What changed

Follow up to the European Parliament non-legislative resolution on a united response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure

B100424/2025

Resolution tabled pursuant to Rule 136(2) of the European Parliament's Rules of procedure

European Parliament resolution on a united response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure

References: 2025/2901(RSP) / B10-0419/2025 / P10_TA(2025)0230

(2025/2901(RSP))

Date of adoption of the resolution: 9 October 2025

The European Parliament,

Competent Parliamentary Committee: /

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia, including that of 23 November 2023 recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism,

Brief analysis/ assessment of the resolution and requests made in it:

– having regard to the international legal framework for preventing and fighting terrorism, including UN Security Council Resolution 2341 on protection of critical infrastructure against terrorist acts, adopted on 13 February 2017,

The resolution expresses full solidarity with all Member States exposed to Russia’s direct and escalatory threats and acts of hybrid warfare, threatening European citizens, and calls for increased cooperation, unity and enhanced coordination and detection. It welcomes the response by NATO forces and encourages the EU’s future actions against similar violations. It calls on the Council and the Commission to increase the effectiveness of sanctions on Russia, Russia’s shadow fleet and against its supporters and to penalize those violating them. It urges the integration towards a European Defence Union and building on and going further than current frameworks such as provided in the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030. Notes that the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) legislation should be implemented swiftly. It welcomes the use of the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument, the Defence Equity Facility, the drone initiative, the Eastern Flank Watch initiative, the role of the Drone Coalition in the standardisation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAVs) and calls on the Commission to present a coherent plan at the European Council meeting on 23-24 October 2025. Lessons learned from Ukraine should be considered.

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, in particular Article 2(4) thereof, and to the relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly,

Response to the requests in the resolution and overview of the action taken, or intended to be taken, by the Commission:

– having regard to the agreement between the Council of Europe and Ukraine on the establishment of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine,

On paragraph 4, the Commission and the High Representative /Vice-President underline that since 2014 the Council adopted numerous packages of sanctions, targeting Russian ability to continue waging the war against Ukraine, including by targeting its sources of revenue and its supply lines.

– having regard to verified reports concerning repeated violations of EU and NATO member states’ airspace by the Russian Federation, posing serious risks to regional security and stability, as well as to the sabotage and terrorist operations conducted on behalf of, and instigated by, the Russian Federation on these territories,

On 23 October 2025, the EU adopted the 19th sanctions package against Russia, which targeted key sectors fuelling Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, in particular energy, finance, and the military industrial complex, including on third countries enablers. The package also imposed additional sanctions on critical shadow fleet networks, notably on vessels, enablers and buyers in third countries such as China. After the adoption of further designations in December 2025, the EU has now sanctioned more than 50 shadow fleet enablers and nearly 600 vessels. Work has already begun on the 20th sanctions package.

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

The Commission and the High Representative /Vice-President also recall that, in October 2024 a new framework for restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities was adopted by the Council. These new sanctions regime aims to address hybrid actions against the EU, its Member States, partner states, as well as international organisations and bodies. Following the latest round of designations on 15 December 2025, there are currently 59 individuals and 17 entities included on the list of persons subject to restrictive measures. In May 2025 the Council added a possibility to target tangible assets which are used for activities of destabilising character. That may include vessels, aircraft, real estate, ports, airports, and physical elements of digital and communication networks. It should be noted that each Member State is responsible for implementing and enforcing sanctions on their territory.

A. whereas the Russian Federation continues its illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine in violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, accompanied by systematic violations of international humanitarian law and war crimes, including the unlawful detention of prisoners of war and civilians, all of which amount to crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide;

On paragraph 6, the Commission recalls that countering hybrid threats is a primary responsibility of the Member States, whose security (in terrestrial, aerial, maritime and digital domains) is a primary sovereign competence. Due to the cross-border nature of these hybrid threats, the Commission and the High Representative /Vice-President support the Member States and have put in place a range of policies and instruments. Those actions will follow the Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 flagship instruments, such as European Eastern Flank Watch and European Drone Defence Initiative, aiming to assist the coordination and to boost the EU defence industry technological base via supporting actions in domains of companies, industry, innovations and joint procurement. This will aim to help Member States enhance their situational awareness and monitoring capacity, strengthen their resilience, develop and implement an effective deterrence by cost imposition to tackle hybrid threats, all in close coordination and joint action with partners, notably NATO. Any proposal for such an escalation ladder will have to be discussed with the Council.

B. whereas there are now an alarming number of incidents in which the Russian Federation has deliberately violated, and allowed its weapons systems or drones to violate, the airspace of NATO member states and adjacent non-NATO states;

On paragraph 7, the Commission took action on 3 December 2025 to preserve the integrity of the EU financial system by proposing to add Russia to the EU list of high-risk jurisdictions presenting strategic deficiencies in their national anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) regimes. The Delegated Regulation accomplishing this was subject to a period of scrutiny and non-objection of the European Parliament and the Council for one month. None of the co-legislators objected, and so the Delegated Regulation entered into application on 29 January 2026.

C. whereas approximately 24 drones were deliberately launched into Poland’s airspace by Russia on 9 and 10 September 2025, while Russia continues to deny any responsibility for the deliberate large-scale incursion;

The Commission shares the concerns expressed by the European Parliament in paragraph 8 regarding the disruptions to Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) services, which have far-reaching economic and societal consequences, including a significant negative impact on aviation and maritime safety. In light of actions that led to the condemnation of Russia by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Assembly and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the Commission is prepared to continue collaborating with Member States to escalate pressure on Russia by addressing the issue at the international level, including initiatives within UN agencies. Merely defending the EU values in international forums is insufficient, as this challenge is fundamentally an EU issue. Consequently, the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) are developing a comprehensive EU action plan in response to requests made by several Member States in June 2025. The aviation part of this plan, to be prepared together with the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and EUROCONTROL and in consultation with relevant stakeholders, is expected to focus on actions aimed at guaranteeing safety and minimising the impact on capacity in the short term while enhancing resilience to interference in the medium and long term.

D. whereas on 19 September, three Russian MIG-31 fighter jets entered and stayed in Estonia’s airspace for a total of 12 minutes, disregarding communication from two Italian pilots in F-35 fighter jets in a deliberate violation of Estonia’s airspace;

On paragraph 13, the Commission recalls that it works closely with the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group to provide financing to the EU defence industry. In line with the calls made by the Commission, such as in the European Defence Industrial Strategy, since 2024 the EIB Group progressively increases its support to this sector, including by adapting its exclusion policy. In 2026 the EIB will invest EUR 4.5 billion in support of security and defence, corresponding to 5% of EIB’s total financing within the EU. The Commission partnered with the European Investment Fund (EIF) to set up the Defence Equity Facility, a EUR 175 million instrument under InvestEU supporting the development of an ecosystem of private funds investing in defence. In the Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, the Commission announced that, together with EIB/EIF, it would create an up to EUR 1 billion Fund of funds (equity) supporting the fast growth of defence-related scale-ups and defence related projects – by the first quarter of 2026.

E. whereas both Poland and Estonia have invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

On paragraphs 14 and 15, the Commission recalls that Member States will decide on the scope, format, content, and schedule of possible flagships. The Joint Communication of 16 October 2025 on Preserving peace - Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 invites Member States to agree on the appropriate coordination arrangements by Spring 2026, with support from the Commission, the High Representative and other EU actors, including the European Defence Agency. Progress on each flagship will be monitored in the Annual Defence Readiness Report.

