What changed

B100191/2024

P10_TA(2024)0055

European Parliament resolution on reinforcingReinforcing EU’s unwavering support to Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression and the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia

(2024/2940(RSP))

PE766.505

European Parliament resolution of 28 November 2024 on reinforcing EU’s unwavering support to Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression and the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia (2024/2940(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine, Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea),

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia, in particular those of 17 July 2024 on the need for the EU’s continuous support for Ukraine and of 19 September 2024 on continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States, and to its previous resolutions on the situation on the Korean Peninsula,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

– having regard to all Unitedthe NationsHelsinki SecurityFinal CouncilAct, resolutionsthe onCharter Northof Korea,Paris infor particulara ResolutionsNew 1874Europe and 2094,the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances,

– having regard the statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU of 25 October 2024 on reports of the DPRK sending troops to Russia,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility, to Regulation (EU) 2024/2773 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2024 establishing the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism and providing exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine, and to other forms of EU support for Ukraine,

– having regard to the EUjoint statement ofby 20Minister Novemberof 2024Foreign atAffairs of the InternationalRepublic Atomicof EnergyKorea AgencyCho (IAEA)Tae-yul Boardand ofHigh GovernorsRepresentative onof the ApplicationUnion offor safeguardsForeign inAffairs theand DemocraticSecurity People’sPolicy RepublicJosep Borrell of Korea,4 November 2024 on DPRK-Russia Cooperation,

– having regard to the joint statement by the foreign ministers of Finland and Germany of 18 November 2024 on the severed undersea cable in the Baltic Sea,

– having regard to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s address to the European Parliament on 19 November 2024, marking 1 000 days since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine,

– having regard to the joint declaration of 19 November 2024 by the foreign ministers of Germany, France, Poland, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom in Warsaw,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea, including UN Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006) of 14 October 2006,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the statement of the North Atlantic Council of 8 November 2024 on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,

A. whereas over a thousand days have passed since the Russian Federation, on 24 February 2022, launched another continuous and unprecedented assault as part of its unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the Russian aggression against Ukraine started in 2014 with the occupation of parts of the Donbas region and the occupation and illegal annexation of Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea; whereas according to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, there was almost daily artillery shelling and small arms fire on a low level by Russian military personnel along the line of contact between 2014 and 2022;

– having regard to the 2010 EU-Republic of Korea Strategic Partnership,

B. whereas Russia’s forces continue to conduct systematic and indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine; whereas heavy and intense bombardments combined with ground fighting have continued throughout 2024; whereas waves of Russian attacks on energy infrastructure disrupting power and water supplies have seriously limited access to essential services for civilians, healthcare facilities and schools, with longer-term implications anticipated and the situation expected to worsen over the course of the winter;

– having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

C. whereas on 17 November 2024 Russia launched a massive attack against civilian infrastructure and residential areas using around 120 missiles and 90 drones, killing and wounding many; whereas some of the strikes were aimed at electricity substations, which are critical to the operation of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants; whereas on the same day, the IAEA reported that power lines from four substations to three nuclear power plants had been cut and that output had been reduced in six of the nine nuclear reactors on the three sites;

A. whereas Russia has been carrying out an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022, in a continuation of its aggression since 2014, including the illegal annexation of Crimea and the occupation of parts of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, persistently, blatantly and grossly violating the principles of the UN Charter and international humanitarian law, as established by the Geneva Conventions of 1949;

D. whereas one of the major threats to Ukrainian critical infrastructure, civilian populations and defence forces is bombardment by large numbers of glide bombs, which can be launched by Russian aircraft from great distances that make them difficult for Ukrainian air defences to defend against;

B. whereas Russia’s forces have systematically and indiscriminately attacked residential areas and civilian infrastructure, causing the deaths of thousands of Ukrainian civilians and the destruction of public and private property; whereas Russian forces are responsible for forced deportations, disappearances, including of children, illegal imprisonments, torture, executions of civilians, soldiers and prisoners of war, and acts of terror, including the use of sexual violence and mass rape as weapons of war, and they continue to alter the ethnic composition of the occupied territories of Ukraine;

E. whereas Russia still has an advantage in the air and in troops on the ground as it currently fields some 520 000 troops in Ukraine and plans to raise this number to 690 000 by the end of 2024; whereas Ukraine is experiencing severe and growing personnel shortages; whereas the Ukrainian, South Korean and US authorities have reported that around 11 000 North Korean troops have arrived in Russia to take part in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; whereas reports indicate that these soldiers are already taking part in battles in Russia’s Kursk region; whereas according to media reports, North Korea may actually deploy as many as 100 000 troops;

