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What changed

From · Plenary report · 18 Jul 2025 A-10-2025-0147 on public procurement
To · Adopted text · 9 Sept 2025 TA-10-2025-0174 Public procurement
✦ In short · AI narration of the differences below, generated 4 Sept 2026

Adds provisions to prioritize European bidders and EU added value in public procurement, including new recitals and paragraphs on strategic independence and reciprocity. #1#4#7 Extends the scope of best price-quality ratio to intellectual and engineering services, and requires industrial partnerships for strategic projects. #6#9 Expands the impact assessment to cover Article 15 of Directive 2014/24/EU and adds emphasis on lot division for engineering services. #8#10 Strengthens language on preventing social dumping and preserving economic sovereignty in the call to the Commission. #3 The other changes are formal or wording: recital renumbering, reference update, and rephrasing of paragraph 24. #2#5

8 changes of substance, plus 1 formaland1 wording-only. Each change below carries a one-line ✦ note from the same model. Written from the two texts only — read the highlighted passages before relying on it.

The changes to the text itself, in document order. Cover page, citations (“having regard to …”), standard resolution paragraphs and punctuation-only edits are left out — they are in “Show every difference”.

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Change #1 Substance

Adds two new recitals stating that public procurement should be a strategic lever for EU added value and that contracting authorities should be allowed to prefer bids with significant EU added value.

O. whereas considering the challenges related to European industrial sovereignty and the need to preserve and strengthen European jobs and know-how, public procurement should be used as a major strategic lever to promote the creation of added value within the EU, thereby enhancing industrial resilience and the sustainability of European supply chains;

P. whereas contracting authorities in the EU should be allowed to give preference to bids that include a significant proportion of added value produced within the EU;

Change #3 Substance

Replaces 'including by addressing harmful dependencies' with 'preventing social dumping and preserving our economic and industrial sovereignty, in order to address harmful dependencies'.

4. Calls, therefore, on the Commission to fully align the public procurement reform with its strategic objectives aimed at reducing bureaucracy and regulatory burdens, simplification, maintaining high social and environmental standards, guaranteeing ambitious local economic development, promoting access for SMEs and boosting the EU’s competitiveness and security, includingpreventing bysocial addressingdumping and preserving our economic and industrial sovereignty, in order to address harmful dependencies in respect of certain vital products and services; advises against measures that could compromise any of these principles;

Change #4 Substance

Adds a new paragraph noting international competition pressure and expecting lead markets to be anchored in public tenders to strengthen strategic independence, giving priority to European bidders.

7. Notes that international competition is putting pressure on numerous industrial sectors in Europe through overcapacity and price dumping, and therefore expects that, in addition to promoting green and social initiatives, lead markets should also be anchored in public tenders in order to strengthen Europe’s strategic independence in key sectors, giving priority to European bidders within these sectors;

Change #6 Substance

Extends the call for best price-quality ratio to include intellectual and engineering services, and adds that non-price considerations should have substantial weight.

37.38. Notes that awarding public contracts based solely on the lowest price might encourage unfair competition and that this is at the expense of quality, sustainability and social standards; insists that more contractscontracts, especially for intellectual services, should be awarded based on the best price-quality ratio, through use of MEAT criteria, meaning that tenders should be evaluated not only on price but also on factors such as quality, regional impact or continuity of supply of complex and essential services; adds that non-price considerations should be given a substantial weight in the overall rating and final decision on the award of contracts;contracts, especially for engineering services, which are essential to ensure high-quality, profitable projects in the long term, while protecting innovation and deterring the submission of abnormally low tenders;

Change #7 Substance

Adds a new paragraph calling on the Commission to exclude bidders from non-EU countries that do not grant reciprocal market access.

58. Calls on the Commission to set out clearly that bidders from non-EU countries are not eligible to participate in public procurement procedures conducted within the EU if their country of origin does not give, on the basis of a plurilateral or bilateral agreement on public procurement signed with the EU, reciprocal market access for EU bidders;

Change #8 Substance

Extends the impact assessment to include Article 15 of Directive 2014/24/EU for targeted strategic sectors, in addition to Article 85 of Directive 2014/25/EU.

67.69. Requests that the Commission conduct an in-depth impact assessment, in the context of the upcoming review of the public procurement framework, on possible ways and implications of prioritising the ‘European preference’ principle in procurement related to strategic industries so as to ensure the continuity of critical capabilities in Member States and bolster resilience, security, competitiveness and strategic autonomy; emphasises that the Commission should carefully evaluate the potential cost implications, the risks of limiting access to cutting-edge technologies, and the effects on the quality of services and products, while maintaining consistency with the EU’s international legal commitments and not excluding like-minded partners; underlines that any measures to promote the participation of European companies should not amount to protectionism or distort competition; recognises, in that context, the importance of businesses that invest and reinvest in the EU, strengthening the EU’s economy, protecting workers’ welfare and benefiting local communities; invites the Commission, furthermore, to examine opportunities to boost the participation of EU-based companies in procurement processes launched for projects financed by EU institutions or by extension of the preference system set out in Article 85 of Directive 2014/25/EU to contracts awarded by contracting authorities;authorities and in Article 15 of Directive 2014/24/EU for targeted strategic sectors;

Change #9 Substance

Adds a new paragraph calling for provisions allowing contracting authorities to require industrial partnerships with EU-based entities for strategic projects, including technology transfer.

70. Calls for the inclusion, in public procurement procedures concerning projects of strategic interest for the EU – particularly in the fields of critical infrastructure, advanced technologies and critical raw materials – of provisions allowing contracting authorities to require economic operators to establish industrial partnerships with legal entities based in the EU; is of the view that such partnerships should include clauses ensuring the transfer of technologies, know-how or key technical skills to EU-based partners, in full compliance with Union law and international commitments;

Change #10 Substance

Adds a sentence underlining the relevance of dividing contracts into smaller lots for engineering, construction, and planning services.

76.79. Stresses that the EU public procurement framework must ensure equitable access for SMEs, social economy entities and local businesses by promoting simplified procedures, including by ensuring that companies are not required to re-submit publicly available information in their tender application and by applying proportional requirements based on the local context; calls on the Commission to consider mainstreaming the division of contracts into smaller lots to foster competition and to prevent dominance by large entities, while recognising that contracts should not be divided where there is a genuine technological or efficiency rationale for not doing so; underlines that this division into smaller lots is of particular relevance for engineering, construction and planning services as it can strengthen competition, safeguard participation opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises and micro-enterprises, and enable the targeted use of specialised expertise; emphasises the need for clear guidelines determining when non-division of contracts is justified; notes that the division of lots is also an effective means of preventing unfeasible subcontractor chains;