What changed

B100411/2026

P10_TA(2026)0317

European Parliament resolution on theThe recent hybrid attacks and instrumentalisation of migrants in Ceuta and the need for a coordinated response to protect the EU’s external borders

(2026/2870(RSP))

PE788.264

European Parliament resolution of 17 September 2026 on the recent hybrid attacks and instrumentalisation of migrants in Ceuta and the need for a coordinated response to protect the EU’s external borders (2026/2870(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Articlethe 4(2)Treaty andon (3)European ofUnion and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular their provisions on the area of freedom, security and justice,

– having regard to Articles 67,the 77Geneva andConvention 80relating ofto the Treaty onStatus theof FunctioningRefugees of 1951, and the Europeanadditional Union,protocol thereto,

– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

– having regard to the Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the French Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Member States of the European Communities) and the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic concerning the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the European Economic Community and to the European Atomic Energy Community, signed on 12 June 1985,

– having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989,

– having regard to the Pact for the Mediterranean launched jointly by the EU, its Member States and southern Mediterranean partners in November 2025,

– having regard to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part,

– having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989, in particular Articles 3 and 18 and the principle of the best interests of the child,

– having regard to the legislative instruments comprising the Pact on Migration and Asylum, which entered into application on 12 June 2026,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013,

– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

– having regard to its resolution of 10 June 2021 onCouncil theDecision breach2006/688/EC of the5 UNOctober Convention2006 on the Rightsestablishment of the Child and thea usemutual ofinformation minorsmechanism byconcerning theMember MoroccanStates’ authoritiesmeasures in the migratoryareas crisisof inasylum Ceuta,and immigration,

– having regard to the joint letter of 1 August 2026 initiated by the Prime Ministers of Italy and Denmark concerning the recent events in Ceuta,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2026/464 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 February 2026 amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 as regards the establishment of a list of safe countries of origin at Union level, which establishes Morocco as a safe country of origin,

– having regard to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part, which entered into force in 2000,

– having regard to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Spain and the Kingdom of Morocco on cooperation in the field of prevention of illegal emigration of unaccompanied minors, their protection and their concerted return, which was signed in Rabat on 6 March 2007 and entered into force on 2 October 2012,

– having regard to the European Court of Human Rights judgment of 13 February 2020 in the case of N.D. and N.T. v Spain (8675/15 and 8697/15),

– having regard to the Chișinău Declaration of 15 May 2026 and the commitments undertaken therein by participating states,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Morocco, in particular its resolution of 10 June 2021 on the breach of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the use of minors by the Moroccan authorities in the migratory crisis in Ceuta and its non-legislative resolution of 16 January 2019 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco on the amendment of Protocols 1 and 4 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part,

– having regard to the letter signed by 22 heads of state and government on 1 August 2026 and sent to President of the European Council António Costa, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, and Taoiseach Micheál Martin,

– having regard to the statements by the Council and the Commission of 15 September 2026 on the recent hybrid attacks and instrumentalisation of migrants in Ceuta and the need for a coordinated response to protect EU’s external borders,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas approximately 80 000 people entered Ceuta from Morocco on 30 and 31 July 2026 in an unprecedented episode of mass illegal entry, placing exceptional pressure on the city’s public services, security forces and reception capacities, resulting in a tragic loss of life;

A. whereas Ceuta and Melilla constitute a singular example of coexistence, being two Spanish cities in which Christian, Muslim, Jewish and Hindu communities have coexisted for generations, sharing public space, cultural traditions and civic life, united by a common commitment to the rule of law, equal rights and the values that underpin the European project;

B. whereas Ceuta and Melilla are integral parts of the Kingdom of Spain and, as such, form part of the EU and its external borders; whereas their effective protection is essential for safeguarding the security of the EU and is therefore a matter of common European interest;

B. whereas international law and the principle of sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of state borders must be respected;

C. whereas the events of 30 and 31 July constitute an instrumentalisation of illegal migrants as a means of exerting political and social pressure on a Member State and, by extension, the EU;

C. whereas any attempt to undermine or put pressure on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a Member State, including through the weaponisation of migration by non-EU countries or other hostile international actors, constitutes a hybrid threat to the security and stability of the EU and its Member States and requires a response that goes beyond the instruments designed for addressing ordinary migratory flows;

