What changed

B100154/2025

B100162/2025

European Parliament resolution on the need for EU support towards a just transition and reconstruction in Syria

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Syria,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to other UN human rights treaties and instruments,Charter,

– having regard to theUN decisionsSecurity ofCouncil previousResolution UN2254, Securityas Counciladopted sanctionson committees,18 December 2015,

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) of 18 December 2015,

– having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 77/301 of 29 June 2023, establishing the Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic,

– having regard to the UNreport Charter,of the HagueUN conventionsIndependent andInternational Commission of Inquiry on the RomeSyrian StatuteArab Republic of 11 March 2024 and to the Internationalreport Criminalof Court12 (ICC),August 2024,

– having regard to the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 and the additional protocols thereto,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 19 December 2024,

– having regard to the UNEuropean ConventionCouncil onconclusions theof Elimination27 ofJanuary All2025 Formsand the outcome of Discriminationthe againstForeign WomenAffairs Council meeting of 1824 DecemberFebruary 1979,2025,

– having regard to the UNEuropean ConventionCouncil onconclusions theof Rights16 ofNovember 2015 on the ChildEU’s ofsupport 20to Novembertransitional 1989,justice,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas on 8 December 2024 an alliance of rebel groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) overthrew the Assad regime in Syria, marking the end of over five decades of autocratic family rule in Syria, including 14 years of war;

A. whereas on 8 December 2024 then Syrian President Bashar al-Assad fled his country following the fall of Damascus to the rebels of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS); whereas he was granted asylum by Russia;

B. whereas on 29 January 2025 Ahmed al-Sharaa was named interim president of Syria and was tasked with forming a temporary legislative council; whereas the interim president has announced plans for a new constitution and for holding elections in four to five years from now; whereas rebel military commander Hassan Abdul Ghani has announced that all institutions related to the old regime, including the 2012 constitution, the People’s Assembly, the Baath Party and all revolutionary factions – military, political and civil – would be dissolved and integrated into new state institutions;

B. whereas although the HTS succeeded in toppling the Assad regime, it controls only a fraction of Syrian territory;

C. whereas only two out of seven people appointed to the preparatory committee for the National Dialogue Conference were women;

C. whereas bombings and strikes continue, in particular Israeli strikes in southern Syria and at the Lebanese-Syrian border;

D. whereas on 24 and 25 February 2025, the Syrian interim government held the announced National Dialogue Conference;

D. whereas HTS is an offshoot of the former branch of al-Qaeda in Syria, known as the Al-Nusrah Front, listed by the UN Security Council as engaged in terrorist activities; whereas HTS and its leader are subject to EU and international sanctions;

E. whereas since 2011, half a million Syrians have died and 14 million have been forcibly displaced as a result of the fierce repression and demographic engineering by Assad and his allies, Russia and Iran; whereas between 2011 and August 2024, at least 157 634 people were arrested by the regime forces and other parties to the war in Syria and are still under arrest and/or have been forcibly disappeared, with frequent occurrences of deaths in custody and extrajudicial executions; whereas tens of thousands of people went missing during the Assad family’s rule and their fates and whereabouts remain unknown;

E. whereas the UN Security Council sanctions committees have imposed sanctions on al-Qaeda, the Al-Nusrah Front and associates pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) for having carried out terrorist operations;

F. whereas over 90 % of Syrians live below the poverty line, with at least 13 million – more than half of the population – unable to access or afford enough quality food; whereas at least 16.5 million Syrians across Syria require some form of humanitarian aid to meet their basic needs;

F. whereas the leader of HTS, Ahmed al-Sharaa (also known as Abu Mohammed al-Joulani), tries to depict himself as a ‘moderate’ Islamist, capable of respecting minorities, including freedom of religious minorities to worship; whereas in Idlib and other Syrian territories controlled by HTS, he repeatedly carried out attacks against religious minorities and has stated that his intention is to establish an Islamic regime in Syria;

G. whereas, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the humanitarian response for Syria is significantly underfunded, having secured less than 10 % of the USD 1.2 billion needed until March 2025;

G. whereas the risk of the re-emergence of certain jihadist groups, in particular Daesh, and of increased regional instability remains;

H. whereas despite recent adjustments, the EU sanctions policies towards Syria hinder reconstruction efforts and exacerbate the suffering of millions of Syrians struggling to access basic services;

H. whereas as Syria’s interim president, al-Sharaa has pledged to guarantee that the state would have a ‘monopoly’ on arms;

I. whereas during the rebel offensive, Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) militias, aided by Turkish air strikes, attacked and seized control of parts of the Kurdish-dominated areas in northern Syria; whereas the continuation and intensification of attacks on Kurdish-dominated areas in northern Syria, including through improvised explosive devices, are killing civilians, including children, and causing a new displacement of over 25 000 people from Manbij and eastern Aleppo; whereas, according to Human Rights Watch, the Türkiye-SNA coalition may be responsible for war crimes in north-eastern Syria;

I. whereas a number of foreign actors directly or indirectly involved in Syria endanger Syrian sovereignty and its prospects for peace, democracy and prosperity;

J. whereas Türkiye has conducted large-scale military operations on Syrian territory, particularly targeting Kurdish-held areas, and occupies territories in northern Syria, both actions violating international law;

J. whereas Syria and its people have faced a brutal operation of subversion, aggression and military occupation by foreign powers;

K. whereas Israel has occupied a part of the Syrian territory in the Golan Heights since 1967; whereas following the overthrow of the Assad regime, Israel revoked the truce of 1974 and seized the UN-patrolled demilitarised zone between Syria and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, and on 17 December 2024 declared that it would hold on to the territory indefinitely and construct settlements; whereas Israel continues to conduct air raids on Syria and has declared that all of southern Syria should be a demilitarised security zone;

K. whereas around 2 000 US troops are still deployed in Syria;

L. whereas, as a result of the fall of the Assad regime, the regime’s main foreign supporters, Russia and Iran, have retreated from their military and naval bases and relocated their military assets and militias; whereas Russia seeks to retain its military bases in Syria, particularly the Tartus naval base and the Hmeimim military airfield; whereas the interim government in Damascus cancelled a leasing agreement with the Russian company Stroytransgaz for the civilian section of the port of Tartus in January 2025;

L. whereas the Syrian Golan Heights, in south-western Syria, have been occupied by Israel since 1967 and were illegally annexed in 1981; whereas Israel, after illegally occupying the slopes of Mount Hermon, has now entered the UN buffer zone; whereas the Israeli army has not operated in this zone since 1974; whereas the UN Disengagement Observer Force, in charge of ensuring security in the region, confirmed on 9 December 2024 that Israeli armed forces had entered the area of separation, had moved into the area and remained present in at least three locations;

M. whereas the overall security situation in Syria is volatile and violent events, including revenge killings, sectarian violence and criminal activities, are increasing, particularly in the coastal and rural areas;

M. whereas the Israeli Government has illegally reaffirmed its sovereignty over the Syrian Golan Heights and is carrying out massive attacks on military installations in Syria; whereas on 9 December 2024, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu went so far as to claim that the annexed Golan Heights belonged to Israel ‘for eternity’;

N. whereas EU Member States host over 1.3 million Syrian asylum seekers and refugees; whereas shortly after the ousting of President Assad, some Member States announced a suspension of pending asylum applications by Syrians;

N. whereas on 15 December 2024 the Israeli Government approved a plan to double the Israeli population of the Syrian Golan Heights;

O. whereas the revocation of refugee status under the 1951 Refugee Convention requires fundamental and durable changes in the country of origin, which cannot currently be demonstrated in Syria; whereas the EU Qualification Directive and the new Qualification Regulation state that when deciding on cessation due to a change in circumstances, Member States ‘shall have regard to whether the change of circumstances is of such a significant and non-temporary nature that the refugee’s fear of being persecuted can no longer be regarded as well-founded’;

O. whereas the Kurds in north-eastern Syria are still caught between radical Islamist fundamentalist armed groups and Turkish extraterritorial ambitions;

1. Welcomes the fall of the Assad regime, putting an end to over 50 years of brutal dictatorship, tyranny and war; recognises the pivotal role that HTS and other armed groups played in the overturn of Assad’s rule;

P. whereas the new de facto Syrian authorities announced an agreement to disband all armed groups, with a plan to integrate them into the Syrian Ministry of Defence; whereas the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led coalition headed by Commander Mazloum Abdi, did not immediately join the agreement, considering their concerns about preserving their autonomy and the political and cultural gains made in north-eastern Syria;

2. Echoes the Syrian people’s celebration of the fall of the Assad regime’s long and brutal reign, salutes their long-standing peaceful opposition to the regime and expresses its solidarity with all its victims and their families; acknowledges that victims, survivors and the families of victims of serious violations of international law in Syria continue to require urgent support;

Q. whereas the HTS intends to draft a new Syrian constitution; whereas certain groups, including Kurdish factions, are so far excluded from this dialogue;

3. Expresses the EU’s full commitment to supporting a Syrian-led political transition to unite and rebuild the country, in line with the core principles of UN Security Council Resolution 2254, and, to this end, engaging with Syrian civil society to support their demands, also when engaging with the de facto authorities;

R. whereas in places such as Homs, Alawite communities express concerns over potential reprisals in the post-Assad era;

4. Reaffirms the fundamental role of Syrian civil society, particularly women-led initiatives, for a successful political transition and the future of Syria; calls on the Commission to strengthen Syrian civil society throughout all of its Syria programming and prioritise direct support to these organisations rather than channelling funds through international intermediaries;

S. whereas Rojava, also known as the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, is an autonomous administration protected by Kurdish-led forces in north-eastern Syria and stands as a model of democratic self-governance, inclusivity and resilience in a region marked by conflict; whereas rooted in principles of ethnic and religious pluralism, gender equality and grassroots democracy, Rojava has fostered a governance system that empowers local communities and promotes stability;

5. Welcomes interim president Al-Shaara’s acknowledgement of Syria’s religious, political and cultural diversity and his pledge to work towards uniting the country, while taking note that the interim authorities currently do not yet reflect this diversity;

T. whereas crucial to Rojava’s defence and security efforts are the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a coalition of Kurdish, Arab, Assyrian and other ethnic groups committed to protecting the region from extremist threats; whereas the SDF played a pivotal role in the fight against Daesh;

6. Supports the Commission and the Member States in continuing to use exchanges with the interim authorities in Damascus to stress that the caretaker government and security forces need to reflect the country’s political, ethnic, religious and cultural diversity and ensure women’s participation and representation;

U. whereas beyond their military efforts, the SDF and the Rojava authorities have worked to rebuild communities, provide humanitarian aid and establish governance structures that prioritise justice and coexistence; whereas their emphasis on women’s leadership, particularly through the Women’s Protection Units, has set an example for gender equality in the region;

7. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to reiterate Parliament’s expectations that the interim government in Damascus uphold good governance, fundamental freedoms and human rights, without discrimination, including the freedom of movement, assembly and expression, refraining from arbitrary arrests or any other form of repression;

V. whereas despite ongoing challenges, Rojava and the SDF continue to advocate for peace, dialogue and a democratic solution for Syria, demonstrating a commitment to human rights, freedom and stability;

8. Calls on the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to consistently speak out against any violation of fundamental freedoms and human rights in Syria by the interim government or other groups;

W. whereas several factions, including the Syrian National Army, are backed by Türkiye; whereas negotiations are still ongoing regarding the two Russian military bases at Tartous and Hmeimim;

9. Notes with concern the fragile security situation across Syria, particularly in the coastal area, where revenge killings, kidnappings and sectarian incitement are on the rise; calls on the de facto authorities to rein in violent factions and protect people from violence and ensure their right to live in safety, possibly by involving local communities in providing security;

X. whereas Hezbollah was equipped by Iran through Syria;

10. Calls on the de facto Syrian authorities to release all detainees who are not lawfully detained and ensure that every remaining detainee is rapidly brought before an independent judicial body that can assess the legality and necessity of their detention; calls, further, for them to allow independent monitors such as the International Committee for the Red Cross to access all detention centres to monitor conditions and detainee well-being; calls, further, for them to take urgent steps to provide people released from prison with health care, psychosocial support and rehabilitation, and facilitate swift reunions with their families;

Y. whereas Qatar was the first country to reopen its embassy in Damascus, in order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid; whereas on 12 January 2025 Saudi Arabia hosted the Riyadh Meetings on Syria to deliberate on Syria’s post-conflict reconstruction, refugee repatriation and regional security;

11. Endorses the HTS-led rebel offensive’s destruction of the Assad regime’s captagon drug laboratories and the rebels’ efforts to stop drug trafficking, which has negatively affected the whole region for years;

Z. whereas US sanctions, reinforced in 2020 under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, continue to seriously damage the Syrian economy, complicating the capacity to rebuild a stable country;

12. Notes that all political and religious groups have expressed their wish to be part of the new Syria and have adopted constructive positions in this regard; firmly believes that the unification of all segments of Syria, including the integration of all armed factions within a national army, require a Syrian-led negotiated solution, including between the de facto authorities and the Kurdish-led authorities; calls for the EU and Member States to use all diplomatic channels to support negotiations to reach a peaceful and stable solution and ensure that the well-being and preservation of economic, social and cultural rights, as well as the gender equality of all Syrians, in particular those living in north-eastern Syria, remain at the centre of negotiations;

AA. whereas following the fall of the dictator Assad, several of the Member States swiftly announced that they were suspending the examination of asylum applications from Syria, though the situation in the country is far from stabilised;

13. Expresses its strong concern about the continuation of military aggression by the Türkiye-SNA alliance in north-eastern Syria, including deadly attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure in the Manbij and Kobani areas, causing a new displacement and putting further strain on a peaceful transition; denounces Türkiye’s unlawful military incursions and occupation of parts of Syria; urges Türkiye to comply with international humanitarian law;

AB. whereas Assad stands accused of war crimes, including chemical attacks, mass executions and torture;

14. Condemns Israel’s unlawful military air and ground invasion of southern Syria and its seizing of the demilitarised border zone along the occupied Golan Heights, violating the 1974 armistice agreement, undermining Syria’s sovereignty while further destabilising the region; urges Israel to cease its incursions and occupation of Syrian territory in full compliance with international law;

AC. whereas the HTS and other groups engaged in terrorist activities are accused of war crimes, mass executions and torture;

15. Urges all foreign powers to respect Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; calls for an end to external interference in Syria by destabilising actors, including Russia, Iran, Türkiye and their proxies, as well as Israel; calls for the EU and its Member States to use all available diplomatic channels to advocate the stabilisation of Syria, which is in the interest of most countries in the region, and oppose and limit external interference;

AD. whereas some of the Member States have issued arrest warrants for Assad and senior officials from his former regime, expanding their inquiry into crimes against humanity;

16. Commends the interim authorities for intercepting Iranian weapon shipments destined for Hezbollah in Lebanon;

AE. whereas on 17 January 2025, Prosecutor of the ICC Karim Khan met al-Sharaa in Damascus to discuss how to support the efforts of the new authorities in bringing the Assad regime to justice for the crimes allegedly committed under its rule;

17. Highlights the security threat emanating from prisons, detention centres and refugee camps in north-eastern Syria, where people, including jihadist fighters and their families, notably children, are held arbitrarily without due process in extremely poor humanitarian conditions, also increasing the recruitment potential of Daesh; urgently calls on the Member States to continue repatriating their nationals from these facilities;

1. Welcomes the fall of Assad’s dictatorship, which marks the start of a new era for Syria; notes the opportunity for the Syrian people to restore a genuine democracy; remains concerned, however, by the high degree of instability in the secular, multi-ethnic and multi-religious Syria and in the surrounding region;

18. Emphasises the importance of preserving the international coalition against Daesh and for it to cooperate with the Syrian interim government to prevent Daesh and other jihadist groups from reorganising;

2. Calls for an immediate ceasefire throughout the region by all parties; joins the UN Special Envoy for Syria in calling for a halt to Israeli bombing and troop movements in Syria;

19. Is alarmed that hundreds of people, including children, have been killed or injured by mines and other explosives since the fall of the Assad regime; commends efforts by international and local organisations in identifying, marking and clearing explosive ordnance, as well as teaching people to stay safe; calls for the EU and the Member States to provide expertise, as well as financial and logistical support, to these initiatives;

3. Recalls that UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) states that all parties to the conflict, both Syrian and regional, must be involved in the political transition process; calls for the EU and its Member States to request a meeting of the UN Security Council to relaunch the process provided for in Resolution 2254 (2015) and establish the conditions for disarming the various armed groups present in Syria, and for maintaining peace throughout the political process;

20. Welcomes the announcement by Syria’s interim government to destroy any remaining stockpiles of chemical weapons in Syria and its openness to cooperate with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW); calls for the EU and its Member States to aid efforts to identify, secure and destroy stocks of internationally prohibited weapons, such as chemical weapons, anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions;

4. Underlines, in that regard, that Syria’s democratic future depends in particular on the ability of the new government to respect all components of Syrian society, in particular numerous ethnic and religious minorities and other communities that aspire to peaceful coexistence;

21. Commends the Syrian interim government for holding the promised National Dialogue Conference as a first step towards a political process and future government; expresses its concern about the exclusion of political representatives of Kurds and other groups, as well as the conference’s failure to ensure the participation of all segments of Syrian civil society, particularly women; encourages the Syrian interim government to organise more inclusive and transparent follow-up National Dialogue Conferences, including on the local level, with binding conclusions on personal freedoms and women’s rights; calls on the interim government to craft a roadmap that sets out its plan and vision for a political process, including for the implementation of initiatives announced by the interim government, and improve its communication with the Syrian public;

5. Deplores the fact that some political parties and social forces have been denied freedom of assembly and expression and have had their assets confiscated;

22. Calls on the caretaker government to work on immediate, genuine and profound reforms that ensure the participation of all Syrians, both within Syria and abroad, in designing the transitional phase and the transitional governing body in order to initiate an inclusive constitutional process that is transparent, participatory and formally includes diverse civil society actors, particularly women; highlights Syrian civil society’s demand for a pluralistic and decentralised democratic system, including a law on political parties, that respects the rights of all communities and ethnic, cultural and religious groups in Syria and breaks with the policies of repression and marginalisation;

6. Welcomes the lifting of EU sanctions on Syria in several sectors, conditional on the respect of human rights by the new authorities; highlights that UN Special Rapporteurs on Human Rights have many times underlined the devastating impact of sanctions on populations, in particular their worsening of humanitarian crises and limiting of access to food, medicine and essential services; calls for the EU and the Commission, during its official relations with the HTS-led government, to remind it of the importance of the strict application of international human rights law;

23. Calls on the Commission to prioritise financial support for Syrian civil society, particularly women’s initiatives, enabling Syrians to embrace their fundamental role in the country’s political transition and future;

7. Believes some specific efforts are needed when it comes to the exportation from Syria of drugs such as Captagon, which represents a major source of foreign currency for Syria, as the stakes are both security-related (financing of militias and regional instability) and health-related; encourages the new authorities to rapidly identify alternative economic pathways to encourage Syrians to participate in the licit formal economy, prevent a regional overspill of drug production and reduce demand for the drugs;

24. Calls on the Commission to support independent journalists and provide funding and capacity-building for Syrian journalists and media outlets across the country; recognises the importance of reliable information and the fight against disinformation for Syria’s transition;

8. Is extremely concerned about the fact that the Kurdish autonomous administration, which controls a large part of north-eastern Syria, and its armed wing, the SDF, were not invited to take part in the first national dialogue conference, held on 25 February 2025, on Syria’s future;

25. Urges Syria’s transitional authorities to immediately take all steps needed to secure and preserve all evidence of serious international crimes across the country in order to give families answers about the fate and whereabouts of their loved ones and provide the crucial bases for accountability and legal processes;

9. Encourages discussions between the SDF and the Damascus interim government, in particular regarding the reactivation of civil institutions and state public services in north-eastern Syria and the facilitation of the return of displaced persons and refugees to their towns and villages, providing them with the conditions necessary to enable them to live there;

26. Calls on the Syrian interim government to support all international and local documentation and investigation efforts and, to this end, invite and fully cooperate with the International Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM), the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria and the Independent Institution on Missing Persons, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the OPCW, as well as civil society initiatives documenting and investigating crimes and violations, granting all of them full access to the country and the relevant facilities;

10. Is extremely concerned about the announcement of state reforms that include plans to privatise state-owned enterprises and reduce the number of public sector employees by one third; stands with the protesters among Syria’s government workers, who are concerned about potential sectarian-based job purges and widespread job losses;

27. Calls for the EU to offer help and expertise in the preservation of evidence and documenting crimes, including financial assistance, technical expertise and capacity-building programmes for Syrians, building on previous experience in the Western Balkans, Colombia and the Central African Republic, in line with the EU’s policy framework on support to transitional justice;

11. Highlights the fact that that the protection of all populations also requires the territorial integrity of Syria to be guaranteed, and implies therefore respect for international law by the various actors in the region;

28. Calls for the EU and its Member States to increase financial support for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisation (CSOs) engaged in securing and preserving evidence, documentation, the search for missing persons, forensic analysis and capacity building; recognises the negative impact of the freeze of US aid funding on those efforts; urges the EU and its Member States to agree on the joint provision of sustainable funding at the Brussels Conference on Syria on 17 March 2025;

12. Further underlines that the Rojava government in north-eastern Syria, spearheaded by the Syrian Kurdish forces and involving Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians and other minorities, offers a model that must be protected from Türkiye’s repeated threats and attacks;

29. Calls for the EU to support the renewal of the mandate of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria at the ongoing UN Human Rights Council and increase funding for the IIIM and other current justice initiatives on Syria;

13. Warns of the continuing serious military and paramilitary attacks on Rojava, with the Kurds being the target of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s regime and its mercenary networks; calls for the war crimes committed by Türkiye and its affiliates in Rojava to stop;

30. Urges the interim government of Syria to engage in national transitional justice efforts that recognise and address all human rights violations and abuses, regardless of the perpetrator, focus on redress for victims and society, and guarantee the non-recurrence of those human rights violations and abuses; highlights the importance of a victim-based approach and the inclusion of Syrian women’s experiences and perspectives;

14. Firmly condemns the territorial incursions and expansionist ambitions of Israel and Türkiye; underlines that Syria’s stability begins with respect for its internationally recognised borders; stresses further that Israel is violating the 1974 mutual agreement on disengagement from the Golan Heights; is highly concerned about the Israeli Government’s plan to double the Israeli population in the Golan Heights region, a project fuelling extreme-right partisans of the ‘Great Israel’; warns against the risk of ethnic cleansing in the Golan Heights;

31. Urges the interim government of Syria to closely consult with civil society on transitional justice mechanisms and allow all segments of Syrian society to shape and actively participate in the national transitional justice process; recognises that the expertise and local knowledge of NGOs and Syrian-led CSOs are essential for successful transitional justice efforts; regrets the fact that a conference on transitional justice set for 27 February 2025, organised by Syrian civil society, had to be cancelled at the last minute;

15. Recalls that the EU does not recognise Israel’s sovereignty over the occupied Golan Heights, in accordance with international law and UN Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 497 (1981) of 18 December 1981; demands that actions be taken by the EU towards Israel, namely the immediate suspension of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, as well as an arms embargo;

32. Calls for the EU to make support for transitional justice a priority in its engagement with Syria and offer legal, financial and psychological support to survivors of detention, sexualised and gender-based violence, and torture, while training Syrians to lead these healing processes autonomously;

16. Urges the Member States and the Commission to prevent any external military intervention in Syria, starting with Türkiye and Israel; highlights the fact that that the faster the Rojava authorities obtain a guarantee of its peaceful coexistence with the interim government in Damascus, the faster the US troops stationed in the region will have to leave the country;

33. Encourages the Commission to function as a bridge-builder between Syrian civil society outside and inside Syria and create forums for exchanges on their perception and demands for transitional justice; calls, further, on the Commission to strengthen the coordination between Syrian-led CSOs, international bodies and relevant Syrian stakeholders, in order to ensure that Syrian-led CSOs are directly integrated into transitional justice processes; recommends the establishment of knowledge exchange programmes bringing Syrian activists, legal experts and civil society leaders into dialogue with their European counterparts;

17. Stresses that the future of Syria must be determined by the will of its people, free of external pressure or interference; emphasises that Syria’s sovereignty and political trajectory should reflect the aspirations of its citizens; condemns any attempts, whether foreign or domestic, to undermine Syria’s democratic institutions;

34. Encourages the Syrian transition government to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), give the court retroactive jurisdiction through a declaration and align national Syrian legislation with the ICC treaty and international law;

18. Believes justice and accountability are crucial for the future of Syria; welcomes the visit of Prosecutor of the ICC Karim Khan to Damascus to meet with Syria’s de facto leader al-Sharaa in January 2025; calls on Syria’s new authorities to sign the Rome Statute and, consequently, on the Member States to refer the Assad regime to the ICC for investigation; regrets that Russia is not a signatory to the Rome Statute;

35. Encourages the EU, its Member States and their courts to continue prosecuting people suspected of serious crimes in Syria through universal jurisdiction cases;

19. Reaffirms its full support for the ICC as an independent institution indispensable to international justice; urges the EU and its Member States to take concrete measures to ensure the protection and adequate funding of the ICC, in particular by strengthening international judicial cooperation; calls on the Member States to actively oppose any attempt to intimidate the ICC and to promote, more than ever, its universality by encouraging non-signatory states to accede to the Rome Statute;

36. Welcomes the European Council’s decision of 24 February 2025 to suspend EU restrictive measures on key economic sectors and to indefinitely extend the exemption of humanitarian aid from sanctions as a positive step towards alleviating the suffering of millions of Syrians and enabling recovery; calls on the European Council to implement this decision swiftly and ensure that as part of its gradual approach, all other sanctions that negatively impact on humanitarian operations, the economic and social rights of Syrians and their access to basic services, or impact on Syrian financial institutions, are lifted, including all restrictions on the sale of petroleum, the repair of electricity networks and financial transactions from and to Syria; calls on the Member States to put Syrians’ well-being at the top of all sanction-related decisions;

20. Condemns the decision taken by many of the Member States to pause the processing of asylum applications lodged by Syrians immediately after the fall of the Assad regime, and the pressure applied to Syrian asylum seekers to sign papers accepting their ‘voluntary return’; condemns also the intention of some of the Member States to re-examine the protection status granted to Syrian refugees; considers that premature returns would expose refugees to grave risks, including persecution, arbitrary detention and violence and that such actions disregard international refugee and human rights obligations, particularly the principle of non-refoulement;

37. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to remove all sanctions that isolate the Syrian Central Bank and financial sector and provide European businesses and banks with legal assurances to counteract over-compliance;

21. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the interim government of Syria.

38. Takes note of the reversibility of EU sanction relief and asks the European Council to define and clearly communicate clear benchmarks that Syria’s authorities must meet and to secure further sanctions to ease or prevent the activation of a snapback;

39. Agrees with the European Council to maintain restrictive measures against people and entities who are responsible for widespread and systematic violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Syria, in particular the Assad regime and its affiliates, as well as HTS leaders;

40. Calls on the European Council to formulate clear delisting criteria for individuals subject to sanctions, who could assist accountability efforts against the Assad regime’s human rights violations;

41. Encourages the European Council to explore pathways to use frozen assets of the Assad regime for a trust fund for Syrian reconstruction and the rehabilitation and compensation of victims;

42. Calls on the Commission and Council to reach out to other countries imposing sanctions on Syria, in particular the US and the UK, to plead for their alignment with EU sanction relief;

43. Notes that the EU sanctions expire on 1 June 2025; highlights the importance of clarifying the above-mentioned issues before that date and outlining, as soon as possible, a list of individual sanctions that must remain in place for the time being;

44. Express deep concerns over the dire humanitarian and economic conditions faced by Syrians as a consequence of the reign of the Assad regime, war and the obstruction of humanitarian aid; welcomes the interim government’s removal of all barriers to cross-border and cross-line aid access in Syria and calls for the international community and the EU to seize the opportunity to increase humanitarian and development aid; welcomes recent reports by the UN about increased aid delivery to north-western Syria, despite ongoing hostilities;

45. Welcomes the announcement by the Commission to provide EUR 235 million in new humanitarian support to Syrians; encourages the Commission and the Member States to closely work with UN institutions and local humanitarian groups to address the dire humanitarian situation in Syria holistically;

46. Firmly believes that while humanitarian aid is crucial, reconstruction and economic development are key for Syria’s transition and stabilisation; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to support reconstruction efforts in Syria, focusing on sectors that can improve the economic and social rights of Syrians, including transport, electricity, health and education; recommends that the Commission and the Member States focus on bottom-up initiatives supporting local businesses and civil society rather than funnelling money through centralised institutions and, to this end, ensure that funding schemes are adapted to the local context, avoiding unnecessary bureaucratic obstacles that could exclude small local actors;

47. Acknowledges that Syrians, especially those most affected by the war, must lead the reconstruction, ensuring that their resilience and knowledge shape the recovery; highlights the importance of mainstreaming gender equality as an objective across reconstruction efforts, including land and property rights for women; expresses the view that all programming needs to be accompanied by due diligence, address housing, land and property rights in Syria and be supervised through independent monitoring;

48. Calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the relevant countries in the region, to ensure that entities or individuals who are sanctioned by the EU for their responsibility for breaches of international law and violation of human rights are excluded from the reconstruction of Syria and are not awarded any tenders;

49. Welcomes the timely organisation of the 9th Brussels Conference on Syria in March 2025 and urges the Commission to prioritise the inclusion and participation of Syrian CSOs, particularly women’s organisations, in this dialogue to ensure that the EU’s approach supports the Syrian people’s aspirations and protection of their rights;

50. Recognises the importance of the Syrian diaspora in the EU for the economic development and reconstruction of Syria; recognises the importance of remittances alongside official development assistance and urges all Member States to lift any restrictions on sending remittances to Syria;

51. Calls on the Commission to provide Syrian civil society, especially women-led groups, with sustainable, flexible and long-term funding, including small grants and cash assistance, in contexts with financial restrictions; highlights the importance of closely consulting with Syrian civil society in designing and implementing EU funding for Syria and ensuring that schemes are easily accessible to local initiatives;

52. Reaffirms that the fragile and evolving political and security situation of the country does not warrant deeming Syria, or parts of it, a safe country of origin for the return of Syrian nationals living as refugees and asylum seekers in Europe and around the world; reiterates the EU’s position that any return needs to be truly voluntary, safe and dignified, and underpinned by refugees being given all the knowledge they need to make informed decisions about their futures, in full accordance with international law and the principles set out by the UNHCR;

53. Calls on the Member States to reverse any decision that suspends asylum applications by Syrians and guarantee a full, individual and merit-based assessment of each asylum claim in a fair and transparent procedure; urges Member States that suspend decision-making on asylum claims to limit this suspension to a short and clearly defined period of time;

54. Stresses that any change in the protection status of Syrian refugees should be made only after a thorough assessment and securing of evidence that the political and security situation has changed in a fundamental and durable way, as required by the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Qualification Directive, and offers safety and stability, as well as human rights guarantees; emphasises that the withdrawal of international protection from individuals must follow the procedure set out in the Asylum Procedures Directive; encourages the Member States to assess alternative grounds for granting residence permits to Syrians, including naturalisation, family reunification, long-term residence or humanitarian grounds; reiterates that no asylum seeker may be forcibly returned, as this would violate countries’ non-refoulement obligation;

55. Calls on the Member States and non-EU countries, including Türkiye, Lebanon and Jordan, to allow, as a matter of urgency, Syrian refugees and asylum seekers residing in their countries to choose to temporarily travel to Syria without losing their protection status; calls on the Commission to encourage and provide the Member States with guidance and best practice on the implementation of EU law on this issue, including as regards the difference between ‘travel’ and ‘re-establishment’;

56. Calls on the Commission to maintain financial support for countries in the region hosting Syrian refugees, in particular Türkiye, Lebanon and Jordan;

57. Calls on Syria’s neighbours Türkiye, Lebanon and Jordan to adhere to international law and refrain from returning Syrian refugees and asylum seekers until these returns can be voluntary, safe and under dignified conditions;

58. Recalls the plight of the more than 400 000 Palestinian refugees in Syria who depend primarily on the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) for their basic needs; commends UNRWA for its essential work in the region and calls on the Commission to continue its full political and financial support for the agency;

59. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the interim government of Syria, and to have it translated and published in Arabic.