What changed

B100465/2025

B100468/2025

European Parliament resolution on the polarisation and increased repression in Serbia, one year after the Novi Sad tragedy

The European Parliament,

having regard to Serbia’s application for membership of the EU of 19 December 2009,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 October 2011 entitled ‘Commission Opinion on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union’ (COM(2011)0668), the European Council decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia candidate status and the European Council decision of 27-28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,

– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part, which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

– having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia and of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb,

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999, the International Court of Justice advisory opinion of 22 July 2010 on the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, and to UN General Assembly Resolution 64/298 of 9 September 2010, which acknowledged the content of the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion and welcomed the EU’s readiness to facilitate dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on Enlargement,

– having regard to the interim measure issued on 29 April 2025 by the European Court of Human Rights stating that the Serbian authorities must prevent the use of sonic devices for crowd control,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0072/2025),

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia,

– having regard to the Commission staff working document of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘Serbia 2023 report’ (SWD(2023)0695), accompanying the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement policy’ (COM(2023)(0690),

– having regard to the Commission staff working document of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Serbia 2024 Report’ (SWD)(2024)0695), accompanying the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690),

– having regard to Serbia’s application for EU membership, submitted on 19 December 2009,

– having regard to the European Council Presidency conclusions of 14-15 December 2006, to the Council conclusions of 25 March 2020 and to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 October 2011 entitled ‘Commission Opinion on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union’ (COM(2011)0668), the European Council decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia EU candidate status and the European Council decision of 28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,

– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part, which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

– having regard to the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas on 1 November 2024, the newly renovated concrete canopy of the main railway station in Novi Sad collapsed onto a crowded pavement, killing 16 people and severely injuring one person; whereas one year after the tragedy, the investigations have not yet yielded tangible outcomes; whereas the victims’ families and civil society representatives have expressed frustration over the lack of transparency and accountability; whereas the absence of credible and transparent investigations undermines public trust in the rule of law and efforts to fight corruption;

A. whereas 16 people lost their lives following the collapse of the concrete canopy of the railway station in Novi Sad on 1 November 2024;

B. whereas dozens of civilians and police officers were injured during protests in Belgrade and other cities following the tragedy; whereas independent media and human rights organisations have reported that law enforcement deployed a long-range acoustic device in Belgrade, raising serious concerns about the proportionality and legality of the use of force;

B. whereas renovation work on the station had begun in 2021, and was officially unveiled during an election campaign in 2022; whereas further reconstruction work was done by two Chinese companies, namely China Railway International (CRI) and China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), both of which are predominantly state-owned, publicly traded Chinese companies;

C. whereas all political and social actors in Serbia, including members of the student movement and opposition parties, should refrain from inflammatory and nationalistic rhetoric and contribute to fostering a climate of mutual respect, democratic dialogue and de-escalation;

C. whereas, citing corruption as the main cause of the accident, protesters across Serbia have been demanding snap elections to remove Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and his party, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), from power; whereas the increase in internal political tensions demonstrates the growing public discontent in Serbia with government corruption and authoritarian tendencies;

D. whereas concerns have been raised by civil society organisations regarding the proposed draft law on amendments to the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code and the Law of 2005 on Juvenile Offenders and Criminal Protection of Juveniles, which introduce new offences and harsher penalties that could disproportionately restrict freedom of expression and assembly; whereas such provisions risk criminalising forms of peaceful protest or everyday civic behaviour that do not endanger public safety or constitutional order;

D. whereas the Serbian Government has resorted to violence against political opponents and the use of excessive force against demonstrators across the country; whereas according to the Serbian Constitution, the president has no formal authority over policing;

E. whereas in recent years, serious concerns have persisted about the erosion of political pluralism, the rule of law and civic space in Serbia, including pressure on independent media, opposition actors and civil society organisations, and continuing challenges in the fight against corruption and in safeguarding the independence of the judiciary;

E. whereas the Novi Sad tragedy has unveiled further structural weaknesses in Serbia’s public administration, transparency and rule of law, which remain essential areas of reform for any country aspiring to EU membership;

F. whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) has been steadily declining since 2021; whereas Serbia has not imposed sanctions against Russia; whereas accession to the EU inevitably requires full alignment with the EU’s foreign policy objectives; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the CFSP dropped from 54 % in 2023 to 51 % in 2024, while most other candidate countries in the region achieved 100 % alignment; whereas this declining alignment raises questions about Serbia’s commitment to EU accession negotiations;

F. whereas concerns have also been raised regarding the activities of certain foreign contractors, particularly Chinese state-owned companies, operating in Serbia; whereas the 2018 sale of the Serbian mining and smelting complex RTB Bor to the Chinese company Zijin has led to uncontrolled exploitation of copper and gold ore in the municipalities of Bor and Majdanpek, affecting local communities and the environment; whereas reports indicate that the local population, which is almost entirely comprised of people belonging to Serbia’s Romanian minority, are at risk of being displaced, which would threaten the local ethnic composition, thereby breaching the Serbian Constitution;

G. whereas China’s presence and influence in Serbia have significantly increased in recent years through large-scale infrastructure investments; whereas Chinese companies have been involved in major construction projects, including the renovation of the Novi Sad railway station, raising concerns about transparency, adherence to EU standards, and environmental compliance; whereas Serbia has become the largest recipient of Chinese investment in the Western Balkans; whereas growing economic dependence on China may undermine Serbia’s alignment with EU values and foreign policy positions;

G. whereas Serbian President Aleksander Vučić has claimed that EU Member States are involved in organising a ‘colour revolution in Serbia’;

H. whereas the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is a precondition for the progression of both countries towards EU membership;

1. Expresses its profound sorrow following the tragic Novi Sad railway station collapse on 1 November 2024, which led to the deaths of 16 people, and offers its heartfelt condolences to the victims and their families;

I. whereas democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights are among the core values on which the EU is founded, as enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union; whereas, in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria, candidate countries must fully respect and uphold these values to progress towards EU membership;

2. Expresses concern about the main issue raised by the student protests, namely corruption related to large-scale infrastructure projects in Serbia; notes the that the criminal justice system in Serbia fails to investigate and prosecute cases of high-level corruption;

1. Demands a transparent and impartial investigation into the events leading to the collapse of the Novi Sad railway station canopy, ensuring that all those responsible are held accountable in accordance with the rule of law; calls for an independent technical examination of the structural failure, a comprehensive review of construction permits and oversight procedures, and a full assessment of potential corruption or negligence; urges the Serbian authorities to guarantee the victims’ families effective access to justice and adequate compensation;

3. Condemns the use of unlawful surveillance on protesters and the deployment of unidentified or plainclothes officers, including individuals employed by private security companies, against demonstrators;

2. Notes with concern the reports of the use of force against peaceful protesters in Novi Sad, Belgrade and other Serbian cities; expresses particular concern about the possible deployment of long-range acoustic devices and the extensive use of tear gas against civilians; condemns any excessive or unlawful use of force by law enforcement authorities against individuals exercising their fundamental rights to freedom of assembly and expression;

4. Condemns in the strongest terms the conduct of members of the Unit for the Security of Certain Persons and Facilities (JZO) and its commanding officer, Marko Kričak, which has included illegal detention, the beating of restrained detainees, spitting, verbal degradation including threats of sexual violence and death; reiterates that these actions amount to inhumane and degrading treatment prohibited by international law and policing protocols;

3. Expresses concern about the intensifying political polarisation in Serbia; calls on all political actors to engage in constructive dialogue grounded in mutual respect and democratic principles; urges the Serbian Government to promote inclusive political participation and guarantee equal access to media for all political parties and candidates; stresses the importance of depolarising public discourse and fostering a political culture rooted in tolerance, compromise and respect for democratic institutions; calls on civil society, media and educational institutions to play an active role in bridging societal divisions and strengthening democratic resilience;

5. Reminds the Serbian authorities that freedom of assembly and freedom of speech are fundamental human rights and basic democratic freedoms; reiterates that these rights form a central part of the Copenhagen criteria and are to be upheld by EU candidate countries;

4. Expresses solidarity with the families of the victims of the Novi Sad tragedy and strongly supports the right of Serbian students and citizens to peaceful protest, calling for accountability and democratic reforms; stresses the importance of civic courage, creativity, commitment to non-violence, and youth engagement for the advancement of Serbia’s European path;

6. Deplores the unfounded allegations that the EU and some of its Member States were involved in any way with the organisation of student protests; reiterates that the protest movement began as a genuine and authentic grassroots effort by the Serbian student community to demand action against systemic corruption and authoritarian tendencies;

5. Reaffirms its longstanding commitment to Serbia’s European perspective and future EU membership, while clearly underlining that progress on EU accession depends on full respect for the EU’s values, a genuinely merit-based process, and adherence to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights;

