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From · resolution motion · 2025-03-07 B-10-2025-0166 on continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression
To · resolution motion · 2025-03-07 B-10-2025-0165 on continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression
+32 added · −56 removed · 6 modified paragraphs

B100166/2025

B100165/2025

European Parliament resolution on continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, in particular to the obligation of all states under Article 2 of the Charter to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN, and to settle their international disputes by peaceful means,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter in the event of an armed attack,

– having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty,

− having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, in particular to the principles contained therein that the territory of a state may not be the object of acquisition by another state resulting from the threat or use of force, and that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a state or country or at its political independence is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter,

– having regard to the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of 1975,

− having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, which defines aggression as the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the UN Charter,

– having regard to the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation of 1997,

having regard to the Geneva ConventionsCode of 1949Conduct andon AdditionalPolitico-Military ProtocolAspects Iof theretoSecurity of 1977,1994,

having regard to the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and the Budapest Memorandum onEuropean Security Assurances,of 1999,

− having regard to the reports of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Ukraine,

– having regard to the draft proposal for an agreement on measures to ensure the security of the Russian Federation and the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of 17 December 2021,

− having regard to the regular reports of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,

– having regard to the response of NATO and the United States to the draft proposal for an agreement on measures to ensure the security of the Russian Federation and the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of 17 December 2021,

having regard to theUkrainian UNPresident SecurityVolodymyr CouncilZelenskyy’s resolutionsfull adoptedspeech sinceat the start ofMunich theSecurity warConference of aggression19 againstFebruary Ukraine,2022,

having regard to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s address to the applicationnation foron EUthe membershipstart submittedof bythe intervention in Ukraine on 2824 February 2022,

– having regard to the Commissiondraft communicationtreaty ofon 17permanent Juneneutrality 2022and entitledsecurity ‘Commissionguarantees Opinionfor onUkraine, Ukraine’sas applicationpresented forto membershipthe President of the EuropeanRussian Union’Federation (COM(2022)0407),on 15 April 2022,

– having regard to theUS subsequentVice-President EuropeanJD CouncilVance’s conclusionsfull ofspeech 23at andthe 24Munich JuneSecurity 2022,Conference of 14 February 2025,

– having regard to the Commission staff working document of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Ukraine 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0699),

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2774 (2025) of 24 February 2025,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the Russian Federation has been conducting a full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022, in blatant and flagrant violation of the UN Charter and the fundamental principles of international law;

A. whereas the global geopolitical landscape has fundamentally shifted towards a multipolar world order, with even the United States, as the leading Western power, acknowledging these new realities and adapting to them;

B. whereas on 30 September 2022, Russia unilaterally declared its annexation of the partly Russian-occupied Ukrainian oblasts of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia, in addition to its previous annexation of the Crimean peninsula;

B. whereas for decades, the EU has followed a foreign and security policy largely aligned with the United States, yet this approach is now proving increasingly outdated and ineffective in the evolving global order;

C. whereas people all over Europe are deeply concerned about the war, which has the potential to result in a war between nuclear-armed states;

C. whereas major powers, including the United States and Russia, have consistently sidelined the EU in key geopolitical negotiations, including those directly affecting European security;

D. whereas according to recent polls, the majority of Ukrainians are in favour of starting negotiations and ending the war as soon as possible;

D. whereas three years of full-scale war in Ukraine have demonstrated that the strategy of the EU and the United States under the Biden administration has failed to achieve its stated objectives to defeat Russia militarily, to cripple it economically and to isolate it politically;

E. whereas in March and April 2022, direct peace talks were held between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul, during which a possible peace agreement was discussed;

E. whereas, on the contrary, this strategy has caused political divisions among the Western allies and undermined their economic stability, making a continuation of the current approach untenable;

F. whereas the war in Ukraine has resulted in hundreds of thousands of casualties on both sides, and according to several military analysts, there is unlikely to be a military solution to the conflict in the short term; whereas the number of deserters, who refuse to fight in the war, is constantly increasing on both the Ukrainian and Russian sides;

F. whereas the conflict has inflicted catastrophic demographic, economic and infrastructural damage on Ukraine, with each passing day worsening the country’s long-term viability as an independent state;

