What changed

B100295/2026

B100311/2026

European Parliament resolution on Russia’s unacceptable provocative actions and drone incursions into Romania, the Baltic states and Finland

(2026/2772(RSP))

– having regard to the UN Charter, inits particularprevious Articlesresolutions 2(4),on 21Russia and 51 thereof,Ukraine,

– having regard to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the principle enshrined therein of the peaceful settlement of disputes,

– having regard to the UN Charter,

– having regard to the 2026 Doomsday Clock statement of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and in particular Articles 24(3), 42(7) and 222 thereof,

– having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949, and in particular Articles 4 and 5 thereof,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions on Ukraine of 19 March 2026,

– having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 October 2025 entitled ‘Preserving Peace - Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0027),

– having regard to the State of the Union address delivered on 10 September 2025 by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen,

– having regard to the statement by Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas of 29 May 2026 on the reckless violation of the EU’s airspace by Russia,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the Russian Federation’s illegal invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 constitutes a grave violation of the UN Charter, in particular Article 2(4) thereof; whereas deliberate or indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure violate international humanitarian law and must be condemned, and those responsible must be held fully accountable;

A. whereas more than four years ago Russia launched its illegal, unprovoked, and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, continuing its 2014 annexation of Crimea and occupation of parts of the Donbas in flagrant violation of international law and Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty; whereas Russia’s campaign of aggression has expanded to include deliberate drone incursions into EU territory, alongside systematic disinformation, malign influence and provocative operations targeting European society, reflecting a broader imperial strategy directed against the European Union;

B. whereas Russia’s war of aggression has already lasted for more than four years, causing immense human suffering, the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives, mass displacement, long-term physical and psychological trauma, ecological destruction and the destruction of large parts of Ukraine’s civilian, social and economic infrastructure;

B. whereas Russia’s military build-up along the EU’s eastern flank is ongoing and also includes the territory of Belarus, which is complicit in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and hybrid attacks against the EU, notably via its instrumentalisation of irregular migration and the launch of meteorological balloons, which pose serious security threats, including the constant disruption of civilian aviation, the terrorisation of Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish populations, and damage to local economies;

C. whereas on 29 May 2026, a Russian Geran-2 drone struck a residential building in Galați, Romania, injuring two civilians; whereas Romanian President Dan stated that the drone had been struck by Ukrainian air defence over Reni, deflecting it into Romanian territory; whereas this incident is therefore the combined product of a Russian offensive weapon and Ukrainian defensive action, with responsibility for the original attack resting with Russia;

C. whereas Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania and other Member States have been targeted by Russia’s attempts at destabilisation, which take the form of drone incursions and airspace violations, propaganda and disinformation, electronic warfare, global navigation satellite system (GNSS) interference, cyberattacks and sabotage; whereas Russian intrusions into NATO and EU airspace have occurred frequently since the launch of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, constituting clear violations of Member State sovereignty and international law, and have recently intensified to an unprecedented scale;

D. whereas since March 2026, a series of drone incursions have affected all three Baltic states and Finland; whereas on 23 March 2026, a drone crashed in Lithuania; whereas on 25 March 2026, a drone struck the chimney of the Auvere power station in Estonia, less than 50 kilometres from the Russian port of Ust-Luga, which Ukraine had struck that night; whereas on 7 May 2026, two drones crossing from Russian airspace struck an oil storage facility in Rēzekne, Latvia, damaging four empty storage tanks;

D. whereas Russia is leading an aggressive disinformation campaign, claiming that the Baltic states are allowing Ukraine to use their territories and airspace for drone attacks against targets in Russia, and threatening to retaliate by targeting alleged drone launch locations; whereas the Baltic states have categorically rejected these Russian allegations, calling them completely baseless; whereas in recent months, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania have reported a significant increase in the number of drone incursions ; whereas on 29 May 2026, a Russian military drone crashed into a residential area in Galați, Romania, injuring two civilians, including a minor; whereas this incident constitutes the first case in which EU citizens have been injured on EU and NATO territory by Russian weapons employed in the bombing of Ukraine; whereas this incident constitutes a serious breach of international law and a violation of an EU and NATO Member State’s sovereignty; whereas it represents a grave and dangerous escalation in Russia’s campaign of illegal aggression;

E. whereas Finland, as an EU Member State sharing a direct land border with the Russian Federation and with a key position in the Baltic Sea security architecture, is particularly exposed to spillover risks from Russian military operations, drone activity and hybrid threats targeting critical infrastructure and energy systems and affecting aviation safety; whereas on 15 May 2026, Helsinki-Vantaa Airport was shut down for three hours, 1.8 million residents of the Helsinki region were ordered to remain indoors and Finnish Air Force jets were scrambled following drone activity linked to overnight Ukrainian strikes on Russian targets near the Finnish border; whereas this response demonstrates the high readiness and vital importance of national defence and border security capabilities; whereas on 8 June 2026, NATO fighter jets shot down another drone that had entered Latvian airspace;

