What changed

B100578/2025

P10_TA(2025)0345

European Parliament resolution on the continuousContinuous Belarusian hybrid attacks against Lithuania

(2025/3025(RSP))

PE779.052

European Parliament resolution of 18 December 2025 on the continuous Belarusian hybrid attacks against Lithuania (2025/3025(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU of 29 October 2025 on Belarus’ hybrid actions at the EU external border,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Belarus, Russia and Ukraine,

– having regard to the public declaration by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, describing the smuggling balloon incursions as a ‘provocation’ and a ‘hybrid threat’ that we cannot tolerate,

– having regard to the statement of 29 October 2025 by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU on Belarus’ hybrid actions at the EU external border,

– having regard to itsthe previousCharter resolutionsof onthe BelarusUnited andNations, the complicity ofHelsinki theFinal BelarusianAct authoritiesand inthe Russia’sfundamental warprinciples of aggression againstinternational Ukraine,law,

– having regard to the report by Special Adviser to the President of the Commission Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas Belarus has intensified its hybrid operations against Lithuania, including the deployment of UAVs and balloon incursions, cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns, and continues to instrumentalise migration;

A. whereas Lithuanian officials report that since the start of 2025, around 600 weather balloons linked to smuggling and originating from Belarus have entered EU airspace, which has led to 16 closures of airports, affecting over 300 flights and more than 47 000 passengers, and causing more than EUR 750 000 in losses to Lithuanian airports and aviation companies; whereas the Lithuanian Government considers that the weather balloons are now primarily targeting the country’s main international airport;

B. whereas these actions must be understood in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its broader strategy to destabilise the EU and NATO; whereas Belarus is a platform for Russia’s hybrid operations against Europe; whereas intelligence and security assessments across the EU indicate that Belarusian hybrid tactics closely align with and contribute to Russia’s broader strategy of hostility against the EU and its Member States;

B. whereas on 9 December 2025, the Government of Lithuania declared a ‘nationwide emergency situation’ in response to the ongoing and escalating balloon incursions originating from Belarus, recognising the threat these actions pose to national security and civil aviation safety;

C. whereas, since 2024, Lithuania has recorded hundreds of airspace violations by objects launched from Belarus, including weather balloons, none of which had been notified to aviation authorities, constituting breaches of international safety rules and Lithuanian sovereignty;

C. whereas the weather balloons were initially used to carry smuggled cigarettes over the border, with most of these cigarettes then consumed in Lithuania; whereas the Lithuanian State Border Guard Service reported that it confiscated 1.4 million packs of illicit cigarettes in 2024, of which 1.2 million packs were marked for sale in Belarus;

D. whereas these incursions, including in the vicinity of Vilnius and Kaunas airports, are endangering lives, undermining security and disrupting civil aviation, and have already caused 19 airport closures and affected hundreds of flights and tens of thousands of passengers, causing significant economic losses;

D. whereas the use of these weather balloons is considered a form of hybrid attack because they can also ‘double’ as sabotage tools by forcing the closure of airports for safety reasons, and thus form part of a broader hybrid campaign against Lithuania;

E. whereas the Lithuanian authorities have reported a major escalation of hybrid activities originating from Belarus, having detected three balloons in 2023, 184 in 2024, and around 700 balloons and 200 drone intrusions in 2025;

E. whereas Belarusian hybrid attacks follow the example of Russia, which has repeatedly violated the airspace of EU Member States and NATO allies for decades; whereas such airspace violations have rapidly increased over the last year and present a reckless escalation that threatens regional security; whereas the EU has imposed sanctions on Belarus and has expressed the political will to adopt further measures in response to Belarus’s escalating hybrid attacks against the EU;

F. whereas Lithuanian security services have recovered debris from Belarus-launched UAVs and balloons, indicating controlled deployment, onboard electronics and, in one case, the presence of explosive materials;

F. whereas the growing repression in Belarus, especially since the 2020 fraudulent elections, has resulted in high levels of migration from Belarus, mostly to Poland, Lithuania and Georgia; whereas Lithuania currently hosts over 50 000 migrants from Belarus, including many political activists in exile; whereas Lithuania has long been a key supporter of Belarus’s democratic movement;

G. whereas, since Lithuania’s decision to temporarily close its border with Belarus, the Belarusian de facto authorities have engaged in economic coercion by detaining European freight vehicles, threatening their confiscation and obstructing lawful cross-border trade;

G. whereas Belarus has been involved and complicit in Russia’s unprovoked, unjustifiable and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, in gross violation of the United Nations Charter and its own international commitments;

H. whereas, since 2021, Belarus has systematically instrumentalised migration by directing irregular migrants toward the Lithuanian border as a deliberate destabilisation strategy; whereas, taken together, UAVs and balloon incursions, disinformation campaigns and border pressure constitute a pattern of coordinated hybrid aggression against Lithuania and the EU;

H. whereas EU countries in the Baltic Sea region and along the eastern border face persistent provocations by Russia and Belarus and must maintain a high level of readiness and resilience;