G. whereas since the start of the war, the EU and its Member States have made available over USD 167 billion in financial, military, humanitarian and refugee assistance to Ukraine; whereas in July 2024, the EU made available the first USD 1.6 billion generated from immobilised Russian assets, which will be channelled through the European Peace Facility and to the Ukraine Facility to bolster Ukraine’s military capabilities and to support the country’s reconstruction; whereas the EU formally opened accession negotiations with Ukraine in June 2024;

G. whereas Ukraine and Russia held negotiations on a treaty on permanent neutrality and security guarantees for Ukraine just one month after the war began, which could have ensured Ukraine’s security in exchange for its neutrality and immediately ended hostilities;

H. whereas on 17 March 2023, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court issued warrants for the arrest of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and of the Commissioner for Children’s Rights in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation, Maria Lvova-Belova;

H. whereas the signing of this agreement was stalled due to the intervention of foreign powers, particularly the United Kingdom, which encouraged Ukraine to continue the war instead;

I. whereas former US President Biden’s administration authorised Ukraine to use US-supplied longer-range missiles for deeper strikes inside Russia and increased arms deliveries, including the provision of anti-personnel mines;

I. whereas US and EU military, economic and political support has failed to secure a decisive breakthrough for Ukraine, and, given the policy shift of the United States under its new administration, the EU alone cannot change the course of the war;

J. whereas the Ottawa Treaty, ratified by the vast majority of the EU Member States, prohibits the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines because of their indiscriminate nature and devastating impact on civilians, particularly children;

J. whereas each additional day of conflict results in further loss of Ukrainian lives and of territorial control and in the further destruction of infrastructure, and continuing to pursue unrealistic objectives will only deepen the crisis;

K. whereas Russia has revised its nuclear doctrine and has signed a deal to increase military cooperation with North Korea;

1. Recognises the need to adapt to the new geopolitical reality and warns that continuing outdated policies will lead the EU into a strategic deadlock and global irrelevance;

L. whereas the Ukrainian economy has been devastated by the war, with vast sections of its industry and resources falling under foreign ownership, including Western multinational corporations, and the population suffering from impoverishment and displacement; whereas the economic consequences of the war have also harmed EU Member States, contributing to energy crises, inflation and deindustrialisation, while benefiting primarily US economic and military interests;

2. Calls for the EU to develop an independent foreign policy strategy that clearly defines its own interests and objectives, in line with its long-term goal of being recognised as a serious geopolitical actor in a multipolar world;

M. whereas diplomatic initiatives to end the war have been largely absent from EU foreign policy;

3. Rejects the outdated notion of indefinite military support for Ukraine under the ‘as long as it takes’ framework, highlighting that such an approach is neither sustainable nor beneficial to the EU or Ukraine;

N. whereas the Trump administration has undertaken a bilateral dialogue with the Russian Federation aimed at ending the conflict in Ukraine, thereby excluding representatives of the Ukrainian people from negotiations on their own future and sovereignty; whereas the resulting exclusion of the EU leadership from the negotiations was a consequence of their total alignment with the United States and NATO;

4. Calls for the EU and its institutions to align with ongoing diplomatic efforts between the United States and Russia and actively contribute to the upcoming negotiations;

O. whereas over the years, the policy of alignment with NATO and the United States has led Europe to be an accomplice and spectator of the genocide of the Palestinian people by the Israeli Government;

5. Urges the EU to develop and propose its own diplomatic solutions for resolving the conflict, ensuring that a future settlement takes into account the legitimate security interests of all stakeholders in Europe;

P. whereas Europe has an interest in building a lasting peace and a European security system that contributes to developing peaceful relations with its neighbouring countries, and to pursue a policy of mutual nuclear disarmament instead of a new and senseless arms race and a new cold war;

6. Calls strongly for the EU and its Member States devise a post-conflict reconstruction strategy where any EU commitment must be framed within mutually beneficial commercial agreements, ensuring that EU taxpayers’ contributions are balanced by economic opportunities for European businesses, industries and strategic sectors, in line with the pragmatic approach pursued by the new US administration;

Q. whereas the United States is forcing Ukraine into a deal on the exploitation of Ukrainian mineral resources as a precondition to continuing its engagement; whereas the agreement initially was not signed due to an unprecedented public verbal clash in the Oval Office between Presidents Trump and Zelenskyy;

7. Calls for direct diplomatic engagement between the EU and Russia, as any lasting peace and security framework in Europe must be negotiated with all relevant actors;

R. whereas the Trump administration’s aim to end the conflict in Ukraine and with Russia is linked to the declared objective to focus its attention on the containment of China and the Indo-Pacific area, which was also declared a strategic priority by the previous US administration; whereas President Trump has openly declared that there will be no Ukrainian accession to NATO;

8. Acknowledges that every sovereign state has legitimate national security interests that must be respected under international law; emphasises that no country can enhance its security at the direct expense of another;

S. whereas several European and non-EU NATO leaders met in London on 2 March 2025, in the presence of Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, confirming and even increasing military support to Ukraine; whereas Prime Minister Starmer of the UK and President Macron of France confirmed on this occasion their willingness to send their troops to Ukraine as part of an as-yet undefined peace plan and as part of an undefined ‘coalition of the willing’;

9. Calls for a shift away from aggressive rhetoric towards constructive proposals, urging EU institutions to prioritise diplomacy over escalation;

T. whereas President Trump announced the suspension of all US military and intelligence aid to Ukraine; whereas a few hours after the announcement, President Zelenskyy declared his willingness to sign the mineral deal and to engage in peace talks ‘under the leadership of President Trump’;

10. Calls on European leaders to take into account the position of, and the decisions taken by, the new US administration, notably the suspension of military aid and intelligence services to Ukraine, which have underscored the necessity of achieving peace in Ukraine as swiftly as possible;

U. whereas the special European Council of 6 March 2025 supported Commission President von der Leyen’s ‘ReArm Europe’ plan to unlock up to EUR 800 billion of additional defence spending over the coming years;

11. Draws attention to the fact that meetings of European heads of state, such as the one held in London on 2 March 2025, where renewed calls for additional military support to Ukraine were made, do not contribute to ending hostilities but, on the contrary, escalate the risk of the Ukraine conflict transforming into a global war;

1. Reiterates, in the strongest possible terms, its condemnation of the attack on Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty resulting from the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine; condemns this invasion as a war of aggression that constitutes a serious violation of international law, in particular the UN Charter, and for which there is no justification; condemns Belarus’s involvement in this aggression;

12. Calls on the Ukrainian authorities to outlaw the non-governmental organisation ‘Myrotvorets’, which cooperates with Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) and Ministry of Internal Affairs, inciting tensions in society and misusing the personal data of hundreds of people, including journalists, politicians and members of minority groups;

2. Expresses its deepest solidarity with the people of Ukraine and the families of all the victims;

13. Calls on the Ukrainian authorities to unequivocally condemn and take action towards prohibiting Banderist symbols and the promotion of the ideology of the Bandera faction (OUN-B) of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which were responsible for the genocide in Volhynia and neighbouring regions between 1943 and 1945; calls on the Member States to introduce a ban on the use of Banderist symbols and the dissemination of this ideology within their territories;

3. Stresses the failure of the European Union’s leaders to pursue a serious diplomatic resolution to the war in Ukraine and calls for an immediate shift towards peace negotiations; stresses the urgent need for intensive, sustained diplomatic efforts to immediately put an end to the war in Ukraine and stop the suffering of the Ukrainian people; regrets the fact that a diplomatic and peaceful resolution to the conflict has not yet been found; regrets the EU’s total alignment with US and NATO policy, which has prevented the EU from taking any autonomous diplomatic initiatives in the past three years, openly opposing any kind of dialogue with Russia; calls for increased efforts to finally initiate a peace negotiation process that includes all parties; calls for the EU institutions and Member States to support an immediate ceasefire and a negotiated settlement;

14. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President and Government of Ukraine, the President and Government of the Russian Federation, NATO and the United Nations.

4. Regrets the arrogant behaviour of the Trump administration towards Ukraine and its European allies; stresses that a peace agreement cannot be reached without the involvement and consent of all parties and that it cannot be solely the outcome of negotiations between the major powers;

5. Underlines that while the priority of the Biden and Trump administrations was to pursue the interests of the United States, the European leadership has given priority to relations with the United States and subordination to NATO over the defence of peace in Europe and European interests; considers that no military solution to the current conflict can be envisaged in the short term; expresses its disappointment at the EU’s lack of initiative, participation and cooperation in any negotiating process and the absence of efforts to identify concrete and realistic conditions under which negotiations could take place; denounces the hypocrisy of the EU, specifically its stance on this conflict compared to its backing of the ongoing support and protection the United States and other NATO and EU powers continue to give Israel’s genocidal policies against the Palestinian people, as well as the escalation of war in the Middle East;

6. Believes that the EU should have undertaken a major diplomatic initiative by convening a multilateral conference for peace and security on its own account; recalls that, according to Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union, the EU should promote multilateral solutions and ‘preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter [and] with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act’; insists on the necessity of initiating a formal negotiation process under the auspices of the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which would provide a neutral platform for dialogue and help ensure that any agreement respects international law and the rights of all parties involved; calls for the EU to engage directly with all relevant actors, including both Ukraine and Russia and non-aligned nations, to facilitate a diplomatic resolution to the conflict; calls for the EU to focus its efforts not only on continuing its financial support to Ukraine, but also on undertaking a diplomatic initiative to achieve a ceasefire and a political solution to the conflict; calls for renewed EU initiatives to promote mutual nuclear disarmament and reduce reliance on nuclear deterrence in global security strategies;

7. Expresses deep concern over the geopolitical tensions between NATO and the Russian Federation in the common eastern neighbourhood, which risks leading to a direct confrontation between them, with potentially disastrous consequences for Europe and the world; recalls that EU citizens fear a confrontation or war with Russia; opposes Ukraine’s NATO membership, recognising that such a move would only exacerbate tensions and prolong the war;

8. Stresses that European security must be built on a framework of collective diplomacy and regional stability rather than military expansionism and bloc confrontation; believes that it is time for the EU to have a security and foreign policy of non-alignment and independent from NATO and the United States;

9. Expresses its strong opposition to send European troops to Ukraine, and reiterates that the sending of peacekeeping troops from third countries can only be considered as a result of an agreement between the parties and on a mandate from the United Nations;

10. Expresses its strong opposition to the special European Council’s support to the von der Leyen rearmament plan and the militarisation of the EU, in particular on the use of cohesion funds for military spending; reiterates that European cohesion funds, and derogation from the stability and growth pact, must be used to allow investments in schools, healthcare, housing, innovation and research, digitalisation and the fight against climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss; stresses that the objective of the construction of a common European defence, along with achieving strategic autonomy and independence from the United States and NATO, cannot be at the expense of social spending; denounces the double standards of this neoliberal and Atlanticist Europe, which applies flexibility on fiscal rules on military spending while continuing to impose austerity and neoliberal criteria on social and economic policies; strongly deplores the decision to use Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to approve the rearmament plan without the vote and the democratic control and scrutiny of Parliament;

11. Demands that the Russian Federation cease its use of force against Ukraine and refrain from any unlawful threat or use of force against any state; demands that the Russian Federation withdraw its military forces from the territory of Ukraine; reaffirms its commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, extending to its territorial waters;

12. Urges Russia, in the strongest possible terms, to turn back from the path of violence and aggression it has chosen and to return to the path of dialogue and negotiation; urges NATO and its member countries not to further escalate the conflict by continuing to engage in a new arms race; deplores the announced deployment of US short-range and medium-range missiles in Germany; strongly condemns the recent US decision to authorise the use of long-range weapons to attack Russia, and Russia’s decision to review its nuclear doctrine; expresses grave concern over Russia’s revised nuclear doctrine, which lowers the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, and calls on all nuclear-armed states to commit to non-proliferation agreements; stresses that both decisions are another turn on the spiral of escalation, making the need for diplomatic efforts even more urgent;

13. Reiterates its deep opposition to, and concern about, the risk of escalation of the conflict that could arise from the use of US, UK and other Western weapons and missiles to attack targets in Russia, which could lead to a direct confrontation between the EU, NATO and Russia;

14. Denounces the economic exploitation of Ukraine by foreign actors, such as the Trump administration and US and other Western multinational corporations, which have taken advantage of the war to acquire strategic assets and resources, undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty and economic future; notes that Ukraine is required to make substantial and onerous debt service payments to the International Monetary Fund and other international lenders in the coming years; considers that in the light of the severity of the economic situation in Ukraine, continuing to pay off pre-war debt and debt accrued during the war will severely limit Ukraine’s access to public funds for reconstruction and the provision of public goods and services; calls therefore for the EU to cancel Ukraine’s external debt;

15. Calls on the Member States to urgently support the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force to protect the 15 nuclear reactors in Ukraine, in close cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency mission; stresses that the UN General Assembly, in accordance with its Resolution 377 (V), has subsidiary decision-making powers when the UN Security Council is unable to take adequate decisions on peacekeeping;

16. Strongly condemns the deepening of military ties between Russia and North Korea, including reports of arms transfers, which contravene international sanctions and exacerbate global security risks; urges the EU and the international community to reinforce measures to block illicit arms trading and support the enforcement of existing UN Security Council sanctions concerning the nuclear weapons programme;

17. Strongly condemns the decision by the United States to provide anti-personnel mines to Ukraine, emphasising that such weapons violate international humanitarian principles and have catastrophic long-term effects on civilian populations; urges the EU to reaffirm its commitment to the Ottawa Treaty by ensuring that no Member State participates, directly or indirectly, in the deployment or transfer of these weapons;

18. Calls on all countries, including the United States, Ukraine and Russia, to adhere to the principles of the Ottawa Treaty and to work towards the universal eradication of anti-personnel mines;

19. Expresses its dismay at the continuous large-scale Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure, including energy facilities, residential areas, schools and hospitals; urges Russia to immediately stop all hostilities, bombardments and attacks on civilians; demands that all parties fully comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law to spare the civilian population and civilian objects, to refrain from attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless objects necessary for the survival of the civilian population and to respect and protect humanitarian personnel and consignments used for humanitarian relief operations; stresses that those responsible for war crimes must be held accountable in accordance with international law;

20. Denounces the effects that the war is having on women’s mental, physical, sexual and reproductive health; notes that the destruction of infrastructure in Ukraine is having disastrous consequences for the health of women, who are often doing the nursing, medical and care work;

21. Expresses its concern about the economic, environmental, energy and social consequences that the war is having not only in Europe, but worldwide; notes that inflation, caused in part by rising energy prices, is squeezing working people and the most vulnerable groups; expresses its concern about the environmental impact of the war and about the EU’s increasing energy dependence on liquefied natural gas from the United States;

22. Regrets the fact that the Temporary Protection Directive is being interpreted so narrowly that many women who have fled Russia’s war of aggression cannot access abortion care or other sexual and reproductive health treatments, including treatments following sexual abuse; is appalled by the fact that, as a consequence, many women have been forced to return to war-torn Ukraine to access services relating to their sexual and reproductive health and rights and reproductive care; calls on the Commission to review the Temporary Protection Directive to ensure that all Member States are obliged to offer the same care that women could otherwise receive in Ukraine;

23. Calls for the EU to support international justice processes to try war crimes committed during the war; stresses the need to adhere to the principles of restoration and non-repetition; denounces the double standards applied by the EU regarding sanctions and international justice;

24. Recalls that the reconstruction of Ukraine must be the highest priority and that Russia must contribute financially to this reconstruction; notes the importance of the reconstruction being based on the needs of the Ukrainian people, not on corporate profit interests; supports the calls for an international conference to be organised in due time to raise funds under the Ukraine Solidarity Trust Fund; stresses the need to prioritise the reconstruction of facilities allowing Ukrainians who wish to return to do so in safety;

25. Is deeply concerned about the changes being made to Ukrainian labour law, recalling the importance of strong trade unions, good working conditions and a robust, functioning public sector as the foundation enabling a society to be well equipped to face external challenges, such as war;

26. Highlights the recommendations of Ukraine’s High-Level Working Group on the Environmental Consequences of the War; believes that more attention should be paid to the environmental consequences of wars, especially in times of intensifying global ecological crises; urges the Assembly of States Parties to the International Criminal Court to include ‘ecocide’ as a core international crime under the Rome Statute;

27. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation.