What changed

B100454/2025

B100452/2025

European Parliament resolution on the situation in Belarus, five years after the fraudulent presidential elections

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Belarus, in particular those adopted since the fraudulent presidential elections of 2020,

– having regard to the statements by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and Commissioner Kos of 9 August 2025 on the fifth anniversary of the fraudulent presidential elections in Belarus, and to the statements by the VP/HR of 1 August 2024 on the release of a number of political prisoners, of 26 February 2024 on the parliamentary and local elections, and of 8 August 2023 on the third anniversary of the fraudulent presidential elections,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 12 October 2020 and 19 February 2024 on Belarus and to the European Council conclusions of 22 October 2021 on Belarus,

– having regard to the Council conclusions on Belarus of 12 October 2020 and 19 February 2024,

– having regard to the statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU of 17 September 2025 on the joint strategic military exercise ZAPAD-2025,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions on Belarus of 21 and 22 October 2021,

– having regard to the joint statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commissioner for Enlargement of 9 August 2025 on the fifth anniversary of the fraudulent presidential elections in Belarus,

– having regard to the Letter of Intent on Cooperation between the European Parliament and the Belarusian Democratic Forces, signed on 3 May 2024,

– having regard to the statements by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 26 February 2024 on parliamentary and local elections and of 1 August 2024 on the release of a number of political prisoners, and the statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU of 8 August 2023 on the third anniversary of the fraudulent presidential elections,

– having regard to the Luxembourgresolution Solutionsof onthe addressingParliamentary theAssembly specificof challengesthe facedCouncil byof theEurope Belarusiansof in24 exile,June adopted2025 onentitled 6‘Legal and 7human Junerights 2024issues underin the auspicescontext of the ParliamentaryRussian AssemblyFederation’s ofaggression against Ukraine’, which holds Aliaksandr Lukashenka responsible for the Councilillegal transfer of Europe,Ukrainian children to Belarus,

– having regard to the report of the UN Special Rapporteur of 22 April 2025 on human rights developments in Belarus between 1 April and 31 March 2025, and to the report of 25 March 2024 on the situation of human rights in Belarus in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election and in its aftermath,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other international human rights instruments to which Belarus is a party,

– having regard to Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s order of 10 October 2025 for the Belarusian Armed Forces to be placed on the highest level of combat readiness,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas more than five years after the fraudulent presidential electionelections of 9 August 2020, Belarus remains2020 underand the authoritarian rule of Aliaksandr Lukashenka, whose regime continues tobrutal systematicallycrackdown targeton politicalpeaceful activists,pro-democracy civilprotests, society,the human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists, artists, religious leaders, trade unionists and other groupssituation in Belarus and abroad, subjecting thousands to arbitrary detention, repression, torture, forced disappearances, and suppression of fundamentalremains freedoms;critical;

B. whereas following the fraudulent 2020 presidential election and the subsequent brutal crackdown, the EU and many of its democratic partners did not recognise the results of the elections or Aliaksandr Lukashenka as legitimate leader and President of Belarus;

B. whereas the illegitimate regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka has conducted a relentless campaign of repression against peaceful protesters, opposition leaders, lawyers, journalists, athletes, trade unions, civil society actors and others;

C. whereas the mass mobilisation of Belarusian citizens in 2020 represented an unprecedented demand for democracy, justice and human rights; whereas the regime’s response was characterised by systemic human rights violations, widespread arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, and the confirmed death of at least a dozen peaceful protesters;

C. whereas, more generally, the 31-year authoritarian regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka has been characterised by the systematic repression of political opponents and dissent, including the enforced disappearance of Lukashenka’s critics;

D. whereas since 2020 hundreds of thousands of Belarusians have fled the country, seeking refuge from persecution, arbitrary detention, and repression, and continue to face political intimidation, even abroad;

D. whereas, according to the Human Rights Center ‘Viasna’, over 8 900 individuals have faced politically motivated charges since 2020, with over 1 200 political prisoners remaining in detention, many of whom are in fragile health or are being held in conditions that put their lives at risk; whereas 96 cases of political repression were recorded in September 2025 alone, with 77 individuals being recognised as political prisoners that same month;

E. whereas the authoritarian regime in Belarus continues to drift towards totalitarianism, intensifying political repression and persecution, destroying independent media, requiring political loyalty as a precondition for participation in public life, and continuing the widespread use of torture, arbitrary detention and forced exile;

E. whereas several political prisoners have died in custody, including, most recently, Andrei Padniabenny, who died in penal colony No. 15 in Mahiliou in September 2025; whereas political prisoners face torture, denial of medical care, restricted access to visits from lawyers and family members, and solitary confinement;

F. whereas on 26 January 2025, a presidential election was held in Belarus, in which Lukashenka was declared the winner with 86.8 % of the vote; whereas these elections, although held without mass protests, failed to meet international standards;

F. whereas, according to the Belarusian Association of Journalists, 33 media representatives, including journalists, reporters and bloggers, are currently imprisoned, and 83 media workers have been prosecuted over the past five years;

G. whereas despite the pardon of approximately 52 political prisoners in September 2025, more than 1 000 political prisoners remain unjustly detained under inhumane and life-threatening conditions;

G. whereas more than 6 000 teachers have lost their jobs as a result of repression, more than 50 have been imprisoned, and education in the Belarusian language is being dismantled amid the increasing militarisation of schools;

H. whereas Lukashenka remains in power largely through the continued loyalty of the Belarusian elite, police and security forces, and with significant political and economic support from the Russian Federation, including in the area of security;

H. whereas multiple international organisations, including the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, have documented systematic human rights violations in Belarus, including torture, arbitrary detentions, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty, enforced disappearances, forced labour, persecution on political or national grounds, deportation and suppression of fundamental freedoms, which amount to crimes against humanity as defined by international law;

I. whereas Lukashenka’s regime has become complicit in international war crimes, notably through its collaboration with Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, its role in the deportation and kidnapping of Ukrainian children, and its acceptance of the permanent militarisation of Belarusian territory by Russian forces, thereby undermining NATO’s deterrence posture and undercutting the EU’s security policy;

I. whereas the penitentiary system functions as a network of slave-labour camps, with prisoners, including political detainees, being forced to work in unsafe and degrading conditions;

J. whereas Belarus has become a military foothold for Russia, falling into deep political, economic and informational dependence on the Kremlin, thereby undermining regional stability and European security;

J. whereas the judiciary, prosecutors and law enforcement agencies have been instrumentalised to commit human rights violations and crimes against humanity;

K. whereas the Belarusian regime has further aligned itself with the Russian Federation, providing logistical and military support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including by allowing Russian troops and equipment to operate from Belarusian territory when launching the assault on Ukraine in February 2022; whereas joint military exercises such as Zapad 2025 and the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil increase regional instability;

K. whereas ‘extremism’ is the most common pretext for prosecuting political prisoners, and the regime’s ‘list of extremists’ now includes more than 5 800 people;

L. whereas the regime has also engaged in hybrid operations against the EU, including orchestrated migration pressure on EU borders and facilitating or tolerating drone incursions from Belarusian territory into neighbouring Member States, notably Poland, in what constitutes deliberate destabilisation efforts;

L. whereas at least four political prisoners are still being held incommunicado, namely Viktar Babaryka, Maksim Znak, Uladzimir Kniha and Aliaksandr Aranovich; whereas Maria Kalesnikava was long held incommunicado, with a letter from her recently reaching the outside world for the first time in 2.5 years; whereas Andrzej Poczobut remains imprisoned in harsh conditions, in an isolation cell; whereas Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ales Bialiatski is being subjected to forced labour and punishments while imprisoned;

M. whereas the Belarusian people overwhelmingly oppose Russia’s war against Ukraine, a stance which has helped to limit Belarus’s direct involvement in the conflict and demonstrates the Belarusian nation’s commitment to peace, independence and European values;

M. whereas the Belarusian KGB and other security structures have intensified the cross-border repression and transnational intimidation of exiled Belarusians; whereas the Belarusian regime is among the top ten perpetrators of transnational repression;

N. whereas, despite persecution, physical danger and threats to their lives, democratic Belarusian leaders in exile continue their work with courage and determination, often at huge personal risk, advocating for human rights and representing the aspirations of the Belarusian people for a free, democratic and independent Belarus;

N. whereas Czech counterintelligence dismantled a Belarusian spy network that was operating under diplomatic cover, which allowed it unrestricted movement within the EU;

O. whereas Parliament and the Belarusian democratic forces remain steadfast in their shared commitment to restoring democracy in Belarus through free and fair elections, the rule of law, and the promotion of Belarus’s European integration as a guarantee of its independence and sovereignty;

O. whereas in recent years, the Lukashenka regime has stepped up pressure on the staff of Western diplomatic missions accredited in Belarus and on other foreigners;

P. whereas the EU has mobilised more than EUR 170 million since 2020 to support Belarusian civil society, independent media and victims of repression, and continues to impose sanctions on those responsible for undermining democracy and violating human rights;

P. whereas Lukashenka ‘pardoned’ over 200 political prisoners in 2024 in an attempt to have certain Western sanctions lifted; whereas political arrests continued despite these pardons, with at least 1 721 individuals convicted on political charges in 2024 alone; whereas the regime continued to release prisoners in 2025, but also arrested many others; whereas the regime is using political prisoners as bargaining chips to extort concessions from Western countries;

Q. whereas sustained and coordinated pressure on the Lukashenka regime, including through the use of targeted and effective sanctions, remains one of the key instruments in compelling it to make meaningful concessions to the forces of democracy, including the release of all political prisoners and the cessation of repression;

Q. whereas Siarhei Tsikhanouski, a laureate of Parliament’s Sakharov Prize, was released on 21 June 2025 after more than five years of imprisonment and solitary confinement, along with 13 other political prisoners, following diplomatic efforts by the United States;

R. whereas, during the visit by the US Special Envoy to Ukraine, General Keith Kellogg, to Minsk on 21 June 2025, the Belarusian authorities released fourteen political prisoners, including former presidential candidate Siarhei Tsikhanouski, after nearly five years of imprisonment; whereas, however, many more political prisoners remain behind bars;

R. whereas the political prisoners who were released have shared accounts of torture; whereas 2020 Sakharov Prize laureate Mikalai Statkevich, who was among those released, refused to cross the border to Lithuania, was imprisoned again and is being held incommunicado;

S. whereas Andrzej Poczobut, a journalist and member of the Union of Poles in Belarus, was arrested on 18 March 2021, and later sentenced to three years in prison on charges of ‘publicly insulting the President of Belarus’ and ‘inciting ethnic hatred’; whereas on 8 February 2023 the Hrodna Regional Court found him guilty of encouraging actions aimed at harming the national security of the Republic of Belarus and inciting ethnic hostility, and sentenced him to eight years in prison, where he remains to this day;

S. whereas the Lukashenka regime employs anti-extremism laws to obstruct media outlets, under which most independent media have been labelled ‘extremist’;

T. whereas the Lukashenka regime continues to force migrants from non-EU countries across its borders with Latvia, Lithuania and Poland as part of a hybrid attack on the EU; whereas migrants in Belarus face torture and other ill treatment by border guards and other officials;

T. whereas the Lukashenka regime has sought to intimidate Belarusian higher education institutions and academics operating in exile by declaring them ‘extremist organisations’;

1. Reiterates its non-recognition of Aliaksandr Lukashenka as President of Belarus and considers any elections conducted under his regime as fraudulent and illegitimate; acknowledges the widespread evidence and numerous testimonies indicating that Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya was the legitimate winner of the 2020 presidential election, while the Lukashenka regime unlawfully seized power and refused to acknowledge her victory;

U. whereas more than 500 000 Belarusians have been forced to flee the country since 2020, with some continuing to face persecution from the Lukashenka regime, including through trials in absentia, threats from the security forces, pressure on relatives, confiscation of property and other restrictions; whereas it is dangerous for Belarusians in exile to return to their homeland, as many of those who have returned since 2020 have been convicted on politically motivated charges; whereas many hold passports on the verge of expiry, which the Lukashenka regime uses to pressure them into returning to Belarus, where they face imprisonment;

2. Continues to express grave concern about the situation of political prisoners, including Ales Bialiatski, Maria Kalesnikava, Viktar Babaryka, Andrzej Poczobut, Valiantsin Stefanovich, Maksim Znak, Uladzimir Matskevich, Marfa Rabkova, Uladzimir Labkovich, Anastasiya Loika, Yana Pinchuk, Mikalai Bankou, Andrei Navitski, Henrykh Akalatovich, Uladzimir Kniha, Mikalai Statkevich, Pavel Sieviarynets and others, many of whom have no access to proper medical care, despite facing severe health issues, isolation, ill-treatment and torture; calls on Member State diplomats and representatives to actively support relevant organisations that advocate for political prisoners and, where appropriate, to seek ways to provide direct political support to prisoners in Belarus;