F. whereas on 13 September 2025, a Geran-2 drone used by the Russian Federation in attacks against Ukraine entered Romanian airspace, and was intercepted by F-16 aircraft of the Romanian Air Force; whereas the drone flew in Romanian national airspace for approximately 50 minutes before leaving, and whereas the risk of collateral damage prevented it from being shot down; whereas Romania has experienced over 10 drone incursions as well as repeated drone crashes and instances of drone debris landing at its border and in the Danube Delta area between 2023 and 2025;

The European Drone Defence Initiative will be designed with a 360° approach, as a multi-layered, technologically advanced system with interoperable counter-drone capabilities for detection, tracking, and neutralisation, as well as capabilities to hit ground targets by leveraging drone technology for precision strikes. The counter drone capacity should be fully interoperable and connected among Member States providing European situational awareness and ability to act together and secure critical infrastructure together with NATO. The Eastern Flank Watch will integrate the air defence and counter-drone systems with a set of ground defence systems with maritime security in the Baltic and Black Seas and systems for increased situational awareness, as well as internal security and border management.

G. whereas debris from Russian drones has repeatedly entered the territory of Moldova, including the incident in Etulia in February 2024 when fragments of an explosive-laden Shahed drone were discovered; whereas Latvia and Lithuania have also reported multiple incursions and reconnaissance flights, amounting to dozens of incidents since early 2022 and posing serious risks to sovereignty, civilian safety and regional security; whereas Russia bears full responsibility for these actions, which are escalatory, risk miscalculation and endanger lives; whereas several NATO allies have warned they would shoot down Russian jets or drones involved in any further violations of NATO airspace;

In addition, the Commission is engaging actively with the European defence industrial ecosystem on drones and counter-drone solutions. On 28 November 2025, an industrial roundtable was organised, bringing together primes, mid-caps, Small and Mediums Entreprises (SMEs), start-ups and scale-ups across the EU and Ukraine. The roundtable aimed to achieve three key objectives: understanding the industry's current capacities, identifying main bottlenecks, and collecting concrete proposals to enhance interoperability. Furthermore, on the same day, the Commission hosted the launch event of the EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS) Tech Alliances, which aims to bring together new defence actors (particularly start-ups and SMEs, including dual use ones) and Member States. Additionally, the Commission plans to conduct an industrial mapping of drones and anti-drone systems in 2026. Furthermore, in July 2025 the European Commission together with Ukraine has announced an establishment of BraveTechEU, a joint initiative to boost defence innovation under EDF and learn from Ukrainian defence tech experience. The EDIP programme will include a Ukraine Support Instrument, which will be instrumental not only to the implementation of BraveTechEU, but also flagship projects under EDPCIs.

H. whereas the Russian Federation deliberately engages in repeated airspace violations and related hostile acts with the aim of testing NATO’s resolve and probing the limits of collective defence, seeking to provoke a reaction by NATO member states; whereas Russia consistently refuses to acknowledge responsibility for such incidents, instead denying all evidence, accusing NATO member states of fabricating reports and disseminating disinformation to discredit the EU and its allies;

On paragraph 25, the Commission shares the Parliament's assessment of Russia's hybrid warfare and recalls that its Communication “ProtectEU - a European Internal Security Strategy” identified hybrid threats among the key security threats faced by the Union. The Commission is committed to ensure its swift implementation to upgrade the Union’s capacity to anticipate, prevent and respond to security threats, as well as to strengthen resilience across Member States. Both ProtectEU and the Preparedness Union Strategy emphasise notably the urgent need for Member States to fully transpose and implement the Directive on the resilience of critical entities (CER Directive) and the NIS2 Directive. In this context, the Commission has launched infringement proceedings against those Member States that failed to notify national transposition measures and continues to provide support and guidance to Member States and operators for the correct implementation of the directive(s).

I. whereas numerous drones – some already confirmed by the authorities to be used ‘militarily’ – have been spotted over and in close proximity to civilian airports and military bases across NATO member states; whereas these incidents occurred, among other places, in Germany, Norway and Denmark, where such a drone incursion over Copenhagen Airport led to major disruptions in air traffic on 22 September 2025;

Air transport services with Russia and with several other third countries such as China, which are referred to in paragraph 26, are regulated by bilateral air service agreements between Member States and those countries. As regards measures to stop benefits from “overflight fees”, it is important to recall that the Commission has deemed these “overflight fees” (or “royalties”) in the Member States’ bilateral agreements with Russia illegal and that infringement proceedings against our Member States are ongoing, albeit currently dormant in light of the ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine and the resulting sanctions regime. As regards the re-examination of bilateral agreements with China, the Commission remains ready to engage with Member States to coordinate a common approach and to continue enforcing robust sanctions against Russia's aviation sector. The Commission has also drawn attention to the safety risks of operating in the Russian airspace as outlined in the Conflict Zone Information Bulletin issued by EASA and also stands ready to coordinate with Member States the information on risks to be provided to European passengers.

