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B100162/2024
European Parliament resolution on EU actions against the Russian shadow fleets and ensuring a full enforcement of sanctions against Russia
– having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia and Ukraine, in particular since the escalation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022,
– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,
– having regard to the 14 consecutive packages of sanctions against Russia adopted by the EU since February 2022,
– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations and to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
– having regard to the report of its Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of 7 July 2023 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures,
– having regard to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and other relevant International Maritime Organization (IMO) conventions,
– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to IMO General Assembly Resolution A.1192(33) entitled ‘Urging Member States and all relevant stakeholders to promote actions to prevent illegal operations in the maritime sector by the “dark fleet” or “shadow fleet”’, adopted on 6 December 2023,
A. whereas on 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas Russia had previously illegally annexed Crimea and the city of Sevastopol and invaded eastern Ukraine; whereas since its outset, the EU has strongly condemned Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and has called on Russia to put an end to these aggressions and respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity;
– having regard to the G7 leaders’ statement of 6 December 2023,
B. whereas Russia is one of the world’s top oil producers; whereas between February 2022 and June 2024, Russia earned approximately EUR 475 billion in revenue from oil exports; whereas in 2023, around one third of Russia’s total tax revenue came from the sale of oil and gas; whereas Russia is heavily dependent on sales of oil in terms of export earnings and budget revenues; whereas Russia uses these revenues to finance its war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas cutting oil export volumes would create challenges for Russia’s external accounts and its budget, and in turn its ability to finance its war against Ukraine;
– having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,
C. whereas since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the EU has imposed massive and unprecedented sanctions against Russia; whereas in June 2022, the Council adopted a sixth package of sanctions, which, among other things, prohibits the purchase, import and transfer of seaborne crude oil and certain petroleum products from Russia to the EU; whereas the restrictions apply as of 5 December 2022 for crude oil and as of 5 February 2023 for other refined petroleum products; whereas the EU sanctions packages have included exemptions allowing some Member States to continue importing Russian seaborne crude oil and pipeline gas up until now;
A. whereas Russia has been carrying out an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022, continuing what it started in 2014 when it annexed Crimea and subsequently occupied parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions; whereas since its outset, the EU has strongly condemned Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and has called on Russia to put an end to these aggressions and respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity;
D. whereas the EU and the other members of the G7+ Price Cap Coalition have decided on a price cap of 60 USD per barrel on their tankers and on the ones they insure which are used to move Russian oil; whereas the economic incentive for Russia to supply oil to the market remains intact even at much lower prices and with sanctions in place;
B. whereas Russia is one of the world’s largest oil producers; whereas Russia is heavily dependent on sales of oil in terms of export earnings and budget revenues, making oil a key source of financing for its war in Ukraine;
E. whereas, in response, Russia has spent an estimated EUR 9 billion on building up its so-called shadow fleet; whereas Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ is composed of older tankers with opaque ownership, posing an environmental hazard as there is a very high risk of oil spills alongside other mechanical problems that might lead to the sinking of an entire ship; whereas these ships often sail without industry standard insurance, frequently changing names and flag registrations, enabling them to sell a significant portion of their oil above the price cap and undermining the ability of governments to hold them liable for the clean-up in the event of oil spills;
C. whereas the EU and the other members of the G7+ Price Cap Coalition established a price cap on Russian-origin crude oil and petroleum products with the aim of maintaining global supplies, while limiting the revenue streams used by Russia to finance its war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas, in response, Russia has spent an estimated EUR 9 billion on building up its ‘shadow fleet’; whereas oil tankers filled with Russian oil sail through European waters every day as part of Russia’s efforts to evade EU and G7 sanctions;
F. whereas the ‘shadow fleet’ used by Russia as a workaround has significantly reduced the leverage of the sanctions regime and has allowed Russia to further use these revenues to finance its war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas almost two years since this oil price cap was enacted, nearly 70 % of the Kremlin’s oil is being transported on ‘shadow tankers’ that are evading these restrictions; whereas Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ is estimated at around 600 tankers; whereas before Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, 75 % of the ships transporting Russian crude oil were operated by Western companies; whereas as of April 2024, this number has dropped to 29 %; whereas, according to the Kyiv School of Economics, the companies that manage the ‘shadow tankers’ are predominantly registered in Russia, the United Arab Emirates, China, Azerbaijan, India, the Seychelles, Türkiye, the Marshall Islands, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritius and Viet Nam;
D. whereas since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the EU has imposed massive and unprecedented restrictive measures and sanctions against Russia, with the aim of undermining Russia’s economic, financial and military ability to sustain its war effort; whereas the Council’s sixth package of sanctions, among other things, prohibits the purchase, import and transfer of seaborne crude oil and certain petroleum products from Russia to the EU; whereas the Council’s 11th and 12th sanctions packages address circumvention risks posed by the ‘shadow fleet’; whereas in its 14th package of sanctions on Russian oil, the Council introduced a new measure targeting specific vessels contributing to Russia’s war against Ukraine, which are subject to a port access ban and a ban on the provision of services; whereas so far, the EU has placed only 27 vessels on this list, including tankers transporting Russian oil and engaging in dangerous and illegal shipping practices; whereas in October 2024, the UK Government imposed sanctions against 18 Russian oil tankers and 4 liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers; whereas to date, the act of designating ‘shadow fleet’ vessels has had the biggest impact on ‘shadow fleet’ operations;
G. whereas, should accidents occur, oil spills from ‘shadow fleet’ vessels can result in clean-up costs amounting to billions of euro for coastal countries and their taxpayers, as the owners of these vessels are largely untraceable; whereas such spills pose significant threats to water quality and local wildlife, harming marine ecosystems, contaminating consumer products such as shellfish and disrupting fish reproduction;
E. whereas ‘shadow fleets’ have already been used by hostile countries such as Iran, Venezuela and North Korea; whereas, however, the scale and sophistication of Russia’s operations set it apart as Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ is estimated to operate around 160-200 tankers monthly to transport oil, with an estimated total fleet of 600 vessels that play a key role in sustaining Russian crude exports;
H. whereas the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the EU have tightened control over maritime safety following the Erika (1999) and Prestige (2002) disasters off European coasts; whereas Directive 2009/20/EC on the insurance of shipowners for maritime claims has been in place since 2009, ensuring that all ships flying the flag of an EU Member State have insurance and carry insurance certificates; whereas one of the objectives of Directive 2009/20/EC was the elimination of substandard ships;
F. whereas the ‘shadow fleet’ used by Russia as a workaround has significantly reduced the leverage of the sanctions regime and has allowed Russia to further use these revenues to finance its war of aggression against Ukraine and underlines the need to strengthen and broaden international coordination of sanctions;
I. whereas recent reports from the Swedish Navy have highlighted the security risks linked to the activities of the ‘shadow fleet’ and its possible use in hybrid operations against European countries;
G. whereas the ‘shadow fleet’ is estimated to number at least 600 tankers worldwide; whereas these are older tankers, often sailing without industry standard insurance and frequently changing names and flag registrations, enabling Russia to sell a significant portion of its oil above the price cap and undermining the ability of governments to hold the owners of the tankers liable for clean-up in the event of oil spills; whereas these ships are generally unfit for service and contribute to the rising risk of maritime collisions on international trade routes, thereby posing a serious environmental hazard due to the high risk of oil spills harming marine ecosystems and coastal areas, including in marine protected areas with particularly sensitive wildlife, where oil spills would have disastrous consequences; whereas experience with past oil spills caused by tankers shows that damage to coastal and underwater ecosystems, as well as to surface-dwelling animals and seabirds, can last for decades; whereas expanding the fleet of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) with additional response vessels would align with the EU’s commitment to environmental protection, resilience under the European Green Deal and the objectives of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism to enhance rapid response and disaster-preparedness capabilities;
J. whereas the Council first adopted measures to address circumvention risks posed by the ‘shadow fleet’ in the 11th and 12th sanctions packages; whereas in its 14th package of sanctions on Russian oil, adopted in June 2024, the Council introduced a new measure targeting specific vessels contributing to Russia’s war against Ukraine, which are subject to a port access ban and a ban on the provision of services; whereas so far, the EU has placed only 27 vessels on this list, including tankers transporting Russian oil and engaging in dangerous and illegal shipping practices; whereas to date, the act of designating ‘shadow fleet’ vessels has had the biggest impact on ‘shadow fleet’ operations;
H. whereas the Russian ‘shadow tankers’ regularly conduct ship-to-ship transfers of Russian crude oil and oil products in territorial waters, including in the Mediterranean Sea; whereas in these operations, they transfer and blend Russian oil between vessels without docking at any port in order to conceal the origin of the oil; whereas the proximity of these operations to the coast poses a high risk of environmental damage; whereas their satellite-based Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders are often switched off in order to evade monitoring and official inspections; whereas the coastal countries of Europe would be particularly affected; whereas, should accidents occur, oil spills from ‘shadow fleet’ vessels could result in clean-up costs amounting to billions of euro for coastal countries and their taxpayers, as the owners of these vessels are largely untraceable; whereas oil spills can also incur significant economic losses, including from the decline in tourism and fishing activities; whereas such spills pose significant threats to water quality and local wildlife, harming marine ecosystems, contaminating consumer products such as shellfish and thus posing a threat to human health, spreading further contamination and disrupting fish reproduction;
K. whereas removing a vessel from commercial operations via sanctions poses a major risk for any operator and a substantial financial loss; whereas including more tankers on the sanctions list could therefore disincentivise engineering, trading and insurance service providers from cooperating with these individual tankers;
I. whereas the intentional overboard discharge of waste oil slops is illegal under MARPOL, an international treaty that aims to curb shipping pollution; whereas Russia is a signatory of MARPOL; whereas there is evidence of violations of MARPOL; whereas sanctioning individual ships has proved effective, as the ships that have already been blacklisted saw their ability to trade oil decrease after they were penalised;
L. whereas on 17 October 2024, the UK Government imposed sanctions against 18 Russian oil tankers and 4 liquefied natural gas tankers, which are estimated to have transported fossil fuels amounting to USD 4.9 billion in the last year alone;
J. whereas Directive 2009/20/EC on the insurance of shipowners for maritime claims has been in place since 2009, ensuring that all ships flying the flag of an EU Member State have insurance and carry insurance certificates; whereas one of the objectives of Directive 2009/20/EC was the elimination of substandard ships; whereas the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties allows countries ‘to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent danger to their coastline or related interests from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by oil, following upon a maritime casualty or acts related to such a casualty’;
M. whereas despite banning imports of oil products refined in Russia, there is no ban on imports from third-country refineries that process Russian crude oil; whereas the ‘shadow fleet’ delivers Russian crude oil to third-country refineries; whereas EU and G7 members continue to import oil products derived from Russian oil, for example from refineries in Türkiye, and the volume of imports is in fact on a significant upwards trajectory; whereas the labelling of ‘blended’ fuels as non-Russian generated up to EUR 3 billion in earnings for the Russian state budget from three ports alone in the year following the EU ban on Russian fuels in February 2023;
K. whereas recent reports from the Swedish Navy have highlighted the security risks linked to the activities of the ‘shadow fleet’ and its possible use in hybrid operations against European countries;
N. whereas a significant portion of Russian oil is transported through busy international shipping routes, including the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the Strait of Gibraltar, the Danish Straits, the Viro Strait, the English Channel, the North Sea and the Aegean Sea; whereas Russia ships the overwhelming majority of its oil from ports in the Baltic and Black Seas;
L. whereas despite the ban on imports of oil products refined in Russia, there is no ban on imports from third-country refineries that process Russian crude oil; whereas the ‘shadow fleet’ delivers Russian crude oil to third-country refineries; whereas EU and G7 countries continue to import oil products derived from Russian oil, for instance from refineries in Türkiye;
O. whereas the Russian ‘shadow tankers’ regularly conduct ship-to-ship transfers of Russian crude oil and oil products in territorial waters, including in the Mediterranean Sea; whereas in these operations, they transfer and blend Russian oil between vessels without docking at any port; whereas the proximity of these operations to the coast poses a high risk of environmental damage; whereas the coastal countries of Europe would be particularly affected;
M. whereas the traffic of such vessels has risen dramatically in the course of 2024, with the number of trips completed by Russian ‘shadow vessels’ more than doubling; whereas a significant portion of the Russian oil is transported through busy international shipping routes; whereas Russia ships the overwhelming majority of its oil from ports in the Baltic and Black Seas;
P. whereas since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, an increasing number of tanker routes have shifted towards the East, specifically towards China and India; whereas Russia became China’s top crude oil supplier in 2023, with a 35 % volume export increase compared to 2021;
N.Q. whereas those transporting the oil and managing the ‘shadow fleet’ do not actoperate in isolation;a vacuum; whereas their activities are interconnectedalso withtied, for instance, to the financial transactions that supportbehind them; whereas thesethe transactionsactivities mayof involvethe ‘shadow fleet’ are also linked to financial transactions with entities that may be subject to financial sanctions; whereas compliance with the sanctions regime should be analysed from a holistic perspective to avoid circumvention;
O. whereas ship operators have been willing to flout the sanctions by registering their vessels in countries that are not part of the price cap agreement; whereas Russia uses third-country intermediaries, organisations or individuals to purchase some ‘shadow fleet’ tankers; whereas some owners and managers of ‘shadow fleet’ tankers and gas carriers are also registered in EU Member States;
R. whereas Directive (EU) 2024/1226 established minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and penalties in the area of violations of Union restrictive measures;
P. whereas Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ relies heavily on the complicity and collaboration of several countries to bypass sanctions, especially China, India and Türkiye;
S. whereas ship operators have been willing to flout the sanctions by registering their vessels in countries that are not part of the price cap agreement; whereas Russia uses third-country intermediaries, organisations or individuals to purchase some ‘shadow fleet’ tankers;
1. Reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest terms, of Russia’s unprovoked, illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; calls on Russia to immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine and to completely and unconditionally withdraw all forces, proxies and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine, to end its forced deportations of Ukrainian civilians and to release all detained and deported Ukrainians, particularly children;
1. Reiterates Parliament’s unequivocal support for the EU sanctions regime; is convinced that these sanctions help weaken the capacity of the Russian regime to pursue its aggression against Ukraine; reminds the global community of the EU’s unwavering resolve to pursue the results intended by its sanctions regime: to completely deplete the Russian Federation’s war chest and bring victory to Ukraine;
2. Reiterates its unequivocal support for the EU sanctions regime, which aims to undermine the capacity of the Russian regime to pursue its war of aggression against Ukraine; underlines that the objective of EU sanctions in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is to strategically weaken the Russian economic and industrial base, in particular the military-industrial complex, in order to undermine the ability of the Russian Federation to continue waging the war, attacking the civilian population and violating the territorial integrity of Ukraine, as well as to hamper Russia’s access to military technologies and components; notes that Russia is actively circumventing EU sanctions and seeking new ways to do so, inter alia, by operating a ‘shadow fleet’ of oil tankers and may therefore still be able to intensify its war efforts against Ukraine in the short term, especially during the upcoming winter season;
2. Calls for more targeted international sanctions on the ‘shadow fleet’ in the next sanctions package against Russia, such as designating all possible individual ‘shadow fleet’ vessels, as well as their owners, operators, managers, accounts, etc.; calls for an immediate ban on the use of Western vessels in the transport of Russian oil and, in this context, calls for the implementation of a full embargo on Russian oil and crude oil; calls for the dangers posed by the ‘shadow fleet’ to be raised with the governments of the countries where the companies managing the ‘shadow tankers’ are based, and calls for their cooperation in abolishing these activities; immediately calls for the sale of tankers to countries facilitating trade with Russia to be banned; condemns all countries, including Greece, Cyprus and the United Kingdom, that are enabling and facilitating such sales;
3. Considers the ‘shadow fleet’ a key financial lifeline for Russia in its illegal and unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine and a major tool created to circumvent the EU sanctions regime; denounces the risk these unsafe and uninsured Russian vessels pose to maritime security and to our European coastal Member States and marine ecosystems; condemns Russia for deliberately creating immense risks for its own financial gain, with no regard for international safety or the potential for irreversible environmental damage; calls for the EU and its Member States to intensify their efforts to curb sanctions evasion and circumvention by Russia, and to implement concrete measures to ensure maritime safety and prevent environmental hazards in European waters, in particular in the Baltic Sea; considers ship-to-ship transfers in the high seas to be high-risk activities that undermine international maritime safety and environmental protection;
3. Urgently calls for sanctions to be placed on Russian liquefied natural gas; calls for such sanctions to immediately include price caps and transport embargoes; emphasises the critical importance of sanctions covering the sale of any vessels where there is suspicion that they would be used in the ‘shadow fleet’;
4. Calls for more targeted sanctions on the ‘shadow fleet’ in the next sanctions packages against Russia, such as designating all individual ‘shadow fleet’ vessels, as well as their owners, operators, managers, accounts, banks, insurance companies, etc.; calls for an immediate ban on the use of Western vessels in the transport of Russian oil; calls, more broadly, for the next EU sanctions packages to include the systematic sanctioning of vessels sailing through EU waters without known insurance in order to protect our waters and avoid the financial burdens of oil spill clean-ups; urges the European External Action Service and the EU Sanctions Envoy to reach out to the governments of the countries where the companies managing the ‘shadow tankers’ are registered and of the countries whose flag presence has increased substantially in EU waters since the imposition of the oil price cap; calls for the EU and its Member States to approach these flag states to inform them about the basis of the listings and the consequences of a potential listing, highlight the risks and adverse environmental impact of irregular and high-risk shipping practices and remind them of flag states’ responsibilities; urges flag states to delist sanctioned vessels from their ship registries;
4. Calls for sanctions to be placed on any vessels sailing in EU waters without known insurance; highly commends, in this regard, the recent sanctions imposed by the UK Government against Russian oil tankers and four liquefied natural gas tankers; calls for enhanced EU-wide measures to ensure stricter enforcement and the expansion of sanctions, including the immediate inspection and regulation of vessels operating in EU waters; emphasises that the US Office of Foreign Assets Control follows up on sanctions and their enforcement; strongly calls for the EU to set up a corresponding agency with a similar mandate to ensure compliance with EU sanctions;
5. Notes that the flag states aiding the Russian ‘shadow fleet’ are thereby also helping the Russian war effort; emphasises that if classical diplomatic efforts fail, the EU should seriously reassess its bilateral cooperation with non-EU countries that are helping Russia circumvent EU sanctions;
5. Calls on the Commission to take action, under the framework of the EU’s cooperation with the IMO, to prevent and limit the activities of the ‘shadow fleet’; calls on the Commission to take into consideration the environmental and security aspects of the Russian ‘shadow fleet’ in the territorial waters of EU Member States; welcomes the fact that eight out of nine countries bordering the Baltic Sea are now NATO members, with Russia as the only exception; underlines the importance of NATO’s presence for the overall security of the region; calls for the EU and its Member States to explore mechanisms and measures to restrict Russian ‘shadow fleet’ vessels from accessing the territorial waters of EU Member States; calls, in this regard, for ‘shadow fleet’ vessels to be prohibited from entering EU territorial waters; encourages the EU Member States to explore ways to restrict passage through important waterways, such as the Öresund Strait, and to cooperate closely with the United Kingdom on measures to prohibit Russian ‘shadow fleet’ vessels from accessing the English Channel; stresses that restricting access to the English Channel would mean increased transport times for said vessels, leading to decreased revenues for the Russian state; emphasises that the European Maritime Safety Agency must be used to its full potential in order to support Member States in identifying ships falling under sanctions and monitoring the movement of suspicious ships;
6. Condemns the involvement of European shipowners in the creation of Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’; condemns the behaviour of states, legal service providers and other entities and individuals that help Russia to evade or mitigate EU sanctions; recalls that the violation of the sanctions is a crime at EU level, and has a severe impact on EU financial interests; calls for broadening and enforcing restrictions on vessel sales and for tanker sales to countries facilitating trade with Russia to be banned;
6. Encourages the Commission and the Member States to use data from Sentinel satellite imagery to monitor and identify ‘shadow fleet’ vessels sailing in EU waters, in violation of EU directives and the MARPOL Convention, and to promptly investigate when risks to coastal areas and marine ecosystems arise;
7. Calls for enhanced EU-wide measures to ensure stricter enforcement and the expansion of sanctions, including the immediate inspection of vessels operating in EU waters in order to verify their insurance coverage and compliance with IMO requirements; calls on the Member States to assess and strengthen their administrative capacities to ensure swift implementation and strict enforcement of EU sanctions;
7. Denounces the risks these unsafe and uninsured Russian vessels pose to our European coastal Member States and marine ecosystems; calls on the Commission to closely monitor the implementation of Directive 2009/20/EC on the insurance of shipowners for maritime claims, so as to prevent uninsured vessels from sailing through EU waters; stresses the need for strengthened enforcement mechanisms, such as enabling EU Member States to prevent uninsured or non-compliant vessels from docking at EU ports or using EU waters for refuelling or other services, as they should meet EU environmental standards, and increasing the monitoring of such vessels, including by drones; calls on the Member States to take action to ensure that non-compliant vessels, especially old tankers that do not meet international environmental and safety standards due to age and bad condition, are not made available on the market;
8. Calls on the Commission to take action, under the framework of the EU’s cooperation with the IMO, to prevent and limit the activities of the ‘shadow fleet’; calls for the strict implementation of IMO General Assembly Resolution A.1192(33), which was adopted in December 2023 to combat harmful maritime operations, notably the obligation for vessels to report all ship-to-ship transfers to their flag states and enhanced inspections, at ports, of suspicious ships; calls for the EU and its Member States to restrict Russian ‘shadow fleet’ vessels from accessing EU waters; emphasises that the European Maritime Safety Agency must be used to its full potential in order to support Member States in identifying ships falling under sanctions and monitoring the movement of suspicious ships; calls, in particular, for the EU to establish a comprehensive list of vessels belonging to the Russian ‘shadow fleet’, to conduct targeted inspections, including at sea, and impose sanctions that also result in vessels being permanently or temporarily blocked for administrative reasons;
8. Urges the European External Action Service and the EU Sanctions Envoy to reach out to countries whose presence in EU waters has significantly increased since the imposition of the oil price cap, as well as to countries that provide flags to the ships listed in the 14th sanctions package and to countries involved in suspicious maritime practices in the context of other sanctions regimes; notes that the EU delegations and the Member States represented in these countries should approach the host governments to inform them about the basis of the listings and the consequences of a potential listing, highlight the risks and adverse environmental impact of irregular and high-risk shipping practices and remind them of the flag states’ responsibilities (such as IMO Resolution A.1192(33) and the revised IMO guidelines for accepting insurance companies and certificates);
9. Calls for the EU and its Member States to closely monitor the implementation of Directive 2009/20/EC on the insurance of shipowners for maritime claims, so as to prevent uninsured vessels from sailing through EU waters; stresses the need for strengthened enforcement mechanisms, such as enabling EU Member States to prevent uninsured or non-compliant vessels from docking at EU ports or using EU waters for refuelling or other services, and increasing the monitoring of such vessels; calls on the Member States to take action to ensure that non-compliant vessels are not made available on the market;
9. Notes that the flag states aiding the Russian ‘shadow fleet’ are thereby also helping the Russian war effort; emphasises that if classical diplomatic efforts fail, the Commission should seriously reassess its cooperation, including development cooperation, the ‘Everything but Arms’ scheme, etc., with these non-EU countries that are working against EU foreign policy;
10. Encourages the Member States to cooperate closely with the United Kingdom on measures to restrict the use of the English Channel by Russian ‘shadow fleet’ vessels; calls for countries with international straits to require ships to demonstrate proof of protection and indemnity insurance and their adherence to minimum safety standards; calls on all Member States to require the disclosure of oil spill insurance coverage from all vessels passing through their waters to ensure transparency regarding insurance arrangements;
10. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure sufficient environmental disaster preparedness, especially for large oil spills, and to ensure that Member State authorities cooperate closely, both together and with the European Maritime Safety Agency, to deal with large-scale, cross-border pollution disasters, including by continuing to coordinate inventories of equipment needed for clean-ups, such as booms, skimmers and modified boats; calls on the Commission to develop a crisis management and preparedness strategy to quickly deal with large-scale, cross-border pollution or environmental disasters;
11. Encourages the EU and its Member States to enhance surveillance capabilities, especially drone and satellite monitoring, including through the use of Sentinel satellite imagery, in order to identify ‘shadow fleet’ vessels in EU waters and monitor activities, such as ship-to-ship transfers in violation of EU directives and MARPOL, and to promptly investigate when risks to coastal areas and marine ecosystems arise;
11. Calls on the Commission to ensure the effective implementation and enforcement of Directive 2009/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2005/35/EC on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements;
12. Calls for ship-to-ship transfers of Russian crude oil and oil products in EU waters to be banned; requests that the necessary resources to identify and hinder these transfer operations be deployed, including by prohibiting the anchoring and fuelling of all such ships in EU waters;
12. Calls for the EU and its Member States to take a more holistic view of the ‘shadow fleet’ operations and to prevent any trade in oil and its products involving the ‘shadow fleet’; calls for the EU and its Member States to identify and sanction third-country facilities that blend or mask Russian-origin oil and oil products, as well as organisations, banks and insurance companies, among other entities, that enable the operations of Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’;
13. Calls on the Member States to enforce strict regulatory measures at their ports and in their territorial waters; urges the Member States, in the case of tankers potentially carrying Russian oil, to make full use of their right to have vessels guided by an on-board pilot from the relevant national authority to conduct checks on the origins of the cargo, ultimate ship ownership, insurance papers and compliance with safety standards, and to ensure that vessels suspected of sanctions evasion and environmental non-compliance are flagged for investigation;
13. Highlights the need for cooperation with trading partners, continued monitoring and a decidedly committed enforcement of restrictive measures at international level; calls for the EU and its Member States to deploy all available resources to this effect;
14. Calls on the Member States to designate ports capable of handling sanctioned vessels carrying crude oil and LNG and to seize illegal cargo without compensation;
14. Strongly recommends that the EU and its G7 partners significantly expand the sanctions list to include additional vessels that circumvent their price caps and operate without respecting international standards; calls for the EU and partner countries to diligently verify the adequacy of insurance covering oil spills when applying the sanctions framework, for instance when providing or renewing registrations; calls for enhanced due diligence requirements for obtaining insurance for vessels, such as proof of sales contracts compliant with the price cap or reliable, verified bank statements, etc.;
15. Stresses that the impact of existing sanctions and financial and military support to Ukraine will continue to be undermined as long as the EU continues to import Russian fossil fuels; calls, therefore, for the EU and its Member States to ban all imports of Russian fossil fuels, including LNG; calls for the EU to impose the requirement that vessels exporting Russian LNG be included on the EU sanctions list, denying them access to EU ports and maritime services; calls for the EU and its Member States to ban the import of Russian nuclear products and urges the Member States not to conclude any new agreements with Rosatom, or its leadership and subsidiaries;
15. Welcomes the updated advisory by the Price Cap Coalition for both government and private sector actors involved in the global maritime industry, providing stakeholders with new recommendations on meeting international obligations, enhancing due diligence around tanker sales, avoiding interactions with sanctioned counterparties and raising internal awareness;
16. Calls on the G7 countries to more effectively enforce the price cap imposed on Russian seaborne oil, to substantially decrease the oil price cap and to crack down on the loopholes used by Russia to repackage and sell its oil and oil products at market prices; calls for the EU, its Member States and its G7 partners to enhance their cooperation with trading partners to more swiftly and effectively identify buyers of Russian oil and to cease purchasing oil products from them; calls for these designated facilities to be included on the targeted sanctions list and for a full ban to be introduced on re-exported Russian refined oil products; calls for harmonised testing of the origin of fossil fuel, LNG and refined fossil fuel imports to prevent the re-export of Russian energy to the EU; calls on the Member States to thoroughly investigate companies’ compliance with export restrictions on listed goods and to impose dissuasive penalties;
16. Calls on the Member States to promptly transpose and implement Directive (EU) 2024/1226 on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures and to ensure adequate financial, technical and human resources in place to properly enforce EU restrictive measures;
17. Strongly recommends that the EU and its G7 partners significantly expand their sanctions lists to include additional vessels that circumvent their price caps and operate without respecting international standards; calls for the EU and partner countries to diligently verify the adequacy of insurance covering oil spills when applying the sanctions framework, for instance when providing or renewing registrations; calls for enhanced due diligence requirements for obtaining insurance for vessels, such as proof of sales contracts compliant with the price cap or reliable, verified bank statements, etc.;
17. Calls for the EU and its G7 partners to deploy all necessary resources to identify third-country refineries using Russian crude oil and sometimes masking its origin, and to cease the import of these oil products; calls for the EU, its Member States and its G7 partners to enhance their cooperation with trading partners to more swiftly and effectively identify buyers of Russian oil and to cease purchasing oil products from them; calls for these designated facilities to be included on the targeted sanctions list;
18. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure sufficient environmental disaster preparedness, especially for large oil spills, and to ensure that Member State authorities cooperate closely, both together and with the European Maritime Safety Agency, to deal with large-scale, cross-border pollution disasters, including by continuing to coordinate inventories of equipment needed for clean-ups; highlights that incidents of this nature will result in severe long-term environmental degradation, which could in turn significantly affect the tourism, fishing and marine industries in the Member States bordering the affected seas; calls on the Commission to provide additional funding to secure sufficient oil spill response vessels for the European Maritime Safety Agency;
18. Calls for ship-to-ship transfers of Russian crude oil and oil products in EU territorial waters to be banned; requests that the necessary resources to identify and hinder these transfer operations be deployed, including by prohibiting the anchoring and fuelling of all such ships in EU waters;
19. Calls on the Commission to ensure the effective implementation and enforcement of Directive 2009/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2005/35/EC on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements; calls on the Member States to promptly transpose and implement Directive (EU) 2024/1226 on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures and to ensure that adequate financial, technical and human resources are in place to properly enforce EU restrictive measures;
19. Calls on the Member States to impose stricter penalties for non-compliance with sanctions to further increase risks for actors involved in ‘shadow fleet’ operations;
20. Encourages the Member States and the Commission to work with international partners and stakeholders, including in the shipping, energy, insurance and financial sectors, to identify best practices for detecting and addressing sanctions evasion and mitigating environmental impacts in EU waters;
20. Reiterates its call to further reduce the dependence of the remaining Member States on Russian oil and gas, as this leads to exemptions from EU sanctions against Russia and finances Russia’s war machine against Ukraine;
21. Calls on the Commission to develop clearer guidelines and more robust due diligence standards for EU companies and financial institutions to avoid unintended interactions with entities linked to ‘shadow fleets’;
21. Calls for the EU and its Member States to ban the import of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) and nuclear products, and urges the Member States not to conclude any new agreements with Rosatom, or its leadership and subsidiaries; underlines that, given the importance of strengthening EU nuclear energy supply chains, including via the deployment of small modular reactors, it is essential to immediately mitigate any new dependencies on Russia and thus ensure the use of non-Russian nuclear fuels;
22. Calls for support for the work of the EU Sanctions Envoy on anti-circumvention in order to prevent the systematic re-export of sanctioned EU goods to Russia, which is seriously undermining the effectiveness of EU sanctions and obstructing international efforts to end the war; calls, in this respect, for all candidate and potential candidate countries for EU accession to strictly align with EU sanctions in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine as a sign of their readiness to take on the obligations of EU membership; reiterates its call on the Council to expand the powers of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office in order to address the crime of violation of EU restrictive measures; calls for the EU and its Member States to reinforce and centralise, at EU level, the oversight of sanctions implementation and to develop a mechanism to prevent and monitor sanctions circumvention;
22. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the International Maritime Organization and the Russian authorities.
23. Encourages global transparency standards in vessel registration to reduce reliance on shell companies and flags of convenience, in order to improve vessel ownership transparency;
24. Calls on the Commission to examine the adoption of trade policy tools similar to those employed by the United States, focusing on actors that gain market advantages because of sanctions regimes and may operate unfairly within the EU market as a result;
25. Expresses concern over the reported surplus in Russian oil production, which considerably exceeds Russia’s quota set by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Plus (OPEC+), further enabling circumvention of the established price cap and allowing Russia to generate additional revenue; calls for the EU and its Member States to closely monitor the situation and to take appropriate action in cooperation with the EU’s international partners;
26. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the International Maritime Organization and the Russian authorities.