Sittings · Document
Countering transnational repression – towards an EU strategy to protect Europe’s sovereignty and democratic values
P10_TA(2026)0203
Countering transnational repression – towards an EU strategy to protect Europe’s sovereignty and democratic values
Committee on Foreign Affairs
PE778.365
European Parliament resolution of 16 June 2026 on countering transnational repression – towards an EU strategy to protect Europe’s sovereignty and democratic values (2025/2179(INI))
– having regard to Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, which enshrines the EU’s founding values of human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights,
– having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Articles 3 and 21 thereof,
– having regard to the increasing acts of transnational repression, and to the responsibility of Member States to protect all people residing within their territory,
– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 83 and 215 thereof,
– having regard to the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders of 1998,
– having regard to the UN Human Rights Council resolutions of 4 April 2025 entitled ‘Human rights defenders and new and emerging technologies: protecting human rights defenders, including women human rights defenders, in the digital age’ and of 1 July 2025 entitled ‘Civil society space’,
– having regard to the brief of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on transnational repression, published on 18 June 2025,
– having regard to the statement of 13 January 2025 by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on improving protection for human rights defenders,
– having regard to the annual report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General ‘A/HRC/60/62: Cooperation with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights - Report of the Secretary General’ of September 2025,
– having regard to the ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ endorsed in UN Human Rights Council Resolution 17/4 of 16 June 2011,
– having regard to the statement by a group of independent UN human rights experts, expressing concern about the proliferation of trials in absentia in Belarus, published on 22 January 2025,
– having regard to the preliminary examination conducted by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court into the situation in the Republic of Lithuania / Republic of Belarus (ICC-01/24-1),
– having regard to the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, adopted in June 2004 and updated in 2008, and to its resolution of 16 March 2023 on the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders,
– having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 January 2025 on ‘EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2025’,
– having regard to the Council conclusions of 30 January 2026 on ‘EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2026’,
– having regard to the EU action plan on human rights and democracy 2020-2024, extended until 2027,
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act),
– having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859 (Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence),
– having regard to the 2024 and 2025 EU Annual Reports on Human Rights and Democracy in the World,
– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 November 2025 entitled ‘EU Strategy for Civil Society’ (COM(2025)0790),
– having regard to its recommendation of 15 June 2023 to the Council and the Commission following the investigation of alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware,
– having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 12 November 2025 entitled ‘European Democracy Shield: Empowering Strong and Resilient Democracies’ (JOIN(2025)0791),
– having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 June 2025 entitled ‘An International Digital Strategy for the European Union’ (JOIN(2025)0140),
– having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2025 on addressing transnational repression of human rights defenders,
– having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2026 on addressing impunity through EU sanctions, including the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (so-called ‘EU Magnitsky Act’),
– having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,
– having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,
– having regard to the work of its special committee on the European Democracy Shield,
– having regard to the Constitution of the International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO-Interpol), in particular Article 2, which requires the organisation to act in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
– having regard to the G7 Leaders’ statement on transnational repression of 17 June 2025 and the G7 multistakeholder dialogue on transnational repression held in February 2025,
– having regard to the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting communiqué of 19 April 2024 on ‘addressing global challenges, fostering partnerships’,
– having regard to Resolution 2509 (2023) and Recommendation 2257 (2023) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe entitled ‘Transnational repression as a growing threat to the rule of law and human rights’,
– having regard to the study of its Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union of June 2025 entitled ‘Transnational repression of human rights defenders: The impacts on civic space and the responsibility of host states’,
– having regard to the study of its Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union of January 2026 entitled ‘Perpetrators and methods of transnational repression and possible counter strategies’,
– having regard to the seventh report of Session 2024-25 of the Joint Committee on Human Rights of the Parliament of the United Kingdom entitled ‘Transnational repression in the UK’,
– having regard to the annual report published by the German Federal Ministry of the Interior in June 2025 entitled ‘Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024’,
– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0142/2026),
A. whereas transnational repression (TNR) is a deliberate, systematic, targeted and repressive practice, whereby regimes or their proxies reach across borders and perpetrate acts outside their territorial jurisdiction to intimidate, threaten, silence, coerce, control or harm in any other way individuals or groups residing abroad, or family members or their support networks by using a broad range of physical, psychological, digital, legal, administrative and other means, in violation of fundamental rights; whereas targets of TNR include thousands of pro-democracy figures forced to flee their countries of origin due to domestic repression;
B. whereas the EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights;
C. whereas TNR undermines these founding values, contributes to the manipulation of public debate and violates fundamental rights and international law, as well as the EU’s and Member States’ sovereignty and security; whereas increased human rights violations in the countries of origin often go hand in hand with increased TNR activity abroad;
D. whereas TNR committed on territories of EU Member States is part of a broader strategy of foreign interference aimed at weakening democratic institutions and societies and directly interferes with the Union’s internal democratic space by silencing voices, fragmenting communities and generating fear and self-censorship, while also undermining the EU’s external action by restricting the ability of individuals residing in the EU to advocate for democracy, human rights and accountability in non-EU countries;
E. whereas TNR may constitute a crime against humanity within the meaning of Article 7(h) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, taking into account the systematic and widespread nature of such acts;
F. whereas everyone residing in the EU, irrespective of their ethnic or national origin, enjoys equal rights and protections under EU law, including those guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; whereas the individual rights of everyone residing in the EU must be safeguarded and upheld by the competent national and EU authorities; whereas TNR requires specific, victim-centred responses to close existing protection gaps; whereas treating TNR primarily as a security or foreign interference issue risks obscuring its other dimensions, limiting the effectiveness of the response and leaving persons and communities affected by TNR insufficiently protected;
G. whereas foreign actors have carried out TNR against individuals and groups residing in EU Member States; whereas Member States are affected by TNR to differing degrees and demonstrate varying levels of awareness, institutional preparedness and availability of protection mechanisms; whereas perpetrators operate across borders and exploit such divergences between national legal and institutional frameworks, thereby reducing the effectiveness of isolated national responses;
H. whereas TNR cuts across multiple policy domains and therefore demands additional coordination; whereas TNR tactics often exploit grey zones between agencies and departments;
I. whereas Member States play a fundamental role in preventing, investigating and responding to acts of TNR; whereas fragmented national approaches, and a lack of coordination between Member States, undermine the EU’s ability to identify, prevent and combat TNR effectively and consistently, and are insufficient to address its cross-border nature; whereas such fragmentation may, in practice, exacerbate insecurity for affected individuals and communities, including by increasing exposure, visibility or vulnerability to coercion by states of origin; whereas stronger coordination at EU level should support and complement Member States’ competences in the field of national security;
J. whereas data collected over the last decade indicate a sustained increase in the scale, geographic reach and sophistication of TNR; whereas the number and types of actors involved in TNR have also expanded due to the outsourcing of repression to proxies such as organised crime networks, former intelligence officers, and cyber actors, including within EU Member States, thereby increasing deniability, complicating attribution and undermining accountability;
K. whereas TNR frequently exploits the ordinary operation of host-state administrative, financial, and migration systems, including compliance-driven financial controls, rigid documentation requirements and fragmented data-handling practices; whereas, as a result, EU institutions and Member States risk their structures being abused by perpetrators, even in the absence of intent or direct cooperation with perpetrator states; whereas addressing TNR therefore requires scrutiny of internal EU and national procedures to prevent their exploitation for repressive purposes;
L. whereas individuals and communities targeted by TNR are also key first responders with unique knowledge of repressive tactics, proxy networks and evolving risk patterns; whereas therefore meaningful engagement with affected communities is essential for effective prevention, early warning, and the development of durable counter-strategies;
M. whereas TNR has a severe and sustained impact on human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers and political activists, as well as on their family members;
N. whereas TNR is often mischaracterised as a series of isolated incidents rather than as a sustained strategy targeting entire communities; whereas the absence of physical violence or overt harassment should not be equated with safety or freedom, as silencing, fear, trauma and fragmentation are often the intended outcome of TNR; whereas these cumulative effects of TNR necessitate not only immediate protection but also access to effective remedies and compensation; whereas, even when victims prevail, compensation is often symbolic, delayed or unenforced;
O. whereas TNR affects individuals differently depending on their gender, sexual orientation, racial, ethnic or religious background, and socio-economic position; whereas intersecting forms of discrimination and structural inequalities in both countries of origin and host states may increase the negative effects of TNR; whereas women face particular forms of TNR that can manifest in sexualised and sexist digital attacks targeting their identity, aiming to intimidate, discredit and deter them from activism, reflecting a broader pattern of gender-based online abuse and harassment, and whereas LGBTIQ+ individuals are also disproportionately targeted;
Trends, forms and methods of transnational repression
P. whereas TNR, albeit not new as such, is an evolving phenomenon and is taking place in a challenging context marked by the deterioration of human rights, restrictions on fundamental freedoms and civic space, and the increasingly assertive behaviour of certain authoritarian regimes;
Q. whereas physical forms of TNR include targeted killings, abductions, violence, enforced returns, enforced disappearances, deportations, and attacks on property; whereas 1 375 direct physical incidents were recorded by Freedom House in 107 target countries between 2014 and 2025;
R. whereas certain regimes are known to use threats or pay collaborators to record participants in public protest or spy on dissidents within the EU, thereby directly affecting the exercise of fundamental rights;
S. whereas authoritarian regimes, in the digital era, are developing increasingly sophisticated capabilities to conduct digital TNR; whereas digital TNR includes online harassment, direct threats, doxxing, hacking, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, smear operations, and incitement of hatred against dissidents in their countries of residence, including through the use of artificial intelligence (AI), and the deployment of spyware and other surveillance technologies, to monitor, profile, intimidate or silence individuals abroad, intertwining with traditional methods of TNR; whereas such practices are often difficult to attribute and frequently remain below traditional criminal thresholds; whereas these practices are especially harmful as internet platforms and digital media can be crucially important, both personally and professionally, for individuals who have been forced to leave their countries as a result of political persecution; whereas the rise of AI has exponentially increased TNR’s reach and impact, including by enabling authorities to perform facial recognition, behaviour analysis and real-time data processing; whereas digital threats against civil society are considered human rights violations; whereas social media companies and online platforms play a significant role in shaping the online environment for human rights defenders and activists; whereas the absence of effective rapid-response mechanisms to address doxxing and targeted online harassment leaves defenders exposed to heightened risks of intimidation, surveillance and further TNR; whereas the Digital Services Act provides tools that can address aspects of TNR, particularly regarding coordinated harassment and disinformation;
T. whereas digital service providers, social media and other online platforms, private spyware companies and other technology companies have, at times, become enablers of TNR; whereas mainstream platforms such as WeChat, Telegram, Facebook, X and others are used for tracking dissidents participating in protests or expressing their opinions in other ways; whereas companies placing surveillance technologies on the market have a responsibility to prevent their illegitimate use for political purposes;
U. whereas malicious foreign actors abuse open vulnerabilities in devices in order to infiltrate personal or professional communications; whereas multiple cases in recent years have shown that the EU is not equipped to tackle infiltration of devices by spyware; whereas spyware has been used by foreign actors to monitor dissidents and public officials alike; whereas the growing surveillance of human rights defenders should be considered a form of TNR or surveillance-enabled coercion; whereas the use of spyware for TNR poses a serious threat to fundamental rights, democratic processes and electoral integrity;
V. whereas coercion-by-proxy constitutes a widespread and particularly harmful form of TNR, involving threats, harassment, detention or punishment of family members or associates who remain in the country of origin, as well as the use of diaspora events or organisations to enable surveillance and intimidation of community members, thereby inflicting severe psychological harm and creating incentives for self-censorship; whereas coercion-by-proxy can also involve members of diaspora communities being compelled to carry out repressive activities on behalf of the state, rendering them simultaneously victims and instruments of TNR; whereas some members of diasporas can also be used as a tool to exert TNR without being compelled; whereas it is important to strengthen the identification of individuals among the diaspora that might be involved in carrying out acts of TNR;
W. whereas, in order to make their requests appear more credible, state services responsible for TNR often falsify allegations, presenting victims of TNR as perpetrators of crimes; whereas perpetrators of TNR increasingly use trials in absentia, mass criminal proceedings, property confiscation, and intimidation of relatives as tools of repression against dissidents abroad, thereby preventing international travel and safe return, restricting property rights, and exerting indirect pressure through family members remaining in the country; whereas jurisdictional limitations and the extraterritorial nature of such practices make coercion-by-proxy especially difficult for host countries to prevent, document and prosecute, contributing significantly to victims’ reluctance to report incidents;
X. whereas states engaging in TNR frequently misuse international and legal cooperation mechanisms, including extradition and information requests, data-sharing mechanisms, mutual legal assistance, the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) anti-money laundering / countering of the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) and cybersecurity frameworks, as well as Interpol notices or diffusions used in connection with their implementation, to locate, detain or forcibly return individuals on political grounds, thereby giving repressive regimes legitimacy, despite explicit prohibitions on political misuse under international law; whereas, in particular, Interpol Purple and Silver Notices are conceived as operational tools without individual remedy or review avenues for those affected, which facilitates their abuse in the context of TNR; whereas the sharing of Interpol data, including for red notices and diffusions, can expose the persons targeted by autocratic actors to danger; whereas the number of Interpol red notices and diffusions has increased dramatically over the last decade and is the key tool used by perpetrators of TNR;
Y. whereas perpetrator states employ administrative and mobility-based forms of TNR through surveillance and coercion by diplomatic or consular missions, including by cancelling or refusing to renew passports, denying consular services, or revoking nationality, thereby coercing individuals to engage with consular authorities or preventing travel; whereas the denial of consular services affects not only human rights defenders and political activists but also their families;
Z. whereas financial TNR involves the misuse of FATF AML/CFT standards to disseminate false allegations and trigger compliance-based account freezes and de-banking; whereas these practices deprive affected individuals and organisations of funding and financial services, and undermine their livelihoods, civic and political activities; whereas the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLA) constitutes a key EU safeguard point that must develop rapid-response mechanisms against abusive freezes and closures and establish strict limits on data-sharing with perpetrator states;
AA. whereas administrative procedures may be exploited by perpetrator states and their enablers, particularly where access to documents issued by the country of origin is required or where interpreters are used as proxies to intimidate or coerce victims;
Perpetrators, cooperation and proxy structures
AB. whereas Parliament-commissioned research and independent datasets demonstrate that TNR is a global phenomenon, with more than 25 % of governments worldwide engaged in TNR, an estimated 3.5 million people at risk, and documented cases in more than 100 countries, according to Freedom House research; whereas TNR is committed mostly by authoritarian regimes; whereas prominent perpetrators of TNR in Europe and globally include Russia, China, Iran and Belarus;
AC. whereas Parliament-commissioned research demonstrates that a majority of documented TNR incidents involve cooperation between origin and host states or the exploitation of weak rule-of-law environments, including through misuse of extradition frameworks, law enforcement cooperation and international organisations;
AD. whereas TNR is often regionally clustered, indicating informal or formal cooperation frameworks and shared practices among perpetrator states and their enablers, including reciprocal enforcement of repression against exiled communities, European citizens and entities;
AE. whereas Russia is among the most aggressive perpetrators of TNR globally and is responsible for the highest number of documented incidents within the EU of any origin country, treating political emigration as a strategic threat, and using practices including assassination, attempted assassination, digital surveillance, harassment, kidnapping plots, cyberattacks, hostile intelligence operations, blackmail, smear campaigns, intimidation of diaspora communities, stigmatisation, in-absentia legal proceedings, coercion-by-proxy and threats against family members, the systematic weaponisation of international legal, financial, cybersecurity and lawenforcement cooperation mechanisms, as well as threats against EU lawmakers; whereas Russia accounts for a disproportionate share of public Interpol Red Notices globally, far exceeding comparable usage by other states; whereas Russia relies on bilateral prosecutorial cooperation agreements with third countries to facilitate extradition requests targeting its nationals abroad; whereas Russia’s intelligence services have conducted online recruitment campaigns, often through Telegram, for murder-for-hire and terrorist activities often directed against Russian diaspora and political opponents; whereas Russia uses proxies, including the Wagner Group, Chechen death squads, cultural institutions, and, in some cases, structures affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church to carry out TNR;
AF. whereas Belarus conducts TNR at an alarming scale, including on EU territory, notably through physical violence, the abuse of Interpol mechanisms, denial of travel documents, the use of spyware, coercive consular practices, forced returns, asset seizures and intimidation; whereas Belarus uses Interpol’s Red Notice system to target political opponents in exile, and targets the diaspora and dissidents, including those residing in the EU, through criminal cases, special in-absentia trials and coercion-by-proxy;
AG. whereas China operates the most comprehensive and systematic TNR campaign in the world, supported by extensive extraterritorial infrastructure, comprising state-aligned entities, overseas police service stations, diaspora, academic and student organisations, media outlets and digital networks, used to identify, monitor, intimidate and coerce individuals within diaspora communities and their associates, through surveillance, harassment, legal and financial pressure, abuse of Interpol mechanisms, forced returns and family intimidation; whereas China uses coercive measures against European individuals and entities; whereas reports by human rights defenders indicate that China operates covert police stations and proxy actors on European soil without legal basis, enabling surveillance and coercive returns, including through threats against relatives and, in some cases, abductions; whereas Chinese authorities exert pressure on academics to halt research deemed sensitive, including on supply chains and forced labour practices, or on Tibet and Taiwan, and target artists by seeking the cancellation of events relating to Taiwan; whereas China is a leading exporter of surveillance systems, spyware and data-driven policing tools, which are used by other authoritarian regimes to monitor and intimidate their own diaspora communities abroad; whereas Hong Kong’s 2020 National Security Law and the 2024 Safeguarding National Security Ordinance assert extraterritorial jurisdiction and have been used to carry out TNR, including by targeting European politicians with threats of prosecution and extradition, and issuing arrest warrants and bounties against activists and academics residing in the EU; whereas the EU’s extradition arrangements with China and Hong Kong raise serious concern;
AH. whereas Iran has a long-standing record of pursuing perceived opponents abroad and conducting TNR within the EU, with operations directed at the highest levels of state authority and executed by the Ministry of Intelligence and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including its Quds Force, using tactics such as assassinations, abductions, enforced disappearances, credible threats of violence, digital TNR and the outsourcing of repression to organised crime groups and other proxies, including by intimidation of journalists and dissidents, cyber surveillance, coercion of relatives in Iran and documented assassination and kidnapping plots against opposition figures on European soil; whereas these actions threaten public security and violate fundamental rights;
AI. whereas the EU global human rights sanctions regime (EU Magnitsky Act) provides an important instrument to target individuals and entities responsible for serious human rights violations and abuses worldwide, including those involved in acts of TNR; whereas its effective and consistent use can contribute to deterrence, accountability and the protection of fundamental rights;
AJ. whereas the EU currently lacks a common definition, comprehensive data collection mechanisms and a coordinated, whole-of-EU institutional approach to countering TNR; whereas these are also lacking outside the EU, which creates challenges for prevention, identification and effective policy responses;
AK. whereas many forms of TNR are rarely captured in official statistics due to their covert nature; whereas TNR is significantly under-reported, including within the EU, as persons targeted by TNR often fear retaliation against family members or distrust authorities due to prior experiences in authoritarian contexts; whereas additional barriers to reporting include a lack of awareness and training among law enforcement and administrative authorities, the absence of accessible and trauma-informed reporting mechanisms, language barriers and the cumulative psychological toll of sustained intimidation, surveillance and harassment; whereas many TNR victims also refrain from reporting instances of abuse due to the inefficiency of local law enforcement or fear of making the situation worse; whereas this structural under-reporting results in a persistent protection gap for victims and communities targeted by TNR, undermines evidence-based policymaking and accountability, and thus contributes to the continued use of TNR by perpetrator states with limited risk of exposure or consequences;
AL. whereas many EU host countries fail to address and capture TNR below the criminal threshold;
AM. whereas the current proposal for the European Democracy Shield includes no mention of TNR;
Establishing a common EU understanding of transnational repression
1. Considers TNR to constitute a serious and growing threat to democracy, a human rights violation, and a form of foreign interference, undermining democratic governance, the rule of law, fundamental rights and the sovereignty and security of host states and their ability to ensure the protection of persons residing on their territory; underlines that these trends are likely to intensify due to the erosion of international norms and rapid technological change, which is also reducing the cost of carrying out such actions;
2. Condemns acts of TNR and foreign interference, including those carried out in EU Member States, in the strongest possible terms; calls on the Commission and the Member States to acknowledge that TNR constitutes an unacceptable and unlawful practice, primarily exercised by authoritarian regimes, and to commit to a zero-tolerance approach, which requires decisive, coordinated and comprehensive action towards any form of TNR occurring on EU territory;
3. Considers that the lack of a clear definition of TNR contributes to under-reporting, limits effective policy responses and hinders the use of accountability tools, including sanctions mechanisms; therefore calls on the Commission, the Council and the Member States to adopt a common EU definition of TNR based on the definition set out in this report and previous Parliament reports and integrate this definition systematically in all EU policies and instruments, including in external action, justice and home affairs, digital policy, financial regulation and sanctions frameworks, in order to prevent the EU’s legal and administrative frameworks from being misused for repressive purposes; urges Member States to codify TNR in their national legislation;
4. Defines TNR as deliberate acts or threats carried out by states, including repressive or authoritarian regimes, state-affiliated entities or entities subject to the influence of, or pressure from, a state, or its proxies, to defend and advance their interests by reaching across borders to intimidate, threaten, silence, coerce, control or harm in any other way individuals or groups living abroad, or their support networks and family members;
5. Notes with concern that targets of TNR include a broad range of individuals and groups, comprising, inter alia, dissidents, journalists, activists, academics and diaspora members and their families; acknowledges that TNR extends beyond diasporas and also targets organisations and persons defending or assisting victims, including those with no national connection to the perpetrator state; expresses serious concern about the shrinking of civic space and the silencing of exiled communities, whose voices are instrumental in documenting human rights situations and abuses;
6. Underlines that TNR encompasses a wide range of constantly expanding coercive practices, including but not limited to:
(a) physical TNR, such as targeted killings, abductions, violence, forced returns, enforced disappearances, deportations, and attacks on property;
(b) legal and administrative abuse – including the misuse of consular services, extradition and mutual legal assistance procedures – in absentia prosecutions, abuse of international notice systems, asset freezing and restriction of access to banking and financial services, baseless criminal charges, selective prosecution, denial of permits, licenses, or approvals without valid reason, or arbitrary fines or penalties;
(c) non-physical coercive methods, such as digital surveillance, threats, intimidation, digital harassment, misuse of spyware technologies, hacking, blackmail, accusations of terrorism or undermining state security, harassment of relatives and coercion-by-proxy – including through diplomatic or consular missions, organised crime networks, private actors, or state-aligned and state-affiliated entities operating abroad;
7. Stresses that the Member States are currently affected by TNR to differing degrees and display varying levels of awareness, institutional preparedness and protection mechanisms; stresses, however, that as perpetrators operate across borders and exploit divergences between national systems, TNR cannot be addressed effectively through isolated national responses, and therefore requires the engagement and preparedness of all Member States, within a coordinated EU framework;
Strengthening EU coordination, data collection and institutional response
8. Stresses that TNR is significantly under-reported, even though collecting reliable data is essential to understand its scale; notes that people targeted by TNR may be reluctant to report incidents because they fear retaliation against family members, distrust authorities due to experiences in authoritarian countries or face language barriers;
9. Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), in cooperation with relevant EU bodies including Europol, to establish an EU data collection, monitoring and reporting mechanism on TNR, covering incidents within the EU and globally, allowing public authorities and stakeholders to provide input, and which the Commission and Member States can use to develop, refine and evaluate their policies to counter TNR; stresses the need for shared methodologies and ensuring cooperation in this area with like-minded partners; stresses that reporting channels should be multilingual and trauma-informed, while ensuring robust data protection and confidentiality;
10. Calls on the Member States to ensure that criminal and non-criminal acts that have a component of TNR are consistently recorded as such across the EU, and that the relevant authorities are equipped to identify the TNR dimension;
11. Highlights the need for strong encryption and strict safeguards to ensure that information shared through these channels cannot be intercepted, misused or accessed by unauthorised actors, and that victims are not exposed to further harm;
12. Stresses that reports received through these channels should be assessed quickly and, where appropriate, followed by concrete action by the competent authorities, including investigations and efforts to identify possible links to foreign intelligence actors;
13. Recognises the essential role of civil society organisations in documenting the most hidden forms of TNR – including digital surveillance, financial repression, administrative harassment, and coercion-by-proxy; highlights that current data collection on TNR is still primarily based on non-governmental sources, many of which face severe funding constraints, increasing the urgency for Member State and EU-level monitoring mechanisms; reiterates the need to support civil society, journalists, whistleblowers and others who uncover mechanisms and cases of TNR, often exposing them to high personal risks;
14. Calls on the Member States to maintain close contact with the diasporas most susceptible to TNR; calls on the Commission to provide guidance and recommendations to the Member States on how to protect at-risk groups in exile;
15. Calls on the Member States to provide specialised training for law enforcement, the judicial, financial, cybersecurity, immigration and asylum authorities on identifying and responding to TNR; calls on the Member States to include affected communities in the design and implementation of this training;
16. Urges the establishment of a comprehensive framework to address the fragmentation of national responses and ensure coordination and information-sharing across EU institutions and agencies, Member States, national human rights institutions, and relevant stakeholders; stresses the need for strengthened inter-service cooperation and structured policy dialogue in order to ensure a consistent and effective EU response;
17. Invites Member States to designate national contact points on TNR tasked with coordinating between relevant authorities at all levels;
18. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to facilitate regular exchange between Member States through a network of those national contact points on TNR, enabling them to share experiences, trends, good practices and lessons learned; calls for the national contact points to be regularly invited to meetings of the European Centre for Democratic Resilience; calls on the Member States to ensure systematic reporting on national-level developments to the Commission and strengthen coordination of national measures with a view to more effectively addressing the cross-border dimension of TNR;
19. Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to publish an annual public report on TNR affecting the EU, assessing trends, patterns and emerging risks, including under-reported forms such as digital surveillance, financial repression, administrative harassment, and coercion-by-proxy;
20. Calls on the Commission to make a proposal to update the mandates of Europol and Eurojust to counter TNR more effectively; calls on Europol and Eurojust to prioritise close cooperation and information exchange among EU Member States to address TNR and ensure better information sharing, including via dedicated training, as well as targeted TNR threat assessments;
21. Calls on the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the EEAS to strengthen coordination within existing EU foreign policy instruments in order to counter TNR more effectively, including by reinforcing EU presence in non-EU countries and by strengthening focal points in EU Delegations to raise cases of TNR in non-EU countries;
22. Calls on the Council to appoint a coordinator for countering TNR, who could serve as a central contact point and contribute to the development of an overarching EU strategy on TNR; considers that this coordinator should be involved in and complement the work of the European Centre for Democratic Resilience;
23. Emphasises that all data collection, victim support, protection measures and all other mechanisms aimed at tackling TNR should consider the specific risks faced by racial, ethnic and religious minorities, and LGBTIQ+ persons, and should be culturally competent and systematically consider gendered impacts and intersecting vulnerabilities;
Strengthening protection and support for persons targeted by transnational repression
24. Calls for a comprehensive, victim-centred and intersectional approach to protection and support for persons targeted by TNR, combining immediate and long-term protection measures, and tailored support for persons at heightened risk; calls, in this context, on the Commission and the Member States to adopt gender-sensitive protection measures for women and LGBTIQ+ communities affected by TNR;
25. Highlights the needs for prevention, protection, stabilisation, accountability and deterrence, and the need to address existing protection gaps, including access to legal and administrative assistance, and psychosocial support; further stresses the need to develop rapid response capabilities within the competent authorities;
26. Highlights the serious psychological, social and security consequences of TNR for victims and their families; calls on the Member States to recognise psychosocial harm as an integral feature of TNR and to ensure access to multilingual, and trauma-informed mental health support; recalls in that respect the consequences and psychological burden caused by strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) on journalists or legal pressure on academics;
27. Calls on the Member States to recognise the abuse of legal systems as a form of TNR and to ensure that victims of TNR have access to specialised legal assistance, as well as effective, proportionate and enforceable remedies and reparations, including compensation and reimbursement by the perpetrators, of legal costs resulting from abusive or vexatious proceedings;
28. Calls on the Member States to provide targeted support enabling persons targeted by TNR to continue their professional and civic activities, and to ensure effective and timely protection for those who choose to publicly document or report abuses; welcomes, in this respect, the EU anti-SLAPP directive; is of the opinion that similar measures should be taken to protect academic freedom from external pressure;
29. Calls on law-enforcement and security authorities to establish sustained outreach and trusted communication channels with communities affected by TNR and community liaison structures, in order to raise awareness, facilitate safe reporting and improve understanding of evolving TNR patterns, including conduct falling below criminal thresholds;
30. Calls for the EU and its Member States to recognise and support affected individuals and communities as key first responders; recognises the role of exiled journalists as key allies in countering authoritarian propaganda and foreign information manipulation and interference; calls on the Commission to operationalise the EU Civil Society Strategy, and encourages better cooperation and information-sharing between civil society and EU institutions and Member States;
31. Calls on the EEAS to update the EU action plan on human rights and democracy and the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders to explicitly address TNR, including protection and support for human rights defenders in exile and diaspora communities;
32. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure predictable funding for such support for victims, including under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI), Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme (CERV) and Horizon Europe;
Preventing and responding to specific forms of transnational repression
Physical TNR
33. Calls on the Member States and the Commission to develop new or adapt existing mechanisms to address the cross-border nature of physical TNR, including surveillance, coercion, assaults, and attempted abductions, to ensure such acts are systematically identified, investigated, and treated as state-linked repression rather than isolated criminal offences;
Digital and technology-enabled TNR
34. Calls for the EU and its Member States to recognise, prevent and counter digital forms of TNR such as censorship, disinformation, smear campaigns, online harassment and intimidation, facilitated by mechanisms enabled by online platforms, including engagement-based recommender systems, fake accounts and bot networks; stresses the need to recognise the specific challenge of gender-based digital TNR and the particular consequences of this type of repression for women targeted by TNR; calls on the Commission and Member States to take TNR into consideration within the enforcement of the existing framework of relevant EU legislation, including the Digital Services Act, the AI Act, and the Dual-Use Regulation, to ensure robust enforcement, stringent export controls, and accountability mechanisms;
35. Urges digital platforms to take effective action to mitigate and address digital TNR threats; calls on the Commission to assess whether digital TNR fits the criteria for inclusion under activities that have negative effects on ‘fundamental rights’ as defined by the Digital Services Act; calls on the Commission to pay particular attention to the impact of TNR in the forthcoming revisions of the guidelines in relation to risk assessment and mitigation measures applicable to very large online platforms, including by investigating the systemic risks posed by platforms such as WeChat and TikTok;
36. Expresses grave concern about the use of AI by non-EU countries and their proxies as a tool of TNR, including through AI-enabled digital surveillance, deployment of spyware, phishing and hacking attacks, doxxing, automated online harassment and coordinated disinformation campaigns on social media; calls on the Commission’s AI Office to further assess the impact of AI on TNR and to propose concrete safeguards to prevent the misuse of AI systems in ways that enable surveillance, coercion or repression across borders;
37. Highlights that the right to secure and private communication is fundamental; strongly condemns the use of spyware and surveillance technologies by non-EU countries and their proxies against individuals in the EU; notes with concern documented cases involving private companies developing and exporting advanced spyware and digital surveillance tools used to commit TNR;
38. Recalls the report by its PEGA Committee (Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware), which contained recommendations on combating the illegal use of spyware, in particular intrusive spyware; laments that the Commission, to this date, has not taken the recommendations on board, even though issues prevail; calls, in that context, on Member States and the Commission to implement the recommendations of Parliament’s PEGA Committee, and to strengthen safeguards against spyware proliferation and abuse, and counter deficiencies in national legislation through better enforcement of EU legislation such as the Anti-Money Laundering Directive, procurement rules, and the Dual-Use Regulation; calls for the EU and the Member States to ensure strict oversight of spyware markets and effective accountability mechanisms and the criminalisation of unlawful data collection carried out on behalf of foreign states in violation of EU law;
39. Calls for holding technology companies and other private actors accountable where they facilitate TNR, including by failing to mitigate risks to the fundamental rights of individuals residing in the EU, particularly regarding the use of these apps for state-sponsored surveillance, the censorship of political speech, and the facilitation of TNR against diaspora communities; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that very large online platforms and search engines apply human-rights-based content moderation; calls on these platforms to establish rapid response mechanisms for individuals at risk, including priority reporting channels, timely human review, safeguards against arbitrary content removal, and effective responses to doxxing, account takeovers and coordinated online harassment;
Coercion-by-proxy and family-based repression
40. Recognises reprisals against family members of exiled individuals, whether occurring within the EU or in non-EU countries, as a distinct and serious form of TNR; calls for family-targeted intimidation, detention, property confiscation, travel bans and similar practices to be systematically addressed within EU monitoring, sanctions and diplomatic response frameworks;
41. Stresses that family reunification and other protective pathways reduce exposure to coercion-by-proxy;
Addressing the structures that enable transnational repression
42. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to identify, assess and mitigate structural vulnerabilities in EU and national administrative, legal and financial systems that may be exploited for TNR, including in consular services;
43. Encourages the EU institutions and the Member States to take measures to avoid the risk of their structures being abused by perpetrators of TNR, which could include the introduction of risk-aware safeguards, alternative procedures where necessary, and enhanced oversight of legal, administrative and financial infrastructure, including fundamental rights impact assessments, residency-by-investment schemes and anti-money-laundering frameworks, in order to prevent misuse by perpetrators and ensure accountability;
44. Urges Member States to rigorously vet – and where appropriate revoke – investment-linked residence permits and similar ‘golden visa’ arrangements for persons credibly linked to regimes or networks known to engage in TNR, in order to prevent perpetrators and enablers from acquiring EU residency rights that facilitate illicit activity;
Abuse of international cooperation mechanisms
45. Calls on the Member States to remain vigilant and refuse, document and report informal, coercive or extralegal requests from foreign authorities to surveil, detain, restrict, intimidate or hand over exiles or members of diaspora communities, including when such requests are conveyed through diplomatic channels; calls, in this context, for enhanced scrutiny involving persons at risk of TNR; further calls on Member States to refrain from extraditing victims or potential victims of TNR and to ensure their protection within the EU;
46. Calls on the Member States to ensure that law-enforcement, judicial and other relevant authorities receiving Interpol data and implementing bilateral cooperation agreements with countries suspected of TNR are properly trained to identify and assess risks of abuse;
47. Stresses that addressing Interpol abuse requires affirming in domestic law and operational guidance that Interpol notices and diffusions are not subject to the same scrutiny as arrest warrants before they are issued and should not be treated as equivalent to arrest warrants; stresses that the conditions and assessments for Interpol corrective measures should be reviewed in the context of countering TNR;
48. Calls on the Commission to establish an EU-level appeal mechanism for abusive Interpol Red Notices, consider suspending cooperation in cases where due-process concerns exist or in-absentia verdicts are used, and withhold recognition or assistance for requests originating from perpetrator states until judicial independence is restored;
49. Calls on the Member States to push within Interpol for the publication, on an annual basis, of detailed statistics for each type of notice and diffusion, broken down by issuing state and indicating the number and reasons for approvals, refusals and deletions;
50. Calls for adequate reforms and resources to be put in place to provide long-term solutions that prevent politically motivated Red Notices and diffusion orders for arrest, including setting benchmarks preventing misuse of the Interpol notice system and enhanced scrutiny of governments with a poor human rights or TNR record;
Financial and administrative instruments of repression
51. Calls on EU financial regulators and relevant supervisory authorities to recognise that compliance with FATF AML/CFT and cybersecurity frameworks may be misused as a tool for TNR to target civil society and their donors, journalists and diaspora communities, business people and their entities, associates and individuals; calls on Member States’ law enforcement and judiciaries to cooperate with financial regulators to help prevent and address abuses of financial systems and travel databases used to facilitate TNR;
52. Calls on EU financial regulators, including the AMLA, to develop safeguards to prevent such manipulation, including pre-freeze verifications, and appropriate screening and data protection measures;
53. Calls on EU financial regulators to develop victim-centred redress mechanisms to remedy financial manipulation and long-term harm, including public correction mechanisms; calls for increased coordination between financial regulators, entities and relevant supervisory authorities with the relevant EU bodies addressing TNR;
54. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to establish mechanisms ensuring guaranteed access to basic banking services to individuals credibly at risk of TNR and emergency financial continuity or liquidity mechanisms where repression results in sudden asset freezes;
55. Calls on Financial Intelligence Units to identify and systematically analyse TNR-linked financial patterns and report relevant findings to national and EU TNR coordination hubs;
56. Calls on the Member States to ensure specialised training for law-enforcement, judicial, financial and cybersecurity authorities on identifying TNR-linked financial patterns, including the misuse of FATF, Interpol and travel database tools;
57. Calls on the Member States to provide guidance to financial institutions, ensure that their national financial regulators have the mandate to share the data available to them with law enforcement and judiciaries, and establish an effective national complaint and review mechanism;
Protecting asylum, migration and consular services from being abused by perpetrators of TNR
58. Highlights the denial of consular services as a form of TNR that can be linked to intimidation, surveillance or coercion; condemns the use of mobility controls by perpetrator states, including the revocation of passports, denial of consular services and other restrictions on movement;
59. Calls on the Commission to issue official guidelines on countering consular coercion, ensuring that persons targeted by TNR do not need to visit their national embassies or consulates abroad;
60. Invites the Member States to ensure that the individual circumstances of applicants who are victims of TNR are properly addressed; calls on the Member States and other Schengen area countries to use the EU’s Visa Code and Handbook consistently and flexibly to address protection needs for persons targeted by TNR;
Strengthening deterrence and accountability
61. Stresses the need to increase the cost of TNR and strengthen deterrence, including through effective investigation and prosecution of perpetrators and enablers; calls on the Member States to establish clear legal liability for individuals and entities who knowingly facilitate or profit from acts of TNR on behalf of foreign states; calls furthermore for the effective implementation of corporate human rights due diligence obligations, including under the Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence; believes that an adequate measure to counter the rising phenomenon of TNR perpetrated by authoritarian regimes against individuals residing in the EU is through demonstrating that the EU can be a deterring force; therefore, urges the EU to continue to increase its own defence capabilities and reduce dependencies;
62. Calls on the Member States to strengthen preventive and accountability measures, including by vetting diplomats, official staff of the countries involved, interpreters, lobbyists’ representatives and other relevant actors for involvement in TNR prior to accreditation, and to impose appropriate measures — including expulsions, entry bans or suspension of accreditation – against individuals responsible for such acts; further calls on the Member States to share relevant information with partner countries to prevent re-accreditation or continued abuse; expresses the need to acknowledge the risks posed by TNR infiltration among democratic opposition groups abroad and to undertake coordinated, collective measures to prevent and counter such activities;
63. Calls for the EU and its Member States to monitor abusive use of judicial or law-enforcement mechanisms by perpetrator state or state-linked actors; calls for the EU and its Member States to, upon sufficient evidence, consider imposing cautionary measures on such states;
64. Calls on the Member States to ensure that their legal frameworks prohibit interference with rights protected under the European Convention on Human Rights, including when such actions are carried out on behalf of a foreign power, and that this involvement is considered an aggravating factor in sentencing for related offences;
65. Calls on the Council to explore the possibility of identifying TNR as a serious crime with a cross-border dimension in accordance with Article 83 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, with a view to establishing common EU rules on definitions and sanctions where appropriate; calls on the Commission to initiate legislation to harmonise the prohibition of foreign surveillance activities within the EU, in particular those activities falling under TNR;
66. Calls on law enforcement and judiciaries to investigate and prosecute acts of TNR that amount to crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute;
67. Calls on the Member States, in cooperation with the Commission and the EEAS, to integrate TNR risks into EU travel information and consular guidance, including through targeted travel advisories for countries where credible evidence indicates the involvement of state authorities or proxies in TNR;
68. Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that individuals and entities engaging in TNR are systematically considered for listing under the EU global human rights sanctions regime (EU Magnitsky Act), and to explicitly include TNR as grounds for designation under the forthcoming EU sanctions regime on transnational organised crime;
69. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase investment in forensic, financial and digital investigations related to TNR to identify, attribute and document TNR, and to support legal proceedings brought by victims;
70. Calls on the Member States to prioritise the investigation and dismantling of TNR networks, including proxy actors and links to organised crime, through enhanced coordination between security, judicial and financial authorities;
Positioning the European Union as a global leader in countering transnational repression
71. Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to systematically integrate countering TNR into EU external action, including political and human rights dialogues, engagement with non-EU countries and candidate countries, and public diplomacy, and to raise concerns publicly; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to include conditions preventing the abuse of multilateral and bilateral cooperation agreements in criminal matters for TNR in international agreements and cooperation frameworks, including the possibility of suspension;
72. Calls for the EU and its Member States to raise TNR cases, including coercion-by-proxy and family-based repression in bilateral relations with perpetrator states, and to call for the cessation of such practices;
73. Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to strengthen strategic communication on TNR, explicitly recognising it as a global threat, strongly condemning perpetrators, and signalling EU support for targeted individuals;
74. Calls on the EEAS to include TNR explicitly within the mandate of the EU Special Representative for Human Rights and to ensure that it is addressed in EU human rights reporting;
75. Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to systematically consider TNR risks when preparing funding, cooperation and partnership agreements with non-EU countries;
76. Calls on the Commission to include TNR as a category in its Rule of Law Reports and enlargement reports;
77. Calls on the Commission to make TNR a priority in the implementation of the European Democracy Shield, especially for the European Centre for Democratic Resilience;
78. Calls on future Council Presidencies to prioritise TNR on the EU agenda, facilitate exchanges of best practice among Member States, and work towards a Council communication setting out a coherent EU approach to countering TNR;
79. Welcomes the G7 Leaders’ Statement on TNR and calls on the Council and the Commission to further strengthen coordination at G7, Council of Europe, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and UN level, including through sustained engagement at the UN Human Rights Council, and support for the work of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; calls, furthermore, for systematic TNR practices by perpetrator states to be taken into consideration when evaluating these countries involvement with, and initiatives within, intergovernmental bodies;
80. Calls on the Member States to advocate for a Council of Europe convention on TNR;
81. Strongly believes that the EU should coordinate closely with like-minded partners, including through exchanges of best practice on legislation, victim protection, attribution and sanctions against proxy networks;
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82. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.