What changed

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

P10_TA(2025)0309

on the applicationApplication of the Treaty provisions related to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the role of national parliaments in the EU legislative process

(2025/2042(INI))

Committee on Constitutional Affairs

PE768.159

European Parliament resolution of 27 November 2025 on the application of the Treaty provisions related to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the role of national parliaments in the EU legislative process (2025/2042(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Article 5 on the conferral of competences, subsidiarity and proportionality, Article 10(1) on representative democracy, Article 10(2) on the representation of EU citizens, Article 10(3) on the right of EU citizens to participate in the democratic life of the Union, Article 11 on participatory democracy and Article 12 on the role of national parliaments,

– having regard to Protocol No 1 to the TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on the role of national parliaments in the European Union1Union and to Protocol No 2 to the TEU and the TFEU on the application of the principles of subsidiarysubsidiarity and proportionality2,proportionality,

– having regard to Articles 2-6, 15 and 122 TFEU,

– having regard to its resolutions of 7 May 2009 on the development of the relations between the European Parliament and national parliaments under the Treaty of Lisbon3,Lisbon, of 16 April 2014 on relations between the European Parliament and the national parliaments4,parliaments, of 19 April 2018 on the implementation of the Treaty provisions concerning national parliaments5parliaments and of 17 January 2024 on the implementation of the Treaty provisions on national parliaments6,parliaments,

– having regard to its resolution of 22 November 2023 on proposals of the European Parliament for the amendment of the Treaties7,Treaties, in particular the proposed amendments related to the subsidiarity principle and Protocol No 2,

– having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’8competitiveness’ (the Draghi report),

– having regard to the Commission’s annual reports on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and relations with national Parliaments,

– having regard to the final report of the Task Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and ‘Doing Less More Efficiently’ of 10 July 20189,2018,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 23 October 2018 entitled ‘The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality: Strengthening their role in the EU’s policymaking’ (COM(2018)0703),

F. whereas, in line with the principles enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon, particularly Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, the entire EU institutional framework must make consistent and sustained efforts to ensure the active involvement of national parliaments in the European decision-making process; whereas the yellow and orange card mechanisms, as provided for in the Treaty of Lisbon, should be strengthened, and consideration should be given to further enhancing their effectiveness;

G. whereas only the first of the three yellow card procedures led to the withdrawal of a proposal for a regulation10,regulation, the second led to enhanced cooperation between 20 Member States instead of unanimous implementation11,implementation, and the third had no effect, while 14 reasoned opinions have been submitted by parliaments in 11 Member States12;States;

H. whereas the EWS has only led to two procedures before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to assess the correct application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; whereas the CJEU ruled in both cases that there had been no violation of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

7. Stresses that any legislative initiative by the Commission falling under shared competences must be strictly framed by a thorough ex ante impact assessment, demonstrating in a quantified and reasoned manner the need for effective action and the choice of instruments; demands that the Commission expressly justify, through a comparative analysis between Member States, that legislative harmonisation at EU level brings substantial added value and does not constitute a disguised extension of competence; recalls the Commission’s intention, expressed in its 2018 communication, to integrate an assessment grid into its better regulation guidance and to use it as part of the impact assessments, evaluations and explanatory memoranda that accompany its legislative proposals; regrets that so far this has not been fulfilled in practice; welcomes, in this regard, the subsidiarity grid developed by the European Committee of the Regions and encourages the Commission to use it as the basis for its subsidiarity assessments; insists on the need for more rigorous control of the use of Articles 122 and 352 TFEU as a legal basis and calls for a strengthened prior consultation of the national and regional parliaments with legislative powers before proposing legislation at EU level;

8. Notes the concerns expressed unanimously by the French Senate’s European Affairs Committee13Committee regarding the weak legal foundation for certain EU legislative initiatives, the increasing tendency to favour regulations over directives, and the excessive use of implementing or delegated acts;

9. Recalls that Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the Treaties requires the Commission to provide a detailed appraisal of whether it has complied with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; urges the Commission, jointly with the European Parliament, to conduct a more systematic analysis of subsidiarity and proportionality when drafting legislative proposals; recalls that subsidiarity checks are essential for good governance and should not be reduced to a mere box-ticking exercise; calls for greater transparency in applying these principles, with each legislative proposal providing detailed justifications for EU intervention, the added value of the action and the proportionality of measures in relation to the objectives;

12. Points out that national parliaments have rarely used the yellow card or orange card procedures; underscores that this is not because of disinterest on the part of national parliaments; notes that there are a number of possible explanations for the limited use of the yellow card procedure, including the lack of transparency in EU law-making, the lack of knowledge about the EU legislative process, and time constraints; considers that parliaments that refrain from using the instrument make it more difficult to reach the required threshold; recognises that the current procedure is too cumbersome and leaves room for improvement; recalls, in this context, its earlier proposals to extend the deadline for yellow card procedures to 12 weeks and to have a wider reflection on the possibility to upgrade the EWS to a tool to enable national parliaments to shape EU policies; recalls, in this sense, its latest resolution on the implementation of the Treaty provisions on national parliaments, where it called on the Member States to ensure that national parliaments have enough resources to fulfil their constitutional role of oversight and recommended that national parliaments use the platform for EU Interparliamentary Exchange (IPEX) more effectively and involve their regional parliaments in bringing the EWS into operation;

13. Welcomes the creation of informal procedures to enhance coordination between the Commission, the European Parliament and national parliaments, such as the political dialogue, the rapporteurs’ dialogue and the website entitled ‘National Parliament opinions and Commission replies’14;replies’; urges the Commission to explore avenues to further improve consultation with national parliaments on subsidiarity concerns, for example by establishing a ‘single subsidiarity hub’ (SSH) based on the IPEX platform, where reasoned opinions, as well as, for example, contributions, opinions of the European Committee of the Regions, answers from the Commission and Parliament resolutions, would be collected and freely accessible; considers that an SSH would be a suitable place for the Member States to request that the Commission propose supporting or coordinating legislation in an area of the Member States’ exclusive competence;

14. Welcomes the Commission’s recent efforts to expand and improve the subsidiarity grid as part of its ex ante impact assessment of EU legislation using the better regulation toolbox; calls on the Commission to further mainstream the subsidiarity review in its policy cycle by, inter alia, extending the evaluation of subsidiarity following interinstitutional negotiations if required by the resulting amendments;

21. Recalls that national parliaments exercise democratic control over their respective national governments, which represent the interests of Member States in the Council; highlights that some Member States provide for more active participation of their national and/or regional parliaments in the European legislative process by, for example, exercising parliamentary reserve; encourages all Member States to implement measures ensuring more active participation of national parliaments in the forming of their national positions in order to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the Council’s deliberations;

22. Welcomes the contributions of the LXXII Plenary Meeting of the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC)15,(COSAC), which recommended strengthening the subsidiarity review by the national parliaments by extending the eight-week deadline for submitting opinions to 10 weeks and through lowering the threshold for triggering the yellow card to one quarter of the votes cast;

23. Calls for a strengthening of the role of national parliaments in the EU by enhancing transparency, dialogue, and cooperation mechanisms between national parliaments and the Commission; stresses that while national parliaments do not hold formal direct powers over the Commission akin to those of the European Parliament, their political influence should be reinforced to ensure more transparency and legitimacy of the Commission’s actions;

35. Notes that the CJEU is also bound by the principles of subsidiarity when interpreting matters of shared competences, since the act of judicial interpretation of legislation amounts to law-making;

36. Takes note of the CJEU’s interpretation that not taking into account the particular situation of one or more of the Member States in the assessment of a legislative initiative does not constitute a violation of the principle of proportionality16;proportionality; insists that the individual particularities of the Member States are relevant for the purpose of drafting legislation for the EU as a whole;

37. Expresses concern about the CJEU’s judgment stating that the failure to carry out an impact assessment cannot be regarded as a breach of the principle of proportionality17;proportionality; calls on the Commission to carry out impact assessments without exception and ensure that when the scope of the legislative proposal changes, the Commission comes forward with a new impact assessment;

38. Underlines that respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is crucial for citizens’ trust in the EU and its legislation, and should be more clearly communicated to the public during communication on single legislative initiatives;

50. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and national parliaments.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

This draft report comes at a crucial point where the Commission has committed to simplifying EU regulation and cutting red tape. The proper application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality can contribute significantly towards this goal, since it would mean that the Commission only proposes legislation where strictly necessary.

The draft report analyses the application of the Treaty provisions on how effectively the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are being upheld in the European legislative process.

The principle of subsidiarity and proportionality are key concepts in the European Union’s governance framework, primarily outlined in Articles 4 and 5 of the Treaty on European Union as well as its Protocol No 2 on the “Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality”. This Protocol provides additional rules for assessing compliance with the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality. It emphasises the role of national parliaments in monitoring the application of this principle. The Early Warning Mechanism, introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon in its Protocol No 2, offers to national parliaments the possibility of examining new legislative proposals from the Commission for compliance with the concept of subsidiarity through the so-called ‘yellow card’ and ‘orange card’ procedures. In this context, national parliaments are crucial actors in the European legislative process, ensuring that EU actions respect the principle of subsidiarity, promoting accountability, and enhancing democratic legitimacy within the EU framework.

The draft report urges the Commission to provide more detailed responses to reasoned opinions received from national parliaments and to provide a more substantive analysis of whether the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality have been complied with in their explanatory memorandums included in the legislative proposal.

It further focuses on the challenges faced, particularly in inter-institutional dialogue and the role of national parliaments in the Early Warning System since the Treaty of Lisbon. The draft report points out the need to have a common understanding of the definition of principles of subsidiarity and proportionality as well as the lack of a consistent and substantive judicial review of the application of these principles by the European Court of Justice.

The draft report explores ways to strengthen legislative scrutiny by national parliaments within the European legislative process and proposes how to empower the role of national parliaments in this process.

The draft report emphasises the importance of respecting the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality to ensure that EU legislative action respects Member States’ competences and sovereignty. It also suggests that respect for these principles will inevitably lead to deregulation and better law-making within the EU.

ANNEX: DECLARATION OF INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she included in her report input on matters pertaining to the subject of the file that she received, in the preparation of the report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee, from the following interest representatives falling within the scope of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory transparency register1, or from the following representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies:

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Key:

+ : in favour

- : against

0 : abstentions