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What changed

From · Plenary report · 10 Jun 2026 A-10-2026-0163 on the 2025 Commission report on Serbia
To · Adopted text · 8 Jul 2026 TA-10-2026-0261 2025 Commission report on Serbia
✦ In short · AI narration of the differences below, generated 4 Sept 2026

Adds criticism of Serbia's cooperation with China and its governing party, and of intimidation against protesters and MEPs. #4#5 Updates the status of the national minority action plan, noting its adoption. #6 The other changes are formal: decimal separators and a date are corrected. #1#2#3

3 changes of substance, plus 3 formal. Each change below carries a one-line ✦ note from the same model. Written from the two texts only — read the highlighted passages before relying on it.

The changes to the text itself, in document order. Cover page, citations (“having regard to …”), standard resolution paragraphs and punctuation-only edits are left out — they are in “Show every difference”.

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Change #4 Substance

Adds a note of concern about a memorandum of cooperation between the Serbian governing party and the Chinese Communist Party, questioning Serbia's EU commitment.

6. Reiterates the significant need for Serbia to clearly and consistently demonstrate its geopolitical orientation towards the EU, including by fully aligning with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), in particular the restrictive measures taken by the EU in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and expresses serious concern over Serbia’s continued failure to fully align with the EU’s CFSP; regrets that its alignment is among the lowest of all candidate countries; notes that Serbia’s lack of alignment with the EU’s foreign policy, including its failure to adopt restrictive measures, is inconsistent with one of the specific objectives set out in Article 3 of the Reform and Growth Facility Regulation; reiterates its view that full alignment remains a non-negotiable requirement for accession; welcomes Serbia’s recent alignment with Council Decisions (CFSP) 2026/438 and (CFSP)(EU) 2025/490, but reiterates that selective alignment is insufficient;

Change #5 Substance

Adds condemnation of intimidation against students, journalists, and activists, and of attacks by Serbian officials on MEPs.

9. Expresses concern over Serbia’s ongoing military build-up, combined with the increasingly hostile rhetoric towards neighbouring countries and the deepening of Serbia’s security and defence cooperation with China, including special forces exercises and the expansion of strategic agreements, as well as the growing presence of Chinese security and surveillance technology; strongly condemns Serbia’s recent acquisition of Chinese CM-400AKG air-to-surface ballistic missiles; warns that this military build-up alters the regional security balance and undermines regional stability and good neighbourly relations with surrounding NATO member states; stresses that such procurement contradicts the EU’s CFSP and raises serious questions about Serbia’s geopolitical orientation; underlines that major defence procurements from authoritarian strategic competitors of the EU require full transparency and careful assessment of their implications for regional stability, interoperability and Serbia’s declared European orientation; notes with concern the recent memorandum of cooperation between the Serbian governing party and the Chinese Communist Party, which raises further questions regarding Serbia’s strategic commitment to pursuing its EU path;

Change #6 Substance

Updates the status of the action plan for national minority rights, noting its adoption on 28 May 2026, and removes the call to finalise it.

45. Expresses deep concern over credible allegations regarding the use of an acoustic weapon against peaceful protesters; notes the absence of a prompt and transparent investigation into the incident; recalls the Council of Europe’s interim measure of April 2025 concerning the protection of demonstrators and stresses that failure to investigate such allegations may constitute a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights; calls on the Serbian authorities to conduct an immediate, impartial investigation and to ensure accountability; notes that Serbia is purchasing Chinese hardware and software at reduced prices in order to step up surveillance of its citizens, notably with the deployment of extensive video-surveillance systems and advanced facial recognition in public spaces through cooperation with Huawei under the ‘Safe City’ project implemented in Belgrade; expresses serious concern over reports that Serbian authorities have used EU pre-accession funds to procure biometric and forensic software from Papilon, a Russian company subject to EU sanctions; calls on the Commission to ensure full compliance with EU restrictive measures in all EU-funded programmes; deplores the Serbian authorities’ campaign of intimidation against peaceful students, journalists and activists, which relies on a controversial report by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) to falsely accuse protesters of using a sound cannon during the Slavija Square protest in Belgrade on 15 March 2025; underlines that weaponising fear to suppress civil dissent is entirely unacceptable and incompatible with EU fundamental values; strongly condemns the latest attacks by highest-ranking Serbian officials against Members of the European Parliament, including false accusations that they have spread lies and misinformation concerning the protest;