What changed

B100326/2025

P10_TA(2025)0166

European Parliament resolution on tacklingTackling China’sChina's critical raw materials export restrictions

(2025/2800(RSP))

PE774.020

European Parliament resolution of 10 July 2025 on tackling China’s critical raw materials export restrictions (2025/2800(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 (Critical Raw Materials Act),

– having regard to its previous resolutions on China,

– having regard to the strategic partnerships on raw materials signed by the EU with Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Greenland, Kazakhstan, Namibia, Norway, Rwanda, Serbia, Ukraine and Zambia,

– having regard to the upcoming EU-China summit planned for 24 and 25 July 2025,

– having regard to DirectiveRegulation (EU) 2024/17602024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 1311 JuneApril 2024 onestablishing corporatea sustainabilityframework duefor diligenceensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending DirectiveRegulations (EU) 2019/1937No and168/2013, Regulation(EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2023/2859,2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020, also known as the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA),

– having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on Shaping the EU’s position on the UN binding instrument on business and human rights, in particular on access to remedy and the protection of victims,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology manufacturing ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724(Net-Zero Industry Act),

– having regard to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Inventory of Export Restrictions on Industrial Raw Materials 2025,

– having regard to the G7 Leaders’ statement on the G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan,

– having regard to the International Labour Organization (ILO) Safety and Health in Mines Convention (No176) of 1995,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

– having regard to the ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No 169) of 1989,

– having regard to the clean trade and investment partnerships being negotiated by the EU, and to the EU’s critical raw material partnerships,

– having regard to the statementsjoint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2023 on ‘European Economic Security Strategy’ (JOIN(2023)0020), and to the speeches about de-risking given by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen at the G7European summitPolicy inCentre Kananaskis,on Alberta30 fromMarch 162023 toand 17in JuneParliament 2025,on 18 April 2023,

– having regard to the 13th EU-China Strategic Dialogue, held between the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, and the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, in Brussels on 2 July 2025,

– having regard to the statements made by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen at the G7 summit held in Kananaskis, Canada from 16 to 17 June 2025,

– having regard to World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, in particular the principles of non-discrimination and of transparency regarding export restrictions,

– having regard to WTO dispute settlement rulings DS431, DS432 and DS433 on China’s rare earth export restrictions,

– having regard to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas critical raw materials are essential for the EU’s technological and green transition goals, playing a vital role in industries such as renewable energy, electronics and electric vehicles;

A. whereas on 4 April 2025, China started to enact export restrictions on 7 of the 17 rare earth elements (REEs) and on permanent magnets produced from these, introducing a system for non-automatic licences, and cited dual-use and security considerations as justification; whereas the list of items covered by the restrictions includes medium and heavy REEs (samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium);

B. whereas the International Energy Agency estimates that China accounts for approximately 61 % of rare earth production and 92 % of their processing;

B. whereas critical raw materials are essential inputs for a wide array of industrial products and processes, including in critical sectors such as clean technologies, digital technologies, healthcare and defence; whereas a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials is fundamental to achieving the Union’s climate, digital, competitiveness and defence objectives;

C. whereas the EU depends on China for over 90 % of its supply of rare earths; whereas any meaningful reduction in this dependency might take three to four years;

C. whereas export volumes have reportedly decreased by as much as 80 %, having a heavy impact on a wide range of sectors, including electronics and consumer tech, green energy and renewables, the automotive industry, aerospace and healthcare;

D. whereas China is the EU’s second largest trading partner for goods after the United States, with bilateral trade reaching EUR 739 billion in 2023; whereas the European Union’s stated goal of de-risking from China has led to a number of adjustments in European economic governance;

D. whereas the EU’s dependence on China for critical raw materials has continued to grow or, at best, remains stubbornly high; whereas the global REE supply chain is heavily concentrated in China, which has control of around 75 % of mining output and of 85 % of processing capacity, reaching more than 95 % in the case of some REEs such as terbium, yttrium and dysprosium; whereas the EU remains overly reliant on non-EU countries for the supply of critical raw materials (CRMs) and is almost entirely dependent on China for the supply of heavy REEs; whereas the EU covers 98 % of its demand for permanent magnets, and 92 % of its demand for NdFeB magnets, with imports from China;

E. whereas on 4 April 2025, in response to US President Donald Trump’s tariffs on Chinese products, China’s Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs issued Announcement 18, imposing export restrictions on seven of the 17 rare earth elements, permanent magnets, and other finished products;

E. whereas China has significantly expanded its dominance in the global mining, processing and refining of CRMs and intermediate products, creating strategic dependences along key value chains, , which have, at times, been deliberately leveraged through restrictive trade measures; whereas China first restricted the export of REEs in 2010 over a territorial dispute with Japan, and this restriction was declared incompatible with WTO rules by the Appellate Body; whereas China has also applied extensive restrictions on the export of raw minerals classified as strategic and/or critical by the EU, including gallium and germanium since 1 August 2023, graphite since December 2023, antimony products since 15 September 2024, tungsten and bismuth since 4 February 2025, and scandium since 17 April 2025;

F. whereas these export restrictions affect global supply chains and demonstrate China’s ability to leverage its dominance in critical mineral processing;

F. whereas the implementation of these export restrictions has already started to cause severe disruptions to industry in the EU, including the automotive industry, with as many as 17 assembly lines experiencing temporary shutdowns in May 2025; whereas a wide array of sectors could face disruption, such as healthcare, space and defence – including fighter jets, frigates, drones and precision-guided weapons systems – wind turbines and batteries, as could the green and digital transitions more generally;

G. whereas the number of export restrictions on industrial raw materials globally increased more than fivefold between 2009 and 2023; whereas China accounted for 21 % of new export restrictions in 2023;

G. whereas China’s licensing procedure requires applicants to disclose sensitive information to the Chinese authorities, which breaches economic secrecy; whereas China’s updated export control framework of December 2024 gives greater discretionary powers to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the State Council and the Central Military Commission to subject items not formally listed as dual-use goods to export controls; whereas these new regulations include measures with extraterritorial applications;

H. whereas the EU has formally challenged China at the World Trade Organization regarding its export restrictions on rare earth elements and other critical raw materials;

H. whereas the EU applies export controls to certain types of critical and advanced materials, but these controls are clearly focused on material types, with precise technical parameters relating to their use in specific military applications, do not affect trade in commercial non-sensitive products and account for only a small share of total exports of the materials in question;

I. whereas the EU has introduced tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and has decided to exclude Chinese companies from EU government purchases of medical devices valued at over EUR 5 million; whereas China introduced anti-dumping tariffs on brandy imports from the EU;

I. whereas China has deliberately pursued a strategy of undercutting global market prices while keeping its domestic market closed, generally to the benefit of state-owned enterprises, and couples this with huge subsidy schemes, leading to significant distortions in global competition and jeopardising recent efforts by the EU and the Member States to keep the EU’s remaining mining sectors afloat;

J. whereas China’s Commerce Ministry has undertaken to speed up the approval of rare earth export licences for EU firms;

J. whereas the EU adopted the CRMA in April 2024 as the starting point of efforts towards improving the resilience and autonomy of the EU’s supply of CRMs and strategic raw materials (SRMs); whereas the CRMA addresses both the supply side and the demand side, including through production targets, through resource efficiency aimed at moderating consumption, and through the substitution of SRMs; whereas circularity is at the core of the CRMA, which aims to cover 25 % of the Union’s SRM needs through recycling by 2030 and has the objective of recycling substantially larger amounts of each SRM from waste, including for permanent magnets;

K. whereas an EU-China summit will take place in China in July, marking 50 years of bilateral diplomatic relations;

K. whereas the upcoming EU-China summit is an opportunity to engage in dialogue while continuing to stand strong against coercion;

L. whereas the EU consumes 25-30 % of the metals produced globally and its consumption levels are significantly higher than in Latin America, Asia and Africa;

L. whereas China still has sanctions in place against a former MEP, members of Member State parliaments and European think tanks;

M. whereas the EU itself has acknowledged that export restrictions can be justified for development objectives, environmental protection, or to ensure the sustainable exploitation of natural resources;

1. Strongly condemns China’s decision to enact REE export restrictions, which has halted exports and significantly disrupted supply chains vital for the automotive industry, defence manufacturers, semiconductor companies, green technologies, healthcare applications and many other sectors in the EU and across the world; considers that China’s action is unjustified and has a coercive intent, building on the enormous leverage its quasi-monopolistic position on the global market provides;

N. whereas many developing countries have successfully used such policies, as seen in Kenya’s leather industry, which benefited from a 40 % export duty on raw hides and skins, creating thousands of jobs and boosting incomes;

2. Believes that China is using these export restrictions to strengthen its negotiating position; stresses that the EU must firmly reject any attempts by China to use these restrictions to force concessions on other ongoing trade irritants, and believes that any concessions to China in this respect would harm the EU’s ability to protect itself from current and future coercion;

O. whereas the current high dependence of the EU on external sources for critical raw materials is largely a result of the EU’s own lack of strategic foresight and an unsustainable consumption model, rather than solely the actions of other countries;

3. Underlines the importance of expressing concern regarding China’s export restrictions on REEs and the broader implications of these restrictions for global supply chains at the upcoming EU-China summit; is convinced that export controls should be part of a multilateral approach designed to protect international security and ensure a global level playing field, insists that unilateral controls must be limited to those made strictly necessary by national security considerations, with transparent and clearly defined rules, and therefore stresses that making China’s actions run counter to multilateral rules and practices, and calls on the Commission and the Member States to take a firm and unified stance, engage with China to find a structural solution and continue dialogue with China in this regard;

P. whereas the pursuit of critical raw materials for the green transition must not replicate historical patterns of ‘green colonialism’ or ‘new resource grabs’ that disproportionately impact the Global South;

4. Urges the Chinese authorities to follow up tangibly on their proposal and fully lift the export restrictions; takes note, in the meantime, of the recent proposal by the Chinese authorities to establish so-called ‘green lanes’ aimed at simplifying procedures for European companies;

Q. whereas the current EU approach, often driven by European businesses seeking cheap access to raw materials, risks hindering the economic prospects of developing countries by reinforcing their dependence on unprocessed raw material exports and limiting their policy space for industrialisation;

5. Stresses the urgent need for the EU to enhance its strategic leverage and indispensability by identifying, operationalising and strengthening areas in which it holds critical advantages over China in essential goods and technologies, with the objective of strengthening the EU’s strategic autonomy, or by limiting access to the EU internal market for high-risk Chinese vendors in accordance with EU and international trade law;

R. whereas the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act designates strategic projects to increase EU capacity to extract, process and recycle strategic raw materials and diversify EU supplies from non-EU countries;

6. Considers China’s measures to be an unjustified weaponisation of its CRM supply lines, rendering it an untrustworthy source of input for critical sectors and a threat to the Union’s economic and essential security interests;

S. whereas existing EU trade agreements and strategic partnerships on raw materials often lack sufficient binding commitments to ensure high environmental, social and governance standards, and have not yet proven effective in fostering genuine value addition or green industrialisation in partner countries;

7. Expresses deep concern over the requirements, imposed by Chinese authorities, that applicants must disclose sensitive data when applying for export permits, and over the considerable risk of technology leaks associated with this as regards the defence industrial base value chain and national security secrets, stressing that this may be used for future coercion; considers it essential for the Commission and the Member States to assess and mitigate the security implications of such data transfers, in line with the European economic security strategy;

T. whereas the reliance on voluntary schemes for corporate social and environmental responsibility has proven insufficient to guarantee respect for human rights and environmental protection;

8. Urges the Commission and the Member States to accelerate the implementation of the CRMA; stresses the important role of the European Raw Materials Board and its sub-groups for the rapid and efficient implementation of the CRMA; recalls the clear and ambitious targets set to reinforce EU capacities to extract, process and recycle SRMs domestically by 2030; highlights the selection of the first 60 strategic projects under the CRMA;

U. whereas foreign direct investment in raw materials sectors has a poor track record, often leading to low revenues for host governments, limited technology transfer, human rights abuses and the displacement of communities;

9. Regrets the fact that the CRMA was not accompanied by a dedicated EU budget, despite the lack of funding being the main bottleneck; stresses the urgent need to secure investments in the strategic projects approved under the CRMA and in other projects to boost extraction, refining, processing and recycling that contribute to de-risking from China and to achieving the CRMA benchmarks; urges the Commission to dedicate further EU-level support to the diversification of the REE and CRM supply, and to guarantee that the forthcoming multiannual financial framework will include a budget line to foster investment in extraction, processing, circularity, research and innovation, including for the substitution of CRMs;

V. whereas trade agreements, such as the EU-Chile free trade agreement, have been criticised for limiting partner countries’ ability to secure domestic supplies of critical minerals and to implement policies that foster local industrial development;

10. Underlines the need for the EU to mine domestically and re-establish processing capacity; underlines that increasing the efficiency of resource use through technological innovation is one of the objectives of the CRMA; emphasises the potential of recycling and urban mining to alleviate supply constraints in the short term and asks the Commission to take immediate measures to improve the collection and retention of REEs in the internal market;

W. whereas a truly just energy transition requires a fundamental shift in the EU’s approach to raw materials, prioritising reduced consumption, increased circularity and equitable partnerships that benefit all parties and the planet;

11. Underlines the need to ensure the long-term business case for and the viability of investments in CRM value chains, including through financial support such as price floors, offtake support and strategic stockpiling; calls on the Member States to request that large companies producing technologies in strategic sectors duly and regularly carry out risk-preparedness activities and measures to mitigate supply shortages, including via stockpiling;

1. Calls for the EU and China to use the upcoming summit as an opportunity to ease trade tensions and to jointly revive multilateralism by advocating global trade rules, guided by the principles of solidarity, cooperation, sustainability and democracy;

12. Calls on the Commission, together with the Member States, to assess the minimum level for the EU of strategic stocks of REEs listed as SRMs (neodymium, praseodymium, terbium, dysprosium, gadolinium, samarium and cerium) and the corresponding end-use applications, including those linked to the defence industry;

2. Insists that the EU must not follow the Trump administration’s calls to confront China or to decouple its supply chains from it;

13. Calls, furthermore, for stronger engagement to conclude clean trade and investment partnerships (CTIPs) and bilateral strategic partnerships on raw materials that are based on true win-win partnerships and meet high sustainability and human rights standards; insists on the need to move towards binding agreements on CRMs to ensure the long-term security of the EU’s supplies, guarantee more transparency and ensure that Parliament has scrutiny powers; underlines the importance of free trade agreements and the Global Gateway initiative in enhancing access to CRMs;

3. Recalls that export restrictions can be a legitimate policy tool for sovereign states to ensure the sustainable management of their natural resources, promote domestic processing, generate revenue, and protect their environment;

14. Encourages the use of preference clauses for sourcing REEs from EU suppliers and trusted partners in relevant procurement legislation; calls for greater coordination with like-minded international partners, particularly within the G7 and NATO frameworks and with the Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security, in order to improve knowledge transfer, align supply chain security, joint investments and stockpiling strategies, and develop trusted-source standards for strategic sectors and projects;

4. Rejects rivalry and bloc-building, which risk empowering authoritarian and ultranationalist forces, heightening geopolitical tensions and increasing competition for critical raw materials;

15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Government and Parliament of the People’s Republic of China.

5. Rejects current trade agreements as the primary solution for securing raw materials, as they reinforce neo-extractivism and lock developing countries into the role of raw materials exporters;

6. Highlights that EU trade agreements, by pushing for liberalisation and restricting export taxes or dual-pricing policies, limit developing countries’ policy space to pursue their own industrialisation and value addition strategies; insists that any new agreements explicitly support value addition in partner countries, prioritising processing and recycling projects over extractive ones, and that they include incentives for domestic procurement and local processing of mined critical raw materials;

7. Asserts that the EU’s historical approach, driven by business interests seeking cheap access to raw materials, has contributed to a ‘race to the bottom’ rather than fostering sustainable development; calls for the EU to develop a new type of sustainable trade and investment agreement for the clean transition that sets a ‘new gold standard’ by securing enforceable labour and environmental commitments, effective regulatory cooperation, and strong financing capacity to ensure mutually beneficial outcomes;

8. Emphasises that trade agreements and strategic partnerships should facilitate, not hinder, the global circular economy by promoting international cooperation to establish a global market for secondary raw materials, including reviewing existing trade rules and waste directives to support this objective;

9. Calls for a fundamental re-evaluation of the EU’s consumption patterns and a strong commitment to more sufficiency; insists that reducing the EU’s overall consumption of minerals and shifting towards a low-resource economic model must be at the heart of its raw materials strategy;

10. Proposes a binding target to reduce Europe’s demand for primary raw materials by at least 10 % by 2030, by promoting efficiency, circularity and avoidance of use; demands that industrialised countries like the EU bear the main responsibility for reducing their consumption of raw materials;

11. Demands significant investment in, and prioritisation of, circular economy principles domestically; calls for greater EU investment in research and innovation to develop new materials, enable substitution, and improve the recycling and reuse of critical raw materials;

12. Calls for the promotion of a fair, industrialised circular economy at EU level, with clear eco-design standards to ensure that products are fit for reuse, repair and recycling;

13. Emphasises the need to create new economic and business models that support the growth of recycling activities, recognising their potential for job creation;

14. Insists on a review of the current export of waste outside Europe to ensure full implementation of the circular economy and secondary raw material production within the EU;

15. Insists that any external sourcing of raw materials must adhere to the highest international social, environmental and governance standards and calls for strategic partnerships to include clear, specific and binding measures for mandatory due diligence on environmental, social and human rights impacts for companies involved in the supply chain;

16. Emphasises the need to respect ‘no-go zones,’ including protected areas, the deep sea and sacred sites, and to enforce regulations on conflict minerals and minerals extracted through forced or child labour;

17. Insists on robust and effective transparency measures, including public availability of all negotiation reports, memoranda of understanding, roadmaps, and impact assessments related to strategic partnerships on raw materials;

18. Requires that financial support mechanisms, such as the Global Gateway and export credit agencies, be fully transparent, inclusive and aligned with development policy objectives and communities’ needs; stresses that companies with a history of human rights abuses or environmental destruction must be excluded from participating in strategic projects;

19. Calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and the Member States to actively engage in the negotiations for the United Nations Binding Treaty on Business and Human Rights and support provisions to strengthen access to justice and remedy for victims of corporate-related human rights abuses;

20. Calls for strategic partnerships to support producer countries’ own green transition through specific, tailored language on value addition, including support for the domestic energy transition and green industrialisation, and the sharing of knowledge, technology, patents and capital;

21. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to uphold these principles in all their engagements concerning critical raw materials, ensuring that the EU’s green transition responds to the urgent need for a just global energy transition rather than replicating past colonial mistakes;

22. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.