What changed

B90125/2024

B90130/2024

European Parliament resolution on Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, notably Articles 7, 8, 11, 12, 39, 40, 47 and 52 thereof, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, notably Articles 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 16 and 17 thereof, and the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, notably Article 3 thereof,

– having regard to the three reports by the Special Committee on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation, and the strengthening of integrity, transparency, and accountability in the European Parliament (INGE and ING2),

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 24 February 2022 and 30-31 May 2022,

– having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda by third countries,

– having regard to Council Decision of 3 June 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2014/512 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine,

– having regard to its recommendation of 13 March 2019 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning taking stock of the follow-up taken by the EEAS two years after the EP report on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties,

– having regard to the Commissionits communicationresolution of 1219 DecemberSeptember 20232019 on Defencethe importance of Democracy,European remembrance for the future of Europe,

– having regard to the Commission proposal for a directive establishing harmonised requirements in the internal market on transparency of interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (COM(2023)0637),

– having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on recent actions by the Russian Federation against Lithuanian judges, prosecutors and investigators involved in investigating the tragic events of 13 January 1991 in Vilnius,

– having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2022 on recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism,

– having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on European historical consciousness,

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 24 March 2022,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 3 December 2020 on the European democracy action plan (COM(2020)0790),

– having regard to itsthe resolutionCommission communication of 2312 NovemberDecember 20162023 on EUDefence strategicof communicationDemocracy to(COM(2023)0630), counteractand propagandathe againstproposals itfor bythe thirdDefence countries,of Democracy package therein,

– having regard to its resolution ofthe 92nd MarchEEAS 2022Report on foreign interference inForeign allInformation democraticManipulation processesand inInterference theThreats Europeanof Union,23 includingJanuary disinformation,2024,

– having regard to its resolution ofthe 1ongoing Junelegislative 2023work on foreign interference in all democratic processesthe intransparency theand Europeantargeting Union,of includingpolitical disinformation,advertising,

– having regard to its oral question to the Commission of 31 May 2023 on Election integrity and resilience build-up in the run-up to the 2024 European elections (O-000018/2023),

– having regard to its resolution of 13 July 2023 on Recommendations for reform of the European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption,

– having regard to its resolution of 13 September 2023 on amendments to Parliament’s Rules of Procedure with a view to strengthening integrity, independence and accountability,

– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas foreign interference constitutes a serious violation of the universal values and principles on which the Union is founded, such as human dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law;

A. whereas Russia under President Putin, has become a totalitarian state without any opposition or a functional justice system; whereas Putin is trying to spread this system throughout the world, as democracy and free and open societies are a threat to his rule and the corrupt system he has installed in Russia;

B. whereas the spread of disinformation, hacking of candidates’ electronic devices and cyberattacks on election infrastructure, notably from Russia, have risen to an unprecedented level;

B. whereas Russia is using every available means of hybrid warfare in order to achieve its goals; whereas the intensity of foreign information manipulation, as a means to justify the war and divide democratic societies, accelerated after Russia launched its unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine;

C. whereas Russia has used several methods of interference, including trying to weaken and divide the EU’s Member States, trying to influence European political parties, mostly on the far right, and trying to destabilise the EUs neighbouring countries;

C. whereas the systematic falsification of history has been part of Russia’s information warfare for decades;

D. whereas Russia has for several years been carrying out disinformation campaigns across both traditional media outlets and social media platforms, cyberattacks, elite capture and attacks, which also sought to prepare the ground for its aggression against Ukraine;

D. whereas citizens, non-governmental organisations and other civil society organisations throughout Europe have expressed their serious concern about cases of Russian-sponsored foreign interference in the EU’s democratic processes;

E. whereas several investigations have revealed that electoral rules have been breached or circumvented, in particular the existing provisions on the transparency of election campaign financing with allegations of covert funding from third country sources, notably from Russia;

E. whereas an international team of investigative journalists has reported that long-standing Latvian MEP Tatjana Ždanoka has for more than a decade served as an agent of influence of the Russian intelligence services; whereas in response to these reports, Parliament has opened an internal investigation into Ms Ždanoka;

F. whereas the European Parliament is the only directly elected body among the EU institutions and is at the forefront of EU political discussions on fighting foreign interference, information manipulation and hybrid threats in our democracies, including in the EU institutions; whereas recent events have highlighted that Parliament is a target of diverse and aggressive foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) campaigns;

F. whereas Ms Ždanoka has been well known for her pro-Russia stance and consistent spread of anti-Latvian and anti-EU narratives throughout her time as an MEP, including during her membership of the Green Group, which only ended in early 2022;

G. whereas recent press sources have unveiled allegations that a Member of the European Parliament was working on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB); whereas there are other claims and suspicions about more Russian agents in the European Parliament;

G. whereas Ms Ždanoka has visited Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine and prior to 2022 repeatedly visited Moscow and participated in TV shows spreading pro-Kremlin propaganda; whereas she, together with, among others, Irish MEPs Clare Daly and Mick Wallace from The Left Group, organised public events in support of Algirdas Paleckis, a Lithuanian citizen who was convicted of espionage for Russia;

H. whereas 2024 is a crucial electoral year and several presidential, national, local and regional elections are due to be held in Member States, in addition to the European elections scheduled on 6-9 June;

H. whereas Ms Ždanoka has invited representatives of the administration from the illegally annexed Donetsk and Luhanska regions to the European Parliament;

I. whereas according to the Eurobarometer survey of March 2023, citizens consider false and misleading information circulating online, propaganda from non-democratic foreign sources and covert foreign interference – including through financing of domestic actors – to be among the main challenges to our democratic systems;

I. whereas Ms Ždanoka’s activities have been consistently sponsored by Kremlin-funded front groups, such as the Russkiy Mir Foundation;

J. whereas Russia still has considerable influence in the Western Balkans, notably in Serbia and Republica Srpska, one of the entities of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where it has the power to interfere in regional attempts at reconciliation, integration and reform towards democratisation;

J. whereas despite the credible doubts concerning Ms Ždanoka, the current rules in Parliament have not been able to prevent this extraordinary case of foreign interference;

K. whereas funding from outside the EU of political activities and politicians within the European Union before and after 24 February 2022, in particular from Russia, continues to be revealed and poses a risk for the integrity of democratic processes in the EU Member States and requires thorough investigation;

K. whereas credible newspaper reports have for a long time highlighted contacts between secessionists in Catalonia and the Kremlin; whereas articles showed that the former Russian diplomat Nikolai Sadovnikov met with former separatist leader and now MEP Carles Puigdemont in Barcelona on the eve of Catalonia’s illegal referendum in October 2017;

L. whereas instances of FIMI attacks on EU and national institutions have increased following the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

L. whereas the journalists involved have revealed that the authorities of the government of the autonomous community of Catalonia maintained contacts with high-ranking officials of Putin’s entourage with the aim of promoting a strategic alliance within the European Union; whereas the objective of such communications would have been to establish relations of political and economic influence if Catalonia had managed to unilaterally become independent from Spain;

M. whereas civil society organisations (CSOs) play an essential role as watchdogs, are key to building democratic resilience from within and protecting democracy, and support the fight against breaches of the rule of law while actively contributing to fostering the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights on the ground;

M. whereas Court of Instruction Number 1 in Barcelona, which is in charge of the investigation into the Voloh case, which links, among others, the former president of Catalonia, Carles Puigdemont, and his entourage with Russia, recently extended the investigation for six months;

1. Expresses deep concern over the press allegations resulting from investigations conducted by the Latvian newspaper ‘The Insider’, revealing that a Member of the European Parliament was working on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB);

N. whereas the Kremlin has also sponsored and supported a number of far-right parties in Europe and, among others, provided the party of Marine Le Pen with a loan of EUR 9.4 million in 2013; whereas since then Le Pen and her party members have further bolstered their pro-Kremlin stance;

2. Recalls the continual unveiling of evidence of Russian interference in the run-up to all major national and European elections, as highlighted in the final reports of its special committees on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE and INGE2);

O. whereas further Members from the Identity and Democracy (ID) and The Left Groups, as well as non-attached Members, have been known for expressing pro-Kremlin propaganda in Parliament, including extreme public calls in January 2024 for the destruction of Europe by MEP Miroslav Radačovský who was also paid by Russian sources to observe the parliamentary elections in Russia in 2021;

3. Considers it imperative to immediately conduct a thorough internal investigation in order to assess all possible cases of foreign interference from Russia and misbehaviours from its own Members;

P. whereas all these examples of MEPs and European parties working for Putin and spreading pro-Kremlin propaganda are blatant cases of foreign interference, and in the context of the upcoming European elections in particular, are to be treated with the utmost seriousness by national and EU authorities;

4. Calls for the highest level of political and administrative attention to be given to the Recommendations for reform of the European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption adopted on 13 July 2023 and the full implementation of its new rules on transparency and integrity adopted in September 2023, as well as the monitoring of all its internal codes of conduct and decisions approved by its Bureau, in particular concerning the interaction with third countries;

Q. whereas the Kremlin has been operating an extensive network of agents of influence across the EU, who have affected electoral processes and policies on key strategic issues such as energy infrastructure; whereas these agents of influence actively target all areas of public life, particularly culture, historical remembrance, the media and religious communities, as well as politicians and their families; whereas dozens of investigations have proven links between prominent active or retired European political and public actors and the Kremlin;

5. Calls for all European institutions to raise their ambitions regarding the implementation of the European ethics body;

R. whereas the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs has uncovered a large-scale disinformation campaign, allegedly orchestrated by Russia, on the X platform, aimed at manipulating public opinion;

6. Believes that free and fair elections are at the heart of the democratic process and therefore urges EU institutions and Member States to take decisive action to ensure that solely the will of the people serves as the basis of the authority of government, without foreign interference by malign actors, with a particular focus on the preparations for the European elections of 6-9 June 2024;

S. whereas reputable German media outlets have exposed the fact that an employee of a member of the German Bundestag belonging to the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party was identified as a contact person for the Russian Federal Security Service;

7. Highlights that hybrid warfare and FIMI are not just foreign policy issues but in fact threaten the very basis of our democracies; urges the European institutions to adopt a permanent cross-cutting approach to combating FIMI more effectively; considers that electoral interference in one Member State affects the EU as a whole insofar as it can have an impact on the composition of the EU institutions; believes that national authorities cannot address these threats by working in isolation, nor can private sector self-regulation solve it all; welcomes the work done by the European External Action Service (EEAS) in its second Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats published on 23 January 2024;

T. whereas there have been reported cases of MEPs using Parliament’s resources to advocate and promote activities which are directly or indirectly linked to cases of foreign interference, for example in December 2022 when the Belarusian state propaganda channel STV gained access to Parliament’s premises and the VoxBox video recording facility inside Parliament and, as a result, Parliament’s premises were used by several MEPs to create pro-Kremlin and anti-EU disinformation content;

8. Underlines that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has exposed the extent of foreign manipulation of information and information threats to the EU and its immediate neighbourhood, namely the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries, and therefore calls for the EU and its neighbouring countries to increase their cooperation on the fight against disinformation;

1. Expresses its complete outrage and grave concern about the continuous efforts by Russia to undermine European democracy; is appalled by credible reports which cast light on Russia’s efforts to foment divisions between European citizens by recruiting MEPs as agents of influence, as well as its efforts to systematically create a system of dependencies through European political parties which then act as amplifiers of the Kremlin’s propaganda;

9. Acknowledges that the overwhelming majority of Member States have full or partial bans on foreign donations to political parties and candidates; expresses its concern about Russia’s connections with several political parties and politicians in the EU; recalls that even in the case where the law limits the sources of political funding, Russian actors have found ways to circumvent them and offered support to their allies by taking out loans with foreign banks (such as in the case of the National Front party in 2016), purchase and commercial agreements (such as in the allegations reported by Der Spiegel and Süddeutsche Zeitung on 17 May 2019 about the FPÖ party and by Buzzfeeds and L’Espresso on 10 July 2019 about Lega per Salvini premier), and facilitation of financial activities (as reported by the British press about the Leave.eu campaign);

2. Unequivocally condemns the ongoing Russian efforts to abuse and falsify the historical recollection of Europe’s most tragic periods, such as the terror of the Nazi regime, in order to try to justify its current brutal, illegal and inhumane aggression and its expansionist policy, as well as its attempts to systematically spread false historical narratives with the goal of casting doubt on the sovereignty of other nations by systematically undermining their domestic democratic processes, among other methods;

10. Is deeply concerned by the evidence that much Russian interference favoured anti-EU, extremist and populist candidates; deplores the fact that FIMI campaigns are often directed against specific minorities and vulnerable groups and notes that the targeting of those minorities serves the larger purpose of undermining the appeal of democratic and equal societies;

3. Strongly condemns and expresses its outrage about the recent revelations that MEP Tatjana Ždanoka has been working as an agent of influence for the Russian intelligence services, and urgently calls on the relevant national and EU authorities to immediately investigate this case with a sense of urgency to limit any further damage;

11. Insists on its commitment to continuing to undertake serious and concrete reforms in the European Parliament in order to enhance its integrity and transparency, to show zero tolerance for corruption and corrupting political interference and to protect European democracy;

4. Points to other credible cases of Members, particularly Members belonging to the ID and The Left Group, as well as non-attached Members, who are knowingly serving Russia’s interests, as reflected by their public interventions, voting record and organised events, as well as pursuing covert activities; underlines that the activities of these MEPs are undermining the security, credibility and democratic resilience of the EU;

12. Calls on the Secretariat of the EU Transparency Register to ban any entities with direct or indirect relations with the Government of Russia, pursuant to the Council decision of 3 June 2022 concerning restrictive measures ;

5. Is extremely concerned about the relations between Catalan secessionists and the Russian administration; notes that Russian interference in Catalonia is part of a broader Russian strategy to promote internal destabilisation and EU disunity;

13. Expects the Commission and the Council to deliver on the Defence of Democracy Package in order to urgently take action and close the numerous loopholes in EU party financing legislation, find a compulsory regulatory scheme for the big platforms, and step up the EU’s cyber defence against possible attacks on our electoral system;

6. Expresses deep concern about the massive disinformation campaigns that Russia has pursued in Catalonia, as well as the intense contacts and number of meetings between the agents responsible for Russian interference with the pro-independence movement and the regional government of the autonomous community of Catalonia;

14. Considers it urgent to enhance and update the tools for the protection of the integrity of the elections for the digital age, in order to protect democratic processes from new forms of manipulation by third countries or private interests; invites the Commission to address the harmful potential of new AI-powered techniques on the electoral process and calls for an update to its existing commitments on the transparency of political advertising and cooperation among stakeholders;

7. Calls on the competent Spanish authorities to continue, further intensify and swiftly conclude their investigations into the reported cases of interference by Russia, particularly those linked to Catalan secessionist groups; deplores the attacks on judges investigating these interference activities;

15. Calls for Parliament to reinforce the security culture within the institution; calls therefore for mandatory, effective and regular training on security, interference, ethical standards, compliance and integrity for all MEPs and their offices and for all Parliament staff, making them aware that they are potential targets of foreign state and non-state actors; recommends appropriate security clearance for Parliament officials and political group staff, and evaluation of when security clearance is needed for accredited parliamentary assistants (APAs) when dealing with foreign affairs, security and defence or trade issues; calls on national authorities to follow procedures and a common timeframe whenever they are asked to give security clearance to MEPs and Parliament staff, as well as for any security screening related to the EU institutions; calls for Parliament’s services to put in place effective monitoring and surveillance systems to detect foreign interference while respecting MEP’s freedom of mandate;

8. Strongly condemns the recent incident in Slovakia, whereby the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, in a provocative move, released a statement during the pre-election moratorium questioning the integrity of the Slovak Republic’s electoral process; expresses its concern about the visible and direct role played by Russian diplomacy in Slovak public and political life since the parliamentary elections in September 2023;

16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

9. Strongly condemns the large-scale disinformation campaign exposed by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, purportedly orchestrated by Russia on the X platform, with the intention of manipulating public opinion in Germany;

10. Strongly condemns the alarming revelation brought to light by reputable German media outlets exposing the fact that an employee affiliated with the AfD party and associated with a member of the German Bundestag was identified as a contact person for the Russian Federal Security Service, raising serious concerns about potential foreign influence within the German political landscape;

11. Recalls that by pursuing a long-term strategy of foreign interference, Russia is trying to undermine and ultimately destroy democracy in Europe; points to Putin’s efforts to completely dismantle any form of democracy inside Russia and underlines that this must be a warning sign not to be naive about Putin’s long-term goals and hence to tackle these Russian interference attempts as a matter of extreme gravity;

12. Stresses that Russia’s interference in the democratic processes of the EU Member States and institutions is exceptional in terms of the threat and danger it poses to the fundamental principles of democracy in Europe; underlines, therefore, that, Russian foreign interference is unique and differs from any other non-EU country’s attempts at foreign interference in Europe’s democratic processes; reiterates its previous position that the exceptional character of Russian foreign interference requires special efforts by national and EU institutions, including the European Parliament, to identify, address and overcome this specific threat;

13. Underlines that Russia is trying to exert influence in European societies and erode democratic discourse by, among other methods, advancing disinformation campaigns with the ultimate goal of inflicting damage on European democracies and destroying the European way of life;

14. Points out that Russia’s efforts to undermine democratic processes in Europe are closely linked to Russia’s objectives in Putin’s illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine;

15. Points out that Russia has assumed that fostering regional secessionism and interference through national diasporas is a useful instrument in its strategy to promote internal destabilisation and disunity in the European Union, with the aim of intensifying polarisation in our society, undermining trust between citizens and the public authorities by weakening the democratic processes of target countries, among other tactics;

16. Underlines that in the context of the upcoming European elections, all national and EU authorities must intensify their efforts to combat and uncover cases of foreign interference in order to ensure the full integrity of these important elections;

17. Expresses its concern about reports that not only French and Irish MEPs, but also members of staff from Ireland and France have similarly been spreading pro-Kremlin propaganda inside Parliament for years; insists that these reports are followed up by immediate action by the appropriate authorities and that urgent measures are taken immediately to put a stop to these dangerous activities;

18. Notes that laws are essential to fight against corruption and criminal behaviour but cannot in themselves prevent criminal and unethical actions by individual Members; underlines that all political groups in the European Parliament bear a certain responsibility to monitor the actions of their Members, and therefore reminds all groups to quickly act in the event that they are made aware of any behaviour raising doubts about the integrity of any of their Members; calls on all MEPs and groups to fully cooperate with the relevant national and EU authorities in this context;

19. Reiterates its outrage about the regular revelations of large-scale Russian funding of political parties, politicians and officials in several democratic countries in an attempt to interfere with and gain leverage in their domestic processes;

20. Condemns all types of elite capture and the technique of co-opting top-level civil servants and former EU politicians, among others, by providing them with lucrative jobs in companies linked to governments actively engaged in interference actions against the EU; regrets the lack of tools available to prevent these practices;

21. Stresses that it should be made illegal in all Member States to engage in any open or covert activity financed by foreign authoritarian states or state-linked actors which aims to influence the process of European or national politics; underlines that non-profit organisations and third parties, coordinated by foreign authoritarian state actors and created with a view to influencing electoral processes, are tools for foreign interference and therefore represent a threat to democracy;

22. Underlines that Russia has pursued similar efforts to undermine democracies outside the EU, namely in the UK, the US and in numerous African countries; recalls that countries around the world have been severely affected by these malign and dangerous efforts;

23. Underlines that democratic processes and free and fair elections are at the heart of the European identity and that any attack against these principles is therefore a matter of extreme gravity and should be addressed as such by the respective authorities;

24. Is of the firm opinion that Parliament cannot tolerate a delayed response in light of the recent revelations; welcomes, therefore, the opening of an initial investigation into the case of MEP Tatjana Ždanoka and insists on strong and swift action;

25. Calls for stricter scrutiny of the organisation of events, of the invitation of external guests to Parliament and of access to Parliament’s communication platforms;

26. Calls for a review of the screening procedures for all Parliament staff, including the staff of MEPs’ offices, with a view to preventing infiltration by foreign authoritarian states’ agents of influence;

27. Is of the firm opinion that Parliament resources such as sponsoring events and trips, granting access to video recording studios and other communication platforms and the financing of political groups’ or Members’ communication projects, must not be used to undermine the values of the EU or for the purposes of disseminating hostile information by authoritarian regimes;

28. Calls for the use of all available instruments to restrict the activities of the MEPs linked to interference by Russia and other authoritarian regimes, for example by suspending Members who carry out subversive actions in the guise of parliamentary activities;

29. Believes that national authorities should intensify their efforts to prevent foreign interference and should therefore improve their mutual cooperation; acknowledges the critical significance of the Strategic Communication Centres specifically designed to investigate and unveil agents involved in activities that pose threats to democratic processes;

30. Underlines the key role of investigative journalism in revealing the attempts at foreign interference and covert activities, such as in the case of MEP Tatjana Ždanoka, whose cooperation with Russian intelligence was exposed by an international team of investigative journalists; reiterates its call for the EU institutions and the Member States to ensure sufficient and sustainable funding for investigative journalism;

31. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the parliaments of the Member States.