What changed

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

P10_TA(2026)0012

on the implementationImplementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2025

(2025/2164(INI))

Committee on Foreign Affairs

PE776.921

European Parliament resolution of 21 January 2026 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2025 (2025/2164(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the report of 25 June 2025 by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy Report – Our Priorities in 2025’,

– having regard to the European Council Conclusions of 18 December 2025,

– having regard to its resolution of 8 May 2025 on the return of Ukrainian children forcibly transferred and deported by Russia,

– having regard to the Kiruna Declaration of 15 May 2013,

– having regard to the US National Security Strategy, published in December 2025,

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2600 of 12 December 2025 on emergency measures addressing the serious economic difficulties caused by Russia’s actions in the context of the war of aggression against Ukraine,

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security,

B. whereas over the past year, wars and armed conflicts, including direct confrontations and rising tensions as well as hybrid attacks, have affected almost every continent; whereas the intensifying geopolitical and economic confrontation constitutes a factor conducive to the re-escalation of frozen conflicts and to the outbreak of new ones; whereas the international organisations established to prevent such tensions from arising have encountered challenges in their endeavours to fulfil their mandates, making their reform urgent and indispensable and requiring greater collective engagement among democracies in strengthening defence;

C. whereas there is an urgent need to continue to defend and strengthen the rules-based international order and its institutions, the universal norms, values and principles of the UN Charter such as human rights and international justice, multilateralism, and the Helsinki Final Act, in particular as regards the non-violation of international borders;borders and the prohibition of the use of force; whereas the EU is, by nature, a promoter of the multilateral interdependence of different institutional actors;

D. whereas certain historic and other emerging powers exhibit complex behaviours ranging from close cooperation to sectoral confrontation and coercion; whereas Russia, which is waging an unlawful and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, plays the leading role in undermining the rules-based international order; whereas Russia is deliberately prolonging its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine with the aim of exhausting Ukraine and destabilising the EU and NATO; whereas the protection of the entire eastern flank of the EU is essential for the stability, security and resilience of the EU as a whole; whereas the currently fragmented geopolitical climate compels the EU to adapt and better defend its interests and those of its Member States;

E. whereas the EU engages with transatlantic partners and like-minded countries to bolster its economic security;

F. whereas the EU and the UK, in their Joint Statement of 19 May 2025, assume a shared commitment to the stability of the Western Balkans; whereas the EU and the UK should define concrete areas of cooperation in the region, in particular to ensure respect for the power-sharing principle of the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement;

F. whereas the Dayton-Paris Agreement brought an end to the devastating war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 30 years ago; whereas the full implementation of its principles is crucial;

G. whereas certain international actors, most notably authoritarian states, are jeopardising European security and stability by employing a vast set of hybrid tactics, notably the sabotage of critical infrastructure and interference in the democratic functioning of our societies as well as fully fledged security threats such as drone incursions and attacks on rail networks; whereas addressing such threats forms part of the EU’s CFSP, necessitating a credible, first-hand intelligence information system on external threats that contributes to the EU’s ability to respond rapidly and effectively, as well as to safeguard its interests abroad;

G. whereas the EU and the UK, in their Joint Statement of 19 May 2025, assume a shared commitment to the stability of the Western Balkans; whereas the EU and the UK should define concrete areas of cooperation in the region, in particular to ensure respect for the power-sharing principle of the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement;

H. whereas enlargement represents a geostrategic investment in long-term peace, democracy, stability, security, climate protection and prosperity across the continent, in particular in the face of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the preparation for enlargement requires internal EU reforms and whereas the EU should conduct the enlargement process in parallel with the institutional and decision-making reforms necessary to safeguard the EU’s integration capacity; whereas a credible enlargement policy strengthens the EU’s geopolitical influence and resilience; whereas compliance with the fundamental principles of the Union and respect for international law is a prerequisite for accession to the EU;

H. whereas certain international actors, most notably authoritarian states, are jeopardising European security and stability by employing a vast set of hybrid tactics, notably the sabotage of critical infrastructure and interference in the democratic functioning of our societies as well as fully fledged security threats such as drone incursions and attacks on rail networks; whereas addressing such threats forms part of the EU’s CFSP, necessitating a credible, first-hand intelligence information system on external threats that contributes to the EU’s ability to respond rapidly and effectively, as well as to safeguard its interests abroad;

I. whereas the EU continues to promote its own autonomous European diplomacy in all areas, including public, cultural, economic, climate, artificial intelligence, digital and cyber diplomacy; whereas achieving an EU diplomatic service shaped by a common diplomatic culture nurtured from a predominantly EU perspective is an essential step in this regard; whereas the European Diplomatic Academy contributes to this objective;

I. whereas enlargement represents a geostrategic investment in long-term peace, democracy, stability, security, climate protection and prosperity across the continent, in particular in the face of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the preparation for enlargement requires internal EU reforms and whereas the EU should conduct the enlargement process in parallel with the institutional and decision-making reforms necessary to safeguard the EU’s integration capacity; whereas a credible enlargement policy strengthens the EU’s geopolitical influence and resilience; whereas compliance with the fundamental principles of the Union and respect for international law is a prerequisite for accession to the EU;

J. whereas the EU prioritises partnerships with like-minded democracies; whereas the conclusion of new global partnerships is based on political due diligence in order to avoid dependencies that expose the EU to coercion and to guarantee that cooperation does not undermine human rights, sustainable development or EU solidarity; whereas sectoral cooperation cannot be pursued to the detriment of EU fundamental values; whereas divisions within the EU or the transatlantic alliance, as well as with our strategic partners, make us all weaker, and benefit our opponents, rivals and competitors;

J. whereas the EU continues to promote its own autonomous European diplomacy in all areas, including public, cultural, economic, climate, artificial intelligence, digital and cyber diplomacy; whereas achieving an EU diplomatic service shaped by a common diplomatic culture nurtured from a predominantly EU perspective is an essential step in this regard; whereas the European Diplomatic Academy contributes to this objective;

K. whereas the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) associated with the EU share close constitutional, historical and cultural ties with the Member States; whereas they provide the EU with a unique global presence and geostrategic advantages, particularly in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans, as well as in the Arctic and Antarctica; whereas the CFSP should strengthen the structured cooperation with the OCTs in areas such as security, strategic commercial routes, resilience to climate change, maritime security and critical raw materials, thereby ensuring that the OCTs are more closely integrated into the Union’s external action priorities;

K. whereas the EU prioritises partnerships with like-minded democracies; whereas the conclusion of new global partnerships is based on political due diligence in order to avoid dependencies that expose the EU to coercion and to guarantee that cooperation does not undermine human rights, sustainable development or EU solidarity; whereas sectoral cooperation cannot be pursued to the detriment of EU fundamental values; whereas divisions within the EU or the transatlantic alliance, as well as with our strategic partners, make us all weaker, and benefit our opponents, rivals and competitors;

L. whereas the space for civil society is shrinking worldwide and human rights defenders and civil society organisations are increasingly at risk of attacks and threats from state and non-state actors;

L. whereas, compared to the 2021 version, the US National Security Strategy (NSS) of 4 December 2025 reflects a radical shift in emphasis, as it stops short of a substantive assessment of the challenges posed by actors such as Russia and China, and includes critical references to alleged democratic shortcomings in certain EU Member States; whereas the NSS frames global developments largely in terms of economic and strategic interests, revealing a more transactional approach to traditional allies and thus questioning the principles that have underpinned US foreign policy for decades; whereas the NSS was publicly welcomed by the Kremlin’s spokesperson and met with concern in several EU capitals, raising questions about its impact on transatlantic unity and the credibility of collective deterrence;

M whereas vibrant civil societies worldwide play an essential role in advancing human rights, democracy and pluralism, as well as in promoting good governance and social progress;

M. whereas the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) associated with the EU share close constitutional, historical and cultural ties with the Member States; whereas they provide the EU with a unique global presence and geostrategic advantages, particularly in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans, as well as in the Arctic and Antarctica; whereas the CFSP should strengthen the structured cooperation with the OCTs in areas such as security, strategic commercial routes, resilience to climate change, maritime security and critical raw materials, thereby ensuring that the OCTs are more closely integrated into the Union’s external action priorities;

N. whereas Parliament recently expressed its unequivocal position on the human rights violations in Cuba and on the state of affairs in Venezuela, in particular, its recognition of Edmundo González Urrutia as the President-elect of Venezuela following the elections of 28 July 2024; whereas it has repeatedly condemned the regime of Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo in Nicaragua;

N. whereas the space for civil society is shrinking worldwide and human rights defenders and civil society organisations are increasingly at risk of attacks and threats from state and non-state actors;

O. whereas on 10 January 2025, Nicolás Maduro claimed a new term in office and illegally maintained his grip on power despite widespread electoral fraud; whereas it recognised Edmundo González Urrutia as the legitimate and democratically elected President of Venezuela and María Corina Machado as the leader of the democratic opposition by awarding them the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought; whereas María Corina Machado was further honoured as the Nobel Peace Prize laureate for 2025;

O. whereas vibrant civil societies worldwide play an essential role in advancing human rights, democracy and pluralism, as well as in promoting good governance and social progress;

P. whereas theParliament principlesrecently ofexpressed its unequivocal position on the UNhuman arerights beingviolations challengedin toCuba anand extenton neverthe seenstate before;of affairs in Venezuela; whereas Parliamentit has repeatedly called oncondemned the internationalregime communityof toDaniel defendOrtega and strengthenRosario theMurillo UN;in Nicaragua;

Q. whereas the multilateral world order has not adequately adapted to the current geopolitical realities; whereas the UN80 Initiative launched by the UN Secretary-General is an indispensable part of the UN reform and would imply ending the veto system in the UN Security Council; whereas the dire financial situation of the UN raises serious concerns; whereas the UN is facing a USD 500 million budget cut and the loss of 20 % of its staff; whereas the UN is facing further significant cuts to its peacekeeping, humanitarian and health agencies following the withdrawal of US financial support; whereas the UN reform process necessitates sufficient financial resources and political support to sustain multilateralism as the basis for global governance;

Q. whereas on 10 January 2025, Nicolás Maduro claimed a new term in office and illegally maintained his grip on power despite widespread electoral fraud; whereas it recognised Edmundo González Urrutia as the legitimate and democratically elected President of Venezuela and María Corina Machado as the leader of the democratic opposition by awarding them the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought; whereas María Corina Machado was further honoured as the Nobel Peace Prize laureate for 2025; whereas recent political developments, including the removal of Nicolás Maduro from power and the beginning of the release of political prisoners, signal a critical moment in Venezuela’s democratic transition; whereas at the same time, the situation remains unstable, with key power structures of the former regime still in place and substantial challenges for democratic consolidation remaining;

R. whereas organised crime, particularly drug trafficking, poses a serious threat to the EU’s security; whereas since 2020, the EU has become the world’s largest market for cocaine; whereas this cocaine comes largely from Latin America and enters the EU chiefly through its Atlantic ports;

R. whereas the principles of the UN are being challenged to an extent never seen before; whereas Parliament has repeatedly called on the international community to defend and strengthen the UN;

S. whereas authoritarian regimes, criminal networks and terrorist groups endanger the health and safety of Europeans through illicit drug and human trafficking, which contributes to regional instability and, in certain cases, amounts to the weaponisation of migration;

S. whereas the multilateral world order has not adequately adapted to the current geopolitical realities; whereas the UN80 Initiative launched by the UN Secretary-General is an indispensable part of the UN reform and would imply ending the veto system in the UN Security Council; whereas the dire financial situation of the UN raises serious concerns; whereas the UN is facing a USD 500 million budget cut and the loss of 20 % of its staff; whereas the UN is facing further significant cuts to its peacekeeping, humanitarian and health agencies following the withdrawal of US financial support; whereas the UN reform process necessitates sufficient financial resources and political support to sustain multilateralism as the basis for global governance;

T. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has seriously undermined European and global security, causing economic uncertainty, food insecurity and high energy prices while destabilising the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood; whereas this aggression is part of a broader strategy pursuing an imperialistic and expansionist agenda, which started with the war in Georgia in 2008; whereas the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, under which Ukraine removed all nuclear weapons from its territory in exchange for security assurances, including from Russia, did not prevent the Russian war of aggression;

T. whereas organised crime, particularly drug trafficking, poses a serious threat to the EU’s security; whereas since 2020, the EU has become the world’s largest market for cocaine; whereas this cocaine comes largely from Latin America and enters the EU chiefly through its Atlantic ports;

U. whereas Russia continues to plunder Ukrainian national heritage; whereas the Russian war of aggression has caused severe and long-lasting damage to the environment in Ukraine; whereas the Russian Federation is conducting intense and deliberate attacks against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure;

U. whereas authoritarian regimes, criminal networks and terrorist groups endanger the health and safety of Europeans through illicit drug and human trafficking, which contributes to regional instability and, in certain cases, amounts to the weaponisation of migration;

V. whereas the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova, the Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights, for the war crime of the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children;

V. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has seriously undermined European and global security, causing economic uncertainty, food insecurity and high energy prices while destabilising the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood; whereas this aggression is part of a broader strategy pursuing an imperialistic and expansionist agenda, which started with the war in Georgia in 2008; whereas the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, under which Ukraine removed all nuclear weapons from its territory in exchange for security assurances, including from Russia, did not prevent the Russian war of aggression;

W. whereas the 9 July 2025 ruling byRussia thecontinues Europeanto Courtplunder ofUkrainian Humannational Rightsheritage; inwhereas the caseRussian ofwar Ukraineof andaggression thehas Netherlandscaused v.severe Russiaand markslong-lasting adamage significantto stepthe forwardenvironment in holdingUkraine; Russiawhereas accountablethe forRussian itsFederation waris ofconducting aggressionintense and the atrocitiesdeliberate itattacks hasagainst committedUkraine’s inenergy Ukraine;infrastructure;

X. whereas the accelerated militarisation of China as well as its strategic partnerships with Russia, North Korea and Iran, could jeopardise the stability not only of Indo-Pacific countries, but also of the entire international community; whereas in recent years and in clear breach of UN Security Council resolutions, North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles with unprecedented frequency, while bolstering its nuclear capabilities in both quality and quantity; whereas the assertive military, political and economic pressure of these authoritarian and dictatorial powers, together with their ongoing and multifaceted assaults on the rules-based international order, constitute some of the most serious security threats to the EU Member States in its history;

X. whereas the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova, the Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights, for the war crime of the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children;

Y. whereas at the 2024 NATO summit in Washington DC, China was referred to as a decisive enabler of Russia’s aggression; whereas China has never formally condemned Russia’s illegal aggression against and invasion of Ukraine; whereas Russia characterised its strategic relations with China as being at an unprecedentedly high level; whereas the People’s Republic of China is the main supporter of Russia in its war of aggression, providing most of the dual-use goods that serve as inputs for Russia’s defence sector, as well as diplomatic, political and economic support, thereby prolonging and enabling the war; whereas Russia seeks to undermine regional stability and European aspirations through coercive and military actions, while China increasingly uses economic leverage and strategic partnerships to influence developments in the EU’s neighbourhoods alongside other actors contributing to such destabilisation;

Y. whereas the 9 July 2025 ruling by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia marks a significant step forward in holding Russia accountable for its war of aggression and the atrocities it has committed in Ukraine;

Z. whereas the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Azerbaijan has further deteriorated over the past year; whereas all orders issued by the International Court of Justice regarding Nagorno-Karabakh should be implemented, including the order of 17 November 2023 indicating provisional measures regarding the safe, unimpeded and expeditious return of people who have fled the region;

Z. whereas the accelerated militarisation of China as well as its strategic partnerships with Russia, North Korea and Iran, could jeopardise the stability not only of Indo-Pacific countries, but also of the entire international community; whereas in recent years and in clear breach of UN Security Council resolutions, North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles with unprecedented frequency, while bolstering its nuclear capabilities in both quality and quantity; whereas the assertive military, political and economic pressure of these authoritarian and dictatorial powers, together with their ongoing and multifaceted assaults on the rules-based international order, constitute some of the most serious security threats to the EU Member States in its history;

AA. whereas the EU’s external action is irrevocably tied to the values and principles enshrined in Articles 2, 3(5) and 21 TEU, including the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all Member States, in line with the UN Charter; whereas these principles apply equally to Cyprus; whereas Türkiye’s foreign policy remains at odds with that of the EU; whereas the constructive engagement of Türkiye itself is key for the Cyprus settlement talks to resume and progress within the UN framework;

AA. whereas at the 2024 NATO summit in Washington DC, China was referred to as a decisive enabler of Russia’s aggression; whereas China has never formally condemned Russia’s illegal aggression against and invasion of Ukraine; whereas Russia characterised its strategic relations with China as being at an unprecedentedly high level; whereas the People’s Republic of China is the main supporter of Russia in its war of aggression, providing most of the dual-use goods that serve as inputs for Russia’s defence sector, as well as diplomatic, political and economic support, thereby prolonging and enabling the war; whereas Russia seeks to undermine regional stability and European aspirations through coercive and military actions, while China increasingly uses economic leverage and strategic partnerships to influence developments in the EU’s neighbourhoods alongside other actors contributing to such destabilisation; whereas through a combination of state-directed investment, strategic infrastructure acquisition, technology transfer, and influence operations, China seeks to expand its footprint within the EU;

AB. whereas Türkiye’s military occupation of EU territory in Cyprus continues, as does the threat of force against a Member State;

AB. whereas the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Azerbaijan has further deteriorated over the past year; whereas all orders issued by the International Court of Justice regarding Nagorno-Karabakh should be implemented, including the order of 17 November 2023 indicating provisional measures regarding the safe, unimpeded and expeditious return of people who have fled the region;

AC. whereas Türkiye’s violations of Greek airspace and infringements of air traffic regulations within the Athens Flight Information Region are on the rise; whereas violations of Greek territorial waters are also on the rise, while systematic illegal fishing activities are being conducted by Turkish vessels within Greek territorial waters; whereas disputes over search and rescue operations, as well as over NAVTEX-related responsibilities, still persist;

AC. whereas the EU’s external action is irrevocably tied to the values and principles enshrined in Articles 2, 3(5) and 21 TEU, including the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all Member States, in line with the UN Charter; whereas these principles apply equally to Cyprus; whereas Türkiye’s foreign policy remains at odds with that of the EU; whereas the constructive engagement of Türkiye itself is key for the Cyprus settlement talks to resume and progress within the UN framework;

AD. whereas the only viable solution to the Kurdish issue in Türkiye is a just, comprehensive and sustainable settlement;

AD. whereas Türkiye’s military occupation of EU territory in Cyprus continues, as does the threat of force against a Member State;

AE. whereas Egypt is a relevant pillar for stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, which has been underscored by the EU’s decision to grant EUR 4 billion in macro-financial assistance to Egypt for the 2024-2027 period;

AE. whereas Türkiye’s violations of Greek airspace and infringements of air traffic regulations within the Athens Flight Information Region are on the rise; whereas violations of Greek territorial waters are also on the rise, while systematic illegal fishing activities are being conducted by Turkish vessels within Greek territorial waters; whereas disputes over search and rescue operations, as well as over NAVTEX-related responsibilities, still persist;

AF. whereas in 2024, the EU and the Kyrgyz Republic signed an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement; whereas human rights constitute an essential component of the agreement; whereas the worrying human rights situation in the country signals serious backsliding in this regard, which has increased in the context of the snap elections, as shown, inter alia, by the recent detention of Temirlan Sultanbekov and the proposal to reintroduce the death penalty in the country; whereas the Kyrgyz Government must take concrete steps towards addressing the pressing concerns outlined by Parliament in its resolution of 9 September 2025; whereas in recent years, the authorities in all five Central Asian countries have clamped down to varying degrees on dissent and have tightened controls over freedom of expression, with the intimidation, harassment and prosecution of critical activists, journalists and members of the LGBTIQ+ community worsening;

AF. whereas the only viable solution to the Kurdish issue in Türkiye is a just, comprehensive and sustainable settlement;

AG. whereas the first-ever EU-Central Asia summit from 3 to 4 April 2025 was significant as it marked a strategic turning point in relations between the two regions and the start of a structured dialogue that fully recognises the key role of the Central Asian region as a crossroads between Europe and Asia;

AG. whereas Egypt is a relevant pillar for stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, which has been underscored by the EU’s decision to grant EUR 4 billion in macro-financial assistance to Egypt for the 2024-2027 period;

AH. whereas in its relations with India, the EU should acknowledge the country’s continued strategic engagement with Russia, including its regrettable participation in the Zapad-2025 joint military exercises with Russia and Belarus, while taking into account geopolitical challenges in a way that strengthens the EU’s shared interests with India, enhances security and upholds international law;

AH. whereas in 2024, the EU and the Kyrgyz Republic signed an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement; whereas human rights constitute an essential component of the agreement; whereas the worrying human rights situation in the country signals serious backsliding in this regard, which has increased in the context of the snap elections, as shown, inter alia, by the recent detention of Temirlan Sultanbekov and the proposal to reintroduce the death penalty in the country; whereas the Kyrgyz Government must take concrete steps towards addressing the pressing concerns outlined by Parliament in its resolution of 9 September 2025; whereas in recent years, the authorities in all five Central Asian countries have clamped down to varying degrees on dissent and have tightened controls over freedom of expression, with the intimidation, harassment and prosecution of critical activists, journalists and members of the LGBTIQ+ community worsening;

AI. whereas it welcomed efforts made by certain Arab states and Israel to normalise diplomatic relations under the Abraham Accords; whereas it supports initiatives aimed at building broad regional and international backing for a better future in Arab-Israeli relations;

AI. whereas the first-ever EU-Central Asia summit from 3 to 4 April 2025 was significant as it marked a strategic turning point in relations between the two regions and the start of a structured dialogue that fully recognises the key role of the Central Asian region as a crossroads between Europe and Asia;

AJ. whereas the EU has a historic opportunity to deepen its alliance with Latin America; whereas the political and cooperation pillar of the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement requires the approval of Parliament, the Council and the national parliaments of the Member States; whereas the trade pillar requires the approval of Parliament and the Council only; whereas this approval would mark a geopolitical milestone that reinforces the EU’s global presence and strengthens the multilateral rules-based order; whereas the agreement will set up an institutional framework to foster cooperation in areas such as human rights, sustainable development, the digital economy and combating organised crime; whereas the adoption and implementation of the agreement should improve interregional ties, ripen geopolitical dividends and advance the EU’s strategic interests; whereas the swift signing and ratification of the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement and the EU-Mexico Global Agreement underpin the EU’s deepened engagement in and strengthened political ties with Latin America;

AJ. whereas in its relations with India, the EU should acknowledge the country’s continued strategic engagement with Russia, including its regrettable participation in the Zapad-2025 joint military exercises with Russia and Belarus, while taking into account geopolitical challenges in a way that strengthens the EU’s shared interests with India, enhances security and upholds international law;

AK. whereas the EU’s Arctic policy should encourage sustainable economic development, support Indigenous peoples in preserving their language and culture, ensure the protection of the Arctic ecosystem in the face of the climate crisis and promote resilience in the face of geopolitical challenges posed by non-EU countries; whereas this policy should take into account the justified concerns about increased cooperation between China and Russia in the Arctic region; whereas this policy needs to fully integrate the recommendations of the Kiruna Declaration, support increased funding for renewable energy and sustainable waste management in Arctic communities, and build capacity for addressing environmental, economic and social challenges;

AK. whereas it welcomed efforts made by certain Arab states and Israel to normalise diplomatic relations under the Abraham Accords; whereas it supports initiatives aimed at building broad regional and international backing for a better future in Arab-Israeli relations;

AL. whereas Russia’s repeated breaches of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring states, together with its obstruction of navigation in the Azov, Black and Baltic Seas, raise serious doubts about the prospects for sustaining peaceful coexistence in the Arctic; whereas Russia is significantly enhancing its Arctic infrastructure and icebreaker fleet, while advancing its strategic ambitions in the region; whereas the Russian Federation is pursuing a strategy to consolidate federal control over natural resources, reinforce territorial claims and attract investment through special economic zone incentives;

AL. whereas the EU has a historic opportunity to deepen its alliance with Latin America; whereas the political and cooperation pillar of the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement requires the approval of Parliament, the Council and the national parliaments of the Member States; whereas the trade pillar requires the approval of Parliament and the Council only; whereas this approval would mark a geopolitical milestone that reinforces the EU’s global presence and strengthens the multilateral rules-based order; whereas the agreement will set up an institutional framework to foster cooperation in areas such as human rights, sustainable development, the digital economy and combating organised crime; whereas the adoption and implementation of the agreement should improve interregional ties, ripen geopolitical dividends and advance the EU’s strategic interests; whereas the swift signing and ratification of the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement and the EU-Mexico Global Agreement underpin the EU’s deepened engagement in and strengthened political ties with Latin America;

AM. whereas a key objective of the CFSP for the Arctic region should be to actively seek full observer or, where possible, participant status for the EU in all relevant Arctic governance bodies where it is not yet represented; whereas this also requires strengthened interoperability between the EU, its Member States and its transatlantic allies in Arctic security, maritime surveillance, search and rescue operations, and the protection of critical infrastructure;

AM. whereas the EU’s Arctic policy should encourage sustainable economic development, support Indigenous peoples in preserving their language and culture, ensure the protection of the Arctic ecosystem in the face of the climate crisis and promote resilience in the face of geopolitical challenges posed by non-EU countries; whereas this policy should take into account the justified concerns about increased cooperation between China and Russia in the Arctic region; whereas this policy needs to fully integrate the recommendations of the Kiruna Declaration, support increased funding for renewable energy and sustainable waste management in Arctic communities, and build capacity for addressing environmental, economic and social challenges;

AN. whereas the protection of religious freedom should be consistently integrated into the EU’s external action; whereas the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and the Commission should regularly report on religious freedom and the persecution of religious minorities around the world; whereas faith communities and faith-based organisations can play key roles in promoting peace, inter-religious dialogue, conflict resolution, humanitarian assistance and the protection of human rights;

AN. whereas Russia’s repeated breaches of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring states, together with its obstruction of navigation in the Azov, Black and Baltic Seas, raise serious doubts about the prospects for sustaining peaceful coexistence in the Arctic; whereas Russia is significantly enhancing its Arctic infrastructure and icebreaker fleet, while advancing its strategic ambitions in the region; whereas the Russian Federation is pursuing a strategy to consolidate federal control over natural resources, reinforce territorial claims and attract investment through special economic zone incentives;

AO. whereas the increasing faith-based persecution of religious minorities around the world, including, but not limited to, the persecution of Christians in the world as recently seen in Syria, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nicaragua, underscores the need for greater attention to be given to the persecution of religious minorities; whereas the European External Action Service (EEAS) should work with the international community to reverse the alarming trend towards increased religious persecution;

AO. whereas a key objective of the CFSP for the Arctic region should be to actively seek full observer or, where possible, participant status for the EU in all relevant Arctic governance bodies where it is not yet represented; whereas this also requires strengthened interoperability between the EU, its Member States and its transatlantic allies in Arctic security, maritime surveillance, search and rescue operations, and the protection of critical infrastructure;

AP. whereas the Global Gateway initiative fosters close partnerships with like-minded countries based on mutual benefits, economic development and resilient supply chains; whereas the effective use of resources is the main priority, concentrating them on a limited number of strategic initiatives, in particular the strengthening of infrastructure, as well as countering concurrent initiatives by non-EU countries; whereas the EU’s fundamental values, including respect for human rights, good governance, democracy, transparency and environmental sustainability, should always guide Global Gateway projects; whereas these projects need to systematically involve civil society and local communities at all stages of project design, implementation and evaluation to ensure that they are responsive to local needs, are gender-sensitive and generate meaningful development outcomes;

AP. whereas the protection of religious freedom should be consistently integrated into the EU’s external action; whereas the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and the Commission should regularly report on religious freedom and the persecution of religious minorities around the world; whereas faith communities and faith-based organisations can play key roles in promoting peace, inter-religious dialogue, conflict resolution, humanitarian assistance and the protection of human rights;

AQ. whereas the EUR 300 billion budget allocated to this initiative is less than one third of the scale of projects already under way under China’s comparable connectivity- and infrastructure-focused Belt and Road Initiative; whereas the current funding for the EEAS and EU delegations is insufficient to meet their needs given the scale of today’s challenges; whereas cuts to core diplomatic activities increase the risk of mission closures, which would limit the EU’s ability to act as a global player;

AQ. whereas the increasing faith-based persecution of religious minorities around the world, including, but not limited to, the persecution of Christians in the world as recently seen in Syria, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nicaragua, underscores the need for greater attention to be given to the persecution of religious minorities; whereas the European External Action Service (EEAS) should work with the international community to reverse the alarming trend towards increased religious persecution;

AR. whereas preventive diplomacy is a proactive external policy tool for avoiding conflict between parties and for mediating and supporting them in finding peaceful resolutions, including peace mediation and dialogue; whereas the efforts of malign non-EU actors have diminished the influence of the EU around the world; whereas the VP/HR, together with the EEAS, should analyse previous European diplomatic efforts and their outcomes; whereas such an analysis requires a clear understanding of local, historical, cultural and religious contexts, among others; whereas a renewed approach to preventive diplomacy might be needed to ensure that the EU is perceived as a reliable partner at all levels; whereas EU election observation missions play a central role in supporting democracy around the world; whereas parliamentary diplomacy and interparliamentary relations are key tools to achieve the EU’s foreign policy goals in non-EU countries and create ties beyond the governmental level only; whereas under the next multiannual financial framework, the budget allocation for democracy support and election observation should be increased, in particular with a view to deploying such missions to candidate countries;

AR. whereas the Global Gateway initiative fosters close partnerships with like-minded countries based on mutual benefits, economic development and resilient supply chains; whereas the effective use of resources is the main priority, concentrating them on a limited number of strategic initiatives, in particular the strengthening of infrastructure, as well as countering concurrent initiatives by non-EU countries; whereas the EU’s fundamental values, including respect for human rights, good governance, democracy, transparency and environmental sustainability, should always guide Global Gateway projects; whereas these projects need to systematically involve civil society and local communities at all stages of project design, implementation and evaluation to ensure that they are responsive to local needs, are gender-sensitive and generate meaningful development outcomes;

AS. whereas climate change increasingly acts as a ‘threat multiplier’, leading to the further destabilisation of vulnerable countries and regions, preventable humanitarian crises and additional migratory pressures;

AS. whereas the EUR 300 billion budget allocated to this initiative is less than one third of the scale of projects already under way under China’s comparable connectivity- and infrastructure-focused Belt and Road Initiative; whereas the current funding for the EEAS and EU delegations is insufficient to meet their needs given the scale of today’s challenges; whereas cuts to core diplomatic activities increase the risk of mission closures, which would limit the EU’s ability to act as a global player;

AT. whereas the 25th anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) calls for gender equality and the WPS agenda to be maintained as core principles of the EU CFSP; whereas the EEAS and the Commission should maintain the EU’s leading role in championing women’s rights worldwide by thoroughly and ambitiously implementing the Gender Action Plan III; whereas the ‘Leading by example’ pillar under the Gender Action Plan III requires the VP/HR to improve the gender balance in leadership positions within the EEAS;

AT. whereas preventive diplomacy is a proactive external policy tool for avoiding conflict between parties and for mediating and supporting them in finding peaceful resolutions, including peace mediation and dialogue; whereas the efforts of malign non-EU actors have diminished the influence of the EU around the world; whereas the VP/HR, together with the EEAS, should analyse previous European diplomatic efforts and their outcomes; whereas such an analysis requires a clear understanding of local, historical, cultural and religious contexts, among others; whereas a renewed approach to preventive diplomacy might be needed to ensure that the EU is perceived as a reliable partner at all levels; whereas EU election observation missions play a central role in supporting democracy around the world; whereas parliamentary diplomacy and interparliamentary relations are key tools to achieve the EU’s foreign policy goals in non-EU countries and create ties beyond the governmental level only; whereas under the next multiannual financial framework, the budget allocation for democracy support and election observation should be increased, in particular with a view to deploying such missions to candidate countries;

AU. whereas in recent years, authoritarian and repressive governments, like in Russia, have doubled down on traditionalist gender norms as a means of state legitimisation and sociopolitical control; whereas transnational religious networks and far-right political movements promote anti-LGBTIQ+ polices; whereas these trends erode fundamental rights and pose a direct challenge to the values enshrined in the Treaty on European Union, which encompass gender equality and form the foundation of the Union’s foreign policy;

AU. whereas climate change increasingly acts as a ‘threat multiplier’, leading to the further destabilisation of vulnerable countries and regions, preventable humanitarian crises and additional migratory pressures;

AV. whereas the 25th anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) calls for gender equality and the WPS agenda to be maintained as core principles of the EU CFSP; whereas the EEAS and the Commission should maintain the EU’s leading role in championing women’s rights worldwide by thoroughly and ambitiously implementing the Gender Action Plan III; whereas the ‘Leading by example’ pillar under the Gender Action Plan III requires the VP/HR to improve the gender balance in leadership positions within the EEAS;

AW. whereas in recent years, authoritarian and repressive governments, like in Russia, have doubled down on traditionalist gender norms as a means of state legitimisation and sociopolitical control; whereas transnational religious networks and far-right political movements promote anti-LGBTIQ+ polices; whereas these trends erode fundamental rights and pose a direct challenge to the values enshrined in the Treaty on European Union, which encompass gender equality and form the foundation of the Union’s foreign policy;

1. Underscores that its resolutions on the implementation of the CFSP are a key component of its contribution to EU foreign policymaking; underlines that these resolutions demonstrate the practical implication of the strengthened right of scrutiny in the area of foreign policy conferred on Parliament by the Treaty of Lisbon; recalls that its 2025 resolution is the second of this nature in this parliamentary term and aims to serve as a guide for the EU executive when setting foreign policy priorities for this term; highlights the fact that, in an ever volatile international environment, the EU needs to simultaneously tackle numerous foreign policy challenges affecting it directly or indirectly, including the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the conflicts in the Middle East, the rising great power competition, constant attempts to undermine the multilateral rules-based international order and a growing nexus of foreign and internal crises; strongly believes that in order to remain relevant on the international stage, the EU needs to pursue a determined, disciplined and assertive foreign policy that fulfils the EU’s own strategic objectives and continues to define, assert and defend its interests worldwide; recalls that the EU’s external action should be guided by the values and principles enshrined in Articles 2, 3(5) and 21 TEU, which inspired the EU’s own creation, development and enlargement, including in the areas of democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, and the principles of equality and solidarity; further believes that the CFSP should ensure the implementation of the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals;

(b) fosters cooperation on shared interests;

(c) establishes clear boundaries and non-negotiable positions; and

(c) respects the neutrality of certain Member States and ensures that diplomatic action is undertaken in a manner consistent with the UN Charter;

(d) increases the visibility and impact of EU action abroad;

(d) establishes clear boundaries and non-negotiable positions; and

(e) increases the visibility and impact of EU action abroad;

and thereby pursues the ambitious objectives and clearly addresses the key geopolitical challenges outlined in the following paragraphs;

5. Underlines that Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine constitutes a blatant violation of international law and of the UN Charter, as well as an unprecedented attack on the European peace order since the Second World War; recalls that Russia’s aggressions against Ukraine started in 2014; reiterates its firm belief that ultimately Russia’s aggression must fail and Ukraine must prevail, ensuring peace through strength, thereby signalling that force will never prevail over law in order to discourage others from attempting to challenge borders through military means; stresses the urgent need for a long-term and strategic approach towards Moscow and its allies;

6. Honours the courage and resilience of the Ukrainian people, who are not only defending their sovereignty and territorial integrity, but who are also upholding fundamental European values; demands an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, Russian withdrawal from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and the return of all Ukrainian prisoners of war, all abducted and detained civilians, and all children illegally taken by Russia and the Lukashenka regime; calls, furthermore, for the return of the bodies of all fallen Ukrainian soldiers; urges the EU to maintain and strengthen its support for Ukraine, including through political, economic, financial and military assistance, in order to empower Ukraine; welcomes the European Council’s decision of December 2025 to provide Ukraine with a EUR 90 billion financial assistance package in the form of EU-backed loans; regrets, however, that the Council was unable to reach an agreement on a more ambitious financing structure on the basis of frozen Russian assets, which would reduce Ukraine’s growing debt burden; recalls, however, that Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2600 of 12 December 2025 enacts the indefinite immobilisation of Russian sovereign assets; stresses that investments in Ukraine’s territorial defence and its defence industrial base are necessary and mutually beneficial for Europe, yet do not constitute security guarantees as such; welcomes, in this context, NATO’s Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative and urges the EU Member States to continue the delivery of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine, in particular air defence systems and deep strike capabilities, while simultaneously supporting a diplomatic solution to the war, in accordance with international law, with the aim of achieving a just and lasting peace;

7. Reiterates its call to develop an EU legal framework for the designation of states as sponsors of terrorism; calls on the Council to add the Russian Federation to such an EU list of state sponsors of terrorism;

