What changed

B100461/2025

B100459/2025

European Parliament resolution on the polarisation and increased repression in Serbia, one year after the Novi Sad tragedy

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part, which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Articles 2 and 6 thereof,

– having regard to Serbia’s application for EU membership, submitted on 19 December 2009,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia, in particular that of 8 February 2024 on the situation in Serbia following the elections, and of 7 May 2025 on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

– having regard to the previous EU statements on Serbia, in particular the open letter on Serbia of 5 February 2025 by the Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

– having regard to the interim measure of 29 April 2025 issued by the European Court of Human Rights instructing Serbia to refrain from using sonic devices for crowd control,

– having regard to the statements made by several UN Special Rapporteurs on 4 August 2025 concerning the Serbian Government’s crackdown on the student movement,

– having regard to the numerous reports and statements by domestic and international human rights organisations, independent media and civic groups documenting systemic abuses in Serbia,

– having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of December 2006, to the Council conclusions of March 2020 and to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

– having regard to Serbia’s status as a candidate country for EU membership, granted in March 2012,

– having regard to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) of 31 October 2003, to which Serbia is a signatory,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas on 1 November 2024, a concrete and glass canopy collapsed in the main railway station in Novi Sad, leading to the deaths of 16 people; whereas the railway station underwent renovations from 2021 to mid-2024; whereas this tragedy triggered large-scale student and citizen protests across Serbia; whereas protesters initially demanded a transparent investigation into the collapse, criticising government corruption, with their calls soon escalating into demands for early elections;

A. whereas on 1 November 2024, a renovated concrete canopy at Novi Sad railway station collapsed, killing 16 people; whereas the Novi Sad railway station project formed part of the Belgrade-Budapest high-speed railway line and was carried out under a Serbia-China intergovernmental agreement, outside the scope of the EU’s ordinary public procurement legislative framework; whereas the 2024 Commission report on Serbia had already warned about the circumvention of procurement rules via such agreements;

B. whereas the December 2023 parliamentary elections brought the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) a very large victory; whereas the SNS won 46.7 % of the vote, far ahead of the newly formed opposition coalition Serbia Against Violence (SPN), which gained only 23.6 % of the vote;

B. whereas the canopy collapse triggered unprecedented nationwide protests led by students demanding accountability, the publication of documentation regarding the reconstruction of the Novi Sad railway station, which was not publicly available, respect for civil liberties, separation of powers, electoral integrity, media freedom and an end to systemic corruption;

C. whereas supporters of the SPN opposition coalition, among them the Green-Left Front’s co-leader Radomir Lazović, engaged in violent demonstrations against the result of the parliamentary elections of December 2023, in an attempt to storm the Belgrade city hall; whereas more than 30 people were arrested during this demonstration and eight police officers were injured;

C. whereas from February to the end of September 2025, more than 10 700 protests took place across more than 630 municipalities and 1 200 local community assemblies, including the largest demonstration in Serbia’s history on 15 March 2025 and the secondlargest on 28 June 2025;

D. whereas the mass street protests in 2024, following the Novi Sad tragedy, led to the resignation of Serbia’s Prime Minister Miloš Vučević on 28 January 2025, along with the Mayor of Novi Sad, Milan Djuric; whereas the demonstrators nevertheless continued their street protests, calling for snap elections;

D. whereas the protests organised by the student movement have been overwhelmingly peaceful, with only a few isolated violent incidents over the summer of 2025, which were preceded by violence perpetrated by supporters of the ruling party; whereas the media with close ties to the ruling party has relentlessly attempted to portray the protests as violent, including through the use of fake news since March 2025;

E. whereas in the summer of 2025, anti-government protests intensified and violence re-emerged; whereas anti-government protestors and supporters of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić are holding parallel rallies across Serbia;

E. whereas there were several cases of radical symbols being displayed and extreme nationalist rhetoric being used during the mass protests organised by the student movement; whereas these protests reflect years of authoritarian consolidation, the capture of institutions and the erosion of electoral integrity, as repeatedly documented by domestic civil society and international observers;

