What changed

B100307/2026

P10_TA(2026)0231

European Parliament resolution on Russia’s unacceptable provocative actions and drone incursions into Romania, the Baltic states and Finland

(2026/2772(RSP))

PE783.361

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the fundamental principles of international law,

European Parliament resolution of 18 June 2026 on Russia’s unacceptable provocative actions and drone incursions into Romania, the Baltic states and Finland (2026/2772(RSP))

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, inUkraine, particularnotably thosethat adoptedof since9 Russia’sOctober annexation2025 ofon thea Crimeanunited Peninsularesponse into Februaryrecent 2014Russian andviolations Russia’sof full-scaleEU invasionMember ofStates’ Ukraineairspace inand Februarycritical 2022,infrastructure,

– having regard to the Strategic Compass forUN SecurityCharter and Defence, adopted by the Councilfundamental onprinciples 21of Marchinternational 2022,law,

– having regard to the report by Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 24(3), 42(7) and 222 thereof,

– having regard to the joint white paper from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

– having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949, in particular Articles 4 and 5 thereof,

– having regard to itsthe resolutionjoint communication of 12the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 March 2025 onentitled the‘Joint white paper onfor theEuropean futureDefence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120) and to its resolution of European12 defence,March 2025 thereon,

– having regard to its resolution of 9 October 2025 on a united response to recent Russian violations of the EU Member States’ airspace and critical infrastructure,

– having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 October 2025, entitled ‘Preserving Peace - Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0027),

– having regard to itsthe resolutionEuropean Council conclusions of 2119 JanuaryMarch 2026 on the implementation of the common security and defence policyEU’s –continued annualsupport reportfor 2025,Ukraine,

– having regard to its resolution of 18 December 2025 on the continuous Belarusian hybrid attacks against Lithuania,

– having regard to the statements made by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 20 May 2026 regarding Russian threats against the Baltic states,

– having regard to the Commission’s Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security, which was published on 11 February 2026,

– having regard to the statement made by Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas of 29 May 2026 condemning the reckless violation of the EU’s airspace by Russia,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 March 2026 on advancing the EU’s capacity to counter hybrid threats,

– having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 September 2022 updating guidelines on general visa issuance in relation to Russian applicants following Council Decision (EU) 2022/1500 of 9 September 2022 on the suspension in whole of the application of the Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation on the facilitation of the issuance of visas to the citizens of the European Union and the Russian Federation, and on providing guidelines on controls of Russian citizens at the external borders (C(2022)7111),

A. whereas more than four years ago Russia launched its illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, continuing its 2014 annexation of Crimea and occupation of parts of the Donbas in flagrant violation of international law and Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty; whereas intrusions into EU and NATO airspace, caused by Russia, have been occurring since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but have recently increased in frequency and intensity;

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

B. whereas Russia’s military build-up along the EU’s eastern flank is ongoing and also includes the territory of Belarus, which is complicit in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and hybrid attacks against the EU, notably via its instrumentalisation of irregular migration, organised crime, disinformation and the launch of meteorological balloons, which pose serious security threats, including the constant disruption of civilian aviation, the terrorisation of countries bordering Belarus like Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and damage to local economies;

A. whereas on 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation launched an unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, in gross violation of the Charter of the United Nations and its own international commitments; whereas Russian aggression against Ukraine started in 2014 with the occupation of parts of the Donbas Region and the occupation and annexation of Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea; whereas during this time, Russia’s forces have continued and escalated indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure; whereas heavy and intense bombardments combined with ground fighting have continued throughout 2026;

C. whereas Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania and other EU Member States have been targeted by Russia’s attempts at destabilisation, which take the form of drone incursions and airspace violations, propaganda and disinformation, electronic warfare, global navigation satellite system (GNSS) interference, cyberattacks and sabotage;

B. whereas in recent weeks, several drones have entered Romanian, Finnish, Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian airspace; whereas Russia has repeatedly violated the airspace of EU Member States and NATO allies for decades; whereas these recent airspace violations present a reckless and ongoing escalation that threatens regional security;

D. whereas on 29 May 2026, a Russian drone crashed into a residential building in Galați, Romania, causing an explosion that injured two people; whereas this was the first such incident on the territory of an EU and NATO Member State to result in injuries requiring medical treatment; whereas more than 70 people had to be evacuated;

C. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has demonstrated the decisive role of unmanned and autonomous systems, low-cost attrition warfare and electronic warfare in modern combat, with drones now reshaping the battlefield and the nature of the threats facing the EU; whereas the EU’s ability to deter and counter these threats depends on its capacity to develop, test and field its own innovative drone and counter-drone solutions at speed;

E. whereas on 19 May 2026, an intruding drone flying in Estonian airspace was shot down by a Romanian fighter jet participating in the NATO Baltic Air Policing Mission; whereas on 20 May 2026, the incursion of an unidentified drone into Lithuanian airspace forced authorities to issue an unprecedented air raid alert, compelling civilians to seek shelter; whereas on 8 June 2026, French NATO fighter jets, participating in a NATO mission, shot down drones flying over Latvia; whereas these drone incursions are a direct result of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, with the majority entering EU airspace as a result of Russian electronic warfare; whereas, in March 2026, due to the interference from Russian electronic warfare systems, at least three Ukrainian drones were diverted from their intended course and entered Finnish territory, where they crashed;

D.F. whereas on 29 May 2026, a Russian drone entered Romanian airspace and struckUkrainian anaval residentialdrone buildingexploded in the city of Galați, forcing approximatelyRomanian 70port civiliansof toConstanța evacuateas anda injuringresult two;of whereaselectronic thiswarfare incidentmeasures wasemployed notby isolated,the asRussian multipleFederation, priorcausing violationsdamage ofto Romanianproperty airspacebut haveno beenhuman documented;casualties;

E. whereas since March 2026, Russia has started electronically hijacking Ukrainian military drones to make incursions into the sovereign territory of EU Member States; whereas a similar incursion into Finland occurred on 15 May 2026 when a Ukrainian drone was redirected by Russia into Finnish airspace, leading to a shelter in place warning for a large part of the population and a three-hour closure of Helsinki Airport; whereas on 18 May 2026 a drone was redirected into Estonia’s airspace, after which it was shot down by a Romanian NATO fighter jet; whereas on 20 May 2026 a drone alert caused the Lithuanian capital Vilnius to come to a standstill, forcing citizens to seek shelter underground; whereas such alerts have become increasingly common in recent months; whereas on 5 June 2026 a Ukrainian naval drone that had been electronically hijacked by Russia exploded near an oil terminal in the Romanian port of Constanța; whereas on 8 June 2026 a French fighter jet had to shoot down a drone entering Latvian airspace, which marks the first time a drone has been shot down over Latvia’s territory;

G. whereas on 7 May 2026, two Ukrainian drones, jammed by Russian electronic warfare systems, struck a fuel storage depot in Rēzekne, Latvia;

F. whereas Russia is waging a disinformation campaign in the Baltic states, falsely claiming that Ukraine is launching drone attacks on Russia from their territory; whereas on 19 May 2026 Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service alleged that Ukrainian drone units were stationed at Latvian military bases, a claim firmly rejected as disinformation by the Latvian authorities and disproved by NATO’s interception of stray drones over Baltic territory; whereas such fabrications seek to intimidate front line Member States and to manufacture pretexts for retaliation;

H. whereas the Baltic Sea region contains a high concentration of critical infrastructure, including subsea energy and telecommunications networks, transport links and other strategic assets, making it particularly vulnerable to hybrid attacks, sabotage and drone-related threats; whereas the protection of critical infrastructure requires both physical hardening and increased redundancy and decentralisation, as demonstrated by the lessons learned from Russia’s attacks against Ukrainian infrastructure;

G. whereas in response to ongoing airspace violations, on 12 September 2025 NATO announced the launch of ‘Eastern Sentry’, a multi-domain military activity aimed at bolstering NATO’s position along the eastern flank; whereas this was followed by the introduction on 16 October 2025 of the European Drone Defence Initiative and the Eastern Flank Watch as flagship projects under the Commission’s Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030; whereas on 11 February 2026 the Commission published the Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security;

I. whereas the decommissioning of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in Lithuania presents significant regional security and environmental hazards due to the presence of large volumes of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste stored in temporary overground facilities, and whereas any accident or intentional provocation to this critical infrastructure could have severe consequences for the entire Baltic region and far beyond;

H. whereas on 9 June 2026 the Commission published its 21st sanctions package against Russia, which includes export restrictions for metals and alloys used in Russian drones and sanctions against entities involved in drone production; whereas, despite calls from several Member States and Members of this Parliament, exports of alumina to Russia were not included in the 21st sanctions package;

J. whereas there have been other serious incidents of suspected Russian violations of EU Member States’ airspace;

I. whereas, in its communication of 30 September 2022, the Commission called for heightened scrutiny of short-stay visa applications by Russian nationals and stated that a very strict approach is justified for Russian citizens travelling for tourism, including refusal where reasonable doubts exist regarding the purpose of travel, security risks or the applicant’s intention to leave the Schengen area;

K. whereas the security and protection of the EU Member States along its eastern flank are an immediate priority and a joint European responsibility, especially given that hybrid attacks are being carried out using modern drone warfare, an area in which the EU Member States’ capacity is far from complete;

J. whereas trade data exposed by reporters and information released by the Ukrainian military show that dual-use goods produced in Europe are still found in large quantities in Russian Geran-2 drones; whereas without Western technologies, Russia would not be able to produce the Geran-2 drones it uses to hit civilian targets in Ukraine;

L. whereas drone incidents on the EU’s eastern flank have exposed significant gaps in both military and civilian preparedness; whereas existing radar systems often prove unable to track low-altitude objects, methods chosen for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) interception are economically inefficient and reports on incidents revealed that some air-raid shelters were locked or inaccessible to the public; whereas these failures highlight urgent systemic vulnerabilities in alert and reaction procedures, and broader societal resilience;

1. Strongly condemns Russia’s repeated deliberate violations of the sovereign airspace and territory of EU Member States; expresses its undivided solidarity with the countries affected by Russian airspace violations and hijacked drone incursions, and stresses the importance for EU Member States to stand united in the face of Russia’s provocations;

M. whereas in its latest attacks against Ukraine, Russia set ablaze the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra, a historic monastery of Eastern Christianity and a UNESCO World Heritage Site, among other invaluable cultural heritage sites;

2. Highlights that these clear provocations are an active strategy of hybrid warfare designed to destabilise, divide and undermine the EU, its Member States and NATO; stresses the importance of societal resilience and preparedness as highlighted in the Niinistö report, which presents a comprehensive and holistic approach to preparedness and readiness that encompasses all civilian and military aspects;

N. whereas those recent drone incidents have demonstrated the urgent need for multilayered defence capabilities integrating kinetic and non-kinetic counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS); whereas drones have become a defining feature of modern warfare and hybrid conflict, and their use in Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped defence requirements and operational doctrines across the continent;

3. Highlights with concern that current European drone detection and defence systems are inadequate and stresses the urgent need to improve detection and defence; stresses, in this context, the need for a holistic approach that focuses on better equipping police forces and civilian authorities with the means to detect and defend against drones;

O. whereas the Arctic and the High North are becoming increasingly important for European security, while limited sensor coverage and a sparse permanent presence create vulnerabilities that hostile actors may seek to exploit through unmanned systems and hybrid operations, thereby increasing the risk of hostile drone incursions deep into EU territory;

4. Calls for the EU and its Member States to equip authorities with the means to counter drones at critical infrastructure sites such as airports and power plants; notes that such means must be suitable for the civilian context and follow a model of layered defence with multiple systems that can take down drones kinetically and electronically;

1. Strongly condemns Russia’s unacceptable provocative actions and drone incursions into the EU Member States;

5. Insists that urgent needs cannot wait for the next multiannual financial framework and calls for the launch of another off-budget financial facility that would sufficiently pool and Europeanise parts of national defence budgets at EU level and address the entire life cycle of military capabilities, from collaborative research and development and joint procurement to joint maintenance, training and security of supply, and which is, like the current off-budget European Peace Facility, open to non-EU countries such as Norway and the United Kingdom; stresses, therefore, the need to improve decision-making and oversight procedures compared to the current European Peace Facility governance model;

2. Reaffirms its full solidarity with Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, whose territory, airspace and critical infrastructure have been targeted by Russian hybrid provocations; reaffirms that the EU will not be intimidated by Russia’s campaign of destabilisation and that it stands united in its determination to defend the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all EU Member States and to continue to support Ukraine;

6. Stresses that countering drones and other emerging threats requires the EU to develop and field innovative defence solutions at speed; supports, in this context, the proposed programme for agile and rapid defence innovation (AGILE) and calls for its contract-based model to be scaled up substantially; underlines the importance of EU action to foster innovation by small and medium-sized enterprises, start-ups and new defence actors, in particular on the eastern flank, so that they can scale up and help meet the EU’s capability needs, especially in drone and counter-drone warfare; calls for increased and dedicated support to this end under the next multiannual financial framework;

3. Recognises the particular vulnerability of, and expresses its full solidarity with, citizens in the EU border regions along the eastern flank, who are most exposed to serious threats and who also bear significant economic and social costs as a result; calls for targeted EU-level measures, including dedicated financial support, to strengthen the protection of affected communities and critical infrastructure, and ensure prevention, preparedness, resilience and emergency response and reconstruction in these particularly exposed regions;

7. Expresses its gratitude to Ukraine for volunteering assistance and cooperation to the affected Member States in the wake of the airspace incursions by redirected drones; is obliged to Ukraine for sending air defence experts to Lithuania to assist that country with its protection against stray drones; notes the recently announced cooperation between Ukraine and Latvia to promote joint drone production with Ukrainian companies;

4. Unequivocally condemns the Russian drone strike on a residential building in Galați, Romania, which caused direct civilian casualties, constituting a grave and serious escalation; considers that repeated drone incursions and airspace violations into EU countries are not isolated incidents but an integral part of Russia’s broader strategy of intimidation directed against the EU and its allies;

8. Welcomes the Commission’s 21st sanctions package as announced on 9 June 2026, including the sanctions against more than 30 entities involved in drone production and the new export bans on ground support equipment, and jamming and launch systems; expresses serious concern about the fact that European dual-use goods, the export of some of which is already sanctioned, are currently ending up in Russian drones; calls on the Commission, the EU Sanctions Envoy and the Member States to strictly implement the new and existing sanctions, to prioritise without delay the closing of loopholes in supply chains, and for additional sanctions to be imposed as needed, in particular concerning legal entities in non-EU country re-export hubs, to ensure that European dual-use goods and technology are no longer contributing to the production of Russian drones;

5. Declares that Russia bears full and unequivocal responsibility for these reckless escalatory attacks which endanger lives; reiterates that the acts of the Russian Federation constitute a deliberate, systematic and ongoing threat to the security, resilience and sovereignty of the EU and its Member States; reiterates its condemnation in the strongest possible terms of Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as Belarus’s complicity in it; strongly denounces Russia’s decision to continue its war of aggression, including its latest targeted attacks on cultural heritage sites and the UNESCO World Heritage Site Kyiv Pechersk Lavra, while refusing any direct negotiations with Ukraine, as recently proposed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy;

9. Regrets that the 21st sanctions package failed to include any restriction on exports of alumina to Russia, a strategic raw material that ultimately feeds Russia’s military-industrial complex; calls on the Commission and the Member States to include alumina in the next sanctions package without delay, and urges all Member States not to block such a listing on grounds of national economic interest;

6. Reiterates its condemnation of Russia’s deliberate jamming of GNSS signals in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions, and of Belarus’s deliberate launch of meteorological balloons, which pose serious safety risks for civilian aviation and maritime transport; condemns Belarus, furthermore, for its hybrid attacks against the EU;

10. Calls on Member States, in particular those issuing the majority of visas to Russian nationals, to strictly implement the Commission Implementing Decision of 6 November 2025 establishing adapted rules on the issuing of multiple-entry visas to Russian nationals residing in the Russian Federation and applying in the Russian Federation for short-stay visas (C(2025)7552), and fully apply the Commission’s 2022 guidance on heightened scrutiny, especially for tourist and other non-essential travel, while safeguarding access for anti-war political activists, independent journalists, human rights defenders, civil society representatives and humanitarian cases;

7. Reiterates its call to urgently accelerate the production and delivery of priority military equipment to Ukraine, in particular air defence systems, ammunition, drones and missiles, at a critical moment when acute shortfalls in air defence capabilities leave Ukraine’s population and infrastructure increasingly exposed;

11. Reiterates its condemnation of Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine in the strongest possible terms and demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land and infrastructure; expresses its undivided solidarity with the people of Ukraine, fully supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and underlines that this war constitutes a serious violation of international law;

8. Highlights that these hostile acts are compounded by an aggressive disinformation campaign seeking to intimidate local populations, spread fear, damage local economies and lay the groundwork for possible retaliatory actions, as in the case of unfounded Russian allegations that the Baltic states allow Ukraine to use their territories and airspace for drone attacks against targets in Russia;

12. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary-General of NATO, the President and Parliament of Ukraine, and the President and Parliament of the Russian Federation.

9. Reiterates its call for the urgent establishment of a genuine European Defence Union, including proposals for swift decision-making processes, going beyond existing frameworks, including the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 and the subsequent Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030; underlines that deeper integration, coordination and the pooling of resources are indispensable to an effective EU response to Russia’s escalating threats; calls for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base and its production capacity across the EU to be boosted through enhanced EU-level coordination, maximising the use of national initiatives and EU instruments;

10. Calls for the solidarity clause (Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) and the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU) to be further operationalised, including where a conventional or hybrid attack leads a Member State to invoke them;

11. Emphasises the need for the coherent strengthening of the EU and NATO’s eastern flank along its entire length from the Arctic to the Black Sea, including the land, maritime and air dimensions by building capabilities in frontline Member States to combat drones and meteorological balloons, and through the allocation of adequate resources for this purpose; calls for the EU and its Member States to urgently strengthen detection, jamming, interception and neutralisation capabilities along the EU’s eastern flank; further calls for regular joint exercises between the Member States, the EU institutions, Ukraine and NATO to test and improve the readiness of these rapid response mechanisms;

12. Recommends the integration of C-UASs into joint training exercises and EU-level civil protection planning, with an emphasis on critical infrastructure that enables police, airport authorities and energy sector operators to access EU-wide training and standardised C-UAS capabilities;

13. Highlights with concern that current European drone detection and defence systems are inadequate and stresses the urgent need to improve detection and defence; stresses, in this context, the need for a holistic approach that focuses on better equipping law enforcement and civilian authorities with the means to detect and defend against drones;

14. Encourages the Member States to prioritise integrating command and control systems with first responders, civil defence and UAS defence doctrines to ensure that civil preparedness, sheltering, early warning and technological integration are optimised to the fullest extent possible;

15. Stresses that Russia’s deliberate incursions into the eastern flank of the EU and NATO are intended not only to provoke and destabilise Member States, but also to test and exploit weaknesses in NATO’s detection and response capabilities; recognises that Russia continues its destabilising activities in the Black Sea region, both through conventional and hybrid actions, including through the use of drifting mines, jamming operations and threats to freedom of navigation, making the strengthening of security in this region a strategic priority that must be addressed urgently as a threat to European security;

16. Calls for the full implementation of the EU’s strategic approach to the Black Sea, and calls for the acceleration of the creation of the Black Sea Maritime Security Hub;

17. Welcomes the recent approval of the 20th package of EU sanctions against Russia and the presentation of the 21st sanctions package; calls on the Commission, the EU Sanctions Envoy and the Member States to strictly implement new and existing sanctions, and to prioritise without delay the closing of loopholes in supply chains; calls on the Commission to develop additional sanctions without delay, including sanctions on alumina and other strategic raw materials and dual-use goods, and urges all Member States not to block such a listing on grounds of national economic interest; supports additional measures for the upcoming sanctions package targeting the Russian Federation’s energy and financial sectors, as well as a ban on entry into the EU for former Russian combatants who fought in Ukraine, and calls on Member States that continue to support the Russian Federation to cease such support;

18. Calls on Member States, in particular those issuing the majority of visas to Russian nationals, to strictly implement the Commission Implementing Decision of 6 November 2025 establishing adapted rules on the issuing of multiple-entry visas to Russian nationals residing in the Russian Federation and applying in the Russian Federation for short-stay visas, and fully apply the Commission’s 2022 guidance on heightened scrutiny, especially for tourist and other non-essential travel, while safeguarding access for anti-war political activists, independent journalists, human rights defenders, civil society representatives and humanitarian cases;

19. Calls for the establishment of a horizontal EU sanctions framework specifically designed for hybrid threats, which would exist alongside the hybrid sanctions regime for Russia, to underscore Russia’s active engagement in hybrid operations globally, while enabling faster and more systematic sanctioning of entities responsible for hybrid campaigns; recalls that some individuals, among which Ksenia Fedorova in France, who worked for sanctioned Russian propaganda outlets, such as RT, are still spreading disinformation in Europe; calls for their inclusion among the list of sanctioned individuals in the next sanctions package;

20. Calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure appropriate funding for the construction and renovation of civil air-raid shelters in eastern flank and other EU Member States, and to carry out EU-wide information campaigns and civilian exercises to make citizens aware of how to act in the event of an air raid or similar crisis situation; considers that protecting EU civilian populations from aerial threats must be treated as an integral component of European defence readiness, preparedness and resilience; stresses the urgent need for increased financing for security and defence programmes and projects, with a special focus on the eastern flank countries, in the next multiannual financial framework; calls for the EU and its Member States to adopt a comprehensive, whole-of-society approach, recognising that lasting security requires not only adequate military capabilities but also social cohesion, economic resilience, democratic stability and strong public services;

21. Underlines that Ukraine has developed unparalleled operational and industrial expertise in drone production and counter-drone systems; considers, therefore, that deepening EU-Ukraine defence industrial cooperation in this domain is a strategic imperative; calls for the EU and its Member States to fully integrate Ukrainian expertise and industrial capacity into the development of European capabilities to counter unconventional aerial threats;

22. Emphasises that in addressing the drone threats coming from Russia, cooperation with the Republic of Moldova – alongside Ukraine – is essential in terms of operational efficiency, situational awareness and the exchange of information; calls, therefore, on the Member States to increase funding for Moldova through the European Peace Facility, also in the light of repeated violations of Moldovan airspace by Russian drones and missiles; further calls on the Member States to include Moldova and Ukraine in joint acquisitions;

23. Calls on the Member States to urgently deliver the priority capabilities identified in the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030, in particular air and missile defence as well as drones and counter-drone systems; calls on the Member States to rapidly establish joint, layered, cost-effective counter-drone defence systems, starting on the eastern flank, capable of detecting and intercepting airborne and seaborne threats from outside the EU, including through enhanced air and maritime surveillance, early-warning systems, rapid-response assets and improved military mobility infrastructure;

24. Calls for the establishment of a European Centre of Excellence for Drone Warfare, where Ukrainian instructors pass on their expertise to the EU Member States;

25. Calls for the full and speedy implementation of the European Drone Defence Initiative and the Eastern Flank Watch; calls on the Member States to actively engage in and contribute to both initiatives in close coordination with NATO;

26. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary General of NATO, UNESCO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Russian authorities and the de facto authorities of the Lukashenka regime.