What changed

B100309/2026

European Parliament resolution on Russia’s unacceptable provocative actions and drone incursions into Romania, the Baltic states and Finland

(2026/2772(RSP))

– having regard to its previous resolutions on RussiaUkraine and Ukraine,on notablyRussia, thatin ofparticular 9those Octoberadopted 2025since onRussia’s afull-scale unitedinvasion responseof toUkraine recentin RussianFebruary violations2022 and the annexation of EUthe MemberCrimean States’Peninsula airspaceon and19 criticalFebruary infrastructure,2014,

– having regard to the UN Charter of the United Nations and the fundamental principles of international law,

– having regard to Articles 42(7) and 24(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 24(3), 42(7) and 222 thereof,

– having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949, in particular Articles 4 and 5 thereof,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia,

– having regard to the joint communicationwhite ofpaper from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Joint whiteWhite paperPaper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120) and to its resolution of 12 March 2025 thereon,

– having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 October 2025, entitled ‘Preserving Peace - Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0027),

– having regard to the NATO-led Baltic Sentry and Eastern Sentry operations launched along the Alliance’s eastern flank, and to ongoing discussions on the establishment of a Black Sea Sentry initiative,

– having regard to the European CouncilDefence conclusionsIndustry Programme (EDIP) and the European Defence Projects of 19Common MarchInterest 2026(EDPCI), onand to the EU’smandate continuedof the European Defence Agency (EDA) to support forthe Ukraine,development of common defence capabilities,

– having regard to the statements made by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 20 May 2026 regarding Russian threats against the Baltic states,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, on European security and defence, and on the strengthening of the EU’s eastern flank,

– having regard to the statement made by Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas of 29 May 2026 condemning the reckless violation of the EU’s airspace by Russia,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, drone incursions into European airspace and territorial waters have become an increasingly frequent and alarming phenomenon, posing a threat beyond Ukraine’s borders;

A. whereas more than four years ago Russia launched its illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, continuing its 2014 annexation of Crimea and occupation of parts of the Donbas in flagrant violation of international law and Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty; whereas intrusions into EU and NATO airspace, caused by Russia, have been occurring since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but have recently increased in frequency and intensity;

B. whereas, following previous incidents involving drone fragments and other military debris falling on Romanian territory, on 29 May 2026 a Russian-made Geran-2 drone hit a residential block of flats in the eastern Romanian city of Galați, injuring civilians, including a child, and causing serious material damage, with the Galați incident marking a qualitative escalation from falling drone fragments and military debris to civilian injuries and direct damage to residential infrastructure; whereas on 5 June 2026, a maritime drone exploded in the Black Sea Port of Constanța; whereas these incidents demonstrate that Romania has been directly affected by the consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and underline the immediate risks posed to EU citizens, civilian infrastructure, maritime security and critical infrastructure in the Black Sea region;

B. whereas Russia’s military build-up along the EU’s eastern flank is ongoing and also includes the territory of Belarus, which is complicit in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and hybrid attacks against the EU, notably via its instrumentalisation of irregular migration, organised crime, disinformation and the launch of meteorological balloons, which pose serious security threats, including the constant disruption of civilian aviation, the terrorisation of countries bordering Belarus like Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and damage to local economies;

C. whereas the Black Sea is increasingly a strategic theatre of military operations, hybrid threats, drone warfare, attacks on critical infrastructure and disruptions to maritime transport and trade routes; whereas the EU’s security is increasingly linked to the security and stability of the Black Sea region and its maritime domain awareness capabilities;

C. whereas Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania and other EU Member States have been targeted by Russia’s attempts at destabilisation, which take the form of drone incursions and airspace violations, propaganda and disinformation, electronic warfare, global navigation satellite system (GNSS) interference, cyberattacks and sabotage;

D. whereas, on 3 June 2026, Estonia and Latvia issued simultaneous airspace alerts after sensors detected drone activity moving across the region; whereas Estonia’s EE-Alarm system broadcast warnings across six counties (Tartu, Jõgeva, Viljandi, Valga, Võru and Põlva), covering much of the country’s south and east, and Latvia issued a yellow-level warning for Alūksne municipality in the north east; whereas NATO Baltic Air Policing aircraft were scrambled and Lithuania reportedly conducted overnight reinforcement sorties in support of the response;

D. whereas on 29 May 2026, a Russian drone crashed into a residential building in Galați, Romania, causing an explosion that injured two people; whereas this was the first such incident on the territory of an EU and NATO Member State to result in injuries requiring medical treatment; whereas more than 70 people had to be evacuated;

E. whereas on 8 June 2026, a French military Rafale fighter jet shot down a drone that entered Latvia’s airspace from Russia;

E. whereas on 19 May 2026, an intruding drone flying in Estonian airspace was shot down by a Romanian fighter jet participating in the NATO Baltic Air Policing Mission; whereas on 20 May 2026, the incursion of an unidentified drone into Lithuanian airspace forced authorities to issue an unprecedented air raid alert, compelling civilians to seek shelter; whereas on 8 June 2026, French NATO fighter jets, participating in a NATO mission, shot down drones flying over Latvia; whereas these drone incursions are a direct result of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, with the majority entering EU airspace as a result of Russian electronic warfare; whereas, in March 2026, due to the interference from Russian electronic warfare systems, at least three Ukrainian drones were diverted from their intended course and entered Finnish territory, where they crashed;

F. whereas, on 8 June 2026 a drone crossed the Moldovan border and its fragments were later found in a field near the village of Lopatna in the Orhei district;

F. whereas on 29 May 2026, a Ukrainian naval drone exploded in the Romanian port of Constanța as a result of electronic warfare measures employed by the Russian Federation, causing damage to property but no human casualties;

G. whereas Finland has investigated several incidents involving damage to undersea power and telecommunications cables in the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea, alongside cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and other acts of sabotage; whereas Finland continues to combat the instrumentalisation of migration as a form of hybrid threat at its eastern border, the longest external border that both the EU and NATO share with Russia; whereas, on 15 May 2026, Finnish authorities issued an emergency warning after detecting a suspected drone incursion into the country’s airspace, resulting in air traffic at Helsinki Airport being suspended and nearly two million residents in southern Finland being advised to take shelter;

G. whereas on 7 May 2026, two Ukrainian drones, jammed by Russian electronic warfare systems, struck a fuel storage depot in Rēzekne, Latvia; whereas the Latvian military’s five-hour delay in communicating its response, the lack of public warnings in Rēzekne and the failure of initial radar detection ignited an intense public backlash, causing a political crisis that led to the collapse of the Latvian Government;

H. whereas the decommissioning of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in Lithuania presents significant regional security and environmental hazards due to the presence of large volumes of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste stored in temporary overground facilities, and whereas any accident or intentional provocation to this critical infrastructure could have severe consequences for the entire Baltic region;

H. whereas the Baltic Sea region contains a high concentration of critical infrastructure, including subsea energy and telecommunications networks, transport links and other strategic assets, making it particularly vulnerable to hybrid attacks, sabotage and drone-related threats; whereas the protection of critical infrastructure requires both physical hardening and increased redundancy and decentralisation, as demonstrated by the lessons learned from Russia’s attacks against Ukrainian infrastructure;

I. whereas on several occasions, unmanned aerial vehicles originating from or entering through Belarusian airspace have crossed into the territory of the Republic of Lithuania, including incidents affecting the municipalities and districts of Jonava, Vilnius District, Varėna and other areas bordering Belarus; whereas such incursions have required the deployment of military, police and civil protection resources and have demonstrated the vulnerability of the external borders of NATO and the EU to airborne provocations; whereas Lithuanian authorities have repeatedly warned residents not to approach unidentified aerial objects and to immediately report sightings through the emergency number 112; whereas some incidents have involved suspected military-type drones and explosive devices, creating significant risks for civilian populations and critical infrastructure;

I. whereas the decommissioning of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in Lithuania presents significant regional security and environmental hazards due to the presence of large volumes of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste stored in temporary overground facilities, and whereas any accident or intentional provocation to this critical infrastructure could have severe consequences for the entire Baltic region and far beyond;

J. whereas drone-related security incidents in Lithuania have led national authorities to activate emergency warning systems and issue public alerts to residents in affected municipalities and districts; whereas residents were instructed to remain vigilant, monitor official communications, report suspicious aerial objects through the emergency number 112 and, where necessary, move to shelters or other safe locations pending the assessment of potential threats; whereas such incidents illustrate the direct impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and associated hybrid threats on the security of EU citizens;

J. whereas there have been other serious incidents of suspected Russian violations of EU Member States’ airspace;

K. whereas in May 2026, Lithuanian authorities issued air-alert warnings affecting Vilnius and surrounding municipalities, urging residents to seek shelter and follow emergency instructions following a drone-related security alert, demonstrating the growing threat posed by hostile aerial incursions on the EU’s eastern border;

K. whereas the security and protection of the EU Member States along its eastern flank are an immediate priority and a joint European responsibility, especially given that hybrid attacks are being carried out using modern drone warfare, an area in which the EU Member States’ capacity is far from complete;

L. whereas drone incursions into European airspace and territorial waters are either deliberate tests of the Alliance’s resolve or stray drones affected by Russian GPS jamming and spoofing, either way blurring the line between accident and provocation; whereas they expose serious gaps in Europe’s air and maritime defence along its eastern flank;

L. whereas drone incidents on the EU’s eastern flank have exposed significant gaps in both military and civilian preparedness; whereas existing radar systems often prove unable to track low-altitude objects, methods chosen for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) interception are economically inefficient and reports on incidents revealed that some air-raid shelters were locked or inaccessible to the public; whereas these failures highlight urgent systemic vulnerabilities in alert and reaction procedures, and broader societal resilience;

M. whereas Romania, the Baltic states, Finland and other Member States on the EU’s eastern flank play a key role in safeguarding European security, stability and resilience; whereas past incidents in these Member States, and particularly the one in Romania, constitute a serious warning for the EU, demonstrating that the consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine are no longer limited to falling drone fragments or military debris, but have resulted in injuries to EU citizens on the territory of a Member State; whereas these incidents underscore the growing vulnerability of the EU’s citizens, territory and critical infrastructure to airborne and maritime threats, urgently requiring a stronger common European response to protect civilians, residential areas and critical infrastructure throughout the EU, and in particular along the EU’s eastern border;

M. whereas in its latest attacks against Ukraine, Russia set ablaze the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra, a historic monastery of Eastern Christianity and a UNESCO World Heritage Site, among other invaluable cultural heritage sites;

N. whereas the protection of the EU’s airspace, territory and citizens against all threats constitutes a core European public good that should be financed from the EU budget; whereas meeting rising security and defence needs primarily through the redeployment of funds from existing programmes risks weakening cohesion, social, research and other policies that are equally essential to the EU’s resilience and to the regions and citizens most exposed to these threats;

N. whereas those recent drone incidents have demonstrated the urgent need for multilayered defence capabilities integrating kinetic and non-kinetic counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS); whereas drones have become a defining feature of modern warfare and hybrid conflict, and their use in Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped defence requirements and operational doctrines across the continent;

O. whereas the border regions most exposed to drone incursions and hybrid threats suffer not only heightened security risks but also tangible economic and social harm, including loss of tourism, declining investment, business closures and depopulation; whereas, for example, the Latgale region in eastern Latvia has experienced a severe downturn in its tourism sector as a direct consequence of repeated airspace alerts and the perception of insecurity along the EU’s eastern border;

O. whereas the Arctic and the High North are becoming increasingly important for European security, while limited sensor coverage and a sparse permanent presence create vulnerabilities that hostile actors may seek to exploit through unmanned systems and hybrid operations, thereby increasing the risk of hostile drone incursions deep into EU territory;

P. whereas the Commission and the High Representative’s strategic approach for the Black Sea region identifies the establishment of a Black Sea Maritime Security Hub as a flagship initiative under the Black Sea maritime security pillar; whereas Parliament has already called, through its resolutions concerning the general budget of the EU for the financial years 2026 and 2027, for the creation and operationalisation of this hub;