F. whereas on 16 September 2025, the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office in Novi Sad filed an updated indictment, charging Serbia’s former Minister for Construction, Transport and Infrastructure Goran Vesić and 12 others, including another former minister, Tomislav Momirović, who headed the Construction, Transport and Infrastructure Ministry before Vesić; whereas those indicted face charges of serious crimes against public safety;

F. whereas elections in Serbia have been marred by systemic abuses, including irregularities in the voter register, vote buying, misuse of state resources, pressure and intimidation against voters and public employees, and the deployment of fake election observers; whereas independent observers reported that the recent local elections in Zaječar and Kosjerić were neither free nor fair;

G. whereas Serbia ranked 105th in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index;

G. whereas by early 2025, repression had escalated, with police raids on civil society organisations, arbitrary arrests, politically motivated prosecutions, intimidation of journalists and mass surveillance of ordinary citizens;

H. whereas in November 2023, the Commission announced a growth plan for the Western Balkans, to accelerate the region’s socio-economic development and EU integration; whereas a EUR 6 billion Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans is to provide key support for the implementation of the growth plan; whereas in October 2024, the Commission approved the Reform Agenda for Serbia, anticipating EUR 1.586 billion in non-repayable grants and highly concessional loans;

H. whereas in March 2025, during the largest protest in Serbian history, commemorating the victims of the Novi Sad tragedy, thousands of demonstrators in Belgrade were attacked by an unknown device – later identified as a sonic weapon – which caused panic and harm, and exposed demonstrators to grave risks; whereas doctors were prohibited from documenting injuries; whereas human rights organisations collected testimonies from 3 400 attendees impacted by the incident, despite official denials by the authorities; whereas the official investigation into the incident, which includes more than 170 witness statements, remains at an early stage, with no indictments;

I. whereas between 2021 and 2024 the EU allocated over EUR 586 million in financial and technical assistance to Serbia under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance;

I. whereas since late 2024, protests have been met with sustained repression, including beatings, arbitrary arrests, the use of tear gas, politically motivated detentions, deportations and mass surveillance; whereas more than 1 028 arrests and at least 340 violent incidents have been recorded, some involving serious injuries; whereas independent observers stress that this figure is not exhaustive, given the explosion of violence and police brutality during the summer of 2025, when simultaneous attacks and incidents within large groups made comprehensive monitoring impossible;

J. whereas under the economic and investment plan for the Western Balkans, since 2020, the EU has mobilised EUR 6.2 billion in investments, including support for railways and healthcare;

J. whereas since August 2025, violence has further intensified, including police brutality, torture and sexual violence against students, threats by JZO special police units, politically motivated prosecutions by the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office, and smear campaigns by pro-government media, including the broadcast of intimate images of a female student as an act of revenge pornography;

K. whereas the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, accounting for 59.7 % of Serbia’s total trade in goods in 2023; whereas total EU foreign direct investment reached EUR 1.39 billion in 2022;

K. whereas security agencies (BIA) have unlawfully recorded and televised private conversations, some of which were then used to accuse nine students of preparing attacks against the constitutional order and security of Serbia; whereas the Cobras elite military unit has been deployed to respond to domestic clashes, even firing live ammunition;

L. whereas in Serbia, support for EU accession has plummeted to an historic low point; whereas according to a Eurobarometer survey, published in September 2025, only 33 % of Serbian citizens support EU accession, reflecting general distrust towards the EU;

L. whereas pro-government mobs and prior convicts have been shielded by police during violent counter-demonstrations, while opposition figures, students and even members of Serbia’s parliament have been beaten and abducted by plainclothes officers;

