What changed

B100439/2026

European Parliament resolution on the 2026 undemocratic elections to the Russian State Duma and their implications for civil society

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, in particular Articles 1(2), 2(1), 2(4) and 2(7) thereof,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in particular Article 21 thereof, and to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the Russian Federation is a party, in particular Articles 19, 21, 22 and 25 thereof,

– having regard to the international obligations to which Russia is bound under international law,

– having regard to the 1990 Copenhagen Document and the 1991 Moscow Document of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),

– having regard to the statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU of 21 September 2026 on the Russian State Duma elections held on 18 to 20 September 2026 and their non-applicability on Ukrainian territory,

– having regard to the statement byof the21 HighSeptember Representative2026 onby behalfMEP ofVille theNiinistö, EUChair of 21the SeptemberDelegation 2026to onthe RussianEU-Russia StateParliamentary DumaCooperation electionsCommittee, helddenouncing onthe 18-20parliamentary Septemberelections 2026in Russia and their non-applicabilityillegal onconduct Ukrainianin territory;the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of 29 September 2026 entitled ‘Fake ‘elections’ in Russia and its destabilising attacks on Europe’,

A. whereas elections were held in Russia from 18 to 20 September 2026 to elect all 450 seats of the ninth State Duma;

– having regard to the statement of 6 August 2026 by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the decision of the Russian Federation not to invite the OSCE to observe the elections to the State Duma,

B. whereas according to the Central Election Commission, United Russia received 349 seats, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) 37, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 23, New People 19 and A Just Russia 17; whereas Putin’s party, United Russia, made further gains compared with the 2021 elections; whereas independent analysts have questioned the official turnout figures and results;

– having regard to the report entitled ‘Nowhere is safe: exporting the rule of fear beyond borders – transnational repression by the Russian Federation’ submitted on 21 September 2026 to the UN Human Rights Council by the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Russia,

C. whereas Yabloko was excluded from the party-list ballot by the Russian Supreme Court in August, reducing the range of political options available to voters and excluding one of the few anti-war voices; whereas several CPRF candidates were excluded from running, including Nikolai Bondarenko;

– having regard to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,

D. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been accompanied by an intensification of domestic repression, including restrictions on freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, the criminalisation of anti-war dissent and increased pressure on independent media, civil society, trade unionists and political opponents;

– having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

E. whereas no political force opposing the war is represented in the newly elected State Duma, as the only registered party campaigning for peace and all candidates who opposed the war were excluded from the ballot;

– having regard to the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document,

F. whereas remote electronic voting was used in 33 regions without independent verification mechanisms;

– having regard to the Hague Regulations of 1907, in particular Articles 42 and 43 thereof,

G. whereas the organisation of elections by the Russian Federation in the occupied territories of Ukraine is incompatible with international law;

– having regard to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, in particular Article 47 thereof,

H. whereas independent election monitors and civil society organisations have been subjected to sustained repression by the Russian authorities; whereas Grigory Melkonyants, co-chair of the Golos election-monitoring movement, was sentenced in 2025 to five years’ imprisonment;

– having regard to the UN Charter

I. whereas the regularity of the September 2026 vote was also contested by parties represented in the Duma; whereas concerns about the transparency of elections in Russia are long-standing; whereas after the 2011 Duma elections, allegations of fraud led to the largest street protests in the country since the 1990s; whereas after the 2021 Duma elections, the CPRF refused to recognise the electronic voting results in Moscow, demanded their annulment and organised protests; whereas this mobilisation shows that the demand for fair and transparent elections originates within Russian society itself;

– having regard to Rule 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

J. whereas the principle of non-intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a country is a cornerstone of international law and of peaceful relations among peoples; whereas the choice of political system and representatives belongs to the Russian people alone; whereas the right to determine the political future and institutions of the Russian Federation belongs to its citizens, who must be able to exercise that right through genuine periodic elections guaranteeing the free expression of their will; whereas it is not for the EU, its Member States or any third country to choose Russia’s government;

A. whereas the fake elections to the Russian State Duma held from 18 to 20 September 2026 were illegitimate and undemocratic and conducted without any genuine political competition in an increasingly authoritarian environment of systematic and institutionalised repression; whereas Russia continues to wage an illegal war of aggression against Ukraine;

K. whereas the Russian Federation has freely accepted international obligations on civil and political rights, including within the OSCE;

