What changed

B100466/2025

B100461/2025

European Parliament resolution on the polarisation and increased repression in Serbia, one year after the Novi Sad tragedy

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia,

– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part, which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

– having regard to the EU-Serbia Stabilisation and Association Agreement,

– having regard to Serbia’s application for EU membership, submitted on 19 December 2009,

– having regard to the final report of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on the early parliamentary elections held in Serbia on 17 December 2023,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 andentitled 2024‘New Commissiongrowth reportsplan onfor Serbia,the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

– having regard to the open letter on Serbia of February 2025 by the Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos, and to her subsequent visit to Serbia in April 2025,

– having regard to the statement of UN human rights experts of 4 August 2025 condemning the Serbian Government’s violent crackdown on peaceful protesters,

– having regard to the Council conclusions on Enlargement of 17 December 2024,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas Serbia’s continued democratic decline is manifest in worsening corruption, a deterioration in the rule of law and freedom of expression, insufficient judicial independence, and a lack of media pluralism and trust in state institutions, as well as in insufficient alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, which is hindering Serbia’s progress towards EU membership;

A. whereas on 1 November 2024, a concrete and glass canopy collapsed in the main railway station in Novi Sad, leading to the deaths of 16 people; whereas the railway station underwent renovations from 2021 to mid-2024; whereas this tragedy triggered large-scale student and citizen protests across Serbia; whereas protesters initially demanded a transparent investigation into the collapse, criticising government corruption, with their calls soon escalating into demands for early elections;

B. whereas on 1 November 2024, the concrete canopy of the Novi Sad railway station in Serbia collapsed, killing 16 people and injuring several others;

B. whereas the December 2023 parliamentary elections brought the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) a very large victory; whereas the SNS won 46.7 % of the vote, far ahead of the newly formed opposition coalition Serbia Against Violence (SPN), which gained only 23.6 % of the vote;

C. whereas the station had been renovated under a publicly financed infrastructure project implemented by a consortium of Chinese state-owned companies as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative; whereas in the aftermath of the tragedy the debris of the canopy was carelessly discarded, thus destroying the evidence for the investigation;

C. whereas supporters of the SPN opposition coalition, among them the Green-Left Front’s co-leader Radomir Lazović, engaged in violent demonstrations against the result of the parliamentary elections of December 2023, in an attempt to storm the Belgrade city hall; whereas more than 30 people were arrested during this demonstration and eight police officers were injured;

D. whereas investigative reporting by the Serbian media has uncovered a pattern of politically connected contractors winning major state construction tenders; whereas such corruption practices resulted in a tragic, mass loss of life in Novi Sad train station;

D. whereas the mass street protests in 2024, following the Novi Sad tragedy, led to the resignation of Serbia’s Prime Minister Miloš Vučević on 28 January 2025, along with the Mayor of Novi Sad, Milan Djuric; whereas the demonstrators nevertheless continued their street protests, calling for snap elections;

E. whereas the Novi Sad tragedy has triggered a massive democratic civic protest movement in Serbia led by students, calling for accountability, transparency, justice and the rule of law; whereas the protests continue to the present day; whereas protests have spread to over 400 cities and towns, becoming the largest grassroots movement in decades; whereas on 1 October 2025 thousands of people marched in Belgrade in remembrance of the Novi Sad tragedy;

E. whereas in the summer of 2025, anti-government protests intensified and violence re-emerged; whereas anti-government protestors and supporters of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić are holding parallel rallies across Serbia;

F. whereas inon 16 September 20252025, the publicHigher prosecutorPublic Prosecutor’s Office in Novi Sad re-indictedfiled 13an individuals,updated includingindictment, thecharging Serbia’s former Minister for Construction, Transport Ministerand Infrastructure Goran Vesić,Vesić overand the12 tragedy,others, afterincluding theanother initialformer indictmentminister, wasTomislav rejectedMomirović, bywho headed the courtConstruction, Transport and returnedInfrastructure forMinistry furtherbefore investigation;Vesić; whereas those indicted face charges of serious crimes against public safety;