E. whereas the Spanish Government launched an extraordinary mass regularisation scheme, which had received 1 174 978 applications by 30 June 2026, of which 609 737 had been processed by 2 July, contributing to the perception that illegal entry may ultimately result in legal stay and, therefore, acting as an additional pull factor for illegal migration to the EU;

D. whereas between 29 and 31 July 2026, approximately 80 000 migrants crossed irregularly into Ceuta from Morocco, by land and sea, and several hundred crossed into Melilla; whereas at least 141 people died during the crossing; whereas up to 11 000 irregular migrants refused to return to Morocco and remain in Ceuta; whereas the exact number of deaths and crossings and the identities of those remaining are still unknown;

F. whereas the joint letter initiated by the Prime Ministers of Italy and Denmark and supported by 22 European leaders rightly underlined the need to address all policies that can serve as pull factors, such as the regularisation of very large numbers of irregular migrants, and stressed that the EU cannot allow uncontrolled mass crossings, the instrumentalisation of migration or other hybrid threats to create the perception that illegal entry into the EU can result in legal stay;

E. whereas the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration in all actions concerning children; whereas unaccompanied children may face heightened risks of trafficking, sexual and gender-based violence, exploitation, disappearance and re-victimisation; whereas girls, younger children and children who have experienced violence may have specific protection and care needs;

G. whereas Spanish and international intelligence reportedly raised concerns about the possible presence, among those who entered Ceuta, of individuals with potential links to jihadist groups, highlighting the serious security risks arising from the lack of effective identification and screening following such a large-scale mass entry;

F. whereas special attention should be given to the protection needs of women, children and other vulnerable persons, including measures to prevent and address sexual and gender-based violence and exploitation;

H. whereas the Schengen area can only function efficiently if the EU and its Member States ensure the effective protection of the EU’s external borders and cooperate closely in combating migrant smuggling and other forms of organised crime;

G. whereas Ceuta, with a resident population of approximately 84 500, has been invaded and has seen its reception facilities, health services and infrastructure brought close to collapse; whereas evidence on the ground, including statements from the Spanish Public Prosecutor’s Office, indicates that sexual violence has risen, including forced prostitution of migrant children; whereas normal life has not resumed, residents, workers and businesses continue to suffer lasting consequences, public order and security remain at risk, and children are returning to school under armed escort, demonstrating that the situation remains far from resolved;

I. whereas information that was subsequently made public by the Spanish authorities shows that, in the days preceding the events, the competent Spanish authorities received multiple reports, alerts and intelligence assessments concerning increasing irregular movements of people towards Ceuta and, on 29 July 2026, the National Intelligence Centre of Spain issued multiple warnings of calls on social media for a mass crossing by sea and over the border fence the following day;

H. whereas repeated warnings from local authorities and security and intelligence services had been conveyed to the Spanish Government, as per the confidential reports disclosed on 9 September 2026, indicating that pressure at the border had been building well before those days; whereas during the crisis, the Assembly of Ceuta unanimously called on the national government to close the border, declare a national emergency, convene the National Security Council, appoint a single coordinating authority and deploy the armed forces; whereas the Spanish Government failed to act on those calls;

J. whereas the mobilisation of tens of thousands of people through social media and messaging applications highlights the capacity of organised actors and networks to rapidly exploit information gaps, judicial developments and perceived weaknesses in border controls;

I. whereas on 1 August 2026, 22 heads of state and government signed a joint letter calling for an immediate and coordinated European response; whereas, in the letter, the heads of state and government linked the crisis to the Spanish Government’s mass regularisation of over one million irregular migrants and stressed that illegal entry must never turn into legal stay; whereas the letter also called for enhanced Frontex support and effective cooperation with Morocco on returns;

K. whereas the assessment of the competent Spanish police authorities concludes that the events of 30 and 31 July were neither spontaneous nor incidental, but part of a planned process involving different phases, coordinated actors, a high level of technical organisation and a shared objective;

J. whereas on 4 August 2026, home affairs ministers of the Member States expressed solidarity with Spain and stressed the need to reinforce returns, external borders, third-country cooperation and early-warning systems; whereas the Spanish Ministers for Home Affairs, Grande-Marlaska, and for Inclusion, Social Security and Migration, Saiz, declined to attend the extraordinary meeting of Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of 6 August 2026;

L. whereas, despite the exceptional scale of the crisis and repeated requests from the authorities of Ceuta for a stronger response and support from the Spanish Government, it took 26 days to declare the crisis a situation of interest for national security and establish a coordinated command structure;

K. whereas on 24 August 2026, Spain requested over EUR 32 million in emergency financial support through the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and the Border Management and Visa Policy Instrument, but only formally requested reinforced support from Frontex, Europol and the EU Agency for Asylum on 28 August 2026, almost a month after the crisis began and despite numerous offers from the Commission;

M. whereas relations between Spain and Morocco have repeatedly experienced episodes of territorial tension, including in May 2021 when thousands of people crossed illegally into Ceuta after Moroccan border controls were relaxed;

L. whereas the Chișinău Declaration, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 15 May 2026, recognises instrumentalisation of migration as a contemporary threat to territorial integrity and national security, and affirms the sovereign right of states to protect their borders and pursue new approaches to deter irregular migration;

N. whereas the competent Spanish authorities have identified relevant common patterns with previous episodes in 2021 and 2024 and assessed the 2026 operation as significantly more complex, coordinated and sophisticated;

M. whereas on 7 September 2026, the Spanish high court Audiencia Nacional assumed responsibility for the judicial investigation into the mass entry of migrants into Ceuta on the grounds that the events may constitute a serious attack on Spain’s territorial integrity;

O. whereas Morocco is a key partner of the EU in the management of migration in the Western Mediterranean and, as a country of origin and transit, has a particular responsibility to prevent irregular departures from its territory, combat migrant smuggling and trafficking networks, and ensure effective and timely cooperation on identification, returns and readmission;

N. whereas on 9 September 2026, the Commission granted Spain EUR 114,7 million in emergency financial support to help manage the crisis;

P. whereas the EU has a strategic interest in maintaining constructive and reliable relations with neighbouring non-EU countries, including Morocco, based on reciprocity, mutual respect, respect for territorial integrity and effective cooperation on border management, migration and readmission;

1. Pays tribute to and expresses full support for the people of Ceuta and Melilla, who have long embodied a living example of coexistence between people of different cultures, origins and religions; stresses that this coexistence is not merely a social reality but a daily affirmation of the rule of law, equal rights and the common values that lie at the heart of the European project;

Q. whereas combating the instrumentalisation of migration is inseparable from dismantling the criminal infrastructure that facilitates illegal crossings, including networks that use social media and digital communication channels to organise and encourage mass movements;

2. Expresses its deep regret and sorrow for the 141 people who died at sea during the events of 30 and 31 July 2026;

R. whereas, in 2025, the Commission withdrew its proposal for a regulation addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum (COM(2021)0890) following the adoption of the Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation and amendments to the Schengen Borders Code, while failing to adequately address the threat posed by the instrumentalisation of migration in subsequent legislative proposals;

3. Expresses its full solidarity with the citizens and local authorities of Ceuta, who have faced and continue to face an unprecedented crisis with remarkable responsibility, calm and resilience; reiterates that Ceuta and Melilla are Spanish and European cities whose sovereignty and territorial integrity are beyond question;

S. whereas the events in Ceuta demonstrate the need to ensure that the EU’s legal and operational framework is fully equipped to respond effectively to future cases of large-scale instrumentalisation;

4. Condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the mass illegal crossings into Ceuta from Morocco, by land and by sea, and the instrumentalisation of irregular migration as a tool of hybrid warfare against the territorial integrity of a Member State; considers it of the utmost priority to strengthen the protection of the EU’s external land and maritime borders in Ceuta;

T. whereas the EU asylum system has been suffering from structural weaknesses, including lengthy procedures, secondary movements, a social benefits system prone to abuse, insufficient cooperation with non-EU countries, a solidarity mechanism based on mandatory relocations within the EU, and low return rates for rejected applicants;

5. Regrets the loss of life that occurred during the illegal crossing; recalls that these deaths could have been prevented had the necessary measures been taken on both sides to stop the illegal crossing before it took place;

U. whereas Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) held an extraordinary meeting on 6 August 2026 to discuss the situation in Ceuta, with the participation of the Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration, Magnus Brunner, and the President of Ceuta, Juan Jesús Vivas; whereas the Spanish Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Inclusion, Social Security and Migration, both of whom had been invited to participate, did not attend the meeting;

6. Calls on the Spanish and Moroccan authorities, with the support of the Commission, to ensure the identification of all those who died during the crossing, the dignified treatment and repatriation of their remains, and the notification of and support for their families; calls for a full and transparent investigation into the circumstances of each death;

1. Reaffirms unequivocally that Ceuta and Melilla are integral parts of the Kingdom of Spain and form part of the EU’s external border; stresses that their sovereignty and territorial integrity are non-negotiable and that protecting Spain’s territorial integrity and the EU’s external borders is a matter of common European security;

7. Restates its firm support for multilateralism and the rules-based international order, noting that any attempt to undermine the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of any Member State violates international law and the UN Charter;

2. Expresses its full solidarity with the people of Ceuta and recognises the exceptional pressure placed on the local population by the unprecedented mass illegal entry of migrants; is gravely concerned about all the documented cases of physical and sexual assault, theft and degrading treatment suffered by the local population as a result of this situation;

8. Calls on the Spanish Government to urgently deploy all necessary measures to restore normality in Ceuta, including adequate security and economic support for affected businesses, workers and residents;

3. Strongly condemns the instrumentalisation of illegal migration and the use of migrants, including unaccompanied minors, as a means of exerting political pressure on a Member State and the EU;

9. Expresses serious concern at the large-scale regularisation policy pursued by the Government of President Pedro Sánchez, which acts as a pull factor and sends the wrong signal to potential migrants and criminal smuggling networks; stresses that illegal entry must never become a shortcut to legal residence;

4. Expresses its full support for law enforcement officers and for border and coast guards tasked with protecting the EU’s external borders;

10. Calls on the Commission to assess, in cooperation with the Member States, the possible cross-border impact of national mass regularisation schemes on secondary movements and the functioning and security of the Schengen area;

5. Deplores the failure of the Spanish authorities to adequately anticipate and prepare for the scale of the mass entry into Ceuta, despite the relevant information, alerts and communications shared with them in the days preceding and during the event;

11. Commends the work of the Policia Nacional, the Guardia Civil, the Spanish Armed Forces, the Spanish Red Cross, Caritas, non-governmental organisations, and other civil society organisations involved in the response to the crisis, often under exceptionally difficult circumstances;

6. Raises serious concerns about the delayed response of the Spanish Government to the crisis in Ceuta; regrets that, despite repeated requests from the authorities of Ceuta for additional resources and support, including help with identifying, accommodating and returning persons who had entered illegally, it took 26 days after the mass entry for the Spanish Government to declare the crisis a situation of interest for national security and establish a coordinated command structure;

12. Condemns the acts of violence that have been recorded in Ceuta since the start of the crisis; calls on the Spanish Government to immediately reinforce the presence of police and security forces in the city to restore public order and security, which remain at risk weeks after the mass illegal crossing;

7. Notes that, weeks after the mass entry, significant discrepancies persisted between the figures provided by the central government and those provided by the authorities of Ceuta concerning the number of persons still present in the city, with estimates ranging from around 10 000 to 13 000 or more; considers that this delay placed an excessive burden on the authorities and population of Ceuta, while creating significant security risks linked to a lack of clarity regarding the number, identity and whereabouts of persons who had entered the city, and exposed serious shortcomings in preparedness, coordination and crisis management;

13. Reaffirms that the preservation of the Schengen area requires the EU to ensure the effective protection of its external borders and requires all Member States to fully assume their responsibilities in preventing and combating migrant smuggling;

8. Calls on the Spanish Government to provide full and transparent information on the situation in Ceuta, including the number of persons who had entered the territory, the number who were identified and underwent security screening, the number who were returned to Morocco or transferred to mainland Spain, and the number of adults and unaccompanied minors who remain in Ceuta;

14. Welcomes the Commission’s swift decision to grant Spain EUR 114,7 million in emergency assistance to help manage the crisis in Ceuta; calls on the Spanish Government to make full and effective use of these funds, as well as the material resources and operational support from EU agencies offered by the Commission, to restore normality, improve conditions and accelerate returns;

9. Expresses serious concern at the large-scale regularisation policy pursued by the Government of President Pedro Sánchez, which acts as a pull factor and sends the wrong signal to potential migrants and criminal smuggling networks; stresses that illegal entry must never become a shortcut to legal residence, and calls on the Commission to assess, in cooperation with the Member States, the possible cross-border impact of national mass regularisation schemes on secondary movements and the functioning and security of the Schengen area;

15. Takes note of the decision of the Spanish national high court, the Audiencia Nacional, to assume jurisdiction over the judicial investigation into the mass illegal crossing on the grounds that it may constitute a serious attack on Spain’s territorial integrity; calls on the Spanish Government to fully cooperate with and support the ongoing investigation;

10. Stresses that the protection of the EU’s external borders requires effective identification, registration and security screening of persons entering illegally, and that the security implications of large-scale illegal entries must be properly assessed, including through appropriate checks against relevant European and national databases and counter-terrorism screening, in order to prevent persons linked to terrorism or representing a security risk from exploiting weaknesses in EU external border controls;

16. Endorses the assertion by 22 heads of state and government that uncontrolled mass crossings and the instrumentalisation of migration must never create the perception that illegal entry into the European Union can turn into legal stay; warns that such a perception encourages further attempts and undermines confidence in the EU’s common migration policy; recalls, in this regard, that national policies such as mass regularisation cannot be adopted without regard for their impact on other Member States, the Schengen Area and the EU as a whole;

11. Reaffirms that the Schengen area can only be preserved if the EU effectively protects its external borders and all Member States do their part in combating migrant smuggling;

17. Recalls that protecting the EU’s external borders is a shared responsibility between the Member States and that any failure to act decisively undermines the integrity of the Schengen Area as a whole; recognises the efforts made by countries targeted by instrumentalised migration, including Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Greece and Poland, and their determination in protecting the EU’s external borders; calls on the Commission and all Member States to step up their efforts, increase funding, including for external border protection infrastructure, enhance Frontex’s capabilities and ensure that all instruments are swiftly deployable in situations of crisis, hybrid threats or instrumentalisation;

12. Calls on the Commission, Frontex, Europol and the Member States to strengthen early-warning mechanisms, intelligence-sharing and operational cooperation at the EU’s external borders, including the capacity to identify and respond rapidly to coordinated mobilisation facilitated through social media and messaging applications;

18. Recalls that the Pact on Migration and Asylum has been fully applicable since 12 June 2026 and underlines Spain’s responsibility to make full and effective use of the Pact’s legal and operational framework, including screening, border asylum and return procedures; calls, furthermore, for strengthened cooperation with countries of origin and transit to ensure effective migration management;

13. Stresses that EU relations with neighbouring non-EU countries must be based on reciprocity and effective cooperation; considers that preferential access to the EU market, EU financing and strategic cooperation should be conditional on effective cooperation, including with regard to border management, the fight against migrant smuggling and trafficking, identification and readmission, and should seek clear and measurable commitments in order to prevent illegal crossings, ensure effective returns, protect the EU’s external borders and ensure respect for the territorial integrity of Member States; calls for existing EU partnerships to be used to secure concrete commitments and measurable results;

19. Recognises that a large number of unaccompanied children are still in Ceuta; stresses that the Spanish authorities must ensure the protection and appropriate care of unaccompanied minors; calls on the Spanish authorities to carry out individual assessments of their circumstances and needs without delay, with the minors’ best interests as a primary consideration, in accordance with EU law and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child;

14. Calls on the Commission to review the use of EU financial assistance, trade preferences and other cooperation instruments where a partner country fails to meet clear and measurable commitments on border management, readmission, good-neighbourly relations or respect for the territorial integrity of a Member State;

20. Stresses the urgent need to ensure the swift and effective return of all those who have no right to remain in the EU, including unaccompanied minors, in full compliance with EU and international law; urges Spain and Morocco to accelerate their cooperation on returns and readmission of all irregular migrants who arrived during the mass illegal crossing of 29-31 July 2026;

15. Calls on the Commission to accelerate the conclusion and enforcement of readmission agreements with countries of origin and transit and to make full use of the leverage available through the EU’s trade, aid and visa policies, in order to secure effective cooperation on readmission;

21. Stresses that EU relations with neighbouring non-EU countries must be based on reciprocity and effective cooperation; considers that preferential access to the EU market, EU financing and strategic cooperation should be conditional on effective cooperation, including with regard to border management, the fight against migrant smuggling and trafficking, identification and readmission, and should seek clear and measurable commitments in order to prevent illegal crossings, ensure effective returns and protect the EU’s external borders; stresses that such cooperation must be accompanied by full respect for the territorial integrity of the Member States; calls for existing EU partnerships to be used to secure concrete commitments and measurable results;

16. Calls on the Commission to strengthen operational cooperation with the Kingdom of Morocco and other countries of origin and transit;

22. Calls on the Moroccan authorities to fulfil their responsibilities as a key partner of the European Union and honour their commitments on border management, return and migration cooperation; stresses that such partnership must be grounded in unconditional respect for the territorial integrity of EU Member States, as a fundamental principle of international law and a non-negotiable condition; considers any statement calling Spanish sovereignty into question to be unacceptable and incompatible with the obligations of a partner country;

17. Calls on the Kingdom of Morocco to fully comply with its international obligations and cooperate fully and transparently with the relevant Spanish and EU authorities;

23. Calls for the establishment of a stricter and more transparent framework governing the disbursement and oversight of EU development and cooperation funds to third countries; insists on the introduction of robust mechanisms allowing for the immediate suspension and full recovery of funds in cases of non-cooperation, or where the interests of the EU or the Member States are at stake;

18. Underlines that the instrumentalisation of migration cannot be addressed solely through the management of migratory flows after migrants have reached EU territory; calls for stronger action upstream, including through intelligence cooperation, cooperation with countries of origin and transit, the disruption of smuggling networks and the prevention of organised mobilisation towards the EU’s external borders;

24. Calls on the Government of Spain, with the support of the Council and the Commission, to draw up a proposal setting out the necessary EU regulatory and financial mechanisms required to strengthen the security, stability and development of the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, taking into account the particular circumstances, risks and threats that both cities face;

19. Calls on the Commission to urgently propose an effective legal framework that provides the EU and its Member States with the necessary tools for preventing, countering and responding to the instrumentalisation of migration by hostile state and non-state actors;

25. Calls on the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, with the support of the European External Action Service and in cooperation with the relevant Member State authorities, to assess, within their respective competences and on the basis of all available information, including relevant Spanish and EU law-enforcement and intelligence information, the circumstances surrounding the events of 30 and 31 July 2026, including possible facilitation by or deliberate inaction or involvement of state or non-state actors;

20. Underlines that the fight against migrant smuggling must remain a central element of the EU’s response; calls for stronger operational capacity to identify, disrupt and prosecute smuggling networks, including networks exploiting social media and messaging applications;

26. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Government and Parliament of Morocco.

21. Calls on the Commission to deploy the necessary EU operational, technical and financial resources to guarantee the effective protection of Ceuta and Melilla as external borders of the EU, including reinforced permanent cooperation with Frontex, in full respect of the competences and responsibilities of the Member States;

22. Calls for stronger EU support to frontline Member States facing exceptional migratory pressure;

23. Calls on the Council and the Commission to support the Member States facing instrumentalisation by providing appropriate funds, emergency measures and tools in order to enable them to respond swiftly and proportionately, building on the lessons learnt from the instrumentalisation of migrants by the Lukashenko and Putin regimes on the Polish border, which was successfully countered by the Polish Government at the time, despite the lack of adequate support from the Commission, unjustified criticism directed against the Polish authorities and a widespread campaign aimed at discrediting their actions;

24. Recognises that the physical protection of the EU’s external border remains the first and most essential line of defence against instrumentalisation; calls on the Commission to guarantee full, flexible and rapidly disbursed EU financial support for Member States constructing physical barriers and surveillance infrastructure;

25. Calls on the Member States to make full use, where justified by serious threats to public policy or internal security and in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code, of the safeguards available to protect the integrity of the Schengen area and prevent unauthorised secondary movements;

26. Welcomes the recent strengthening of the EU’s return framework and calls for its swift and effective implementation, including through the use of return hubs and stronger cooperation with non-EU countries, giving that effective returns are essential for ensuring that illegal entry cannot result in an automatic or de facto right to remain;

27. Regrets the absence of the Spanish Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Inclusion, Social Security and Migration from the extraordinary LIBE meeting of 6 August 2026, despite the exceptional nature of the situation and the direct impact of the events in Ceuta on the security of the EU’s external borders;

28. Calls on the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, with the support of the European External Action Service and in cooperation with the relevant Member State authorities, to assess, within their respective competences and on the basis of all available information, including relevant Spanish and EU law-enforcement and intelligence information, the circumstances surrounding the events of 30 and 31 July 2026;

29. Calls on the Commission to report to Parliament on the lessons learnt from the events in Ceuta, the measures taken to prevent their recurrence and the safeguards in place to ensure that similar episodes of mass instrumentalisation cannot destabilise the EU’s external borders or the Schengen area;

30. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Government and Parliament of Spain, and the Kingdom of Morocco.