What changed

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

P10_TA(2026)0203

on counteringCountering transnational repression – towards an EU strategy to protect Europe’s sovereignty and democratic values

(2025/2179(INI))

Committee on Foreign Affairs

PE778.365

European Parliament resolution of 16 June 2026 on countering transnational repression – towards an EU strategy to protect Europe’s sovereignty and democratic values (2025/2179(INI))

The European Parliament,

AD. whereas TNR is often regionally clustered, indicating informal or formal cooperation frameworks and shared practices among perpetrator states and their enablers, including reciprocal enforcement of repression against exiled communities, European citizens and entities;

AE. whereas, in order to make their requests appear more credible, state services responsible for TNR often falsify allegations, presenting victims of TNR as perpetrators of crimes;

AE. whereas Russia is among the most aggressive perpetrators of TNR globally and is responsible for the highest number of documented incidents within the EU of any origin country, treating political emigration as a strategic threat, and using practices including assassination, attempted assassination, digital surveillance, harassment, kidnapping plots, cyberattacks, hostile intelligence operations, blackmail, smear campaigns, intimidation of diaspora communities, stigmatisation, in-absentia legal proceedings, coercion-by-proxy and threats against family members, the systematic weaponisation of international legal, financial, cybersecurity and lawenforcement cooperation mechanisms, as well as threats against EU lawmakers; whereas Russia accounts for a disproportionate share of public Interpol Red Notices globally, far exceeding comparable usage by other states; whereas Russia relies on bilateral prosecutorial cooperation agreements with third countries to facilitate extradition requests targeting its nationals abroad; whereas Russia’s intelligence services have conducted online recruitment campaigns, often through Telegram, for murder-for-hire and terrorist activities often directed against Russian diaspora and political opponents; whereas Russia uses proxies, including the Wagner Group, Chechen death squads, cultural institutions, and, in some cases, structures affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church to carry out TNR;

AF. whereas Russia is among the most aggressive perpetrators of TNR globally and is responsible for the highest number of documented incidents within the EU of any origin country, treating political emigration as a strategic threat, and using practices including assassination, attempted assassination, digital surveillance, harassment, kidnapping plots, cyberattacks, hostile intelligence operations, blackmail, smear campaigns, intimidation of diaspora communities, stigmatisation, in-absentia legal proceedings, coercion-by-proxy and threats against family members, the systematic weaponisation of international legal, financial, cybersecurity and lawenforcement cooperation mechanisms, as well as threats against EU lawmakers; whereas Russia accounts for a disproportionate share of public Interpol Red Notices globally, far exceeding comparable usage by other states; whereas Russia relies on bilateral prosecutorial cooperation agreements with third countries to facilitate extradition requests targeting its nationals abroad; whereas Russia’s intelligence services have conducted online recruitment campaigns, often through Telegram, for murder-for-hire and terrorist activities often directed against Russian diaspora and political opponents; whereas Russia uses proxies, including the Wagner Group, Chechen death squads, cultural institutions, and, in some cases, structures affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church to carry out TNR;

AF. whereas Belarus conducts TNR at an alarming scale, including on EU territory, notably through physical violence, the abuse of Interpol mechanisms, denial of travel documents, the use of spyware, coercive consular practices, forced returns, asset seizures and intimidation; whereas Belarus uses Interpol’s Red Notice system to target political opponents in exile, and targets the diaspora and dissidents, including those residing in the EU, through criminal cases, special in-absentia trials and coercion-by-proxy;

AG. whereas Belarus conducts TNR at an alarming scale, including on EU territory, notably through physical violence, the abuse of Interpol mechanisms, denial of travel documents, the use of spyware, coercive consular practices, forced returns, asset seizures and intimidation; whereas Belarus uses Interpol’s Red Notice system to target political opponents in exile, and targets the diaspora and dissidents, including those residing in the EU, through criminal cases, special in-absentia trials and coercion-by-proxy;

AG. whereas China operates the most comprehensive and systematic TNR campaign in the world, supported by extensive extraterritorial infrastructure, comprising state-aligned entities, overseas police service stations, diaspora, academic and student organisations, media outlets and digital networks, used to identify, monitor, intimidate and coerce individuals within diaspora communities and their associates, through surveillance, harassment, legal and financial pressure, abuse of Interpol mechanisms, forced returns and family intimidation; whereas China uses coercive measures against European individuals and entities; whereas reports by human rights defenders indicate that China operates covert police stations and proxy actors on European soil without legal basis, enabling surveillance and coercive returns, including through threats against relatives and, in some cases, abductions; whereas Chinese authorities exert pressure on academics to halt research deemed sensitive, including on supply chains and forced labour practices, or on Tibet and Taiwan, and target artists by seeking the cancellation of events relating to Taiwan; whereas China is a leading exporter of surveillance systems, spyware and data-driven policing tools, which are used by other authoritarian regimes to monitor and intimidate their own diaspora communities abroad; whereas Hong Kong’s 2020 National Security Law and the 2024 Safeguarding National Security Ordinance assert extraterritorial jurisdiction and have been used to carry out TNR, including by targeting European politicians with threats of prosecution and extradition, and issuing arrest warrants and bounties against activists and academics residing in the EU; whereas the EU’s extradition arrangements with China and Hong Kong raise serious concern;

AH. whereas China operates the most comprehensive and systematic TNR campaign in the world, supported by extensive extraterritorial infrastructure, comprising state-aligned entities, overseas police service stations, diaspora, academic and student organisations, media outlets and digital networks, used to identify, monitor, intimidate and coerce individuals within diaspora communities and their associates, through surveillance, harassment, legal and financial pressure, abuse of Interpol mechanisms, forced returns and family intimidation; whereas China uses coercive measures against European individuals and entities; whereas reports by human rights defenders indicate that China operates covert police stations and proxy actors on European soil without legal basis, enabling surveillance and coercive returns, including through threats against relatives and, in some cases, abductions; whereas Chinese authorities exert pressure on academics to halt research deemed sensitive, including on supply chains and forced labour practices, or on Tibet and Taiwan, and target artists by seeking the cancellation of events relating to Taiwan; whereas China is a leading exporter of surveillance systems, spyware and data-driven policing tools, which are used by other authoritarian regimes to monitor and intimidate their own diaspora communities abroad; whereas Hong Kong’s 2020 National Security Law and the 2024 Safeguarding National Security Ordinance assert extraterritorial jurisdiction and have been used to carry out TNR, including by targeting European politicians with threats of prosecution and extradition, and issuing arrest warrants and bounties against activists and academics residing in the EU; whereas the EU’s extradition arrangements with China and Hong Kong raise serious concern;

AH. whereas Iran has a long-standing record of pursuing perceived opponents abroad and conducting TNR within the EU, with operations directed at the highest levels of state authority and executed by the Ministry of Intelligence and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including its Quds Force, using tactics such as assassinations, abductions, enforced disappearances, credible threats of violence, digital TNR and the outsourcing of repression to organised crime groups and other proxies, including by intimidation of journalists and dissidents, cyber surveillance, coercion of relatives in Iran and documented assassination and kidnapping plots against opposition figures on European soil; whereas these actions threaten public security and violate fundamental rights;

AI. whereas Iran has a long-standing record of pursuing perceived opponents abroad and conducting TNR within the EU, with operations directed at the highest levels of state authority and executed by the Ministry of Intelligence and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including its Quds Force, using tactics such as assassinations, abductions, enforced disappearances, credible threats of violence, digital TNR and the outsourcing of repression to organised crime groups and other proxies, including by intimidation of journalists and dissidents, cyber surveillance, coercion of relatives in Iran and documented assassination and kidnapping plots against opposition figures on European soil; whereas these actions threaten public security and violate fundamental rights;

AI. whereas the EU global human rights sanctions regime (EU Magnitsky Act) provides an important instrument to target individuals and entities responsible for serious human rights violations and abuses worldwide, including those involved in acts of TNR; whereas its effective and consistent use can contribute to deterrence, accountability and the protection of fundamental rights;

AJ. whereas the EU global human rights sanctions regime (EU Magnitsky Act) provides an important instrument to target individuals and entities responsible for serious human rights violations and abuses worldwide, including those involved in acts of TNR; whereas its effective and consistent use can contribute to deterrence, accountability and the protection of fundamental rights;

AJ. whereas the EU currently lacks a common definition, comprehensive data collection mechanisms and a coordinated, whole-of-EU institutional approach to countering TNR; whereas these are also lacking outside the EU, which creates challenges for prevention, identification and effective policy responses;

AK. whereas the EU currently lacks a common definition, comprehensive data collection mechanisms and a coordinated, whole-of-EU institutional approach to countering TNR; whereas these are also lacking outside the EU, which creates challenges for prevention, identification and effective policy responses;

AK. whereas many forms of TNR are rarely captured in official statistics due to their covert nature; whereas TNR is significantly under-reported, including within the EU, as persons targeted by TNR often fear retaliation against family members or distrust authorities due to prior experiences in authoritarian contexts; whereas additional barriers to reporting include a lack of awareness and training among law enforcement and administrative authorities, the absence of accessible and trauma-informed reporting mechanisms, language barriers and the cumulative psychological toll of sustained intimidation, surveillance and harassment; whereas many TNR victims also refrain from reporting instances of abuse due to the inefficiency of local law enforcement or fear of making the situation worse; whereas this structural under-reporting results in a persistent protection gap for victims and communities targeted by TNR, undermines evidence-based policymaking and accountability, and thus contributes to the continued use of TNR by perpetrator states with limited risk of exposure or consequences;

AL. whereas many forms of TNR are rarely captured in official statistics due to their covert nature; whereas TNR is significantly under-reported, including within the EU, as persons targeted by TNR often fear retaliation against family members or distrust authorities due to prior experiences in authoritarian contexts; whereas additional barriers to reporting include a lack of awareness and training among law enforcement and administrative authorities, the absence of accessible and trauma-informed reporting mechanisms, language barriers and the cumulative psychological toll of sustained intimidation, surveillance and harassment; whereas many TNR victims also refrain from reporting instances of abuse due to the inefficiency of local law enforcement or fear of making the situation worse; whereas this structural under-reporting results in a persistent protection gap for victims and communities targeted by TNR, undermines evidence-based policymaking and accountability, and thus contributes to the continued use of TNR by perpetrator states with limited risk of exposure or consequences;

AL. whereas many EU host countries fail to address and capture TNR below the criminal threshold;

AM. whereas many EU host countries fail to address and capture TNR below the criminal threshold;

AM. whereas the current proposal for the European Democracy Shield includes no mention of TNR;

AN. whereas the current proposal for the European Democracy Shield includes no mention of TNR;

Establishing a common EU understanding of transnational repression

6. Underlines that TNR encompasses a wide range of constantly expanding coercive practices, including but not limited to:

(1)(a) physical TNR, such as targeted killings, abductions, violence, forced returns, enforced disappearances, deportations, and attacks on property;

(2)(b) legal and administrative abuse – including the misuse of consular services, extradition and mutual legal assistance procedures – in absentia prosecutions, abuse of international notice systems, asset freezing and restriction of access to banking and financial services, baseless criminal charges, selective prosecution, denial of permits, licenses, or approvals without valid reason, or arbitrary fines or penalties;

(3)(c) non-physical coercive methods, such as digital surveillance, threats, intimidation, digital harassment, misuse of spyware technologies, hacking, blackmail, accusations of terrorism or undermining state security, harassment of relatives and coercion-by-proxy – including through diplomatic or consular missions, organised crime networks, private actors, or state-aligned and state-affiliated entities operating abroad;

7. Stresses that the Member States are currently affected by TNR to differing degrees and display varying levels of awareness, institutional preparedness and protection mechanisms; stresses, however, that as perpetrators operate across borders and exploit divergences between national systems, TNR cannot be addressed effectively through isolated national responses, and therefore requires the engagement and preparedness of all Member States, within a coordinated EU framework;

Abuse of international cooperation mechanisms

45. Calls on the Member States to remain vigilant and refuse, document and report informal, coercive or extralegal requests from foreign authorities to surveil, detain, restrict, intimidate or hand over exiles or members of diaspora communities, including when such requests are conveyed through diplomatic channels; calls, in this context, for mandatory enhanced scrutiny, automatic suspension and independent judicial review of all international cooperation requests – including extradition, Interpol notices, mutual legal assistance and law-enforcement data sharing –scrutiny involving persons at risk of TNR; further calls on Member States to refrain from extraditing victims or potential victims of TNR and to ensure their protection within the EU;

46. Calls on the Member States to ensure that law-enforcement, judicial and other relevant authorities receiving Interpol data and implementing bilateral cooperation agreements with countries suspected of TNR are properly trained to identify and assess risks of abuse;

59. Calls on the Commission to issue official guidelines on countering consular coercion, ensuring that persons targeted by TNR do not need to visit their national embassies or consulates abroad;

60. Invites the Member States to update guidance for asylum and migration authorities to ensure that the individual circumstances of applicants who are victims of TNR are properly addressed; calls on the Member States and other Schengen area countries to use the EU’s Visa Code and Handbook consistently and flexibly to address protection needs for persons targeted by TNR;

Strengthening deterrence and accountability

61. Stresses the need to increase the cost of TNR and strengthen deterrence, including through effective investigation and prosecution of perpetrators and enablers; calls on the Member States to establish clear legal liability for individuals and entities who knowingly facilitate or profit from acts of TNR on behalf of foreign states; calls furthermore for the effective implementation of corporate human rights due diligence obligations, including under the Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence, to prevent, identify, mitigate and remedy TNR-related harms across value chains;diligence; believes that an adequate measure to counter the rising phenomenon of TNR perpetrated by authoritarian regimes against individuals residing in the EU is through demonstrating that the EU can be a deterring force; therefore, urges the EU to continue to increase its own defence capabilities and reduce dependencies;

62. Calls on the Member States to strengthen preventive and accountability measures, including by vetting diplomats, official staff of the countries involved, interpreters, lobbyists’ representatives and other relevant actors for involvement in TNR prior to accreditation, and to impose appropriate measures — including expulsions, entry bans or suspension of accreditation – against individuals responsible for such acts; further calls on the Member States to share relevant information with partner countries to prevent re-accreditation or continued abuse; expresses the need to acknowledge the risks posed by TNR infiltration among democratic opposition groups abroad and to undertake coordinated, collective measures to prevent and counter such activities;

82. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

Transnational repression has become one of the most serious and under-addressed threats to democracy, human rights and state sovereignty and security within the European Union. Once primarily associated with authoritarian practices beyond Europe’s borders, it is now an increasingly prevalent phenomenon on EU territory, targeting, among others, exiles, members of diasporas, journalists, human rights defenders, political activists, humanitarian organisations and their donors, business representatives and their entities residing within the Union.

Through a broad and evolving range of physical, legal, financial, administrative, digital and proxy-based tactics, perpetrator states seek to silence dissent, intimidate communities and restrict civic participation across borders. These practices undermine fundamental rights and democratic space within the Union while violating Member State sovereignty through covert and coercive foreign interference and by restricting the ability of individuals residing in the EU to advocate for democracy, human rights and accountability in their countries of origin.

The urgency of addressing transnational repression has intensified as perpetrators increasingly exploit digital technologies, surveillance tools, FATF’s AML/CFT standards and cybersecurity frameworks, financial compliance frameworks, international cooperation mechanisms and migration systems in ways that often remain below traditional criminal or security thresholds. These tactics have evolved faster than the policy responses designed to counter them. At the same time, transnational repression remains significantly underreported and systematically underestimated, resulting in a persistent protection gap for those targeted.

Because transnational repression cuts across internal and external EU policies and exploits cross-border legal and institutional gaps, fragmented national responses are insufficient. Coordinated Union-level action is necessary to ensure consistency, close loopholes and prevent perpetrators from exploiting differences between Member States. Hence, while member states are affected differently by TNR, this report calls on all member states to jointly address the threat posed by TNR.

Moreover, the Union’s credibility as a global actor committed to democracy and human rights depends on its ability to protect individuals residing on its territory from repression by foreign states. Failing to do so not only endangers victims, affected communities, and associated entities, but also weakens the Union’s external action, and undermines trust in democratic institutions and the financial integrity and European competitiveness.

The recommendations in this report respond to the growing threat of transnational repression in the European Union and to the absence of a coherent, victim-centred EU strategy. They seek to close existing protection gaps by proposing a comprehensive approach grounded in human rights, democratic resilience and the defence of EU sovereignty by: (1) establishing a common EU understanding of transnational repression; (2) strengthening EU coordination, data collection and institutional response; (3) strengthening protection and support for victims of Transnational Repression; (4) preventing and responding to specific forms of Transnational Repression, (5) addressing structures that enable transnational repression, (6) strengthening deterrence and accountability, and (7) positioning the European Union as a global leader in countering transnational repression.

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she included in her report input on matters pertaining to the subject of the file that she received, in the preparation of the report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee, from the following interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register, or from the following representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies:

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

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