7. Reiterates that Serbia must ensure the consistent and effective implementation of the legislative and institutional frameworks for the respect of fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to freedom of assembly, and furthermore, the equal respect of the rights of people belonging to national minorities, in line with the Copenhagen criteria and Serbia’s commitments under the EU accession process;

6. Regrets the fact that no substantial progress has been made on Chapter 31 of the negotiating chapters as Serbia’s pattern of alignment with EU foreign policy positions has remained largely unchanged, mainly owing to Serbia’s close relations with Russia; recalls that Serbia remains a notable exception in the Western Balkans regarding alignment with the CFSP;

8. Calls on the Serbian authorities to ensure full transparency and due diligence in public procurement and concession processes involving foreign state-owned companies, including Chinese contractors; stresses that Serbia must safeguard its constitutional order, environmental standards, and the rights of local and national minority communities when approving such projects;

7. Expresses disappointment with Serbia’s declining alignment with the CFSP; emphasises that progressive alignment with the CFSP is a key requirement for all EU candidate countries; calls on Serbia to demonstrate tangible commitment to its declared EU accession goal by substantially increasing alignment with EU foreign policy positions and restrictive measures; acknowledges Serbia’s complex regional circumstances, while stressing that EU membership requires full adherence to the EU’s values, principles and common policies;

9. Condemns the visits and attendance of President Vučić at the military parades held in Moscow in May 2025 and Beijing in September 2025 in the midst of Serbia’s biggest political and societal crisis since he came to power; reiterates that China remains a strategic rival and that the Russian Federation is an enemy, which continues to wage an illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine – a candidate country for EU membership;

8. Remains concerned about the presence of nationalistic narratives within parts of the protest movement, including statements made during the student gathering on 28 June 2025, Saint Vitus Day, referring to Kosovo and Metohija as an ‘inalienable part of Serbia’; underlines that such rhetoric risks undermining Serbia’s European path and the spirit of reconciliation in the Western Balkans;

10. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Government and Parliament of the Republic of Serbia.

9. Deplores the continued use of nationalist narratives, such as the ‘Greater Serbia’ and ‘Serbian World’ concepts, which have in the past been promoted by certain members of the Serbian Government; recalls that such rhetoric has no place in EU-Serbia relations and undermines regional stability; calls on the Serbian authorities to re-engage constructively in the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue with a view to reaching a comprehensive and legally binding normalisation agreement;

10. Rejects unfounded allegations that the EU and certain Member States were involved in organising the student protests in Serbia with the aim of triggering a ‘colour revolution’; strongly condemns, in this context, the unlawful arrests and expulsions of EU citizens and the public disclosure of personal data of EU nationals by convicted war criminals; further condemns all forms of hate speech and incitement to hatred, particularly against national minorities;

11. Warns against the misuse of criminal law to suppress civic participation; stresses that amendments to the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code and the Law of 2005 on Juvenile Offenders and Criminal Protection of Juveniles must not result in criminalising normal, peaceful behaviour or non-violent forms of protest; recalls that the proportional application of criminal sanctions is a cornerstone of the rule of law and of Serbia’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights;

12. Reiterates that Serbia must refrain from any actions or statements aimed at influencing the domestic politics of neighbouring Western Balkan countries, including with regard to the unconstitutional celebration of Republika Srpska Day in Bosnia and Herzegovina and public questioning of the decisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s courts and constitutional institutions;

13. Reiterates its strong support for Serbian civil society organisations, human rights defenders and independent activists working to strengthen democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; calls on the Commission to ensure adequate and accessible funding and effective protection mechanisms for civil society actors; condemns any form of intimidation, harassment or administrative pressure against non-governmental organisations and activists; emphasises the vital role of civil society in promoting transparency, monitoring democratic standards and holding public authorities accountable;

14. Acknowledges Serbia’s progress in certain areas, including economic growth, regional infrastructure connectivity and cooperation with the EU on migration management and energy security; welcomes Serbia’s participation in EU-funded projects under the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans and the Green Agenda for the Western Balkans; encourages Serbia to continue advancing reforms in alignment with EU standards, and reaffirms the EU’s readiness to support the Serbian people in their efforts towards a democratic, prosperous and European future;

15. Reaffirms that Serbia’s future ultimately lies within the EU, as a fully committed and values-based member; underlines, however, that genuine progress on EU accession depends on Serbia’s clear alignment with EU values, principles and foreign policy positions, and full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and the requirements of the accession process;

16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia.