official European Parliament missions; whereas several MEPs were sanctioned for this breach under the Democracy Support and Election Coordination group procedure; whereas these visits took place systematically in Russia and countries allied to Russia;

4. Remains steadfast in its support for efforts to improve and enforce the rules that protect the integrity of this institution as a pillar of European democracy;

K. whereas the MEP concerned was excluded from her political group and now sits as a non-affiliated member; whereas the Member concerned gathered support from some other MEPs whose public positions on international issues are similar to hers; whereas, for instance, on several occasions, other MEPs travelled to Lithuania as did the MEP concerned to demonstrate in favour of Algirdas Paleckis, a former diplomat and politician who was convicted of spying for Russia;

5. Reiterates its concerns about Russia’s significant funding of and close connections with political parties and politicians in a number of countries throughout Europe, as it attempts to further interfere and gain leverage in domestic- and EU-level processes;

L. whereas in the wake of the revelations the President of the European Parliament immediately announced the launch of an internal investigation, including a referral to the Advisory Committee on the Code of Conduct; whereas the Latvian security service announced it will investigate the allegations;

6. Expresses particular concern about recent reports that the Russian authorities are providing specific narratives to far-right political parties and actors in different EU countries, most notably in Germany and France, aimed at subverting public support for Ukraine, following Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022;

M. whereas in 2016, Russia’s ruling party, Edinaia Rossiia (United Russia), signed a cooperation agreement with the Austrian far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ), calling for increased cooperation between the two parties and stronger political and economic ties between Vienna and Moscow; whereas this agreement was signed in the presence of an MEP from the FPÖ, who, since then, has repeatedly called for easing EU sanctions against Russia and disseminated pro-Kremlin disinformation;

7. Stresses that, in this year of major elections, including the European Parliament elections in June, more effective responses are needed at both national and European level to fight Russian and other foreign interference in electoral processes, be it in the form of cyberattacks, the use of bots on social media, widespread disinformation or the use of agents of influence; calls for the Member States and the European institutions to implement resilience strategies for the elections;

N. whereas for a number of years, some MEPs have recruited and employed Russian nationals as interns, accredited parliamentary assistants (APAs) and group advisors and have not stopped doing so even after the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

8. Underlines the need to strengthen permanent monitoring efforts and enhance their implementation well ahead of elections, referendums and other important political processes across Europe;

O. whereas Parliament’s Special Committee on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the EU, including disinformation (INGE) has exposed in detail the Russian-led efforts and operations to infiltrate, influence and interfere with European democracies and the European institutions;

9. Urges the EU institutions and the Member States to make significant and lasting investments in strengthening our democratic resilience and the rule of law, including through measures directed at enhancing the EU’s counter-intelligence capabilities; calls for the Commission to improve the quality of the Defence of Democracy package, specifically the proposal of 12 December 2023 for a directive establishing harmonised requirements in the internal market on transparency of interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937, to effectively address internal threats of undue influence and to move away from a singular and ineffective focus on actors receiving foreign funding;

P. whereas some political groups unsuccessfully tried to deny the extension of the ING2 special committee mandate to address all forms of corruption and foreign interference in the European Parliament, advocating instead for an investigation committee focusing only on Qatargate;

10. Stresses that, beyond the EU’s own democratic spaces, there is an urgent need for it and its Member States to provide enhanced support to Eastern Partnership and candidate countries, as well as to partner countries in the Global South, in particular through cooperation on building state and societal resilience to disinformation and Russian covert influence and state propaganda, in order to counter any strategic weakening or fragmentation of their societies and institutions;

Q. whereas the Russian Federation has long been engaged in a hybrid war against the EU and its Member States, deploying a wide array of different methods of interference, embedded within a larger strategy to undermine the proper functioning of Europe’s democratic processes; whereas these methods include but are not limited to cyberattacks, including on the European Parliament, elite capture of European decision-makers, election meddling including through the use of foreign information manipulation and interference; whereas this hybrid war was the precursor of and continues to support Russia’s illegal war of aggression in Ukraine;

11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the parliaments of the Member States and the Russian authorities.

R. whereas Russia has provided practical support for extremist forces and radical-minded entities to destabilise the EU and its Member States; whereas it has established contacts with parties, personalities and movements in order to rely on actors within the Union’s institutions to legitimise Russian positions, support independence movements and proxy governments and to press for the easing of sanctions and mitigate the consequences of international isolation;

S. whereas following the Qatargate revelations, in September 2023 Parliament updated and significantly strengthened its internal integrity framework, among other things through an in-depth revision of its Rules of Procedure, the Code of Conduct for MEPs and the relevant Bureau Decisions;

1. Is appalled by and expresses serious concern about the allegations of spying involving a non-attached member of Parliament; denounces, in the strongest possible terms, Russia’s alleged attempts to influence Members, which constitute serious foreign interference in the EU’s democratic processes;

2. Stresses that the MEP concerned has been excluded from her political group for reasons related to her positions on Russia and Ukraine and is now unaffiliated; underlines that her opinions do not represent the opinion of the vast majority of the Members of the European Parliament, which overwhelmingly condemns Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, its use of hybrid warfare tactics against European democracy and other aggressive and anti-democratic policy choices in recent years; notes nevertheless that a small number of MEPs have participated in actions jointly with the MEP concerned, expressing similar viewpoints and siding overtly with Russia;

3. Commits to provide its full support to and cooperation with the Latvian authorities in their investigation into the conduct of the MEP concerned; calls on the competent Belgian authorities to investigate whether the Member concerned is liable for prosecution under Belgian criminal law and remains ready to provide its full support and cooperation therefor;

4. Welcomes the referral of the Member concerned to the Advisory Committee on the Code of Conduct; commits to enforce its applicable internal sanction framework in full; notes that the alleged facts pre-date the recent adoption of the reform of Parliament’s integrity framework; considers that rules by themselves would not have prevented the MEP’s alleged reprehensible conduct; remains nevertheless ready to further evaluate and fine-tune the functioning and sanctioning of Parliament’s integrity framework, which was reinforced in the wake of Qatargate;

5. Considers that the allegations regarding the MEP concerned underline the need for an enhanced security culture within the European Parliament; reiterates, therefore, its call for the full implementation of the recommendations contained in its resolution of 13 July 2023 on recommendations for reform of European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption, including mandatory security training for MEPs and staffers, appropriate security clearance and reinforced screening of staffers, in particular those attending in camera meetings;

6. Expresses deep concern over the links the MEP concerned may have entertained with other MEPs and firmly denounces any internal coordinated attempts to advance the Kremlin’s political agenda within the Parliament; instructs its services to investigate whether the conduct of these MEPs constitutes sanctionable behaviour under its Code of Conduct;

7. Calls for the cases of the Catalan MEPs concerned to be referred to the Advisory Committee on the Code of Conduct; calls on Spain to effectively investigate the connections of the MEPs associated with the Kremlin and the attempts at destabilisation and interference by Russia in the European Union and its Member States; also calls for the full implementation of relevant legislation regarding illegal relations with governments of third countries;

8. Recalls that foreign interference is a systemic threat that must be countered vigorously; recalls further that, while Russia remains the main origin of foreign interference and disinformation in the European Union, other countries have also conducted such campaigns; underlines that the EU’s response to these threats can only be effective if it is based on a transversal, holistic and long term policy approach jointly carried out by both the EU and its Member States; remains determined to follow through in its efforts to combat foreign interference in the EU in the years to come, among other things through a dedicated Parliamentary body; stresses that vigilance and protection against foreign interference are particularly necessary in the run-up to the European elections this year;

9. Firmly denounces the Russian Federation’s continued attempts to undermine the functioning of European democratic processes and stresses that these tactics must be met with consequences; reiterates its call on the Member States to further develop and fine-tune the sanction packages adopted against the Russian Federation and to close loopholes in the enforcement of the restrictive measures currently in force;

10. Stresses the seriousness of Russia’s connections with parties and politicians in the Union and its extensive interference in secessionist movements in European territories, such as in Catalonia;

11. States that the close and regular contacts between Russian officials and representatives of a group of Catalan secessionists in Spain are part of Russia’s broader strategy to seize any and every opportunity to manipulate political practice in Europe in order to promote its destabilisation;

12. Expresses the commitment of EU institutions and Member States to conduct thorough investigations into the connections between European politicians and the Kremlin, as well as into Russia’s efforts to disrupt, influence and intervene in the affairs of the European Union and its Member States;

13. Stresses that the Russian Federation’s hybrid tactics do not in the least advance Russia’s political agenda within the EU, but in contrast generate further momentum for the EU’s unwavering support to Ukraine in its defence against the illegal occupier;

14. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.