J. whereas since 2022, Moscow has shifted to a ‘gig-economy’ model of sabotage in Europe: small, on-demand attacks task-allocated via Telegram and often paid for in cryptocurrency; whereas this model relies on cross-border crypto flows and opaque payment services that exploit regulatory gaps; whereas encrypted platforms such as Telegram enable recruitment and payment routing while facing no oversight;

The Commission is concerned by the multiple recent incidents involving unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), commonly known as ‘drones’, which can be used for espionage, attacks and illegal trafficking. It actively monitors technology developments and threat evolution. As announced in European Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 (JOIN(2025) 27) and in its Communication on countering potential threats posed by drones (COM(2023) 659), the Commission continues to support Member States, facilitating sharing of best practices and of information related to drone incidents, testing counter-UAS technologies, delivering counter-UAS training for law enforcement and working on the development of voluntary performance requirements for counter-UAS systems. In this regard, ProtectEU contains additional proposals to increase response capacity, notably upgrading the existing JRC living lab into a Counter-Drone Centre of Excellence, assessing the harmonisation of Member States’ laws and procedures for the use of counter-drone systems, and working on the development of a harmonised testing methodology for counter-drone systems.

K. whereas the Russian Federation’s actions form part of a coherent and escalating hybrid-warfare modus operandi directed at NATO, the EU and their member states, encompassing foreign-influence operations targeting elections (including documented interference attempts and disruptive campaigns in Romania and persistent malign influence in Moldova) as well as sustained disinformation, the weaponisation of migration, cyberattacks, and GPS-spoofing and jamming; whereas hybrid actions increasingly take the form of kinetic operations such as arson attacks, maritime sabotage and suspected cuts to undersea communication cables, and acts of sabotage targeting railway infrastructure and disruption of airport operations, as well as other measures designed to degrade democratic resilience and critical infrastructure; whereas these combined activities are intended to probe and test the limits of NATO and national responses, weaken support for Ukraine and create political and social fractures while Moscow disavows responsibility and amplifies denialist narratives; whereas recent high-visibility incidents in the Baltic states, Poland, Denmark, Romania, Moldova and other countries, together with corroborating intelligence assessments, underline the immediacy and severity of the threat, which demands a sharp increase in situational awareness across the EU and NATO and should prompt coordinated efforts to strengthen deterrence and resilience, and to introduce robust countermeasures;

L. whereas on 12 September 2025, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte announced the launch of ‘Eastern Sentry’, a military activity aimed at bolstering NATO’s posture along the alliance’s eastern flank; whereas in her State of the Union address, the President of the Commission announced the establishment of a ‘drone wall’;

M. whereas Russian forces continue to carry out systematic drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities in record numbers, targeting civilians in the course of their daily activities, including by striking ambulances and rescue personnel; whereas the use of drones against clearly identifiable civilian targets, the dissemination of footage of these killings and the posting of explicit threats on social media demonstrate a coordinated state policy aimed at terrorising the population and forcing displacement; whereas during recent attacks, Ukrainian government buildings, as well as the EU mission and the Embassy of Poland, were hit, indicating deliberate targeting by the Kremlin;

N. whereas components of Western origin are still being found in Russian missiles and drones, which demonstrates insufficient pressure and inadequate enforcement of sanctions, and requires urgent investigation and prosecution of intermediaries as well as of entities failing to exercise appropriate due diligence and end-user control;

O. whereas apparent neutrality or peace posturing by political actors and movements, whether promoted domestically or imported from abroad, replicates and amplifies Kremlin narratives and thus functionally aids Russian disinformation and foreign-influence operations aimed at confusing voters, polarising societies and undermining free choice at the ballot box; whereas such dynamics have been documented in the neighbourhood (notably in Moldova and in targeted campaigns affecting Romania), and are part of a broader pattern of foreign information manipulation and interference;

1. Condemns in the strongest terms the recent blatant and deliberate violations of Polish and Estonian airspace by the Russian Federation by means of large-scale drone swarms and fighter jet incursions; condemns the Russian Federation for repeatedly breaching the airspace of several other EU Member States and NATO allies including Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Romania; recalls that Russia bears full responsibility for these actions, which are escalatory, risk miscalculation and endanger lives;

2. Strongly condemns the Russian Federation for its ongoing hybrid warfare, which encompasses weaponisation of migration, cyberattacks and misinformation campaigns, sabotage and subversion, as well as a series of aggressive and flagrantly irresponsible actions that threaten the security and territorial integrity of the EU Member States and their neighbours; strongly condemns acts of state-sponsored terrorism, including sabotage, arson and bomb attacks targeting Europe’s military and critical infrastructure, such as airports and railways, plotted assassinations and physical assaults, and even the placement of explosive devices on commercial aircraft, as recently revealed by Lithuanian prosecutors;

3. Recalls that Parliament has recognised Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism and as a state that uses means of terrorism;

4. Welcomes the initiative to establish a European ‘drone wall’ as part of a broader defence shield along the EU and NATO’s eastern flank in response to repeated Russian airspace violations; stresses the need for unity, solidarity and rapid implementation in order to strengthen Europe’s security, in particular of those countries most exposed to Russia’s threat; recognises the challenge posed by the high cost of intercepting drones and calls for joint programmes to promote the development of cost-effective counter-unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) capabilities;

5. Welcomes the ongoing Eastern Sentry operation aimed at shielding and protecting NATO’s eastern flank as well as any other operations and deployments, as concrete means and essential components of strengthening the EU’s collective defence posture along its eastern flank and in the Baltic region;

6. Calls on the Commission, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States, in close coordination with NATO, to accelerate the development of a concrete and operational plan for the swift deployment of the Eastern Sentry operation, ensuring interoperability with national air-defence systems, adequate financing and robust civilian protection; underlines that time is of the essence in deterring further provocations and safeguarding the sovereignty and security of the Union and its neighbourhood;

7. Underlines the urgent need to accelerate reaction times at both EU and NATO levels in response to repeated Russian provocations, including airspace violations and hybrid operations; stresses the importance of enhanced coordination between Member States, EU institutions and NATO structures, including the possible establishment of a permanent interinstitutional Russia crisis cell, tasked with real-time monitoring, rapid information sharing and swift operational decision-making at the highest institutional level; recalls that delayed reactions not only risk leaving security gaps but also undermine the credibility of the EU and its partners in deterring further Russian aggressive actions;

8. Calls for the EU, in close cooperation with Ukraine, to invest in the deployment of physical barriers and anti-drone nets in order to strengthen the protection of the eastern flank; highlights the importance of the EU’s Black Sea strategy and of the maritime security hub, as well as Romania’s role in hosting it;

9. Recommends the development of comprehensive national civil defence strategies against aerial and missile threats, including UAS, ensuring preparedness at the national, regional, municipal, community and household levels, and that these strategies emphasise early warning systems for local populations, clear instructions regarding response behaviour, and protected spaces (sheltering);

10. Encourages Member States to pursue a regulatory environment and procurement processes that coordinate and integrate the existing European ecosystem with strategic partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and Japan where they bring needed critical capabilities and raw materials, emphasising joint development in propulsion, electronic warfare, laser development and mission-critical software;

11. Calls on the European Defence Agency to establish a dedicated, flexible budget for UAS that spans the full capability lifecycle, flexible requirements and appropriations to accelerate acquisition and fielding, while drawing on the operational lessons and battlefield experience gained by Ukraine;

12. Recommends that Member States, particularly frontline states, adopt missile and drone launch detection systems that can transmit information across the EU to serve as a shield for Europe’s multilayered aerial defence capabilities;

13. Calls on the Commission to include specific drone capability goals in the upcoming EU common defence policy, monitored through the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence and backed by Permanent Structured Cooperation projects; welcomes the use of the Security Action for Europe instrument and the Defence Equity Facility to scale production, secure supply chains and support the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises in the unmanned systems sector;

14. Recommends the joint development and procurement of multilayered defence systems and robust domestic preparedness emphasising civil alert systems, protected shelters and public education campaigns;

15. Emphasises the need for stronger civil-military airspace coordination; supports the expansion of joint simulation and interception exercises involving civilian, law enforcement and military organisations to enhance preparedness for multi-domain threats; underlines that such exercises should be conducted on a mandatory annual basis to ensure sustained readiness and interoperability;

16. Underlines that it is unacceptable that, in the fourth year of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, Russian missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles used in attacks continue to rely heavily on Western-manufactured components; calls for thorough investigations and tougher penalties for entities that violate sanctions or fail to exercise due diligence in export controls and end-user verification; reiterates that any form of support provided to the aggressor by states such as Iran, North Korea or China must have direct consequences for all other relations with these countries, including trade;

17. Recognises the ongoing role the Drone Coalition plays in the standardisation of UAS, its critical aid to Ukraine and its role in ensuring Member States keep pace with fast-changing requirements on the battlefield; encourages Member States to use this partnership to reduce lengthy procurement, clearance, development and testing requirements to aid the speedy acquisition of UAS and anti-drone systems;

18. Calls for the creation of a joint EU-NATO drone centre of excellence in a frontline state hosting the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence battalion, including active testing facilities and an active drone manufacturing hub to streamline joint exercises and interoperability across Member States;

19. Calls for the institutionalisation of Ukraine-NATO-EU knowledge transfer programmes via rotational staff exchanges with personnel from the Ukrainian armed forces and by expanding joint training programmes under the European Defence Agency, focused on real-world drone survivability and innovation lessons;

20. Calls for EU-NATO cooperation in institutionalising the lessons learned from Ukraine’s battlefield experience by integrating the doctrinal and technological innovations into their preparations for modern combat conditions;

21. Calls on the Member States, the Commission and the High Representative, acting in full respect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, to adopt proportionate, transparent and legally robust measures to strengthen democratic resilience and to prevent the establishment of covert foreign influence in Member States;

22. Expresses concern about the alarming increase in Schengen visas being issued to Russian nationals, and the high number of entries recorded in summer 2025; underlines the moral implications of hosting tourists from an aggressor state as well as the related security dimension; calls on the Commission and the Member States to adopt tougher rules regarding the issuance of tourist visas for Russian citizens and limitations thereon, including introducing a requirement for visa applicants to attach a copy of their military booklets, and to introduce measures restricting the movement of Russian diplomats within the EU;

23. Considers it unacceptable that, despite extensive evidence that Russia conducts state terrorism and systematically uses terrorist means, the EU still does not classify Russia as a high-risk third country for money laundering and terrorist financing, which limits the tools available to counter acts of sabotage sponsored or instigated by the Kremlin; urgently calls on the Commission to initiate the procedure to independently list Russia as a high-risk third country under Regulation (EU) 2016/1675; believes that formally recognising the Russian Federation as a jurisdiction with strategic anti-money laundering and terrorist financing deficiencies would also help to combat sanctions evasion and the circumvention of restrictive measures;

24. Calls for the immediate adoption of a robust 19th sanctions package targeting Russia’s primary sources of revenue;

25. Notes reports indicating that Russia has been using Telegram to recruit agents and coordinate sabotage activities within the EU; calls on the relevant authorities, in particular the Belgian Institute for Postal Services and Telecommunications (BIPT), which serves as the regulatory body for Telegram in the EU, to take into account independent data and to classify Telegram as a very large online platform (VLOP), thereby subjecting it to much stricter EU obligations, including enhanced risk-management duties, data-sharing requirements and independent audits;

26. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations.