What changed

B90144/2024

B90145/2024

European Parliament resolution on the critical situation in Cuba

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Cuba, in particular its resolution of 12 July 2023 on the state of the EU-Cuba PDCA in the light of the recent visit of the High Representative to the island,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and other international human rights treaties and instruments,

– having regard to the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Cuba, of the other part (PDCA) signed in December 2016 and provisionally applied since 1 November 2017,

– having regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, in particular Article 1 thereof,

– having regard to Articlethe 5International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the16 CubanDecember Constitution,1966,

– having regard to the InternationalUN CovenantGuiding Principles on CivilBusiness and PoliticalHuman Rights of 16 December 1966 and other international human rights treaties and instruments,2011,

– having regard to the definition of ‘civilprinciples societylaid organisation’down in the Official Journal of the EuropeanUN Union,Charter,

– having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 2 November 2023 entitled ‘Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba’,

– having regard to the United States’ so-called Monroe Doctrine, which remains the heart of American diplomacy on the American continent and justifies its expansionism and interference,

– having regard to the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Cuba, of the other part (the EU-Cuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement),

– having regard to the joint press statements by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, and the Cuban Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, after the EU-Cuba Joint Council of 26 May 2023,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Cuba, in particular those of 15 November 2018 on the human rights situation in Cuba, of 28 November 2019 on Cuba, the case of José Daniel Ferrer, of 10 June 2021 on the human rights and political situation in Cuba, of 16 September 2021 on the government crackdown on protests and citizens in Cuba and of 16 December 2021 on the situation in Cuba, namely the cases of José Daniel Ferrer, Lady in White Aymara Nieto, Maykel Castillo, Luis Robles, Félix Navarro, Luis Manuel Otero, Reverend Lorenzo Rosales Fajardo, Andy Dunier García and Yunior García Aguilera,

– having regard to its position of 5 July 2017 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Cuba, of the other part,

– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas Parliament gave its consent to the PDCA on 5 July 2017, with clear conditions linked to the improvement of human rights and democracy in Cuba, including a suspension clause in the event of a violation of human rights provisions; whereas the accompanying resolution asked the Cuban authorities to allow Parliament delegations to enter the country and have access to their interlocutors;

A. whereas the US economic, trade and financial blockade on Cuba constitutes a violation of the human rights of the Cuban people that qualifies as an act of economic warfare hindering the development of the Cuban people and the full achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs);

B. whereas several articles of the EU-Cuba PDCA, namely Articles 1, 2 and 3, establish clear principles on equality, reciprocity, mutual respect, strengthening of contacts, dialogue and cooperation between both societies;

B. whereas the US blockade against Cuba has lasted since February 1962; whereas this blockade is justified by the US administration as ‘the only foreseeable way to reduce domestic support was through disenchantment and discouragement based on dissatisfaction and economic difficulties […] Any means to weaken the economic life of Cuba must be used quickly [...]: refuse to give credit and to supply Cuba to lower real and monetary wages with the aim of causing hunger, despair and the overthrow of the government’; whereas as such, it can been seen as a crime against humanity;

C. whereas the number of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience in Cuba has risen dramatically, reaching 1 066 on 31 January 2024, including 33 who were minors at the time of detention, an eightfold increase since 2018, rising by 170 in the last 12 months, equivalent to a monthly average of more than 14 politically motivated detentions; whereas human rights organisations have also documented more than 11 000 cases of ‘pre criminal’ convictions with sentences averaging 2 years and 10 months;

C. whereas the consequences of the US economic, commercial and financial blockade have worsened severely, including during Cuba’s fight against the COVID-19 pandemic; whereas the blockade has been reinforced, in particular since the beginning of the pandemic by former US President Donald Trump, who added 243 additional coercive measures against Cuba, notably the suspension of Western Union services throughout the country, making it almost impossible for relatives abroad to send foreign currency and hindering the country’s access to vital medicines and medical equipment; whereas these measures have been maintained by the Biden administration and, from 1 March 2022 to 28 February 2023 alone, have caused damage to the Cuban economy estimated at USD 4.867 billion;

