What changed

B100483/2026

European Parliament resolution on the escalation of Russian strikes in the EU, particularly on Black Sea shipping, threatening human life, regional stability and food security

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, in particular Article 2(3) on the peaceful settlement of international disputes and Article 2(4) on the prohibition of the threat or use of force,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia and Ukraine, notably those of 9 October 2025 on a united response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure, of 18 June 2026 on Russia’s unacceptable provocative actions and drone incursions into Romania, the Baltic states and Finland, and of 16 September 2026 on hybrid warfare and the protection of the EU’s territorial integrity and critical security and defence infrastructure,

– having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in particular Articles 2 and 17 thereof concerning sovereignty over the territorial sea and the right of innocent passage and Article 58(1) thereof concerning freedom of navigation in the exclusive economic zone,

– having regard to the UN Charter and the fundamental principles of international law,

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 28 May 2025 entitled ‘The European Union’s strategic approach to the Black Sea region’ (JOIN(2025)0135),

– having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)of 10 December 1982,

– having regard to the Joint Report from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 July 2026 on the implementation of the EU strategic approach to the Black Sea region (JOIN(2026)0015),

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 24(3) and 42(7) thereof, and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Article 222 thereof,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949, in particular Articles 4 and 5 thereof,

A. whereas the Black Sea region and south-eastern Europe are of strategic importance for the economic, transport, digital and energy connectivity between Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia; whereas the Black Sea forms part of the EU’s external maritime border, and the region’s stability and resilience are essential to European security;

– having regard to the statement by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen of 13 October 2026 on the attacks against merchant vessels in the Black Sea,

B. whereas all attacks and maritime incidents in the Black Sea, including those involving commercial vessels in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone and Romania’s territorial waters, endanger human lives, threaten civilian navigation and critical infrastructure, disrupt international trade and transport connectivity and pose serious environmental risks; whereas the attacks by both parties against maritime and energy-related targets, including naval vessels, port facilities, oil terminals and refineries, have serious consequences for regional stability;

– having regard to the statement by European Council President António Costa of 13 October 2026 that the European Council was to discuss the intensification of Russia’s hybrid campaigns at its summit on 15 and 16 October 2026,

C. whereas disruptions to energy supplies and market volatility undermine the resilience of the EU and its Member States, increase costs for households and businesses, weaken EU industrial competitiveness and discourage private investment;

– having regard to the statement by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte of 13 October 2026 on the attacks against commercial shipping in the Black Sea,

D. whereas diplomatic engagement and de-escalation are essential to achieving a negotiated settlement of the conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine and lasting stability in the Black Sea region; whereas regional integration and restoration of mutually beneficial economic relations, transport connectivity and energy cooperation can contribute to confidence-building and reconciliation in the Black Sea region;

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 28 May 2025 entitled ‘The European Union’s strategic approach to the Black Sea region’ (JOIN(2025)0135) and to the first joint implementation report thereon of July 2026,

1. Expresses serious concern over the escalation of hostilities in the Black Sea and the growing risks to human life, civilian shipping and regional stability;

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 19 June 2026 and of 15 to 16 October 2026,

2. Stresses that all attacks in the Black Sea must be assessed consistently and impartially in accordance with applicable international law, irrespective of the party responsible; rejects double standards and selective condemnation of attacks;

– having regard to Article 1 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation,

3. Urges all parties to exercise restraint, refrain from actions that endanger security, including for international shipping, and take immediate steps to prevent further escalation or the spread of the conflict to other countries in the region;

– having regard to the revised EU Maritime Security Strategy,

4. Takes note of the response to the maritime incidents in the Black Sea, including the deployment of specially trained Bulgarian personnel to inspect an affected vessel under difficult conditions;

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, adopted by the Council on 21 March 2022,

5. Stresses that continued military attacks in the Black Sea undermine prospects for a peaceful settlement of the conflict; supports diplomatic initiatives aimed at achieving lasting peace in Ukraine and promoting reconciliation, mutual trust and the restoration of constructive political and economic relations in the region;

