What changed

Follow up to the European Parliament non-legislative resolution on Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

B90123/2024

Resolution tabled pursuant to Rule 132(2) and (4) of the European Parliament's Rules of procedure

European Parliament resolution on Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

Reference numbers: 2024/2548 (RSP) / B9-0124/2024 / P9_TA (2024)0079

(2024/2548(RSP))

Date of adoption of the resolution: 8 February 2024

The European Parliament,

Competent Parliamentary Committee: N/A

– having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on strengthening transparency and integrity in the EU institutions by setting up an independent EU ethics body,

Brief analysis/ assessment of the resolution and requests made in it:

− having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

The resolution has been adopted in view of allegations of Russian interference in the EU democracy and in the context of media reports that a Member of Parliament may have acted as an informant for the Fifth Service of the Russian Federation’s Federal Security Service (‘FSB’) from at least 2004 to 2017.

− having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on suspicions of corruption from Qatar and the broader need for transparency and accountability in the European institutions,

The Parliament expresses its outrage and grave concern about the efforts of Russia to undermine European democracy and condemns Russian efforts to abuse and falsify European history. The resolution expresses deep concern over the media reports about the Member of Parliament in question and provides support to the Latvian investigation into the case. The document reiterates the European Parliament’s outrage about the revelations of Russian funding of political parties and points out to concrete cases of Russian interference in Member States. It urges the EU institutions to adopt a permanent cross-cutting approach to combating foreign information manipulation and interference more effectively, calls for a raised ambition on the part of the Institutions regarding the Ethics Body and calls on the Secretariat of the EU Transparency Register to ban any entities with direct or indirect relations with the Government of Russia. In the resolution, the Parliament asks the Commission and the Council to deliver on the Defence of Democracy package, to find a compulsory regulatory scheme for the big platforms and step up the EU’s cyber defence against possible attacks on our electoral system. The Parliament calls to close the loopholes in EU party financing legislation and make significant investments in strengthening democratic resilience and the rule of law, including measures directed at enhancing EU counter-intelligence capabilities. The resolution urges EU institutions and Member States to take decisive action to ensure that European elections are free of foreign interference and calls on EU institutions and Member States to implement resilience strategies for the elections. It underlines the need to monitor efforts and enhance their implementation well ahead of elections, referendums and other important political process. The document also underlines the key role of investigative journalism and reiterates its call to ensure sufficient and sustainable funding for this activity.

− having regard to its resolution of 13 July 2023 on recommendations for reform of the European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption,

Response to the requests and overview of the action taken, or intended to be taken, by the Commission:

− having regard to the legal principle of the presumption of innocence,

The Commission shares the European Parliament’s concerns regarding threats of foreign interference coming from Russia and takes note of the Parliament’s calls to establish a permanent cross-cutting approach to combating foreign information manipulation and interference more effectively (paragraph 17).

− having regard to Rules 9 and 10 of its Rules of Procedure and Annex I on the Code of Conduct for Members of the European Parliament regarding integrity and transparency,

In December 2023, the Commission adopted the Defence of Democracy package, including a Directive on the transparency of interest representation. The package is focused on transparency and democratic accountability while addressing the issue of foreign interference. The Commission would like to reassure the European Parliament that it is doing its utmost to make sure that the proposals and recommendations contained in the package are adopted and implemented (paragraph 22).

– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

As explained in the Communication presenting the Defence of Democracy package, under the European Democracy Action Plan, the EU has enhanced efforts to improve its capacity to react to the new and evolving threat landscape – both domestically and internationally. Existing cooperation has been strengthened within the Commission, between the EU institutions and services and beyond, involving relevant stakeholders in civil society, academia and private industry, as well as international partners.

A. whereas according to media reports, the Latvian security service intends to open an investigation into allegations of espionage on behalf a third country by MEP Tatjana Ždanoka;

More particularly, the Commission’s Network against Disinformation, is contributing to the fight against disinformation over several relevant strands: (i) monitoring, (ii) strategic communication (iii) coordination, and (iv) awareness raising. The Commission is further strengthening coordination and operational work in the context of the Network and developing responses to disinformation and other strategic communications challenges.

B. whereas the case was immediately handed over to the European Parliament’s Advisory Committee on the Conduct of Members;

The European External Action Service (EEAS) has been working on tackling foreign information manipulation and interference (‘FIMI’) in close cooperation with the Commission services, other EU institutions and the Member States. This resulted in the dedicated FIMI Toolbox to ensure the necessary instruments to prevent, detect, deter and respond to the threat. Strong networks within the European Union Institutions, with Member States and international partners (in particular the G7 and the NATO) have been built to respond to the FIMI threat in a multi-directional effort in particular within the Rapid Alert System (‘RAS’). Considering the cross-border nature of the threat, an international cooperation has accelerated towards creation frameworks for a collective response, in particular with the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism. In the period leading up to the 2024 European Parliament elections, EEAS continues its thorough monitoring and analyses of Russian state and pro-Kremlin outlets’ malign campaigns. EEAS shares these insights on the RAS, in a dedicated space for the elections, and uses them in its awareness raising and capacity building. Outreach to civil society, media and academia is intensified across EU institutions and Member States to equip the defender community with relevant knowledge and tools ahead of the elections.

C. whereas the possible penalties under the Rules of Procedure include forfeiture of the entitlement to the daily subsistence allowance, temporary suspension from participation in all or some of the activities of Parliament and limitations on the right to access confidential or classified information;

With regards to the Parliament’s calls to urgently take action and close loopholes in EU party financing legislation (paragraph 22), the Commission would like to underline that donations from third countries are not allowed under Regulation 1141/2014 on the statute and funding of European Political parties. In its Recommendation on inclusive and resilient elections, which is part of the Defence of Democracy Package, the Commission identified and addressed possible gaps in national legislation and other regulatory measures related to donations and other funding from third countries. The Commission has been working with Member States on the implementation of its recommendations, including at several meetings of its European Cooperation Network on Elections, which has discussed the subject of foreign interference and how to address it. The Council’s Horizontal Working Party on Hybrid Threats and Democratic Resilience is preparing Council conclusions on resilient electoral processes.

D. whereas trust in Parliament’s integrity and the rule of law is paramount for the functioning of European democracy;

Regarding the calls for a regulatory scheme for the big platforms and to step up EU cyber defence against possible attacks on our electoral system (paragraph 22), the Commission notes that with the Digital Services Act (‘DSA’), the EU has put in place a strong framework that regulates online intermediaries and platforms such as marketplaces, social networks, content-sharing platforms, app stores, and online travel and accommodation platforms. Its main goal is to put in place due diligence obligations to guard against illegal and harmful activities online and the spread of disinformation, so as to establish a safe online environment. The DSA sets out an unprecedented new standard for greater accountability and transparency of online platforms to safeguard fundamental rights and identify and address societal risks. Under the DSA, providers of large online platforms must implement effective and proportionate measures to mitigate any systemic risk that their services represent and that can negatively affect our democratic societies. The Guidelines for Providers of Very Large Online Platforms (‘VLOPs’) and Very Large Online Search Engines (‘VLOSEs’) on the Mitigation of Systemic Risks for Electoral Processes, published on 26 March 2024, are aimed at supporting providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs to ensure that they comply with their obligation to mitigate specific risks linked to electoral processes. The guidelines reflect best practises in the area of election-related risks, on the basis of scientific insights. If Very Large Online Platforms or Search Engines employ other risk mitigation measures different from the ones proposed by the guidelines, they must prove to the Commission that those alternative measures are also as reasonable, proportionate and effective as the ones contained in the guidelines. These guidelines also build on the ongoing work under the Code of Practice on disinformation. In view of the elections of the European Parliament, signatories of the Code also setup a work-stream dedicated to it. This will be a key tool to ensure timely exchanges about disinformation threats between platforms signatories and other stakeholders (e.g. fact-checkers, civil society organizations) during the electoral period. The European Digital Media observatory, supported by the Commission, has setup a taskforce dedicated to the elections of the European Parliament, which will issue daily reports and weekly investigation regarding disinformation campaigns targeting the elections.

1. Expresses serious concern about the alleged acts;

The upcoming Cyber Solidarity Act, on which a political agreement was reached in March 2023, will strengthen solidarity at EU level to better detect, prepare and respond to cyberthreats and incidents. The Act constitutes a measure reinforcing the capacities of Member States that could come under sustained cyber-attacks, inter alia politically motivated ones on elections.

2. Offers its full cooperation with the ongoing investigations;

Meanwhile, with the Regulation 2023/2841 which entered into force early January 2024, the EU has taken steps to reinforce the cybersecurity of EU institutions, agencies and bodies, putting in place a framework for governance, risk management and control across EU entities in cybersecurity, and the establishment of a new Inter-Institutional Cybersecurity Board to monitor implementation. The Commission calls for progress in the negotiations of the parallel proposal on information security, which is essential to complete a robust legislative framework for EU institutions, agencies and bodies.

3. Remains committed to fighting all forms of corruption, alleged attempts to influence Members and other forms of undue interference in the EU’s democratic processes;

The EU cybersecurity framework has also been further strengthened, including with the upcoming Cyber Resilience Act (‘CRA’), on which co-legislators reached a provisional political agreement that the Parliament adopted on 12 March 2024. The CRA aims to establish cybersecurity requirements for market access in the EU of hardware and software and sets out corresponding obligations for the manufacturers of these products. It will therefore further contribute to reducing the attack surface of hardware and software that spyware is trying to exploit.

4. Calls for the European Union to be vigilant with regard to attempts by any third country, including Russia, to unduly influence its democratic processes;

With regard to the Parliament’s calls to make significant investments in strengthening our democratic resilience and the rule of law, including measures directed at enhancing EU’s counter-intelligence capabilities (paragraph 22), the Commission would like to reply that it is committed to making use of all tools available in the rule of law toolbox to promote and protect the rule of law, which is essential for the Union’s overall resilience. This also includes supporting concrete reforms in Member States to strengthen the rule of law and institutional checks and balances, both technically and financially, for example through the national Recovery and Resilience Plans and the Technical Support Instrument.

5. Recalls the need to respect due process, the rule of law and fundamental rights; reiterates that political choices cannot be criminalised and that MEPs must not face further restrictions to the expression of their opinions when exercising their legitimate mandate;

Regarding the strengthening of the measures directed at EU’s counter-intelligence capabilities, the Commission would like to refer to the work of the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (‘EU INTCEN’), which is since 2002 the exclusive civilian intelligence function of the EU, providing in-depth analysis for EU decision makers. Its analytical products are based on intelligence from the Member States’ intelligence and security services. As highlighted in the EU Security Union Strategy, exploring new and enhanced forms of cooperation between intelligence services, EU INTCEN, and other organisations involved in security should be part of efforts to enhance cybersecurity, as well as combatting terrorism, extremism, radicalism and hybrid threats.

6. Takes notes of the Commission proposal on a defence of democracy package (COM(2023)0630); warns against the approach proposed to tackle so-called ‘foreign agents’, which could lead to significant restrictions on civic space in the EU and globally; strongly supports, however, common transparency and accountability rules for interest representation services paid for or directed from outside the EU, with the aim of protecting the EU democratic sphere from covert outside interference;

The Commission takes note of the Parliament’s position concerning the EU Ethics body expressed in this resolution (paragraph 20). The Commission welcomes the agreement of all institutions and advisory bodies of the EU referred to in Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union on the basis of the proposal it made on 8 June 2023 for the creation of an EU Ethics Body common to all institutions while regretting the fact that the European Council decided not to participate. The Commission considers that the agreement is a significant contribution to a common culture of ethics regarding the members of the institutions and advisory committees at EU level and looks forward to the signature of the agreement by all parties so that the Agreement on the Body enters into force ahead of the European elections of 2024.

7. Reiterates its call for a dedicated vice-president be put in charge of integrity and fighting corruption and foreign interference in Parliament;

Regarding the Parliament’s calls to ban from the Transparency Register any entities with direct or indirect relations with the Government of Russia (paragraph 21), the Commission would like to respond that in the context of the measures adopted at EU level in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the Transparency Register’s Secretariat investigated all registered interest representatives headquartered in the Russian Federation for a possible non-observance of the Transparency Register’s code of conduct. As a result, 8 Russian registrants were removed from the Transparency Register. In addition, in the context of Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/884 of 3 June 2022, the application for registration of any entity with direct or indirect relations with the Government of Russia will not be accepted in the Transparency Register.

8. Reiterates its support for the establishment of an independent ethics body as soon as possible, in line with its resolution of 16 September 2021;

On to the Parliament’s calls condemning all types of elite capture (paragraph 23), the Commission would like to recall that ethical behaviour of political decision-makers and of the civil service of the EU is of utmost importance for the credibility of the EU Institutions and that the core principles and obligations have been set out directly in the founding treaties. Members of the Commission must pursue the general interest of the EU, they must be completely independent and must respect obligations also after their term of office. For the EU civil service, there is legislation adopted by the Parliament and Council which defines the rights and obligations of civil servants. Under the Staff Regulations, EU staff are required to be independent, impartial, objective and loyal to the institutions for which they work.

9. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Government and Parliament of Latvia and the Government and Parliament of Russia.

The Commission has a robust ethical framework in place, which includes in-depth checks on activities of its former staff within 2 years after they left the service and it implements these rules in a consistent, proportionate, and robust manner. If identified risks cannot be appropriately mitigated by temporary restrictions, the Commission forbids envisaged activities fully. A recent audit from the Court of Auditors and the inquiry of the European Ombudsman on the revolving doors phenomenon have shown that the Commission has the necessary rules in place to prevent conflicts with its legitimate interests.

The Commission is aware of the risks accompanying the upcoming European elections and adopted a number of related strategies in this regard (paragraph 25). The Recommendation on inclusive and resilient elections addresses the protection and cybersecurity of election-related infrastructure and proposes measures to minimise risks of interference from third countries through funding of political parties, political foundations, campaign organisations and candidates. The Guidelines for Providers of Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines on the Mitigation of Systemic Risks for Electoral Processes contain best practices and possible measures to mitigate systemic risks that may threaten the integrity of democratic electoral processes. They also provide examples of potential mitigation measures relating to election-related risks, specific mitigation measures linked to Generative Artificial Intelligence content, the planning of risk mitigation measures before or after an electoral event and specific guidance for the European Parliament elections. In view of upcoming elections, the Commission also stepped up its monitoring efforts via the Network against Disinformation and Rapid Alert System.

The Commission recognises the need to support the resilience and independence of the news media sector, including investigative journalism (paragraph 26). Since 2021, grants for news media projects are available under Creative Europe. Every year, the Commission supports Journalism Partnerships i.e. projects that strengthen the wider sector or support media pluralism by re-distributing grants to sectors of special relevance to democracy (i.e. local and community media and investigative projects). In addition, a study on public financing of news media in the EU was undertaken to map national funding models. The Commission also put forward a series of initiatives to protect journalists, including investigative journalists, and independent media. The European Media Freedom Act on which co-legislators reached a provisional political agreement that the Parliament adopted on 13 March 2024 and the Council on 26 March 2024, contains several provisions protective of media and journalists, including of independent public media. Other relevant initiatives include the Directive and Recommendation on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings (“Strategic lawsuits against public participation”), as well as the Recommendation on the safety of journalists.