D. whereas the UN previously expressed its concern to Cuba about the detention and imprisonment of religious leaders in the country; whereas on 16 November 2023, five mandates and rapporteurs of the UN Special Procedures sent Cuba a Communication in which they described and condemned Cuba’s systematic pattern of persecution, imprisonment and torture of evangelical pastors and Catholic priests, Muslim imams, and Yoruba/Santería religious leaders;

D. whereas the US-imposed Helms-Burton Act, and the reactivation of Titles III and IV thereof in particular, violates several principles of international law and the rules of the multilateral trade and commerce system;

E. whereas human rights organisations continue to document the ongoing crackdown on the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association in the country and the Cuban authorities’ stifling of dissenting voices and targeting of human rights defenders;

E. whereas the extraterritorial application of the US blockade goes against the sovereignty of other countries, including Member States; whereas this blockade has led to titanic fines of USD 11 billion for 38 banks, including the French group BNP Paribas; whereas most European banks (including ING and BNP Paribas) have since then refused to transfer money to the island, making investments and solidarity actions extremely complicated;

F. whereas Parliament has repeatedly reminded the EEAS that the participation of representatives of independent civil society in political dialogues and the agreement’s cooperation projects is an essential part of the PDCA, as stressed in its Article 36, and that excluding representatives of independent civil society from cooperation funds and/or participation in the agreement while, on the contrary, allowing participation and access to cooperation funds exclusively for companies in which the state participates or which it controls, as has been the case since the signing of the agreement, should be remedied immediately;

F. whereas a few days before the end of his mandate in January 2021, former US president Donald Trump added Cuba to the list of countries sponsoring international terrorism on the pretext of Cuba having welcomed the Colombian peace agreements and for having refused to extradite the leaders of the National Liberation Army (ELN), as requested at the time by the Duque government, even though this was contrary to international law; whereas the extradition request was withdrawn by the new Colombian Government; whereas since the end of 2022, under the leadership of Gustavo Petro, the Colombian Government has been negotiating with the ELN; whereas a ceasefire agreement was reached in Havana on 9 June 2023;

G. whereas on 2 January 2024, the UN publicly disclosed the letter of indictment sent to the Cuban regime accusing it of forced labour, one of the forms of modern slavery denounced by the Special Rapporteurs on Human Trafficking and Slavery; whereas several international organisations have denounced that Cuban civilian workers such as doctors, teachers, sailors, engineers, artists and athletes serving abroad are subjected to human trafficking by inherently coercive laws and regulations explicitly affecting basic freedoms, such as Article 176 of the Penal Code, Mincex Resolution 368 of 2020, the Migration Law, and Decree 306 of 2012, among others;

G. whereas the inclusion of Cuba on the list of countries sponsoring international terrorism has led to new sanctions, not only restricting assistance and foreign trade with the US and imposing significant financial limitations, but also negatively impacting commercial relations with foreign operators, especially European ones;

H. whereas the regime gradually imposed on Cuba rules out any prospect of democratic change, as Article 5 of the Cuban Constitution states that the ‘unique, Martí, Fidelista and Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Cuba’ is the superior political force and ruler of society and the state, and as Articles 4 and 229 establish the current political system as irrevocable;

H. whereas it has also damaged the international tourism sector, as nationals of countries that benefit from the Electronic System for Travel Authorisation to enter US territory cannot benefit from the visa waiver programme with the United States, but must formally apply for a visa to enter the US if they visited Cuba after 1 March 2011;

I. whereas despite years of insisting on the need to visit the island, the Cuban authorities systematically refuse to allow official committees, delegations and some political groups from the European Parliament, international human rights organisations and other independent observers of the human rights situation, including UN special rapporteurs, to enter Cuba;

I. whereas the important tourism sector collapsed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and has still not recovered, because of the war in Ukraine and the energy crisis; whereas the Cuban people have recently faced serious economic and social difficulties in their daily lives; whereas there is a serious shortage of fuel, which is also causing significant delays in the distribution of food; whereas the energy crisis has led to daily periods of mandatory power cuts;

J. whereas on 23 November 2023, the Conference of Presidents of the European Parliament authorised the sending of an ad hoc delegation to Cuba following a letter of invitation from the Ambassador of Cuba to Belgium and the European Union dated 20 September 2023; whereas on 19 December 2023, the Vice President of the Cuban Parliament informed the EU ambassador in Cuba of its refusal to receive Parliament’s delegation with the justification that it did ‘not wish to receive the visit of Members of the European Parliament who work against Cuba’s interests and are completely aligned with the United States’; whereas the Ambassador of the Republic of Cuba, in a letter dated 25 January 2024, addressed to the President of the European Parliament, referred to the President of the ad hoc delegation of the European Parliament to Cuba and two other members, as ‘maintaining links and supporting citizens and organisations included in the National List of persons and entities ... based on acts of terrorism’; whereas in November 2023, a delegation of the Cuban Parliament was received at the European Parliament’s premises;

J. whereas material difficulties have led to an unprecedented migratory wave; whereas according to estimates, more than 500 000 people emigrated in 2022 and 2023, of whom around 400 000 entered the United States irregularly, encouraged by US policies of unique benefits for Cuban irregular migrants, its non-compliance with the immigration agreements and the refusal to effectively process visas at the US Consulate in Havana;

K. whereas Parliament has awarded its Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to Cuban activists on three occasions: Oswaldo Payá in 2002, the Ladies in White in 2005 and Guillermo Fariñas in 2010; whereas Sakharov laureates and their relatives are still being regularly harassed, intimidated and prevented from leaving the country and participating in international events;

K. whereas in May 2023, the Third Cuba-EU Joint Council was hosted in Havana on the third cycle of the implementation of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) between Cuba, the EU and its 27 Member States, which was signed on 12 December 2016 and has been in force, provisionally, since 1 November 2017;

L. whereas the PDCAdevelopment hasand failedconsolidation inof itsdemocracy coreand aimthe rule of improvinglaw, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedomsfreedoms, are included in the PDCA between the EU and Cuba;

1. Regrets that, despite the time that has elapsed since the entry into force of the PDCA, the situation in terms of democracy, freedoms and human rights in Cuba has not improved; highlights that on the contrary, there has been a further deterioration and worsening of the human rights situation on the island, in clear and systematic violation of the basic provisions of the Agreement;

M. whereas the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, Eamon Gilmore, met with representatives of the Cuban authorities such as the President of the Republic, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice, the Attorney General, the Deputy Minister of the Interior and deputies of the National Assembly during his last visit to Havana; whereas after these exchanges, he recognised the ‘honest’ and ‘respectful’ two-way EU-Cuba dialogue on human rights and fundamental freedoms;

2. Stresses the obligation for all parties to fulfil the binding provisions of the PDCA and to uphold the principle of the universality of human rights; recalls that the PDCA contains a ‘human rights clause’, as a standard essential element of EU international agreements, that allows the suspension of the agreement in the event of violations of human rights provisions;

N. whereas during his visit to the island in May 2023, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR), Josep Borrell, stated that ‘despite all the limitations and restrictive measures of the American blockade, which does not make things any easier, we are Cuba’s main trading partner’; whereas he announced an EUR 14 million fund to help promote small businesses in Cuba, a sign of the EU’s ‘willingness to accompany Cuba in its process of economic and social reform in a relationship of mutual respect’;

3. Condemns in the strongest terms the systematic human rights violations and abuses against protesters, political dissidents, religious leaders, human rights activists and independent artists, among others, perpetrated by the Cuban regime; urges the Cuban authorities to immediately put an end to the policy of repression; condemns the lack of religious freedom in Cuba;

O. whereas according to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, ‘The III Joint Council confirmed the progress achieved in the fulfilment of the objectives defined in the PDCA and also its validity as a guideline and driver for the development and deepening of mutually beneficial relations’;

4. Is concerned at the alarming increase in the number of political prisoners, which has risen more than eightfold since 2018, making Cuba the biggest prison for political activists and dissidents in Latin America; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of individuals arbitrarily detained solely for exercising their human rights, including the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly; calls for abusive criminal charges to be dropped and for those in exile to be allowed to return to their country;

P. whereas the visits of the EU Special Representative for Human Rights to Cuba in November 2023 and the visit of VP/HR Josep Borrell confirm the value of this cooperation and the full engagement of the Cuban authorities; whereas the validity and usefulness of all the political and sectoral dialogues have been established in the PDCA, without establishing a hierarchy between them;

5. Denounces the Cuban regime’s practice of excluding legitimate civil society organisations from EU-Cuba civil society seminars; declares unacceptable that the EEAS and the EU Delegation in Havana agreed to the exclusion of the Cuban democratic opposition along with independent and legitimate Cuban and European civil society organisations from political and human rights dialogues owing to their lack of endorsement by Cuban authorities, thus depriving the PDCA of an essential part of its purpose and contravening the will of Parliament and the EU Member States that signed it;

Q. whereas the US and its allies from the extreme right in Europe are trying to use the pretext of the current difficult situation in Cuba to further destabilise the country and re-establish the so-called common position, which was a regime of sanctions unique in the world;

6. Expresses its deep concern over the existence of forced labour in Cuba and condemns Cuban state-driven forced labour, in particular in medical brigades, but also involving teachers, sailors, engineers, artists, athletes and others; denounces the fact that 78 % of the ‘volunteers’ in international missions stated they were deployed against their will or had to participate under coercive structural conditions;

R. whereas the UN General Assembly resolution of 2 November 2023 entitled ‘Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba’ was approved for the 31st consecutive time (as it has been every year since 1992 with the exception of 2020 owing to the pandemic), with 187 countries voting in favour, including all EU Member States;

7. Notes that in November 2023, members of the Cuban Parliament, including the Secretary of the Cuban National Parliament, Homero Acosta, were accorded respectful treatment and warmly received at the European Parliament; declares the continued exclusion of the European Parliament, which is the sole European institution denied access to Cuban territory, to be unacceptable and in violation of the PDCA; rejects Cuba’s decision to refuse a visit by an ad hoc delegation from Parliament and urges the Cuban authorities to adhere to the principles of the PDCA and grant Parliament access to the country; requests that, in accordance with the PDCA’s principles of equality, reciprocity and mutual respect, similar measures be adopted, denying access to Parliament’s premises to any representative of the National Assembly of People’s Power or of the Cuban regime, and that this refusal of access be extended to other EU institutions;

S. whereas, without the EU being the target of sanctions, blockage or difficulties in accessing the international financial system, 21.6 % of its population, more than 95 million people, were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in the EU in 2021 and 2022; whereas in spite of constituting the third-largest capitalist economy in the world and accounting for one sixth of global trade, almost 1 million people suffer from homelessness in the EU; whereas almost 40 % of the agricultural and livestock farms in the EU have disappeared in the last 20 years;

8. Demands that, in accordance with the PDCA, the Cuban authorities grant access for a delegation from the European Parliament, other EU institutions and the Member States, as well as from independent human rights organisations, in order to monitor trials and visit the hundreds of activists and ordinary Cubans who remain imprisoned for exercising their right to freedom of expression and assembly; calls on the VP/HR to raise the fact that Parliament has yet again been denied access in any contact with the Cuban authorities and to urge them to reverse this decision immediately;

1. Expresses full solidarity with the people of Cuba, who are suffering as the result of a very difficult economic and social situation, mainly as a consequence of impositions by foreign powers, which have been trying to put an end to its own model of development since 1 January 1959; urges the immediate lifting of the economic, trade and financial blockade imposed by the US, as well as all other unilateral coercive measures, which are the main cause of this difficult situation and the current wave of migration;

9. Reiterates its call on the Council to apply the provisions of the EU Global Human Rights Sanction Regime (the EU Magnitsky Act) and adopt sanctions against those responsible for the persistent human rights violations in Cuba, starting by sanctioning Miguel Díaz-Canel, as the most senior figure in the chain of command of the Cuban security forces, along with other high-ranking officials within the Cuban Government and all those responsible for the imprisonment of political prisoners;

2. Calls for the immediate removal of Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, in order to put an end to the country’s difficulties in accessing the international financial system that this listing entails;

10. Reiterates its call for the EU to trigger Article 85(3)(b) of the PDCA to request an immediate meeting of the joint committee owing to the Cuban Government’s breaches of the agreement, which constitute a ‘case of special urgency’ that should lead to the suspension of the agreement; underlines that these breaches involve persistent and substantial violations of democratic principles, as well as a disregard for the basic human rights and fundamental freedoms outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and emphasised in Article 1(5) of the PDCA; stresses that the Cuban regime’s failure to address such transgressions despite repeated calls from Parliament to do so should lead to the suspension of the agreement;

3. Recognises the permanent efforts of the Cuban authorities to look for measures that improve and update the Cuban development model, focusing on benefiting the majority within society and endeavouring to minimise the serious economic and social consequences of the illegal US blockade;

11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Government and National Assembly of People’s Power of Cuba, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the governments of the members of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.

4. Rejects any attempt to exploit the difficult economic situation of the Cuban people in order to interfere in internal affairs; highlights that, according to Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, ‘All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’ without foreign interference; urges the EU and its Member States, therefore, to respect international law;

5. Calls for an increase in EU aid and cooperation with Cuba and for effective ways of financing foreign investments to be explored; calls for the cancellation of Cuba’s debt payments to the Member States, and, in particular, the members of the so-called Paris Club, to enable the Cuban authorities to better cope with the difficult economic situation and to compensate for the Member States ‘climate debt’;

6. Calls for EU-Cuba relations to be strengthened on the basis of dialogue and cooperation on common challenges, such as climate change or the full achievement of the UN SDGs, in particular goal 16; denounces the consequences for the EU and its Member States, citizens and enterprises of the extraterritorial application of the US economic, commercial and financial blockade; calls on the Commission to develop measures to counter the effects of this policy in collaboration with other countries;

7. Stresses the importance of the PDCA as a key tool to promote understanding and mutually beneficial relations between the EU and Cuba; welcomes the start of the fourth implementation cycle of the PDCA in November 2023, with political dialogues on human rights and disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control; welcomes the visits to Cuba of the VP/HR, Josep Borrell, and the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, Eamon Gilmore, in 2023;

8. Stresses Cuba’s importance in multilateral forums, in particular since January 2023 and the Cuban Presidency of the G77; highlights the efforts made by the Cuban Government and the Cuban people in order to achieve the UN SDGs and the country’s important role in promoting them;

9. Commends Cuba for the significant role it played in the global fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, in particular for its development of five candidate vaccines, three of which were certified; commends the brigades of doctors and nurses for saving lives around the world, including in the EU;

10. Reaffirms its commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Cuba; calls for an immediate dismantlement of the naval base and military prison in Guantánamo Bay, the withdrawal of all US forces from Cuban territory and the restoration of Cuba’s territorial integrity; calls on the US authorities to guarantee respect for the human rights of prisoners remaining in Guantánamo Bay, including their right to a fair trial;

11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the parliaments and governments of the Member States, the Government and the National Assembly of the Republic of Cuba, the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly, and the Latin American sub-regional entities, including the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.