What changed

B100445/2025

P10_TA(2025)0254

European Parliament resolution on the UN Climate Change Conference 2025 in Belém, Brazil (COP30)

(2025/2666(RSP))

PE772.168

European Parliament resolution of 23 October 2025 on the UN Climate Change Conference 2025 in Belém, Brazil (COP30) (2025/2666(RSP))

– having regard to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol thereto,

– having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2024 on the UN Climate Change Conference 2024 in Baku, Azerbaijan (COP29),

– having regard to the agreement made at COP29 on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance and the objective to triple financing for developing countries to USD 300 billion annually by 2035 and secure efforts from all actors to work together to scale up financing for developing countries, from public and private sources, to USD 1.31,3 trillion per year by 2035,

– having regard to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals,

– having regard to its resolution of 9 July 2025 on implementation and delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals in view of the 2025 High-Level Political Forum,

– having regard to the 2018 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.51,5 ºC above pre-industrial levels, its special report on climate change and land, its special report on the ocean and cryosphere in a changing climate and its sixth assessment report (AR6),

– having regard to the UNFCCC synthesis report of 28 October 2024 on nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/3012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 establishing a Union certification framework for carbon removals, carbon farming and carbon storage in products,

-– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1787 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on the reduction of methane emissions in the energy sector and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/942,

– having regard to the resolution adopted by the UN Human Rights Council of 12 July 2019 on human rights and climate change (A/HRC/RES/41/21),

– having regard to the Council conclusions on climate finance of 10 October 2025 in view of the 30th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP30) in Belém,

– having regard to the questions to the Commission and to the Council on the UN Climate Change Conference 2025 in Belém, Brazil (COP30) (O-000028/2025 – B100000/2025B100011/2025 and O-000029/2025 – B100000/2025),B100012/2025),

– having regard to Rules 142(5) and 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

B. whereas the Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016; whereas 2025 marks the ten-year anniversary of the adoption of the Paris Agreement;

C. whereas according to the UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2024, fully implementing unconditional NDCs made under the Paris Agreement for 2030 would put the world on course for limiting temperature rise to 2.82,8 °C this century, and fully implementing conditional NDCs would lower this temperature rise to 2.62,6 °C;

D. whereas the 2024 NDC synthesis report states that the total global greenhouse gas (GHG) emission level in 2030 is projected to be 2.62,6 % below the 2019 level; whereas the IPCC concludes that in scenarios limiting warming to 1.51,5 °C, GHG emissions need to be 43 % below the 2019 level by 2030;

E. whereas the EU should remain a leader in international climate negotiations; whereas a collective effort is needed by all parties to achieve global climate targets; whereas decarbonisation in the EU alone will not be enough; whereas the United States accounts for 23.823,8 % of global cumulative CO2 emissions, the EU Member States account for 16.516,5 %, China for 15 %, Russia for 6.76,7 % and the UK for 4.44,4 %; whereas the EU is currently the world’s fourth largest annual emitter of CO2, representing around 6 % of worldwide emissions, after China, the United States and India; whereas the EU represents 5.75,7 % of the global population and 14.714,7 % of global GDP;

F. whereas pathways limiting global warming to 1.51,5 °C require reaching net-negative emissions post-2050;

G. whereas most climate change mitigation actions featured in the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report, published in 2023, include carbon capture and storage, and carbon removal;

H. whereas the IPCC estimates that the global carbon budget for a 67 % likelihood of limiting global warming to 1.51,5 °C is approximately 400 gigatonnes of CO₂ from 2020 onwards; whereas, at current global emission levels, this global carbon budget is expected to be exhausted by 2030;

I. whereas methane has been responsible for around 30 % of the rise in global temperatures since the industrial revolution; whereas the EU co-launched the Global Methane Pledge (GMP) at COP26 to reduce methane emissions, by 2030, to 30 % of 2020 levels; whereas the report by the International Energy Agency of May 2025 entitled ‘Global Methane Tracker 2025’ shows that methane emissions are still on the rise and that the implementation of the Global Methane Pledge remains weak;

N. whereas the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) contains concrete measures to halt and reverse nature loss, including targets to restore 30 % of all degraded ecosystems by 2030 and a target to conserve 30 % of land, waters and seas;

O. whereas 2024 was the hottest year ever recorded and the first time global temperatures exceeded 1.51,5 °C above pre-industrial levels; whereas Copernicus data for the first half of 2025 shows some of the highest temperatures on record, with only 2024 being hotter for the month of May; whereas each of the past ten years also ranks among the top ten hottest years on record; whereas Europe is the fastest warming continent in the world, warming at roughly twice the global average rate since the 1980s, according to Copernicus data;

P. whereas the UN General Assembly has recognised the right to access a clean, healthy and sustainable environment as a universal human right and Article 37 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union enshrines the principle that environmental protection must be integrated into the policies of the Union;

S. whereas making global financial flows consistent with a pathway towards a net zero and climate-resilient economy is an essential goal for the green transition, in accordance with Article 2 of the Paris Agreement;

T. whereas the UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance’s report of 2021, entitled ‘First report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties’, states that national reports submitted by developing country Parties to the UNFCCC demonstrate that the costs for meeting their needs until 2030, in relation to implementing the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement, cumulatively amount to USD 5.8-5.95,8-5,9 trillion; whereas the UNFCCC’s NCQG on climate finance includes a commitment to scale up finance to the amount of at least USD 1.31,3 trillion per year by 2035;

U. whereas the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty Initiative is inspired by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and calls for a binding international treaty to stop fossil fuel expansion, to phase out existing production and to support a just global transition; whereas only 17 countries have so far endorsed the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty, and none of these is an EU Member State;

Global stocktake, NDCs and the COP30 in Belém

1. Highlights the fact that the outcome of the first global stocktake (GST) at COP28 recognises that pathways limiting global warming to 1.51,5 °C with no or limited overshoot and to 2 °C require a peaking of global GHG emissions by 2025, and that limiting global warming to 1.51,5 °C with no or limited overshoot requires deep, rapid and sustained reductions in global GHG emissions of 43 % by 2030 and 60 % by 2035 relative to the 2019 level, reaching net zero GHG emissions by 2050;

2. Takes note of the relative progress made in some areas at COP29 in Baku, especially as regards the NCQG on climate finance, the progress on making the loss and damage fund operational, and the carbon market agreement; regrets, however, the lack of sufficient progress on mitigation;

3. Notes with concern that the aggregated emissions reductions from the submitted NDCs fall significantly short of the emission pathways required to respect the Paris Agreement target and the conclusions of the first GST; urges COP30 to reaffirm the commitment to the 1.51,5 °C target and to agree on the need to continue to strengthen ambition, and to take concrete decisions to support the implementation of the NDCs; considers that GSTs should take place more frequently and calls for all parties that are not on track to achieving the Paris Agreement goal to update and strengthen their NDCs every second year, in addition to the five-yearly review cycle;

4. Stresses that a collective effort and further action by all parties is required to close the emissions gap and implement the actions included in the first GST through concrete targets, and to scale up nationally determined action; underlines the particular responsibility of all major emitters, including emerging economies and the G20 countries, to demonstrate leadership, in this regard; calls for the EU and like-minded partners to spearhead a coalition of high ambition and work collaboratively with all parties to secure a successful outcome at COP30;

6. Reiterates the principle of policy coherence for development, to which the EU and its Member States have committed, and which aims to minimise contradictions and build synergies between different EU policies; insists on a coherent approach to the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in both internal and external policies;

7. Recalls that in the first GST, the Parties to the UNFCCC recognised the need for deep, rapid and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in line with 1.51,5 °C pathways and committed themselves to contributing to the global effort to triple renewable energy capacity globally and to double the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030; remains concerned about the insufficient progress towards these targets; underlines that it is essential that COP30 build on these targets, take concrete decisions on their implementation and undertake additional measures should an ambition gap remain; reaffirms its commitment to deliver on the consensus reached in the COP28 Declaration on Climate and Health; takes note of the commitment to contribute to accelerating the development of zero- and low-emission technologies; recalls in this regards point (e) of paragraph 28 of the first GST as adopted at COP28;

8. Recalls that in the first GST, countries committed themselves to accelerating efforts towards the phase-down of unabated coal power and the phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, and to transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems in a just, orderly and equitable manner, with a view to accelerating action in this critical decade so as to achieve net zero by 2050, in keeping with the science; calls on all Parties to step up efforts in this direction and to engage in the development of a fossil fuel non-proliferation treaty; expects COP30 to strengthen the commitment to the transition away from fossil fuels and insists on the urgent need for ambitious and time-bound plans to phase out fossil fuel subsidies and fossil fuel production;

9. Notes that 2025 is the deadline for countries to submit their NDCs for 2035, which are essential for raising climate ambition, tracking progress and enhancing resilience; considers it essential that the EU lead by example and calls for the EU and all Parties that have not yet done so to respond to the COP28 GST and submit economy-wide absolute, as opposed to relative, emissions reduction targets covering all greenhouse gases, sectors and categories and aligned with the 1.51,5 °C goal, as soon as possible and well before COP30; regrets that most parties failed to meet the deadline for submitting their updated NDCs, stresses the importance of respecting all UNFCCC processes and submission deadlines for the good functioning of multilateralism in climate politics;

10. Stresses the importance of granular and transparent reporting to assess progress on the NDCs;

11. Acknowledges progress on the implementation of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and emphasises that the use of Article 6 should always result in a guaranteed net benefit for the climate and thus calls on all Parties to ensure that projects accounted towards Article 6 do not deter domestic emission reductions; urges the Supervisory Body and all Parties to stand by the Glasgow Agreement, and hence ensure that all approved Clean Development Mechanism activities comply with Article 6.4 methodologies by the end of 2025 at the latest; calls on the Commission to advocate and support the development of a robust international governance framework for internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) at international level that includes binding standards on international carbon credits to guarantee environmental, climate and social integrity, fair sharing of the mitigation benefits, clear implementation rules to ensure transparency, additionality and permanence, strict reporting obligations, and effective oversight mechanisms for all Article 6 projects, in order to eliminate the risk of double-counting and safeguard the environmental integrity of the system; calls for clear rules on liability sharing for monitoring and reversal risks, to avoid undue burdens on host Parties; highlights the need for private carbon market initiatives to implement the highest standards of integrity;

12. Calls on all Parties to make meaningful progress at COP30 to ensure that the second GST, beginning in 2026, is guided by the best available science and integrates cross-cutting issues such as gender equality,equity, human rights and ecosystem protection;

International climate finance and sustainable finance

15. Stresses that adaptation is underfunded, and that the NCQG does not respond sufficiently to adaptation finance needs; highlights the fact that, while all sources of finance – public and private – are needed, international public finance is needed in particular for responding to adaptation needs and addressing loss and damage;

16. Notes that the EU and its Member States provide roughly one third of global public climate finance, making them the largest providers globally, with EUR 28.628,6 billion provided from public sources in 2023 and EUR 7.27,2 billion in private finance also mobilised; reiterates that EU and national budgets should be adapted to meet the agreed NCQG, so that the EU delivers its fair share of international climate finance, including by mobilising private climate finance; considers that the NCQG represents the lower end/boundary for climate finance mobilisation;

17. Recognises that the EU played a significant role in brokering a deal to achieve agreement on the NCQG; calls on all Parties to contribute their fair share towards meeting the NCQG, which should include subgoals for finance for mitigation and adaptation and for loss and damage; calls for the EU and its Member States to scale up new and additional climate finance, through a dedicated and predictable EU public finance mechanism, to be in line with the agreed NCQG; recalls that, in order to achieve the necessary global climate finance levels, a broader contributor base reflecting Parties’ evolving financial capabilities is needed; expects upper-middle income countries with high emissions to contribute their fair share and increase their contributions more than currently is the case; calls on all parties to identify new and innovative sources of public and private finance; calls for Parties, when financing the NCQG, to prioritise instruments and measures that are grant-based and non-debt inducing in order to ensure that the recipient countries are able to implement necessary mitigation and adaptation measures without increasing their debt burden; expresses its concern about the NCQG being met by re-categorising other funds; points also to concerns about the ambiguity around the kinds of funding that contribute to the NCQG, in particular the issue of double-counting;

44. Points out that, at a time of rising geopolitical instability and volatile energy markets, decarbonisation is a powerful driver of strategic autonomy and economic competitiveness for the EU; recalls that this is acknowledged in the Clean Industrial Deal and its objective to bring climate action and competitiveness together in one overarching strategy;

45. Notes with concern that fossil fuel subsidies rose in recent years, with fossil fuel consumption subsidies totalling USD 620 billion globally in 2023 and a substantial share of subsidies observed in emerging and developing economies; regrets that fossil energy subsidies in the EU remained high, at EUR 111 billion in 2023, despite a decrease from 2022 levels; recalls that subsidies for imported fossil energy place a burden on European economies and distort incentives for clean energy transitions; underlines the importance of reducing subsidies for the most polluting fuels at international level and of transparent reporting of those subsidies; reiterates the need for the Commission and the Member States to implement the requirement in the 8th EAP to ‘set a deadline for the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies consistent with the ambition of limiting global warming to 1.51,5 °C’; regrets the lack of progress since the programme’s adoption in 2022, and calls on the Commission to put forward its roadmap to further reduce and phase out fossil fuel subsidies, in line with the EU’s climate commitments;

46. Stresses that the current geopolitical context underscores the urgent need to end the EU’s fossil fuel dependence and accelerate the energy transition; welcomes progress under REPowerEU and calls for the EU and the Member States to act faster;

90. Recalls the recommendations of the Group of Chief Scientific Advisors of the Commission published in December 2024 and accordingly calls on the Commission to take a proactive role in negotiating a global governance framework for SRM based on a firm stance of non-deployment, and to strengthen the capability to detect and quantify any undeclared deployment of SRM; further calls on the Commission and the Member States to agree on an EU-wide moratorium on the use of SRM, and to ensure that any potential public funding for responsible scientific research and comprehensive international assessments of the risks, potential effects and impacts of this technology, does not replace public funding for research on adaptation and mitigation;

Defence sector

91. Stresses that the defence sector must contribute to tackling climate change by reducing its emissions intensity while maintaining operational effectiveness and meeting Member States’ defence spending targets where agreed, and that the development of decarbonisation technologies and strategies in the defence sector should be accelerated; notes that the inclusion of disaggregated data on military emissions in UNFCCC submissions is voluntary, and that it is not currently possible to identify reported military GHG emissions from the submitted UNFCCC data; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission and the Council to formulate a proposal to increase the transparency of the accounting of military emissions to the UNFCCC that takes into account national security concerns and that acknowledges the adoption of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, and in order to fully implement the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap;

Climate change and gender

92.91. Underscores the importance of gender perspectives and inclusive approaches in the UNFCCC process, including the Just Transition Work Programme; calls for all Parties, including the EU and its Member States, to increase efforts to integrate gender equality into their revised NDCs and national adaptation plans and into their climate and environmental policies, in particular those related to mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage; emphasises the need for more concrete actions by all Parties, including the EU and its Member States, to deliver on the commitments under the renewed Gender Action Plan agreed at COP25; urges the Member States and the Commission to increase efforts to achieve the goals set out in the EU Gender Action Plan III;

93.92. Calls for the development of a new ambitious gender action plan ahead of COP30 that is intersectional, inclusive, measurable, human rights-based and cohesive across all areas of climate action; calls on the Parties to ensure that climate funding becomes gender-responsive and that the gender action plan includes an adequate and dedicated plan for funding; calls on all Parties to support the adoption of a new gender action plan during COP30;

94.93. Reiterates that adaptive capacity and vulnerability differ across gender, age, ability, racial and occupational lines; calls, therefore, on all Parties to assess, respond to and prioritise the needs of vulnerable populations in their national adaptation plans, adaptation communications and NDCs;

95.94. Recognises the disproportionate impact of climate change on women and girls, exacerbating existing gender inequalities and posing unique threats to their livelihoods, health and safety; reiterates the need to accelerate action for gender-responsive disaster risk reduction and, therefore, for gender-responsive implementation of the Sendai Framework; calls for further efforts to be made to prioritise and account for gender in disaster preparedness, particularly through the use of disaggregated disaster risk reduction datasets;

96.95. Considers that women’s access to inclusive climate finance must be increased and facilitated, noting that women receive disproportionately less access to financial resources for climate adaptation and mitigation projects; urges the EU and its Member States to report on the gender responsiveness of their climate finance contributions and to enhance the consistency between gender and climate support through external action instruments and the European Investment Bank;

97.96. Reiterates the importance of increasing women’s participation in decision-making in the climate diplomacy context, including in COP delegations and in leadership at all levels of climate action; calls on all Parties to aim for gender parity in their delegations and at all levels of climate change decision-making and negotiations; urges all Parties to nominate a national gender and climate change focal point and to increase the associated resources, training and support, including within the EU;

Participation of stakeholders at COP30

98.97. Recalls the importance of the full involvement of all Parties in the UNFCCC decision-making processes in the spirit of sincere collaboration, and recognises that protecting space for civil society and local- and regional-level actors to operate and participate in climate governance is fundamental to accountability and transparency; acknowledges that there are many barriers to the participation of civil society organisations at COPs; stresses that civil society and local- and regional-level actors play a vital role in advancing the implementation of NDCs by ensuring actions are effective, locally tailored and responsive to community needs;

99.98. Calls on the COP30 presidency and future presidencies to better enable the participation of developing countries and delegates from the least developed countries and to allocate additional resources to this end; encourages Parties to include young people in their delegations to ensure that future generations have an active role in shaping decisions that affect their future; welcomes the creation of the Youth Climate Champion role at COP28 as a step towards the stronger inclusion of young people in the UNFCCC process; calls for COP30 to institutionalise the meaningful participation of children and young people, including through structured dialogue mechanisms and official representation; calls for the increased use of virtual platforms at COPs to enhance global inclusiveness and participation of delegates and civil society representatives;

100.99. Demands that the organisers of the COPs ensure that human rights, fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of expression, full and unrestricted participation for citizens and civil society organisations, including the right to peaceful assembly and association, and equitable access to this and future COPs are fully enshrined and guaranteed in the Host Country Agreement, which should be made public as soon as possible after signing; calls on the UNFCCC secretariat to monitor compliance and to take action in the event of breaches of such human rights criteria;

101.100. Believes that the selection of the host city for any future COP meetings should take into account a set of predefined conditions including logistical and organisational capacity, safety and security as well as the environmental, economic and social impacts of the organisation of the event; stresses the importance of the sustainable organisation of COP30; regrets any negative impact that COP30 might have on the local ecosystem and local community of Belém; calls for precautionary measures in order to mitigate those risks;

Conflicts of interest, transparency and integrity

102.101. Expresses concern that more than 1 770 fossil fuel lobbyists were accredited attendees at COP29; calls for the UNFCCC and the Parties to ensure that the decision-making process is protected from interests that run counter to the goals of the Paris Agreement; urges the UNFCCC to take the lead in proposing an ambitious accountability framework that would protect the UNFCCC’s work from undue influence, based on the model contained in the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control with regard to the tobacco industry; urges all Parties to agree, within the framework of this agreement, on a definition of ‘conflicts of interest’ for the purposes of strengthening disclosure requirements;

103.102. Calls for accreditation for observers to be made conditional on the submission of a formal declaration of represented interests to a UNFCCC registry, accessible to the public, in order to increase transparency over influence at the COP;

104.103. Welcomes the fact that the Commission did not provide accreditation for fossil fuel lobbyists to attend COP29 and calls for the continuation of this practice; regrets that 113 fossil fuel lobbyists were accredited by EU Member States at COP29 and calls for all Member States to refrain from providing accreditation to any fossil fuel lobbyists to attend COP30 or any future COP;

Industry, SMEs and competitiveness

105.104. Views the COP30 as a key milestone 10 years on from the Paris Agreement and underlines that the fight against climate change should be a powerful driver of growth, reduce energy poverty and boost resilience, sustainability and competitiveness of industries and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); calls on policymakers across all Parties to the Convention to implement ambitious, timely and targeted responses within a stable, predictable and supportive transition framework, in accordance with the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR);

106.105. Stresses that well-designed and implementable enabling policies can ensure that decarbonisation and climate goals go hand in hand with industrial growth, job creation and innovation; recalls that investing in sustainable and clean technologies contributes to environmental and economic and social objectives;

107.106. Deems it to be of the utmost importance for the EU to ensure a fair transition to climate neutrality by 2050, to maintain public support for climate action and to lead by example, which should ensure a first-mover advantage in clean technologies and sustainable industries; calls for strong and targeted measures to shield EU industry from the risk of carbon leakage and from unfair global competition, ensuring a global level playing field; stresses the urgency of tackling the persistently high energy prices that undermine the EU industry’s competitiveness, including through investments in clean and renewable energy, energy efficiency, grids and flexibility;

108.107. Recognises that the EU’s objective of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 while enhancing its competitiveness implies a deep industrial transformation, which requires massive and targeted public and private investments tailored to Member States’ and industries’ varying circumstances and scaling up support for clean technologies, innovation, skills and infrastructure; underlines that investing in industrial value chains for clean technologies is also key to reindustrialising the EU and boosting strategic autonomy;

109.108. Urges support for EU industrial companies, including SMEs and small mid-caps (SMCs), to preserve their global leadership, while they decarbonise and transition towards a net-zero economy; underlines the need to provide effective solutions to support them in this transition phase in order to foster their innovation capacity and ensure competitiveness, to provide them with predictable and simplified administrative procedures, for example online permitting processes and access to finance, and to facilitate their participation in public procurement;

110.109. Calls for accelerated decarbonisation alongside strengthened competitiveness; welcomes the Net-Zero Industry Act, the Clean Industrial Deal and the Action Plan for Affordable Energy as key steps towards a resilient and climate-neutral economy, and the forthcoming Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act; welcomes the expanded EU Innovation Fund that supports the scaling up of new innovations and technologies in Europe aimed at decarbonisation and supply chain development;

111.110. Supports carbon management as part of industrial emission mitigation measures and underlines the key role played by carbon capture, utilisation and storage in the decarbonisation of hard-to-abate industrial emissions, and the production of low-carbon products including low-carbon hydrogen; recalls the industrial carbon management strategy to expand CO₂ capture, storage, use and removal; welcomes advancements to establish a global carbon market, which should help the decarbonisation of industries globally and ensure a level playing field for companies worldwide; recalls, in this regard, its position on the EU ETS and the CBAM, welcoming the proposed simplification of the CBAM in the first omnibus package as an important step to further enhance its effectiveness in addressing carbon leakage and calling for a workable export solution to address the risk of carbon leakage for CBAM goods exported from the EU to non-EU countries;

112.111. Urges improved access to finance for European industrial companies to decarbonise in line with the Paris Agreement; highlights the need for adequate financial resources to support decarbonisation under the next multiannual financial framework, including through specific funding instruments that effectively address the financing needs of European industries;

113.112. Recognises the essential role of SMEs and SMCs, in particular microenterprises and start-ups, in driving and delivering on innovation, job creation and economic growth as well as in leading the way in the digital and green transitions through innovation and cutting-edge technological solutions; stresses the need for predictable rules and better access to finance in this regard;

114.113. Emphasises the need for all Parties to continuously have secure and competitive access to critical raw materials, including secondary ones; welcomes the Critical Raw Materials Act and the Commission’s intention to propose a new Circular Economy Act and calls for diversified supply chains with EU-equivalent standards; believes that a predictable regulatory framework is needed that unlocks circular business models, particularly those based on waste prevention, reuse and high-quality recycling to ensure access to critical raw materials;

115.114. Highlights the urgency of re/upskilling the workforce, with investments in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and net-zero skills academies, to close labour shortage and skills gaps in decarbonising the European industry; calls for collaboration with social partners to address skills gaps and future labour demands in clean technologies;

Energy policy

116.115. Stresses the importance of phasing out fossil fuels as soon as possible while reiterating the need to develop measures to ensure gas supply at a mitigated cost for sectors that cannot rely substantially on electrification in the short to medium term; notes that, while putting effort into achieving a global consensus on such a phase-out at COP30, the EU should continue to reduce its dependency on fossil fuels, increase the diversity of its energy suppliers, and develop an energy efficient and decarbonised economy, in order to boost its energy security and industrial competitiveness, and provide access to affordable energy for households and businesses; calls for the EU to urgently end imports of Russian fossil fuels, including natural gas, which subsidise Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; welcomes, in this regard, the recent REPowerEU roadmap on ending Russian energy imports; calls on the G7 countries to lead by example in the energy transition, and calls on all COP Parties to decarbonise their energy systems and halt all new investments in fossil fuel extraction;

117.116. Highlights the untapped potential of geothermal energy in achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement and the EU’s energy policy, in particular for heating and industrial process heat; urges the sharing of best practice, innovations and technologies;

118.117. Recalls the key outcomes of the first global stocktake under the UAE Consensus at COP28, including a tripling of renewables and doubling energy efficiency by 2030 as well as accelerating clean energy investments; welcomes the fact that 2023 was a record year for renewable electricity capacity growth and calls for continuous progress monitoring and tracking, at both EU and global level; notes, with concern, that current investment trends are not aligned with the levels necessary for the world to achieve those goals and stresses that closing this gap requires policy action and stronger public-private coordination;

119.118. Highlights the importance of a global reduction in methane emissions in fossil fuel supply chains during the transition to clean energy systems in order to reach a global reduction of 75 % in methane emissions by 2030 as reflected in the IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 scenario; calls on the Global Methane Pledge signatories to step up their efforts, as current reduction rates remain insufficient and global emissions continue to exceed 120 million metric tonnes annually; welcomes the Methane Abatement Partnership Roadmap, launched by the Commission at COP29, and urges its swift implementation, including by showcasing successful examples at COP30;

120.119. Supports a global goal to increase energy storage capacity sixfold to 1 500 GW by 2030 and more broadly to increase system flexibility in line with G7 targets; stresses the need for innovation in GHG-reducing technologies; warns that climate change disrupts energy systems, including hydropower and thermal plant efficiency; underlines the need for non-fossil flexibility and storage development to better integrate and manage renewables;

121.120. Highlights the in-depth revision of the EU’s energy legislation under the ‘Fit for 55’ package, which has aligned it with the EU’s increased GHG emission reduction target of at least 55 % by 2030 in order to reach climate neutrality at the latest by 2050 and which must now be effectively implemented; believes that other Parties should follow similar and relevant efforts;

122.121. Emphasises the role of clean energy and renewables, energy efficiency and system diversification in achieving climate neutrality; welcomes, in this regard, the recent reform of the EU’s Electricity Market Design, which aims to boost renewables generation and empower and protect consumers; believes that further action is needed to implement the electricity market design rules; underlines the necessity of adopting pragmatic, clear and enabling conditions for the ramp up of low-carbon and renewable hydrogen so as to advance the energy transition, particularly in hard-to-abate sectors;

123.122. Recalls the EU’s commitment to the energy efficiency first principle, which takes into account cost efficiency, system efficiency, storage capacity, demand-side flexibility and security of supply; stresses its role in reducing emissions, lowering energy bills, improving energy security and protecting vulnerable consumers;

124.123. Emphasises the need for large-scale public and private investments in the EU’s energy grid and related infrastructure to allow for their modernisation, including digitalisation and expansion, including cross-border interconnection, and the further flexible integration of clean and renewable energy sources, efficiency measures and storage solutions to provide clean, sufficient, secure and affordable energy to EU citizens and industry; underlines, in particular, the need for an upgrade to the EU’s electricity grid as part of the upcoming European Grids Package;

125.124. Stresses the need for global coordination with and support to developing countries and least developed countries to reach net-zero emissions and build capacity through cross-border cooperation in the fields of policymaking and science and technology transfer;

126.125. Stresses that partnerships with reliable non-EU countries on the external dimensions of energy policies must be fostered; notes the EU’s efforts to build energy alliances through a sustainable development perspective, including by taking into account the interests of their populations and local communities;

127.126. Notes the Declaration to triple global nuclear energy capacity by 2050, which was launched at COP28 and has been signed as of COP29 by 31 countries, including 12 EU Member States and Ukraine; recalls, in this regard, the launch of the nuclear alliance put forward by several EU Member States and the European Industrial Alliance on Small Modular Reactors;

128.127. Highlights the central role of local communities and citizens in a just and inclusive energy transition; highlights the EU legal framework enabling energy communities and its potential as a model for international partners;

Research, innovation, digital technologies and space policy

129.128. Recognises the importance of the Copernicus programme and the EU Knowledge Centre on Earth Observation in climate action and observation; emphasises the importance of satellite monitoring for climate policy, including tracking methane emissions, forests and carbon sinks; calls for joint research on space and climate technologies, stronger public-private partnerships, and increased investment in the EU space economy for strategic autonomy;

130.129. Stresses the critical role of research and innovation (R&I) in achieving the Paris Agreement and Green Deal goals; regrets the EU’s continued shortfall in meeting its 3 % GDP research and development (R&D) investment target and calls for strategies to boost industrial R&D;

131.130. Welcomes the role of the Horizon Europe programme and its partnerships, such as the Joint Undertakings and the Knowledge and Innovation Communities of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology, in driving public-private collaboration towards climate neutrality, ensuring sustainable, accessible and affordable innovation;

132.131. Stresses that the EU must collaborate on research focusing on technology, industry and innovative science, which helps make important contributions to the Paris Agreement and calls for the quick delivery of the new Strategy for European Life Sciences and the review of the Bioeconomy Strategy; welcomes the ‘Choose Europe for Science’ initiative, which improves funding opportunities for research in the EU; calls on the Commission to foster strategic research partnerships to enable a level playing field in Europe; supports further action to secure long-term accessibility to climate-related data for the international research community;

133.132. Underlines the key role of digitalisation in energy integration, market connectivity and emissions reduction; emphasises the importance of digital technologies and AI-based tools in achieving the clean industrial transformation as they offer opportunities in, inter alia, electrification, flexibility and energy efficiency; looks forward to the EU’s strategic roadmap for digitalisation and AI in the energy sector; is concerned by the information and communications technology sector’s carbon footprint and calls for sustainable practices in data centres; recalls the objective of the EU’s digital strategy to deliver climate-neutral and highly energy efficient data centres and electronic communication networks and services by 2030;

Role of the European Parliament at COP30

134.133. Believes that Parliament should be an integral part of the EU delegation at COP30, given that it must give its consent to international agreements and plays a central role in the domestic implementation of the Paris Agreement as one of the EU’s co-legislators; expects, therefore, to be allowed to attend EU coordination meetings at COP30 in Belém and to be guaranteed access to all preparatory documents in good time; commits to act independently and free from conflicts of interest;

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135.134. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Secretariat of the UNFCCC, with the request that it be circulated to all non-EU Parties to that convention.