– having regard to the joint communications from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120) and of 16 October 2025 entitled ‘Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0027),

6. Takes note of diplomatic contacts between the United States and Russia, including on energy-related issues; calls for the EU to pursue a pragmatic foreign policy guided by the strategic interests of its Member States and a willingness to engage in dialogue with all relevant parties;

– having regard to the Commission communication of 18 February 2026 on the EU’s eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine – Strong regions for a safe Europe (COM(2026)0082),

7. Reaffirms the sovereign responsibility of the Member States for national defence; stresses that security challenges in the Black Sea must not be used to justify the further centralisation of EU defence policy, compulsory military integration or the transfer of national control over defence expenditure and procurement;

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 March 2026 on advancing the European Union’s capacity to counter hybrid threats,

8. Invites the Commission to support and strengthen current regional cooperation frameworks in the Black Sea, promoting mutual understanding, dialogue and stability through a bottom-up approach based on the priorities of the countries concerned;

– having regard to Rule 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

9. Calls for the EU to implement its Strategic Approach to the Black Sea through specific initiatives promoting cross-regional security, connectivity and industrial cooperation; stresses that regional economic cooperation and connectivity do not require deeper integration into the EU; invites the Commission to assess regional needs and engage with economic and business stakeholders and investors to leverage private investment and expertise for projects strengthening interconnected industries, trade and economic resilience; stresses the importance of strengthening connectivity between Black Sea and Danube ports and the trans-European transport network;

A. whereas Russia has been waging an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022, in flagrant violation of the UN Charter and international law; whereas this war is a direct threat to European security and stability and is now spilling over into the Black Sea, next to the maritime borders of two countries that are EU Member States and NATO members; whereas Russia’s continued attacks on civilians and critical infrastructure demonstrate a persistent disregard for a peaceful resolution; whereas the Member States must strengthen their collective defence, resilience and support for Ukraine while maintaining a united response to Russian aggression;

10. Calls for the strategic use of all available instruments and financing under the current and the next EU Multiannual Financial Framework in order to create logistic gateways via the Black Sea and Central Asia that will enable European companies to compete better internationally and increase the trade flows throughout the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route;

B. whereas Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine has been deliberately expanded to threaten civilian maritime traffic, port infrastructure and commercial shipping in the Black Sea, endangering seafarers of many nationalities, including a wave of drone attacks on Ukrainian ports, the Danube corridor and grain-export facilities, thereby undermining security and economic stability across the wider Black Sea region and beyond, with far-reaching consequences for global food security, particularly in the Global South;

11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the national parliaments of the Member States.

C. whereas Russian attacks on merchant shipping in the Black Sea have intensified sharply since mid-2026 and have spread from Ukrainian waters to the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and territorial waters of the EU Member States and NATO members Romania and Bulgaria;

D. whereas recent drone attacks against merchant vessels in the Black Sea, including in and near Bulgarian and Romanian territorial waters, have resulted in vessels being struck or sunk, with more than 20 civilian crew members killed or missing, demonstrating the growing danger to human life and international maritime navigation posed by the escalation of Russian strikes; whereas seafarers are civilians and workers who keep supply chains running and are entitled to protection under international law; whereas under the UNCLOS and international humanitarian law, attacks on civilian vessels, especially in the context of an armed conflict, cannot be excused as accidents or error; whereas such attacks also pose a serious threat to the security and sovereignty of EU Member States and, when carried out within their territorial waters, constitute a violation of their territorial sovereignty;

E. whereas on the night of 20-21 July 2026 the Liberia-flagged liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) tanker Gas Lisbon, carrying 3 790 tonnes of propane to the Ukrainian port of Reni, was struck about 20 nautical miles off the Romanian coast, injuring three crew members, an attack that Romanian President Nicușor Dan described as being part of the Russian Federation’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas on 17 September 2026 the captain of a Tanzania-flagged vessel bound for a Ukrainian port was killed and three crew members were wounded;

F. whereas in August 2026 Romania destroyed two drones drifting in its EEZ near the Neptun Deep natural gas project and an explosive naval drone approaching the project’s main production platform, which Romanian President Nicușor Dan attributed to Russia and which Ukraine confirmed was not its own; whereas Neptun Deep, one of the largest new natural gas discoveries in the EU, is due to start production in 2027 and is expected to make Romania the EU’s largest gas producer;

G. whereas on 5 October 2026 the merchant vessel Royad Mammadov, carrying Ukrainian grain from Izmail (Ukraine) to Italy, caught fire and sank in the Black Sea outside Romania’s territorial waters, in Romania’s EEZ; whereas, according to the Romanian maritime authorities, the vessel was hit by several sea and aerial drones; whereas the incident killed two crew members, injured others and prompted a major search-and-rescue operation, demonstrating the lethal consequences of the growing threat to civilian shipping; whereas all these attacks point to a clear pattern of intensified aggression by Russia in the Black Sea;

H. whereas on 6 October 2026, drone attacks in Bulgaria’s EEZ, the first attack on shipping there, sank the Togo-flagged cargo vessel Alfa Watan, leaving its 10 crew members missing, and set ablaze the Palau-flagged cargo ship Able, en route from Galați (Romania) to Istanbul, requiring Bulgarian authorities to evacuate its 18 crew members, two of them injured;

I. whereas on 13 October 2026 two further merchant ships were attacked in Bulgaria’s EEZ, close to its territorial waters: the Guinea-Bissau-flagged general cargo ship HS Dignity, bound for Brăila (Romania), which sank approximately 17 nautical miles east of Krapets, with several seafarers remaining missing and the Maltese-flagged, Ukrainian-owned Chelsea 3, bound for Giurgiulești (Republic of Moldova), which was struck by an aerial drone 18 nautical miles east of Byala, with seven Ukrainian and eight Azerbaijani nationals on board, who were rescued and brought to the Bulgarian port of Varna where several received medical treatment; whereas these acts can only be understood as deliberate acts of armed intimidation directed at the EU;

J. whereas on 14 and 15 October 2026, two chemical tankers were targeted near the mouth of the Danube at Sulina (Romania): the Comoros-flagged merchant ship Yara J, set ablaze deep inside Romania’s territorial waters in a suspected drone attack, and the San Marino-flagged chemical tanker Wine Trader, sailing from Tunisia to Romania, struck by aerial drones 13 nautical miles east of Sulina; whereas several seafarers remain missing following search operations by the Romanian authorities; whereas the Romanian Defence Minister described the attack on the tankers as ‘of significant gravity’; whereas all these attacks point to a clear pattern of intensified attacks by Russia in the Black Sea;

K. whereas on 15 October 2026, the Romanian Ministry of National Defence detected a group of aerial targets near Snake Island and a drone that had entered Romanian airspace above territorial waters south-east of Sulina, prompting a Romanian RO-Alert and the scrambling of Romanian F-16s and Spanish F-18s on NATO air-policing duty; whereas on the evening of 17 October 2026, Romanian F-16 fighter aircraft reportedly shot down two jet-powered Geran-type attack drones, the Russian-produced variant of the Iranian-designed Shahed, over the Black Sea near Sulina, the first about two minutes after it entered Romanian airspace; whereas according to Romanian media citing the Ministry of National Defence, Romania has recorded 54 drone intrusions into its air and sea space since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, 35 of them in 2026;

L. whereas Russia’s drone and missile attacks in the Black Sea region have involved violations of the Republic of Moldova’s airspace and pose serious threats to regional security, civilian populations and critical infrastructure; whereas these developments underline the need to strengthen cooperation with Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova on airspace security, surveillance and counter-drone capabilities;

M. whereas under UNCLOS, coastal states hold sovereign rights in their EEZs and all states enjoy freedom of navigation, and merchant vessels and their crews are considered civilian objects and cannot be lawful targets;

N. whereas the extension of military strikes into the territorial waters and EEZs of EU Member States and NATO members dangerously escalates regional tensions, directly threatens European maritime security and increases collision and environmental risks;

O. whereas following the Russian strikes, the EU is providing satellite imagery to Bulgaria and Romania following their requests for technical assistance from the EU, NATO and the European Maritime Safety Agency;

P. whereas the Black Sea is one of the world’s most important shipping corridors for trade, energy and food, connecting Europe with the Caucasus, Central Asia and global markets, and the systematic disruption of maritime traffic threatens the economic security of the region and the livelihoods of millions of people, many in the Global South;

Q. whereas Ukraine is a major global exporter of agricultural products, particularly of grains, and the disruption of its grain exports at the hands of Russia threatens food availability and affordability, especially in vulnerable countries in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, with the heaviest impact on low-income households and on import-dependent countries; whereas Russia’s deliberate bombardment of Ukrainian Danube ports and of its Black Sea port terminals aims to choke the corridor that carries over 90 % of Ukraine’s agricultural exports;

R. whereas Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has stated that the Black Sea has become another front of escalation of Russia’s war in Ukraine, and has called the attacks unacceptable and called for those responsible to be held to account; whereas NATO Secretary General Mark Ruttehas stated that the alliance had strengthened its posture along the eastern flank and would adjust its deterrence and defence posture as needed;

S. whereas the European Council, in its conclusions of 16 October 2026, reaffirmed the strategic importance of security, stability and freedom of navigation in the Black Sea; whereas it declared that attacks against civilian shipping, including Member State-flagged vessels, such as the recent attacks in Bulgaria’s and Romania’s EEZs, are unacceptable and constitute a serious violation of international and maritime law, including UNCLOS; whereas it called for the immediate restoration of safe passage for all civilian shipping in the Black Sea, and noted that Russia is once again weaponising food and undermining global food security;

T. whereas the EU’s strategic approach to the Black Sea region, as set out in the joint communication of 28 May 2025, identifies a Black Sea maritime security hub as a flagship initiative to strengthen maritime situational awareness, protect critical infrastructure and improve regional resilience; whereas Bulgaria and Romania have developed a joint concept for the establishment of the hub as a civilian-led, cooperative structure, comprising complementary centres in Constanța and Varna, with Constanța focusing on maritime situational awareness and the protection of critical maritime infrastructure and Varna focusing on resilience against hybrid and cyber threats, civilian crisis management, capacity building and environmental security; whereas the timely operationalisation of this initiative requires adequate and dedicated EU financial support;

U. whereas Romania and Bulgaria, both EU Member States and NATO members, face direct security risks from incidents in the Black Sea, including attacks on shipping, drone incursions, airspace violations and debris falling on their territory; whereas these attacks are part of a broader pattern of Russian hybrid warfare against the EU, including drone incursions into Romania, the Baltic states, Finland and Poland and the territory of Moldova; whereas cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns targeting democratic institutions and acts of sabotage, such as the arson attacks on Starlink infrastructure in Poland and Bulgaria, which the Polish authorities attribute to Russian intelligence services, form part of a broader security challenge facing the EU;

V. whereas the security of the Black Sea, which is bordered by two Member States, Bulgaria and Romania, and EU candidate countries and the countries that constitute NATO’s eastern flank, is inseparable from the security of the EU as a whole and requires close coordination, solidarity, strong deterrence and a robust collective response by Member States, NATO allies and regional partners;

W. whereas protection against these threats is a European public good and must be financed through genuine reinforcement of the EU budget, rather than the redeployment of funds for cohesion, social, research and other policies, on which the resilience of citizens and regions equally depends;

1. Strongly condemns the latest deadly attacks against civilian merchant vessels in the western Black Sea, off the coast of Bulgaria and Romania, as well as repeated violations of Romanian airspace which have killed and endangered seafarers, destroyed civilian ships and gravely threatened freedom of navigation, maritime safety and regional stability; stresses that deliberate attacks on civilian vessels and crews violate international law and can never be justified; calls for a full investigation into the recent strikes in the territorial waters of the Member States and within their EEZs, for evidence to be preserved and for those responsible to be held to account; rejects any attempt to deflect responsibility through insinuations of third-party involvement that are not backed by evidence;

2. Deplores the deaths and disappearances of crew members as a direct result of these attacks; expresses its deepest condolences to the families of the seafarers killed, its solidarity with the families of those who are missing and with the injured and surviving crews, and its full solidarity with Bulgaria, Romania and all Black Sea states exposed to Russian aggression; commends the Romanian and Bulgarian maritime rescue services, border police and passing merchant vessels for their swift response; calls for continued efforts to locate the missing crew members, for EU search-and-rescue and technical support, assistance to survivors and support for victims’ families, regardless of vessel flag or crew nationality;

3. Denounces Russia’s continued attacks on Ukrainian Danube ports and the resulting risks to the security, environmental integrity and economic stability of the wider Danube Delta region; calls for enhanced support for Romania in strengthening airspace surveillance, early-warning systems and civil protection in the Danube Delta, as well as environmental monitoring and measures to safeguard its unique biodiversity and local communities against the spillover effects of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

4. Declares that Russia bears full responsibility for destabilising security, trade, the economy and tourism in the Black Sea region due to its war of aggression against Ukraine, and holds Russia responsible for attacking civilian vessels and for its escalation of its war of aggression into the western Black Sea; stresses that these attacks fit a clear pattern of Russian escalation in the context of its war of aggression against Ukraine in which Russia has systematically targeted civilian shipping; stresses that Russia remains the most significant threat to Euro-Atlantic peace and security; demands that Russia immediately cease all attacks on merchant vessels and civilian port infrastructure, respect freedom of navigation and cease its weaponisation of global food supplies; reiterates its unwavering solidarity with the people of Ukraine and its support for a just and lasting peace for Ukraine based on international law, accountability and Russian reparations, with credible security guarantees and with the EU at the table;

5. Recalls that attacks within, or in the immediate vicinity of, Member States’ territorial waters and in their EEZs, where coastal states hold sovereign rights, threaten the security of the EU as a whole and that Member States on the Black Sea cannot be left to face this threat alone; highlights that the security of the Black Sea is an integral part of EU security and requires a coordinated EU response, in close cooperation with NATO; stresses the need for a strengthened eastern flank, from the Arctic to the Black Sea; reiterates that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Member States are foundational principles of the EU; underlines that the pattern, location and timing of these attacks are consistent with Russia’s broader strategy of intimidation, its testing of the EU’s capabilities and resolve, extending into the maritime domain, and its long-standing campaign against European Black Sea trade;

6. Expresses concern over the Bulgarian Government’s ambiguous response to the Russian threat; regrets the weak diplomatic response of the Bulgarian Government towards the Russian Federation and calls on the Member States to coordinate their diplomatic action; calls on Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev to match demands for allied solidarity with concrete action; deplores Bulgaria’s delayed participation in NATO’s Air Defence Capabilities Against Lower-level Air Threats initiative (NATO’s anti-drone initiative) and urges the Bulgarian Government not to delay further but to formally confirm its participation by 30 October 2026;

7. Calls for the EU and the Member States to assess and consider deploying an EU naval operation in the Black Sea; stresses that freedom of navigation and maritime security are part of securing NATO’s eastern flank, the Black Sea region and the Danube Delta; further calls on NATO to consider a Black Sea initiative, building on discussions on a ‘Black Sea Sentry’; underlines the importance of closer regional cooperation between Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia and Türkiye, including through existing Black Sea mine countermeasure arrangements;

8. Calls on the Commission, the Member States and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) to strengthen cooperation with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in addressing threats to civilian shipping in the Black Sea; calls on the IMO to carry out an immediate technical and legal assessment of the attacks on merchant vessels in the Black Sea; recalls that the protection of civilian vessels must be upheld in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS; stresses that seafarers are workers entitled to protection; calls on the Commission, the Member States and the relevant social partners, including maritime trade unions, to ensure that the safety and rights of seafarers operating in conflict-affected waters, including risk assessment measures, insurance, hazard compensation and repatriation rights, are reinforced, and to promote such protection at the IMO and the International Labour Organization;