1. Strongly condemns Russia’s unacceptable provocative actions and drone incursions into the EU Member States;

Q. whereas recent incidents have demonstrated the need for a permanent and integrated European presence and a common European monitoring, early warning and rapid response system for the detection, interception and neutralisation of unmanned aerial and maritime threats along the EU’s eastern border and in the Black Sea basin; whereas enhanced military mobility, interoperability, early warning capabilities and forward deployment of assets are essential for effective deterrence and rapid response;

2. Reaffirms its full solidarity with Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, whose territory, airspace and critical infrastructure have been targeted by Russian hybrid provocations; reaffirms that the EU will not be intimidated by Russia’s campaign of destabilisation and that it stands united in its determination to defend the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all EU Member States and to continue to support Ukraine;

R. whereas the development of sovereign European drone and counter-drone production capabilities, including through regional industrial hubs located in front line Member States, is essential to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), reduce strategic dependencies and ensure rapid operational readiness;

3. Recognises the particular vulnerability of, and expresses its full solidarity with, citizens in the EU border regions along the eastern flank, who are most exposed to serious threats and who also bear significant economic and social costs as a result; calls for targeted EU-level measures, including dedicated financial support, to strengthen the protection of affected communities and critical infrastructure, and ensure prevention, preparedness, resilience and emergency response and reconstruction in these particularly exposed regions;

1. Condemns, in the strongest terms, Russia’s sustained and escalating military and hybrid provocations against the EU and its Member States, in particular Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland; further condemns the use of drones and other airborne incursions, as well as other acts of hybrid warfare aimed at targeting and disrupting critical infrastructure, thereby posing a serious threat to the safety, security and well-being of citizens;

4. Unequivocally condemns the Russian drone strike on a residential building in Galați, Romania, which caused direct civilian casualties, constituting a grave and serious escalation; considers that repeated drone incursions and airspace violations into EU countries are not isolated incidents but an integral part of Russia’s broader strategy of intimidation directed against the EU and its allies;

2. Declares that Russia bears full and unequivocal responsibility for the actions that have taken place, which are escalatory, prone to risk miscalculation and endanger lives; reiterates that the acts of the Russian Federation constitute a deliberate, systematic, and ongoing threat to the security, resilience and sovereignty of the EU and its Member States;

5. Declares that Russia bears full and unequivocal responsibility for these reckless escalatory attacks which endanger lives; reiterates that the acts of the Russian Federation constitute a deliberate, systematic and ongoing threat to the security, resilience and sovereignty of the EU and its Member States; reiterates its condemnation in the strongest possible terms of Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as Belarus’s complicity in it; strongly denounces Russia’s decision to continue its war of aggression, including its latest targeted attacks on cultural heritage sites and the UNESCO World Heritage Site Kyiv Pechersk Lavra, while refusing any direct negotiations with Ukraine, as recently proposed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy;

3. Underlines that the EU and its Member States will not be deterred by these or further hostile acts by the Russian Federation from their enduring commitments to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s war of aggression; recalls that Ukraine’s security contributes to that of Europe as a whole, and stresses Ukraine’s inherent right to self-defence against Russia’s brutal and unprovoked war of aggression; believes that the outcome of the war and the stance taken by the international community will play a crucial role in influencing future aggressive action by Russia in Europe and beyond;

6. Reiterates its condemnation of Russia’s deliberate jamming of GNSS signals in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions, and of Belarus’s deliberate launch of meteorological balloons, which pose serious safety risks for civilian aviation and maritime transport; condemns Belarus, furthermore, for its hybrid attacks against the EU;

4. Reaffirms that the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Union is a fundamental principle of the EU; stresses that any violation thereof constitutes a serious threat to the EU’s security, resilience and democratic foundations, and underlines the need for an immediate, firm, united and proportionate response to protect citizens and critical infrastructure and to detect, deter and counter such hostile activities; urges, in this regard, the Member States to employ, in full compliance with international law, all necessary military and non-military tools to defend the EU, its citizens and territory against threats from all directions;

7. Reiterates its call to urgently accelerate the production and delivery of priority military equipment to Ukraine, in particular air defence systems, ammunition, drones and missiles, at a critical moment when acute shortfalls in air defence capabilities leave Ukraine’s population and infrastructure increasingly exposed;

5. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to urgently increase investments in security and defence in order to close all capability gaps, establish a strong common deterrence, and provide adequate support to Ukraine, ensuring that the EU and its Member States are equipped to address all threats, from hybrid and cyber to conventional military challenges; stresses the importance of using these investments to stimulate joint action, including with Ukraine, in order to improve the efficiency of public spending and interoperability, as well as the EU’s strategic autonomy; stresses that European funding must support European industry, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, secure resilient supply chains and generate technological leadership and high-quality jobs;

8. Highlights that these hostile acts are compounded by an aggressive disinformation campaign seeking to intimidate local populations, spread fear, damage local economies and lay the groundwork for possible retaliatory actions, as in the case of unfounded Russian allegations that the Baltic states allow Ukraine to use their territories and airspace for drone attacks against targets in Russia;

6. Recommends strengthening strategic enablers as a fundamental component of European defence integration, including intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance, cyber capabilities, space assets, and integrated command-and-control systems; stresses that these capabilities are critical for effective coordination and timely responses in modern security environments and recommends they should be developed jointly at the European level to ensure efficiency, resilience, and collective operational readiness;

9. Reiterates its call for the urgent establishment of a genuine European Defence Union, including proposals for swift decision-making processes, going beyond existing frameworks, including the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 and the subsequent Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030; underlines that deeper integration, coordination and the pooling of resources are indispensable to an effective EU response to Russia’s escalating threats; calls for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base and its production capacity across the EU to be boosted through enhanced EU-level coordination, maximising the use of national initiatives and EU instruments;

7. Regrets that the EU and the Member States have not invested sufficiently in drone technologies and production capacities in recent years, creating capability gaps and strategic dependencies; stresses that the evolving security environment and the lessons learnt from the war in Ukraine demonstrate the urgent need to accelerate investments and strengthen the EDTIB;

10. Calls for the solidarity clause (Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) and the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU) to be further operationalised, including where a conventional or hybrid attack leads a Member State to invoke them;

8. Recognises the particular vulnerability of, and expresses its full solidarity with, citizens in the EU border regions along the eastern flank, who are most exposed to serious threats and who also bear significant economic and social costs as a result; calls for targeted EU-level measures, including dedicated financial support, to strengthen the protection of borders and critical infrastructure, and ensure prevention, preparedness, resilience and emergency response and reconstruction for affected communities in these particularly exposed regions;

11. Emphasises the need for the coherent strengthening of the EU and NATO’s eastern flank along its entire length from the Arctic to the Black Sea, including the land, maritime and air dimensions by building capabilities in frontline Member States to combat drones and meteorological balloons, and through the allocation of adequate resources for this purpose; calls for the EU and its Member States to urgently strengthen detection, jamming, interception and neutralisation capabilities along the EU’s eastern flank; further calls for regular joint exercises between the Member States, the EU institutions, Ukraine and NATO to test and improve the readiness of these rapid response mechanisms;

9. Stresses that a common defence against airborne, maritime and hybrid threats, in particular along the EU’s eastern border, must be adequately financed by the EU budget; calls on the Commission and the Council to adapt relevant EU funding instruments in order to ensure that expenditure related to the consequences of Russia’s provocations and hybrid attacks on the territory of Member States may be eligible for EU financial support and rapid reimbursement procedures, where compatible with the legal bases of the respective instruments; insists that the next multiannual financial framework provide dedicated funding for a common defence; underlines that such financing must be ensured through a genuine reinforcement of the budget and not through the redeployment of resources away from cohesion, social, research and other EU programmes, on which the resilience of citizens and regions also depends;

12. Recommends the integration of C-UASs into joint training exercises and EU-level civil protection planning, with an emphasis on critical infrastructure that enables police, airport authorities and energy sector operators to access EU-wide training and standardised C-UAS capabilities;

10. Calls on the Member States to urgently accelerate European drone and counter-drone development and production, ensuring that capability plans and procurement strategies are fit for purpose, with increased investment in large-scale production and joint procurement of affordable systems to strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy and deliver scalable, cost-effective capabilities;

13. Highlights with concern that current European drone detection and defence systems are inadequate and stresses the urgent need to improve detection and defence; stresses, in this context, the need for a holistic approach that focuses on better equipping law enforcement and civilian authorities with the means to detect and defend against drones;

11. Calls for the rapid establishment of joint, layered counter-drone defence systems, starting on the eastern flank, capable of detecting and intercepting airborne and seaborne threats from outside the EU, including through enhanced air and maritime surveillance, early-warning systems, rapid-response assets and improved military mobility infrastructure; underlines that these capabilities are essential for protecting citizens and critical infrastructure, ensuring effective deterrence, and safeguarding the EU’s role as a global actor committed to peace, human rights and the rule of law; urges the Commission and the EDA to make full use of their mandates, including through the EDIP and EDPCI frameworks, to coordinate national efforts effectively;

14. Encourages the Member States to prioritise integrating command and control systems with first responders, civil defence and UAS defence doctrines to ensure that civil preparedness, sheltering, early warning and technological integration are optimised to the fullest extent possible;

12. Calls on the Member States to actively cooperate with Ukraine, particularly in the areas of air and missile defence and drone and counter-drone warfare, acknowledging its groundbreaking operational expertise and advanced capabilities, and thus strengthening both European and Ukrainian defence capabilities; calls, in particular, on Member States to integrate their threat-detection system with that of Ukraine; recommends, in particular, establishing structured mechanisms to facilitate ongoing knowledge-sharing on drone and counter-drone technologies; invites the Member States to consider engagement in training missions in Ukraine in order to fully absorb the expertise and innovative techniques possessed by the Ukrainian armed forces; welcomes bilateral and regional initiatives in that direction, such as the one set up between Romania and Ukraine;

15. Stresses that Russia’s deliberate incursions into the eastern flank of the EU and NATO are intended not only to provoke and destabilise Member States, but also to test and exploit weaknesses in NATO’s detection and response capabilities; recognises that Russia continues its destabilising activities in the Black Sea region, both through conventional and hybrid actions, including through the use of drifting mines, jamming operations and threats to freedom of navigation, making the strengthening of security in this region a strategic priority that must be addressed urgently as a threat to European security;

13. Calls on the Commission to establish and rapidly operationalise a European Black Sea Maritime Security Hub serving as a regional centre for real-time maritime domain awareness, satellite-based and seabed monitoring, early warning, intelligence-sharing, protection of critical underwater, energy, transport and port infrastructure, counter-drone and counter-hybrid operations, responses to naval mines, hostile unmanned maritime systems and the activities of Russia’s shadow fleet, coordination with Black Sea littoral Member States and partner countries, and direct cooperation with relevant EU and NATO structures, in support of EU and NATO maritime security initiatives in the Black Sea basin; notes that locating this hub in affected Member States, such as Romania, could be beneficial and enhance maritime security in the Black Sea region;

16. Calls for the full implementation of the EU’s strategic approach to the Black Sea, and calls for the acceleration of the creation of the Black Sea Maritime Security Hub;

14. Welcomes the ongoing NATO-led Baltic Sentry and Eastern Sentry operations; welcomes discussions on the potential establishment of a Black Sea Sentry initiative to strengthen maritime security, improve regional situational awareness, safeguard critical infrastructure, and support freedom of navigation in the Black Sea region in accordance with international law;

17. Welcomes the recent approval of the 20th package of EU sanctions against Russia and the presentation of the 21st sanctions package; calls on the Commission, the EU Sanctions Envoy and the Member States to strictly implement new and existing sanctions, and to prioritise without delay the closing of loopholes in supply chains; calls on the Commission to develop additional sanctions without delay, including sanctions on alumina and other strategic raw materials and dual-use goods, and urges all Member States not to block such a listing on grounds of national economic interest; supports additional measures for the upcoming sanctions package targeting the Russian Federation’s energy and financial sectors, as well as a ban on entry into the EU for former Russian combatants who fought in Ukraine, and calls on Member States that continue to support the Russian Federation to cease such support;

15. Calls for the establishment of a defensive, European-led Integrated Air Protection Zone over uncontested territory of Ukraine, designed to strengthen civilian protection and critical infrastructure resilience against missile and drone attacks; stresses that such an initiative should form part of a broader European air and missile defence architecture, based on integrated capabilities and close coordination with Ukraine, while ensuring compliance with international law and avoiding escalation risks; underlines that this approach would contribute to enhanced regional security and the protection of European airspace;

18. Calls on Member States, in particular those issuing the majority of visas to Russian nationals, to strictly implement the Commission Implementing Decision of 6 November 2025 establishing adapted rules on the issuing of multiple-entry visas to Russian nationals residing in the Russian Federation and applying in the Russian Federation for short-stay visas, and fully apply the Commission’s 2022 guidance on heightened scrutiny, especially for tourist and other non-essential travel, while safeguarding access for anti-war political activists, independent journalists, human rights defenders, civil society representatives and humanitarian cases;

16. Calls on the EU and the Member States to adopt a comprehensive approach to defence, recognising that security extends beyond military assets and encompasses defending against acts of hybrid warfare; underscores the importance of developing a robust EU‑level toolbox for safeguarding the integrity of the EU’s external borders and for supporting Member States facing pressure from hostile third countries, which should include legal, financial and operational measures to allow it to defend itself against hybrid attacks; stresses that unless the vulnerabilities undermining citizens’ trust in institutions and democracy are addressed, the EU risks instability and weakness despite military strength; urges the development of defence investment plans in a way that also strengthens social cohesion within and among regions and Member States;

19. Calls for the establishment of a horizontal EU sanctions framework specifically designed for hybrid threats, which would exist alongside the hybrid sanctions regime for Russia, to underscore Russia’s active engagement in hybrid operations globally, while enabling faster and more systematic sanctioning of entities responsible for hybrid campaigns;

17. Urges the EU and the Member States to develop clearer procedures and common assessment criteria for the potential activation of Article 42(7) TEU in the context of hybrid threats; calls, furthermore, for enhanced intelligence-sharing, joint exercises, and coordinated preparedness measures to ensure a swift and effective collective response to evolving security challenges;

20. Calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure appropriate funding for the construction and renovation of civil air-raid shelters in eastern flank and other EU Member States, and to carry out EU-wide information campaigns and civilian exercises to make citizens aware of how to act in the event of an air raid or similar crisis situation; considers that protecting EU civilian populations from aerial threats must be treated as an integral component of European defence readiness, preparedness and resilience; stresses the urgent need for increased financing for security and defence programmes and projects, with a special focus on the eastern flank countries, in the next multiannual financial framework; calls for the EU and its Member States to adopt a comprehensive, whole-of-society approach, recognising that lasting security requires not only adequate military capabilities but also social cohesion, economic resilience, democratic stability and strong public services;

18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary General of NATO, and the President and Parliament of Ukraine.

21. Underlines that Ukraine has developed unparalleled operational and industrial expertise in drone production and counter-drone systems; considers, therefore, that deepening EU-Ukraine defence industrial cooperation in this domain is a strategic imperative; calls for the EU and its Member States to fully integrate Ukrainian expertise and industrial capacity into the development of European capabilities to counter unconventional aerial threats;

22. Emphasises that in addressing the drone threats coming from Russia, cooperation with the Republic of Moldova – alongside Ukraine – is essential in terms of operational efficiency, situational awareness and the exchange of information; calls, therefore, on the Member States to increase funding for Moldova through the European Peace Facility, also in the light of repeated violations of Moldovan airspace by Russian drones and missiles; further calls on the Member States to include Moldova and Ukraine in joint acquisitions;

23. Calls on the Member States to urgently deliver the priority capabilities identified in the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030, in particular air and missile defence as well as drones and counter-drone systems; calls on the Member States to rapidly establish joint, layered, cost-effective counter-drone defence systems, starting on the eastern flank, capable of detecting and intercepting airborne and seaborne threats from outside the EU, including through enhanced air and maritime surveillance, early-warning systems, rapid-response assets and improved military mobility infrastructure;

24. Calls for the establishment of a European Centre of Excellence for Drone Warfare, where Ukrainian instructors pass on their expertise to the EU Member States;

25. Calls for the full and speedy implementation of the European Drone Defence Initiative and the Eastern Flank Watch; calls on the Member States to actively engage in and contribute to both initiatives in close coordination with NATO;

26. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary General of NATO, UNESCO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Russian authorities and the de facto authorities of the Lukashenka regime.