What changed

B100167/2025

B100169/2025

European Parliament resolution on the need for EU support towards a just transition and reconstruction in Syria

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Syria,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,

– having regard to its recommendation of 28 February 2024 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the situation in Syria,

– having regard to theUN principlesSecurity Council Resolution 2254 (2015) of national18 sovereigntyDecember and2015 non-interferenceon inthe domesticsituation affairs,in Syria,

– having regard to the currentstatement social,of security9 December 2024 by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and integrationSecurity challengesPolicy, facedKaja byKallas, EUon Memberbehalf Statesof asthe aEuropean resultUnion on the fall of massthe migration,Assad regime,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 19 December 2024,

– having regard to the Council’s decision of 24 February 2025,

– having regard to Syria’s accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2013,

– having regard to the visit of the Commissioner for Preparedness, Crisis Management and Equality, Hadja Lahbib, to Syria on 17 January 2025,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 January 2025 on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2025,

– having regard to the establishment of the UN Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic, under UN General Assembly Resolution 77/301 of 29 June 2023,

– having regard to the International Criminal Court and universal jurisdiction cases in European courts prosecuting war crimes, crimes against humanity and violations of international law committed in Syria,

– having regard to the Paris Conference on Syria held on 13 February 2025,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the civil war in Syria has come to an end following a regime change, bringing relative stability to the country and the region;

A. whereas following the overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria by the Islamist paramilitary rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in December 2024, HTS established a transitional government under its leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, marking the end of decades of Ba’ath party dictatorship and Assad-family oppression;

B. whereas the normalisation of the situation in Syria provides an opportunity for millions of displaced Syrians to return home without delay and contribute to the reconstruction of their country;

B. whereas the new Syrian leadership announced its priorities for the transitional period, including establishing legal and legitimate governance, safeguarding civil peace through the implementation of a transitional justice system and the prevention of individual reprisals, rebuilding state institutions, revitalising the national economy and restoring Syria’s role in regional and international affairs; whereas the leadership held a National Dialogue Conference on 24 and 25 February 2025, where it announced plans to create a representative legislative council, adopt a constitutional declaration for the transition period and create a constitutional committee tasked with drafting the future constitution; whereas, at the same time, the de facto Syrian authorities have stated that it could take up to three years for them to propose a new constitution for the country;

C. whereas the Member States have already borne their share of responsibility by hosting over 1.3 million Syrian refugees and asylum seekers since the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2011;

C. whereas Syria’s de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, was previously a member of the Islamic State of Iraq, then pledged allegiance to Al-Qaida before officially distancing himself from these organisations; whereas he has never expressed regret for being associated with these terrorist organisations; whereas HTS and Ahmed al-Sharaa are on the UN Security Council counterterrorist sanctions list; whereas certain doubts exist as to whether HTS and its leadership have fully transformed from jihadist rebels to legitimate political actors;

D. whereas the Syrian crisis has provided a gateway for millions of non-Syrian people to enter the European Union, often without sufficient vetting, leading to increased pressure on Member States’ resources, security and social services;

D. whereas the security landscape in Syria remains fragmented, with ongoing tensions between various armed groups; whereas hostilities, particularly in north-eastern Syria, continue to impact civilians;

E. whereas Syria’s Christian communities, which are among the most ancient Christian populations in the world, have endured immense suffering, facing persecution, displacement, and systematic violence from jihadist groups throughout the conflict;

E. whereas an estimated 16.7 million Syrians are in need of humanitarian aid, 3 million face starvation and struggle with dangerous levels of food insecurity; whereas over 2 million internally displaced Syrians live in camps in north-west Syria alone;

F. whereas many of those who arrived in the EU have benefited extensively from social welfare and healthcare systems, straining national budgets at the expense of European taxpayers;

F. whereas Syria faces severe economic challenges, including soaring inflation, currency devaluation, electricity shortages and rising commodity prices;

G. whereas the continued presence of large numbers of non-integrated migrants in Europe has created additional burdens on law enforcement, national security and public infrastructure, making migration management a priority concern for Member States’ governments;

G. whereas the Assad regime, since its inception and with direct support and assistance from Moscow and Tehran, engaged in systematic repression, mass arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions and other grave human rights violations; whereas the Assad regime was responsible for documented war crimes, including the deliberate targeting of civilians, the use of barrel bombs, siege warfare leading to mass starvation, and the deployment of chemical weapons in violation of international law; whereas the collapse of the Syrian economy was exacerbated by regime corruption, predatory economic policies and reliance on illicit activities, including the production and trafficking of Captagon;

1. Welcomes the stabilisation of Syria and the restoration of order following years of conflict;

H. whereas the Syrian regime, through ethnic cleansing, conducted a brutal campaign to change the country’s demographic makeup; whereas Christians in Syria made up about 10 % of the pre-war Syrian population, totalling 2.2 million people; whereas the brutality of the war caused a mass exodus of Christians, with only about 640 000 remaining; whereas, in addition to the Syrian regime, Christians in the country have been persecuted by ISIS and other Islamist militias; whereas the Assad regime attempted to project an image as a secular protector of Christians and other minorities in Syria, but the regime reportedly intentionally destroyed churches and detained at least several hundred Christian citizens; whereas the Assad regime, with the active support of the Russian Federation, besieged and completely decimated Aleppo, the city with the largest Christian population in the country; whereas in 2024, the country was ranked as the 18th most difficult place in the world to be Christian;

2. Emphasises that the return of Syrian refugees from the EU to their homeland is a fundamental prerequisite for the successful reconstruction of Syria and for the long-term sustainability of the region;

I. whereas, despite the fact that HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa has made public statements promising safety and peaceful coexistence for minorities, including Christians, doubts persist due to HTS’s jihadist origins as well as reports about continued restrictions on religious freedom in Syria, including the monitoring and control of religious activities, the enforcement of dress codes for women, the misappropriation of properties and a ban on public religious expressions and symbols;

3. Calls on the EU institutions and the Member States to actively support efforts facilitating the immediate repatriation of Syrian citizens to their homeland without delay;

J. whereas the January 2025 proposals to reform Syria’s school curriculum, shifting from a merely nationalist to a more Islamic orientation, illustrate the presence of supporters of radical Islam in the ranks of the new Syrian administration;

4. Stresses that EU Member States are under no moral or financial obligation to support the Syrian population, as taxpayers’ resources should address the many pressing economic, social and security challenges within the EU itself;

K. whereas transitional justice, respect for human rights and the restoration of justice are essential to achieving sustainable peace and reconciliation in Syria; whereas all parties responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses must be held accountable through transparent and independent investigations within the framework of transitional justice;

5. Rejects any future EU plan that would commit the Member States to funding Syria’s reconstruction, emphasising that responsibility must now shift to those who have benefited from the EU’s hospitality, ensuring they contribute to the rebuilding and stabilisation of their own country rather than remaining indefinitely dependent on European welfare systems;

L. whereas the European Council has recognised the need to ensure the protection of all civilians, the provision of public services and the creation of conditions for an inclusive and peaceful political transition, as well as the safe, voluntary and dignified return of Syrian refugees in line with the standards set by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees;

6. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European External Action Service, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

M. whereas on 24 February 2025, the Council decided to suspend restrictive measures on key economic sectors in Syria, while maintaining targeted sanctions against individuals and entities responsible for war crimes and illicit activities;

N. whereas the EU’s humanitarian and financial assistance to Syria amounts to over EUR 30 billion since 2011 to support displaced Syrians and neighbouring host countries;

O. whereas the reconstruction of Syria is extremely challenging, with 90 % of its population living below the poverty line; whereas the sanctions imposed on the Syrian civilian population must first be eased before the EU Member States can make any investments;

P. whereas authoritarian foreign actors, including Russia and Iran and their proxies (the Wagner Group, the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi militias and Afghan mercenaries) as well as local Syrian collaborators, played a destructive role in Syria for over a decade, actively fuelling the conflict and supporting the Assad regime’s brutal repression; whereas Russia and Iran, under the guise of strategic alliances, exploited Syria as a geopolitical battleground to expand their influence in the region, destabilising the country and obstructing diplomatic efforts for a peaceful resolution to the conflict; whereas Iran’s extensive infrastructure in Syria has largely collapsed following the fall of the Assad regime;

Q. whereas Russia used Syria as a testing ground for its military capabilities, tactics and intervention strategies, systematically targeting civilian infrastructure, hospitals and humanitarian aid convoys in clear violation of international law; whereas both Russia and Iran profited from Syria’s economic collapse, extracting resources, controlling strategic industries and using the country as a hub for arms and drug trafficking;

R. whereas approximately 10 000 ISIS fighters are currently detained in Syria; whereas over 40 000 family members of ISIS fighters are being held in camps in Syria; whereas the detention facilities are primarily guarded by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF); whereas the security of these detention centres has become a growing concern since the fall of the Assad regime; whereas the SDF has warned that recent clashes with Turkish-backed fighters in northern Syria are affecting their ability to protect the prisons, which poses a serious threat to regional and European security;

S. whereas several investigations into and prosecutions of serious crimes committed in Syria are ongoing under the principle of universal jurisdiction, offering hope in the pursuit of justice and accountability for acts of torture, crimes against humanity and war crimes perpetrated during the Assad regime’s rule; whereas France has issued an international arrest warrant against Bashar al-Assad, his brother Maher al-Assad, who commanded elite military units responsible for brutal repression, and two Syrian armed forces generals, all accused of complicity in crimes against humanity, including the deployment of chemical weapons in 2013; whereas multiple European courts have prosecuted former Syrian officials and intelligence officers for war crimes and crimes against humanity, further solidifying international legal efforts to hold perpetrators accountable;

T. whereas Russia and China systematically obstructed justice by vetoing UN Security Council resolutions aimed at addressing war crimes in Syria, shielding the Assad regime from international accountability and enabling impunity for atrocities; whereas Russia actively interfered in international investigations into chemical weapons attacks and other war crimes, disseminating disinformation to distort evidence and deflect blame from the Assad regime; whereas the fall of the Assad regime has created an opportunity to fully pursue justice against those responsible for the regime’s atrocities, ensuring that war criminals face prosecution;

U. whereas the Assad regime in Syria supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and recognised the occupied Luhansk and Donetsk regions in eastern Ukraine; whereas Ukraine’s military intelligence service systematically reported that Russia was training Syrian mercenaries to support Russia’s war against Ukraine;

V. whereas Türkiye has maintained a significant military presence in northern Syria since 2016, conducting multiple operations aimed at establishing a buffer zone free from Kurdish-led forces, particularly the People’s Protection Units (YPG), which Türkiye associates with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK); whereas these operations have resulted in Turkish control over territories in northern Syria, with Türkiye exercising authority both directly and through allied Syrian factions; whereas in December 2024, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan asserted that Türkiye’s actions were instrumental in the rapid collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, positioning Türkiye as a dominant influence in the region; whereas in October 2023, the Turkish Parliament extended the mandate authorising military operations in Syria for an additional two years; whereas Türkiye is urged to cease its unauthorised military activities and withdraw its forces in order to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and contribute to regional stability;

W. whereas Türkiye has shifted its strategy in Syria following the fall of the Assad regime, aiming to increase its regional influence by supporting the transitional government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa; whereas Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seeks to establish a cooperative administration in Damascus to position Türkiye as the dominant state in the Levant, offering military aid, training and reconstruction support to Syria, along with lucrative contracts for Turkish firms involved in rebuilding efforts; whereas in February 2025, the new Syrian authorities initiated discussions with Türkiye on establishing a joint defence pact, potentially leading to new Turkish airbases in central Syria and training programmes for Syria’s new army; whereas Erdoğan has urged Damascus to assist in eliminating the SDF, hinting at a full-scale Turkish military incursion against the Kurdish forces that he accuses of terrorism;

1. Recognises the historic fall of the Ba’ath party dictatorship and the Assad regime as an opportunity for the Syrian people to reclaim their sovereignty and establish a democratic government based on the principles of human rights, political inclusivity and the rule of law;

2. Calls on all parties involved to help Syria transition away from a dictatorship, terrorism and repression, and to contribute to a peaceful, Syrian-led and Syrian-owned transition towards an inclusive, democratic governance model that ensures the representation and participation of, and equal rights for, all ethnic, religious and political groups within Syria, ensuring that all citizens have an equal voice in shaping the country’s future, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015); calls, furthermore, on Syria to break free from its notorious long-standing alliances with Tehran and Moscow, which have brought suffering to the Syrian people and destabilisation to the region;

3. Takes note of the priorities of Syria’s de facto leadership for the transitional period in the country, namely to establish legal and legitimate governance, uphold the rule of law and ensure a stable transition towards democracy; encourages efforts to rebuild and reform state institutions to enhance their efficiency, transparency and service to the Syrian people, with a particular focus on strengthening the armed forces and security apparatus in order to maintain stability and protect citizens in accordance with the principles of human rights; is of the opinion that a prosperous and peaceful future for Syria depends on political stability, which, in turn, relies on addressing various domestic issues and is hindered by a lack of national cohesion and political agreement among Syria’s various ethnic and religious groups – a problem that should be addressed in the new Syrian constitution;

4. Takes note of the recent National Dialogue Conference held in Damascus as a first step towards establishing a culture of dialogue for all Syrians; encourages the continuation of the national dialogue in the long term, with the involvement of representatives from all segments of Syrian society without exception; expresses concerns about the announced delay to constitutional reforms; considers that the constitutional vacuum in Syria poses numerous problems for its citizens and represents an obstacle to the restoration of its diplomatic relations;

5. Is particularly concerned by the increasingly alarming reports from Christians and people of other faiths in Syria about double standards on the part of the de facto Syrian authorities; calls on the transitional authorities to guarantee the right to religious freedom and belief without limitations for all Syrian people without exception;

6. Welcomes the EU’s commitment to supporting a stable transition for Syria and calls for strengthened diplomatic coordination with regional and international partners to ensure the successful execution of the political process;

7. Supports the Council’s decision to suspend restrictive measures on key economic sectors in order to improve the dire conditions in the country, in particular the shortages of food, medicine, shelter and energy, and to enable Syria’s economic recovery, which, if not properly addressed, may destabilise the country and potentially the region, while maintaining targeted sanctions against individuals responsible for war crimes, human rights violations and illicit financial activities; urges the new leadership in Syria to guarantee equal distribution of humanitarian aid;

8. Emphasises that any future suspension of restrictive measures must be part of a gradual approach and follow a careful analysis based on the close monitoring of the situation in the country, and it must be conditional on meaningful steps on, inter alia, the process of inclusive transition, respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Syrians without distinction of any kind, the rule of law and international law, and the commitment of the transitional government to distance itself from its jihadist past;

9. Reaffirms the EU’s commitment to humanitarian aid and reconstruction, prioritising the restoration of critical infrastructure, including water supply, electricity, healthcare and education;

10. Calls on the international community to provide coordinated support for Syria’s reconstruction, while ensuring that financial and technical assistance is directed towards legitimate local institutions and communities rather than entities affiliated with the former regime or terrorist organisations;

11. Recognises the EU’s decision to fully operationalise its delegation in Damascus and establish contacts with Syria’s new leadership, emphasising the EU’s commitment to supporting Syria’s transition and reconstruction efforts;

12. Considers that Syria cannot continue to pose threats to its neighbours, notably Israel and Türkiye, as it requires support and cooperation in fighting terrorism, preventing the re-emergence of extremist groups and countering the risk of terrorist groups establishing a de facto safe haven in post-Assad Syria and Syria’s remaining chemical weapons stockpiles being destroyed, as priorities for international security and stability; affirms that progress in relations with the EU must be conditional on cooperation with the transitional government in Syria to track down jihadists with European nationalities or those involved in planning attacks in Europe;

13. Condemns the crimes against humanity committed by the Assad regime, including mass killings, the use of chemical weapons, the forced displacement of populations and the systematic targeting of civilians; highlights the importance of safeguarding civil peace through the implementation of a comprehensive transitional justice system that promotes accountability, reconciliation and national unity, while preventing individual reprisals; affirms that justice for these crimes should primarily be pursued within Syria, ensuring that the Syrian people will have ultimate ownership over the accountability process against their former oppressors and the right to prosecute those responsible and dismantle the remnants of the repressive Assad regime, including ‘terror courts’ and judges responsible for executions and repression; underlines the importance of seeking justice rather than revenge, ensuring proper vetting processes and focusing on victims and their families throughout the transition process; acknowledges the ongoing investigations in European courts under universal jurisdiction, but emphasises that such mechanisms should complement rather than replace efforts to obtain justice within Syria; calls on the international community to provide the necessary assistance to ensure fair and effective trials within the country;

14. Supports the work of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (CoI), the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) and the Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic (IIMP) in their efforts to document human rights violations, ensure justice and provide accountability;

15. Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to take immediate steps to prevent any re-establishment or reinforcement of Russian and Iranian forces, paramilitaries or intelligence in the country;

16. Calls for the immediate withdrawal of all destabilising foreign military forces, including remaining Russian and Iranian troops and militias, in order to ensure Syria’s full sovereignty and to prevent continued external interference in the country’s internal affairs;

17. Urges neighbouring countries to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and cease all military operations that could jeopardise the fragile political transition;

18. Is worried about the security situation in north-eastern Syria; calls for a concerted international effort to prevent the resurgence of ISIS and other terrorist organisations in Syria, ensuring that local security forces receive the necessary support to counter extremist threats;

19. Highlights the importance of protecting Syria’s cultural heritage and calls for international collaboration to restore historical sites and religious landmarks and to prevent the illicit trade in looted artefacts;

20. Condemns the irreparable damage caused to cultural sites by both the Syrian regime and jihadist groups operating in Syria; remains concerned that the instability will lead to an increase in international smuggling and theft of cultural heritage that could be used to finance enhanced activity by terrorist organisations in the region; urges that Syrian cultural artefacts be digitised in Europe to support the detection of smuggled goods and calls for a temporary, comprehensive ban on the import of cultural goods from Syria to deprive the regime and its affiliates of the potential to profit from cultural smuggling;

21. Welcomes the voluntary return of Syrians from neighbouring countries and supports the safe and dignified return of all refugees; calls for the full protection of returnees from persecution, discrimination or forced conscription;

22. Calls for urgent measures to combat the illicit drug trade originating from Syria, particularly the production and trafficking of Captagon, which has destabilised the region and fuelled corruption and violence;

23. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Member States, the United Nations Secretary-General, the United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, the League of Arab States, representatives of Syrian civil society, and the de facto authorities in Syria.