9. Calls on the Member States, in cooperation with NATO, to identify currently existing air and maritime defence gaps in the region, and based on this assessment to establish an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) posture for the Black Sea region and the Danube Delta and to support Bulgaria and Romania in the early detection and tracking of hostile drones threatening Black Sea shipping, including through an urgent deployment of layered and interoperable air and maritime counter-drone capabilities, enhanced intelligence sharing, NATO’s surveillance and early-warning capabilities, the EU’s Copernicus programme, the EU Satellite Centre (SatCen), NATO’s Alliance Persistent Surveillance from Space (APSS), and secure satellite communications provided by EU GOVSATCOM; further calls on the Commission and the VP/HR, in cooperation with the Member States concerned, to develop a coordinated European framework for the security and safety of civilian navigation in the Black Sea, as part of the implementation of the EU’s strategic approach to the region;

10. Notes that defence production capacities across some parts of the EU are under immense strain to deliver; calls on the Commission and the Member States to balance the load and fully use the available defence industry capacities, especially in eastern Europe; calls on the Member States and their defence industries to deepen cooperation with Ukraine, drawing on Ukraine’s unparalleled experience in drone and counter-drone warfare;

11. Recommends that Bulgaria and Romania request assistance from the Commission and the European Defence Agency to develop and procure interception capabilities jointly with other Member States, in view of the need to eliminate airborne threats; urges the adoption and implementation of a European Sky Shield Initiative over the Black Sea; urges the Commission to follow up on its public announcements by presenting, without delay, concrete proposals for a European space shield and a European drone shield;

12. Considers that the unused amounts under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) financial instrument represent a window of opportunity for Romania and Bulgaria to tackle the newly-arising challenge; calls on the EU and its Member States to ensure the rapid operationalisation of the EU Black Sea maritime security hub, anchored in Constanța (Romania) and Varna (Bulgaria), by allocating adequate financial resources for the hub through the mobilisation of available unspent funds under the current multiannual financial framework (MFF) and by earmarking sufficient allocations under the next MFF; underlines that the EU Black Sea maritime security hub is crucial for enhancing maritime security awareness and early warning of potential threats, and for monitoring critical maritime infrastructure, such as submarine cables;

13. Stresses that the MFF for the 2028-2034 period must cater for a wide range of security and defence needs, including in the Black Sea region; recognises Romania and Bulgaria as the guardians of the EU’s and NATO’s south-eastern flank and the front line of European security in the Black Sea; calls for this role to be reflected in EU funding, defence planning and the allocation of capabilities; calls further for dedicated financial support for the coastal and port regions most exposed to these threats, which also bear significant economic and social costs;

14. Further underlines that EU efforts should include enhanced maritime and air surveillance, intelligence sharing leading to a common maritime situational awareness picture, the protection of the EU’s Black Sea ports, critical on- and off-shore transport, energy, such as the Neptun Deep gas exploitation project, and digital infrastructure; emphasises the indivisible link between maritime security and European energy sovereignty; calls on the Member States and the European Defence Agency to advance the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects on critical seabed infrastructure protection, harbour and maritime surveillance and protection, integrated multilayer air and missile defence systems, and counter-unmanned aerial systems; calls, furthermore, on the Commission and the Council to speed up work on the European defence project of common interest dedicated to the integrated defence of the maritime environment and the seabed, using all national and EU instruments available to this end, and ensuring that they also contribute to the security of the Black Sea regions; welcomes the satellite imagery provided by the EU to Bulgaria and Romania and calls for a permanent mechanism for the rapid provision of satellite and intelligence support on request;

15. Calls for implementation of the EU’s strategic approach to the Black Sea region in all its dimensions (security, connectivity and resilience) and for the accelerated creation of the Black Sea maritime security hub, jointly initiated and co-hosted by Bulgaria and Romania, as an urgent European security priority; stresses that the hub should support cooperation and capacity building in maritime security, including the coordination of mine countermeasure operations, search-and-rescue capabilities, and environmental protection, in full complementarity with existing EU and NATO structures; calls for the EU’s Black Sea strategy to be supported by clear priorities, adequate resources and measurable results, with particular attention to the protection of civilian shipping and the resilience of the Danube corridor;

16. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen the protection and resilience of ongoing submarine telecommunications, electricity transmission and data cable projects through enhanced maritime surveillance, regional cooperation and rapid-response mechanisms, notably by establishing a Black Sea regional cable security centre to reinforce the functions of a Black Sea maritime security hub;

17. Recalls the repeated incursions of Russian drones into the EU’s and Moldova’s airspace, as well as cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and acts of sabotage; strongly condemns Russia’s systematic and escalating pattern of airspace violations, drone incursions, Global Navigation Satellite System jamming and spoofing, shadow-fleet sabotage, acts of sabotage, assassination attempts and propaganda operations against EU Member States, and characterises this pattern as a coordinated strategy of hostile actions against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and democratic resilience of the EU and its Member States; underlines that each violation of EU airspace constitutes a violation of international law, including Article 1 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and must be treated as such; calls on Russia to immediately cease all destabilising hybrid activities, including sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and airspace violations;

18. Welcomes the European Council conclusions reaffirming the strategic importance of security, stability and freedom of navigation in the Black Sea and condemning Russia’s systematic attacks; joins the European Council’s call for the immediate restoration of safe passage for grain cargo ships and other vessels in the Black Sea, but regrets that this call has not so far been accompanied by the corresponding measures to support it; calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to fully reflect the security threats to the Black Sea region in the forthcoming EU security strategy;

19. Condemns the Russian shadow fleet’s role in maritime accidents, sabotage and sanctions evasion; welcomes recent interdictions of shadow fleet vessels by Member States and calls for monitoring, inspection, boarding and enforcement to be stepped up and coordinated, drawing on the US Proliferation Security Initiative as a model, and for a comprehensive list of shadow fleet vessels to be published; welcomes the Council’s sanctions listings of 12 October 2026 and calls on the Council and the Commission to step up pressure on Russia’s war economy through further sanctions packages targeting revenues; calls for the EU and its Member States to respond with swift and calibrated measures, including further listings under the sanctions regime on Russia’s destabilising activities, targeted sanctions on those responsible for conducting attacks on civilian shipping and against the suppliers of the equipment used, together with strict enforcement and action against sanctions circumvention;

20. Underlines that Russia’s continued attacks in the Black Sea region are intended to threaten the security and viability of the Middle Corridor; calls on the Commission and the Council to consider targeted restrictive measures against the Northern Corridor, with a view to reducing strategic dependencies and preventing Russia from benefiting from the disruption of alternative trade routes;

21. Underlines that the protection of Black Sea shipping and Danube transport routes is essential to food security and the livelihoods of farmers, transport workers and port communities; calls on the Commission to monitor the risks to maritime trade, the supply of food, energy and agricultural input, as well as their prices, to prepare contingency measures, including strategics stocks of foods and materials to support import-dependent partner countries, and to support secure and resilient alternative export routes for Ukrainian agricultural products, while protecting consumers from price shocks; condemns any attempts to use food insecurity as a weapon or tool of coercion; calls for continued diplomatic and practical efforts to safeguard maritime trade routes, reduce risks for commercial shipping and ensure that disruptions to essential supplies do not disproportionately affect vulnerable populations and import-dependent countries; calls on the Commission to assess measures to mitigate the effects of war-risk costs on EU operators and ports, to support seafarers’ welfare, and to maintain and strengthen export routes, including the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes, in order to safeguard food security; stresses that maintaining Ukraine’s export capacity is essential to its economic resilience and ability to finance its defence against Russian aggression;

22. Calls on the EU Member States to support the establishment of an emergency security protocol, as outlined by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her State of the Union address on 16 September 2026; calls for the mutual defence clause in Article 42(7) TEU to be further operationalised for armed aggression and severe hybrid scenarios, including in maritime areas, through a playbook tested in regular exercises; recalls the solidarity clause in Article 222 TFEU;

23. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary General of NATO, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the International Maritime Organization, the Ukrainian authorities and the Russian authorities.