V. whereas under Lukashenka, more than 250 people sentenced to death have been executed; whereas Belarus remains the only country in Europe and Central Asia to retain the death penalty, with its scope expanded in 2022 to include vaguely defined acts of terrorism and in 2023 to include ‘treason against the state’;

3. Strongly condemns the ongoing repression of political opponents, journalists, civil society activists and cultural figures in Belarus; demands the immediate and unconditional release of all unjustly imprisoned political prisoners, journalists and media workers, and the full restoration of their civil and political rights; calls for strengthened international efforts to secure the release of all political prisoners, ensuring that no one is subjected to forced deportation from Belarus; commends the efforts of the US administration in this regard and its tangible results;

W. whereas the regime employs mass surveillance, censorship and disinformation, targeting both domestic audiences and the EU;

4. Demands that the Belarusian authorities cease the criminalisation of journalism, end the harassment of journalists both within Belarus and in exile, and halt intimidation of their family members; calls for the protection of independent media and of freedom of expression as essential elements of a democratic society;

X. whereas the illegitimate regime held sham presidential elections on 26 January 2025, amid arrests and repression; whereas the sham elections were not observed by any official missions from any democratic countries, and the European Parliament and like-minded partners did not recognise them as legitimate;

5. Strongly condemns the authorities of Belarus for blocking independent media, restricting access to the internet, and arresting journalists and bloggers, which contravenes international standards of press freedom;

Y. whereas the Lukashenka regime has enabled Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine by giving Russian forces access to Belarusian territory and supplying them with ammunition, fuel and other supplies; whereas it assists attempts by Russia and other actors to destabilise the EU and undermine European aspirations among the EU’s neighbours;

6. Deplores the fact that the repressive measures in Belarus have expanded to include attacks on religious freedom, through the adoption of the law on freedom of conscience and religious organisations, which grossly violates the fundamental right to freedom of religion, conscience and belief; urges the Lukashenka regime to immediately halt the persecution of religious communities and churches;

Z. whereas Montenegrin media report that Belarusian and Russian instructors in Serbia trained over 150 pro-Russian activists from the Republic of Moldova to destabilise Moldova after the recent elections there; whereas Moldova has refused entry to 195 Russian and Belarusian athletes and activists, including Dzmitry Shakuta, one of the suspects in the murder of Belarusian democratic activist Raman Bandarenka;

7. Condemns in the strongest possible terms the Lukashenka regime’s involvement in Russia’s unjustified, illegal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine; considers that the Lukashenka regime has become an accomplice in the crimes committed by Russia in Ukraine; deems, furthermore, that the special international tribunal on the crime of aggression perpetrated by Russia against Ukraine must also have the jurisdiction to investigate the Belarusian leadership;

AA. whereas, according to the US State Department’s 2025 Trafficking in Persons Report, Belarus is one of the main hubs for human trafficking and continues to inflict forced labour on Belarusians and foreign citizens; whereas the Belarusian authorities have transferred more than 2 400 unaccompanied children from vulnerable Ukrainian communities to Belarus, placing them in institutions where many have been subjected to ‘re-education’ and military training;

8. Denounces the illegal transfer of several thousand children, including orphans, from Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine to so-called recreational camps in Belarus, where they are subjected to Russification and indoctrination; strongly condemns the involvement of the Belarus Red Cross in the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children; asks the Commission and other relevant bodies to support the President of Ukraine’s Bring Kids Back UA initiative in every possible way;

AB. whereas Belarusian children are being groomed for military service under the guise of ‘patriotic education’, with thousands taking part in military-patriotic club activities; whereas the rhetoric of ‘patriotic education’ conceals the militarisation of minors, their training in the use of combat weapons and their indoctrination with pro-Russian narratives;

9. Supports the establishment of an international accountability mechanism to investigate and prosecute the crimes against humanity committed by the Lukashenka regime;

AC. whereas, according to data revealed by Cyberpartisans, an anti-regime group of Belarusian hackers, the majority of Belarusians fighting on the Russian side in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine are convicted criminals; whereas Article 133 of the Belarusian Criminal Code provides that mercenary activity is punishable by up to seven years’ imprisonment; whereas, however, no Belarusian has been convicted of this offence since Russia began its aggression against Ukraine in 2014;

10. Calls on the Member States and the international community to prepare the ground for the criminal prosecution of Aliaksandr Lukashenka and the Belarusian officials responsible for falsifying the 2020 election results and escalating human rights violations in its aftermath, under the accepted principles of extraterritorial and universal jurisdiction; highlights the invaluable work carried out by human rights defenders and civil society representatives on the ground in monitoring, documenting and reporting the grave human rights violations and crimes against humanity that are taking place in Belarus, in order to ensure subsequent accountability and justice for the victims;

AD. whereas the Lukashenka regime, with Russian assistance, circumvents certain sanctions through preferential market access and the use of Russian infrastructure;

11. Strongly warns the Commission and the European External Action Service, as well as all other EU institutions, bodies and Member States and their representatives that, for the EU to maintain its international credibility and moral authority, and regain trust, it must commit to serious and tangible efforts on the ground rather than engaging solely in performative symbolic gestures on social media platforms; urges all relevant EU institutions to prioritise real and measurable progress in the protection of human rights in Belarus;

AE. whereas, according to the Belarusian Investigative Center, a Belarusian company provided Russia with a sanctioned solvent that could be used to produce banned chemical weapons, and three businessmen close to Lukashenka were involved in its delivery;

12. Insists on the establishment of an EU Special Representative for Belarus, preferably a former high-ranking political figure, tasked with negotiating with Belarusian authorities and officials and with doing everything possible to secure the release of all political prisoners being held in the country;

AF. whereas from 12 to 16 September 2025, Belarus held the Zapad 2025 joint strategic military exercise with Russia, the first Zapad exercise since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022; whereas on 12 September 2025, Poland was forced to temporarily close all border crossings with Belarus, citing concerns over a possible escalation from Belarus;

13. Remains firmly committed to maintaining and strengthening pressure on the Lukashenka regime through robust, targeted and readily adaptable sanctions that address electoral fraud, human rights abuses, Belarus’s complicity in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and its hybrid warfare against neighbouring states;

AG. whereas the Astravets nuclear power plant, located on the border between Belarus and Lithuania, has been plagued by problems, and Belarus is now planning to build a nuclear waste dump near the Lithuanian border; whereas the Lukashenka regime also plans to build a second nuclear power plant in the east of the country to supply electricity, including to Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine;

14. Calls on the EU and its Member States to adopt further coordinated sanctions against individuals and entities responsible for repression and for supporting Russia’s aggression; urges the EU to develop a mechanism for identifying, freezing and confiscating assets owned by Lukashenka, his family, and members of his regime, and to redirect the proceeds to victims of repression and to Belarusian democratic initiatives;

AH. whereas Belarus continues to instrumentalise migration at its borders with Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, deliberately gathering migrants from the Middle East and forcing them to move towards the EU’s external borders; whereas following Lukashenka’s return from Moscow in September 2025, the Belarusian regime stepped up its hybrid actions by instrumentalising migration to destabilise the EU; whereas regime-sponsored contraband from Belarus continues to pose a serious threat to the EU’s security and economy, particularly given that the use of weather balloons to transport such contraband endangers aviation and has forced airports to close; whereas Poland, Lithuania and Latvia have had to step up security measures at their borders in response;

15. Welcomes the unity and solidarity shown by the EU and the Member States in addressing the multifaceted threats which the regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka poses to the EU, in particular through the continued and growing state-engineered instrumentalisation of migration, which deliberately causes human suffering at Belarus’s borders with Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and beyond; strongly condemns the Belarusian authorities’ use of migration for political ends and sees this as a purposefully orchestrated reprisal by the Lukashenka regime against the EU Member States for their support for the democratic forces of Belarus, with the aim of destabilising those Member States; supports the determined efforts undertaken by the Member States concerned to protect their borders, including by constructing physical barriers, such as border fences, as deterrents;

AI. whereas Belarus is experiencing an acute labour shortage as a result of repression, arbitrary detention and forced emigration; whereas the Lukashenka regime has concluded agreements with non-EU countries with the alleged aim of attracting labour; whereas these arrangements exacerbate the risk of migration being instrumentalised against the EU;

16. Calls for increased support to key democratic structures, such as the Office of the Elected President Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the United Transitional Cabinet, the Coordination Council and democratic political parties, to build their capacity and prepare them – as credible alternative institutions – to assume leadership during a democratic transition;

AJ. whereas the EU has mobilised EUR 170 million since 2020 to support Belarusian civil society, independent media and victims of repression, and has imposed targeted sanctions on Belarus in response to the 2020 fraudulent elections, human rights violations, and Belarus’s complicity in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including trade restrictions and sanctions on 310 individuals, among them Lukashenka, and 46 entities;

17. Urges the Member States to allow Belarusian citizens who are long-term EU residents and whose documents have expired to remain within, and travel throughout, the EU, without the obligation to return to Belarus, where they risk persecution;

AK. whereas the announced cuts in US support for Belarusian independent media and non-governmental organisations could lead to some organisations losing all their funding; whereas European partners have only partly filled the gap;

18. Encourages the Commission and the Member States to continue consultative work with the Belarusian democratic forces to lay the conceptual, legislative and human rights framework for Belarus’s transition to democracy in line with EU standards;

1. Reiterates its strong condemnation of the repression in Belarus; reiterates its demand for the immediate and unconditional release of political prisoners and arbitrarily detained persons in Belarus, along with compensation and the restoration of their rights; condemns the instrumentalisation of the judiciary, prosecutors and law enforcement agencies to commit human rights violations and crimes against humanity;

19. Calls for the EU and its Member States to support the democratic forces led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya in every possible way;

2. Continues to expresses grave concern about the situation of political prisoners, including Ales Bialiatski, Maria Kalesnikava, Viktar Babaryka, Andrzej Poczobut, Mikalai Statkevich, Valiantsin Stefanovich, Maksim Znak, Uladzimir Matskevich, Marfa Rabkova, Uladzimir Labkovich, Anastasiya Loika, Yana Pinchuk, Mikalai Bankou, Andrei Navitski, Henrykh Akalatovich, Uladzimir Kniha and others, many of whom face severe health issues without access to proper medical care and are enduring isolation, ill-treatment and torture;

20. Calls on the EU and international organisations to formalise the representation of the Belarusian democratic forces in international forums such as the EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly;

3. Reiterates its calls on the Belarusian authorities to respect detainees’ rights, provide medical care, and grant access to lawyers, families and international organisations;

21. Calls on the EU and individual Member States to further formalise the representation of Belarusian democratic forces by supporting them in opening offices across European capitals and allowing them to issue provisional documents to exiled Belarusian citizens;

4. Reiterates its call for the EU and its Members States to continue investigating human rights abuses and crimes against humanity in Belarus and to support measures to hold those responsible to account, including through extraterritorial and universal jurisdiction; calls for the EU and its Member States to support the Lithuanian Government’s referral of the situation in Belarus to the International Criminal Court in connection with the perpetration of transnational crimes against humanity; encourages the Member States to join the proceedings initiated by Lithuania before the International Court of Justice concerning Belarus’s instrumentalisation of migration;

22. Calls on all Member States to simplify procedures for visa issuance to Belarusian citizens threatened by the Lukashenka regime;

5. Reiterates its call for the EU and the Member States to support political prisoners and their families, including by demanding proof of political prisoners’ whereabouts, requesting their release, simplifying the procedures for Belarusians to obtain visas and identity documents, and providing rehabilitation and other support;

23. Calls on all Member States to create solid visa programmes for Belarusian students, researchers and representatives of academia;

6. Stresses the importance of protecting exiled Belarusians from persecution by the Lukashenka regime and of ensuring that they can access legal residence and employment in the EU;

24. Calls on the Member States to help Lithuania and Poland in their efforts to secure the functioning and funding of the Belarusian government in exile and of free Belarusian media outlets stationed in Lithuania and Poland;

7. Warns against Lukashenka’s instrumentalisation of political prisoners to extort concessions from the West; notes the release of dozens of political prisoners and encourages the EU, the United States and other like-minded partners to continue working for the effective release of all political prisoners in Belarus while further increasing pressure on the regime; reiterates that each time prisoners have been released, even more have subsequently been taken into captivity;

25. Reaffirms its unwavering support for the Belarusian people in their pursuit of democracy, freedom and human rights;

8. Expresses serious concern over the lifting of US sanctions on the Belarusian airline Belavia, which is complicit in the instrumentalisation of migration;

26. Prioritises support for Belarusian diaspora communities as key actors of resilience and advocacy in the sense and spirit of the Luxembourg Solutions adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, including through improved visa access and residence permit procedures and stronger legal protection within the EU; requests increased funding for educational, cultural and identity-preserving projects that safeguard the Belarusian language, culture and national identity while countering Kremlin narratives abroad;

9. Reiterates that it does not recognise Aliaksandr Lukashenka as the legitimate president of Belarus and reaffirms its support for the Belarusian democratic forces led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and for the democratic aspirations of the Belarusian people; calls for the EU and its Members States to work with non-EU countries to strengthen the policy of the non-recognition of Lukashenka as Belarus’s president; stresses the importance of sustained EU engagement with Belarusian democratic actors, ensuring that their efforts have political, financial and security support;

27. Regards an approach towards Belarus that both empowers Belarus’s democratic transition and constrains Russia’s military use of its neighbour as an integral part of the EU’s long-term values-based security strategy and as essential to maintain the EU’s credibility as defender of a democratic Belarus;

10. Commends the resilience of Belarusian civil society and the Belarusian democratic forces; reiterates its solidarity with the people of Belarus and its support for their legitimate aspirations for a democratic and European future, and remains committed to working with Belarusian democratic forces, civil society and independent media for the benefit of the people of Belarus;

28. Strongly condemns incidents involving violations of airspace and blockades of transport corridors, such as the forced landing of a Ryanair plane in 2021;

11. Welcomes the continued documentation of human rights violations by Belarusian non-governmental organisations such as Viasna; commends the work of Belarusian independent media in promoting freedom of expression, and emphasises the need to preserve their records for future judicial proceedings; calls on the EU and its Member States to provide concrete support for civil society organisations and human rights defenders working to collect and preserve evidence of the Lukashenka regime’s abuses and crimes against humanity, and to assist in transmitting such documentation to the competent international bodies, including the International Criminal Court;

29. Commends the continued cooperation between the EU institutions, Member States, Belarusian democratic forces and international partners to support a peaceful transition based on democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights;

12. Calls for the EU and its Member States to continue to support Belarusian democratic forces, civil society, students, journalists, trade union leaders, exiled professionals and others, including by providing them with visas, scholarships, grants, networking opportunities and measures to ensure their safety;

30. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the representatives of the Belarusian democratic forces and the de facto authorities of the Republic of Belarus.

13. Calls for the EU and its Member States to launch thorough investigations into, and dismantle, Belarusian and Russian spy networks in the EU and the candidate countries, and stresses, once more, the need to impose restrictions on Russian and Belarusian diplomats in the Schengen area;

14. Reiterates that any future normalisation of relations between the EU and Belarus must be conditional on the release of all political prisoners, the cessation of repression, the decriminalisation of political activity, and the holding of new, free and democratic elections under the supervision of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe;

15. Expresses deep concern over Russia’s growing influence in Belarus, which threatens its existence as a sovereign state; denounces the Lukashenka regime’s complicity in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and condemns its deliberate subordination of Belarus to Moscow in a so-called union state encompassing political, geopolitical, economic, military and cultural spheres; denounces the militarisation of Belarusian territory by Russia, including though military exercises such as Zapad, and warns that the deployment of nuclear-capable systems undermines Europe’s security; reiterates the need to strengthen Belarusian national identity and the Belarusian language, and to combat the falsification of Belarusian history by the Lukashenka regime and the Kremlin and its proxies;

16. Urges the EU and international partners to strengthen sanctions against individuals and entities responsible for the evasion of sanctions, the undermining of democracy and the rule of law, repression, human rights violations and crimes against humanity and for Belarus’ participation in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, while also closing sanctions loopholes; calls for the EU to impose sanctions on Belarusian entities and individuals responsible for the forced labour of political prisoners and on goods produced through such forced labour;

17. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to impose targeted sanctions on intermediaries and enablers who knowingly evade Belarusian fertiliser sanctions, and on any persons or entities leasing production facilities, re-branding, re-packaging or falsifying the origin of Belarusian fertiliser, providing financing or insurance, or otherwise facilitating transit; urges stronger enforcement and enhanced cross-border information-sharing; notes the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project’s findings on EU routing and Lukashenka’s recent push to expand the use of crypto-assets and tokenisation as a sanctions workaround;

18. Reiterates its calls on EU and Western companies to cease their activities in Belarus;

19. Urges Belarus to commute all death sentences, impose a moratorium on capital punishment and move towards its permanent abolition;

20. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Union / High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the relevant EU institutions, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the representatives of Belarusian democratic forces and the Belarusian de facto authorities.