C. whereas Russia has escalated its air attacks against Ukraine, deploying significant numbers of missiles and drones to target electricity generation and transmission infrastructure nationwide, leading to power disruptions and necessitating nationwide rationing measures announced by Ukrenergo, Ukraine’s primary electricity provider, to stabilise the energy system;

F. whereas North Korea and Russia have recently signed and ratified the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which requires both countries to use all available means to provide immediate military assistance if either is attacked; whereas the treaty also commits the two countries to actively cooperate in their efforts to establish a ‘just and multipolar new world order’ and strengthen cooperation on atomic energy, space, food supply, trade and economy;

D. whereas the EU and its Member States stand in solidarity with Ukraine, committing significant humanitarian, financial and military support to aid Ukraine’s defence until its victory and recovery; whereas, however, there continues to be an insufficient level of military aid both in terms of quality and quantity, and a delay in actual delivery of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine after delivery decisions are taken; whereas a significant number of the systems that Ukraine was supposed to receive after the decision taken at the NATO Summit have not yet been delivered;

G. whereas Russia is rapidly increasing its own military production, with military spending reaching around EUR 140 billion in 2024; whereas Russia is also using Belarus’s ammunition stockpile and artillery shells and ballistic missiles from North Korea, as well as Iranian drones and missiles; whereas Iran has transferred shipments of Fath-360 close-range ballistic missiles to Russia; whereas the EU, France, Germany and the United Kingdom have introduced new sanctions against Iran in response;

E. whereas a number of third countries, notably Iran, North Korea and Belarus, have provided Russia with substantial deliveries of weapons and ammunitions, and Belarus has allowed Russia to use its territory to attack Ukraine;

H. whereas media reports indicate that Russia’s armed forces have recruited hundreds of Yemeni men to fight in Ukraine; whereas according to further reports, Moscow is providing assistance to the Houthis, including targeting data for missile launches and possibly sales of advanced Russian anti-ship missiles;

F. whereas the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and North Korea, signed on 18 June 2024, mandates mutual military assistance, including nuclear and conventional support, in the event of armed aggression, thereby deepening military ties between the two nations; whereas this development combines significant security challenges in both Asia and Europe, further complicating global stability;

I. whereas US President Joe Biden has recently decided to lift some restrictions on the use of longer-range missiles by Ukraine against legitimate military targets in Russia; whereas it has been reported that restrictions on the use of ATACMS missiles, with a maximum range of around 300 km, have been lifted for Russia’s Kursk region; whereas according to media reports, the US administration took the decision in response to the deployment of North Korean troops, with the aim of deterring North Korea from sending more troops;

G. whereas North Korea and Russia have directly escalated the conflict in Ukraine with the deployment of North Korean troops alongside Russian forces, marking a dangerous expansion of the war with severe implications for regional and global security; whereas North Korea’s arms transfers to Russia, including the provision of munitions and military equipment, constitute a clear violation of UN Security Council sanctions aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons from North Korea;

J. whereas media reports also indicate that France and the UK have lifted some restrictions on the use of Storm Shadow/Scalp missiles against legitimate military targets in Russia that are within the 250 km range of that weapon;

H. whereas Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has reported that 11 000 North Korean soldiers have already been deployed near Ukraine’s borders, with this contingent potentially increasing further; whereas North Korea, in exchange for supplying ammunition and troops, receives much-needed food, oil and money from Russia, and possibly assistance in developing nuclear weapons and missile technology know-how;

K. whereas there continues to be a low level of military aid both in terms of quality and quantity and a delay in actual delivery of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine after delivery decisions are taken; whereas a significant number of the systems that Ukraine was supposed to receive after the decision taken at the NATO Summit have not yet been delivered;

I. whereas North Korea has escalated its threats, abandoned its unification policy and continued provocations in the region, particularly through missile tests and military demonstrations, which increase the risk of military conflict and undermine efforts for a peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict;

L. whereas, at the February 2024 meeting of EU defence ministers, Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Josep Borrell announced that Member States had undertaken to send at least EUR 21 billion of military aid to Ukraine during 2024;

J. whereas Russia’s armed forces have reportedly recruited hundreds of Houthi Yemeni mercenaries to fight in the conflict in Ukraine, facilitated by a shadowy trafficking operation that shows the increasing ties between Moscow and the Houthi rebel group;

M. whereas Hungary is blocking both the newly established EUR 5 billion Ukraine Assistance Fund (UAF) set up in March 2024 within the European Peace Facility (EPF) and the eighth tranche of EPF reimbursements for Member States that have been delivering military aid to Ukraine for nearly two years;

K. whereas Iran has transferred shipments of Fath-360 close-range ballistic missiles to Russia; whereas the EU, France, Germany and the United Kingdom have introduced new sanctions against Iran in response;

N. whereas the Hungarian prime minister and foreign minister have abused their Council Presidency by travelling to Moscow and engaging in diplomatic talks with an aggressor state; whereas Hungary has repeatedly vetoed, delayed or watered down various rounds of EU sanctions on Russia, directly contributing to the ability of the Russian state to maintain its war economy;

L. whereas China is today the biggest supplier of dual-use goods and military items sustaining Russia’s military base and war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the EU has conclusive evidence that armed drones are being produced for the Russian military in China’s western Xinjiang region;

O. whereas on 18 November 2024 the 1 200 km cable connecting Helsinki to the German port of Rostock stopped working; whereas a 218 km internet link between Lithuania and Sweden’s Gotland island went out of service on 17 November 2024; whereas European authorities suspect the Chinese-flagged ship Yi Peng 3 of being responsible for the damage to both undersea cables; whereas the Danish navy has stopped the vessel in its territorial waters and several European authorities are investigating the incident;

M. whereas the newly elected European Parliament and Commission Presidents each immediately pledged to uphold their unwavering support for Ukraine; whereas the President-elect of the United States is expected to do the same; whereas anything but victory for Ukraine would be widely perceived as a strategic defeat for both Europe and the United States and would have far-reaching consequences for their security;

P. whereas the re-election of Donald Trump to the White House has raised serious concerns about an unpredictable future US policy towards Russia and a reduction in US political support and military aid to Ukraine;

N. whereas US President Joe Biden has authorised Ukraine to use US-made Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) in the Kursk region of the Russian Federation; whereas France and the United Kingdom have provided Storm Shadow / SCALP cruise missiles to Ukraine, with both countries allowing their use against Russian targets; whereas Germany continues its policy of refraining from the delivery of Taurus long-range missiles to Ukraine;

Q. whereas President Zelenskyy presented Ukraine’s Peace Formula in September 2022, outlining 10 requirements for a just peace for Ukraine and for restoring the rules-based order; whereas as a follow-up to this, a first Summit on Peace in Ukraine was held in Switzerland in June 2024 and attended by more than 90 states; whereas Ukraine announced plans for a second Summit on Peace to which Russia would be invited, but Moscow immediately rejected the invitation; whereas earlier this year, President Zelenskyy presented Ukraine’s Victory Plan, outlining steps that will create conditions to strengthen Ukraine’s position for ending the war on favourable terms for Ukraine and improving global peace and stability;

O. whereas under international law, Ukraine’s right to self-defence includes proportional military action extending beyond its own territory; whereas Ukraine has reportedly used the donated long-range weapons systems against military targets within Russian territory following the recent lifting of restrictions by donor countries;

1. Condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as the involvement of Belarus in this war, and demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land and infrastructure;

P. whereas Russia attacked the Ukrainian city of Dnipro on 21 November 2024 with an intermediate-range ballistic missile;

2. Expresses its undivided solidarity with the people of Ukraine, fully supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and underlines that this war constitutes a serious violation of international law; stresses that the ultimate goal remains the achievement of a just and lasting peace in Ukraine on Ukraine’s terms, ensuring the safety and dignity of the Ukrainian people within a peaceful and stable Europe;

Q. whereas since February 2022, the EU has adopted 14 packages of sanctions aimed in particular at limiting as far as possible the Kremlin’s ability to finance the war it has unleashed; whereas these sanctions are set for a period of six months at a time; whereas a proposal to extend the duration of sanctions to three years has not been adopted; whereas the proposal has been blocked by the Hungarian Government’s veto, which hampers secure, longer-term stability and support for this loan structure;

3. States its firm support for Ukraine’s Peace Formula and Victory Plan as the best basis for a just, comprehensive and lasting peace for the people of Ukraine and the wider region; stresses that the EU and its Member States, alongside its NATO and non-NATO partners, possess the means to achieve the goals outlined in those two strategies;

R. whereas the EU’s overall military support for Ukraine – provided through the European Peace Facility (EPF) and by Member States directly – amounts to around EUR 43,5 billion; whereas in August 2024, the EU mobilised only the first tranche – EUR 1,4 billion – of windfall profits from frozen assets of the Central Bank of Russia through the EPF to support further military assistance for Ukraine;

4. Calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to proactively support Ukraine’s Peace Formula and Victory Plan as a matter of utmost urgency, and to develop, without further delay, a clear strategy with specific goals, identify the tools and actions needed to achieve those goals in the coming months and years, and ensure that the EU plays a central role in achieving a just, comprehensive and lasting peace for Ukraine;

S. whereas the EU, together with the G7 countries, adopted the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, which uses the windfall profits from the frozen Russian assets to pay back the loans provided by the EU to Ukraine; whereas these frozen assets are not yet being used directly to support Ukraine financially, but only the windfall profits of these frozen assets; whereas the EU will provide up to EUR 35 billion in new macro-financial assistance as part of the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism;

5. Stresses, in this regard, the importance of global support for Ukraine’s Peace Formula and Victory Plan; urges the Commission, the VP/HR and the Member States to engage with countries in the Global South in this context and to prepare the ground for holding the second Summit on Peace;

T. whereas the Hungarian Government is blocking both the newly established EUR 5 billion Ukraine Assistance Fund set up in March 2024 within the EPF and the eighth tranche of EPF reimbursements for Member States that have been delivering military aid to Ukraine for nearly two years; whereas the Hungarian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs travelled to Moscow to engage with an aggressor state;

6. Urges the VP/HR and the Member States to forcefully address the direct and aggressive involvement of North Korea in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine; believes that the deployment of North Korean combat troops on the European continent is an unacceptable and unprecedented escalation by Russia, which has to be met with the strongest possible response; considers North Korea’s deployment of troops and transfer of arms to Russia, in particular ballistic missiles, an egregious violation of UN Security Council resolutions and a unilateral hostile act by North Korea threatening European security; stresses the need for the EU and its Member States to promptly engage with China on the matter as North Korea remains highly dependent on its neighbour;

U. whereas President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in his address to the Verkhovna Rada on 19 November 2024, presented Ukraine’s Internal Resilience Plan, comprising 10 key points: unity, front, armament, money, energy, security, communities, human capital, cultural sovereignty and heroes policy; whereas President Zelenskyy presented Ukraine’s Peace Formula in September 2022, outlining 10 requirements for a just peace for Ukraine and for restoring the rules-based order;

7. Calls on all EU and UN Member States to do their utmost to ensure the implementation of all UN Security Council resolutions regarding North Korea and to proactively block any routes for North Korea to obtain financing, materials or knowledge for its illegal weapons programmes;

1. Reiterates its condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which has lasted for more than 1 000 days, not counting the aggression that began in 2014, and of the involvement and support of third countries in this war; demands that Russia immediately cease all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine, release Ukrainian prisoners of war and unlawfully detained Ukrainian civilians, return abducted Ukrainian children and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land, nature and infrastructure;

8. Condemns recent acts in the Baltic Sea that have damaged European critical infrastructure; stresses the urgent need to investigate these grave incidents and release information about the perpetrators and their intentions; underlines that several representatives of European governments believe that this recent incident constitutes a grave act of sabotage; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to respond with measures impacting bilateral relations with the state actors responsible, notably China and Russia, if evidence proves their involvement;

2. Further condemns Russia’s continuous escalation in its war of aggression, in particular its bombings of civilians and critical infrastructure, its recourse to North Korea to provide troops to fight against the Ukrainian army and its testing of new ballistic missiles in Ukraine; considers that these recent escalatory steps represent a new phase in the war and a new risk for Europe’s security as a whole; calls for the EU, its Member States and Ukraine’s other partners to respond accordingly;

9. Welcomes the signing of the joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine and calls on the Commission and the Member States to act swiftly to implement the commitments effectively, and to synchronise these efforts with an EU strategy on the implementation of Ukraine’s Peace Formula and Victory Plan; supports, in this regard, the proposal by VP/HR Borrell to establish an EU military support coordination cell in Kyiv, directly under the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine;

3. Recalls that any nuclear threats by Russia will not deter the EU from providing further assistance to Ukraine for its self-defence; urges all states to reject the normalisation of nuclear intimidation;

10. Underlines that insufficient or delayed deliveries of weapons and ammunition risk undermining efforts made so far and therefore urges the Member States to substantially increase and significantly accelerate their military support as a matter of the utmost urgency, in particular the provision of weapons, including TAURUS missiles, and ammunition in response to clearly identified needs; emphasises that a significant number of the systems that Ukraine was supposed to receive after the decision taken at the NATO Summit have not yet been delivered; welcomes the recent decisions to use longer-range missiles to target legitimate military targets on Russian territory; urges Member States and international partners to withdraw all limitations imposed on Ukraine’s use of Western arms for legitimate military targets in Russian territory, which contradict Ukraine’s rights under international public law;

4. Expresses its undivided solidarity with the people of Ukraine; reiterates the EU’s unwavering commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and emphasises the need for increased and accelerated EU solidarity in providing political, military, humanitarian, economic and financial support to Ukraine until Ukraine’s victory, in order to end Russia’s war of aggression and allow Ukraine to liberate all its people; reiterates that Ukraine, as a victim of aggression, has a legitimate right to self-defence in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter; reaffirms the EU’s commitment to a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, based on its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and supports Ukraine’s Peace Formula as a framework for international engagement;

11. Deeply deplores the declining financial volume of bilateral military aid to Ukraine from Member States, despite strong statements made at the beginning of this year, which are now being contradicted by recent governmental decisions and the severe problems with the overall functioning of the EU’s key mechanism (EPF) to incentivise bilateral military aid to Ukraine; notes that financial resources deriving from frozen Russian assets should be considered additional and cannot replace funding for Ukraine from existing state budgets;

5. Calls for the EU and its Member States to actively work towards maintaining and achieving the broadest possible international support for Ukraine and identifying a peaceful solution to the war, which must be based on full respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principles of international law, accountability for war crimes and the crime of aggression committed by Russia, and Russian reparations and other payments for the massive material and immaterial damage caused in Ukraine; insists that no negotiations about Ukraine can take place without Ukraine; calls for the engagement of the EU and the Member States in implementing Ukraine’s Peace Formula and establishing the necessary conditions for holding the second Summit on Peace, also engaging countries from the Global South; is convinced that the EU and its Member States must participate in establishing Ukraine’s future robust security guarantees, based on Ukraine’s Peace Formula and Victory Plan, with a clear strategy, specific goals and a concrete roadmap; regrets the German Chancellor’s recent phone call with Vladimir Putin;

12. Echoes VP/HR Borrell’s assessment of Hungary’s unacceptable blockade of up to EUR 6.6 billion of EPF funds, which are supposed to reimburse parts of bilateral military aid and have now been partially frozen for over a year and a half; calls for the Member States, the President of the Commission, and the VP/HR to do their utmost to overcome Hungary’s veto as a matter of urgency; reiterates the need to suspend Hungary’s voting rights in line with the procedure laid down by Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union; calls on the Council to activate the passerelle clauses to introduce qualified majority voting on matters concerning the common foreign and security policy; stresses that if the EPF Ukraine Assistance Fund and previous reimbursement tranches remain blocked until the next European Council, the EU must urgently and immediately establish a new format to allow those Member States that are willing and able to provide military aid to Ukraine to do so, and to restore the EU’s credibility in that role, or to reimburse national contributions in order not to hamper the smooth financing of bilateral aid on a purely national basis;

6. Denounces Iran, Belarus and North Korea for their military support to Russia, and in particular all North Korea’s military support for Russia, which further exacerbates the conflict; reiterates that both Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and North Korea’s participation in the war and its nuclear and missile programmes constitute grave threats to the rules-based international order; condemns the signing and recent ratification of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and North Korea, a regime that is under the most comprehensive sanctions regime imposed by the UN; urges North Korea to withdraw its troops and end military cooperation with Russia; calls on Russia to cease all forms of military and technological cooperation with North Korea and to abide by its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and multiple UN Security Council resolutions; warns of the serious implications of this military partnership in inspiring other autocratic regimes to become actively involved in military conflicts;

13. Calls for the EU and its Member States to redouble their efforts to ensure the right quantity and quality of military support for Ukraine, ensure the right timing of delivery and rights of use and address global production bottlenecks affecting Ukraine’s domestic arms production, in order to concretely enable Ukraine to re-establish its territorial integrity; calls, in particular, on those Member States that are not living up to their own commitments regarding the production of defence products and direct support for relevant production capacities to engage in joint ventures with Ukraine or directly place orders in Ukraine; calls on the Member States to accelerate direct investments in scaling up Ukraine’s military industrial capacity, following the model used by Denmark; calls for the EU to include this model in the Ukraine Assistance Fund;

7. Condemns, in the strongest possible terms, China’s supply of dual-use goods and military items to Russia; reminds China of its responsibilities, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, to stand up in defence of the rules-based international order, and therefore calls on Beijing to end all military or dual-use assistance to Russia and its war of aggression against Ukraine; underlines that a refusal to change course on this matter risks seriously affecting bilateral EU-China relations; highlights China’s significant influence over North Korea and Russia and urges China to help to reduce tensions and prevent further escalation of hostilities; expresses deep concern about the effect that European dependencies on China have on the credibility of the Member States’ ability to safeguard their national security and the EU as a whole;

14. Reiterates its previous position that all EU Member States and NATO allies should collectively and individually commit to supporting Ukraine militarily with no less than 0.25 % of their gross domestic product annually; stresses that this commitment is needed now more than ever following the re-election of Donald Trump to the White House;

8. Urges the international community to take swift and decisive action to address this alarming escalation; calls for strengthened international cooperation to prevent arms shipments from North Korea to Russia, including enhanced monitoring and enforcement mechanisms within the UN framework and through multilateral alliances; urges the EU to take decisive action to sanction individuals and entities in North Korea who are involved in arms and troops transfers, as well as intermediaries facilitating these transactions; welcomes the efforts of the international community to crack down on North Korea’s illicit arms trade and emphasises the need for sustained pressure on Pyongyang to cease its destabilising actions; calls on all EU and UN member states to do their utmost to ensure the implementation of all UN Security Council resolutions regarding North Korea and to proactively block any routes for North Korea to obtain financing, materials or knowledge for its illegal weapons programmes;

15. Expresses its conviction that a lasting peace is only possible if there is certainty that Russia will not prepare and launch another assault after the cessation of hostilities; calls in this context for discussions about Ukraine’s future NATO membership to be accelerated and intensified;

9. Urges the Member States to further broaden and strengthen the sanctions regime against North Korea, Belarus and Iran in light of these countries’ military support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and to add to the EU sanctions lists all the main Chinese entities and individuals who directly support Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and Russia’s defence and security sector;

16. Calls on the Council to maintain and extend its sanctions policy against Russia and Belarus, while monitoring, reviewing and enhancing its effectiveness and impact; stresses that the impact of existing sanctions, as well as financial and military support for Ukraine, will continue to be undermined as long as the EU allows Russian fossil fuels to be imported; is deeply concerned about China and other countries deemed to be helping Moscow’s war effort;

10. Expresses deep concern about the possibility of any transfer of nuclear- or ballistic missile-related technology to North Korea, which would undermine international non-proliferation efforts and pose a grave threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and globally; calls for the EU and its Member States, in cooperation with G7 and G20 partners, to develop and promote an alternative mechanism to the UN Panel of Experts in order to ensure efficient monitoring and enforcement of sanctions on North Korea;

17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the authorities of Russia and North Korea, and the United Nations Security Council.

11. Expresses deep concern over the ongoing and severe human rights violations in North Korea, where the regime’s oppressive policies and systemic neglect of basic needs have resulted in widespread suffering among the country’s people; condemns the diversion of resources towards military activities and external conflicts, including support for Russia’s war of aggression, at the expense of addressing urgent humanitarian needs within North Korea; calls for the EU and international partners to enhance efforts to hold the North Korean regime accountable for its human rights abuses; urges increased support for civil society organisations and human rights defenders working to document abuses and provide aid to North Korean citizens; urges the Chinese Government to cease refoulement practices and provide North Korean refugees with access to international protection; calls on North Korea to grant UN human rights bodies access to the country to assess the human rights situation, enforced disappearances and the conditions of detainees and returned refugees, including the cases of Kim Cheol-ok and South Korean missionaries Kim Jung-wook, Kim Kook-kie and Choi Chun-gil;

12. Highlights the need for a comprehensive EU strategy to address the broader implications of authoritarian alliances, particularly between Russia, North Korea, Belarus, Iran, China and other states undermining the rules-based international order; calls for active efforts by the EU and its Member States to promote the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and for closer cooperation with international partners to reduce tensions in the Indo-Pacific region;

13. Calls for the EU and its Member States to further strengthen their military support for Ukraine, including through the provision of aircraft, long-range missiles, including Taurus missiles, modern air defence systems, including Patriots and SAMP/T, and ammunition, as well as MANPADS, artillery and training programmes for Ukrainian forces, and calls for accelerated delivery of the equipment pledged to meet Ukraine’s urgent needs; reiterates its position that all EU Member States and NATO allies should collectively and individually commit to supporting Ukraine militarily, with no less than 0,25 % of their GDP annually; welcomes the signing of the joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine and calls for the Commission and Member States to act swiftly to effectively implement the commitments made; calls on the Commission and the Council to prioritise making the European IRIS2 space communication capabilities fully operational and to grant Ukraine (and Taiwan) access as soon as possible;

14. Calls on the Council to extend its sanctions against Russia; calls for further sanctions against sectors of special economic importance for Russia (the metallurgical, nuclear, chemical, agricultural and banking sectors) and on Russian raw materials, such as aluminium, steel products, uranium, titanium and nickel, for a full embargo on imports into the EU of Russian fossil fuels and liquefied natural gas (LNG), and for the price cap on Russian petroleum products to be lowered further in coordination with G7 partners, in order to stop contributing to the financing of Russia’s illegal war of aggression; calls for stronger and more targeted sanctions against Russia’s shadow fleet; underlines the need to cease any cooperation with Russia in the nuclear energy sector; highlights that Russia is shifting from reliance on gas exports to gas-derived fertilisers, which provide a major source of revenue and foreign currency earnings for the Russian state, directly fuelling its war machine, while simultaneously compromising EU economies and threatening food security; calls for the EU to address this challenge properly, urgently and with strong, decisive actions, as the EU’s reliance on Russian fertilisers is growing at an alarming rate;

15. Calls, in particular, on those Member States that are not living up to their own commitments regarding the production of defence products and direct support for relevant production capacities to engage in joint ventures with Ukraine or directly place orders in Ukraine; calls on the Member States to accelerate direct investments in scaling up Ukraine’s military industrial capacity, following the model used by Denmark; calls for the EU to include this model in the Ukraine Assistance Fund;

16. Calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to actively contribute towards maintaining unity on sanctions and to swiftly pursue the adoption of the 15th package of sanctions; urges the Member States to actively pressure the Hungarian Government to end its irresponsible blockade of the European Peace Facility, including the newly established Ukraine Assistance Fund, which has prevented the release of EUR 6,6 billion in partial reimbursements to Member States providing military support to Ukraine; stresses that if the EPF remains blocked until the next European Council, a new format must immediately be established that only includes those Member States that are willing and able to provide military aid to Ukraine, or national contributions must be reimbursed in order not to hamper the smooth financing of bilateral aid;

17. Urges the Council and the Member States to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention by EU-based companies and individuals, third parties and non-EU states and to adopt and strictly implement restrictive measures against all entities facilitating the circumvention of sanctions and providing Russia’s military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment, ensuring that no loopholes are exploited to channel arms or resources to Russia; considers it essential to strengthen controls on the export and maintenance of high-tech equipment produced in the EU, and to increase law enforcement measures and cooperation to prevent sanctions circumvention; calls to urgently intensify the review of EU Member States’ trade with Central Asian countries, as well as with Türkiye and Azerbaijan, among others, as they are clearly used in EU sanctions evasion;

18. Reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to revise the current duration of the sanctions imposed on Russia, extending the validity period from the current six months to a more robust and strategic three years; notes that such a measure would enhance the consistency and predictability of the EU’s foreign policy stance and shield it from abusive instrumentalisation of unanimity requirements, strengthen the impact of the sanctions and send a clear message of commitment to upholding international law and European security, while also reducing the administrative burden of frequent renewals;

19. Welcomes US President Joe Biden’s decision to allow Ukraine to use advanced rocket systems on military targets within Russian territory, highlighting that this authorisation respects Ukraine’s legitimate right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter; calls for the EU and its Member States to adopt similar measures, removing restrictions on the use of military systems for legitimate defensive operations beyond Ukraine’s borders to deter further Russian aggression;

20. Calls for the EU and its Member States to engage with the incoming administration in Washington to strengthen mutually beneficial transatlantic cooperation, emphasising the shared strategic interest of supporting Ukraine, and to highlight that Russia and its allies pose not only a threat to European stability but also a significant danger to global security and the rules-based international order; expects the incoming Trump administration to maintain support for Ukraine and remain steadfast in its commitment to NATO, and meanwhile urges the EU and its Member States to put words into action and establish a genuine Defence Union, also as a European pillar of NATO, starting with strengthening its defence capabilities;

21. Calls for accountability for war crimes and violations of international law committed by Russia and its allies, including North Korea, through strengthened cooperation with the International Criminal Court and other judicial bodies; urges the EU and international partners to intensify efforts to hold all perpetrators accountable;

22. Calls on the Commission to propose additional measures to support the Ukrainian economy by providing further financial support and facilitating investment opportunities; welcomes the agreement with the Council on macro-financial assistance for Ukraine of up to EUR 35 billion, making use of frozen Russian assets as well as the new Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism; calls for the swift implementation of both tools in order to allow Ukraine to benefit as quickly as possible from these new funding possibilities;

23. Reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to take more substantive steps towards establishing creative solutions under a sound legal regime allowing for the confiscation of Russian state-owned assets frozen by the EU, and for their use to address the various implications of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including the prevention of further destruction and loss of life, reconstruction of the country and compensation for the victims of Russia’s aggression; stresses that any future claim by Russia to these assets may only be settled after an overall consideration of the outstanding reparations due to Ukraine; stresses the importance of the Ukraine Facility as a mechanism for long-term financial support, reconstruction and recovery efforts, and urges its swift and efficient implementation; calls on the Commission to propose long-term financial assistance beyond 2027 for the reconstruction of Ukraine, building on the experience of the Ukraine Facility;

24. Emphasises the need to create a more stable and predictable framework for EU-Ukraine trade relations; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to accelerate consultations with Ukraine under Article 29 of the Association Agreement and urges both sides to agree on the most ambitious level of liberalisation possible; calls on the Commission to closely involve Parliament in the review of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA); notes the restrictions on imports of agri-food products from Ukraine imposed unilaterally by several Member States, which touch on the EU’s exclusive competence for trade under the common commercial policy and the EU’s obligations under the DCFTA with Ukraine; calls on the Commission to find European solutions to potential market distortions caused by increased inflows of Ukrainian agri-food products, in consultation with Ukraine and the relevant Member States;

25. Calls, in view of the harsh winter months, for a significant increase in EU humanitarian aid to address the dire situation caused by Russia’s systematic attacks on civilian infrastructure, in particular energy infrastructure, which have left millions of Ukrainians without essential services; acknowledges the work of many Ukrainian and other civil society organisations in assisting families of abducted Ukrainian children, prisoners of war and illegally detained Ukrainian civilians and their tireless efforts to bring their loved ones home; calls for the EU, its Member States and the international community to support their activities and to use all available international forums to pressure Russia to return abducted Ukrainian children, Ukrainian prisoners of war and illegally detained Ukrainian civilians;

26. Deplores the deliberate killing and mistreatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war by Russia and calls on Russia to comply with its international obligations, in particular the Geneva Convention, and to allow international organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit prisoners of war and to assess their state of health; calls for the EU, its Member States and the international community, in particular the UN, to review and adapt international conventions and the work of the relevant international organisations to today’s realities and to make them more responsive to the needs of prisoners of war;

27. Notes with concern that Russia is actively recruiting individuals from distant regions, including Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, using deception or coercion, in order to send them to fight in the war against the people of Ukraine; calls on the UN, the African Union and countries whose populations are targeted by Moscow to take active measures to counter this recruitment;

28. Highlights again the constructive role of South Korea in the rules-based international order, including its unwavering commitment to Ukraine; calls for the EU and its Member States to engage with South Korea and seek to shift its position on arming Ukraine, in order to provide significant military resources to aid Ukraine’s defence operations; welcomes the first-ever EU-Republic of Korea Strategic Dialogue, held in Seoul on 4 November 2024, and the subsequent Security and Defence Partnership between the EU and South Korea; supports the deepening of the EU’s relations with South Korea and enhanced bilateral cooperation on security and defence; calls for the EU and its Member States, in cooperation with Ukraine and South Korea, to encourage and be prepared for the possible defection of members of the Korean People’s Army; calls for the EU and its Member States to deepen their cooperation with South Korea on Ukraine’s future, focusing on its EU aspirations, security guarantees and reconstruction; calls for closer cooperation with other like-minded partners, particularly Japan, Australia and Taiwan, and emphasises the need for greater dialogue in the Indo-Pacific;

29. Calls for the EU and its Member States to continue providing support to the Russian democratic opposition, to ensure their protection and to encourage them to fight against the Putin regime, in particular the militarist, chauvinist and imperialist sentiments in Russian society, and to strongly express and actively seek support for Ukraine;

30. Condemns recent acts in the Baltic Sea that have damaged European critical infrastructure; stresses the urgent need to investigate these grave incidents and release information about the perpetrators and their intentions; underlines that several representatives of European governments believe that the most recent incident constitutes a grave act of sabotage; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to respond with appropriate measures against any state or non-state actors responsible, if evidence proves their involvement;

31. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Russian Government, the South and North Korean governments and the other governments concerned, and the United Nations.