What changed

B100309/2026

B100307/2026

European Parliament resolution on Russia’s unacceptable provocative actions and drone incursions into Romania, the Baltic states and Finland

(2026/2772(RSP))

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and on Russia, in particular those adopted since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula on 19 February 2014,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the fundamental principles of international law,

– having regard to Articles 42(7) and 24(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, in particular those adopted since Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in February 2014 and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022,

– having regard to itsthe previousStrategic resolutionsCompass onfor UkraineSecurity and Russia,Defence, adopted by the Council on 21 March 2022,

– having regard to the joint white paper from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120) and to its resolution of 12 March 2025 thereon,

– having regard to the report by Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the NATO-led Baltic Sentry and Eastern Sentry operations launched along the Alliance’s eastern flank, and to ongoing discussions on the establishment of a Black Sea Sentry initiative,

– having regard to the joint white paper from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

– having regard to the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) and the European Defenceits Projectsresolution of Common Interest (EDPCI), and to12 theMarch mandate2025 ofon the European Defence Agency (EDA)white topaper supporton the developmentfuture of common defenceEuropean capabilities,defence,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia’s warresolution of aggression9 againstOctober Ukraine,2025 on European securitya andunited defence,response andto onrecent theRussian strengtheningviolations of the EU’sEU easternMember flank,States’ airspace and critical infrastructure,

– having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2026 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2025,

– having regard to its resolution of 18 December 2025 on the continuous Belarusian hybrid attacks against Lithuania,

– having regard to the Commission’s Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security, which was published on 11 February 2026,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 March 2026 on advancing the EU’s capacity to counter hybrid threats,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 September 2022 updating guidelines on general visa issuance in relation to Russian applicants following Council Decision (EU) 2022/1500 of 9 September 2022 on the suspension in whole of the application of the Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation on the facilitation of the issuance of visas to the citizens of the European Union and the Russian Federation, and on providing guidelines on controls of Russian citizens at the external borders (C(2022)7111),

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, drone incursions into European airspace and territorial waters have become an increasingly frequent and alarming phenomenon, posing a threat beyond Ukraine’s borders;

A. whereas on 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation launched an unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, in gross violation of the Charter of the United Nations and its own international commitments; whereas Russian aggression against Ukraine started in 2014 with the occupation of parts of the Donbas Region and the occupation and annexation of Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea; whereas during this time, Russia’s forces have continued and escalated indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure; whereas heavy and intense bombardments combined with ground fighting have continued throughout 2026;

B. whereas, following previous incidents involving drone fragments and other military debris falling on Romanian territory, on 29 May 2026 a Russian-made Geran-2 drone hit a residential block of flats in the eastern Romanian city of Galați, injuring civilians, including a child, and causing serious material damage, with the Galați incident marking a qualitative escalation from falling drone fragments and military debris to civilian injuries and direct damage to residential infrastructure; whereas on 5 June 2026, a maritime drone exploded in the Black Sea Port of Constanța; whereas these incidents demonstrate that Romania has been directly affected by the consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and underline the immediate risks posed to EU citizens, civilian infrastructure, maritime security and critical infrastructure in the Black Sea region;

B. whereas in recent weeks, several drones have entered Romanian, Finnish, Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian airspace; whereas Russia has repeatedly violated the airspace of EU Member States and NATO allies for decades; whereas these recent airspace violations present a reckless and ongoing escalation that threatens regional security;

C. whereas the Black Sea is increasingly a strategic theatre of military operations, hybrid threats, drone warfare, attacks on critical infrastructure and disruptions to maritime transport and trade routes; whereas the EU’s security is increasingly linked to the security and stability of the Black Sea region and its maritime domain awareness capabilities;

C. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has demonstrated the decisive role of unmanned and autonomous systems, low-cost attrition warfare and electronic warfare in modern combat, with drones now reshaping the battlefield and the nature of the threats facing the EU; whereas the EU’s ability to deter and counter these threats depends on its capacity to develop, test and field its own innovative drone and counter-drone solutions at speed;

D. whereas, on 3 June 2026, Estonia and Latvia issued simultaneous airspace alerts after sensors detected drone activity moving across the region; whereas Estonia’s EE-Alarm system broadcast warnings across six counties (Tartu, Jõgeva, Viljandi, Valga, Võru and Põlva), covering much of the country’s south and east, and Latvia issued a yellow-level warning for Alūksne municipality in the north east; whereas NATO Baltic Air Policing aircraft were scrambled and Lithuania reportedly conducted overnight reinforcement sorties in support of the response;

D. whereas on 29 May 2026, a Russian drone entered Romanian airspace and struck a residential building in the city of Galați, forcing approximately 70 civilians to evacuate and injuring two; whereas this incident was not isolated, as multiple prior violations of Romanian airspace have been documented;

E. whereas on 8 June 2026, a French military Rafale fighter jet shot down a drone that entered Latvia’s airspace from Russia;

E. whereas since March 2026, Russia has started electronically hijacking Ukrainian military drones to make incursions into the sovereign territory of EU Member States; whereas a similar incursion into Finland occurred on 15 May 2026 when a Ukrainian drone was redirected by Russia into Finnish airspace, leading to a shelter in place warning for a large part of the population and a three-hour closure of Helsinki Airport; whereas on 18 May 2026 a drone was redirected into Estonia’s airspace, after which it was shot down by a Romanian NATO fighter jet; whereas on 20 May 2026 a drone alert caused the Lithuanian capital Vilnius to come to a standstill, forcing citizens to seek shelter underground; whereas such alerts have become increasingly common in recent months; whereas on 5 June 2026 a Ukrainian naval drone that had been electronically hijacked by Russia exploded near an oil terminal in the Romanian port of Constanța; whereas on 8 June 2026 a French fighter jet had to shoot down a drone entering Latvian airspace, which marks the first time a drone has been shot down over Latvia’s territory;

F. whereas, on 8 June 2026 a drone crossed the Moldovan border and its fragments were later found in a field near the village of Lopatna in the Orhei district;

F. whereas Russia is waging a disinformation campaign in the Baltic states, falsely claiming that Ukraine is launching drone attacks on Russia from their territory; whereas on 19 May 2026 Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service alleged that Ukrainian drone units were stationed at Latvian military bases, a claim firmly rejected as disinformation by the Latvian authorities and disproved by NATO’s interception of stray drones over Baltic territory; whereas such fabrications seek to intimidate front line Member States and to manufacture pretexts for retaliation;

G. whereas Finland has investigated several incidents involving damage to undersea power and telecommunications cables in the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea, alongside cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and other acts of sabotage; whereas Finland continues to combat the instrumentalisation of migration as a form of hybrid threat at its eastern border, the longest external border that both the EU and NATO share with Russia; whereas, on 15 May 2026, Finnish authorities issued an emergency warning after detecting a suspected drone incursion into the country’s airspace, resulting in air traffic at Helsinki Airport being suspended and nearly two million residents in southern Finland being advised to take shelter;

G. whereas in response to ongoing airspace violations, on 12 September 2025 NATO announced the launch of ‘Eastern Sentry’, a multi-domain military activity aimed at bolstering NATO’s position along the eastern flank; whereas this was followed by the introduction on 16 October 2025 of the European Drone Defence Initiative and the Eastern Flank Watch as flagship projects under the Commission’s Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030; whereas on 11 February 2026 the Commission published the Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security;

H. whereas the decommissioning of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in Lithuania presents significant regional security and environmental hazards due to the presence of large volumes of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste stored in temporary overground facilities, and whereas any accident or intentional provocation to this critical infrastructure could have severe consequences for the entire Baltic region;

H. whereas on 9 June 2026 the Commission published its 21st sanctions package against Russia, which includes export restrictions for metals and alloys used in Russian drones and sanctions against entities involved in drone production; whereas, despite calls from several Member States and Members of this Parliament, exports of alumina to Russia were not included in the 21st sanctions package;

I. whereas on several occasions, unmanned aerial vehicles originating from or entering through Belarusian airspace have crossed into the territory of the Republic of Lithuania, including incidents affecting the municipalities and districts of Jonava, Vilnius District, Varėna and other areas bordering Belarus; whereas such incursions have required the deployment of military, police and civil protection resources and have demonstrated the vulnerability of the external borders of NATO and the EU to airborne provocations; whereas Lithuanian authorities have repeatedly warned residents not to approach unidentified aerial objects and to immediately report sightings through the emergency number 112; whereas some incidents have involved suspected military-type drones and explosive devices, creating significant risks for civilian populations and critical infrastructure;

I. whereas, in its communication of 30 September 2022, the Commission called for heightened scrutiny of short-stay visa applications by Russian nationals and stated that a very strict approach is justified for Russian citizens travelling for tourism, including refusal where reasonable doubts exist regarding the purpose of travel, security risks or the applicant’s intention to leave the Schengen area;

J. whereas drone-related security incidents in Lithuania have led national authorities to activate emergency warning systems and issue public alerts to residents in affected municipalities and districts; whereas residents were instructed to remain vigilant, monitor official communications, report suspicious aerial objects through the emergency number 112 and, where necessary, move to shelters or other safe locations pending the assessment of potential threats; whereas such incidents illustrate the direct impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and associated hybrid threats on the security of EU citizens;

J. whereas trade data exposed by reporters and information released by the Ukrainian military show that dual-use goods produced in Europe are still found in large quantities in Russian Geran-2 drones; whereas without Western technologies, Russia would not be able to produce the Geran-2 drones it uses to hit civilian targets in Ukraine;

K. whereas in May 2026, Lithuanian authorities issued air-alert warnings affecting Vilnius and surrounding municipalities, urging residents to seek shelter and follow emergency instructions following a drone-related security alert, demonstrating the growing threat posed by hostile aerial incursions on the EU’s eastern border;

1. Strongly condemns Russia’s repeated deliberate violations of the sovereign airspace and territory of EU Member States; expresses its undivided solidarity with the countries affected by Russian airspace violations and hijacked drone incursions, and stresses the importance for EU Member States to stand united in the face of Russia’s provocations;

L. whereas drone incursions into European airspace and territorial waters are either deliberate tests of the Alliance’s resolve or stray drones affected by Russian GPS jamming and spoofing, either way blurring the line between accident and provocation; whereas they expose serious gaps in Europe’s air and maritime defence along its eastern flank;

2. Highlights that these clear provocations are an active strategy of hybrid warfare designed to destabilise, divide and undermine the EU, its Member States and NATO; stresses the importance of societal resilience and preparedness as highlighted in the Niinistö report, which presents a comprehensive and holistic approach to preparedness and readiness that encompasses all civilian and military aspects;

M. whereas Romania, the Baltic states, Finland and other Member States on the EU’s eastern flank play a key role in safeguarding European security, stability and resilience; whereas past incidents in these Member States, and particularly the one in Romania, constitute a serious warning for the EU, demonstrating that the consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine are no longer limited to falling drone fragments or military debris, but have resulted in injuries to EU citizens on the territory of a Member State; whereas these incidents underscore the growing vulnerability of the EU’s citizens, territory and critical infrastructure to airborne and maritime threats, urgently requiring a stronger common European response to protect civilians, residential areas and critical infrastructure throughout the EU, and in particular along the EU’s eastern border;

3. Highlights with concern that current European drone detection and defence systems are inadequate and stresses the urgent need to improve detection and defence; stresses, in this context, the need for a holistic approach that focuses on better equipping police forces and civilian authorities with the means to detect and defend against drones;

N. whereas the protection of the EU’s airspace, territory and citizens against all threats constitutes a core European public good that should be financed from the EU budget; whereas meeting rising security and defence needs primarily through the redeployment of funds from existing programmes risks weakening cohesion, social, research and other policies that are equally essential to the EU’s resilience and to the regions and citizens most exposed to these threats;

4. Calls for the EU and its Member States to equip authorities with the means to counter drones at critical infrastructure sites such as airports and power plants; notes that such means must be suitable for the civilian context and follow a model of layered defence with multiple systems that can take down drones kinetically and electronically;

O. whereas the border regions most exposed to drone incursions and hybrid threats suffer not only heightened security risks but also tangible economic and social harm, including loss of tourism, declining investment, business closures and depopulation; whereas, for example, the Latgale region in eastern Latvia has experienced a severe downturn in its tourism sector as a direct consequence of repeated airspace alerts and the perception of insecurity along the EU’s eastern border;

5. Insists that urgent needs cannot wait for the next multiannual financial framework and calls for the launch of another off-budget financial facility that would sufficiently pool and Europeanise parts of national defence budgets at EU level and address the entire life cycle of military capabilities, from collaborative research and development and joint procurement to joint maintenance, training and security of supply, and which is, like the current off-budget European Peace Facility, open to non-EU countries such as Norway and the United Kingdom; stresses, therefore, the need to improve decision-making and oversight procedures compared to the current European Peace Facility governance model;

P. whereas the Commission and the High Representative’s strategic approach for the Black Sea region identifies the establishment of a Black Sea Maritime Security Hub as a flagship initiative under the Black Sea maritime security pillar; whereas Parliament has already called, through its resolutions concerning the general budget of the EU for the financial years 2026 and 2027, for the creation and operationalisation of this hub;

6. Stresses that countering drones and other emerging threats requires the EU to develop and field innovative defence solutions at speed; supports, in this context, the proposed programme for agile and rapid defence innovation (AGILE) and calls for its contract-based model to be scaled up substantially; underlines the importance of EU action to foster innovation by small and medium-sized enterprises, start-ups and new defence actors, in particular on the eastern flank, so that they can scale up and help meet the EU’s capability needs, especially in drone and counter-drone warfare; calls for increased and dedicated support to this end under the next multiannual financial framework;

Q. whereas recent incidents have demonstrated the need for a permanent and integrated European presence and a common European monitoring, early warning and rapid response system for the detection, interception and neutralisation of unmanned aerial and maritime threats along the EU’s eastern border and in the Black Sea basin; whereas enhanced military mobility, interoperability, early warning capabilities and forward deployment of assets are essential for effective deterrence and rapid response;

7. Expresses its gratitude to Ukraine for volunteering assistance and cooperation to the affected Member States in the wake of the airspace incursions by redirected drones; is obliged to Ukraine for sending air defence experts to Lithuania to assist that country with its protection against stray drones; notes the recently announced cooperation between Ukraine and Latvia to promote joint drone production with Ukrainian companies;

R. whereas the development of sovereign European drone and counter-drone production capabilities, including through regional industrial hubs located in front line Member States, is essential to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), reduce strategic dependencies and ensure rapid operational readiness;

8. Welcomes the Commission’s 21st sanctions package as announced on 9 June 2026, including the sanctions against more than 30 entities involved in drone production and the new export bans on ground support equipment, and jamming and launch systems; expresses serious concern about the fact that European dual-use goods, the export of some of which is already sanctioned, are currently ending up in Russian drones; calls on the Commission, the EU Sanctions Envoy and the Member States to strictly implement the new and existing sanctions, to prioritise without delay the closing of loopholes in supply chains, and for additional sanctions to be imposed as needed, in particular concerning legal entities in non-EU country re-export hubs, to ensure that European dual-use goods and technology are no longer contributing to the production of Russian drones;

1. Condemns, in the strongest terms, Russia’s sustained and escalating military and hybrid provocations against the EU and its Member States, in particular Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland; further condemns the use of drones and other airborne incursions, as well as other acts of hybrid warfare aimed at targeting and disrupting critical infrastructure, thereby posing a serious threat to the safety, security and well-being of citizens;

9. Regrets that the 21st sanctions package failed to include any restriction on exports of alumina to Russia, a strategic raw material that ultimately feeds Russia’s military-industrial complex; calls on the Commission and the Member States to include alumina in the next sanctions package without delay, and urges all Member States not to block such a listing on grounds of national economic interest;

2. Declares that Russia bears full and unequivocal responsibility for the actions that have taken place, which are escalatory, prone to risk miscalculation and endanger lives; reiterates that the acts of the Russian Federation constitute a deliberate, systematic, and ongoing threat to the security, resilience and sovereignty of the EU and its Member States;

10. Calls on Member States, in particular those issuing the majority of visas to Russian nationals, to strictly implement the Commission Implementing Decision of 6 November 2025 establishing adapted rules on the issuing of multiple-entry visas to Russian nationals residing in the Russian Federation and applying in the Russian Federation for short-stay visas (C(2025)7552), and fully apply the Commission’s 2022 guidance on heightened scrutiny, especially for tourist and other non-essential travel, while safeguarding access for anti-war political activists, independent journalists, human rights defenders, civil society representatives and humanitarian cases;

3. Underlines that the EU and its Member States will not be deterred by these or further hostile acts by the Russian Federation from their enduring commitments to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s war of aggression; recalls that Ukraine’s security contributes to that of Europe as a whole, and stresses Ukraine’s inherent right to self-defence against Russia’s brutal and unprovoked war of aggression; believes that the outcome of the war and the stance taken by the international community will play a crucial role in influencing future aggressive action by Russia in Europe and beyond;

11. Reiterates its condemnation of Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine in the strongest possible terms and demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land and infrastructure; expresses its undivided solidarity with the people of Ukraine, fully supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and underlines that this war constitutes a serious violation of international law;

4. Reaffirms that the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Union is a fundamental principle of the EU; stresses that any violation thereof constitutes a serious threat to the EU’s security, resilience and democratic foundations, and underlines the need for an immediate, firm, united and proportionate response to protect citizens and critical infrastructure and to detect, deter and counter such hostile activities; urges, in this regard, the Member States to employ, in full compliance with international law, all necessary military and non-military tools to defend the EU, its citizens and territory against threats from all directions;

12. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary-General of NATO, the President and Parliament of Ukraine, and the President and Parliament of the Russian Federation.

5. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to urgently increase investments in security and defence in order to close all capability gaps, establish a strong common deterrence, and provide adequate support to Ukraine, ensuring that the EU and its Member States are equipped to address all threats, from hybrid and cyber to conventional military challenges; stresses the importance of using these investments to stimulate joint action, including with Ukraine, in order to improve the efficiency of public spending and interoperability, as well as the EU’s strategic autonomy; stresses that European funding must support European industry, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, secure resilient supply chains and generate technological leadership and high-quality jobs;

6. Recommends strengthening strategic enablers as a fundamental component of European defence integration, including intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance, cyber capabilities, space assets, and integrated command-and-control systems; stresses that these capabilities are critical for effective coordination and timely responses in modern security environments and recommends they should be developed jointly at the European level to ensure efficiency, resilience, and collective operational readiness;

7. Regrets that the EU and the Member States have not invested sufficiently in drone technologies and production capacities in recent years, creating capability gaps and strategic dependencies; stresses that the evolving security environment and the lessons learnt from the war in Ukraine demonstrate the urgent need to accelerate investments and strengthen the EDTIB;

8. Recognises the particular vulnerability of, and expresses its full solidarity with, citizens in the EU border regions along the eastern flank, who are most exposed to serious threats and who also bear significant economic and social costs as a result; calls for targeted EU-level measures, including dedicated financial support, to strengthen the protection of borders and critical infrastructure, and ensure prevention, preparedness, resilience and emergency response and reconstruction for affected communities in these particularly exposed regions;

9. Stresses that a common defence against airborne, maritime and hybrid threats, in particular along the EU’s eastern border, must be adequately financed by the EU budget; calls on the Commission and the Council to adapt relevant EU funding instruments in order to ensure that expenditure related to the consequences of Russia’s provocations and hybrid attacks on the territory of Member States may be eligible for EU financial support and rapid reimbursement procedures, where compatible with the legal bases of the respective instruments; insists that the next multiannual financial framework provide dedicated funding for a common defence; underlines that such financing must be ensured through a genuine reinforcement of the budget and not through the redeployment of resources away from cohesion, social, research and other EU programmes, on which the resilience of citizens and regions also depends;

10. Calls on the Member States to urgently accelerate European drone and counter-drone development and production, ensuring that capability plans and procurement strategies are fit for purpose, with increased investment in large-scale production and joint procurement of affordable systems to strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy and deliver scalable, cost-effective capabilities;

11. Calls for the rapid establishment of joint, layered counter-drone defence systems, starting on the eastern flank, capable of detecting and intercepting airborne and seaborne threats from outside the EU, including through enhanced air and maritime surveillance, early-warning systems, rapid-response assets and improved military mobility infrastructure; underlines that these capabilities are essential for protecting citizens and critical infrastructure, ensuring effective deterrence, and safeguarding the EU’s role as a global actor committed to peace, human rights and the rule of law; urges the Commission and the EDA to make full use of their mandates, including through the EDIP and EDPCI frameworks, to coordinate national efforts effectively;

12. Calls on the Member States to actively cooperate with Ukraine, particularly in the areas of air and missile defence and drone and counter-drone warfare, acknowledging its groundbreaking operational expertise and advanced capabilities, and thus strengthening both European and Ukrainian defence capabilities; calls, in particular, on Member States to integrate their threat-detection system with that of Ukraine; recommends, in particular, establishing structured mechanisms to facilitate ongoing knowledge-sharing on drone and counter-drone technologies; invites the Member States to consider engagement in training missions in Ukraine in order to fully absorb the expertise and innovative techniques possessed by the Ukrainian armed forces; welcomes bilateral and regional initiatives in that direction, such as the one set up between Romania and Ukraine;

13. Calls on the Commission to establish and rapidly operationalise a European Black Sea Maritime Security Hub serving as a regional centre for real-time maritime domain awareness, satellite-based and seabed monitoring, early warning, intelligence-sharing, protection of critical underwater, energy, transport and port infrastructure, counter-drone and counter-hybrid operations, responses to naval mines, hostile unmanned maritime systems and the activities of Russia’s shadow fleet, coordination with Black Sea littoral Member States and partner countries, and direct cooperation with relevant EU and NATO structures, in support of EU and NATO maritime security initiatives in the Black Sea basin; notes that locating this hub in affected Member States, such as Romania, could be beneficial and enhance maritime security in the Black Sea region;

14. Welcomes the ongoing NATO-led Baltic Sentry and Eastern Sentry operations; welcomes discussions on the potential establishment of a Black Sea Sentry initiative to strengthen maritime security, improve regional situational awareness, safeguard critical infrastructure, and support freedom of navigation in the Black Sea region in accordance with international law;

15. Calls for the establishment of a defensive, European-led Integrated Air Protection Zone over uncontested territory of Ukraine, designed to strengthen civilian protection and critical infrastructure resilience against missile and drone attacks; stresses that such an initiative should form part of a broader European air and missile defence architecture, based on integrated capabilities and close coordination with Ukraine, while ensuring compliance with international law and avoiding escalation risks; underlines that this approach would contribute to enhanced regional security and the protection of European airspace;

16. Calls on the EU and the Member States to adopt a comprehensive approach to defence, recognising that security extends beyond military assets and encompasses defending against acts of hybrid warfare; underscores the importance of developing a robust EU‑level toolbox for safeguarding the integrity of the EU’s external borders and for supporting Member States facing pressure from hostile third countries, which should include legal, financial and operational measures to allow it to defend itself against hybrid attacks; stresses that unless the vulnerabilities undermining citizens’ trust in institutions and democracy are addressed, the EU risks instability and weakness despite military strength; urges the development of defence investment plans in a way that also strengthens social cohesion within and among regions and Member States;

17. Urges the EU and the Member States to develop clearer procedures and common assessment criteria for the potential activation of Article 42(7) TEU in the context of hybrid threats; calls, furthermore, for enhanced intelligence-sharing, joint exercises, and coordinated preparedness measures to ensure a swift and effective collective response to evolving security challenges;

18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary General of NATO, and the President and Parliament of Ukraine.