8. Condemns, in the strongest terms, the illegitimate Lukashenka regime for allowing Belarusian territory to be used as a base for Russian military operations, thereby undermining the country’s sovereignty and posing a direct threat to the security and stability of the EU and its Member States, while continuing to repress its own population; reiterates the demand for the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and urges the strengthening of restrictive measures; denounces Belarus’s orchestrated hybrid attacks against EU Member States, for example Lithuania, by means of unmanned aerial vehicles and balloon incursions, economic coercion, smuggling operations, military provocations, cyberattacks and state-sponsored disinformation; stresses with concern that the regimes in Russia and Belarus are instrumentalising migration as onepart of a broader strategy to undermine the hybridEU, toolsthe aimedMember atStates’ destabilisinggovernments Europe;and NATO; urges the EU and its Member States to increase political, financial and technical support for the independent media, human rights defenders and civil society initiatives operating within and outside Belarus;

9. StressesWelcomes the conclusions of the meeting of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ held in Paris on 6 January 2026, including the politically and legally binding commitments defining a common approach to supporting Ukraine, sustaining its long-term military capabilities, and restoring peace and security in the event of a future armed attack by Russia; expresses support for the proposal to establish a multinational force for Ukraine and encourages all EU Member States to give due consideration to how they can best support such a force; further welcomes the discussions on a US-led ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism; stresses that any peace deal must feature robust and credible security guarantees for Ukraine, be negotiated by its elected leadership and have the backing of its people; cautions against Russia’s disingenuous proposals aimed at prolonging the war, and warns that any settlement imposed by Russia or rewarding its aggression would undermine European security; recalls that close cooperation between the EU and the US remains vital to achieving and securing a just and lasting peace in Ukraine and hence is crucial to the security of the European continent, alongside the EU’s efforts to take more responsibility for its own security;

10. Stresses that, in the light of the evolving security landscape and the growing threat posed by the Russian Federation, including repeated incursions violating European airspace, it is imperative that EU Member States urgently enhance their civil protection mechanisms, which requires a coordinated and resilient response across the Union, thereby strengthening civil preparedness and modernising early warning systems; deems these aggressive and reckless acts to be irresponsible and a serious escalation by Russia that threatens the security of EU citizens, regional stability and international peace; calls on the Commission to explore solutions, in close coordination with NATO, so that such violations are deterred in the future; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s announcement of the EU’s ‘Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030’, including the ‘Drone Defence Initiative’; encourages, furthermore, the establishment of cooperation mechanisms between the EU institutions and the relevant Ukrainian counterparts in order to exchange best practices in combating hybrid warfare and Russian information operations, thereby strengthening mutual resilience in the face of these evolving threats;

11. Condemns Russia’s aggression for severely destabilising the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood, obstructing pathways to peace and prosperity and triggering spillover effects in the Western Balkans that threaten to slow down reforms and fuel anti-European narratives; is alarmed by the fact that Kremlin-linked media operating in the Western Balkans have intensified their activities after the outbreak of Russia’s war of aggression, including aggressive interference in electoral processes and the information space, with the aim of promoting pro-Russian sentiments and fuelling anti-European rhetoric; calls on the Commission to respond in a more consistent manner to the use of anti-European rhetoric in the Western Balkans, particularly in Serbia, by actively engaging with the states in the region and by taking decisive action to build societal resilience against hybrid threats; highlights that countering Russia’s destabilising influence is essential for reinforcing the Union’s role as a guarantor of stability, democracy and prosperity;

12. Urges the Commission to actively support international justice mechanisms and ensure accountability for war crimes and crimes of aggression; encourages the EU and its Member States to support the establishment of a special tribunal to prosecute Russia’s crime of aggression against Ukraine; recalls that the ICC has issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and the Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights, Maria Lvova-Belova, for their involvement in the abduction of Ukrainian children and their transfer to Russia; expresses support for all of the activities of the ICC and the International Court of Justice in prosecuting the crimes committed on Ukrainian territory; supports innovative solutions to finance Ukraine’s defence efforts as well as its demining and reconstruction using immobilised Russian foreign assets, including those of the Russian state, Russian local authorities, Russian state-owned companies, and of individuals on the EU sanctions list; calls on the Commission to propose, and on the Member States to agree on, legislationan additional legally and financially sound mechanism, in the form of a reparations loan, that enables the use of these immobilised assets;assets, hence providing longer-term visibility to Ukraine and ensuring it eventually receives war reparations, or an equivalent amount, from Russia, as provided for by international law; stresses that Russia, and not EU taxpayers, must bear the cost of Russia’s aggression; expects the Member States to strengthen their sanctions against Russia for as long as necessary to secure a just and lasting peace and until accountability has been achieved; welcomes in this regard ongoing EU-G7 discussions to explore a maritime services ban for all Russian oil exports as an alternative to the oil price cap; calls, in the interim, for the EU and its Member States to reinforce the effectiveness and impact of its sanctions packages adopted so far and to agree on new ones as soon as the need arises; further calls on the Commission and the Member States to close financial loopholes that Russia uses to evade sanctions, and to impose further restrictive measures on non-EU countries enabling Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, whether through the facilitation of sanctions circumvention or through the provision of direct military assistance; believes that penalties should also be imposed on European companies that continue to engage in prohibited business with the Russian Federation; calls on the Council, the Commission and the EEAS to present an EU-wide Russia strategy that links deterrence, containment, accountability and support for democratic alternatives;

13. Reiterates that the EU and all of its Member States must lead by example in upholding the primacy of international law; underlines that its credibility and ability to protect its citizens and vital interests depend on its commitment to its founding principles, such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights in the absence of double standards or selective compliance; calls, therefore, for the strict application of the rule of law mechanism where these principles are disregarded;

14. Stresses the need to fight impunity and strengthen accountability efforts globally, including through the ICC; expresses its utmost concern about the US sanctions against the ICC, its prosecutors, judges and staff, which constitute a serious attack on the international justice system; calls on the Commission to urgently activate the blocking statute in order to protect and safeguard the ICC as an indispensable cornerstone of the international justice system;

14. Calls on the Commission and the Council, in their external relations and policies, to consistently uphold and promote international law, and to take all necessary measures to ensure its full respect by all states, without distinction based on economic or military power;

15. Welcomes the recent commitment to ending the war in Gaza and takes notes of the 20-point peace plan proposed by the US administration, which must now be fully implemented and insulated from any attempts by regional actors to undermine it; welcomes the release of all Israeli hostages kept by Hamas and the resumption of humanitarian aid distribution in Gaza; underlines that while the plan constitutes a crucial first step towards ending the conflict, several challenges remain, in particular concerning enforcement, governance, accountability and maintaining trust; underlines that the full disarmament of Hamas, its exclusion from any form of governance in Gaza and the withdrawal of Israeli forces remain central goals for any further steps; calls for the EU to play an active role in shaping the peace and reconstruction process in close coordination with key regional actors; reiterates that the objective should continue to be a negotiated two-state solution, in line with international law, as the only viable path to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East with the Israeli and Palestinian people living side by side, in peace and security;

15. Stresses the need to fight impunity and strengthen accountability efforts globally, including through the ICC; expresses its utmost concern about the US sanctions against the ICC, its prosecutors, judges and staff, which constitute a serious attack on the international justice system; calls on the Commission to urgently activate the blocking statute in order to protect and safeguard the ICC as an indispensable cornerstone of the international justice system;

16. Expresses deep concern about the catastrophic humanitarian situation, food insecurity and famine in Gaza, as well as the recurrent disregard for international law and UN resolutions by the Israeli Government and repeated cycles of violence and terrorist attacks across the Middle East;

16. Welcomes the recent commitment to ending the war in Gaza and takes notes of the 20-point peace plan proposed by the US administration and endorsed in UN Security Council Resolution 2803, which must now be fully implemented and insulated from any attempts by regional actors to undermine it; welcomes the release of all Israeli hostages kept by Hamas and the resumption of humanitarian aid distribution in Gaza; underlines that while the plan constitutes a crucial first step towards ending the conflict, several challenges remain, in particular concerning enforcement, governance, accountability and maintaining trust; underlines that the full disarmament of Hamas, its exclusion from any form of governance in Gaza, the reform and empowerment of the Palestinian Authority and the withdrawal of Israeli forces remain central goals for any further steps; calls for the EU to play an active role in shaping the peace and reconstruction process in close coordination with key regional actors; supports the ongoing stabilisation efforts in Gaza and welcomes the reinforcement of the EU’s civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL COPPS; reiterates that the objective should continue to be a negotiated two-state solution, in line with international law, as the only viable path to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East with the Israeli and Palestinian people living side by side, in peace and security;

17. Emphasises that the conflict in Gaza destabilises the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood and risks triggering broader spillover effects across the Middle East and North Africa, including radicalisation, forced displacement, and heightened regional tensions; underlines that these dynamics directly affect European security and migration management;

17. Notes with grave concern the enduring, severe humanitarian situation in Gaza, including widespread food insecurity and famine; notes with serious concern the persistent obstacles to humanitarian access and the alarm expressed by the VP/HR regarding recent licensing decisions constraining humanitarian organisations operating in Gaza; calls on all parties to allow the rapid delivery of humanitarian aid; underlines that measures which unduly restrict humanitarian actors risk dismantling essential humanitarian assistance at a time of acute need; is concerned about compliance with international law and relevant UN resolutions by all parties, and the persistence of cycles of violence and terrorist attacks across the Middle East; recalls the obligation of all parties to comply with international law and relevant UN resolutions, including those pertaining to the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and journalists;

18. Considers the growing antisemitism around the world as an unacceptable consequence of Hamas’ brutal and indiscriminate terrorist attacks across Israel and Israel’s disproportionate large-scale military response in Palestine;

18. Emphasises that the conflict in Gaza destabilises the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood and risks triggering broader spillover effects across the Middle East and North Africa, including radicalisation, forced displacement, and heightened regional tensions; underlines that these dynamics directly affect European security and migration management;

19. Condemns in the strongest possible terms the terrorist attack of 7 October 2023 committed by the terrorist organisation Hamas against Israel;

19. Expresses its disagreement with the Israeli Government’s recognition of Somaliland as an independent state; reaffirms the importance of respecting the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia in accordance with its constitution, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and the Charter of the United Nations, as key for the peace and stability of the entire Horn of Africa region;

20. Reaffirms the EU’s commitment to the existence, security and legitimate right to self-defence of the State of Israel as well as the security and dignity of Palestinians; recalls that Israel’s right to self-defence is enshrined in and constrained by international law and must be exercised with full respect for international courts; believes that Israel’s right to self-defence cannot justify the indiscriminate and disproportionate military action in Gaza, which has had devastating humanitarian consequences and led to unacceptable suffering for the civilian population, which has notably been exacerbated by Hamas through the deliberate abuse of civilian infrastructure and its use of the civilian population of Gaza as human shields, including the remaining Israeli hostages; stresses that the UN, the International Court of Justice and the ICC stated that Israeli military operations have not complied with international humanitarian law, including the principle of proportionality and civilian protection obligations; expresses its relief over the liberation of all living hostages and calls on Hamas to deliver the bodies of all deceased hostages to their families; reaffirms its position demanding a permanent ceasefire, urgent humanitarian access as well as relief corridors; deeply regrets the fragility of the ceasefire in Gaza, a circumstance which has jeopardised too many civilian lives;

20. Considers the growing antisemitism around the world as an unacceptable consequence of Hamas’ brutal and indiscriminate terrorist attacks across Israel and Israel’s disproportionate large-scale military response in Palestine;

21. Recalls that compliance with Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement is a crucial element of the partnership and calls for continued monitoring and assessment of its implementation by the Israeli Government; recalls that, in the context of the humanitarian situation in Gaza, on 10 September 2025 the Commission President announced proposals to suspend certain trade provisions of the Association Agreement, and support for targeted measures against specific Israeli ministers; takes note of the arrest warrants issued by the ICC on 21 November 2024; underlines that any such measures ought to be carefully considered and taken in a way that preserves the EU’s capacity to act as a credible partner and to advance the prospects of a negotiated two-state solution; believes that the EU-Israel Association Council remains an essential forum for frank dialogue; reaffirms that constructive engagement and sustained dialogue remain the most effective instruments to promote peace, security and lasting stability in the region; insists that the concrete roadmap for implementing the two-state solution must be the central focus of the Commission’s Middle East strategy, which is planned for 2026; regrets the consequences for the EU’s global image caused by the absence of a united response to the catastrophic situation in the Gaza Strip;

21. Condemns in the strongest possible terms the terrorist attack of 7 October 2023 committed by the terrorist organisation Hamas against Israel;

22. Underlines that sustainable peace requires a credible political process aimed at achieving a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, with two sovereign, democratic states as peaceful neighbours and with Jerusalem as a shared capital; calls on all parties to renew efforts to remove the obstacles to this solution and condemns the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem as such an obstacle; welcomes sanctions adopted against extremist Israeli settlers; underscores the role of the Palestinian Authority as the EU’s main interlocutor in Palestine and reaffirms that any future governance in Gaza must exclude the participation of terrorist organisations and must ensure the demilitarisation of Gaza; reiterates its opposition to any annexation plan for Gaza or any other Palestinian territory and against mass forcible transfers;

22. Reaffirms the EU’s commitment to the existence, security and legitimate right to self-defence of the State of Israel as well as the security and dignity of Palestinians; recalls that Israel’s right to self-defence is enshrined in and constrained by international law and must be exercised with full respect for international courts; notes with concern that the war in Gaza has had devastating humanitarian consequences and has led to unacceptable suffering for the civilian population, which has notably been exacerbated by Hamas through the deliberate abuse of civilian infrastructure and its use of the civilian population of Gaza as human shields, including the remaining Israeli hostages; expresses its relief over the liberation of all living hostages and calls on Hamas to deliver the body of the last deceased hostage still being held by Hamas to his family; reaffirms its position demanding a permanent ceasefire, urgent humanitarian access as well as relief corridors; deeply regrets the fragility of the ceasefire in Gaza, a circumstance which has jeopardised too many civilian lives;

23. Encourages the UN, the Arab League, regional partners and the EU to coordinate donor support, attach robust oversight to funding and ensure that reconstruction assistance supports civic institutions and effective governance; expresses, in this context, deep concern over the misuse by terrorist groups of humanitarian aid directed to Palestinian territories; calls for the control mechanisms for the distribution of EU funds to be strengthened;

23. Recalls that compliance with Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement is a crucial element of the partnership and calls for continued monitoring and assessment of its implementation by the Israeli Government; recalls that, in the context of the humanitarian situation in Gaza, on 10 September 2025 the Commission President announced proposals to suspend certain trade provisions of the Association Agreement, and support for targeted measures against specific Israeli ministers; takes note of the arrest warrants issued by the ICC on 21 November 2024; underlines that any such measures ought to be carefully considered and taken in a way that preserves the EU’s capacity to act as a credible partner and to advance the prospects of a negotiated two-state solution; believes that the EU-Israel Association Council remains an essential forum for frank dialogue; reaffirms that constructive engagement and sustained dialogue remain the most effective instruments to promote peace, security and lasting stability in the region; insists that the concrete roadmap for implementing the two-state solution must be the central focus of the Commission’s Middle East strategy, which is planned for 2026; regrets the consequences for the EU’s global image caused by the absence of a united response to the catastrophic situation in the Gaza Strip;

24. Recognises the efforts made by certain Arab states and Israel to normalise diplomatic relations under the Abraham Accords; calls for the EU to support initiatives aimed at building broad regional and international backing for a better future in Arab-Israeli relations;

24. Underlines that sustainable peace requires a credible political process aimed at achieving a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, with two sovereign, democratic states as peaceful neighbours and with Jerusalem as a shared capital; calls on all parties to renew efforts to remove the obstacles to this solution; condemns the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, recalling the EU’s long-standing position that these remain illegal under international law and constitute a unilateral measure that undermines trust and the prospects for a negotiated solution; welcomes sanctions adopted against extremist Israeli settlers; underscores the role of the Palestinian Authority as the EU’s main interlocutor in Palestine and reaffirms that any future governance in Gaza must exclude the participation of terrorist organisations and must ensure the demilitarisation of Gaza; reiterates its opposition to any annexation plan for Gaza or any other Palestinian territory and against mass forcible transfers;

25. Notes that a significant weakening of Iran and its allies – including the fall of the Assad regime and the defeat of Tehran’s proxies such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis and other militias – would offer hope for peace and for the continuation of regional normalisation in the spirit of the Abraham Accords;

25. Insists that the Commission must guarantee that EU funds are not allocated or linked to any form of terrorism and/or religious and political radicalisation; reiterates its position that all schoolbooks and school materials supported by EU funds must be in line with UNESCO standards of peace, tolerance, coexistence and non-violence; is concerned about the antisemitism, hate speech, promotion of jihad and incitement to violence taught in Palestinian school textbooks funded by the EU;

26. Welcomes the positive changes in Lebanon since the beginning of 2025; remains concerned about the impact of armed militias and terrorist organisations, such as Hezbollah, in the region; reiterates the importance of an ambitious ‘Pact for the Mediterranean’ and its effective implementation, with sufficient technical and financial support for Lebanon, focusing on capacity building, energy infrastructure and social support; urges the VP/HR and the Commission to support the Lebanese Government in its reform agenda;

26. Encourages the UN, the Arab League, regional partners and the EU to coordinate donor support, attach robust oversight to funding and ensure that reconstruction assistance supports civic institutions and effective governance; expresses, in this context, deep concern over the misuse by terrorist groups of humanitarian aid directed to Palestinian territories; calls for the control mechanisms for the distribution of EU funds to be strengthened;

27. Stands with Syria’s religiously and ethnically diverse society, which has suffered over a decade at the hands of the Iran and Russia-bolstered Assad regime and terrorist groups; supports a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned inclusive political process that incorporates territorial integrity, transitional justice and reconciliation; urges the Syrian authorities to intensify efforts to include all components of Syrian society in decision-making, progress on the implementation of the agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces in the North-East and continue facilitating swift, transparent and independent investigations into acts targeting religious and ethnic communities, as well as to take all necessary actions to quell sectarian violence and fight impunity; regrets, in this context, the continuing persecution and forced displacement of, and discrimination and attacks against, religious communities, such as Christians, and reiterates the need for the EU to protect the rich multicultural identity of Syria; recognises the immense gaps in financial and human resources to reconstruct the country and supports the EU’s decision to lift sectoral sanctions, in line with the US and the UK, and provide significant development assistance, in addition to humanitarian aid, as announced in the first leg of the 2025 Brussels Conference for Syria;

27. Recognises the efforts made by certain Arab states and Israel to normalise diplomatic relations under the Abraham Accords; calls for the EU to support initiatives aimed at building broad regional and international backing for a better future in Arab-Israeli relations;

28. Affirms the key role of multilateral organisations, in particular the UN, alongside a functioning World Trade Organization, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and regional forums, as indispensable platforms for conflict resolution and global governance; warns that ‘mini-lateral’ formats risk increasingly fragmenting global norms, and require the EU to prioritise a broad and inclusive conception of multilateralism in close cooperation with its like-minded partners; calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to pioneer global leadership of multilateral initiatives; confirms its commitment to advancing comprehensive reforms to strengthen the UN’s role, efficiency and democratic representation;

28. Notes that a significant weakening of Iran and its allies – including the fall of the Assad regime and the defeat of Tehran’s proxies such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis and other militias – would offer hope for peace and for the continuation of regional normalisation in the spirit of the Abraham Accords; is deeply concerned about Hezbollah’s significant support for Russia’s military operations in Ukraine and its coordination with other Iran-backed militias;

29. Calls on the VP/HR to re-evaluate the EU’s approach towards the BRICS group and its partners and to develop a separate EU policy towards BRICS+; stresses that BRICS+ provides Russia with the means to circumvent measures intended to politically isolate the country and enables China to further extend its influence through its modus operandi of financing infrastructure projects;

29. Welcomes the positive changes in Lebanon since the beginning of 2025, mirrored in the conclusions of the ninth EU-Lebanon association council, in particular the willingness to further support the Lebanese security sector through the full use of EU tools, including the European Peace Facility and programmes under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, and explore possible future common security and defence policy engagement; remains concerned about the impact of armed militias and terrorist organisations, and regrets, in particular, the lack of progress with the pledged disarmament of Hezbollah and other armed groups, which represents a prerequisite for regional stability; reiterates the importance of an ambitious ‘Pact for the Mediterranean’ and its effective implementation, with sufficient technical and financial support for Lebanon, focusing on capacity building, energy infrastructure and social support; urges the VP/HR and the Commission to support the Lebanese Government in its reform agenda and in its plan to reestablish a monopoly on weapons; reiterates its full support for Lebanon’s sovereignty, state authority, territorial integrity, political independence, and stability, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701;

30. Calls on the VP/HR to act consistently and to promote an effective and robust democratic narrative, in close cooperation with the Member States, to counter autocratic pressures that intend to undermine checks on the abuse of power, shrink civic space and erode human rights; calls for the creation of a European democracy assessment that enables the early detection of signs of authoritarian tendencies, as well as a toolbox for action centred on democracy support and countering authoritarian narratives, particularly in the light of the regrettable closure of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) operations; encourages, in this context, greater investment in strategic communication and the fight against foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI); is of the opinion that the EU’s efforts to counter this threat should build on the already existing expertise developed within the EEAS and calls for greater coherence between existing and forthcoming EU regulations and efforts; calls for further efforts to fully operationalise the FIMI toolbox developed by the EEAS; believes that the EU should clearly identify the digital sphere as a field of action and recognise digital diplomacy as a strategic interest;

30. Stands with Syria’s religiously and ethnically diverse society, which has suffered over a decade at the hands of the Iran and Russia-bolstered Assad regime and terrorist groups; supports a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned inclusive political process that incorporates territorial integrity, transitional justice and reconciliation; urges the Syrian authorities to intensify efforts to include all components of Syrian society in decision-making, progress on the implementation of the agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces in the North-East and continue facilitating swift, transparent and independent investigations into acts targeting religious and ethnic communities, as well as to take all necessary actions to quell sectarian violence and fight impunity; regrets, in this context, the continuing persecution and forced displacement of, and discrimination and attacks against, religious communities, such as Christians, and reiterates the need for the EU to protect the rich multicultural identity of Syria; recognises the immense gaps in financial and human resources to reconstruct the country and supports the EU’s decision to lift sectoral sanctions, in line with the US and the UK, and provide significant development assistance, in addition to humanitarian aid, as announced in the first leg of the 2025 Brussels Conference for Syria; welcomes the visit to Syria on 8 January 2026 by the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and the President of the European Council, António Costa, aimed at strengthening political ties and economic engagement; takes positive note of the agreement between Syria and Israel of 6 January 2026, setting up a dedicated communication cell to coordinate military de-escalation;

31. Encourages annual strategic reviews of threats to the rules-based international order, coordinated by the EEAS and followed by active measures to prevent further erosion of multilateral norms;

31. Expresses grave concern at the ongoing fighting in areas such as Aleppo and North East Syria, which is resulting in further displacement and high number of casualties of civilian population and creating a serious security risk, notably due to the escape of Daesh fighters detained in north-eastern Syria; calls on the international coalition, including the United States, to take all necessary and immediate measures to mitigate this security risk without delay;

32. Affirms the key role of multilateral organisations, in particular the UN, alongside a functioning World Trade Organization, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and regional forums, as indispensable platforms for conflict resolution and global governance; warns that ‘mini-lateral’ formats risk increasingly fragmenting global norms, and require the EU to prioritise a broad and inclusive conception of multilateralism in close cooperation with its like-minded partners; calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to pioneer global leadership of multilateral initiatives; confirms its commitment to advancing comprehensive reforms to strengthen the UN’s role, efficiency and democratic representation;

33. Calls on the VP/HR to re-evaluate the EU’s approach towards the BRICS group and its partners and to develop a separate EU policy towards BRICS+; stresses that BRICS+ provides Russia with the means to circumvent measures intended to politically isolate the country and enables China to further extend its influence through its modus operandi of financing infrastructure projects;

34. Calls on the VP/HR to act consistently and to promote an effective and robust democratic narrative, in close cooperation with the Member States, to counter autocratic pressures that intend to undermine checks on the abuse of power, shrink civic space and erode human rights; calls for the creation of a European democracy assessment that enables the early detection of signs of authoritarian tendencies, as well as a toolbox for action centred on democracy support and countering authoritarian narratives, particularly in the light of the regrettable closure of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) operations; encourages, in this context, greater investment in strategic communication and the fight against foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI); is of the opinion that the EU’s efforts to counter this threat should build on the already existing expertise developed within the EEAS and calls for greater coherence between existing and forthcoming EU regulations and efforts; calls for further efforts to fully operationalise the FIMI toolbox developed by the EEAS; believes that the EU should clearly identify the digital sphere as a field of action and recognise digital diplomacy as a strategic interest;

35. Strongly condemns the targeted sanctions against legislators responsible for the Digital Services Act and other digital regulations, in particular against a former commissioner;

36. Encourages annual strategic reviews of threats to the rules-based international order, coordinated by the EEAS and followed by active measures to prevent further erosion of multilateral norms;

Fostering cooperation based on interests we share

32.37. Reaffirms that the EU’s external action requires credible values-based engagement; insists, however, that relying solely on normative power and principles is insufficient; encourages a more assertive pursuit of the EU’s strategic objectives, leveraging partnerships and alliances based on shared interests; underlines that leveraging partnerships and alliances successfully, including in the long-term, needs to be based on a level playing field among partners; underscores that EU support ought to be contingent on respect for fundamental democratic principles and the rule of law; reaffirms, in this context, that EU legislation is not a matter for negotiation with non-EU countries;

33.38. Encourages, in this context, the VP/HR to seek tailored policies that address the expectations of the Member States and partner countries and that deliver quickly on political agreements, thereby establishing the EU as a reliable strategic anchor, especially at a time when conflicts are proliferating and the use of force is increasingly being normalised as a means to pursue political objectives;

34. Stresses that a strong transatlantic partnership with the United States and Canada within NATO remains indispensable and forms the core of the European security architecture; recognises that the United States now follows a more transactional approach to foreign policy, marked by a reduced commitment to multilateralism and European security; highlights the importance for the EU of drawing lessons from the EU’s vulnerabilities and of taking the appropriate measures at EU level to avoid being in a position where it might be coerced in the future; deems it more crucial than ever to continue engaging with US counterparts at federal and state level, ensuring sustained coordination across areas such as security, technology and economic resilience, while showing unity and commitment to a common EU position; fully supports the deepening of cooperation in the framework of the EU-US transatlantic legislator’s dialogue and for EU-US summits to be held on a regular basis to provide top-level impetus to future cooperation; calls for the deepening of the EU-US Dialogue on Security and Defence whose potential remains uncapped; recalls that, to be a strong transatlantic partner, Europe must ensure its own defence and security; reiterates, in this context, the immediate need for the EU and its Member States to fully operationalise the concept of strategic autonomy and defence readiness and, to this end, make collective and well-coordinated investments in the necessary defence capabilities; stresses the urgent need for the EU and its Member States to become more reliable and more self-sufficient in the domains of security, defence and technology, with the objective of strengthening the European pillar within NATO;

39. Stresses that a strong transatlantic partnership with the United States and Canada within NATO forms the core of the European security architecture; expresses, in this context, concerns about the fact that certain elements of the new US National Security Strategy fall significantly short in adequately addressing the threat posed by Russia, notably for European and hence also US security; regrets, furthermore, the National Security Strategy’s flawed assessment of the EU as a political system, including inadequate descriptions of the domestic political situations in EU Member States; reaffirms Parliament’s long-standing support for the EU’s core values of democracy and human rights; considers the National Security Strategy to further reinforce the imperative for Europe to advance its strategic autonomy, reduce its dependencies, and diversify its partnerships;

35. Welcomes the EU-Canada Security and Defence Partnership, signed at the 2025 EU-Canada Summit, as the first such agreement with a partner in the Americas; calls for its swift operationalisation, including Canadian participation in missions and operations of the common security and defence policy (CSDP); supports the negotiation of a directive enabling Canadian entities to participate in EU joint procurement under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Instrument;

40. Regrets the decision of 7 January 2026 by the US President to withdraw from, suspend participation in, or terminate engagement with a significant number of international organisations, including numerous UN bodies; expresses its serious concern that such a move could undermine the financial sustainability of the UN system, weaken multilateral cooperation at a time when it is most needed and embolden authoritarian and revisionist actors, who have historically sought to exploit any withdrawal or disengagement by Western powers from international organisations; encourages the US administration to reflect on its decision and to reaffirm its commitment to the UN and multilateral cooperation;

36. Commends the strong and constructive partnership with the United Kingdom; welcomes the joint statement by the UK and EU leaders of 19 May 2025 following the UK-EU Summit 2025, in particular the establishment of the comprehensive Security and Defence Partnership; calls for its swift and full implementation, including through (i) regular biannual strategic foreign and security dialogues at ministerial level between the UK Foreign and Defence Secretaries and the VP/HR to coordinate responses to crises and align strategic priorities, (ii) UK participation in the EU’s CSDP civilian and military crisis management missions, where legally possible, (iii) enhanced cooperation on cyber resilience, countering hybrid threats, safeguarding critical infrastructure, and tackling illicit finance, (iv) strengthened coordination on sanctions enforcement and (v) joint actions to counter Russia’s shadow fleet; takes note of the political agreement on the core aspects of the future agreement between the EU and the UK in respect of Gibraltar, announced by the parties on 11 June 2025; awaits the publication of the full legal text for examination;

41. Firmly rejects any attempt to undermine the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark, including Greenland; recalls, in this context, that Greenland is a self-governing part of the Kingdom of Denmark and has the authority to decide on its economic development, international partnerships and raw materials policy; reiterates that only the people of Greenland can decide on their future; cautions, at the same time, that such political processes must not be instrumentalised or influenced by external actors; highlights in particular China’s strategic interest in the Arctic and its use of economic leverage to gain political influence; takes note of the fact that US interest is driven by security concerns linked to the evolving strategic environment in the Arctic but believes that the 1951 defence agreement between the Kingdom of Denmark and the United States offers ample opportunities for an increased US presence in Greenland; recalls that Denmark, including Greenland, is a member of NATO and is therefore fully covered by the alliance’s collective security guarantees; welcomes the statement of seven European leaders of 6 January 2026 and underlines that security in the Arctic can only be achieved collectively, in conjunction with NATO; calls on the Commission and the European Council to define concrete support to Greenland and Denmark in line with EU principles, international law, and the NATO Charter;

37. Commends the close relationship with non-EU western European countries and their strong cooperation with the EU on external action; welcomes, in this context, the conclusion of negotiations on and provisional sectorial application of a broad package of measures for future EU-Switzerland relations, which mark a significant milestone in advancing and deepening the already close relationship; encourages its swift ratification; emphasises the significance of the defence and security partnership with Norway and stresses the importance of promoting stronger relations with Norway in the light of the country’s crucial role for the EU’s energy security; calls for enhanced cooperation on energy resilience and supply diversification as key instruments for advancing the Union’s strategic autonomy; welcomes the growing public support for EU accession in Iceland and the intention expressed by the Icelandic authorities to hold a referendum on the resumption of the EU accession negotiations by 2027; calls, in the meantime, for proactive engagement with the Icelandic Government to deepen the defence and security cooperation and to promote the benefits of EU membership; calls for the swift ratification of the EU association agreements with Andorra and San Marino;

42. Regrets that the United States now follows a more transactional approach to foreign policy, marked by a reduced commitment to multilateralism and European security; highlights the importance for the EU of drawing lessons from the EU’s vulnerabilities and of taking the appropriate measures at EU level to avoid being in a position where it might be coerced in the future; deems it more crucial than ever to continue engaging with US counterparts at federal and state level, ensuring sustained coordination across areas such as security, technology and economic resilience, while showing unity and commitment to a common EU position; fully supports the deepening of cooperation in the framework of the EU-US Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue and for EU-US summits to be held on a regular basis to provide top-level impetus for future cooperation; calls for the deepening of the EU-US Dialogue on Security and Defence, whose potential remains untapped; recalls that, to be a strong transatlantic partner, Europe must ensure its own defence and security; reiterates, in this context, the immediate need for the EU and its Member States to bring the concept of strategic autonomy and defence readiness fully into operation and, to this end, make collective and well-coordinated investments in the necessary defence capabilities; stresses the urgent need for the EU and its Member States to become more reliable and more self-sufficient in the domains of security, defence and technology, with the objective of strengthening the European pillar within NATO;

38. Emphasises the strategic importance of the Western Balkans and supports a credible political and security cooperation on their merit-based path to EU integration; believes that the future of the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova lies within the EU, in accordance with the aspirations of their people; condemns Russian interference in the democratic processes of EU candidate countries, notably Moldova; expresses concern with regard to the political deadlock in Kosovo and urges all political parties to work together to overcome it; reiterates that EU accession negotiations with Serbia should only advance on the basis of measurable and sustainable progress in the fundamentals cluster, including full alignment with the EU’s CFSP, in particular the sanctions against Russia; welcomes the successful resumption of the CFSP dialogue between the EU and its partners in the Western Balkans and underlines the importance of these partnerships for peace and security; recalls that EU enlargement constitutes a geostrategic investment in regional security and stability, requiring commitment from both the Union and the candidate countries and calls, in this context, for the EU to make the enlargement process more predictable and politically visible to the citizens of the region; believes that, to this end, the EU must maintain the enlargement momentum and provide candidate countries with sufficient technical and financial assistance and consistent political support on their path towards full membership; stresses, however, the need to further improve the rule of law conditionality and to ensure that all EU funding for the accession countries is fully in line with the EU’s own strategic goals and interests; stresses, simultaneously, that progress on their EU accession path is merit based and conditional on full respect for international law and the EU acquis, as well as their alignment with the CFSP, including adherence to sanctions and EU visa policy; recalls that the enlargement process should proceed in parallel with institutional and decision-making reforms aimed at safeguarding the Union’s integration capacity; urges the EU candidate countries to actively support and collaborate with international justice tribunals and mechanisms to ensure that they can properly carry out their work, and prosecute and ensure accountability for war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and crimes of aggression committed across the whole world;

43. Confirms its full and unwavering solidarity with Greenland, as part of the Kingdom of Denmark; denounces the use of unilateral trade threats and economic intimidation against Denmark and other EU Member States as a form of coercion incompatible with international law and the core principles of cooperation between NATO allies; warns against attempts to instrumentalise security concerns in the Arctic to exert territorial or political pressure, fully supports the position of the Kingdom of Denmark, including Greenland, that Greenland is not for sale; stresses that Greenland must not be used as a tool to divide the European Union; calls on the Union to respond firmly, collectively and decisively and to resist any such actions.

39. Reiterates its support for the European Political Community as a platform for discussion, dialogue and cooperation with European partners on the foreign policy and security challenges we are facing, with the aim of strengthening security and stability in Europe and pursuing political and security cooperation based on shared interests; calls for the close involvement of Parliament in the clarification of the scope and the future work of this community; underlines that, for the future success and coherence of this format, some level of alignment on democratic values and principles is essential; reiterates that the European Political Community may under no circumstances become a pretext for delays to the EU accession of enlargement countries;

44. Welcomes the EU-Canada Security and Defence Partnership, signed at the 2025 EU-Canada Summit, as the first such agreement with a partner in the Americas; calls for its swift operationalisation, including Canadian participation in missions and operations of the common security and defence policy (CSDP); supports the negotiation of a directive enabling Canadian entities to participate in EU joint procurement under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Instrument;

40. Underlines that Türkiye’s strategic role as a NATO member and its cooperation with the EU, notably by contributing to EU crisis management missions and operations, are important for European stability and security; believes in the importance of developing a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner, with strict conditionality on respect for the rule of law, fundamental rights, international law and good neighbourly relations; regrets, in this context, that Türkiye continues to dispute the sovereignty of an EU Member State and stresses the fact that Türkiye is making an inadequate effort in aligning with the EU’s CFSP; reiterates its view that the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states, does not comply with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third states; recalls, in this context, the signature and the evocation of the memoranda of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on comprehensive security and military cooperation and on the delimitation of maritime zones; deplores, in addition, Türkiye’s refusal to designate Hamas as a terrorist organisation; underlines, further, the incompatibility between Türkiye’s candidacy for BRICS+ and the EU’s CFSP; calls on Türkiye to fully align itself with EU sanctions against Russia; expresses, furthermore, concern about the state of fundamental freedoms and the democratic backsliding in Türkiye; urges the immediate release of opposition leader Ekrem İmamoğlu, Selahattin Demirtaş, Osman Kavala, and all other political detainees, and calls for the end of the sustained targeting of and judicial harassment against the political opposition, members of the press and civil society representatives; supports the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Türkiye in the interests of reconciliation, good neighbourly relations, regional stability and security and socio-economic development, and welcomes the progress achieved so far;

45. Commends the strong and constructive partnership with the United Kingdom; welcomes the joint statement by the UK and EU leaders of 19 May 2025 following the UK-EU Summit 2025, in particular the establishment of the comprehensive Security and Defence Partnership; calls for its swift and full implementation, including through (i) regular biannual strategic foreign and security dialogues at ministerial level between the UK Foreign and Defence Secretaries and the VP/HR to coordinate responses to crises and align strategic priorities, (ii) UK participation in the EU’s CSDP civilian and military crisis management missions, where legally possible, (iii) enhanced cooperation on cyber resilience, countering hybrid threats, safeguarding critical infrastructure, and tackling illicit finance, (iv) strengthened coordination on sanctions enforcement and (v) joint actions to counter Russia’s shadow fleet, and welcomes the joint commitment to enhance cooperation in the Western Balkans, especially in order to ensure the respect of the power sharing principle of the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement; takes note of the political agreement on the core aspects of the future agreement between the EU and the UK in respect of Gibraltar, announced by the parties on 11 June 2025; awaits the publication of the full legal text for examination;

41. Expresses its deep concern that Türkiye continues to retain the threat of a casus belli against Greece and condemns the illegal occupation of part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkish military forces; regrets that Türkiye has failed to implement the obligations assumed towards the EU as per the Negotiating Framework of October 2005; recalls that full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and normalisation of relations with all EU Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus, is a necessary component of the accession process; believes that, as a consequence of the above, Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed under current circumstances;

46. Commends the close relationship with non-EU western European countries and their strong cooperation with the EU on external action; welcomes, in this context, the conclusion of negotiations on and provisional sectorial application of a broad package of measures for future EU-Switzerland relations, which mark a significant milestone in advancing and deepening the already close relationship; encourages its swift ratification; emphasises the significance of the defence and security partnership with Norway and stresses the importance of promoting stronger relations with Norway in the light of the country’s crucial role for the EU’s energy security; calls for enhanced cooperation on energy resilience and supply diversification as key instruments for advancing the Union’s strategic autonomy; welcomes the growing public support for EU accession in Iceland and the intention expressed by the Icelandic authorities to hold a referendum on the resumption of the EU accession negotiations by 2027; calls, in the meantime, for proactive engagement with the Icelandic Government to deepen the defence and security cooperation and to promote the benefits of EU membership; calls for the swift ratification of the EU association agreements with Andorra and San Marino;

42. Calls for the swift resumption of the Cyprus settlement talks within the UN-agreed framework, and urges against any unilateral actions that are inconsistent with a peaceful settlement; calls for the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus to be respected;

47. Emphasises the strategic importance of the Western Balkans and supports a credible political and security cooperation on their merit-based path to EU integration; believes that the future of the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova lies within the EU, in accordance with the aspirations of their people; condemns Russian interference in the democratic processes of EU candidate countries, notably Moldova; takes note of the results of the parliamentary elections held in Kosovo on 28 December 2025; calls for the swift formation of a new Kosovar assembly and government, in order to address much needed EU-related reforms, particularly concerning the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, and to address obligations regarding the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia; welcomes the partial lifting of EU measures on Kosovo; reiterates that EU accession negotiations with Serbia should only advance on the basis of measurable and sustainable progress in the fundamentals cluster, including full alignment with the EU’s CFSP, in particular the sanctions against Russia; welcomes the successful resumption of the CFSP dialogue between the EU and its partners in the Western Balkans and underlines the importance of these partnerships for peace and security; recalls that EU enlargement constitutes a geostrategic investment in regional security and stability, requiring commitment from both the Union and the candidate countries and calls, in this context, for the EU to make the enlargement process more predictable and politically visible to the citizens of the region; believes that, to this end, the EU must maintain the enlargement momentum and provide candidate countries with sufficient technical and financial assistance and consistent political support on their path towards full membership; stresses, however, the need to further improve the rule of law conditionality and to ensure that all EU funding for the accession countries is fully in line with the EU’s own strategic goals and interests; stresses, simultaneously, that progress on their EU accession path is merit based and conditional on full respect for international law and the EU acquis, as well as their alignment with the CFSP, including adherence to sanctions and EU visa policy; recalls that the enlargement process should proceed in parallel with institutional and decision-making reforms aimed at safeguarding the Union’s integration capacity; urges the EU candidate countries to actively support and collaborate with international justice tribunals and mechanisms to ensure that they can properly carry out their work, and prosecute and ensure accountability for war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and crimes of aggression committed across the whole world;

43. Notes that the Eastern Partnership (EaP) has entered a new geopolitical phase, with partners on an accession path, others pursuing tailored cooperation, and Russia’s aggression dismantling the previous regional balance; whereas the EU must therefore redefine the strategic purpose of the EaP, anchoring it in resilience, democratic transformation, and security; recognises the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly as the parliamentary dimension of the EaP; calls on the Council, the EEAS and the Commission to integrate Euronest’s Parliamentary Assembly deliberations into policy planning;

48. Underlines that one of the key priorities of the CFSP and CSDP in relation to the Eastern Partnership countries must be firm support for their sovereignty and territorial integrity within internationally recognised borders; calls on the Russian Federation to withdraw all its troops from the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, from the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia, and from the illegally occupied parts of Ukraine, with full respect for international law and the UN Charter;

44. Welcomes the EU’s long-term strategic approach to the Black Sea and its Connectivity Agenda as a cornerstone for regional prosperity, linking Europe with the South Caucasus and Central Asia; calls for the swift and effective implementation of the strategy in close cooperation with partner countries, bearing in mind that the promotion of human rights and the rule of law must remain central to the EU’s engagement in the region; underlines the strategic importance of completing key infrastructure projects in line with the extended Trans-European Networks; emphasises the role of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly in this context;

49. Reiterates its support for the European Political Community as a platform for discussion, dialogue and cooperation with European partners on the foreign policy and security challenges we are facing, with the aim of strengthening security and stability in Europe and pursuing political and security cooperation based on shared interests; calls for the close involvement of Parliament in the clarification of the scope and the future work of this community; underlines that, for the future success and coherence of this format, some level of alignment on democratic values and principles is essential; reiterates that the European Political Community may under no circumstances become a pretext for delays to the EU accession of enlargement countries;

45. Emphasises the strategic importance of the South Caucasus and urges the EU to develop a long-term vision for its engagement with the region;

50. Underlines that Türkiye’s strategic role as a NATO member and its cooperation with the EU, notably by contributing to EU crisis management missions and operations, are important for European stability and security; believes in the importance of developing a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner, with strict conditionality on respect for the rule of law, fundamental rights, international law and good neighbourly relations; regrets, in this context, that Türkiye continues to dispute the sovereignty of an EU Member State and stresses the fact that Türkiye is making an inadequate effort in aligning with the EU’s CFSP; reiterates its view that the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states, does not comply with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third states; recalls, in this context, the signature and the evocation of the memoranda of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on comprehensive security and military cooperation and on the delimitation of maritime zones; deplores, in addition, Türkiye’s refusal to designate Hamas as a terrorist organisation; underlines, further, the incompatibility between Türkiye’s candidacy for BRICS+ and the EU’s CFSP; calls on Türkiye to fully align itself with EU sanctions against Russia; expresses, furthermore, concern about the state of fundamental freedoms and the democratic backsliding in Türkiye; urges the immediate release of opposition leader Ekrem İmamoğlu, Selahattin Demirtaş, Osman Kavala, and all other political detainees, and calls for the end of the sustained targeting of and judicial harassment against the political opposition, members of the press and civil society representatives; supports the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Türkiye in the interests of reconciliation, good neighbourly relations, regional stability and security and socio-economic development, and welcomes the progress achieved so far;

46. Condemns the authoritarian tendencies of the Georgian Dream Party and their pivot towards Russian interests, in spite of the protracted occupation of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region / South Ossetia by Russia; rejects any recognition of the parliamentary elections and considers Georgia to be a state captured by the illegitimate Georgian Dream regime; urges the Georgian Parliament to repeal the laws on ‘foreign influence’ and ‘family values’; calls for an immediate end to politically motivated persecution of the political opposition, civil society and independent media and for the unconditional release of all political prisoners; urges the EU to finally respond adequately and decisively to this democratic crisis in a candidate country by leveraging all means available and reiterates its repeated call for the EU and its Member States to impose targeted sanctions against Georgian Dream leaders and officials responsible for democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism; calls for Georgia to return to the European path in line with the clear choice of its people; recalls that, at the same time, Georgia should align with the CFSP, including compliance with sanctions against Russia;

51. Expresses its deep concern that Türkiye continues to retain the threat of a casus belli against Greece and condemns the illegal occupation of part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkish military forces; regrets that Türkiye has failed to implement the obligations assumed towards the EU as per the Negotiating Framework of October 2005; recalls that full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and normalisation of relations with all EU Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus, is a necessary component of the accession process; believes that, as a consequence of the above, Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed under current circumstances;

47. Supports the August 2025 peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan and calls for its implementation in good faith, with full respect for Armenian territorial integrity, as well as for the accompanying peace treaty to be formalised and ratified, starting with the withdrawal by Azerbaijan from territory it occupies in Armenia; calls for the EU to remain constructively involved in the further normalisation of the bilateral relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan; reiterates its call on the Azerbaijani authorities to immediately and unconditionally release all 23 Armenian hostages detained following the attack against the Nagorno-Karabakh region; repeats its call for independent investigations into the abuses committed by Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh and calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to allow the safe return of the Armenian population to Nagorno-Karabakh, to genuinely engage in a comprehensive and transparent dialogue with them, and to provide robust guarantees for the protection of their rights; demands the respect of Armenia’s territorial integrity and encourages transitional justice, as well as sustainable return processes; regrets the further deterioration of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Azerbaijan;

52. Calls for the swift resumption of the Cyprus settlement talks within the UN-agreed framework, and urges against any unilateral actions that are inconsistent with a peaceful settlement; calls for the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus to be respected; draws attention to the Commission’s designation of Johannes Hahn as Special Envoy for Cyprus, which underlines the EU’s commitment to a comprehensive settlement on the agreed basis and its readiness to contribute to the settlement process within the UN framework;

48. Welcomes the positive momentum in bilateral relations between the EU and Armenia, which is strongly supported by the authorities in Yerevan; calls on the Commission and the Member States to actively endorse Armenia’s desire for increased cooperation with the EU; expresses its strong support for the activities of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) and underscores the important role it plays; calls on EUMA to continue to closely monitor the evolving security situation on the ground, provide transparent reporting to Parliament and actively contribute to conflict resolution efforts; commends the extension of EUMA’s mandate and increase in its size;

53. Notes that the Eastern Partnership (EaP) has entered a new geopolitical phase, with partners on an accession path, others pursuing tailored cooperation, and Russia’s aggression dismantling the previous regional balance; whereas the EU must therefore redefine the strategic purpose of the EaP, anchoring it in resilience, democratic transformation, and security; recognises the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly as the parliamentary dimension of the EaP; calls on the Council, the EEAS and the Commission to integrate Euronest’s Parliamentary Assembly deliberations into policy planning;

49. Expresses concern about Russian and Chinese pressure exerted in Central Asia and stresses the urgent need to scale up the EU’s political and economic presence in the region; welcomes the results of the first EU-Central Asia Summit of April 2025, also with a view to improving the human rights situation in the region; highlights the hesitation of Central Asian states to lend support to Russia’s war of aggression given the effect the war is having on the region; calls on the authorities of the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, to cooperate closely with the EU, in particular with its Sanctions Envoy; underlines the EU’s interest in increasing economic relations, intensifying political ties and enhancing cooperation on energy infrastructure with the countries of Central Asia, in part to address the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus; urges the Commission and the Member States to continue promoting political and economic reforms and sustainable development, and strengthening the rule of law, democracy, good governance and respect for human rights;

54. Welcomes the EU’s long-term strategic approach to the Black Sea and its Connectivity Agenda as a cornerstone for regional prosperity, linking Europe with the South Caucasus and Central Asia; calls for the swift and effective implementation of the strategy in close cooperation with partner countries, bearing in mind that the promotion of human rights and the rule of law must remain central to the EU’s engagement in the region; underlines the strategic importance of completing key infrastructure projects in line with the extended Trans-European Networks; emphasises the role of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly in this context;

50. Stresses the need for an effective implementation of the EU’s Gulf strategy through tailored multilateral partnerships with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and with each country in the region; underlines that enhanced cooperation should prioritise migration, digital transformation, research and innovation, the green transition, energy, security and counterterrorism; welcomes the successful conclusion of the first EU-GCC Summit as a pivotal moment in advancing a comprehensive partnership for global and regional security and prosperity; welcomes the Gulf countries’ growing diplomatic role in contributing to international stability and conflict mediation;

55. Emphasises the strategic importance of the South Caucasus and urges the EU to develop a long-term vision for its engagement with the region;

51. Regrets that, 30 years after the launch of the so-called Barcelona Process, a shared space of prosperity, stability and freedom with the Mediterranean countries has not been achieved; recognises the strategic importance of enhanced dialogue with countries in the Mediterranean region with a view to improving human rights and democratic standards, but also given their role in diversifying the Union’s energy supplies and in managing migration flows from countries of origin or transit; endorses the new Pact for the Mediterranean as a comprehensive framework to advance a more secure, stable and prosperous Mediterranean region; encourages sustained engagement, targeted investments and technical assistance to address shared challenges such as migration, climate change and security threats; stresses, further, the role that the Union for the Mediterranean can play as a forum to intensify cooperation programmes between European countries and those on the Mediterranean coast;

56. Condemns the authoritarian tendencies of the Georgian Dream Party and their pivot towards Russian interests, in spite of the protracted occupation of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region / South Ossetia by Russia; rejects any recognition of the parliamentary elections and considers Georgia to be a state captured by the illegitimate Georgian Dream regime; urges the Georgian Parliament to repeal the laws on ‘foreign influence’ and ‘family values’; calls for an immediate end to politically motivated persecution of the political opposition, civil society and independent media and for the unconditional release of all political prisoners; urges the EU to finally respond adequately and decisively to this democratic crisis in a candidate country by leveraging all means available and reiterates its repeated call for the EU and its Member States to impose targeted sanctions against Georgian Dream leaders and officials responsible for democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism and against personalities promoting Russian-backed narratives and strongarming political processes; calls for Georgia to return to the European path in line with the clear choice of its people; recalls that, at the same time, Georgia should align with the CFSP, including compliance with sanctions against Russia;

52. Condemns Iran’s destabilising role in the Middle East, in particular its military support for various non-state actors, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as for the Houthi, which undermines regional security; reiterates its call for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to be added to the EU terrorist list; strongly opposes Iran’s hostage diplomacy and demands that all European nationals being detained in Iran be freed and allowed to leave the country; expresses deep concern about the progress of Iran’s nuclear programme beyond all credible civilian justification; points to the fact that the regime in Tehran has clearly rejected a revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and has refused to cooperate in its ongoing dispute with the International Atomic Energy Agency; regrets the fact that there is currently no strategy in place to persuade Iran to refrain from building military nuclear capacity, nor a plan of action in the event that Iran does cross the nuclear threshold; calls on the VP/HR to put forward a revised strategy towards Iran that prepares for all events; supports the re-imposition of all previously lifted UN and EU nuclear-related sanctions and restrictions against Iran due to its non-compliance with its commitments under the JCPOA;

57. Supports the August 2025 peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan and calls for its implementation in good faith, with full respect for Armenian territorial integrity, as well as for the accompanying peace treaty to be formalised and ratified, starting with the withdrawal by Azerbaijan from territory it occupies in Armenia; calls for the EU to remain constructively involved in the further normalisation of the bilateral relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan; reiterates its call on the Azerbaijani authorities to immediately and unconditionally release all 23 Armenian hostages detained following the attack against the Nagorno-Karabakh region; repeats its call for independent investigations into the abuses committed by Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh and calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to allow the safe return of the Armenian population to Nagorno-Karabakh, to genuinely engage in a comprehensive and transparent dialogue with them, and to provide robust guarantees for the protection of their rights; demands the respect of Armenia’s territorial integrity and encourages transitional justice, as well as sustainable return processes; regrets the further deterioration of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Azerbaijan;

53. Strongly condemns the destabilising Houthi attacks against commercial, as well as military, vessels transiting the Red Sea; stresses that these have caused significant disruption to global trade as shipping companies are forced to reroute much of the Red Sea’s traffic around the southern tip of Africa; calls for collective action and encourages enhanced EU engagement and international cooperation; strongly urges continued action to ensure the freedom of navigation in one of the world’s most critical waterways; calls for the immediate cessation of these illegal attacks;

58. Welcomes the positive momentum in bilateral relations between the EU and Armenia, which is strongly supported by the authorities in Yerevan; calls on the Commission and the Member States to actively endorse Armenia’s desire for increased cooperation with the EU; expresses its strong support for the activities of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) and underscores the important role it plays; calls on EUMA to continue to closely monitor the evolving security situation on the ground, provide transparent reporting to Parliament and actively contribute to conflict resolution efforts; commends the extension of EUMA’s mandate and increase in its size; calls on the Council, the EEAS and the Commission to explore other ways to support Armenia, notably, but not exclusively, in the domain of democratic resilience;

54. Stresses the importance of continuous and increased EU support for the Afghan people, especially women and girls, and all those whose rights are persistently violated by the Taliban; insists on maintaining strictly conditional engagement with the Taliban based on the five benchmarks set by the Council and the UN Special Rapporteur’s recommendations;

59. Expresses concern about Russian and Chinese pressure exerted in Central Asia and stresses the urgent need to scale up the EU’s political and economic presence in the region; welcomes the results of the first EU-Central Asia Summit of April 2025, also with a view to improving the human rights situation in the region; highlights the hesitation of Central Asian states to lend support to Russia’s war of aggression given the effect the war is having on the region; calls on the authorities of the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, to cooperate closely with the EU, in particular with its Sanctions Envoy; underlines the EU’s interest in increasing economic relations, intensifying political ties and enhancing cooperation on energy infrastructure with the countries of Central Asia, in part to address the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus; urges the Commission and the Member States to continue promoting political and economic reforms and sustainable development, and strengthening the rule of law, democracy, good governance and respect for human rights;

55. Reiterates that a peaceful, stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific is of vital European interest, not only for regional security, but also for safeguarding global trade routes, protecting freedom of navigation and ensuring resilience against economic coercion; is concerned that intensifying great power competition in the region, particularly between the United States and China, is increasingly imposing constraints on the EU’s ability to pursue its own agenda of promoting multilateralism and cooperative solutions in the region; points out, in this context, that the Asia-Europe Meeting is still hamstrung because of the geopolitical tensions with Russia; encourages, to this end, closer coordination on foreign, security and defence policy with like-minded partners, particularly Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); reaffirms that the Taiwan Strait is international waters, and supports the right to freedom of navigation by European democracies and their like-minded partners, which underscores that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are essential to global security and prosperity;

60. Stresses the need for an effective implementation of the EU’s Gulf strategy through tailored multilateral partnerships with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and with each country in the region; underlines that enhanced cooperation should prioritise migration, digital transformation, research and innovation, the green transition, energy, security and counterterrorism; welcomes the successful conclusion of the first EU-GCC Summit as a pivotal moment in advancing a comprehensive partnership for global and regional security and prosperity; welcomes the Gulf countries’ growing diplomatic role in contributing to international stability and conflict mediation;

56. Recalls, in this context, the strategic partnership the EU enjoys with Japan, which should serve as a role model for a fruitful bilateral relationship enabling effective policy-shaping in multilateral forums; welcomes the entry into force of the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) on 1 January 2025, alongside the existing Economic Partnership Agreement, and encourages the implementation of the SPA’s provisions for enhanced cooperation in security and defence, including the launch of a regular Japan-EU Security and Defence Dialogue, collaboration on industry-related defence matters, exploration of mutual involvement in defence initiatives and ongoing work on a security of information agreement; welcomes the intensification of cooperation in areas such as maritime security, cybersecurity, space and non-proliferation, as well as concrete joint activity under the Digital Partnership and Energy Dialogue;

61. Regrets that, 30 years after the launch of the so-called Barcelona Process, a shared space of prosperity, stability and freedom with the Mediterranean countries has not been achieved; recognises the strategic importance of enhanced dialogue with countries in the Mediterranean region with a view to improving human rights and democratic standards, but also given their role in diversifying the Union’s energy supplies and in managing migration flows from countries of origin or transit; endorses the new Pact for the Mediterranean as a comprehensive framework to advance a more secure, stable and prosperous Mediterranean region; encourages sustained engagement, targeted investments and technical assistance to address shared challenges such as migration, climate change and security threats; stresses, further, the role that the Union for the Mediterranean can play as a forum to intensify cooperation programmes between European countries and those on the Mediterranean coast;

57. Recognises the strategic importance of South Korea as a key democratic partner in east Asia, with whom the EU has established a comprehensive partnership encompassing political dialogue, trade and security cooperation; recalls that the EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement, the first of its kind with an Asian partner, has significantly deepened economic integration, while ongoing collaboration extends to non-proliferation, cybersecurity, counterterrorism and crisis management; underscores South Korea’s pivotal role in regional stability, particularly in addressing security challenges on the Korean Peninsula, and calls for strengthened coordination in multilateral forums to uphold peace, deter provocations and promote denuclearisation; welcomes, in this context, the establishment of the Security and Defence Partnership; highlights that the Partnership provides a structured framework for dialogue and cooperation across the full spectrum of security and defence issues, including annual ministerial-level Strategic Dialogues; supports the ambition to deepen practical cooperation in areas such as maritime security, building on joint operations, including Atalanta, and exploring new engagements under the EU’s Coordinated Maritime Presences initiative; underlines, finally, that the institutionalisation of this Security and Defence Partnership consolidates South Korea’s position as one of the EU’s most significant Indo-Pacific partners and provides a strong basis for long-term joint action to meet common geopolitical challenges;

62. Condemns Iran’s destabilising role in the Middle East, in particular its military support for various non-state actors, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as for the Houthi, which undermines regional security; reiterates its call on the Council to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a EU terrorist organisation and to extend EU sanctions to all of its members, as well as to all those responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran; expresses its unwavering solidarity with the Iranian people in their ongoing pursuit of fundamental rights and freedoms; condemns the systematic and disproportionate use of force by Iranian security forces against peaceful demonstrators, which has resulted in loss of life and serious injuries; condemns the Iranian regime’s attempts to censor the protests by cutting internet access and telephone networks across the country; calls on the Iranian authorities to immediately cease the use of violence against peaceful assemblies, and to fully respect the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly; strongly opposes Iran’s hostage diplomacy and demands that all European nationals being detained in Iran be freed and allowed to leave the country; expresses deep concern about the progress of Iran’s nuclear programme beyond all credible civilian justification; points to the fact that the regime in Tehran has clearly rejected a revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and has refused to cooperate in its ongoing dispute with the International Atomic Energy Agency; regrets the fact that there is currently no strategy in place to persuade Iran to refrain from building military nuclear capacity, nor a plan of action in the event that Iran does cross the nuclear threshold; calls on the VP/HR to put forward a revised strategy towards Iran that prepares for all events; supports the re-imposition of all previously lifted UN and EU nuclear-related sanctions and restrictions against Iran due to its non-compliance with its commitments under the JCPOA and demands immediate and decisive action in the face of the regime’s entrenched, systematic, and brutal repression of the Iranian people, including mass arbitrary detentions, torture, and the execution of political dissidents; condemns in the strongest terms the regime’s renewed and escalating campaign of violence against protesters, which has resulted in the killing of thousands of protestors, including through the deliberate use of live ammunition and state-sanctioned executions and acts that amount to crimes against humanity under international law, while the regime continues to deny fundamental freedoms to a population that persistently demands dignity, liberty and the right to live in a free and democratic country;

58. Stresses the value of deepening ties with New Zealand, a long-standing partner that shares strong political, cultural and normative affinities with the EU; points out that New Zealand has demonstrated consistent leadership in multilateral diplomacy, nuclear disarmament, and climate action, making it an indispensable ally in advancing common global objectives; welcomes the conclusion of the EU-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement as a milestone in strengthening economic cooperation, while also recognising the potential to expand joint work in security and connectivity;

63. Strongly condemns the destabilising Houthi attacks against commercial, as well as military, vessels transiting the Red Sea; stresses that these have caused significant disruption to global trade as shipping companies are forced to reroute much of the Red Sea’s traffic around the southern tip of Africa; calls for collective action and encourages enhanced EU engagement and international cooperation; strongly urges continued action to ensure the freedom of navigation in one of the world’s most critical waterways; calls for the immediate cessation of these illegal attacks;

59. Emphasises the importance of strengthening strategic cooperation with Australia, which is a like-minded partner sharing the EU’s commitment to democracy, human rights, international law and a rules-based global order; underlines that Australia’s geographic position and active role in regional security make it a central actor in safeguarding stability in the Indo-Pacific; welcomes, in this regard, the announcement made at the G7 Leaders’ Summit in Alberta by European Council President António Costa, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to launch negotiations on a Security and Defence Partnership; stresses that this initiative reflects growing recognition of the interconnectedness of European and Indo-Pacific security, and provides an opportunity to expand joint action on global security challenges; highlights that these negotiations, alongside renewed engagement to conclude an Australia-EU free trade agreement, demonstrate strong momentum in the bilateral relationship, reinforcing not only economic and technological ties but also collective resilience and strategic trust;

64. Stresses the importance of continuous and increased EU support for the Afghan people, especially women and girls, and all those whose rights are persistently violated by the Taliban; insists on maintaining strictly conditional engagement with the Taliban based on the five benchmarks set by the Council and the UN Special Rapporteur’s recommendations;

60. Points to the increased political and geostrategic importance of countries in Oceania, as well as organisations such as the Pacific Island Forum; recalls that, while among the countries most exposed to global challenges and geopolitical pressures, Pacific nations play a leading role in promoting multilateralism and remain key partners in the rules-based international order; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase their diplomatic engagement in the region, where possible in close cooperation with Australia and New Zealand;

65. Reiterates that a peaceful, stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific is of vital European interest, not only for regional security, but also for safeguarding global trade routes, protecting freedom of navigation and ensuring resilience against economic coercion; is concerned that intensifying great power competition in the region, particularly between the United States and China, is increasingly imposing constraints on the EU’s ability to pursue its own agenda of promoting multilateralism and cooperative solutions in the region; points out, in this context, that the Asia-Europe Meeting is still hamstrung because of the geopolitical tensions with Russia; encourages, to this end, closer coordination on foreign, security and defence policy with like-minded partners, particularly Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); reaffirms that the Taiwan Strait is international waters, and supports the right to freedom of navigation by European democracies and their like-minded partners, which underscores that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are essential to global security and prosperity;

61. Is of the view that EU-China relations will be a determining factor for our future economic prosperity and international security; considers, in this context, that the accelerating militarisation of China, its increasing military presence and aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea and its unwarranted military provocations against its neighbours, as well as its military and political partnerships with Russia, North Korea and Iran, constitute a key geopolitical challenge of the 21st century; expresses its concern over the possible shift in China’s foreign policy from strongly assertive to openly aggressive;

66. Recalls, in this context, the strategic partnership the EU enjoys with Japan, which should serve as a role model for a fruitful bilateral relationship enabling effective policy-shaping in multilateral forums; welcomes the entry into force of the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) on 1 January 2025, alongside the existing Economic Partnership Agreement, and encourages the implementation of the SPA’s provisions for enhanced cooperation in security and defence, including the launch of a regular Japan-EU Security and Defence Dialogue, collaboration on industry-related defence matters, exploration of mutual involvement in defence initiatives and ongoing work on a security of information agreement; welcomes the intensification of cooperation in areas such as maritime security, cybersecurity, space and non-proliferation, as well as concrete joint activity under the Digital Partnership and Energy Dialogue;

62. Deplores the ‘no limits’ partnership between Russia and China, in particular the renewed commitment to strengthen their military ties and thereby continue support for Russia’s war machine, including through the export of dual-use materials;

67. Recognises the strategic importance of South Korea as a key democratic partner in east Asia, with whom the EU has established a comprehensive partnership encompassing political dialogue, trade and security cooperation; recalls that the EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement, the first of its kind with an Asian partner, has significantly deepened economic integration, while ongoing collaboration extends to non-proliferation, cybersecurity, counterterrorism and crisis management; underscores South Korea’s pivotal role in regional stability, particularly in addressing security challenges on the Korean Peninsula, and calls for strengthened coordination in multilateral forums to uphold peace, deter provocations and promote denuclearisation; welcomes, in this context, the establishment of the Security and Defence Partnership; highlights that the Partnership provides a structured framework for dialogue and cooperation across the full spectrum of security and defence issues, including annual ministerial-level Strategic Dialogues; supports the ambition to deepen practical cooperation in areas such as maritime security, building on joint operations, including Atalanta, and exploring new engagements under the EU’s Coordinated Maritime Presences initiative; underlines, finally, that the institutionalisation of this Security and Defence Partnership consolidates South Korea’s position as one of the EU’s most significant Indo-Pacific partners and provides a strong basis for long-term joint action to meet common geopolitical challenges;

63. Recalls the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy as one of the principles of EU-China relations; condemns China’s intimidations and threats to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding international waters, including large-scale air and sea manoeuvres such as the ‘Strait Thunder-2025A’ exercises in April 2025; calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure, through clear and consistent signalling, that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, cannot be accepted and will have high costs; underscores that Taiwan is a key democratic partner for the EU in the Indo-Pacific region and urges the EU and its Member States to engage in closer cooperation with Taiwan in order to further boost economic, trade and investment ties; calls, furthermore, for regular exchanges between the EU and its Taiwanese counterparts on relevant security issues; calls for the EU and its Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in multilateral organisations, such as the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; recalls that the White Paper for European Defence ‒ Readiness 2030 expresses concern over China’s coercion against Taiwan through the intensification of political, economic, military, cyber and cognitive measures; underscores that China’s territorial claims over Taiwan have no basis in international law, that neither side is subordinate to the other and that only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent the Taiwanese people; opposes the People’s Republic of China’s constant distortion of UN Resolution 2758 and its efforts to block Taiwan’s participation in multilateral organisations;

68. Stresses the value of deepening ties with New Zealand, a long-standing partner that shares strong political, cultural and normative affinities with the EU; points out that New Zealand has demonstrated consistent leadership in multilateral diplomacy, nuclear disarmament, and climate action, making it an indispensable ally in advancing common global objectives; welcomes the conclusion of the EU-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement as a milestone in strengthening economic cooperation, while also recognising the potential to expand joint work in security and connectivity;

64. Denounces the government-led system of forced labour and the persistent violations of human rights, in particular the systematic repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang Province; observes with concern the intense crackdown on ethnic minorities in Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau and the transnational repression of Chinese dissidents; calls on China to comply with all mandatory conventions of the International Labour Organization;

69. Emphasises the importance of strengthening strategic cooperation with Australia, which is a like-minded partner sharing the EU’s commitment to democracy, human rights, international law and a rules-based global order; underlines that Australia’s geographic position and active role in regional security make it a central actor in safeguarding stability in the Indo-Pacific; welcomes, in this regard, the announcement made at the G7 Leaders’ Summit in Alberta by European Council President António Costa, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to launch negotiations on a Security and Defence Partnership; stresses that this initiative reflects growing recognition of the interconnectedness of European and Indo-Pacific security, and provides an opportunity to expand joint action on global security challenges; highlights that these negotiations, alongside renewed engagement to conclude an Australia-EU free trade agreement, demonstrate strong momentum in the bilateral relationship, reinforcing not only economic and technological ties but also collective resilience and strategic trust;

65. Reiterates its strong condemnation of China’s violation of its international commitments and its breaches of the Sino-British and Sino-Portuguese Joint Declarations, the ‘one country, two systems’ principle and the Hong Kong Basic Law; calls on China to respect and guarantee Hong Kong’s autonomy and to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; calls on the Commission and the Council to review the status of the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in Brussels, as well as the autonomous status of Hong Kong and Macau, in the light of the National Security Law and the People’s Republic of China’s violation of its international commitments; is concerned by Hong Kong’s role in assisting Russia to circumvent the sanctions in force and to procure critical components for the production of arms; deplores, in addition, the crackdown on the special administrative region’s autonomy and opposition figures, including members of civil society and their family members; calls on the EEAS to closely monitor the trials of political prisoners in Hong Kong and call for the release of all political prisoners;

70. Points to the increased political and geostrategic importance of countries in Oceania, as well as organisations such as the Pacific Island Forum; recalls that, while among the countries most exposed to global challenges and geopolitical pressures, Pacific nations play a leading role in promoting multilateralism and remain key partners in the rules-based international order; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase their diplomatic engagement in the region, where possible in close cooperation with Australia and New Zealand;

66. Is concerned about the growing economic penetration of Chinese companies within the EU, including in strategic sectors, such as battery manufacturing; stresses the urgent need to continue the policy of de-risking by continuing to reduce economic dependence in critical sectors, in line with the EU’s economic security strategy; underlines that such dependencies restrict the EU’s foreign policy capacity and increase its vulnerability to political and economic coercion; calls, therefore, for effective de-risking measures, diversification of supply chains and the establishment of new partnerships;

71. Is of the view that EU-China relations will be a determining factor for our future economic prosperity and international security; considers, in this context, that the accelerating militarisation of China, its increasing military presence and aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea and its unwarranted military provocations against its neighbours, as well as its military and political partnerships with Russia, North Korea and Iran, constitute a key geopolitical challenge of the 21st century; expresses its concern over the possible shift in China’s foreign policy from strongly assertive to openly aggressive;

67. Stresses the need for the EU to foster principled dialogue and mutually beneficial cooperation with China to address a number of global challenges, from multilateralism and climate change to global health and international development; underlines, in the context of the above, that the EU must adopt a multidimensional strategy that combines principled diplomacy aimed at upholding international law with economic engagement that safeguards a level playing field and hence secures EU interests, and which will require de-risking vis-à-vis China; confirms that viewing China simultaneously as a partner, an economic competitor and a systemic rival remains a useful analytical framework, but stresses that it is insufficient as a long-term strategic orientation; calls for a structured debate among Member States on the future of EU relations with China in order to define the Union’s strategic objectives; underlines that only by setting out a long-term vision for EU-China relations can the Union design a policy that is consistent, credible and effective, and calls on the Commission and the Council to present proposals to this effect;

72. Deplores the ‘no limits’ partnership between Russia and China, in particular the renewed commitment to strengthen their military ties and thereby continue support for Russia’s war machine, including through the export of dual-use materials;

68. Notes that geopolitical challenges have strengthened the shared interests of the EU and India; supports an EU-India summit to launch a new strategic agenda; welcomes the Strategic Dialogue on Foreign and Security Policy initiated in June 2025 and encourages the creation of an EU-India Security and Defence Partnership, including regular joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean and operational cooperation between the Indian Navy and EU naval missions; underlines the objective of concluding a Security of Information Agreement with India by 2026; stresses the strategic opportunity to reduce India’s dependence on Russian arms imports by supporting defence industry cooperation and technology transfer with European partners, and calls on India to take a clear position against the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and to enhance effective measures to prevent the circumvention of EU sanctions; welcomes the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and underlines that this project could accelerate trade between Europe and India; encourages the EU and India to scale up investments under Global Gateway, building on the current EUR 15 billion Team Europe portfolio, with priority projects in renewable energy, sustainable transport, digital infrastructure and health security; calls for the establishment of an EU-India Business Forum to strengthen private-sector cooperation and ensure market uptake of initiatives; supports the creation of EU-India Innovation Hubs and Start-up Partnerships to promote cooperation in semiconductors, artificial intelligence and green hydrogen, including joint research under Horizon Europe; reiterates the importance of regular ministerial dialogues and parliamentary engagement to provide oversight and ensure delivery on joint commitments; calls on the Indian Government to improve the protection of women and minority rights;

73. Recalls the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy as one of the principles of EU-China relations; condemns China’s intimidations and threats to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding international waters, including large-scale air and sea manoeuvres such as the ‘Justice Mission 2025’ and the ‘Strait Thunder-2025A’ exercises in April 2025 which jeopardise stability in the region; calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure, through clear and consistent signalling, that ongoing attempts to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, cannot be accepted and will have high costs; underscores that Taiwan is a key democratic partner for the EU in the Indo-Pacific region and urges the EU and its Member States to engage in closer cooperation with Taiwan in order to further boost economic, trade and investment ties; calls, furthermore, for regular exchanges between the EU and its Taiwanese counterparts on relevant security issues; calls for the EU and its Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in multilateral organisations, such as the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; recalls that the White Paper for European Defence ‒ Readiness 2030 expresses concern over China’s coercion against Taiwan through the intensification of political, economic, military, cyber and cognitive measures; underscores that China’s territorial claims over Taiwan have no basis in international law, that neither side is subordinate to the other and that only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent the Taiwanese people; opposes the People’s Republic of China’s constant distortion of UN Resolution 2758 and its efforts to block Taiwan’s participation in multilateral organisations;

69. Welcomes the 10th EU-Pakistan Political Dialogue held in Brussels on 17 July 2025, and underlines the importance of fully implementing the Strategic Engagement Plan as the framework for strengthening cooperation in political, economic, security and development matters; calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to build on the progress made under the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) framework and the comprehensive Migration and Mobility Dialogue; encourages continued cooperation on migration, counterterrorism and counternarcotics;

74. Denounces the government-led system of forced labour and the persistent violations of human rights, in particular the systematic repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang Province; observes with concern the intense crackdown on ethnic minorities in Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau and the transnational repression of Chinese dissidents; calls on China to comply with all mandatory conventions of the International Labour Organization;

70. Expresses its support and sympathy to pro-democracy movements in South Asia, in particular in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal, and underlines that these democratic ambitions of the population must be met with concrete reforms and progress by the political leadership; recalls the EU’s long-term support to democracy and civil society in South Asia and underlines that the EU should seek a closer partnership with all countries in the region to provide an alternative model of engagement to China, which is increasing its presence in the region;

75. Reiterates its strong condemnation of China’s violation of its international commitments and its breaches of the Sino-British and Sino-Portuguese Joint Declarations, the ‘one country, two systems’ principle and the Hong Kong Basic Law; calls on China to respect and guarantee Hong Kong’s autonomy and to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; calls on the Commission and the Council to review the status of the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in Brussels, as well as the autonomous status of Hong Kong and Macau, in the light of the National Security Law and the People’s Republic of China’s violation of its international commitments; is concerned by Hong Kong’s role in assisting Russia to circumvent the sanctions in force and to procure critical components for the production of arms; deplores, in addition, the crackdown on the special administrative region’s autonomy and opposition figures, including members of civil society and their family members; calls on the EEAS to closely monitor the trials of political prisoners in Hong Kong and call for the release of all political prisoners;

71. Urges the VP/HR and the Member States to focus on developing stronger bilateral partnerships with like-minded democracies in Africa, based on equality, respect and mutual benefit, as well as on the ‘more for more’ principle, while upholding the universal values of human rights and democracy; stresses that both the EU and Africa are facing the same global challenges; underlines the need to strengthen continent-to-continent relations and welcomes the Joint Declaration of the seventh EU-African Union (AU) Summit; underlines the importance of institutionalising the parliamentary dimension of future EU-AU summits as an integral component of their framework, in order to ensure citizen representation, public oversight and a democratic contribution to the deliberations and outcomes of the partnership; reiterates the added value that the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACP) can bring and welcomes increased cooperation with OACP countries through the Samoa Agreement; calls for the creation of a dedicated EU-Africa industrialisation pact under the joint auspices of the AU, the EU and regional development banks, to mobilise public and private capital, which would ensure that Africa is not just a source of raw materials, but a hub for processing, manufacturing and innovation;

76. Is concerned about the growing economic penetration of Chinese companies within the EU, including in strategic sectors, such as battery manufacturing; stresses the urgent need to continue the policy of de-risking by continuing to reduce economic dependence in critical sectors, in line with the EU’s economic security strategy; underlines that such dependencies restrict the EU’s foreign policy capacity and increase its vulnerability to political and economic coercion; calls, therefore, for effective de-risking measures, diversification of supply chains and the establishment of new partnerships;

72. Remains deeply concerned by the continuing violence and humanitarian crises in several parts of Africa; is particularly alarmed by the continuing violence and insecurity in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, mainly in North Kivu and Ituri Province; calls for the EU to play an active and coordinated role in supporting the implementation of the peace process, focusing on enhancing inclusivity and women’s participation, humanitarian access and protection of civilians; urges the Commission and the Council to immediately suspend the EU-Rwanda memorandum of understanding on sustainable raw materials value chains until Rwanda ceases its interference;

77. Stresses the need for the EU to foster principled dialogue and mutually beneficial cooperation with China to address a number of global challenges, from multilateralism and climate change to global health and international development; underlines, in the context of the above, that the EU must adopt a multidimensional strategy that combines principled diplomacy aimed at upholding international law with economic engagement that safeguards a level playing field and hence secures EU interests, and which will require de-risking vis-à-vis China; confirms that viewing China simultaneously as a partner, an economic competitor and a systemic rival remains a useful analytical framework, but stresses that it is insufficient as a long-term strategic orientation; calls for a structured debate among Member States on the future of EU relations with China in order to define the Union’s strategic objectives; underlines that only by setting out a long-term vision for EU-China relations can the Union design a policy that is consistent, credible and effective, and calls on the Commission and the Council to present proposals to this effect;

73. Expresses serious concern about the devastating conflict in Sudan that has resulted in mass civilian causalities, displacement and widespread human rights violations; strongly condemns all war crimes and human rights violations, and calls for unhindered humanitarian access, full accountability, enforcement of all arms embargoes, and targeted sanctions against all individuals committing these atrocities;

78. Notes that geopolitical challenges have strengthened the shared interests of the EU and India; supports an EU-India summit to launch a new strategic agenda; welcomes the Strategic Dialogue on Foreign and Security Policy initiated in June 2025 and encourages the creation of an EU-India Security and Defence Partnership, including regular joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean and operational cooperation between the Indian Navy and EU naval missions; underlines the objective of concluding a Security of Information Agreement with India by 2026; stresses the strategic opportunity to reduce India’s dependence on Russian arms imports by supporting defence industry cooperation and technology transfer with European partners, and calls on India to take a clear position against the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and to enhance effective measures to prevent the circumvention of EU sanctions; welcomes the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and underlines that this project could accelerate trade between Europe and India; encourages the EU and India to scale up investments under Global Gateway, building on the current EUR 15 billion Team Europe portfolio, with priority projects in renewable energy, sustainable transport, digital infrastructure and health security; calls for the establishment of an EU-India Business Forum to strengthen private-sector cooperation and ensure market uptake of initiatives; supports the creation of EU-India Innovation Hubs and Start-up Partnerships to promote cooperation in semiconductors, artificial intelligence and green hydrogen, including joint research under Horizon Europe; reiterates the importance of regular ministerial dialogues and parliamentary engagement to provide oversight and ensure delivery on joint commitments; calls on the Indian Government to improve the protection of women and minority rights;

74. Notes with concern recent electoral challenges in parts of the African continent, including in Tanzania, Cameroon and Cote d’Ivoire, and recognises the public engagement and demonstrations that have followed; encourages a transparent and thorough review of any reported electoral concerns and calls on the respective authorities to safeguard the expressed will of the people and uphold the rights of all political actors; underscores, in this context, the importance of ensuring that political participation and opposition activities can take place freely and without undue restrictions;

79. Welcomes the 10th EU-Pakistan Political Dialogue held in Brussels on 17 July 2025, and underlines the importance of fully implementing the Strategic Engagement Plan as the framework for strengthening cooperation in political, economic, security and development matters; calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to build on the progress made under the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) framework and the comprehensive Migration and Mobility Dialogue; encourages continued cooperation on migration, counterterrorism and counternarcotics;

75. Regrets the democratic backsliding and the increase in military coups, notably in the Sahel, such as in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali, all of which threaten regional stability; condemns the increasing attempts by external actors to undermine state sovereignty and fuel anti-European narratives through the use of mercenary groups and targeted disinformation campaigns, which is exacerbated by the role played by Russia and China in the region; recalls that this has direct repercussions on the security and prosperity of Europe and hence stresses the urgent need to strengthen the EU’s positive contributions to peace, security and development; underlines the need to use the Global Gateway initiative as a key tool to offer positive partnerships in areas such as infrastructure, health and digital transformation, thereby helping to improve the lives of local populations and countering the growing presence of authoritarian powers on the continent; calls for sustained EU investment in good governance, capacity building and partnership aimed at preventing state collapse, migration spillovers and illicit trafficking, and at fighting against terrorism;

80. Expresses its support and sympathy to pro-democracy movements in South Asia, in particular in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal, and underlines that these democratic ambitions of the population must be met with concrete reforms and progress by the political leadership; recalls the EU’s long-term support to democracy and civil society in South Asia and underlines that the EU should seek a closer partnership with all countries in the region to provide an alternative model of engagement to China, which is increasing its presence in the region;

76. Emphasises that the countries of the EU, Latin American and the Caribbean are like-minded and share values, languages, history, culture and religion, which should make them natural partners in today’s geopolitical context; notes that the EU’s engagement in the region has dwindled in recent decades, which has created a vacuum for the growing influence of China and Russia; urges the Commission and the VP/HR to ensure that the partnership with Latin America and the Caribbean moves from words to action by delivering a roadmap that strengthens both regions’ capacity to act in a contested global order; welcomes the Joint Declaration adopted at the Santa Marta Summit in November 2025; stresses that this renewed agenda must respond to the aspirations of citizens by advancing inclusive growth, closing inequality gaps and supporting regional integration, for example by ensuring that the Global Gateway generates tangible benefits for local communities through transparent investment; recalls that the credibility of the EU as a partner depends on offering a model of cooperation in clear contrast to the exploitative approaches of other global actors and multinational corporations driven by unsustainable business practices; urges the Commission and the VP/HR, in the spirit of enhancing the EU’s geopolitical influence in the region, to strengthen relations and step up international diplomatic action in response to the rise of authoritarian regimes; welcomes the recent EU-CELAC summit in this regard; reiterates its call for a substantial increase in bilateral cooperation in the fight against organised crime, particularly drug trafficking;

81. Strongly condemns the sham general elections conducted by the military junta in Myanmar on 28 December 2025, which lack any democratic legitimacy and were held in an environment of systemic intimidation, violence and coercion; highlights that the forced dissolution of opposition parties and the continued detention of political leaders in Myanmar render the electoral process void; rejects any attempt by the junta to use these fraudulent polls to seek international recognition; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to increase pressure on the military regime through targeted sanctions and to continue supporting the democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar and their efforts towards a genuine, inclusive transition to civilian rule;

77. Is deeply concerned about the tactics deployed by authoritarian regimes in Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua, notably the crackdowns on opposition figures, the restrictions on independent media and the shrinking civic spaces; highlights, in particular, the crackdown on the Catholic Church in Nicaragua; calls on all Latin American countries and the international community to avoid conflicts and cooperate to put diplomatic pressure on these regimes; calls on the VP/HR and the Commission to use all necessary available instruments, without the exclusion of any, to ensure compliance with the democratic and human rights clauses of the cooperation agreements with these countries, which involve their revision; expresses deep concern over the erosion of democratic principles and the deliberate circumvention of constitutional safeguards in El Salvador, in particular with regard to the lack of independence of the judiciary and lack of transparency in governmental actions, the excessive use of force, undue militarisation, and the growing restrictions on the freedoms of assembly and the press;

82. Urges the VP/HR and the Member States to focus on developing stronger bilateral partnerships with like-minded democracies in Africa, based on equality, respect and mutual benefit, as well as on the ‘more for more’ principle, while upholding the universal values of human rights and democracy; stresses that both the EU and Africa are facing the same global challenges; underlines the need to strengthen continent-to-continent relations and welcomes the Joint Declaration of the seventh EU-African Union (AU) Summit; underlines the importance of institutionalising the parliamentary dimension of future EU-AU summits as an integral component of their framework, in order to ensure citizen representation, public oversight and a democratic contribution to the deliberations and outcomes of the partnership; reiterates the added value that the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACP) can bring and welcomes increased cooperation with OACP countries through the Samoa Agreement; calls for the creation of a dedicated EU-Africa industrialisation pact under the joint auspices of the AU, the EU and regional development banks, to mobilise public and private capital, which would ensure that Africa is not just a source of raw materials, but a hub for processing, manufacturing and innovation;

78. Underlines the increased geostrategic relevance of the Arctic and reiterates the need for a coherent and up-to-date EU Arctic policy; expresses increased concern about Russia’s military build-up in the Arctic and the illegal restrictions on freedom of navigation in the Northern Sea Route; notes with growing unease the elevated Chinese interest in the Arctic and underlines that the EU must seek an appropriate response to this; stresses that the Arctic must remain a zone of peace, stability and constructive cooperation; underlines the need to strengthen regional dialogue and coordination with our Arctic partners, including Norway, the United States and Canada, in order to ensure security, sustainable economic development and resilience to geopolitical and climate-related challenges; highlights the importance of integrating Arctic climate change projections into EU foreign, security and civil protection planning; calls for the mandate and resources of the EU Special Envoy for Arctic Matters to be reinforced to better coordinate policy, monitor developments and engage with Arctic partners; calls for the EU’s and Member States’ activities in the Arctic to contribute to and not harm the well-being and rights of Indigenous communities, as per the 1996 Ottawa Declaration; welcomes any potential initiative by the Government of Greenland to strengthen its political, institutional and economic links with the EU;

83. Remains deeply concerned by the continuing violence and humanitarian crises in several parts of Africa; is particularly alarmed by the continuing violence and insecurity in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, mainly in North Kivu and Ituri Province; calls for the EU to play an active and coordinated role in supporting the implementation of the peace process, focusing on enhancing inclusivity and women’s participation, humanitarian access and protection of civilians; urges the Commission and the Council to immediately suspend the EU-Rwanda memorandum of understanding on sustainable raw materials value chains until Rwanda ceases its interference;

79. Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to intensify structured engagement with regional organisations – including ASEAN, the AU, CELAC and the GCC – to develop inclusive regional security architectures and coordinate multilateral policy responses such as:

84. Expresses serious concern about the devastating conflict in Sudan that has resulted in mass civilian causalities, displacement and widespread human rights violations; strongly condemns all war crimes and human rights violations, and calls for unhindered humanitarian access, full accountability, enforcement of all arms embargoes, and targeted sanctions against all individuals committing these atrocities;

85. Notes with concern recent electoral challenges in parts of the African continent, including in Tanzania, Cameroon and Cote d’Ivoire, and recognises the public engagement and demonstrations that have followed; encourages a transparent and thorough review of any reported electoral concerns and calls on the respective authorities to safeguard the expressed will of the people and uphold the rights of all political actors; underscores, in this context, the importance of ensuring that political participation and opposition activities can take place freely and without undue restrictions;

86. Regrets the democratic backsliding and the increase in military coups, notably in the Sahel, such as in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali, all of which threaten regional stability; condemns the increasing attempts by external actors to undermine state sovereignty and fuel anti-European narratives through the use of mercenary groups and targeted disinformation campaigns, which is exacerbated by the role played by Russia and China in the region; recalls that this has direct repercussions on the security and prosperity of Europe and hence stresses the urgent need to strengthen the EU’s positive contributions to peace, security and development; underlines the need to use the Global Gateway initiative as a key tool to offer positive partnerships in areas such as infrastructure, health and digital transformation, thereby helping to improve the lives of local populations and countering the growing presence of authoritarian powers on the continent; calls for sustained EU investment in good governance, capacity building and partnership aimed at preventing state collapse, migration spillovers and illicit trafficking, and at fighting against terrorism;

87. Recalls the threat posed by Islamic terrorism in Africa, notably to religious communities, including Christians, and takes note of enhanced counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and Nigeria, including recent actions against Islamic State-affiliated groups; cautions against the unintended consequences of external military actions, including the risk of fuelling extremist narratives, perceptions of foreign intervention and local grievances that may undermine stability and conflict resolution; underscores that the EU and the United States should intensify joint efforts to support governance and security capacities, prevent radicalisation, fight terrorism and protect religious communities;

88. Emphasises that the countries of the EU, Latin American and the Caribbean are like-minded and share values, languages, history, culture and religion, which should make them natural partners in today’s geopolitical context; notes that the EU’s engagement in the region has dwindled in recent decades, which has created a vacuum for the growing influence of China and Russia; urges the Commission and the VP/HR to ensure that the partnership with Latin America and the Caribbean moves from words to action by delivering a roadmap that strengthens both regions’ capacity to act in a contested global order; welcomes the Joint Declaration adopted at the Santa Marta Summit in November 2025; stresses that this renewed agenda must respond to the aspirations of citizens by advancing inclusive growth, closing inequality gaps and supporting regional integration, for example by ensuring that the Global Gateway generates tangible benefits for local communities through transparent investment; recalls that the credibility of the EU as a partner depends on offering a model of cooperation in clear contrast to the exploitative approaches of other global actors and multinational corporations driven by unsustainable business practices; urges the Commission and the VP/HR, in the spirit of enhancing the EU’s geopolitical influence in the region, to strengthen relations and step up international diplomatic action in response to the rise of authoritarian regimes; welcomes the recent EU-CELAC summit in this regard; reiterates its call for a substantial increase in bilateral cooperation in the fight against organised crime, particularly drug trafficking;

89. Is deeply concerned about the tactics deployed by authoritarian regimes in Cubaand Nicaragua, notably the crackdowns on opposition figures, the restrictions on independent media and the shrinking civic spaces; highlights, in particular, the crackdown on the Catholic Church in Nicaragua; calls on all Latin American countries and the international community to avoid conflicts and cooperate to put diplomatic pressure on these regimes; calls on the VP/HR and the Commission to use all necessary available instruments, without the exclusion of any, to ensure compliance with the democratic and human rights clauses of the cooperation agreements with these countries, which could involve their revision, in particular with regard to Cuba, which is additionally a close partner of the regimes in Moscow and Minsk, providing them with political support and contributing negatively to European security, inter alia by facilitating the involvement of hundreds of Cuban mercenaries in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; underlines that such regimes cannot continue to benefit from privileged cooperation with the EU, such as under the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement; expresses deep concern over the erosion of democratic principles and the deliberate circumvention of constitutional safeguards in El Salvador, in particular with regard to the lack of independence of the judiciary and lack of transparency in governmental actions, the excessive use of force, undue militarisation, and the growing restrictions on the freedoms of assembly and the press;

90. Calls attention to previous positions adopted by Parliament and the Council on the political crisis in Venezuela; recalls that the EU has consistently stated that Nicolás Maduro lacked the legitimacy of a democratically elected president and therefore was not recognised as such; expects recent developments to create openings for democratic progress for the Venezuelan people and civil society; stresses, however, that the manner in which political change occurs is of fundamental importance and notes, with grave concern, that the US unilateral military action conducted outside lawful multilateral frameworks raises significant questions under international law and risks undermining the legitimacy and sustainability of a genuine, inclusive and peaceful democratic transition; emphasises that, under all circumstances, the principles of international law and the United Nations Charter – including respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and the prohibition of the use of force – must be upheld, noting that permanent members of the UN Security Council have a particular responsibility in this regard; supports a swift, peaceful and Venezuelan-led transition to democracy to stabilise the country and allow for the return of the exiled population; welcomes the beginning of the release of political prisoners as a positive signal; recalls that they have been unjustly detained in inhumane and cruel conditions; demands that all political prisoners and other arbitrarily detained people be released unconditionally; underscores that the EU shares the priority of combating transnational organised crime and drug trafficking, which pose significant security challenges, but stresses that these challenges must be addressed through sustained cooperation in full respect of international law; underlines that the oil and natural resources of Venezuela should be used in a well-administered manner by a new democratically elected Venezuelan government in a way that benefits the Venezuelan people and takes them out of poverty and fosters the country’s sustainable development;

91. Underlines that the Venezuelan people must determine their own future through free and fair elections;

92. Welcomes the positive telephone calls between President Trump and President Petro, and President Trump and President Sheinbaum, as a way towards constructive and diplomatic cooperation;

93. Underlines the increased geostrategic relevance of the Arctic and reiterates the need for a coherent and up-to-date EU Arctic policy; expresses increased concern about Russia’s military build-up in the Arctic and the illegal restrictions on freedom of navigation in the Northern Sea Route; notes with growing unease the elevated Chinese interest in the Arctic and underlines that the EU must seek an appropriate response to this; stresses that the Arctic must remain a zone of peace, stability and constructive cooperation; underlines the need to strengthen regional dialogue and coordination with our Arctic partners, including Norway, the United States and Canada, in order to ensure security, sustainable economic development and resilience to geopolitical and climate-related challenges; highlights the importance of integrating Arctic climate change projections into EU foreign, security and civil protection planning; calls for the mandate and resources of the EU Special Envoy for Arctic Matters to be reinforced to better coordinate policy, monitor developments and engage with Arctic partners; calls for the EU’s and Member States’ activities in the Arctic to contribute to and not harm the well-being and rights of Indigenous communities, as per the 1996 Ottawa Declaration; welcomes any potential initiative by the Government of Greenland to strengthen its political, institutional and economic links with the EU; calls for the implementation of the EU-Greenland Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2023, with the aim of further strengthening an equal and mutually beneficial partnership; stresses that this cooperation should be underpinned by substantial EU investments in sustainable infrastructure projects across the raw materials value chain, as well as in other areas such as education, creating long-term value for both the EU and Greenland, while supporting Greenland’s own priorities, economic development and the well-being of its people;

94. Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to intensify structured engagement with regional organisations – including ASEAN, the AU, CELAC and the GCC – to develop inclusive regional security architectures and coordinate multilateral policy responses such as:

(a) cross-cutting partnerships on health security;

Establishing non-negotiable positions we treat as inviolable

80.95. Reiterates that the EU is guided in its external action by the values and principles enshrined in Articles 2, 3(5) and 21 TEU, which inspired the EU’s own creation, development and enlargement;

81.96. Recalls that the EU’s credibility depends on its ability to act coherently, particularly with regard to its external representation, as well as its ability to act decisively when protecting its citizens and safeguarding its interests; emphasises that the threshold for decisive action should be consistently communicated and must include unambiguous responses to grave human rights violations, systematic repression, including against parliamentarians and political opposition, and severe corruption, as well as kleptocracy; supports expanding the EU’s Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (Magnitsky-style human rights sanctions regime) to cover systemic repression and corruption; underlines that corruption enables and exacerbates human rights violations, abuses and the erosion of democratic principles and the rule of law; calls for the EU to develop legislation equivalent to the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act;

82.97. Encourages deeper coordination with the G7 and other democratic partners, including within the G20, to align responses to violations of global norms;

83.98. Underlines the importance of ensuring that the EU’s CFSP is guided by principles that support gender equality and the WPS agenda; urges that these be maintained as core principles of the EU’s CFSP; urges the EEAS and the Commission to maintain the EU’s leading role in championing women’s rights worldwide by thoroughly and ambitiously implementing the Gender Action Plan III; expresses serious concern about the growing backlash against LGBTIQ+ rights in various parts of the world;

84.99. Calls for a child-sensitive approach in the EU’s foreign and security policy and highlights the need for strengthened AU-EU-UN coordination to protect children and adolescents affected by war, displacement and/or humanitarian crises;

85.100. Urges greater attention to be given to the persecution of all minorities, including religious minorities such as Christians; strongly condemns all violence against religious minorities and expresses its solidarity with the victims and their families; reiterates that freedom of religion or belief is inseparable from other fundamental rights and should be promoted in a mutually reinforcing manner; calls for the protection of the freedom of, thought, conscience and religion, and diversity to be integrated into the EU’s external action; calls, therefore, on the Commission to reappoint the position of Special Envoy for the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU;

86.101. Stresses the necessity of supporting the defence of freedom of expression worldwide, including online, as well as media pluralism and values-based journalism, in particular investigative journalism;

87.102. Calls on the EEAS and the Commission to develop clear and transparent benchmarks to assess the effectiveness and overall impact of EU sanctions and to regularly update Parliament in this regard; stresses the need to strengthen the enforcement of sanctions and reiterates the importance of communicating the purpose and effects of sanctions to both EU citizens and partner countries in order to maintain public trust and international credibility; recalls that the consistent and uniform application of restrictive measures in all Member States is necessary for the effectiveness and credibility of the EU’s external action;

88.103. Stresses the importance of timely and coordinated responses in crises, emphasising that effective crisis management relies on rapid decision-making, swift deployment of resources and the ability to adapt to evolving situations, rather than on planning or narratives alone;

89.104. Acknowledges that the requirement for unanimity compels Member States to work relentlessly to achieve compromise and unity, which constitutes a key source of the EU’s political leverage on the global stage; points out, however, that the trade-off between the ideal of unity and the substantial costs of unanimity should be assessed carefully;

90.105. Regrets that, in practice individual Member States have at times used their veto right to dilute agreements, delay decision-making or obstruct common policies; regrets that the potential for fast, efficient and effective foreign, security and defence action, as provided for, inter alia, by the passerelle clauses of the TEU, has remained untapped;

91.106. Reiterates its call for the Council to gradually transition to qualified majority voting for decisions in areas of the CFSP that do not have military or defence implications, specifically in the context of our sanctions regime; acknowledges the concerns of some Member States regarding a perceived reduction in their influence over foreign and security policy at EU level; recalls that the VP/HR is tasked, as set out in her mission letter, with triggering the use of Treaty provisions enabling qualified majority voting for the CFSP and, accordingly, expects the VP/HR to engage in constructive dialogue with the Member States to that end; encourages the full use of all possibilities that currently exist to enhance decisiveness in this regard and calls on the Member States to make greater and more transparent use of constructive abstention in line with Article 31(1) TEU in cases where they cannot endorse a decision but do not wish to block the Union’s collective action; stresses that this approach strengthens the EU’s ability to respond swiftly and coherently to international crises, while respecting national sovereignty, and demonstrates that greater effectiveness in the CFSP is already possible without a Treaty change; recognises that progress towards the application of qualified majority voting can only be gradual, building on the formation of a European strategic culture;

Increasing the impact of EU external action that we deliver

92.107. Regrets that the EU’s global visibility and political influence often falls short of its economic, financial and diplomatic footprint; regrets that this lack of visibility is at times the product of a lack of clarity in the external representation of the EU; stresses the need to clearly define the competences of the VP/HR, the President of the Commission and the President of the European Council with regard to the EU’s external action and representation so that the EU’s voice is coherent and perceived as such by its partners; calls on the Commission to strengthen its coordination with the EEAS in external action, including by ensuring full compliance with Articles 3(2) and 9 of the EEAS Decision, which may need to be updated;

93.108. Calls on the Council and the Commission to speak with one voice; notes that some progress on the CFSP can be made by using the provisions in the existing Treaties, such as the ‘passerelle clause’; stresses that the Treaties should provide specifically for the possibility of establishing a European Defence Union, and that the VP/HR should be supported in her efforts to become the main external representative of the EU in international forums;

94.109. Commends the efforts of the European Diplomatic Academy to contribute to an EU diplomatic corps and culture; calls for the Academy to include European citizens who are not only Member States’ diplomats; stresses the importance of ensuring that sufficient resources, including human resources, are allocated to the Academy;

95.110. Calls on the VP/HR to swiftly come up with proposals for the future operational structure of the EU’s external action and, to that end, to fully take into account Parliament’s recommendation of 15 March 2023 taking stock of the functioning of the EEAS and for a stronger EU in the world;

96.111. Calls on the VP/HR to propose a coherent and strategic communication strategy that highlights the benefits of the EU’s external action and underpins EU objectives while countering disinformation campaigns orchestrated by non-EU countries; encourages the EEAS to strengthen the EU’s political presence in our partner countries and to make our external action more accessible to audiences in those countries, including through multilingual campaigns, cultural diplomacy and engagement with local stakeholders and media; supports the inclusion of communication as a performance criterion in EEAS programming; stresses that this strategy should also strengthen the visibility of Union-funded projects with clear signposting including the words ‘European Union’ and the flag of the EU, particularly in candidate countries, in order to counter any attempts to undermine EU initiatives;

97.112. Advocates for a more prominent EU presence at global summits, regional forums and conflict mediation platforms, not only through Member States but also under a visible EU flag;

98.113. Calls for enhanced convergence between the EU’s and the Member States’ diplomatic services to improve synergies between national branding and EU messaging, in line with the ‘Team Europe’ approach;

99.114. Underlines that budgetary constraints pose a major obstacle to increasing the visibility and impact of EU external action; stresses that without clear geographical and thematic prioritisation, limited resources risk being spread too thinly to have a strategic impact; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to carry out a genuine exercise of prioritisation, in order to identify where EU external action can deliver the greatest political and strategic return; recalls, in this context, that the Commission must be able to ensure that funds truly benefit the intended recipient and are not misused;

100.115. Calls for the EEAS – both its headquarters and EU Delegations – to be strengthened through the provision of appropriate financial and human resources so that the EU can be better prepared for current and emerging global challenges; calls for the EEAS to be able to select and recruit its permanent EU diplomatic staff, including those graduating from the European Diplomatic Academy, and to ensure a fairer gender and geographical balance among Member States across all levels within the EEAS;

101.116. Highlights the strategic potential of the Global Gateway initiative to serve not only as an investment platform, but also as a tool to strengthen the EU’s presence and visibility worldwide; welcomes the fact that the Commission has given priority to the implementation of Global Gateway projects; is concerned by reports that a number of Global Gateway projects are being implemented by Chinese companies in direct violation of the initiative’s objectives of presenting an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and of creating genuine national value in partner countries; calls, therefore, for an immediate investigation of all Chinese companies involved in Global Gateway; reiterates that Global Gateway should contribute to global stability and security, while strengthening Europe’s resilience; stresses, furthermore, that to align political commitment and geopolitical ambitions, a renewed commitment to timely delivery, stronger local ownership in the identification of projects, and well-defined private sector engagement are needed; calls on the Commission to accelerate the realisation of projects and to streamline the number of flagship projects with the aim of maximising the impact of the initiative; believes, in addition, that Global Gateway projects require better public communication, in particular in the case of indirect management with implementing partners, such as blended finance operations under the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus involving multiple stakeholders; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the EEAS to systematically strengthen communication around EU-funded actions, ensuring coherent messaging, clear attribution and effective visibility of the Union’s leadership and added value; points to the fact that the EUR 300 billion budget allocated to this initiative is less than one third of the scale of projects already under way under China’s comparable connectivity- and infrastructure-focused Belt and Road Initiative; recommends strengthening Parliament’s oversight role to ensure greater accountability and transparency in the funding process for Global Gateway projects, including regular reporting by the Commission and the EEAS, enhanced parliamentary scrutiny of project selection and implementation, and systematic evaluation of results and impact;

102.117. Reaffirms the role of the EU special representatives (EUSRs), who promote the EU’s policies and interests in specific regions and countries and play an important role in the development of a stronger and more effective CFSP by providing the EU with an active political presence in key countries and regions, acting as a ‘voice’ and ‘face’ for the EU; stresses the importance of EUSRs having a broad, flexible mandate, capable of adapting to evolving geopolitical circumstances in order to promote the EU’s policies and interests in specific regions and countries; insists that the appointment of new EUSRs should take place only after a hearing in Parliament;

103.118. Calls for a renewed approach to preventive diplomacy as a proactive external policy tool to pre-empt, mediate and peacefully resolve conflict between parties; calls on the EEAS to integrate the EU’s preventive diplomacy tools within structural prevention mechanisms and actions, such as political agreements among different actors involved in conflicts, national dialogues for reconciliation, peacebuilding and transitional justice, as well as truth and reconciliation commissions;

104.119. Recalls that Parliament’s exercise of its budgetary function is inextricably linked to its function regarding democratic scrutiny and consultation; underlines that in the CFSP, which comprises the CSDP, Parliament exercises its budgetary function jointly with the Council; recalls that Parliament also exercises the function of political control and consultation over those policies, as referred to in Article 36 TEU;

105.120. Underlines the need for a more detailed budgetary nomenclature in the CFSP budget, as well as for the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument and the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, which allow the budgetary authority to set policy and geographic priorities in the framework of the annual budgetary procedure;

106.121. Reiterates its call to promote the establishment of a system of automatic and continuous flow of intelligence from Member States to the EEAS on foreign and security issues occurring outside the Union; calls, in this regard, for the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre, the EEAS Crisis Response Centre and the EU Satellite Centre to be strengthened by enhancing their staff and financial resources, as well as capabilities; urges the improvement of the security protocols of the services working on intelligence and/or with sensitive information;

107.122. Recalls that Parliament has a distinct role to play in complementing the visibility and impact of the EU’s external action, thereby complementing the efforts of the diplomatic services of the EU and the Member States;

108.123. Believes that there is a need for stronger parliamentary oversight of EU external action, including regular and timely, yet secure, access to confidential information and structured dialogues in line with Article 36 TEU; emphasises the need for more feedback from the VP/HR and the EEAS about the actions taken and the effects achieved, in order to fulfil Parliament’s recommendations outlined in the resolutions on foreign affairs matters; stresses that democratic oversight cannot be effective without genuine access to classified information and assessments, and urges improvements to the 2002 Interinstitutional Agreement to make it fit for current security realities;

109.124. Underlines that each request raised above requires an appropriate written response from the VP/HR; calls on the VP/HR to respond to Parliament’s calls, requests and concerns swiftly and in writing; considers that oral statements in committee or plenary can only constitute a sufficient response in exceptional or urgent cases; stresses that in the current challenging geopolitical context, close cooperation and partnership between Parliament and the VP/HR are of strategic importance; underlines that CFSP or CSDP decisions entailing expenditure always constitute basic choices for those policies and must be subject to parliamentary oversight; expects more systematic exchanges prior to the adoption of mandates and CFSP strategies, and an improved flow of information on negotiations and the implementation of international agreements, as well as memoranda of understanding;

°

° °

110.125. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

Each year, the Committee on Foreign Affairs drafts a resolution on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in response to the report presented by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament. This resolution evaluates the progress and challenges of the CFSP and constitutes a central part of the European Parliament’s contribution to shaping the EU’s external action. It is particularly important in light of the strengthened scrutiny powers granted to the European Parliament under the Treaty of Lisbon.

This report expands on key strategic priorities that guide the future direction of the CFSP, offering clear guidance for the EU executive. It emphasises a forward-looking posture through several core principles that Parliament insists should underpin the CFSP:

a. Shaping the rules-based international order we defend;

b. Fostering cooperation based on interests we share;

c. Establishing non-negotiable positions we treat as inviolable;

d. Increasing the impact of EU external action we deliver.

The report elaborates on each of these priorities in detail.

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he included in his report input on matters pertaining to the subject of the file that he received, in the preparation of the report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee, from the following interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register, or from the following representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies:

1. Interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register

Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS)

The Federal Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany

Permanent Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO

European External Action Service

German Marshall Fund

2. Representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament's Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

MINORITY POSITION

The Left – MEPs Marc Botenga, Pernando Barrena Arza, Danilo Della Valle, Giorgos Georgiou and Rima Hassan

Minority Position under Rule 56 Rules of Procedure

Implementation of the common foreign and security policy –annual report 2025 (2025/2164(INI)

In 2025, the EU continued to strongly condemn Russia’s violations of international law, but still failed to condemn Israel’s genocide in Gaza. The EU adopted more sanctions on Russia, but European arms and money continued to fuel the Israeli war machine. This report fails to hold the EU to account for its complicity in genocide. Instead of abnormalizing genocide, the report openly pushes for the improvement of relations with Israel. It criticizes human rights’ violations by the Iranian regime, but - as the EU hopes to increase trade with Gulf countries - does not even mention for example the Saudi regime.

These double standards show how EU rhetoric on human rights and international law merely serves specific geopolitical interests. More broadly, the report promotes a world vision of opposing blocks, rather than one of multilateral and diversified trade and cooperation. Instead of promoting fundamental principles of the UN Charter, like sovereignty or noninterference, the report violates the Charter’s spirit by pressuring countries to align with EU policy. In an emerging multipolar world, the EU should instead develop a non-aligned foreign policy in the interest of peoples in Europe and abroad, fostering win-win cooperation throughout the world, and promoting disarmament and diplomacy.

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Date adopted

2.12.2025

Result of final vote

+:

–:

0:

42

14

4

Members present for the final vote

Mika Aaltola, Mieke Andriese, Lucia Annunziata, Petras Auštrevičius, Jordan Bardella, Wouter Beke, Adam Bielan, Helmut Brandstätter, Grzegorz Braun, Petr Bystron, Tobias Cremer, Danilo Della Valle, Elio Di Rupo, Loucas Fourlas, Michael Gahler, Giorgos Georgiou, Christophe Gomart, Bernard Guetta, Hana Jalloul Muro, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Ondřej Kolář, Andrey Kovatchev, Sergey Lagodinsky, Antonio López-Istúriz White, David McAllister, Vangelis Meimarakis, Sven Mikser, Francisco José Millán Mon, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Hannah Neumann, Leoluca Orlando, Tonino Picula, Thijs Reuten, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Andreas Schieder, Alexander Sell, Villy Søvndal, Davor Ivo Stier, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Michał Szczerba, Marta Temido, Cristian Terheş, Riho Terras, Hermann Tertsch, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Roberto Vannacci

Substitutes present for the final vote

Pernando Barrena Arza, Jaroslav Bžoch, Viktória Ferenc, Giorgio Gori, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Miriam Lexmann, Matjaž Nemec, Matthieu Valet, Isabel Wiseler-Lima

Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

Nikos Papandreou, Carla Tavares, Catarina Vieira

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

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