M. whereas Serbia is deepening its energy ties with Russia while purchasing Chinese surveillance systems; whereas on 29 September 2025, an international parliamentary conference entitled ‘BRICS – Serbia among friends’ was held in the Serbian National Assembly, joined by diplomats from BRICS countries along with officials of the Socialist Party of Serbia and the ‘We, the People’s Power’ movement; whereas according to a 2025 survey by the Institute for European Studies in Belgrade and the Lidington Research agency, more than 60 % of Serbian citizens support joining BRICS;

M. whereas between July and August 2025, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights urged the Serbian authorities to exercise restraint, halt their crackdown on the student movement and uphold human rights and academic freedom;

N. whereas on 25 June 2024, the EU and Serbia signed an agreement on operational cooperation in border management with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), allowing Frontex to carry out joint operations and deploying its standing corps at Serbia’s borders with neighbouring non-EU countries;

N. whereas dozens of journalists have been assaulted or denied protection while reporting on protests; whereas the pro-government media has been orchestrating campaigns portraying the protests as a Western-backed ‘colour revolution’ aimed at toppling a legitimate government, contributing to declining confidence in the EU in Serbia, as attested by the latest Eurobarometer survey; whereas senior officials are militarising political discourse by branding protesters as ‘terrorists’ or ‘Nazis’;

O. whereas in October 2024, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Serbian President Vučić issued a joint statement, calling for a united front against illegal migration;

O. whereas concerns persist about organised, government-sponsored, anti-European media campaigns in Serbia, including hate speech and public slurs also directed at Members of the European Parliament;

P. whereas Serbia actively participates in EU crisis management missions and operations under the EU’s common foreign and security policy;

P. whereas the government and the ruling elite have normalised repression through pardons for violent attacks committed by government supporters, the suspension of public transport to block protests, the politically motivated expulsion of foreign citizens and the occupation of central Belgrade by pro-government demonstrators with police protection;

Q. whereas Serbia supports the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, and has condemned the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas Serbia has supported various UN resolutions, including the UN General Assembly resolution of 12 October 2022 condemning Russia’s annexation of four eastern regions of Ukraine; whereas Serbia has provided considerable humanitarian aid to the civilian population of Ukraine since the start of the war;

Q. whereas these patterns reveal the systematic subordination of state institutions, including the police, prosecutors and courts, to ruling party control, amounting to a collapse in democratic standards;

1. Notes the updated indictment by the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office in Novi Sad against former Minister for Construction, Transport and Infrastructure Goran Vesić and 12 others; notes that the indictment proposes detention for all the defendants, due to the risk of a ‘significant public disturbance, which could jeopardise the smooth and fair conduct of the criminal proceedings’; calls on all the actors to respect the principle of separation of powers;

R. whereas the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia has convened for only 16 days in 2025;

2. Is deeply concerned by the persistent street violence and deep polarisation within Serbian society;

S. whereas freedom of assembly and expression, media freedom, judicial independence and an enabling environment for civil society and academia are fundamental democratic principles and essential conditions for Serbia’s accession to the EU; whereas the European Parliament has repeatedly underlined that the pace of accession negotiations depends on tangible progress in these areas;

3. Affirms that the SNS won the parliamentary elections of December 2023 by a very large margin and that the Serbian people made a clear choice regarding the composition of their government;

T. whereas Commission President von der Leyen visited Serbia on 15 October 2025;

4. Welcomes the pluralistic composition of the Serbian National Assembly, with its broad representation of political parties, including parties of national minorities;

1. Commemorates, almost one year after the tragedy, the 16 victims who lost their lives as a result of the collapse of the canopy of the Novi Sad railway station on 1 November 2024 and expresses its solidarity with those who were injured; reiterates its calls for full and transparent legal proceedings following the investigation by the authorities in order to bring those responsible to justice; underlines the need to examine more broadly the extent to which corruption led to the lowering of safety standards and contributed to this tragedy;

5. Recalls that in a democracy, people have the freedom to assemble and to protest against government measures; recalls, however, that in a democracy, power is transferred through elections and that political parties must respect the outcomes of elections and not incite violent street protests;

2. Is deeply concerned by the fact that the situation in Serbia remains fraught, with tensions and polarisation that could easily lead to violence; supports genuine attempts at dialogue on how the Serbian Government can meet student demands, including calls for early elections; notes, however, that students and protesters remain convinced that the recent calls for dialogue by the ruling party were not genuine;

6. Calls on the EU to respect the democratic choice of the Serbian people and to avoid drawing stark contrasts between the different parties; warns the EU that by supporting efforts to overturn a legitimate election result because of dissatisfaction with its outcome, it is undermining democracy in Serbia and fuelling polarisation and instability;

3. Condemns, in the strongest terms, the wave of state-sponsored violence and intimidation against and indiscriminate arrest of peaceful protesters, journalists, civil society organisations and opposition representatives in Serbia;

7. Notes the serious decline in Serbia of public support for EU accession; notes that, at the same time, the topic of Serbia’s potential membership of the BRICS countries is steadily gaining traction;

4. Holds the Serbian leadership politically responsible for escalating repression, normalising violence and dismantling democratic institutions in the country; deplores the fact that the most senior state officials are actively spreading conspiracy theories about the collapse of the canopy being an act of sabotage or a terrorist attack, in a deliberate attempt to confuse the public as regards responsibility for the tragedy; is concerned about the lack of response from state institutions, including law enforcement and the judiciary, to refute these baseless claims;

8. Is concerned that corruption is still prevalent in many areas, also related to work designated by the EU as ‘projects of interest for the Republic of Serbia’; notes the adoption by the Serbian Government of an anti-corruption strategy for the 2024-2028 period; deplores, however, that only limited progress has been made in the fight against corruption; encourages Serbia to step up the fight against corruption and to strengthen the independence of its anti-corruption institutions;

5. Is concerned about the potential political instrumentalisation of the criminal offences of ‘preparing actions against the constitutional order and security of Serbia’ and ‘calling for a violent change of the constitutional order’, and, in that context, about the arrests ahead of the protests of 15 March and 28 June 2025; notes that leaked recordings of the suspects’ conversations were published by pro-government media before the arrests took place; notes that several political activists and members of the Free Citizens Movement (PSG) opposition party were arrested on these grounds and that some remain under house arrest or in exile; condemns the pattern of escalating public attacks and smear campaigns, including by public officials, against members of the Serbian judiciary and other actions that further undermine the independence of the judiciary;

9. Notes that the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) has launched a separate investigation into the possible misuse of EU funds for the Novi Sad railway station’s 2021-2024 renovation; expresses concern that EU funds pose a corruption risk and that the provision of massive EU funds to Serbia is fostering corruption on a grand scale;

6. Calls for urgent, impartial and transparent investigations into all allegations of unnecessary and disproportionate use of force and prohibited weapons, arbitrary arrests, detentions, torture, sexual violence against detainees, politically motivated prosecutions and other grave human rights abuses; recalls, in particular, the use of a sonic weapon during the March 2025 protests, the September 2025 case of student Bogdan Jovičić, the August 2025 case of student Nikolina Sinđelić, the July 2025 case of student Luka Mihajlović, as well as prior cases, such as the alleged police brutality against activist Ilija Kostić in November 2024; calls on the authorities to thoroughly examine allegations that these threats originated from high-ranking officials of the police protection service (JZO);

10. Reiterates the strategic importance of the Western Balkans for the security and stability of the EU as a whole;

7. Notes the August 2025 arrest, and subsequent release, of former government ministers Tomislav Momirović and Goran Vesić on charges of abuse of office and suspicion of damaging the Serbian state budget by at least USD 115 million in relation to the reconstruction of the Belgrade-Budapest railway line, including the collapsed canopy of the Novi Sad railway station;

11. Emphasises the importance of Serbia as a partner in the fight against illegal migration; welcomes the operational cooperation agreement on border control and security between Serbia and Frontex; notes that Serbia has proven to be a good partner in fighting crime, migrant smuggling and illegal migration;

8. Condemns smear campaigns, intimidation of the media and the abusive use of personal data to discredit protesters, and urges the Serbian authorities to ensure media freedom; calls on senior officials to end inflammatory rhetoric that incites hostility or violence;

12. Emphasises that the Western Balkans are a crucial energy and security corridor, linking Europe to the Middle East, North Africa and the Caucasus;

9. Condemns the Serbian Government’s retaliation against employees in the education and cultural sectors for supporting the protests; notes that more than 100 teachers have lost their jobs in recent months; condemns the repression against employees in the education and academic sectors, including salary reductions, the presence of the police on university campuses and the withdrawal of funding for public universities; insists that no disciplinary, administrative or criminal sanctions be used to intimidate or discourage lawful protests or academic activities;

13. Encourages Serbia to deepen cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries, especially in the field of cross-border road infrastructure;

10. Calls on the Serbian authorities to immediately restore funding to universities in accordance with Serbian legislation; calls on the competent institutions to ensure the unhindered participation of the academic and research community in projects funded by the EU;

14. Notes that the EU accession negotiations with Serbia are detached from reality and have created frustration, pushing Serbia toward alternative partners, including Russia and China; notes that the massive (pre-accession and other) EU funds to Serbia have not led to a growth in EU influence;

11. Condemns the actions of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) in organising an illegal encampment in Pionirski park in front of the presidency building and its subsequent expansion into the square overlooking the National Assembly; is gravely concerned about multiple reports of individuals with criminal backgrounds being mobilised by the ruling party in counter-protest activities; recalls that reports of the SNS mobilising thugs and hooligans have a long and well-documented history;

15. Is of the opinion that the most effective response to instability in Serbia and the Western Balkans in general is not top-down management by the Commission, but engagement from trusted regional actors who are much better positioned to drive economic development and political stability;

12. Condemns the arbitrary and politically motivated use of presidential pardons for individuals convicted of or prosecuted for violence against students and other citizens participating in peaceful protests, considering such actions to be a direct interference with justice and seriously undermine the rule of law;

16. Is of the opinion that the EU accession negotiations with Serbia have failed; is of the opinion that a privileged partnership between the EU and Serbia, enabling trade and economic integration, while respecting Serbia’s wish for sovereignty and political independence, should be established, as this is in the interests of both the EU and Serbia;

13. Calls on the Serbian authorities to enable the safe return of all citizens who have fled the country as a result of political repression, intimidation or fear of persecution, and to guarantee their full protection and reintegration in accordance with the law and Serbia’s international obligations;

17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and the President, Government and National Assembly of Serbia.

14. Strongly condemns the unlawful arrest and expulsion of EU citizens who made statements in support of protesting students, and the public disclosure, by convicted war criminals, of the personal data of EU citizens; expresses concern about the rising number of detention cases involving EU citizens at Serbia’s borders;

15. Condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the verbal attacks on Members of the European Parliament by the most senior Serbian officials following their participation in, or statements made in the context of, the student protests;

16. Condemns the overt Russian interference in the Serbian protests through statements made by officials of the Russian Federation, including Vladimir Putin, alleging that the protests form part of a Western-backed ‘colour revolution’, and that the events of 15 March 2025 were a conspiracy orchestrated by protesters to spread panic; rejects, following these accusations made by Russian officials, all allegations by Serbian officials and pro-government media that the EU and some of its Member States were involved in organising the student protests with a view to triggering a ‘colour revolution’; calls on the Serbian authorities to take action against such malign propaganda in domestic media, instead of participating in its dissemination; calls on the Commission and the Commission President to clearly and publicly denounce such coordinated actions by Russian and Serbian state actors; notes the recent implementation by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control of sanctions against the Serbian NIS refinery; notes that in recent years, Serbia has chosen to deepen its energy dependence on Russia; considers that Serbia needs to make fundamental choices in this regard; welcomes the Commission President’s announcement of assistance to Serbia to enable it to become more energy independent from Russia, but underlines that any financial assistance must be linked to indisputable and transparent benchmarks towards achieving full energy independence from Russia;

17. Notes with concern that, in parallel with the ongoing protests, the Serbian Government appears to have been negotiating with the owners of the United Media company, under which some of the last remaining media outlets independent of ruling party influence operate, in order to ‘weaken’ these media outlets; warns that, if confirmed, this would represent a serious blow to the already endangered media pluralism in Serbia; calls on all sides to refrain from such activities;

18. Is concerned about the serious risk that the results of the next national elections will not be accepted by all sides; calls for the immediate and full implementation of all recommendations of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) international election observation missions to ensure free and fair elections in Serbia, in particular those concerning an independent audit of the voter register, the transparent and pluralistic appointment of members of the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM) Council and the provision of fair and equal access to airtime on public broadcaster RTS for all political actors;

19. Calls on the Serbian authorities to conduct a fully transparent comprehensive technical safety inspection of all infrastructure facilities, including those on the railway line from Belgrade, through Novi Sad, to the border with Hungary, in order to ensure their structural integrity, safety and compliance with international standards; urges the Serbian authorities not to put into operation any infrastructure facilities that lack the necessary permits and certificates for safe and uninterrupted use, particularly those located on international and regionally important transport corridors;

20. Encourages Serbia to strengthen cooperation with the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and to fully implement its UNCAC obligations; calls for enhanced transparency of ownership and financing in public procurement for infrastructure projects;

21. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to closely monitor the implementation of reforms through the EU accession process and the Reform Agenda adopted under the Reform and Growth Facility;

22. Calls on the Serbian authorities to ensure that the policing of public gatherings strictly complies with international and European human rights standards; urges the adoption and implementation of clear protocols on lawful crowd control technologies and independent oversight mechanisms;

23. Reiterates that EU accession negotiations with Serbia should only advance on the basis of measurable and sustainable progress in the fundamentals cluster, particularly on the rule of law, the fight against corruption and organised crime, judicial independence, media freedom and public administration reform;

24. Supports the prompt deployment of an ad hoc EU fact-finding mission to Serbia, with the participation of the European Parliament, in order to assess, on the ground, the state of democracy, the ongoing protests, attacks on demonstrators and repression targeting students, academics, educators and public-sector employees;

25. Calls on the most senior EU officials to refrain from making unfounded statements praising the reform process in Serbia; calls on the Commission to instead clearly articulate its commitment to Serbia’s future within the EU and to underscore the necessity of genuine and comprehensive reforms, including restoring democratic institutions, strengthening the rule of law and fighting against corruption and organised crime; welcomes the shift in the Commission President’s tone during her recent visit to Serbia, which reflects a more accurate assessment of Serbia’s underlying problems and negative track record on fundamental reforms; calls on the Commission to ensure consistency between words and actions; notes the announced agreement in relation to independent verification of the voter registry and the REM Council media regulator, while underlining that progress is assessed based on implementation of reforms;

26. Invites the Commission to launch an initiative for targeted individual sanctions to be imposed against those responsible for serious violations of law and human rights in Serbia, including those who ordered and carried out violence against peaceful demonstrators, in line with the EU global human rights sanctions regime;

27. Calls on the EU Member States to strengthen protective measures for those at risk, including emergency visas and relocation programmes; urges the EU Member States to adopt a united response to Serbia’s democratic backsliding, including by considering targeted sanctions against individuals responsible for grave abuses;

28. Calls on all countries participating in the upcoming Expo 2027 in Serbia to take into account the serious concerns and evidence of widespread corruption linked to the ruling authorities, as well as the reported lack of compliance with basic construction standards and legal requirements in the organisation and construction of the exhibition;

29. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the VicePresident of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Serbia, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.