What changed

B90130/2024

Follow up to the European Parliament non-legislative resolution on Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

European Parliament resolution on Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

Resolution tabled pursuant to Rule 132(2) and (4) of the European Parliament's Rules of procedure

(2024/2548(RSP))

Reference numbers: 2024/2548 (RSP) / B9-0124/2024 / P9_TA (2024)0079

The European Parliament,

Date of adoption of the resolution: 8 February 2024

– having regard to the three reports by the Special Committee on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation, and the strengthening of integrity, transparency, and accountability in the European Parliament (INGE and ING2),

Competent Parliamentary Committee: N/A

– having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda by third countries,

Brief analysis/ assessment of the resolution and requests made in it:

– having regard to its recommendation of 13 March 2019 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning taking stock of the follow-up taken by the EEAS two years after the EP report on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties,

The resolution has been adopted in view of allegations of Russian interference in the EU democracy and in the context of media reports that a Member of Parliament may have acted as an informant for the Fifth Service of the Russian Federation’s Federal Security Service (‘FSB’) from at least 2004 to 2017.

– having regard to its resolution of 19 September 2019 on the importance of European remembrance for the future of Europe,

The Parliament expresses its outrage and grave concern about the efforts of Russia to undermine European democracy and condemns Russian efforts to abuse and falsify European history. The resolution expresses deep concern over the media reports about the Member of Parliament in question and provides support to the Latvian investigation into the case. The document reiterates the European Parliament’s outrage about the revelations of Russian funding of political parties and points out to concrete cases of Russian interference in Member States. It urges the EU institutions to adopt a permanent cross-cutting approach to combating foreign information manipulation and interference more effectively, calls for a raised ambition on the part of the Institutions regarding the Ethics Body and calls on the Secretariat of the EU Transparency Register to ban any entities with direct or indirect relations with the Government of Russia. In the resolution, the Parliament asks the Commission and the Council to deliver on the Defence of Democracy package, to find a compulsory regulatory scheme for the big platforms and step up the EU’s cyber defence against possible attacks on our electoral system. The Parliament calls to close the loopholes in EU party financing legislation and make significant investments in strengthening democratic resilience and the rule of law, including measures directed at enhancing EU counter-intelligence capabilities. The resolution urges EU institutions and Member States to take decisive action to ensure that European elections are free of foreign interference and calls on EU institutions and Member States to implement resilience strategies for the elections. It underlines the need to monitor efforts and enhance their implementation well ahead of elections, referendums and other important political process. The document also underlines the key role of investigative journalism and reiterates its call to ensure sufficient and sustainable funding for this activity.

– having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on recent actions by the Russian Federation against Lithuanian judges, prosecutors and investigators involved in investigating the tragic events of 13 January 1991 in Vilnius,

Response to the requests and overview of the action taken, or intended to be taken, by the Commission:

– having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2022 on recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism,

The Commission shares the European Parliament’s concerns regarding threats of foreign interference coming from Russia and takes note of the Parliament’s calls to establish a permanent cross-cutting approach to combating foreign information manipulation and interference more effectively (paragraph 17).

– having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on European historical consciousness,

In December 2023, the Commission adopted the Defence of Democracy package, including a Directive on the transparency of interest representation. The package is focused on transparency and democratic accountability while addressing the issue of foreign interference. The Commission would like to reassure the European Parliament that it is doing its utmost to make sure that the proposals and recommendations contained in the package are adopted and implemented (paragraph 22).

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 24 March 2022,

As explained in the Communication presenting the Defence of Democracy package, under the European Democracy Action Plan, the EU has enhanced efforts to improve its capacity to react to the new and evolving threat landscape – both domestically and internationally. Existing cooperation has been strengthened within the Commission, between the EU institutions and services and beyond, involving relevant stakeholders in civil society, academia and private industry, as well as international partners.

– having regard to the Commission communication of 3 December 2020 on the European democracy action plan (COM(2020)0790),

More particularly, the Commission’s Network against Disinformation, is contributing to the fight against disinformation over several relevant strands: (i) monitoring, (ii) strategic communication (iii) coordination, and (iv) awareness raising. The Commission is further strengthening coordination and operational work in the context of the Network and developing responses to disinformation and other strategic communications challenges.

– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 December 2023 on Defence of Democracy (COM(2023)0630), and the proposals for the Defence of Democracy package therein,

The European External Action Service (EEAS) has been working on tackling foreign information manipulation and interference (‘FIMI’) in close cooperation with the Commission services, other EU institutions and the Member States. This resulted in the dedicated FIMI Toolbox to ensure the necessary instruments to prevent, detect, deter and respond to the threat. Strong networks within the European Union Institutions, with Member States and international partners (in particular the G7 and the NATO) have been built to respond to the FIMI threat in a multi-directional effort in particular within the Rapid Alert System (‘RAS’). Considering the cross-border nature of the threat, an international cooperation has accelerated towards creation frameworks for a collective response, in particular with the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism. In the period leading up to the 2024 European Parliament elections, EEAS continues its thorough monitoring and analyses of Russian state and pro-Kremlin outlets’ malign campaigns. EEAS shares these insights on the RAS, in a dedicated space for the elections, and uses them in its awareness raising and capacity building. Outreach to civil society, media and academia is intensified across EU institutions and Member States to equip the defender community with relevant knowledge and tools ahead of the elections.

– having regard to the 2nd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats of 23 January 2024,

With regards to the Parliament’s calls to urgently take action and close loopholes in EU party financing legislation (paragraph 22), the Commission would like to underline that donations from third countries are not allowed under Regulation 1141/2014 on the statute and funding of European Political parties. In its Recommendation on inclusive and resilient elections, which is part of the Defence of Democracy Package, the Commission identified and addressed possible gaps in national legislation and other regulatory measures related to donations and other funding from third countries. The Commission has been working with Member States on the implementation of its recommendations, including at several meetings of its European Cooperation Network on Elections, which has discussed the subject of foreign interference and how to address it. The Council’s Horizontal Working Party on Hybrid Threats and Democratic Resilience is preparing Council conclusions on resilient electoral processes.

– having regard to the ongoing legislative work on the transparency and targeting of political advertising,

Regarding the calls for a regulatory scheme for the big platforms and to step up EU cyber defence against possible attacks on our electoral system (paragraph 22), the Commission notes that with the Digital Services Act (‘DSA’), the EU has put in place a strong framework that regulates online intermediaries and platforms such as marketplaces, social networks, content-sharing platforms, app stores, and online travel and accommodation platforms. Its main goal is to put in place due diligence obligations to guard against illegal and harmful activities online and the spread of disinformation, so as to establish a safe online environment. The DSA sets out an unprecedented new standard for greater accountability and transparency of online platforms to safeguard fundamental rights and identify and address societal risks. Under the DSA, providers of large online platforms must implement effective and proportionate measures to mitigate any systemic risk that their services represent and that can negatively affect our democratic societies. The Guidelines for Providers of Very Large Online Platforms (‘VLOPs’) and Very Large Online Search Engines (‘VLOSEs’) on the Mitigation of Systemic Risks for Electoral Processes, published on 26 March 2024, are aimed at supporting providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs to ensure that they comply with their obligation to mitigate specific risks linked to electoral processes. The guidelines reflect best practises in the area of election-related risks, on the basis of scientific insights. If Very Large Online Platforms or Search Engines employ other risk mitigation measures different from the ones proposed by the guidelines, they must prove to the Commission that those alternative measures are also as reasonable, proportionate and effective as the ones contained in the guidelines. These guidelines also build on the ongoing work under the Code of Practice on disinformation. In view of the elections of the European Parliament, signatories of the Code also setup a work-stream dedicated to it. This will be a key tool to ensure timely exchanges about disinformation threats between platforms signatories and other stakeholders (e.g. fact-checkers, civil society organizations) during the electoral period. The European Digital Media observatory, supported by the Commission, has setup a taskforce dedicated to the elections of the European Parliament, which will issue daily reports and weekly investigation regarding disinformation campaigns targeting the elections.

– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

The upcoming Cyber Solidarity Act, on which a political agreement was reached in March 2023, will strengthen solidarity at EU level to better detect, prepare and respond to cyberthreats and incidents. The Act constitutes a measure reinforcing the capacities of Member States that could come under sustained cyber-attacks, inter alia politically motivated ones on elections.

A. whereas Russia under President Putin, has become a totalitarian state without any opposition or a functional justice system; whereas Putin is trying to spread this system throughout the world, as democracy and free and open societies are a threat to his rule and the corrupt system he has installed in Russia;

Meanwhile, with the Regulation 2023/2841 which entered into force early January 2024, the EU has taken steps to reinforce the cybersecurity of EU institutions, agencies and bodies, putting in place a framework for governance, risk management and control across EU entities in cybersecurity, and the establishment of a new Inter-Institutional Cybersecurity Board to monitor implementation. The Commission calls for progress in the negotiations of the parallel proposal on information security, which is essential to complete a robust legislative framework for EU institutions, agencies and bodies.