I. whereas, on 9 December 2025, following a surge in balloons launched from Belarus, Lithuania declared a national state of emergency and authorised the shooting down of unmanned flying objects;

1. Expresses its solidarity with Lithuania and stresses the importance for EU Member States to stand united in the face of provocations by Belarus and Russia; stresses that the EU must not condone hybrid attacks against any of its Member States; reaffirms that any attack on the security and stability of one Member State is considered an attack on the EU as a whole and requires a united and robust European response;

J. whereas Belarus has tried to deflect responsibility by falsely accusing Lithuania of espionage and fabricating evidence, mirroring established Russian information warfare tactics aimed at eroding public trust and deflecting accountability; whereas countering such actions requires coordination at EU and NATO level;

2. Strongly condemns Belarus’s persistent and provocative actions against the EU and its Member States, which are unacceptable; considers that these actions are intentional, coordinated and hostile acts, all aiming to undermine international law, security, civil aviation safety and public order in the EU; calls on the Belarusian regime to cease all airspace violations and to fight against organised criminal activities in Belarus;

K. whereas Belarus maintains increasingly close military and intelligence cooperation with and dependence on Russia, including shared air-defence structures, the transfer of technology in UAV systems and coordinated hybrid operations targeting EU Member States; whereas these hybrid attacks serve the strategic interests of the Kremlin by testing air-defence and detection systems, probing response thresholds and undermining NATO and EU cohesion;

3. Welcomes the EU sanctions that have been imposed on Belarus since 2020 and urgently calls for further effective sanctions in response to this latest hybrid campaign against Lithuania; reiterates its call on the Member States to impose sanctions on Belarus equal to those imposed on Russia, particularly on officials responsible for transnational repression; welcomes proposals for sanctions targeting nitrogen fertilisers on top of already sanctioned Belarusian potash, along with an EU import ban on Belarusian rapeseed oil and salt;

L. whereas the EU’s eastern flank constitutes a strategic area for Europe’s overall security and therefore requires strengthened infrastructure, enhanced surveillance capabilities and effective rapid reinforcement mechanisms; whereas Lithuania’s experience demonstrates the urgent need for coordinated EU action, effective and innovative counter-UAV capabilities, border-protection technologies and rapid information-sharing across the Member States;

4. Insists that urgent needs cannot wait for the next multiannual financial framework and calls for the launch of another off-budget financial facility that would sufficiently pool and Europeanise parts of national defence budgets at EU level and address the entire life cycle of military capabilities, from collaborative research and development and joint procurement to joint maintenance, training and security of supply, and that, like the current off-budget European Peace Facility, would be open to non-EU countries such as Norway and the United Kingdom; stresses, therefore, the need to improve decision-making and oversight procedures compared to the current European Peace Facility governance model; calls on the EU Member States to use loans under the Security Action for Europe initiative in this regard;

M. whereas the Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 points to the European Drone Defence Initiative and Eastern Flank Watch as the initiatives that should be launched first;

5. Highlights that both Belarus and Russia are engaging in an active strategy of hybrid attacks against EU Member States to sow fear and distrust and to test and destabilise societies; stresses, therefore, the importance of societal resilience and preparedness, as highlighted in the recommendations of the Niinistö report;

N. whereas the US decided to lift some sanctions against Belarus without prior coordination with the EU;

6. Requests the Commission to prepare measures to protect critical infrastructure and to safeguard the continuity of trans-European transport services against such hybrid actions in the future;

1. Strongly condemns Belarus’s ongoing hybrid attacks against Lithuania, and therefore the EU, including UAV and balloon incursions, instrumentalised migration, economic coercion, smuggling operations, military provocations, cyberattacks and state-sponsored disinformation; considers these attacks to be deliberate, coordinated and hostile, and part of a broader Russia-led strategy to undermine the EU, the Member States’ governments and NATO;

7. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure the international accountability of the Belarusian regime for illegally restraining EU vehicles and for endangering the safety and security of civil aviation;

2. Condemns the retaliatory measures taken by the Lukashenka regime against Lithuania, including the illegal detention and intimidation of European freight operators, which constitute acts of coercion aimed at an EU Member State;

8. Calls for the EU and its international partners to strengthen sanctions against individuals and entities responsible for the evasion of sanctions, the undermining of democracy and the rule of law, repression, human rights violations and crimes against humanity, and for Belarus’s participation in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, while also closing sanctions loopholes;

3. Expresses its full solidarity with Lithuania and other Member States targeted by Belarusian hybrid attacks; reiterates that threats to one Member State’s security affect the EU as a whole and require a united response;

9. Urges the International Criminal Court to expedite proceedings on crimes against humanity by Lukashenka’s regime and demands that Member States pursue accountability through national proceedings, based on the principle of extraterritorial and universal jurisdiction, consistent with international due process standards;

4. Demands that Belarus immediately cease all hybrid attacks against Lithuania and other Member States, including the launch of unmanned devices, smuggling, regime-supported organised crime, disinformation, economic coercion, intelligence recruitment, and the instrumentalisation of migration, immediately release all European hauliers and their property, compensate them for any financial losses and ensure the safety of civil aviation and border crossings; condemns the Lukashenka regime for instigating acts of sabotage and other hostile actions directed against Lithuania and other EU Member States, providing operational support for these acts and offering a safe haven to the perpetrators, as evidenced by the recent railway track explosion in Poland and by the granting of refuge to the perpetrators of the murder of Polish soldier Mateusz Sitek, who was killed at the Polish-Belarusian border; calls for the immediate cessation of these hostile actions and for the surrender of those responsible for the above-mentioned serious crimes to law enforcement authorities;

10. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary-General of NATO and the President and Parliament of Belarus.

5. Fully supports Lithuania’s right to take proportionate measures against any attacks to protect its sovereignty, public order and aviation safety, including the interception or neutralisation of unmanned flying objects originating from Belarus:

6. Deplores the lack of coordination surrounding the partial lifting of US sanctions on Belarus on 13 December 2025, which undermines solidarity and collective support for EU and NATO members targeted by Belarusian hybrid attacks; stresses that statements by the US special envoy to Belarus on the Belarusian de facto authorities giving assurances that the balloon launches will be stopped indicate an acknowledgement of responsibility and are relevant for the establishment of state responsibility under international law;

7. Reiterates that it does not recognise Aliaksandr Lukashenka as the legitimate President of Belarus; stresses that any review of EU sanctions against Belarus or engagement with it must be strictly conditional upon Belarus effecting sustained, verifiable and irreversible systemic change, including the release of the more than 1 100 remaining political prisoners; calls for solidarity in addressing the threats posed by the Lukashenka regime, particularly those posed by its state-engineered instrumentalisation of migration; strongly condemns the Belarusian de facto authorities’ use of migration for political ends;

8. Calls for deeper EU-NATO intelligence cooperation on airspace security and counter-hybrid threats; calls for strengthened EU-NATO cooperation on Lithuanian airspace surveillance, including unified incident-classification protocols, enhanced air-policing rotations and coordinated responses to balloon or UAV intrusions; underlines the need for regular joint exercises simulating hybrid aerial threats; calls on the Member States to ensure the rapid cross-border mobility of military and security assets, including air-defence and counter-UAV capabilities, in support of Lithuania;

9. Calls on the Member States and the NATO allies to reassess current strategic and operational frameworks for addressing hybrid threats, with a view to strengthening deterrence, preparedness and timely responses, moving from a reactive approach to proactive deterrence;

10. Emphasises that the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure, including transport and aviation infrastructure, must be structurally embedded and adequately financed in the next MFF;

11. Calls on the Commission and Frontex, in full respect of its mandate, to support the strengthening of Lithuania’s border and airspace surveillance through the use of additional sensors, patrol aircraft, mobile counter-UAV kits and real-time threat analysis; notes that Belarus’s hybrid tactics expose structural vulnerabilities requiring a collective EU response; welcomes the European Drone Defence Initiative as a flagship European project for detecting, tracking and countering hostile unmanned aerial systems; welcomes the proposed Eastern Flank Watch, aimed at integrating air-defence and counter-drone capabilities with ground-based and maritime security in the Baltic and Black Sea regions; calls on the Commission to prepare measures to protect Trans-European Transport Network infrastructure and safeguard the continuity of trans-European transport services against future hybrid attacks; calls for the swift implementation of these projects;

12. Calls for deeper EU–Ukraine cooperation on drone technologies, counter-UAV systems, cyber protection and hybrid-threat resilience, recognising Ukraine’s expertise as strategically valuable for EU security;

13. Welcomes the recent adoption of a new sanctions criterion covering hybrid attacks against Member States; calls on the Council to adopt additional targeted sanctions against Belarusian officials, state-owned and private entities, and individuals involved in UAV production and deployment and all other hybrid operations targeting critical infrastructure, economic activities and democratic institutions; calls on the Council to take further sectoral measures against Belarus, including expanded restrictions in the aviation and financial sectors, additional import and investment bans, broader service prohibitions, restrictions on access to governance roles in critical European infrastructure, and bans on accepting donations from the Belarusian de facto authorities and publicly owned entities;

14. Calls for the EU and the Member States to pursue international accountability for Belarus’s actions, including threats to civil aviation, the illegal detention of EU freight operators and the transnational repression of Belarusians residing in EU Member States, and to raise these issues in relevant international forums;

15. Urges the Council to incorporate eastern-border security priorities into the next MFF, ensuring sustained EU investments to counter hybrid threats and to improve the resilience of the EU’s critical infrastructure, military mobility and defence technologies;

16. Rejects Belarusian disinformation propagating fabricated evidence or alleging espionage; calls for the EU and the Member States to strengthen strategic communication, counter disinformation, publicly attribute hostile acts and implement the recommendations contained in the Niinistö report, in order to build societal resilience;

17. Calls on European businesses, particularly hauliers, to reassess the security risks associated with operating in Belarus and to take appropriate protective measures;

18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU Member States, NATO, the UN and the Belarusian de facto authorities.