What changed

B90133/2024

B90134/2024

European Parliament resolution on the situation in Serbia following the elections

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia,

– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part, which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

– having regard to the statement of preliminary findings and conclusions of the International Election Observation Mission on the 17 December 2023 early parliamentary elections in the Republic of Serbia,

– having regard to Serbia’s application for membership of the EU of 19 December 2009,

– having regard to Serbia’sits 2006previous Constitutionresolutions on Serbia and itsKosovo, in particular those of 10 May 2023 on the 2022 LawCommission Report on ElectionSerbia and of Members10 ofMay Parliament,2023 on the 2022 Commission Report on Kosovo,

– having regard to the jointfirst statementagreement byon theprinciples Highgoverning Representativethe normalisation of therelations Unionbetween forthe Foreigngovernments Affairsof Serbia and SecurityKosovo Policy,of Josep19 Borrell,April and2013, to the Commissioneragreements forof Neighbourhood25 andAugust Enlargement,2015, Olivérand Várhelyi,to ofthe 19ongoing DecemberEU-facilitated 2023dialogue onfor the parliamentary electionsnormalisation inof Serbia,relations,

– having regard to the speech on the elections in Serbia of 17 January 2024 delivered by the Commissioner for Justice, Didier Reynders, on behalf of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP / HR), Josep Borrell, in the Parliament plenary,

– having regard to its co-facilitated parliamentary dialogue process in Serbia,

– having regard to the open letter on the post-election situation in Serbia signed by the chairs of the Committees on Foreign Affairs of several EU countries,

– having regard to the declaration and recommendations adopted at the 14th EU-Serbia Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee meeting of 23 and 24 November 2022,

– having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2022 on recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism,

– having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution on the aggression against Ukraine, adopted on 2 March 2022,

– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas onAleksandar 17Vučić’s DecemberSerbian 2023,Progressive SerbiaParty held(Srpska earlynapredna parliamentarystranka elections– andSNS) localwas electionsdeclared inthe 65election municipalities,winner includingby Belgrade;the whereasstate theseelection werecommission thefollowing thirdsnap parliamentary electionsand inlocal lesselections thanon four17 years;December 2023;

B. whereas prior to the election day, Serbia had failed to implement key recommendations of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Venice Commission, including those on ensuring a level playing field, measures to prevent the misuse of public office and state resources, separation between official duties and campaign activities, and effective mechanisms to prevent intimidation and pressure on voters, including vote buying;

B. whereas opposition parties have accused President Vučić of committing fraud in the elections, particularly in the capital Belgrade; whereas the state election commission has rejected the opposition’s complaints; whereas the Constitutional Court is yet to rule on the dispute;

C. whereas the campaign was dominated by the decisive involvement of the Serbian President, which, together with the ruling party’s systemic advantages, created unjust conditions;

C. whereas according to a statement by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR), the elections held in Serbia on 17 December 2023, although technically well-administrated and offering voters a choice of political alternatives, were dominated by the decisive involvement of the President, which, together with the ruling party’s systemic advantages, created unjust conditions; whereas the ODIHR’s final report has not yet been presented; whereas international observers reported major irregularities in the December elections, stating that the SNS had gained an unfair advantage through media bias, the improper influence of President Aleksandar Vučić, and voting irregularities such as ‘vote buying’ and ‘ballot box stuffing’, said the Serbian election was generally held in ‘unjust conditions’ and have called for a probe into their conclusions; whereas the Serbian authorities deny any irregularities;

D. whereas the campaign was marred by harsh rhetoric, bias in the media, pressure on public sector employees and the misuse of public resources;

D. whereas domestic condemnation of the elections was intensified by the brutal beating and hospitalisation of opposition leader Nikola Sandulović, apparently at the hands of Serbian security forces;

E. whereas the media was dominated by the overwhelming presence of the Serbian President and most media was under the strong influence of the government, which left little margin for the opposition parties despite the changes in the legislation; whereas Russian-sponsored outlets Sputnik Serbia and Russia Today Balkan actively contributed to spreading disinformation about opposition candidates;

E. whereas thousands of people rallied peacefully in Belgrade to demand the annulment of the elections and that a new ballot be held;

F. whereas the campaign and electronic media oversight bodies remained largely ineffective in deterring violations during the election period;

F. whereas in their statement of 19 December 2023, Vice President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell and Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi took note of the initial findings of the ODIHR and concluded with concern that the electoral process required tangible improvement and further reform;

G. whereas the election day was marked by numerous procedural deficiencies, including inconsistent application of safeguards during voting and counting, frequent instances of overcrowding, breaches in secrecy of the vote and numerous instances of group voting;

G. whereas the rule of law and the proper functioning of Serbia’s democratic institutions remain a core challenge for Serbia’s EU accession process;

H. whereas there were credible allegations of voter migration and bussing of voters during local elections to support the ruling party, particularly in Belgrade;

H. whereas the revised enlargement methodology clearly sets out that progress on the fundamentals determines the overall pace of negotiations;

I. whereas the government-led inter-agency Working Group on Co-ordination and Follow-up of the Implementation of Recommendations for the Improvement of the Electoral Process has made limited progress in addressing outstanding issues;

I. whereas it is expected that all credible reports of irregularities will be followed up in a transparent manner by the relevant authorities and international observers and whereas this also includes allegations related to the local elections in Belgrade and other municipalities;

J. whereas since the elections, thousands of citizens have gathered in repeated protests that have unfolded in front of key institutions, such as the Belgrade city hall and the Central Election Commission; whereas several opposition leaders, including Marinika Tepić, have resorted to hunger strikes in order to protest against what they perceive as stolen elections; whereas during the December 2023 protests, the police used excessive force, beat up protesters and detained around 30 students; whereas one of the prosecutors requesting the detention of the students for up to 30 days and charging them with the criminal offence of violent behaviour and with inciting violent change of constitutional order is the same prosecutor who released Milan Radoičić from custody within 24 hours after the attack in Banjska in the north of Kosovo;

J. whereas the Kremlin has condemned the public protests against Serbia’s defrauded general elections as Western attempts to overthrow the government and orchestrate another ‘Maidan coup’;

K. whereas independent Serbian organisations denouncing the irregularities during the recent election have been subjected to continuous attacks from government officials; whereas despite the fact that they brought to light a lot of concrete evidence pointing to election fraud, no competent Serbian institution has followed up on it;

K. whereas the protection of minority rights is an important pillar of the EU’s enlargement policy;

L. whereas both the Serbian President and Kremlin-controlled media have alleged that other countries have interfered in the electoral process in Serbia in brutal ways, but have not provided substantiated evidence for these claims; whereas Prime Minister Brnabić thanked Russian intelligence services for providing information on the planned activities of the opposition;

L. whereas the EU adopted a set of sanctions against Russia and Belarus in March 2014, which were further strengthened after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022; whereas a majority of Member States also criminalise the violation of EU sanctions; whereas Serbia is currently cooperating with the EU to prevent the circumvention of EU restrictive measures, although it is not yet fully aligned with the EU common foreign and security policy (CFSP);

M. whereas since the elections, leading Serbian politicians, including the President, have unjustly vilified Members of the European Parliament and other members of the International Election Observation Mission;

M. whereas the Serbian media continues to face challenges, such as the threat to journalists from political pressure and impunity for crimes committed against them; whereas the Agreement on the path to normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia, concluded on 18 March 2023, contains specific obligations to be fulfilled by both parties before their EU accession process may be accelerated;

N. whereas campaign spending by third parties remained unregulated, leaving a prior OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission recommendation unaddressed and impacting the effectiveness of campaign regulations;

N. whereas Serbia’s continued close political, economic and even military relations with Russia raise questions about Serbia’s strategic orientation; whereas Serbia has not imposed economic, financial, trade, or energy sanctions against Russia for its attack on Ukraine; whereas Serbia continues to benefit from trade deals, investments, energy contracts and other engagements with Moscow;

O. whereas over the past decade since President Vučić came to power, there has been a continuous erosion of media freedom in Serbia, characterised by threats and even physical attacks against journalists; whereas Reporters Without Borders has placed Serbia among the lowest in Europe in its World Press Freedom Index, with the country dropping 12 places to 91 in 2023;

O. whereas Serbia has welcomed thousands of Russian immigrants, many of whom express strong anti-Ukrainian, anti-American and anti-EU sentiments and back Serbia’s mini-imperialist agenda in the Balkans;

1. Expresses its serious concern about the overall election environment and the many reported and identified irregularities by the OSCE/ODIHR in its preliminary report, which fell far below the expected standards for an EU candidate country; reminds the Serbian authorities that the proper functioning of Serbia’s democratic institutions is at the core of Serbia’s EU accession process and the EU accession methodology;

P. whereas Serbia continues to purchase an array of weapons from Russia and has strengthened its institutional and intelligence ties with Moscow, providing the Kremlin with intelligence on NATO and US forces in the region; whereas it helps train agents and saboteurs, prepares for broader regional destabilisation and deepens its dependence on Russia;

2. Calls for an independent international investigation by respected international legal experts and institutions into the election irregularities, as certain allegations, including those regarding organised voter migration at local level, go beyond the scope covered by the OSCE/ODIHR reports;

Q. whereas Moscow has hired a few hundred Serbian private soldiers for immediate deployment in Ukraine; whereas a ‘Serbian unit’ is now being created as part of Russia’s 106th Guards Airborne Division;

3. Notes, with concern, that some of the election irregularities leading up to the December 2023 elections constitute potential criminal activities under Serbian law and its Constitution; urges the Serbian authorities and the judiciary to thoroughly and promptly investigate all allegations related to the election process, vote buying and illegal campaign financing;

R. whereas, allegedly, Serbian secret service agents beat Nikola Sandulović soon after he apologised for crimes against ethnic Albanians;

4. Is concerned about assessments that some participants in the protest on 24 December 2023 have received disproportionately harsh treatment by the police and the judiciary; condemns the excessive use of police force during the protests, which is in stark contrast to the practices of the Serbian police in previous protest cases in the country; urges the EU and Member States’ diplomatic missions to continue monitoring the ongoing legal cases related to the protests;

S. whereas the independence of the judiciary in Serbia continues to face significant challenges, such as continued political influence on judicial appointments and external pressure on their decisions;

5. Notes, with concern, that Serbia has not implemented many long-standing OSCE/ODIHR recommendations on major issues in the electoral process, despite being repeatedly urged to do so, including by the Commission; urges Serbia to immediately begin implementing all the outstanding recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission, without delay or selectiveness;

1. Expects that, following the adoption of the final OSCE/ODIHR report, Serbia will rapidly implement the recommendations for future elections; underlines the importance of upholding the right to peaceful demonstration, while stressing that violence is not a solution and is unacceptable, and that police action must therefore be proportionate and respect fundamental rights under the rule of law;

6. Emphasises that no further steps should be taken in Serbia’s EU accession process until there is a substantial improvement in electoral conditions and in addressing legal issues related to alleged irregularities;

2. Expects Serbia to clearly demonstrate its determination to move forward with the accession process by accelerating work on implementing EU accession-related reforms in all areas and by delivering real and tangible results, in particular in the area of the rule of law and the normalisation of relations with Kosovo through the swift implementation of all commitments under the EU-facilitated dialogue, including the Agreement on the path to normalisation and its Implementation Annex;

7. Is concerned about the unjustified passivity of the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM), which has increased compared to previous elections; notes, with concern, that REM has only published monitoring results for the public broadcaster and private cable channels, but not private national channels close to the ruling party;

3. Reiterates the EU’s strong expectation that Serbia will, as a matter of the highest priority, step up its efforts towards fully aligning with the EU’s CFSP positions and restrictive measures, in particular those imposed on the Russian Federation since its invasion of Ukraine;

8. Calls for the adoption of measures to strengthen the independence and efficiency of the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM), addressing concerns raised by various stakeholders regarding its composition and political influence;

4. Is seriously concerned about the growing ties between Serbia and Russia and Serbia’s deepening dependence on Russian investments and trade;

9. Calls on Serbia to implement the long-standing OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission recommendation to conduct a comprehensive audit of the Unified Voter Register to address concerns about accuracy, including allegations of voter migration and entries of deceased persons;

5. Urges Serbia to make further efforts and show unwavering political commitment in the fight against corruption and organised crime in order to achieve tangible results;

10. Expresses deep concern over instances of pressure on public sector employees, misuse of public resources and voter inducement schemes during the campaign period, and calls for measures to ensure that voters can make choices free from undue pressure;

6. Considers that Serbia should improve the overall environment for freedom of expression and media independence and encourages Serbia to increase its efforts to effectively implement its media strategy action plan;

11. Urges the Republic of Serbia to strengthen campaign regulations to ensure fair conditions for all participating political forces, including the introduction of effective enforcement mechanisms, the establishment of an expenditure limit and measures to address disinformation and potential foreign interference;

7. Expresses concern about frequent high-level meetings between Serbian leaders and Russian authorities, including in Russia; reminds the Serbian authorities that deepening relations with Russia goes against the common European interests;

12. Calls for a reform of the effectiveness of the campaign oversight mechanisms, including of the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption and the ad hoc Committee for Campaign Oversight, to ensure timely and transparent handling of complaints related to the misuse of public resources;

8. Is especially appalled by Serbia’s increasing cooperation with Russia in military and intelligence exchange and the creation of a Serbian volunteer unit destined to fight in Ukraine on the side of Russia;

13. Calls for the timely and transparent resolution of election disputes, emphasising the importance of maintaining independence and impartiality in the electoral dispute resolution process;

9. Strongly condemns Russian actions in Serbia and in the Western Balkans in general, which aim to undermine the credibility of the EU, NATO and the US and to exploit local sentiments to cause further destabilisation of the region;

14. Calls on Serbia to regulate campaign spending by third parties to ensure transparency and prevent circumvention of campaign finance rules;

10. Calls for an urgent investigation into the alleged kidnapping and torture of Serbian opposition politician Nikola Sandulović by secret service agents and for bringing to justice those who gave this order, as well as those responsible for carrying it out;

15. Calls for a thorough review of media regulations to address concerns about media independence, the diversity of views and ruling party influence; calls for an inclusive approach to media coverage, ensuring fair access to public and private broadcasters for all political parties and discouraging practices that limit diversity of views;

11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and the presidents, governments and parliaments of Serbia and Kosovo.

16. Urges the Serbian authorities to address allegations of verbal insults, attacks and intimidation against journalists, ensuring a safe and enabling environment for media professionals to perform their duties;

17. Underlines that the EU institutions must do more to ensure that the rights and freedoms of Serbian journalists and media are protected; points out that access to pre-accession funding should be used as leverage to stop the media freedom situation from deteriorating further;

18. Strongly condemns unsubstantiated claims that EU Member States are organising post-election protests; regrets that the protests have been used as an excuse to spread anti-EU narratives in the media close to the ruling party;

19. Strongly disapproves of the unjustified vilification directed at its Members and members of the International Election Observation Mission by leading Serbian politicians, and calls for a return to respectful and constructive discourse, emphasising the importance of mutual respect in the democratic process;

20. Urges the Republic of Serbia to address concerns about the participation of national minorities in the electoral process, ensuring the consistent application of criteria for minority status and addressing vulnerabilities to pressure and vote buying;

21. Urges the Republic Election Commission to take necessary steps to address concerns about the transparency and efficiency of its functioning, including the timely publication of monitoring results during the campaign period;

22. Urges the Republic of Serbia to consider legislative amendments to strengthen the role of citizen observers, ensuring their effective contribution to transparency and accountability in the electoral process;

23. Expresses its commitment to supporting Serbia in further strengthening its democratic institutions and electoral processes, emphasising the importance of addressing the identified challenges to ensure free, fair and transparent elections that truly and fully reflect the will of the Serbian people;

24. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe and the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Serbia.