B. whereas Russia is using every available means of hybrid warfare in order to achieve its goals; whereas the intensity of foreign information manipulation, as a means to justify the war and divide democratic societies, accelerated after Russia launched its unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine;

The EU cybersecurity framework has also been further strengthened, including with the upcoming Cyber Resilience Act (‘CRA’), on which co-legislators reached a provisional political agreement that the Parliament adopted on 12 March 2024. The CRA aims to establish cybersecurity requirements for market access in the EU of hardware and software and sets out corresponding obligations for the manufacturers of these products. It will therefore further contribute to reducing the attack surface of hardware and software that spyware is trying to exploit.

C. whereas the systematic falsification of history has been part of Russia’s information warfare for decades;

With regard to the Parliament’s calls to make significant investments in strengthening our democratic resilience and the rule of law, including measures directed at enhancing EU’s counter-intelligence capabilities (paragraph 22), the Commission would like to reply that it is committed to making use of all tools available in the rule of law toolbox to promote and protect the rule of law, which is essential for the Union’s overall resilience. This also includes supporting concrete reforms in Member States to strengthen the rule of law and institutional checks and balances, both technically and financially, for example through the national Recovery and Resilience Plans and the Technical Support Instrument.

D. whereas citizens, non-governmental organisations and other civil society organisations throughout Europe have expressed their serious concern about cases of Russian-sponsored foreign interference in the EU’s democratic processes;

Regarding the strengthening of the measures directed at EU’s counter-intelligence capabilities, the Commission would like to refer to the work of the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (‘EU INTCEN’), which is since 2002 the exclusive civilian intelligence function of the EU, providing in-depth analysis for EU decision makers. Its analytical products are based on intelligence from the Member States’ intelligence and security services. As highlighted in the EU Security Union Strategy, exploring new and enhanced forms of cooperation between intelligence services, EU INTCEN, and other organisations involved in security should be part of efforts to enhance cybersecurity, as well as combatting terrorism, extremism, radicalism and hybrid threats.

E. whereas an international team of investigative journalists has reported that long-standing Latvian MEP Tatjana Ždanoka has for more than a decade served as an agent of influence of the Russian intelligence services; whereas in response to these reports, Parliament has opened an internal investigation into Ms Ždanoka;

The Commission takes note of the Parliament’s position concerning the EU Ethics body expressed in this resolution (paragraph 20). The Commission welcomes the agreement of all institutions and advisory bodies of the EU referred to in Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union on the basis of the proposal it made on 8 June 2023 for the creation of an EU Ethics Body common to all institutions while regretting the fact that the European Council decided not to participate. The Commission considers that the agreement is a significant contribution to a common culture of ethics regarding the members of the institutions and advisory committees at EU level and looks forward to the signature of the agreement by all parties so that the Agreement on the Body enters into force ahead of the European elections of 2024.

F. whereas Ms Ždanoka has been well known for her pro-Russia stance and consistent spread of anti-Latvian and anti-EU narratives throughout her time as an MEP, including during her membership of the Green Group, which only ended in early 2022;

Regarding the Parliament’s calls to ban from the Transparency Register any entities with direct or indirect relations with the Government of Russia (paragraph 21), the Commission would like to respond that in the context of the measures adopted at EU level in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the Transparency Register’s Secretariat investigated all registered interest representatives headquartered in the Russian Federation for a possible non-observance of the Transparency Register’s code of conduct. As a result, 8 Russian registrants were removed from the Transparency Register. In addition, in the context of Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/884 of 3 June 2022, the application for registration of any entity with direct or indirect relations with the Government of Russia will not be accepted in the Transparency Register.

G. whereas Ms Ždanoka has visited Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine and prior to 2022 repeatedly visited Moscow and participated in TV shows spreading pro-Kremlin propaganda; whereas she, together with, among others, Irish MEPs Clare Daly and Mick Wallace from The Left Group, organised public events in support of Algirdas Paleckis, a Lithuanian citizen who was convicted of espionage for Russia;

On to the Parliament’s calls condemning all types of elite capture (paragraph 23), the Commission would like to recall that ethical behaviour of political decision-makers and of the civil service of the EU is of utmost importance for the credibility of the EU Institutions and that the core principles and obligations have been set out directly in the founding treaties. Members of the Commission must pursue the general interest of the EU, they must be completely independent and must respect obligations also after their term of office. For the EU civil service, there is legislation adopted by the Parliament and Council which defines the rights and obligations of civil servants. Under the Staff Regulations, EU staff are required to be independent, impartial, objective and loyal to the institutions for which they work.