G. whereas the victims of the Novi Sad tragedy and their relatives are still waiting for justice to be served, and for a transparent, accurate and timely investigation into the incident; whereas serious concerns persist regarding the independence of the investigation and the full disclosure of findings; whereas information on the contracting conditions and financing of the renovation of Novi Sad station has not been publicly disclosed; whereas such an approach by the Serbian authorities demonstrates a lack of transparency and an effort to obfuscate the investigation;

G. whereas Serbia ranked 105th in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index;

H. whereas the protest movement’s demands were initially met with a defensive reaction by the Vučić government, which rejected the allegation that systemic failures caused the tragedy and agreed only to cosmetic political reshuffles;

H. whereas in November 2023, the Commission announced a growth plan for the Western Balkans, to accelerate the region’s socio-economic development and EU integration; whereas a EUR 6 billion Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans is to provide key support for the implementation of the growth plan; whereas in October 2024, the Commission approved the Reform Agenda for Serbia, anticipating EUR 1.586 billion in non-repayable grants and highly concessional loans;

I. whereas the Vučić government and pro-government media then proceeded to demonise the protesters through smear campaigns and portrayed them as terrorists and foreign agents; whereas some activists were arbitrarily arrested, detained, interrogated and had their private communication monitored; whereas state intelligence agencies were involved in secret recordings of students, which were then released to the public in an effort to discredit them;

I. whereas between 2021 and 2024 the EU allocated over EUR 586 million in financial and technical assistance to Serbia under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance;

J. whereas the growing protests were met with excessive use of force, including the use of tear gas, stun grenades and batons to disperse them; whereas many activists, including high school students, were arbitrarily arrested during the protests, with some being detained for prolonged periods of time and being subjected to mistreatment and violence in detention, or being forced into to exile;

J. whereas under the economic and investment plan for the Western Balkans, since 2020, the EU has mobilised EUR 6.2 billion in investments, including support for railways and healthcare;

K. whereas on 15 March 2025, during the largest rally in Belgrade in decades, the alleged illegal use of ‘sound cannon’ during a silent vigil for the victims of the disaster caused shock and a stampede; whereas the Serbian Government invited Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) to investigate the incident, which concluded that acoustic crowd dispersal devices were not used, and alleged that a ‘staged provocation’ was involved; whereas the human rights organisation Earshot, which specialises in sonic investigations, conducted a thorough investigation into the alleged sonic weapon attack and concluded that it was ‘very likely’ that protesters were targeted by a directed acoustic weapon;

K. whereas the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, accounting for 59.7 % of Serbia’s total trade in goods in 2023; whereas total EU foreign direct investment reached EUR 1.39 billion in 2022;

L. whereas over the summer, pro-government hooligans and thugs were deployed at many protests to attack demonstrators with pyrotechnics, further escalating tensions, violence and polarisation in the country; whereas incidents of violence were also reported against members of national minorities, including the Slovak minority in Bački Petrovac and across the province of Vojvodina, notably on 9 and 10 August 2025; whereas such repression of democratic protests is in clear breach of Serbia’s commitments under the EU accession negotiations;

L. whereas in Serbia, support for EU accession has plummeted to an historic low point; whereas according to a Eurobarometer survey, published in September 2025, only 33 % of Serbian citizens support EU accession, reflecting general distrust towards the EU;

M. whereas President Vučić is actively fostering a culture of violence by pardoning thugs accused of assaulting students, using aggressive and divisive language towards his citizens, justifying acts of violence and spreading conspiracy theories; whereas President Vučić has also been using dehumanising language towards EU politicians, including Members of the European Parliament;

M. whereas Serbia is deepening its energy ties with Russia while purchasing Chinese surveillance systems; whereas on 29 September 2025, an international parliamentary conference entitled ‘BRICS – Serbia among friends’ was held in the Serbian National Assembly, joined by diplomats from BRICS countries along with officials of the Socialist Party of Serbia and the ‘We, the People’s Power’ movement; whereas according to a 2025 survey by the Institute for European Studies in Belgrade and the Lidington Research agency, more than 60 % of Serbian citizens support joining BRICS;

N. whereas President Vučić has repeatedly accused the EU and the West of orchestrating a ‘colour revolution’ in Serbia, without evidence; whereas Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) has supported this narrative and accused the EU of carrying out ‘subversive activities’ to fuel the protests, with the goal of triggering a ‘colour revolution’;

N. whereas on 25 June 2024, the EU and Serbia signed an agreement on operational cooperation in border management with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), allowing Frontex to carry out joint operations and deploying its standing corps at Serbia’s borders with neighbouring non-EU countries;

O. whereas journalists covering the protests have been violently attacked by pro-government forces; whereas according to multiple reports the Serbian Government continues to use spyware surveillance on journalists, activists and political opponents;

O. whereas in October 2024, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Serbian President Vučić issued a joint statement, calling for a united front against illegal migration;

P. whereas the Balkan office of Russia’s RT television network in Belgrade plays a key role in disseminating the Kremlin’s propaganda across south-eastern Europe, further increasing polarisation in Serbia;

P. whereas Serbia actively participates in EU crisis management missions and operations under the EU’s common foreign and security policy;

Q. whereas the Serbian Government itself could be implicated in conducting and facilitating foreign interference operations, probably in coordination with Russia; whereas this concerns both candidate and potential candidate partners; whereas over 150 foreign nationals with pro-Russian leanings were given shooting training in Serbia with the intention of inciting unrest ahead of Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections; whereas perpetrators of this crime, one of whom was linked to a high-ranking Serbian official, were only arrested after a media outcry; whereas the Serbian Government exerted direct influence on the 2025 parliamentary elections in Kosovo;

Q. whereas Serbia supports the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, and has condemned the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas Serbia has supported various UN resolutions, including the UN General Assembly resolution of 12 October 2022 condemning Russia’s annexation of four eastern regions of Ukraine; whereas Serbia has provided considerable humanitarian aid to the civilian population of Ukraine since the start of the war;

R. whereas a group of Serbian citizens, later arrested by Serbian law enforcement at the request of foreign national authorities, have committed hate crimes among various ethnic and religious groups in France and Germany with the intention of inciting fear and violence;

1. Notes the updated indictment by the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office in Novi Sad against former Minister for Construction, Transport and Infrastructure Goran Vesić and 12 others; notes that the indictment proposes detention for all the defendants, due to the risk of a ‘significant public disturbance, which could jeopardise the smooth and fair conduct of the criminal proceedings’; calls on all the actors to respect the principle of separation of powers;

S. whereas the long-running protest movement in Serbia demonstrates the public’s frustration with the culture of corruption and impunity, and the erosion of trust in Serbia’s institutions, including the courts, parliament and media; whereas the student movement is among the three finalists nominated for the 2025 Sakharov Prize;

2. Is deeply concerned by the persistent street violence and deep polarisation within Serbian society;

1. Expresses deep sympathy and solidarity with the victims of the Novi Sad tragedy and their families; calls for an independent, timely, comprehensive and transparent investigation into the tragedy and for all those responsible for the disaster to be held to account;

3. Affirms that the SNS won the parliamentary elections of December 2023 by a very large margin and that the Serbian people made a clear choice regarding the composition of their government;

2. Recognises the crucial role played by students and young people in courageously fighting for Serbia’s democratic values and freedoms;

4. Welcomes the pluralistic composition of the Serbian National Assembly, with its broad representation of political parties, including parties of national minorities;

3. Recognises that the democratic decline in Serbia under the government of President Vučić has been continuing for years and that the current situation demands a concrete response by the EU institutions;

5. Recalls that in a democracy, people have the freedom to assemble and to protest against government measures; recalls, however, that in a democracy, power is transferred through elections and that political parties must respect the outcomes of elections and not incite violent street protests;

4. Calls on the Commission and the Council to support the demands of students in Serbia, which are not only an expression of domestic discontent, but are also directly linked to the rule of law, with the aim of ensuring that institutions work effectively, within their mandate and with democratic accountability, standards which the EU expects of Serbia;

6. Calls on the EU to respect the democratic choice of the Serbian people and to avoid drawing stark contrasts between the different parties; warns the EU that by supporting efforts to overturn a legitimate election result because of dissatisfaction with its outcome, it is undermining democracy in Serbia and fuelling polarisation and instability;

5. Condemns the Serbian authorities’ use of violence, intimidation, arbitrary detention, and illegal surveillance against the protesters; calls for the immediate release of all protesters in detention and under house arrest;

7. Notes the serious decline in Serbia of public support for EU accession; notes that, at the same time, the topic of Serbia’s potential membership of the BRICS countries is steadily gaining traction;

6. Calls on the Serbian Government to fully guarantee and respect its people’s right of assembly and freedom of expression in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights;

8. Is concerned that corruption is still prevalent in many areas, also related to work designated by the EU as ‘projects of interest for the Republic of Serbia’; notes the adoption by the Serbian Government of an anti-corruption strategy for the 2024-2028 period; deplores, however, that only limited progress has been made in the fight against corruption; encourages Serbia to step up the fight against corruption and to strengthen the independence of its anti-corruption institutions;

7. Calls on Serbia to align with EU policies in countering foreign interference and disinformation campaigns by implementing concrete regulatory measures in line with EU standards, such as the Digital Services Act and the Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising;

9. Notes that the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) has launched a separate investigation into the possible misuse of EU funds for the Novi Sad railway station’s 2021-2024 renovation; expresses concern that EU funds pose a corruption risk and that the provision of massive EU funds to Serbia is fostering corruption on a grand scale;

8. Expects the Serbian authorities to investigate and prosecute all instances of calls for violence, harassment and strategic lawsuits against the protesters and investigative journalists;

10. Reiterates the strategic importance of the Western Balkans for the security and stability of the EU as a whole;

9. Regrets the continued decline in public support for EU membership in Serbia and the growing support for the Putin regime, which is the result of sustained anti-EU and pro-Russian rhetoric by the government-controlled media and government officials; calls on the Serbian authorities to foster a fact-based and open discussion on accession to the EU;

11. Emphasises the importance of Serbia as a partner in the fight against illegal migration; welcomes the operational cooperation agreement on border control and security between Serbia and Frontex; notes that Serbia has proven to be a good partner in fighting crime, migrant smuggling and illegal migration;

10. Encourages the EU and the Member States to systematically engage with Serbian civil society, youth movements and local actors, through financial, legal and security support to independent media, human rights activists and democratic civil society projects;

12. Emphasises that the Western Balkans are a crucial energy and security corridor, linking Europe to the Middle East, North Africa and the Caucasus;

11. Underlines that EU accession is a voluntary merit-based process and commits itself to exerting further political pressure on the Serbian authorities to implement reforms with regard to judicial independence, transparent public procurement and the protection of fundamental rights;

13. Encourages Serbia to deepen cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries, especially in the field of cross-border road infrastructure;

12. Calls on the Commission and the Council to immediately re-evaluate EU financial assistance to Serbia, should its democratic backsliding continue, and for the implementation of sanctions against all individuals responsible for the violence and harassment campaigns against protesters;

14. Notes that the EU accession negotiations with Serbia are detached from reality and have created frustration, pushing Serbia toward alternative partners, including Russia and China; notes that the massive (pre-accession and other) EU funds to Serbia have not led to a growth in EU influence;

13. Calls on the Commission to make a special assessment of Serbia’s compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and the EU’s values in the forthcoming progress report on Serbia;

15. Is of the opinion that the most effective response to instability in Serbia and the Western Balkans in general is not top-down management by the Commission, but engagement from trusted regional actors who are much better positioned to drive economic development and political stability;

14. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe and the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Serbia.

16. Is of the opinion that the EU accession negotiations with Serbia have failed; is of the opinion that a privileged partnership between the EU and Serbia, enabling trade and economic integration, while respecting Serbia’s wish for sovereignty and political independence, should be established, as this is in the interests of both the EU and Serbia;

17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and the President, Government and National Assembly of Serbia.