What changed

B100179/2024

P10_TA(2024)0054

European Parliament resolution on Georgia’sGeorgia's worsening democratic crisis following the recent parliamentary elections and alleged electoral fraud

(2024/2933(RSP))

PE766.493

European Parliament resolution of 28 November 2024 on Georgia’s worsening democratic crisis following the recent parliamentary elections and alleged electoral fraud (2024/2933(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia, in particular its resolutionthat of 9 October 2024 on the democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia,

– having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part,

– having regard to the joint statement byof thepreliminary Chairfindings and conclusions of the Committeeinternational onelection Foreignobservation Affairs,mission the(I-EOM) Chairled ofby the DelegationOrganization for relationsSecurity withand theCo-operation Southin CaucasusEurope’s andOffice thefor ChairDemocratic ofInstitutions theand DelegationHuman toRights (OSCE-ODIHR) on the Euronestparliamentary Parliamentaryelections Assemblyheld ofin 28Georgia on 26 October 2024 onand to the parliamentarystatement electionsby inthe Georgia,Head of the European Parliament’s election observation delegation,

– having regard to the statement by the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, of 27 October 2024, the joint statementStatement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, and the European Commission of 2729 October 2024 on the Parliamentarylatest developments following the parliamentary elections in GeorgiaGeorgia, and to the joint statement by the High Representative,Representative Josepand Borrell,the Commission of 2927 October 2024 on the latest developments following the Parliamentaryparliamentary elections in Georgia,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 17 October 2024, 27 June 2024 and 14 and 15 December 2023 and to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690) and the accompanying 2024 Georgia report,

– having regard to the joint statement by Emmanuel Macron, President of the French Republic, Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Donald Tusk, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland on the situation in Georgia of 7 November 2024,

– having regard to the joint statement by the Chair of EUthe ministersCommittee on theForeign electionsAffairs, inthe GeorgiaChair of 28the OctoberDelegation 2024for andrelations towith the jointSouth statementCaucasus byand the FriendsChair of Georgia groupthe ofDelegation 6to Novemberthe 2024Euronest onParliamentary anAssembly ‘internationalof inquiry28 commissionOctober to2024 investigateon irregularitiesthe ofparliamentary elections in Georgia’,Georgia,

– having regard to the statement of preliminary findings and conclusions of the International Election Observation Mission led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE-ODIHR) on the parliamentary elections held in Georgia on 26 October 2024 and to the statement by the Head of the European Parliament’s election observation delegation,

– having regard to the joint statement of EU ministers of 28 October 2024 on the elections in Georgia,

– having regard to the Preliminary Statement on the 2024 Georgia Parliamentary Elections of 27 Octoberjoint 2024statement by the InternationalFriends Republicanof InstituteGeorgia, andwhich therepresents preliminaryEuropean statementparliaments, of 276 OctoberNovember 2024 by the National Democraticentitled Institute‘On international election observerinquiry delegationcommission to Georgia’sinvestigate 26irregularities Octoberof 2024elections parliamentaryin elections,Georgia’,

– having regard to the Transparency International interim report entitled ‘Misuse of Administrative Resources in Parliamentary Elections 2024’ of 21 October 2024, the summary statement on Georgia’s parliamentary election on 26 October 2024 by the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) and to the final joint assessment by three independent Georgian domestic election observation missions led by ISFED, MyVote and the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA),

– having regard to Georgia’s status as an EU candidate country, granted by the European Council at its summit of 14 and 15 December 2023,

– having regard to the ConstitutionCommission ofcommunication Georgia,of and30 inOctober particular2024 Articleentitled 78‘2024 thereofCommunication on integrationEU intoenlargement Europeanpolicy’ and(COM(2024)0690), Euro-Atlanticwhich structures,includes the first progress report on Georgia,

– having regard to RuleRules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas parliamentary elections were held in Georgia on 26 October 2024; whereas numerous credible reports of violations cast doubt on the election results, leading many people both within and outside Georgia to question their legitimacy and to refuse to recognise the results;

A. whereas parliamentary elections were held in Georgia on 26 October 2024; whereas the months leading up to the elections were characterised by significant attacks on democracy in Georgia, such as the hasty adoption of anti-democratic legislation criticised by the United Nations, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), and the EU; whereas the pre-election period failed to meet democratic standards due to actions by the ruling Georgian Dream party and the authorities that fostered a climate of fear, including through the arrest, home raids and intimidation of opposition politicians, civil society leaders, journalists, researchers and other persons critical of the government, and violence committed against them;

B. whereas the pre-election period failed to meet democratic standards due to actions by the ruling Georgian Dream party and the authorities that fostered a climate of fear, including through the arrest, home raids and intimidation of opposition politicians, civil society leaders, journalists, researchers and other persons critical of the government, and violence committed against them; whereas this also included the failure to investigate the violence committed against civil society and opposition figures, and the introduction of laws on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ and ‘family values and the protection of minors’, which limited the capacity of civil society and media organisations to operate freely, curtailed freedom of expression and stigmatised minorities; whereas these measures collectively had a detrimental effect on political discourse and diverted resources away from essential election monitoring activities;

B. whereas, during the campaign, the ruling Georgian Dream party exploited Georgian society’s natural fear of war by reiterating that it was the ‘party of peace’, claiming that the opposition would supposedly drag the country into war with Russia under orders from the West, conspiratorially referred to as the ‘Global War Party’; whereas leaders of the Russian Federation and its propagandists openly supported Georgian Dream both before and after the elections; whereas the top leaders of the ruling party made public statements during the campaign expressing their intent to ban key opposition parties following the elections, raising concerns about the fairness and inclusivity of the political process;

C. whereas, during the campaign, the ruling Georgian Dream party exploited Georgian society’s natural fear of war by reiterating that it was the ‘party of peace’, claiming that the opposition would supposedly drag the country into war with Russia under orders from the West, conspiratorially referred to as the ‘Global War Party’; whereas leaders of the Russian Federation and its propagandists openly supported Georgian Dream both before and after the elections; whereas the top leaders of the ruling party made public statements during the campaign expressing their intent to ban key opposition parties following the elections, raising concerns about the fairness and inclusivity of the political process;

C. whereas Georgia’s 26 October 2024 parliamentary elections offered a choice of candidates but were marred by serious irregularities, documented reports of vote manipulation and the suppression of voter freedoms, particularly through vote buying, observer harassment, removal of media from polling stations, intimidation of voters inside and outside of polling stations, tracking of voters and confiscation of identity documents in rural areas, which were then handed to loyal activists of the ruling party to vote, organised transportation of voters, hate speech, insufficient polling access for Georgian citizens abroad, and improbable differences in female and male voter turnout in rural precincts; whereas public sector employees and recipients of social benefits faced pressure to support the ruling party;

D. whereas the ruling party’s influence over a polarised media environment restricted access to unbiased information for the electorate, while targeted attacks on independent media further hindered balanced coverage; whereas disinformation narratives were disseminated and amplified by ruling party officials in the run-up to the elections; whereas at least two foreign journalists were denied entry to Georgia, where they intended to cover the elections;

D. whereas international observers noted deepening political divisions and a significant imbalance in the allocation of financial resources, as well as the many advantages enjoyed by the ruling party, making an already uneven playing field even more uneven; whereas the effectiveness of the financial oversight of the campaign was undermined by limited enforcement and concerns over the impartiality and political instrumentalisation of the oversight body;

E. whereas Georgia’s Central Election Commission (CEC), despite appeals and lawsuits from citizens, civil society organisations and the President of Georgia, failed to take the action necessary to provide sufficient polling access for Georgian citizens abroad, thereby compromising the inclusivity and accessibility of the electoral process;

E. whereas Georgia’s parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024 marked the country’s first full use of a proportional system, with electronic devices for voter identification and vote counting; whereas these technologies raised concerns over transparency, voter secrecy and a lack of independent verification​;

F. whereas independent third-party fact checkers, as well as dedicated research organisations, documented and reported on multiple cases of electoral disinformation, as well as Russia’s information manipulation in the campaign, such as, but not restricted to, public statements made by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service;

F. whereas recent amendments to the Electoral Code, including the removal of gender quotas, changed the composition of the Central Election Commission (CEC) and, along with the enactment of the ‘law on transparency of foreign influence’, have restricted fundamental freedoms, stigmatised civil society organisations and undermined the integrity of Georgia’s democratic institutions;

G. whereas the joint observation mission of the OSCE-ODIHR, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly noted that the campaign was competitive but subdued, with language and imagery that were highly divisive, creating an atmosphere of tension and division among the electorate; whereas the OSCE-ODIHR-led observation mission also noted that reports of pressure on voters, particularly on public sector employees, remained widespread in the campaign and that this, coupled with extensive tracking of voters on election day, raised concerns about the ability of some voters to cast their vote without fear of retribution;

G. whereas respected Georgian independent election observation missions concluded that a combination of pre-election coercion, election day manipulation and restricted observer access meant that the elections did not reflect the true will of the Georgian people; whereas a system of identity card confiscations, data gathering and unauthorised presence created a coercive environment, reinforcing the complicity of state actors in facilitating electoral fraud; whereas the principle of voter secrecy was widely violated on election day; whereas the elections were rigged through a combination of voter intimidation, obstruction of observation, and manipulation of voter procedures, and cannot be considered as free and fair;

H. whereas international and local observers documented systemic, organised violations during the elections, including violence, ballot stuffing, vote-buying, multiple voting, large-scale breaches of voter secrecy, voter coercion, undue pressure and intimidation of voters, particularly among public sector employees and other vulnerable groups, voting fraud, including the confiscation of state workers’ identity cards, which were then handed to loyal activists to use for voting, hate speech, systematic observer obstruction, organised transportation of voters and improbable deviation in female and male voter turnout as well as in rural precincts;

H. whereas widespread anomalies in voter turnout and party vote shares for the ruling party were consistent with many reports of electoral malpractice;

I. whereas, on election day, observers noted a lack of intervention by the election administration and law enforcement, which reinforced the appearance of complicity by state actors in facilitating electoral fraud;

I. whereas almost all the polls before the election suggested that Georgian Dream would fall short of a majority; whereas the discrepancy between pre-election polling and the election results reported by the CEC cannot be explained by a statistical margin of error;

J. whereas the final joint assessment by three independent Georgian domestic election observation missions – International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), MyVote and Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA) – concluded that the outcome of the 26 October 2024 parliamentary elections could not be seen as truly reflecting the preferences of Georgian voters nor be considered free and fair;

J. whereas the President of Georgia, Salome Zourabichvili, publicly condemned the elections as rigged, refused to recognise the validity of the result, and called for an international investigation and fresh elections; whereas the President asserted that acknowledging the outcome would be tantamount to ‘accepting Georgia’s subjugation to Russia’ and described the election process as a ‘Russian special operation’; whereas the four opposition coalitions that surpassed the electoral threshold rejected the election results and refused to legitimise the resulting parliament; whereas four opposition blocs – the United National Movement, the Strong Georgia Coalition, the Coalition for Change and Gakharia for Georgia – turned down their parliamentary mandates and refused to join the 11th convocation of parliament, arguing that the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024 were illegitimate; whereas on 13 November 2024, repeating statements he made in August, Georgian Prime Minister Kobakhidze iterated plans to constitutionally ban major opposition parties if they refuse to accept their parliamentary mandates; whereas Georgia thus finds itself in a constitutional crisis;

K. whereas Georgian non-governmental organisations observing the elections claimed that there had been widespread violations of voter secrecy and called for the annulment of the results in all districts where electronic voting had been used; whereas Georgian civil society organisations filed court complaints and called for investigations into electoral fraud, but investigative bodies often did not initiate inquiries and the courts did not properly examine the reported violations; whereas the My Vote Coalition, a leading electoral watchdog, filed appeals to annul the election results in 245 precincts, representing over 415 000 voters citing breaches of voter secrecy, harassment of observers, procedural irregularities and restrictions to observation, but all these appeals were ultimately rejected by the courts; whereas the CEC has so far refused to publish the audit commissioned on the electronic voting system, and certified the results of the elections on 16 November 2024 notwithstanding the above-mentioned irregularities;

K. whereas the new parliament was convened on 25 November 2024 without the participation of opposition members; whereas President Salome Zourabichvili stated in reference to the inaugural session of parliament that ‘today the parliament of Georgia no longer exists’ as Georgian Dream has ‘trampled the constitution’;

L. whereas legal action by Georgian civil society organisations was followed by punitive measures by the authorities against civil society representatives, including unwarranted summons for questioning and heavy fines for speaking out about electoral fraud;

L. whereas, in his statement after the elections, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) recalled that the international observers had not declared the elections free and fair, asked for a transparent inquiry and investigation into the irregularities and the pressuring and intimidation of voters, and highlighted the need to reverse the trend of democratic backsliding in Georgia;

M. whereas the four opposition coalitions that surpassed the electoral threshold rejected the election results and refused to legitimise the resulting parliament; whereas three opposition blocs – the United National Movement, the Strong Georgia Coalition and the Coalition for Change – turned down their parliamentary mandates and refused to join the 11th convocation of parliament, arguing that the 26 October 2024 parliamentary elections were illegitimate;

M. whereas the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, travelled to Tbilisi to congratulate the Georgian Dream party before the final election results were published and without first consulting other EU leaders, and was the only EU leader to do so;

N. whereas Georgia’s President, Salome Zourabichvili, refused to recognise the validity of the results, citing profound irregularities and abuses that undermined the credibility of the electoral process and compromised the fundamental right of citizens to a free and fair election, and called for fresh elections; whereas Georgia thus finds itself in a constitutional crisis; whereas this crisis is unfolding ahead of the January 2025 presidential election, which will be the first to take place under reformed constitutional rules whereby the president is elected by parliamentary and regional representatives;

N. whereas Georgian civil society organisations filed court complaints and called for investigations into electoral fraud, though in many cases investigative bodies did not initiate inquiries and did not properly examine the violations; whereas the CEC has so far refused to publish the commissioned audit on the electronic voting system, and has certified the results of the elections, notwithstanding the above-mentioned irregularities;

O. whereas the Georgian Prime Minister, Irakli Kobakhidze, has again subsequently threatened the main opposition parties with a constitutional ban if they refuse to accept their parliamentary mandates;

O. whereas legal action by Georgian civil society organisations was followed by punitive measures by the authorities against civil society representatives, including unwarranted summons for questioning and heavy fines for speaking out about election fraud;

P. whereas on 16 November 2024, despite numerous complaints and calls by independent election observers for the results to be annulled, Georgia’s Central Election Commission announced the final summary protocol of the 26 October 2024 parliamentary elections, attributing victory to the ruling Georgian Dream party with 54 % of the vote;

P. whereas Georgian courts have continued to fast-track and dismiss, en masse, lawsuits brought by opposition political parties and local observers alleging voting irregularities, while rejecting motions to summon witnesses and motions that would oblige the CEC to hand over the delivery and receipt records of markers and papers procured and used for ballots;

Q. whereas systematic and organised electoral violations have sparked massive and ongoing protests in several Georgian cities; whereas several demonstrators have been arrested, and whereas Georgia has a record of violence against peaceful demonstrators;

Q. whereas on 16 November 2024, despite numerous complaints and calls by independent election observers for the results to be annulled, Georgia’s CEC announced the final summary protocol of the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024, attributing victory to the ruling Georgian Dream party, with 53,92 % of the vote;

R. whereas the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, travelled to Tbilisi to congratulate the Georgian Dream party before the final election results were published and without first consulting other EU leaders, and was the only EU leader to do so;

R. whereas protests in Tbilisi initially erupted on 28 October 2024, with thousands gathering to challenge the legitimacy of the ruling party’s declared victory; whereas the demonstrations continued on 4 November 2024, growing in scale and intensity; whereas police forcibly dispersed demonstrations in Tbilisi using disproportionate violence against peaceful protesters and journalists, and arrested several demonstrators;

S. whereas, according to Article 78 of the Constitution of Georgia, ‘the constitutional bodies shall take all measures within the scope of their competences to ensure the full integration of Georgia into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’;

T. whereas oligarch and EU citizen Bidzina Ivanishvili, as Georgian Dream’s ‘honorary chairman’ and de facto leader, who also wields considerable influence on Georgia’s economy, has played a defining role in the country’s democratic backsliding and in undermining its Euro-Atlantic orientation in favour of pivoting towards Russia;

T. whereas Georgia, as an EU candidate country, should abide fully by the Association Agreement and fulfil the nine steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of 8 November 2023; whereas although the European Council granted candidate status to Georgia in December 2023, its EU accession process has since been de facto halted due to the course of action taken by the Georgian Government since the spring of 2024;

U. whereas the integrity of Georgia’s electoral processes and the protection of political freedoms are crucial for the country’s future democratic development and its potential membership of the European Union; whereas these elections did not meet the standards expected of an EU candidate country;

U. whereas oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, the leader of Georgian Dream, who also wields considerable influence over Georgia’s economy, has played a defining role in the country’s democratic backsliding and in undermining its Euro-Atlantic orientation in favour of a pivot towards Russia;

1. Strongly deplores the continuing democratic backsliding in Georgia and holds the ruling Georgian Dream party responsible for it; condemns all violations of international norms for free and fair elections documented during the recent elections in Georgia; deplores the refusal of responsible institutions to investigate complaints submitted by independent observer organisations and calls for a thorough, swift, transparent and independent investigation into all reported election-related irregularities and violations;

1. Deplores the fact that Georgia, a candidate country for EU accession, held parliamentary elections on 26 October 2024 that did not respect international standards for democratic elections or its commitments as a member of the OSCE to carry out free and fair elections; emphasises that violations of electoral integrity are incompatible with the standards expected from an EU candidate country; highlights the fact that the conduct of the election was a further manifestation of the continuing democratic backsliding for which the ruling party is fully responsible;

2. Is appalled by the extent of the information provided by international and local observers on systematic and organised violations aimed at ensuring the victory of the ruling party; refuses to recognise the results of the 26 October 2024 parliamentary elections in Georgia; calls on Georgian political forces and civil society to engage in an inclusive dialogue in order to overcome the current political crisis and to proceed with organising new elections under international supervision within a year;

2. Strongly condemns the numerous and serious electoral violations, including documented cases of intimidation, vote manipulation, ballot-stuffing, interference with election observers and the media, reported manipulation involving electronic voting machines that allowed multiple votes per identity document, significant imbalances in financial resources, the advantages of incumbency and a failure to investigate severe procedural irregularities;

3. Calls on the Georgian authorities to demonstrate their commitment to European values, beginning with ensuring full transparency in the electoral process; emphasises that violations of electoral integrity are incompatible with the standards expected from an EU candidate country;

3. Considers that the reported extensive electoral fraud undermines the integrity of the election process, the legitimacy of the results and the public’s trust in any new government, and that the results do not serve as a reliable representation of the will of the Georgian people;

4. Deplores Russia’s interference in democratic processes in Georgia and its divisive election rhetoric and propaganda, including the ‘Global War Party’ conspiracy theory used by the ruling Georgian Dream party, which closely resembles the methods and narratives of Russian propaganda; calls on the Georgian authorities to ensure fact-based information and communication and to build the resilience of Georgian society to Russian disinformation and propaganda;

4. Acknowledges Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili’s strong condemnation of the elections as rigged and her decision not to recognise the results; appreciates the efforts made by Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili to steer the country back towards a democratic and European path of development;

5. Stands in solidarity with the courageous Georgian people fighting for their democratic rights and the European future of their country, and reaffirms its support for their democratic and European aspirations; reiterates its unwavering support for all those who, in the face of verbal attacks, physical threats and legal persecution by the ruling party, advocate for and defend democracy and human rights, work for a peaceful society and are committed to equality and human dignity for all; urges the Georgian authorities to guarantee the right of citizens to assemble and to refrain from using force against them;

5. Considers that, with the legitimacy of the vote severely undermined by the magnitude of the violations, the international community should not recognise the election results; rejects, therefore, any recognition of the parliamentary elections and calls for them to be re-run within a year, with the process conducted in an improved electoral environment by an independent and impartial election administration, under diligent international observation, in order to ensure a genuinely fair and transparent electoral process;

6. Urges the Georgian authorities to uphold their commitment to the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and human rights and encourages them to adopt and implement reforms in line with Georgia’s stated objective of joining the European Union, as demanded by a large majority of Georgia’s citizens;

6. Supports the call for an independent, transparent international investigation into the allegations of electoral manipulation, voter intimidation and systemic violations, which were reported to have taken place in the pre-election period and on election day;

7. Appreciates the efforts made by Georgia’s President Salome Zourabichvili to steer the country back towards a democratic and European path of development;

7. Welcomes the decision by the European External Action Service (EEAS) to send a technical mission to Georgia; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to establish a broad mission mandate that would go beyond the limitations of the OSCE election observation framework and methodology, which is significantly different from the EU election observation methodology, because the OSCE methodology is not always capable of adequately capturing everything that occurs in a country before election day, particularly in countries such as Georgia where there is a well-established system of pressure on public officials, voter intimidation and obstruction of local election observers;

8. Reiterates its call on Georgian decision-makers to cease all attacks on civil society, independent media and the LGBTIQ community and to ensure a genuinely enabling environment for civil society and media in the country; notes that civil society organisations targeted by ‘transparency of foreign influence’ legislation are looking into possibilities to register in the EU Member Sates, as numerous Belarusian civil society organisations have done; calls for the EU and its Member States to guarantee their full support for Georgian civil society and the independent media in this difficult period and to analyse the potential increase in migration from Georgia to the EU if politically motivated persecutions and attacks on fundamental freedoms continue;

8. Expresses concern about the seizure by the Prosecutor’s Office of voter verification devices and election documentation; calls on the authorities to allow verification by voters of their participation in the elections in accordance with the highest standards of data protection; underlines the importance of safeguarding all election-related data and making these accessible to relevant stakeholders, given that they could contain key evidence of any irregularities;

9. Reiterates its strong condemnation of the adoption of the ‘transparency of foreign influence’ law and the ‘family values and protection of minors’ legislation by the Georgian Dream majority; calls again for the immediate withdrawal of these pieces of legislation;

9. Expresses serious concern about the coordinated dismissal by Georgian judicial institutions of numerous election fraud and manipulation complaints and the CEC’s complete failure to investigate any of the reported election incidents; considers that, by not responding to the genuine concerns within society and the reports by local and international observers, the Georgian authorities are wilfully steering the country to the verge of a domestic political crisis and a state of international isolation from Georgia’s democratic partners;

10. Takes note of the coordinated dismissal of numerous election-related complaints by Georgian judicial institutions, particularly regarding large-scale breaches of voter secrecy; takes note of concerns raised by reputable Georgian watchdogs over state capture in the judiciary by a clan linked to Bidzina Ivanishvili, as well as of the US sanctions against four senior Georgian judges for ‘significant corruption’; regrets the failure of long-standing EU assistance projects intended to strengthen the independence, impartiality and accountability of the Georgian judiciary;

10. Expresses deep concern at the significant decline in female political representation in Georgia, compounded by the abolition of gender quotas, and calls for legislative changes to encourage gender equality in politics;

11. Calls on the Council, the Commission, the European External Action Service and the new Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to conduct a comprehensive review and overhaul of EU policy towards Georgia; highlights the fact that the approach of accommodating Bidzina Ivanishvili and his regime has proven ineffective;

11. Calls for the EU and its Member States to impose personal sanctions on the officials and political leaders in Georgia who are responsible for the democratic backsliding, violations of electoral laws and standards, administrative abuses and misuse of state institutions, such as Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, Mayor of Tbilisi and Secretary General of the ruling Georgian Dream party Kakha Kaladze, Speaker of the Georgian Parliament Shalva Papuashvili, and chairman of the Georgian Dream party Irakli Garibashvili, and to extend these sanctions to judges passing politically-motivated sentences; reiterates its call on the Council and the EU’s democratic partners to impose immediate and targeted personal sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili and to freeze all his assets within the EU for his role in the deterioration of the political process in Georgia and for acting against the country’s constitutionally declared interests, including efforts to restore Russia’s sphere of influence over the country;

12. Calls for EU funding provided to the Georgian Government to be frozen until the election-related violations are properly addressed and the recently adopted illiberal pieces of legislation are repealed, and for strict conditions to be applied to the disbursement of any future funding; reiterates its calls on the Commission to assess the impact of Georgia’s ‘foreign agent’ and ‘family values’ legislation on the country’s continuous fulfilment of the visa liberalisation benchmarks, particularly the fundamental rights benchmark, a crucial component of the EU visa liberalisation policy;

12. Emphasises that respect for fundamental rights is vital to the EU’s visa liberalisation benchmarks and urges the Commission and the Council to review Georgia’s visa-free status, with the possibility of suspension if it is considered that EU standards on democratic governance and freedoms are not being upheld;

13. Calls for the EU and its Member States to impose sanctions on Georgian political leaders and officials responsible for the country’s democratic backsliding and violations of the electoral process, including those responsible for the organisation and administration of the elections, and the officials of the Ministry of Interior and its subordinate institutions responsible for using violence against peaceful protesters; calls, in this context, on the Council to consider imposing personal sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze and Kakha Kaladze, mayor of Tbilisi and Secretary General of the ruling Georgian Dream party, for their role in the significant deterioration of democracy in Georgia;

13. Calls for the EU to severely limit formal EU-level contacts with the Georgian Government and Parliament;

14. Condemns Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán’sViktor prematureOrbán’s visit to GeorgiaGeorgia, aswhich yetwas a violation of EU positions and another attempt to undermine the EU’s common foreign and security policy; emphasises that, once again, Prime Minister Orbán did not speak for the EU;

15. Strongly reiterates its urgent demand for the immediate and unconditional release of former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds for the purpose of seeking medical treatment abroad;

15. Recalls that as a result of the adoption of new anti-democratic legislation, such as the ‘law on transparency of foreign influence’ and the ‘law on family values and protection of minors’, the process of Georgia’s integration into the EU has effectively been suspended; recalls that the EU has also frozen the allocation of funds to Georgia; underscores that the continuing democratic backsliding in Georgia is not only a regrettable development, considering that Georgia was once a champion of Euro-Atlantic aspirations, but also needs to be reversed and the said pieces of anti-democratic legislation repealed in order for the country’s relations with the EU to get back on track; regrets that the political environment in Georgia indicates an authoritarian shift by the ruling party and a betrayal of the pro-European aspirations of the Georgian people; recalls its steadfast support for Georgia’s democratic development and the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of its people; reminds the Georgian Government that a large majority of the population strongly supports the country’s pro-Western course and its accession to the EU;

16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the President, Government and Parliament of Georgia.

16. Is alarmed by the climate of intimidation and polarisation fuelled by statements by Georgian Government representatives and political leaders, as well as by attacks against political pluralism, including through threats to ban opposition parties, to arrest their leaders and even ordinary supporters, and to silence dissent; warns the Georgian authorities that any attempts to ban legally established political parties would alienate Georgia from the EU and make any move towards EU accession impossible;

17. Strongly condemns Russia’s systematic interference in democratic processes within Georgia, including through voter intimidation, vote buying and disinformation, such as the ‘Global War Party’ conspiracy; deplores the disinformation narratives disseminated and amplified by ruling party officials and government-affiliated media in the run-up to the elections; calls on the Georgian authorities to ensure fact-based information and communication, to refrain from anti-EU propaganda that is at odds with the stated goal of EU accession, and to strengthen the resilience of Georgian society to Russian disinformation and propaganda;)

18. Recalls that the European Council granted Georgia candidate country status at its summit of 14 and 15 December 2023 on the understanding that the relevant steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 would be taken; stresses that the recent parliamentary elections clearly run counter to this ambition; agrees with the assessment presented in the Commission’s 2024 Enlargement Package, which states that Georgia’s EU accession process is to be halted indefinitely as a result of the democratic backsliding initiated by the Georgian Government; underlines that the policies implemented by Georgian Dream are incompatible with Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration;

19. Reiterates its unwavering support for the Georgian people’s legitimate European aspirations and their wish to live in a prosperous and democratic country, free from corruption, that fully respects fundamental freedoms, protects human rights and guarantees an open society, independent media and free and fair elections; urges the Georgian authorities to guarantee the right of citizens to assemble and to refrain from using unwarranted force against them;

20. Calls on the Council, the Commission, the EEAS and the new VP/HR to conduct a comprehensive review and overhaul of EU policy towards Georgia; calls on the Commission to use the frozen EUR 120 million originally intended as support for the Georgian authorities to enhance the EU’s support for Georgia’s civil society, in particular the non-governmental sector and independent media, which are increasingly coming under undue pressure from the ruling political party and the authorities, as well as to support programmes supporting democratic resilience and electoral integrity; welcomes the proposal of VP/HR Borrell to do so; calls for the EU’s funding mechanisms to be adjusted to take into account the needs that arise in a more hostile and anti-democratic environment;

21. Strongly reiterates its urgent demand for the immediate release of former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds; emphasises that the Georgian Government bears full and undeniable responsibility for the life, health, safety and well-being of former President Mikheil Saakashvili and must be held fully accountable for any harm that befalls him; reiterates its call on President Salome Zourabichvili to use her constitutional right to pardon him;

22. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the President, Government and Parliament of Georgia.