H. whereas Ms Ždanoka has invited representatives of the administration from the illegally annexed Donetsk and Luhanska regions to the European Parliament;

The Commission has a robust ethical framework in place, which includes in-depth checks on activities of its former staff within 2 years after they left the service and it implements these rules in a consistent, proportionate, and robust manner. If identified risks cannot be appropriately mitigated by temporary restrictions, the Commission forbids envisaged activities fully. A recent audit from the Court of Auditors and the inquiry of the European Ombudsman on the revolving doors phenomenon have shown that the Commission has the necessary rules in place to prevent conflicts with its legitimate interests.

I. whereas Ms Ždanoka’s activities have been consistently sponsored by Kremlin-funded front groups, such as the Russkiy Mir Foundation;

The Commission is aware of the risks accompanying the upcoming European elections and adopted a number of related strategies in this regard (paragraph 25). The Recommendation on inclusive and resilient elections addresses the protection and cybersecurity of election-related infrastructure and proposes measures to minimise risks of interference from third countries through funding of political parties, political foundations, campaign organisations and candidates. The Guidelines for Providers of Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines on the Mitigation of Systemic Risks for Electoral Processes contain best practices and possible measures to mitigate systemic risks that may threaten the integrity of democratic electoral processes. They also provide examples of potential mitigation measures relating to election-related risks, specific mitigation measures linked to Generative Artificial Intelligence content, the planning of risk mitigation measures before or after an electoral event and specific guidance for the European Parliament elections. In view of upcoming elections, the Commission also stepped up its monitoring efforts via the Network against Disinformation and Rapid Alert System.

J. whereas despite the credible doubts concerning Ms Ždanoka, the current rules in Parliament have not been able to prevent this extraordinary case of foreign interference;

The Commission recognises the need to support the resilience and independence of the news media sector, including investigative journalism (paragraph 26). Since 2021, grants for news media projects are available under Creative Europe. Every year, the Commission supports Journalism Partnerships i.e. projects that strengthen the wider sector or support media pluralism by re-distributing grants to sectors of special relevance to democracy (i.e. local and community media and investigative projects). In addition, a study on public financing of news media in the EU was undertaken to map national funding models. The Commission also put forward a series of initiatives to protect journalists, including investigative journalists, and independent media. The European Media Freedom Act on which co-legislators reached a provisional political agreement that the Parliament adopted on 13 March 2024 and the Council on 26 March 2024, contains several provisions protective of media and journalists, including of independent public media. Other relevant initiatives include the Directive and Recommendation on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings (“Strategic lawsuits against public participation”), as well as the Recommendation on the safety of journalists.

K. whereas credible newspaper reports have for a long time highlighted contacts between secessionists in Catalonia and the Kremlin; whereas articles showed that the former Russian diplomat Nikolai Sadovnikov met with former separatist leader and now MEP Carles Puigdemont in Barcelona on the eve of Catalonia’s illegal referendum in October 2017;

L. whereas the journalists involved have revealed that the authorities of the government of the autonomous community of Catalonia maintained contacts with high-ranking officials of Putin’s entourage with the aim of promoting a strategic alliance within the European Union; whereas the objective of such communications would have been to establish relations of political and economic influence if Catalonia had managed to unilaterally become independent from Spain;

M. whereas Court of Instruction Number 1 in Barcelona, which is in charge of the investigation into the Voloh case, which links, among others, the former president of Catalonia, Carles Puigdemont, and his entourage with Russia, recently extended the investigation for six months;

N. whereas the Kremlin has also sponsored and supported a number of far-right parties in Europe and, among others, provided the party of Marine Le Pen with a loan of EUR 9.4 million in 2013; whereas since then Le Pen and her party members have further bolstered their pro-Kremlin stance;

O. whereas further Members from the Identity and Democracy (ID) and The Left Groups, as well as non-attached Members, have been known for expressing pro-Kremlin propaganda in Parliament, including extreme public calls in January 2024 for the destruction of Europe by MEP Miroslav Radačovský who was also paid by Russian sources to observe the parliamentary elections in Russia in 2021;

P. whereas all these examples of MEPs and European parties working for Putin and spreading pro-Kremlin propaganda are blatant cases of foreign interference, and in the context of the upcoming European elections in particular, are to be treated with the utmost seriousness by national and EU authorities;

Q. whereas the Kremlin has been operating an extensive network of agents of influence across the EU, who have affected electoral processes and policies on key strategic issues such as energy infrastructure; whereas these agents of influence actively target all areas of public life, particularly culture, historical remembrance, the media and religious communities, as well as politicians and their families; whereas dozens of investigations have proven links between prominent active or retired European political and public actors and the Kremlin;

R. whereas the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs has uncovered a large-scale disinformation campaign, allegedly orchestrated by Russia, on the X platform, aimed at manipulating public opinion;

S. whereas reputable German media outlets have exposed the fact that an employee of a member of the German Bundestag belonging to the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party was identified as a contact person for the Russian Federal Security Service;

T. whereas there have been reported cases of MEPs using Parliament’s resources to advocate and promote activities which are directly or indirectly linked to cases of foreign interference, for example in December 2022 when the Belarusian state propaganda channel STV gained access to Parliament’s premises and the VoxBox video recording facility inside Parliament and, as a result, Parliament’s premises were used by several MEPs to create pro-Kremlin and anti-EU disinformation content;

1. Expresses its complete outrage and grave concern about the continuous efforts by Russia to undermine European democracy; is appalled by credible reports which cast light on Russia’s efforts to foment divisions between European citizens by recruiting MEPs as agents of influence, as well as its efforts to systematically create a system of dependencies through European political parties which then act as amplifiers of the Kremlin’s propaganda;

2. Unequivocally condemns the ongoing Russian efforts to abuse and falsify the historical recollection of Europe’s most tragic periods, such as the terror of the Nazi regime, in order to try to justify its current brutal, illegal and inhumane aggression and its expansionist policy, as well as its attempts to systematically spread false historical narratives with the goal of casting doubt on the sovereignty of other nations by systematically undermining their domestic democratic processes, among other methods;

3. Strongly condemns and expresses its outrage about the recent revelations that MEP Tatjana Ždanoka has been working as an agent of influence for the Russian intelligence services, and urgently calls on the relevant national and EU authorities to immediately investigate this case with a sense of urgency to limit any further damage;

4. Points to other credible cases of Members, particularly Members belonging to the ID and The Left Group, as well as non-attached Members, who are knowingly serving Russia’s interests, as reflected by their public interventions, voting record and organised events, as well as pursuing covert activities; underlines that the activities of these MEPs are undermining the security, credibility and democratic resilience of the EU;

5. Is extremely concerned about the relations between Catalan secessionists and the Russian administration; notes that Russian interference in Catalonia is part of a broader Russian strategy to promote internal destabilisation and EU disunity;

6. Expresses deep concern about the massive disinformation campaigns that Russia has pursued in Catalonia, as well as the intense contacts and number of meetings between the agents responsible for Russian interference with the pro-independence movement and the regional government of the autonomous community of Catalonia;

7. Calls on the competent Spanish authorities to continue, further intensify and swiftly conclude their investigations into the reported cases of interference by Russia, particularly those linked to Catalan secessionist groups; deplores the attacks on judges investigating these interference activities;

8. Strongly condemns the recent incident in Slovakia, whereby the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, in a provocative move, released a statement during the pre-election moratorium questioning the integrity of the Slovak Republic’s electoral process; expresses its concern about the visible and direct role played by Russian diplomacy in Slovak public and political life since the parliamentary elections in September 2023;

9. Strongly condemns the large-scale disinformation campaign exposed by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, purportedly orchestrated by Russia on the X platform, with the intention of manipulating public opinion in Germany;

10. Strongly condemns the alarming revelation brought to light by reputable German media outlets exposing the fact that an employee affiliated with the AfD party and associated with a member of the German Bundestag was identified as a contact person for the Russian Federal Security Service, raising serious concerns about potential foreign influence within the German political landscape;

11. Recalls that by pursuing a long-term strategy of foreign interference, Russia is trying to undermine and ultimately destroy democracy in Europe; points to Putin’s efforts to completely dismantle any form of democracy inside Russia and underlines that this must be a warning sign not to be naive about Putin’s long-term goals and hence to tackle these Russian interference attempts as a matter of extreme gravity;

12. Stresses that Russia’s interference in the democratic processes of the EU Member States and institutions is exceptional in terms of the threat and danger it poses to the fundamental principles of democracy in Europe; underlines, therefore, that, Russian foreign interference is unique and differs from any other non-EU country’s attempts at foreign interference in Europe’s democratic processes; reiterates its previous position that the exceptional character of Russian foreign interference requires special efforts by national and EU institutions, including the European Parliament, to identify, address and overcome this specific threat;

13. Underlines that Russia is trying to exert influence in European societies and erode democratic discourse by, among other methods, advancing disinformation campaigns with the ultimate goal of inflicting damage on European democracies and destroying the European way of life;

14. Points out that Russia’s efforts to undermine democratic processes in Europe are closely linked to Russia’s objectives in Putin’s illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine;

15. Points out that Russia has assumed that fostering regional secessionism and interference through national diasporas is a useful instrument in its strategy to promote internal destabilisation and disunity in the European Union, with the aim of intensifying polarisation in our society, undermining trust between citizens and the public authorities by weakening the democratic processes of target countries, among other tactics;

16. Underlines that in the context of the upcoming European elections, all national and EU authorities must intensify their efforts to combat and uncover cases of foreign interference in order to ensure the full integrity of these important elections;

17. Expresses its concern about reports that not only French and Irish MEPs, but also members of staff from Ireland and France have similarly been spreading pro-Kremlin propaganda inside Parliament for years; insists that these reports are followed up by immediate action by the appropriate authorities and that urgent measures are taken immediately to put a stop to these dangerous activities;

18. Notes that laws are essential to fight against corruption and criminal behaviour but cannot in themselves prevent criminal and unethical actions by individual Members; underlines that all political groups in the European Parliament bear a certain responsibility to monitor the actions of their Members, and therefore reminds all groups to quickly act in the event that they are made aware of any behaviour raising doubts about the integrity of any of their Members; calls on all MEPs and groups to fully cooperate with the relevant national and EU authorities in this context;

19. Reiterates its outrage about the regular revelations of large-scale Russian funding of political parties, politicians and officials in several democratic countries in an attempt to interfere with and gain leverage in their domestic processes;

20. Condemns all types of elite capture and the technique of co-opting top-level civil servants and former EU politicians, among others, by providing them with lucrative jobs in companies linked to governments actively engaged in interference actions against the EU; regrets the lack of tools available to prevent these practices;

21. Stresses that it should be made illegal in all Member States to engage in any open or covert activity financed by foreign authoritarian states or state-linked actors which aims to influence the process of European or national politics; underlines that non-profit organisations and third parties, coordinated by foreign authoritarian state actors and created with a view to influencing electoral processes, are tools for foreign interference and therefore represent a threat to democracy;

22. Underlines that Russia has pursued similar efforts to undermine democracies outside the EU, namely in the UK, the US and in numerous African countries; recalls that countries around the world have been severely affected by these malign and dangerous efforts;

23. Underlines that democratic processes and free and fair elections are at the heart of the European identity and that any attack against these principles is therefore a matter of extreme gravity and should be addressed as such by the respective authorities;

24. Is of the firm opinion that Parliament cannot tolerate a delayed response in light of the recent revelations; welcomes, therefore, the opening of an initial investigation into the case of MEP Tatjana Ždanoka and insists on strong and swift action;

25. Calls for stricter scrutiny of the organisation of events, of the invitation of external guests to Parliament and of access to Parliament’s communication platforms;

26. Calls for a review of the screening procedures for all Parliament staff, including the staff of MEPs’ offices, with a view to preventing infiltration by foreign authoritarian states’ agents of influence;

27. Is of the firm opinion that Parliament resources such as sponsoring events and trips, granting access to video recording studios and other communication platforms and the financing of political groups’ or Members’ communication projects, must not be used to undermine the values of the EU or for the purposes of disseminating hostile information by authoritarian regimes;

28. Calls for the use of all available instruments to restrict the activities of the MEPs linked to interference by Russia and other authoritarian regimes, for example by suspending Members who carry out subversive actions in the guise of parliamentary activities;

29. Believes that national authorities should intensify their efforts to prevent foreign interference and should therefore improve their mutual cooperation; acknowledges the critical significance of the Strategic Communication Centres specifically designed to investigate and unveil agents involved in activities that pose threats to democratic processes;

30. Underlines the key role of investigative journalism in revealing the attempts at foreign interference and covert activities, such as in the case of MEP Tatjana Ždanoka, whose cooperation with Russian intelligence was exposed by an international team of investigative journalists; reiterates its call for the EU institutions and the Member States to ensure sufficient and sustainable funding for investigative journalism;

31. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the parliaments of the Member States.