What changed

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

P10_TA(2026)0222

on the 2025 Commission report on Georgia

(2025/2257(INI))

Committee on Foreign Affairs

PE782.288

European Parliament resolution of 17 June 2026 on the 2025 Commission report on Georgia (2025/2257(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 4 November 2025 entitled ‘2025 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2025)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Georgia 2025 Report’ (SWD(2025)0757),

– having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part1,part,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/2441 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2025 amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 as regards the revision of the suspension mechanism2,mechanism,

– having regard to Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which requires that all possible measures be taken to ensure Georgia’s full integration into the EU and NATO,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

– having regard to its resolution of 11 March 2026 on the EU enlargement strategy3,strategy,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

W. whereas increasing pressure on the education system and attempts to undermine the autonomy of universities as a result of the ‘one city, one faculty’ initiative by Georgian Dream risk weakening one of the key institutional pillars supporting democratic debate, civic engagement and Georgia’s European integration trajectory and risk curtailing access to education; whereas attacks against civil society, independent media and the academic sector demonstrate a broader pattern of pressure on freedom of expression and academic freedom in Georgia;

X. whereas the extraction of manganese in Georgia for export to the EU has caused landslides, polluted the surrounding areas and violated labour rights in the mining region of Chiatura; whereas environmental organisations claim that waste is being discharged directly into the Kvirila River; whereas those protesting against manganese mining have reported cases of surveillance, intimidation and detention by the Georgian authorities; whereas the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive4Directive requires European companies to ensure respect for human rights, good working conditions and regard for the environment in their supply chains;

Y. whereas some of Georgia’s internationally recognised territories remain under occupation; whereas Russia recognised Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia as independent states in 2008 and still has thousands of soldiers in the area, in breach of international law; whereas Russia is continuing its ‘borderisation’ policy, namely the erection of physical barriers along the administrative borders of the regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia, in breach of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; whereas the European Court of Human Rights has found, furthermore, that this has led to human rights violations such as restrictions on the freedom of movement, limited access to property or land, and the separation of family members;

39. Welcomes the Commission’s decision to suspend visa-free travel for holders of Georgian diplomatic, service and official passports, which has applied since 6 March 2026 across all EU Member States under the revised and more flexible visa suspension mechanism that entered into force on 30 December 2025, as a direct consequence of the Georgian Dream regime’s actions in breach of fundamental values; encourages the Member States to carry out a thorough screening, by conducting an interview and requesting supporting documents from these visa applicants, and refuse visas if there are any doubts about the reliability of the information provided by them; regrets that EU-wide visa bans for Georgian officials responsible for serious human rights violations, democratic backsliding and repression have not been possible due to opposition from the Hungarian and Slovak Governments; notes that the eighth visa suspension mechanism report highlights Georgia’s lack of compliance with key benchmarks and previous recommendations; warns that continued inaction by the Georgian authorities could lead to the suspension of visa-free travel for the entire population, for which Georgian Dream would be fully responsible; calls on the Commission to establish a mechanism whereby civil society activists, journalists and students may continue to have visa-free access to the EU, and to increase direct support for people-to-people exchange programmes such as Erasmus +, Horizon Europe, the European Solidarity Corps and Creative Europe;

40. Highlights that the lack of thorough academic research, historical education and public awareness concerning the Soviet occupation and its long-term consequences enables the spread of historical manipulation and disinformation campaigns, which the Russian Federation exploits to undermine the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Georgian society; stresses, therefore, the importance of academic research, documentation and the dissemination of knowledge about Georgia’s history under Soviet occupation, including the political repression, mass executions and the history of resistance to Soviet-Russian occupation, as well as the restoration of these events to the collective memory; expresses regret that, in recent years, with at least the passive acquiescence of the authorities, efforts to relativise communist crimes and reverse the process of de-Stalinisation have been observed; emphasises, in this regard, the important role of independent historians, researchers and civil society organisations, such as SovLab, in studying the Soviet occupation, its political, legal and moral consequences, as well as in identifying burial sites of victims of communist terror and ensuring their identification and dignified commemoration; encourages relevant institutions in the Member States engaged in documenting the consequences of Soviet occupation, communist crimes and other totalitarian regimes, to deepen cooperation with their Georgian counterparts, support joint research projects, and participate in educational programmes and initiatives aimed at uncovering, documenting and disseminating knowledge about this chapter of Georgia’s history; expresses concern about the systematic obstruction of access to archives related to repression and crimes committed during the period of Soviet occupation; calls on the Georgian authorities to ensure full, transparent and non-discriminatory access to archives relating to the Soviet period for scholars, researchers and civil society organisations;

Alignment on foreign and security policy matters

40.41. Regrets that the level of Georgia’s alignment with statements by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and with Council decisions on sanctions has further decreased from 53 % in 2024 to 40 %, demonstrating its lack of commitment to European integration; is particularly disappointed that Georgia did not systematically align with international and EU initiatives in support of Ukraine, including on resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly, the UN Human Rights Council and the Council of Europe, and has instead strengthened its relations with Russia and supported Russian narratives that aim to shift responsibility for the war of aggression and the crimes committed by Russia;

41.42. Is extremely grateful for the strong solidarity the Georgian people have shown towards Ukraine during Russia’s war of aggression, which reflects widespread public opposition to Russian imperialist policies, the country’s own experience of Russian military aggression, and the strong will of the people to preserve their independence and remain outside Moscow’s sphere of influence; points out that many Georgian volunteers have fought alongside the Ukrainian armed forces, in particular in the Georgian Legion, and that Georgian civil society has participated in humanitarian aid campaigns in support of Ukraine;

42.43. Notes that Georgia has still not aligned with the vast majority of sanctions against Russia, Belarus and Iran; calls on the Georgian authorities to adopt verifiable measures and strengthen cooperation and customs monitoring to prevent the territory of Georgia and/or legal entities registered in Georgia from being used to circumvent EU restrictive measures; considers the current level of alignment and enforcement efforts to be manifestly insufficient and incompatible with the responsibilities of an EU candidate country; stresses that more decisive action is urgently required, including full alignment with EU restrictive measures, effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and transparent cooperation with EU institutions to prevent sanctions evasion, including concerning dual-use goods, oil exports and financial flows linked to Russian and Iranian entities; warns that continued failure to align with the EU’s foreign policy and sanctions regime will have direct consequences for Georgia’s EU accession process; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue closely monitoring Georgia’s compliance with the EU sanctions regime, including risks of sanctions circumvention through Georgian territory or entities registered in Georgia;

43.44. Calls for the EU and its Member States to take urgent and decisive action to halt the systematic circumvention of EU sanctions by Russia facilitated by the Georgian authorities, including by establishing a dedicated EU monitoring mechanism to track trade flows of high-priority dual-use goods and aviation components transiting through Georgia; calls, furthermore, on the Georgian authorities to fully cooperate with these efforts and to publish regular, transparent reports on such trade flows in order to strengthen customs enforcement and prevent further sanctions evasion;

44.45. Is concerned by the potential use of Georgian ports, refining infrastructure and oil-handling facilities to facilitate the re-export or blending of Russian petroleum products in order to circumvent international sanctions regimes; expresses serious concern over reports that Russian crude oil is being shipped to Georgia’s newly built and partially state-financed Kulevi refinery on the Black Sea coast; calls on the Georgian authorities to immediately halt and prevent any such activities and to ensure that Georgian infrastructure is not used to facilitate the circumvention of EU sanctions on Russia; notes that the Kulevi Oil Terminal was not included in the 20th EU sanctions package against Russia based on the commitments from the Georgian authorities and the terminal’s operator that they would strictly comply with EU sanctions; calls for its inclusion in future sanctions if the Georgian authorities and the terminal’s operators do not strictly comply with EU sanctions; calls for enhanced cooperation between the EU and international partners to ensure the full enforcement of restrictive measures;

45.46. Calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Anti-Money Laundering Authority, to assess Georgia’s legal and regulatory framework, including provisions of the Georgian Tax Code that may facilitate the use of offshore-registered companies and obscure beneficial ownership, thereby enabling sanctions circumvention and money laundering; calls for the enhanced monitoring and scrutiny of companies registered in Georgia that are owned or controlled by Russian citizens or entities, particularly those established since February 2022; calls on the Georgian authorities to establish an asset recovery office, an asset management office and a register of ultimate beneficial owners in order to strengthen anti-money laundering safeguards and reduce the risk of sanctions circumvention;

46.47. Notes that, having abandoned the path of Euro-Atlantic integration, Georgian Dream is making a strategic turn towards cooperation with China, Russia and Iran, as confirmed in numerous reports; stresses that this reorientation demonstrates a disregard for Georgia’s constitutional commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration and the clear and consistently expressed will of Georgian society; expresses outrage that, instead of addressing credible findings on the growing influence of authoritarian powers, investigations have been launched against the authors of such reports, including Hudson Institute researcher Giorgi Kandelaki and Tinatin Khidasheli;

47.48. Expresses its concern over the involvement of Chinese state-owned enterprises in strategic projects such as the Anaklia Deep Sea Port, which was originally developed with Western partners and intended to strengthen East–West connectivity independent of Russian and Chinese influence; reminds the Georgian authorities that the success of the Middle Corridor is linked to Georgia’s adherence to the rule of law and that Global Gateway investments require Georgia to be a stable and transparent partner;

48.49. Notes initiatives for strategic connectivity projects in the Black Sea region, including the Black Sea Digital Connectivity Submarine Cable and the Black Sea Submarine Electricity Cable, which could enhance energy and digital links between the EU and the South Caucasus;

49.50. Notes that the Georgian Orthodox Church remains an influential institution in Georgian society and plays an important role in shaping public discourse; expresses concerns regarding the use of religious networks by Russia as channels for disinformation and influence operations across Georgia, with the aim of undermining pro-European orientation and democratic resilience; recalls that some clerics within Georgia have resisted such instrumentalisation and have spoken out against both Russian influence and the policies of the Georgian Dream regime; underlines that the Georgian Orthodox diocese and communities are also present in the EU, which highlights the need for vigilance and resilience against transnational disinformation efforts;

50.51. Notes with particular concern Iran’s growing influence in the country, in particular through religious and educational institutions and youth mobilisation, and through economic structures that effectively enable Iran to evade sanctions; is further concerned by the growing influence of economic actors linked to the Iranian regime operating in Georgia; underscores that such actors may be used for financial sanctions circumvention, money laundering and the illicit export of Iranian goods, benefiting actors connected to both the Iranian and the Georgian Dream regimes via corruption and skewed public tenders;

51.52. Considers that Georgia should play a constructive role in facilitating Armenia’s access to international maritime trade routes, thereby contributing to regional connectivity, economic resilience and stability in the South Caucasus;

52.53. Reiterates its unwavering support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia; strongly condemns Russia’s ongoing occupation of Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia and the continued ‘borderisation’ process, which constitutes a violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; urges the Georgian Government to maintain a clear and consistent position on Russian aggression; roundly condemns Russia’s efforts to integrate the occupied territories politically, militarily and economically into the Russian Federation; notes with deep concern the continued illegal detentions and targeting of ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, including women and young people, on fabricated charges, such as espionage or the possession of a Georgian passport; condemns these practices as serious human rights violations contributing to intimidation, discrimination and the forced displacement of the Georgian population; strongly condemns the ongoing development of the Russian naval base in Ochamchire, which is not just a violation of territorial integrity but a direct threat to the security of the entire Black Sea basin and Georgia’s own maritime trade ambitions; reiterates its call for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Russian forces from the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia;

53.54. Calls for targeted restrictive measures against those responsible for human rights violations in the occupied territories building on precedents such as the 2018 ‘Otkhozoria–Tatunashvili List’;

54.55. Reiterates the importance of the work of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) on conflict resolution, human rights monitoring and support for affected communities; strongly condemns the Russian Federation’s continued obstruction of the EUMM’s access to the occupied regions of Georgia, as well as past acts of intimidation against EUMM monitors, including unlawful detentions and other incidents involving threats and interference with the EUMM’s work; considers that the visible and public implementation of the EUMM’s mandate should be further strengthened through increased support and additional personnel and should be more prominently communicated, as it significantly contributes to the EU’s engagement in the region and exposes Russia’s aggressive tactics, which, since the 2008 war against Georgia, have continued to bring death, suffering and instability to the region;

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55.56. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the President of Georgia Salome Zourabichvili and the de facto authorities of Georgia.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

This is the second report on Georgia as an EU candidate country, taking into account the 2025 Commission report on Georgia. The report focuses the European Parliament’s main concerns regarding the state of democracy, rule of law and the European integration of Georgia.

The report reflects the fact that democratic backsliding in Georgia further intensified since the last report. There has been backsliding in the implementation of all nine priorities, which were the condition for granting Georgia candidate status. The ruling Georgian Dream party continues its orchestrated and systematic campaign against the EU, its officials and diplomats, using manipulative narratives, disinformation and conspiracy theories. Political opponents have been imprisoned or face threats and physical attacks. Activities of Georgia’s civil society and independent media are being stifled with increasingly repressive legislation, particularly the most recent amendments to the Law on Grants, which criminalise receiving foreign funding without prior government approval. Hundreds of civil society activists have faced physical violence and intimidation, while dozens have been arrested and imprisoned on political grounds.

The report supports targeted EU and Member State sanctions against Georgian Dream leadership and key officials, welcomes the activation of the OSCE Moscow Mechanism to assess compliance with Georgia’s democratic commitments, and notes the EU’s suspension of visa-free travel for holders of Georgian diplomatic and official passports.

The diminishing alignment with statements by the High Representative on behalf of the EU and Council decisions on sanctions and increasing cooperation with China, Russia and Iran further confirm Georgia’s turn away from its path of Euro-Atlantic integration.

In this negative environment, it is more than ever important to support the Georgian people, who continue their struggle for a European and democratic Georgia.

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

The rapporteur declares under her exclusive responsibility that she did not include in her report input from interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register1, or from representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies, to be listed in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

25.4.2026

MINORITY POSITION

pursuant to Rule 56(4) of the Rules of Procedure

on behalf of the ESN Group on the 2025 Commission report on Georgia

A. Finding:

We firmly reject this report. It extends and intensifies the political overreach already present in last year’s text, adding elements that further violate fundamental principles of international law and the EU’s own legal order.

B. Reasoning:

We reject:

The designation of Georgia’s democratically elected government as an “authoritarian regime” and the consequent call to suspend all diplomatic engagement — a manifest violation of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states under Article 2(7) of the UN Charter;

The call for sanctions against named individuals without prior judicial determination of individual responsibility, and the implicit endorsement of Member States circumventing the unanimity requirement of Article 31(1) TEU, thereby undermining the Union’s own constitutional framework;

The threat to suspend visa-free travel for the entire Georgian population, which constitutes a form of collective punishment incompatible with EU fundamental rights standards;

The characterisation of Georgia’s foreign policy diversification as a strategic betrayal, which disregards every state’s sovereign right to determine its own international partnerships.

This report instrumentalises the enlargement process as a tool of political coercion. We oppose its adoption.

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Date adopted

5.5.2026

Result of final vote

+ : 53

- : 14

0 : 2

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

53

+

ECR

Alberico Gambino, Rihards Kols, Jaak Madison, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Claudiu-Richard Târziu, Sebastian Tynkkynen

PPE

Mika Aaltola, Fredis Beleris, Krzysztof Brejza, Sebastião Bugalho, Loucas Fourlas, Michael Gahler, Christophe Gomart, Rasa Jukneviciene, Lukasz Kohut, Ondrej Kolár, Andrey Kovatchev, David McAllister, Francisco José Millán Mon, Davor Ivo Stier, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Riho Terras, Matej Tonin, Loránt Vincze, Isabel Wiseler-Lima

Renew

Petras Austrevicius, Dan Barna, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Bernard Guetta, Ivars Ijabs, Moritz Körner, Marjan Sarec, Hilde Vautmans

S&D

Robert Biedron, Biljana Borzan, Tobias Cremer, Sandra Gómez López, Giorgio Gori, Costas Mavrides, Sven Mikser, Matjaz Nemec, Thijs Reuten, Chloé Ridel, Sandro Ruotolo, Andreas Schieder, Marta Temido, Kathleen Van Brempt, Nicola Zingaretti

Verts/ALE

Leoluca Orlando, Vladimir Prebilic, Mounir Satouri, Villy Søvndal, Thomas Waitz

14

-

ESN

Tomasz Froelich, Alexander Sell, Stanislav Stoyanov

NI

Grzegorz Braun, Kostas Papadakis

PfE

Mieke Andriese, Susanna Ceccardi, Julie Rechagneux, Silvia Sardone, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Annamária Vicsek

The Left

Marc Botenga, Danilo Della Valle, Giorgos Georgiou

2

0

ECR

Laurence Trochu

PfE

Jaroslav Bzoch

Key:

+ : in favour

- : against

0 : abstentions