B. whereas so-called elections were illegally held in the territories of Ukraine currently under Russian occupation, namely in Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, in parts of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions and in the illegally occupied Transnistria region of the Republic of Moldova and the illegally occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia;

L. whereas the Russian Federation has freely subscribed to international commitments on electoral standards, which it is therefore bound to honour irrespective of any external assessment; whereas, as a party to the ICCPR, it has undertaken, under Article 25 thereof, to guarantee genuine periodic elections by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors; whereas under the OSCE 1990 Copenhagen Document, Russia committed to ensure free and fair elections, to respect the right of citizens and parties to seek office without discrimination and to invite observers from other participating States; whereas, under the OSCE 1991 Moscow Document, it accepted that such commitments are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to its internal affairs; whereas it also signed the 2002 Convention on the Standards of Democratic Elections, Electoral Rights and Freedoms in the Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States;

C. whereas the 2026 fake elections to the State Duma were the first national legislative vote held under wartime conditions and were marked by the expansion of electronic voting across 33 regions, multi-day balloting, coercion and forced voter participation in temporarily occupied areas, resulting in a fabricated turnout of 59.58 % and a record majority of 349 out of 450 seats (over 77 %) for the ruling United Russia party;

M. whereas the credibility of the EU’s external action depends on applying the same standards to all non-EU countries; whereas the EU maintains close energy, commercial or strategic relations with countries in which meaningful political participation is restricted or serious concerns have been raised regarding fundamental freedoms or electoral integrity; whereas differences in the political scrutiny applied to such partners and to geopolitical adversaries risk creating the perception of double standards with regard to the EU’s application of the principles of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental human rights and weakening the credibility of the EU’s external action;

D. whereas Russia’s authoritarian regime has used increasingly fraudulent and farcical elections for decades to provide it with a semblance of democracy while continuing to concentrate all power in the hands of Vladimir Putin; whereas the government suppresses any dissent with the support of loyalist security forces, a subservient judiciary, a state-controlled media environment ensuring a continuous flood of propaganda and disinformation, and a legislature consisting of a ruling party and pliable opposition factions;

1. Stresses that respect for the principle of non-intervention does not preclude scrutiny of compliance with international obligations and OSCE commitments freely undertaken by the Russian Federation; recalls that such commitments are a matter of legitimate international concern; notes with concern that the 2026 elections fell far short of the standards of the ICCPR and of the OSCE commitments to which Russia has subscribed;

E. whereas the Russian authorities have systematically excluded democratic opposition forces from genuine political competition, with opposition politicians imprisoned, exiled or barred from standing; whereas the exclusion of Yabloko candidates from the federal list further limited the choice available to Russian voters, removing from the electoral process one of the last remaining opposition forces and the only registered party with an anti-war platform; whereas anti-war political figures, including Yabloko deputy chairs Maxim Kruglov and Lev Shlosberg, have been imprisoned and prominent party figures, including Nikolay Rybakov, Boris Vishnevskiy, and Vladimir Dorokhov, have been targeted, designated as ‘foreign agents’ or barred from running;

2. Highlights that independent analyses on the 2026 Russian State Duma elections point to widespread manipulation of the results through voter coercion, manipulation of electoral reports and downright falsification; notes that protests have been announced in at least five Russian cities in connection with the elections; condemns, furthermore, the fact that the vote took place in a tightly controlled and repressive environment;

F. whereas there were widespread reports of election fraud, including ballot stuffing, statistical anomalies, vote transfers and turnout spikes;

3. Regrets the exclusion of the few remaining candidates and parties critical of the war and the current government, including Yabloko, and the lack of independent and credible election observation, both domestic and international;

G. whereas the Russian Federation deliberately and repeatedly denied access to international observers by refusing to invite the OSCE/ODIHR or the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly to observe the elections, despite commitments under the 1990 Copenhagen Document; whereas changes to Russia’s electoral laws have made it virtually impossible to conduct any meaningful monitoring; whereas the parliamentary elections of 18 to 20 September 2026 were already the third consecutive nationwide electoral process held without impartial and independent international election observers in the country;

4. Notes the concerns expressed about the transparency of remote electronic voting and calls for the publication of verifiable data;

H. whereas the Russian regime, under Vladimir Putin’s increasingly authoritarian rule, systematically suppresses any form of dissent and denies Russian citizens meaningful participation in political life and their fundamental freedoms, through the persecution of opposition politicians, civil society organisations and independent media, intimidation, criminalisation and systematic and institutionalised repression, politically motivated trials and arbitrary prison sentences in inhumane detention conditions, while repeatedly undermining democratic principles, constitutional safeguards and the right to genuine democratic representation;

5. Underlines that allegations of irregularities have also been raised by parties represented in the State Duma, including the CPRF; considers that these complaints, coming from within Russia’s own institutional framework, should be addressed through transparent procedures, including public access to precinct-level protocols;

I. whereas the second Brussels Dialogue with Russian pro-democracy and anti-war actors was held at the European Parliament on 23 June 2026;

6. Recalls that elections organised in the occupied territories of Ukraine cannot be recognised under international law;

J. whereas the elections were conducted during Russia’s ongoing illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, which has fundamentally affected the political and legal environment in the Russian Federation and has been accompanied by further repression of domestic dissent;

7. Takes note of the election to the new State Duma of 46 veterans of the war against Ukraine, 41 of whom were elected for United Russia; notes that this is in line with the policy of integrating war veterans into a new political elite, in particular through President Putin’s ‘Time of Heroes’ programme, which trains veterans for political and administrative positions; is concerned that this contributes to a growing militarisation of political life in Russia;

K. whereas the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in its resolution entitled Fake ‘elections’ in Russia and its destabilising attacks on Europe’, strongly condemns the undemocratic and illegitimate nature of the elections; whereas the resolution also expresses its firm condemnation of Russia’s relentless and brutal attacks against Ukraine and hybrid operations against EU Member States;

8. Expresses deep concern over restrictions affecting civil society, trade unions, independent media and election observers;

L. whereas the Russian regime has increasingly expanded beyond Russia’s borders into a systematic campaign of transnational repression, as documented in the UN Special Rapporteur’s report entitled ‘Nowhere is safe’, which records nearly 400 cases of targeted physical violence, assassinations, poisonings (including of Elena Kostyuchenko, Irina Babloyan and Natalia Arno), the recent murder of dissident cartoonist Semyon Skrepetsky in Poland, the abuse of INTERPOL Red Notices, and the propagation of Rosfinmonitoring’s ‘extremist’ list through financial databases such as LSEG World-Check to freeze dissidents’ bank accounts globally;

9. Condemns the legislation introduced in 2022 criminalising the dissemination of information deemed ‘false’ concerning the Russian armed forces and public statements deemed to ‘discredit’ them, which is incompatible with Article 19 ICCPR; deplores the use of these provisions to prosecute and silence elected representatives, activists, including trade unionists and left-wing anti-war activists, journalists and citizens for opposing or publicly criticising Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; stresses that these laws have contributed to the systematic suppression of anti-war political dissent and pluralism in Russia;

M. whereas the Russian regime has decimated long-standing human rights organisations by branding them ‘extremist’, while criminalising major environmental watchdogs such as Greenpeace International, WWF International and Bellona as ‘undesirable organisations’ and replacing them with government-organised non-governmental organisations under a ‘sovereign ecology’ framework;

10. Calls on the Russian authorities to release people detained for peacefully exercising their rights, including Grigory Melkonyants and Boris Kagarlitsky;

1. Deplores the fact that the fake elections to the Russian State Duma held from 18 to 20 September 2026 were neither free nor fair, violated fundamental international electoral standards, lacked democratic legitimacy and were a complete sham orchestrated under repression, thereby depriving citizens of their constitutional right to a free and democratic vote; deplores the fact that the Russian opposition, civil society and independent media have been brutally suppressed and that critics of the regime have been imprisoned, murdered or forced into exile;

11. Stresses that the Russian people must not be equated with their government; rejects any measure amounting to collective punishment of the population;

2. Denounces all electoral violations committed by the regime of Vladimir Putin during the Russian legislative elections of 18 to 20 September 2026, as well as the preceding long-standing and intentional destruction of any remnants of democracy in Russia; stresses that the officially announced turnout figures and electoral results cannot be regarded as credible evidence of public support for the ruling authorities, their policies or Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; underlines that Russia’s fake elections were held in a climate of fear and intimidation and against the background of an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; notes that, during the fake elections, there were no genuine alternative candidates, no free media, no credible observers and no political freedoms; concludes that the elections were illegitimate and undemocratic;

12. Stresses that EU support should serve to strengthen civil society, human rights defenders, independent trade unions and independent media, and should be allocated in a transparent and non-partisan manner, while fully respecting their independence and autonomy, guided by the objective of strengthening civic space and fundamental rights, rather than broader geopolitical considerations;

3. Condemns the fact that so-called elections were conducted in Crimea and in parts of the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions that are temporarily occupied by Russia;

13. Calls on Russia to cooperate with UN and OSCE human rights mechanisms;

4. Condemns the organisation of so-called elections in the Transnistria region of the Republic of Moldova and the establishment of Russian polling stations in the Georgian region of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, South Ossetia; reiterates its steadfast support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and the Republic of Moldova within their internationally recognised borders and deplores the continued mistreatment and repression of the inhabitants of the temporarily occupied territories;

14. Reiterates its call for Russia to end its war of aggression against Ukraine and respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; recalls that only an end to the war, through negotiations and a just and lasting peace based on international law and the UN Charter, can create conditions for a democratic opening; calls for the EU to make diplomacy its priority;

5. Refuses to recognise the Russian State Duma as the legitimate representative and legislative body of the Russian Federation and refuses to recognise any legal or political consequences deriving from the illegal organisation of so-called elections by Russia in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine; denounces the inclusion in the new State Duma of 46 individuals who either served in the Russian invasion forces in Ukraine or held posts in the occupation administrations; notes that Nursultan Mussagaleev, who Ukrainian authorities have accused of ordering the torture and execution of a civilian near Bucha in 2022, is among them; condemns the human rights violations committed by the Russian occupation authorities who forced Ukrainian citizens in Ukrainian territories to register and vote in the fake elections to the Russian State Duma; calls on the Council and the Member States to adopt the same position of non-recognition; calls for the EU institutions and Member States to refrain from any official contact with the newly constituted State Duma and its members, to oppose their participation in interparliamentary assemblies, and to consider null any act of this State Duma purporting to legislate for, annex or ratify the status of temporarily occupied Ukrainian territory;

15. Warns against the militarisation of EU foreign policy and against the use of the Russian elections as a pretext for further increases in military spending at the expense of social cohesion;

6. Highlights how the decision of the Russian institutions not to invite the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission to observe the elections further underpins the complete lack of legitimacy of the Russian institutions; notes with concern the lack of domestic electoral observation following sustained pressure on and, ultimately, the forced closure of Russian election observation organisations such as Golos; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of Grigory Melkonyants, co-chair of Golos, and of other election monitors who have been imprisoned or persecuted for their work;

16. Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to apply the same standards on electoral integrity consistently to all non-EU countries, including partners of the EU; deplores the selective application of the EU’s stated commitment to democracy and electoral integrity;

7. Denounces the judicial ban on the Yabloko party, the arbitrary exclusion of candidates and the systemic criminalisation of anti-war sentiment in Russia; demands the immediate, unconditional release and full political rehabilitation of all political prisoners, human rights defenders, anti-war activists, journalists and detained minors in Russia, including Alexei Gorinov, Lev Shlosberg, Maxim Kruglov, Maria Ponomarenko and Alexander Kynev, and urges the Russian authorities to guarantee them immediate access to independent medical care;

17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the UN Secretary-General, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the President, Government and State Duma of the Russian Federation.

8. Decries the continued suppression by the Russian authorities of any form of dissent, including through repressive legislation and politically motivated prison sentences targeting opposition politicians, civil society organisations, human rights defenders and independent media; recalls that the unlawful ‘Foreign Agents Law’, enacted in 2012, has imposed severe constraints on Russian civil society;

9. Stands in solidarity with those Russian citizens who, despite national and transnational repression and the severe personal consequences for them and their family members, continue to find the courage to speak the truth about Russia’s brutal and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, uphold human values such as dignity, respect and compassion and show the world that another Russia exists; recalls the brutal murder of Alexei Navalny and reaffirms that the Russian regime and Putin personally bear political and criminal responsibility for the deaths of dissidents; expresses its solidarity with victims of political repression and its support for independent journalists, human rights defenders and civil society actors who are resisting Russia’s aggression and repression;

10. Urgently calls for EU action against transnational repression, supporting the UN Special Rapporteur’s recommendation for a binding UN convention on transnational repression; urges the Member States to investigate Russian cross-border threats, scrutinise Russian INTERPOL Red Notices and require financial institutions to cease the application of Rosfinmonitoring’s politically motivated ‘extremist’ lists;

11. Calls for continued support for Russian democratic forces, including independent journalists, human rights defenders and reform-oriented forces among the democratic political opposition working for a democratic future for Russia and openly speaking out against Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and Russia’s hybrid warfare against European democracies; stresses that Russian anti-war democratic forces abroad will be credible partners only if they unambiguously support Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, the establishment of accountability and the payment of reparations; calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen their support for Russian anti-war and pro-democracy civil society, democratic actors and independent Russian-language media, including by supporting access to uncensored information inside Russia; calls on the Commission to ensure sufficient long-term funding;

12. Recalls that the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Russia, Mariana Katzarova, reported that internal repression had reached alarming levels, with more than 4 000 political prisoners, more than 1 200 individuals and organisations labelled ‘foreign agents’, over 350 organisations banned as ‘undesirable’, and over 5 000 politically motivated criminal cases; deplores the fact that over 100 minors are currently being detained on political or terrorism charges, Russia ranks third in the world for the number of imprisoned journalists, nearly a third of whom are Ukrainian citizens, including Iryna Danylovych, and torture is widespread and systematic;

13. Highlights that Russia’s defeat in its war of aggression against Ukraine, the restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the ending of Russia’s imperial ambitions are essential conditions for creating the possibility of fundamental political change towards genuine democracy in Russia; reiterates that Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its systematic repression at home are mutually reinforcing and both sustain the Russian regime;

14. Reiterates its unwavering support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders; demands that Russia and its proxy forces immediately, completely and unconditionally terminate all military action in Ukraine, cease all attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure, withdraw all military forces, proxies and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine, and release and return all prisoners of war, political detainees, kidnapped children and civilians; stresses that the Russian regime continues to display unfathomable brutality through its assaults on civilian targets in Ukraine and that the humanitarian situation in the Russian-occupied territories remains catastrophic, including in the city of Oleshky, which is currently under siege and where civilians, including children, remain trapped without sufficient food, medicine, medical care, running water or electricity;

15. Welcomes the second Brussels Dialogue with Russian pro-democracy and anti-war actors which was held at the European Parliament in June 2026;

16. Welcomes the Council’s adoption of restrictive measures against 10 individuals for supporting the systematic and institutionalised repression of democratic opposition and for undermining democracy and the rule of law in Russia; calls on the Member States to introduce extensive EU restrictive measures against further individuals and entities involved in political persecution and Russia’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine; calls for all necessary measures to be taken to prevent sanctions circumvention; commends the Council’s sanctioning of those 10 individuals, who include Supreme Court judges, senior officials in the Prosecutor General’s Office and judges involved in barring Yabloko and sentencing opposition politicians;

17. Urges the adoption of targeted EU sanctions against judges, prosecutors, Rosfinmonitoring officials, and operatives involved in repression, including transnational repression; calls for targeted restrictive measures against Russian electoral officials, judges, prosecutors, occupation authorities and other individuals directly responsible for the organisation of the staged electoral process in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova as well as against members of the Central Election Commission and regional electoral commissions responsible for electoral fraud, and against newly elected State Duma deputies not yet listed, in particular those who served in the invasion forces or occupation administrations; calls for Schengen-wide entry bans on all such individuals;

18. Encourages the Member States to develop coordinated solutions for Russian human rights defenders, independent journalists and other people at risk who are lawfully resident in the EU and are unable to renew documents through Russian consular authorities;

19. Reaffirms that relations with Russia cannot be normalised without a just and lasting peace for Ukraine based on full territorial integrity, the complete withdrawal of Russian troops, the release of all prisoners of war, detained civilians and forcibly deported Ukrainian children, Russia’s payment of full reparations and compensation to Ukraine and the establishment of full accountability for war crimes, crimes against humanity and Russia’s crime of aggression against Ukraine, an end to internal political repression, the restoration of the rule of law and full respect for international law; calls for the political and diplomatic isolation of the Russian regime for as long as necessary, including through coordinated efforts to exclude its representatives from key international forums and prevent any normalisation of Russia’s participation in international sporting and cultural events;

20. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the United Nations, and the authorities of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia.