What changed

B90153/2024

B90142/2024

European Parliament resolution on the need for unwavering support for Ukraine, after two years of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and on Russia, in particular those adopted since the escalation of Russia’s war against Ukraine in February 2022 and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula on 19 February 2014,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, in particular to the obligation of all states under Article 2 of the Charter to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN, and to settle their international disputes by peaceful means,

– having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, and to the accompanying Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area between the European Union and Ukraine, signed in 2014,

− having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, in particular the principles contained therein that the territory of a state may not be the object of acquisition by another state resulting from the threat or use of force, and that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a state or country or at its political independence is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter,

– having regard to the UN Charter, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

− having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, which defines aggression as the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the UN Charter,

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 20 June 2023 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Ukraine Facility (COM(2023)0338),

− having regard to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I thereto of 1977,

– having regard to the European Council’s decision of 14 December 2023 to open accession negotiations with Ukraine, following the Commission’s positive recommendation of 8 November 2023 in this regard,

− having regard to the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 14 December 2023 and 1 February 2024,

− having regard to the reports of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Ukraine,

− having regard to the regular reports of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),

− having regard to the UN General Assembly resolutions adopted since the start of the war of aggression against Ukraine,

− having regard to the application for EU membership by Ukraine on 28 February 2022, the Commission communication of 17 June 2022 entitled ‘Commission Opinion on Ukraine’s application for membership of the European Union’ (COM(2022)0407) and the subsequent European Council conclusions of 23 and 24 June 2022,

− having regard to European Court of Auditors Special Report 23/2021 entitled ‘Reducing grand corruption in Ukraine: several EU initiatives, but still insufficient results’,

− having regard to European Court of Auditors Opinion 03/2023 concerning the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Ukraine Facility,

– having regard to the reports of the High-Level Working Group on the Environmental Consequences of the War of 9 February 2024 entitled ‘An environmental compact for Ukraine’ and of December 2023 entitled ‘Climate Damage Caused by Russia’s War in Ukraine’,

– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas Russiathe Russian Federation has been carrying out an illegal, unprovoked anda unjustifiedfull-scale war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022; whereas Russia’s war against Ukraine started2022, in 2014 with the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the subsequent occupation of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions; whereas this war of aggression constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of the UN Charter and of the fundamental principles of international law; whereas Russia’s actions in Ukraine over the past two years continue to threaten peace and security in Europe and worldwide;

B. whereas the Russian war of aggression is the largest military conflict on the European continent since the end of the Second World War and reflects the growing conflict between authoritarianism and democracy;

B. whereas regular waves of attacks on energy infrastructure continue to cause destruction, leave millions of people across Ukraine with no electricity and disrupt water supply and heating systems; whereas the attacks have also damaged other civilian infrastructure; whereas thousands of civilians across Ukraine, including hundreds of children, have already been killed, injured or forcibly displaced; whereas according to UN humanitarian agency OCHA, more than 14.6 million people, around 40 % of the Ukrainian population, will need humanitarian aid in 2024; whereas the war has forced millions of people to flee and nearly 4 million are still internally displaced throughout Ukraine, while over 6 million live as refugees abroad; whereas the war has resulted in 65 % of households reporting a decrease in their incomes since February 2022; whereas 44 % of households struggle to obtain enough money to meet their needs, and 45 % of the population belongs to at least one vulnerable group; whereas 3.6 million people are at risk of experiencing gender-based violence; whereas the prolongation of the conflict will result in persisting and worsening urgent needs in the coming months;

C. whereas Russia’s forces have conducted indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure, such as schools and hospitals; whereas thousands of civilians, including children, have already been murdered and many more have been tortured, harassed, sexually assaulted, kidnapped or forcibly displaced; whereas this inhumane conduct by Russian forces and their proxies is in total disregard of international humanitarian law; whereas Russia’s attempt to ethnically cleanse occupied parts of Ukraine has included mass atrocities; whereas Russia aims to destroy Ukraine’s national identity and erase Ukrainian culture and statehood;

C. whereas on 30 September 2022, Russia unilaterally declared its annexation of the partly Russian-occupied Ukrainian oblasts of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia, in addition to its previous annexation of the Crimean peninsula;

D. whereas millions of Ukrainians have been displaced inside and outside Ukraine, having fled from Russia’s aggression; whereas Russia’s war crimes will leave a generation of Ukrainian civilians and military personnel requiring treatment for mental distress, depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder;

D. whereas people all over Europe are deeply concerned about the war, which has the potential to result in a war between nuclear power states;

E. whereas the Armed Forces of Ukraine managed to withstand the Russian invasion, liberated more than 50 % of the territories temporarily occupied after 24 February 2022 and regained control of Ukraine’s western access to the Black Sea, effectively pushing out the Russian Black Sea Fleet;

E. whereas Russian authorities have made undue use of force against peaceful protests against the war; whereas the laws on regulating public gatherings and against denigrating the Russian armed forces and the ‘dissemination of deliberately false information’ are being used to further crack down on the opposition; whereas the cases of Alexei Navalny, Alexei Moskaliov, Boris Kagarlitsky and Sergei Udaltsov are further evidence of the regime’s crackdown against all opponents;

F. whereas the Western countries’ combined GDP is 25 times greater than that of Russia, yet in 2023 Western military assistance to Ukraine amounted to less than 0.1 % of this combined GDP; whereas in 2023, Russia spent approximately 6 % of its GDP on its war of aggression and Ukraine the equivalent of 25 % of its GDP on its defence;

F. whereas Ukraine has banned 11 opposition parties, including parties present in parliament, and critical anti-government and pacifist voices are subject to strong repression, arrests and intimidation, as in the cases of Gonzalo Lira, Yurii Sheliazhenko and Mikhail and Aleksander Kononovich;

G. whereas Russia’s war of aggression shows its post-colonial attitude towards its neighbours; whereas as long as Russia remains a state with an imperialistic mentality pursuing revisionist policies, it will continue its efforts to maintain the ever-looming threat of aggression on the European continent; whereas numerous international actors have recognised Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism and a state that uses means of terrorism, and this should be followed by concrete measures;

G. whereas the war in Ukraine has resulted in hundreds of thousands of casualties on both sides, and according to several military analysts, there is no military solution to the conflict in sight in the short term;

H. whereas the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Ukraine following the positive recommendation of the Commission, and further invited the Council to adopt the negotiating framework once the relevant Commission recommendations are met;

H. whereas various representatives of European governments have declared the need for further European rearmament, including nuclear rearmament;

I. whereas the EU has provided Ukraine with unprecedented and multidimensional support since the start of the full-scale invasion, including military support on a scale never before seen; whereas the overall assistance pledged to Ukraine by the EU, its Member States and European financial institutions since February 2022 amounts to at least EUR 85 billion, including humanitarian and emergency assistance, budget support, macro-financial assistance and military aid; whereas EUR 17 billion was provided to Member States to host some four million Ukrainian refugees, who have been offered extended protection under the Temporary Protection Directive until March 2025;

I. whereas Ursula von der Leyen stated that the next European Commission must have a commissioner for defence;

J. whereas the EU and its Member States have so far provided Ukraine with EUR 28 billion in military aid; whereas the European Peace Facility was used to provide EUR 5.6 billion for the transfer of military equipment to Ukraine by Member States; whereas the ammunition initiative will provide Ukraine with approximately 524 000 155 mm shells manufactured by the European defence industry by March 2024, and another 500 000 by the end of the year; whereas the EU Military Mission in Support of Ukraine has trained 40 000 Ukrainian soldiers in Germany and Poland so far, and the number is only increasing;

J. whereas the EU has allocated billions of euro to strengthening the capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces;

K. whereas the EU institutions recently reached an agreement in principle to establish a Ukraine Facility that will offer EUR 50 billion in predictable medium-term support, in the form of grants and loans, for the repair, recovery, reconstruction and modernisation of Ukraine from 2024 to 2027;

1. Reiterates, in the strongest possible terms, its condemnation of the attack on Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty resulting from the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine; condemns this invasion as a war of aggression which constitutes a serious violation of international law, in particular the UN Charter, and for which there is no justification; condemns Belarus’s involvement in this aggression;

L whereas Ukrainian children are paying the ultimate price in the war, as 528 Ukrainian children have been killed and 1 226 wounded, 1.8 million have had to cross into neighbouring countries as refugees and another 2.5 million are internally displaced within Ukraine;

2. Expresses its deepest solidarity with the people of Ukraine;

M. whereas since the beginning of the full-scale war of aggression, approximately 20 000 Ukrainian children have been forcibly deported to Russia and Belarus or detained in the occupied territories; whereas the International Criminal Court has issued international arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova in view of their responsibility for the war crime of unlawful deportation and for the unlawful transfer of children from occupied territories of Ukraine to Russia; whereas fewer than 400 deported children have been returned to Ukraine and reunited with their families;

3. Stresses that on the second anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, now more than ever, there is a need for urgent, intensive and sustained diplomatic efforts to immediately put an end to the war in Ukraine and the suffering of the Ukrainian people; regrets that a diplomatic and peaceful resolution to the conflict has not yet been found to date;

N. whereas Ukraine has signed security agreements with the UK, Denmark, Italy, Germany and France in line with the G7 joint declaration of support for Ukraine, which was agreed on 12 July 2023 on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Vilnius; whereas the G7’s commitment opened the door to negotiations to formalise long-term bilateral security commitments and arrangements in support of Ukraine;

4. Demands that the Russian Federation cease its use of force against Ukraine and refrain from any unlawful threat or use of force against any EU Member State; demands that the Russian Federation withdraw its military forces from the territory of Ukraine;

1. Reiterates its unwavering solidarity with the people and leadership of Ukraine and its support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders;

5. Urges Russia, in the strongest terms, to turn back from the path of violence and aggression it has chosen and to return to the path of dialogue and negotiation; urges NATO and its member countries not to escalate the conflict by starting a new arms race and to design their response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in a manner that leaves ways out of the confrontation between Russia and NATO;

2. Reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as of the involvement of the regime in Belarus; demands that Russia and its proxy forces cease all military actions and that Russia withdraw all military forces, proxies and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine, end its forced deportations of Ukrainian civilians and release all detained Ukrainians; demands that the settlement of Russian citizens in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine cease and be reversed;

6. Reaffirms its commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, extending to its territorial waters; stresses that the EU will not recognise any decision on the annexation of territories of third states and calls on Russia to reverse its decision on the annexation of Ukrainian territories;

3. Recalls that the Russian war of aggression started with the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula in February 2014; recalls that the peninsula was turned into a military base and served as a springboard for the full-scale invasion in 2022;

7. Expresses its dismay at the continuous large-scale Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure, including energy facilities, residential areas, schools and hospitals; urges Russia to immediately stop all hostilities, bombardments and attacks against civilians; demands that all parties fully comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law to spare the civilian population and civilian objects, to refrain from attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless objects necessary for the survival of the civilian population and to respect and protect humanitarian personnel and consignments used for humanitarian relief operations; stresses that those responsible for war crimes must be held accountable in accordance with international law;

4. Pays tribute to the brave people of Ukraine, rightful laureates of the 2023 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, who continue to courageously defend their country, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, while also defending freedom, democracy, the rule of law and European values against a brutal regime that seeks to undermine our democracy and weaken and divide our Union;

8. Demands that all parties allow refugees safe and unfettered passage to destinations both within and outside of Ukraine and facilitate rapid, safe and unhindered access to humanitarian assistance for those in need in Ukraine; commends the extraordinary efforts made by humanitarian organisations, communities in the EU Member States and neighbouring countries, and members of the public in responding to the humanitarian and refugee crises created by the Russian Federation’s aggression; urgently calls for the EU and its Member States to provide more support to these actors;

5. Expresses its deepest condolences to the families and loved ones of the courageous defenders who have sacrificed their lives in defence of Ukraine, its people, freedom and democracy; calls for continuous and increased support from the EU and its Member States for the treatment and rehabilitation of injured defenders of Ukraine;

9. Stresses the need to ensure that nobody fleeing Ukraine is being prevented from leaving, including victims of reproductive exploitation, and that all persons fleeing can benefit from protection, including international students, trans women and Ukrainian conscientious objectors, and are able to move onwards within the EU; condemns the detention of international students fleeing Ukraine; regrets that Ukrainian men of a prescribed age are prohibited by the Ukrainian authorities from fleeing the war; calls on the Ukrainian and Russian authorities to reconsider their policies of forced conscription of men between the ages of 18 and 60 with no military experience; expresses concern, furthermore, over the ‘partial mobilisation’ decreed in Russia in September 2022, which prohibits Russian men from leaving the country after receiving a conscription notice;

6. States its resolve to contribute to maintaining the Ukrainian people’s spirit of resilience and faith in a better future in which peace will reign in Ukraine and Europe, no part of Ukrainian territory will be under Russian occupation and no Ukrainian or other citizen will feel threatened or under attack for their wish to live in peace, safety and prosperity and with respect for European values and principles; reiterates that Ukraine, as an independent and sovereign state, has the fundamental right to determine its own future, including the freedom to choose its alliances and policies and to pursue its national interests;

10. Urges the UN and its member states to step up their efforts to launch the political dialogue and mediation needed to prepare ceasefire and peace negotiations; calls for the EU to focus its efforts on supporting the negotiation process and backing the UN Secretary-General’s attempts to find diplomatic solutions;

7. Praises the solidarity shown by EU citizens, civil society, Member States and the EU itself towards Ukraine and its people; supports the continuous extension of the Temporary Protection Directive for persons fleeing Ukraine as a consequence of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

11. Expresses deep concern over the Russian Government’s crackdown on the opposition and opponents to the war;

8. Believes that the outcome of the war and the stance taken by the international community will play a crucial role in influencing future action by other authoritarian regimes, which are closely observing the course of the war and assessing how much space there is for them to exert aggressive foreign policies, including by military means;

12. Expresses deep concern over the geopolitical tensions between NATO and the Russian Federation in the common eastern neighbourhood, which risks leading to a direct confrontation between them, with potentially disastrous consequences for Europe and the world; is concerned about NATO’s enlargement to the east; calls for an end to the spiral of confrontation and the arms race, and for a return to diplomacy; recalls that EU citizens oppose war with Russia;

9. Underlines that the main objective for Ukraine is to win the war against Russia, which entails driving all the forces of Russia and its proxies and allies out of the internationally recognised territory of Ukraine; considers that this objective can be met only through the continued, sustained and steadily increasing supply of all types of conventional weapons to Ukraine, without exception;

13. Recalls that the reconstruction of Ukraine must be the highest priority and that Russia must contribute financially to the reconstruction; notes the importance of the reconstruction being based on the needs of the Ukrainian people, not on corporate profit interests; calls for the cancellation of Ukrainian debt in order to facilitate the reconstruction of the strategic and infrastructure enterprises destroyed in the war; supports calls for an international conference to be organised in due time to raise funds under the Ukraine Solidarity Trust Fund; stresses the need to prioritise the reconstruction of the facilities needed to ensure the safe return of Ukrainians who wish to return; calls for the speedy reintegration of Ukraine into European and global supply chains, in particular in the areas of energy and food supply;

10. Recalls the importance of liberating and de-occupying the Crimean peninsula, which has been occupied by Russia for a decade now; recalls that citizens of the peninsula who are loyal to Ukraine, in particular the indigenous Tatars, face repression, arrest and torture; recalls that the Russian occupying forces have made every effort to erase Tatar heritage and the memory of Ukrainian presence from the peninsula; supports Ukraine’s efforts to reintegrate Crimea, in particular the Crimea Platform;

14. Rejects the transformation of the EU into a militarised Union;

11. Reaffirms its support for consistently providing military aid to Ukraine for as long as necessary and in whatever form necessary for Ukraine to win; recognises the efforts made by the Member States in providing and by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) in coordinating military support to Ukraine to date; reiterates its call on the Member States to substantially increase and accelerate their military support with a view to not only allowing Ukraine to defend itself against Russian attacks, but also to enabling it to regain full control over its entire internationally recognised territory;

15. Highlights the recommendations of the High-Level Working Group on the Environmental Consequences of the War; believes that more attention should be given to the environmental consequences of wars, especially in times of intensifying global ecological crises; urges the Assembly of States Parties to the International Criminal Court to include ‘ecocide’ as a core international crime under the Rome Statute;

12. Believes that there should be no self-imposed restriction on military assistance to Ukraine; points to the huge divergence in the amounts of support provided by EU Member States as a percentage of their GDP; calls for the necessary investment in the European defence industrial base so as to substantially increase output in order to meet Ukrainian needs and replenish EU Member States’ depleted stocks; underlines that Ukraine is in particular need of sophisticated air-defence systems, long-range missiles, such as TAURUS missiles, modern combat aircraft, various types of artillery and ammunition (155 mm shells in particular), drones and weapons to counter them; supports the proposal that all EU Member States and NATO allies should support Ukraine militarily with no less than 0.25 % of their GDP annually; calls for an overall increase in the financial ceiling of the European Peace Facility and insists that this should be used, among other things, for the single source procurement of available ammunition on the world market to meet Ukraine’s needs; considers that current EU ammunition production that is committed to third countries should be redirected and that Ukraine should be given priority access to it; calls on the governments of the EU Member States and the defence industry to address the late deliveries and the reasons for these with the recipient countries; calls on the US House of Representatives to adopt the military assistance package for Ukraine without further delay;

16. Supports the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); stresses the importance of preserving the integrity of infrastructure and ensuring easy access to nuclear sites for the IAEA’s mission;

13. Welcomes the signing of security agreements between Ukraine and the UK, Denmark, Italy, Germany and France in line with the G7 joint declaration of support for Ukraine, and calls on other like-minded partners to follow suit; underlines that these security agreements cannot be considered a substitute for future NATO membership; welcomes the progress made on the practical details and financial ceiling for a new Ukraine Assistance Fund, under the European Peace Facility, which would support the provision of military equipment to Ukraine through joint European procurement initiatives;

17. Expresses solidarity with and support for the courageous people in Russia and Belarus protesting Putin’s invasion of Ukraine; strongly urges the Member States to protect and grant asylum to any Russians and Belarusians persecuted for speaking out against or protesting the war, as well as to Russian and Belarusian deserters and conscientious objectors; insists that EU protection and asylum must also be extended to Ukrainian deserters and conscientious objectors;

14. Reiterates its support for the peace formula presented by Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy; believes that it is a comprehensive plan to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity; recalls that the plan’s 10 points were reflected in UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/6 of 23 February 2023 on principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine;

18. Expresses concern over the tendency to attack voices that oppose the delivery of weapons to Ukraine and raise critical questions about related EU policies; calls on the Member States to ensure that voices for peace and reconciliation are not silenced; supports the peace movement, which calls for an immediate end to the atrocities and for the opening of negotiations;

15. Reiterates its call on the Commission, the VP/HR and the Member States to work together with Ukraine and the international community on setting up a special tribunal to investigate and prosecute the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine by Russia’s leaders and their allies, such as the regime in Belarus; welcomes the establishment of the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression in Ukraine in The Hague;

19. Takes note of the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine; stresses that there is no ‘fast track’ for EU membership, and that accession remains a complex, merit-based and structured process requiring the effective implementation of reforms and the transposition of the EU acquis; stresses the need to prepare the EU for further enlargement by reforming it;

16. Expresses horror at the fact that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has resulted in one of the fastest growing large-scale displacements of children since the Second World War; recalls that the massive targeting of civilian infrastructure has caused Ukrainian children to be severely deprived of access to basic services, such as education and healthcare, in particular mental health support;

20. Is deeply concerned that, according to the European Court of Auditors 2021 report on reducing grand corruption in Ukraine, grand corruption and state capture were still widespread in Ukraine despite EU action to address the issue as a cross-cutting priority, and that oligarchs and vested interests across Ukraine were the root cause of corruption and posed the main obstacle to the rule of law and economic development in the country; highlights that the June 2023 European Court of Auditors opinion on the Ukraine Facility echoed the report’s message about grand corruption and state capture in Ukraine and how these elements pose a systemic risk to the Ukraine Facility; calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service to develop a strategic document on preventing and combating grand corruption, including state capture, in Ukraine, in line with the recommendation of the European Court of Auditors; is deeply concerned that the provisions of the Ukraine Guarantee under Pillar II of the Ukraine Facility do not envisage any basis for excluding certain final recipients; calls on the Commission to revisit Article 30 in order to ensure that companies under oligarchic influence do not receive support;

17. Reiterates that the continued forced relocation and deportation of Ukrainian children, including those from institutions, to Russia and Belarus and their forced adoption by Russian families is in breach of Ukrainian and international law; underlines that forcibly transferring children of a group to another group constitutes the crime of genocide, according to the Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; demands that the Russian and Belarusian authorities ensure the immediate return of all Ukrainian children; praises the efforts of local Ukrainian organisations that, on a case-by-case basis, support parents and families in searching for their children and fighting for their safe return;

21. Is deeply concerned about the interventions being made in Ukrainian labour law, recalling the importance of strong trade unions, good working conditions and a strong and functioning public sector as the foundation for a society to be well equipped against external challenges, such as war;

18. Condemns Russia’s intention to conduct presidential elections on the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine on 15-17 March 2024 and underlines that it will not recognise the results of these illegal elections;

22. Considers that support for the Ukrainian economy cannot be provided at the expense of European farmers, at the cost of unfair competition; denounces the lifting of customs duties on agricultural products, in particular Ukrainian poultry; points out that these measures mainly benefit one of the giants of the Ukrainian sector, MHP, owned by Yuriy Kosyuk, thus reinforcing the country’s monopolies; points out that its owner has used letterbox companies in EU tax havens and uses two cutting companies, one based in the Netherlands and the other in Slovakia;

19. Reiterates its call for innovative, complementary and flexible interaction between the ongoing work on the implementation of the Association Agreement currently in force and the accession negotiation process, thus allowing for Ukraine’s gradual integration into the EU single market and sectoral programmes, including access to EU funds in the respective areas, so that Ukrainians can reap the benefits of accession throughout the process and not only upon its completion;

23. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the President, Government and Parliament of Ukraine, the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation and the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Belarus.

20. Underlines that the Russian war of aggression has fundamentally changed the geopolitical situation in Europe and threatens its security architecture, and that the response to this necessitates bold, brave and comprehensive political, security and financial decisions by the EU;

21. Welcomes the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine once the Commission’s recommendations are met; believes that Ukraine’s membership of the EU represents a geostrategic investment in a united and strong Europe and that it equates to showing leadership, resolve and vision; calls for the swift submission of the relevant negotiating framework, and for its adoption once the relevant steps from the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 are taken;

22. Recalls that the EU accession process will be merit-based and that the enlargement methodology puts an emphasis on the crucial areas of respect for the rule of law, fundamental values, human rights, democracy and the fight against corruption; believes that a firmly merit-based accession process is in the best interest of both Ukraine and the EU; encourages the EU and its Member States to provide increased support and assistance to Ukraine on its path to EU accession, including technical expertise, capacity building and the institutional reforms necessary to meet the membership criteria;

23. Calls on the Ukrainian Government to continue to strengthen local self-government, a reform that has received significant national and international acclaim, and to embed the success of the decentralisation reform in the overall architecture of Ukraine’s repair, recovery and reconstruction processes;

24. Welcomes the EU institutions’ agreement in principle on the establishment of the Ukraine Facility that will provide predictable financial assistance to Ukraine, and calls for its rapid deployment; underlines the strengthened role of the Verkhovna Rada, the sub-national entities and civil society as relevant partners for the executive authority in identifying the priorities that will be financed via the Ukraine Plan, stressing that this also increases the oversight and monitoring of the Facility;

25. Calls on the Council to maintain its sanctions policy against Russia and Belarus, while monitoring, reviewing and enhancing its effectiveness and impact; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure the swift implementation and strict enforcement of all 13 packages of sanctions; asks the Commission for an impact assessment on the sanctions’ effectiveness in hindering the Russian war effort and on the circumvention of sanctions; recalls that the EU is working on legislation to designate the violation of restrictive measures a criminal offence; calls on the Member States to adopt further sanctions packages aimed at weakening the Russian war machine and targeting further sectors of Russia’s economy, such as the nuclear sector, in particular Rosatom, metallurgy and agriculture;

26. Condemns all those countries that are supplying military equipment to Russia and assisting it in circumventing and avoiding the effects of the sanctions imposed on it, and calls for the EU to rigorously prosecute companies, associations and individuals that participate in the circumvention of sanctions; calls for the EU, the Member States and their allies to strengthen the effectiveness of the sanctions already imposed, to take urgent steps to block any attempt to circumvent these sanctions and to work on a secondary sanctions mechanism that would close any loopholes;

27. Calls for the EU and its Member States to take further action to continue Russia’s international isolation, including with regard to Russia’s membership of international organisations and bodies, such as the UN Security Council;

28. Underlines the urgent need to establish a sound legal regime allowing for the confiscation of Russian assets frozen by the EU and for their use to address the various consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, including the reconstruction of the country, compensation for the victims of Russia’s aggression, and the purchase of military equipment for Ukraine; underlines its conviction that once the war ends, Russia must be obliged to pay the reparations imposed on it to ensure that it makes a substantial contribution to the reconstruction of Ukraine; welcomes the recent Council decision clarifying the obligations of Central Securities Depositories holding assets and reserves of the Central Bank of Russia, which are immobilised as a result of the EU’s restrictive measures; welcomes the creation of the Register of Damage caused by the Russian aggression, which is the first step in the establishment of an international compensation mechanism;

29. Reiterates its concern about the situation at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which is illegally controlled by Russia; supports efforts to maintain a continued International Atomic Energy Agency presence at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant; recalls and condemns Russia’s actions that have inflicted severe damage on the environment in Ukraine, including the destruction of the Kakhovka dam, the logging of Ukrainian forests, extensive mining and the contamination of air and water resources; reiterates its deep concern about the broader long-term environmental impact of the war; underlines the need to create a system for recording and assessing the environmental damage caused by Russia and to prepare legal grounds for Russia’s accountability for those crimes;

30. Calls for the EU and its Member States to work strategically and proactively to counter hybrid threats and to prevent Russia’s interference in political, electoral and other democratic processes in Ukraine and in the EU, in particular malicious acts aimed at manipulating public opinion and undermining European integration, particularly in the light of the upcoming European elections;

31. Expresses concern about the restriction of foreign travel of members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; believes that this could be considered indiscriminate restriction of the political activity of elected members of parliament, in particular of those representing the opposition; strongly believes that in times of war, any political resource that can represent Ukraine’s cause in any international forum should not be disregarded;

32. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the United Nations and the Russian and Belarusian authorities.