E. whereas on 19 May 2026, an intruding drone flying in Estonian airspace was shot down by a Romanian fighter jet participating in the NATO Baltic air policing mission; whereas on 20 May 2026, the incursion of an unidentified drone into Lithuanian airspace forced authorities to issue an unprecedented air raid alert, compelling civilians to seek shelter; whereas on 8 June 2026, French NATO fighter jets, participating in a NATO mission, shot down drones flying over Latvia; whereas these drone incursions are a direct result of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, with the majority entering EU airspace as a result of Russian electromagnetic warfare;

F. whereas the continuation of the war poses serious risks of regional escalation, and has fuelled fears across Europe of a wider confrontation between nuclear-armed states, with potentially catastrophic consequences; whereas the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists set the Doomsday Clock at 85 seconds to midnight for 2026, the closest it has ever stood, citing Russia’ s war of aggression as a primary driver, characterised by destabilising military tactics and repeated Russian nuclear threats; whereas the New START Treaty expired in February 2026 with no successor agreement, thus removing the last formal constraint on deployed strategic nuclear arsenals;

F. whereas on 29 May 2026, a Ukrainian naval drone carrying 500 kilograms of explosives exploded in the Romanian port of Constanța as a result of electromagnetic warfare measures employed by the Russian Federation, causing damage to property but no human casualties; whereas the Ukrainian Navy stated that the device, together with three others which exploded outside the port, had been jammed by Russian electromagnetic warfare;

G. whereas the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has warned that the war in Ukraine represents the world’s biggest threat to nuclear safety; whereas on 31 May 2026, a drone struck within the perimeter of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant – Europe’s largest – prompting the IAEA Director General to warn that attacks on nuclear sites are ‘like playing with fire’; whereas a drone had previously struck the plant’s external radiation control laboratory on 3 May 2026; whereas the IAEA has confirmed physical impacts on the plant, irrespective of the disputed attribution between the parties;

G. Recalls other serious incidents of Russian violation of the Member States’ airspace, such as in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and others;

H. whereas on 7 May 2026, a Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicle carrying explosives was discovered by a fisher on the Greek island of Lefkada; whereas Greek National Defence Minister Dendias confirmed that the vessel was of Ukrainian origin, describing the incident as a threat to Mediterranean navigation and an ‘extremely serious issue’; whereas the Greek authorities subsequently lodged a formal diplomatic protest with Ukraine, concluding that the vessel was part of a broader operation targeting shipping serving Russian interests; whereas Ukraine has since responded and apologised, stating that it seeks to prevent similar incidents in the future;

H. whereas the security and protection of the EU’s eastern border is an immediate priority and a joint European responsibility, especially given that hybrid attacks are being carried out using modern drone warfare, an area in which the Member States’ capacity is far from complete;

I. whereas on 5 June 2026, a Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicle carrying explosives detonated in the Romanian port of Constanța, in close proximity to commercial berths and an ammonium nitrate storage facility after the area had been secured and isolated by the Romanian Intelligence Service, coastguard and Defence Ministry; whereas the Ukrainian Navy and Romanian President Dan both stated that Ukraine had lost control of the drone in the Black Sea due to electronic warfare interference, with the Ukrainian Navy further stating that they had provided the necessary information to the Romanian Navy in order to prevent civilian casualties; whereas, irrespective of the disputes regarding the impact of electronic warfare or technical failures, this event highlights the imminent risk of European civilian and economic infrastructure being targeted in military sabotage operations;

I. whereas drone incidents in the EU’s eastern flank have exposed significant gaps in both military and civilian preparedness; whereas existing radar systems often prove unable to track low-altitude objects, methods chosen for unmanned aerial vehicle interception are economically inefficient and reports on incidents revealed that some air-raid shelters were locked or inaccessible to the public; whereas these failures highlight urgent systemic vulnerabilities in alert and reaction procedures, and broader societal resilience;

J. whereas these incidents collectively illustrate that the war’s geographic boundaries have become structurally uncontainable;

J. whereas those recent drone incidents have demonstrated the urgent need for multilayered defence capabilities integrating kinetic and non-kinetic counter-unmanned aircraft systems; whereas drones have become a defining feature of modern warfare and hybrid conflict, and their use in Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped defence requirements and operational doctrines across the continent;

K. whereas Russia’s Security Council Secretary Shoigu has explicitly threatened Finland and the Baltic states with retaliatory action, claiming Moscow’s right to self-defence if Ukrainian drones enter its airspace; whereas Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chair ‌of Russia’s Security Council, warned European leaders that drones would continue to stray into their countries and prevent their populations from sleeping ​peacefully; whereas such threats against sovereign EU Member States are illegal under international law and constitute deliberate escalatory intimidation;

K. whereas European leaders have characterised these incidents as either deliberate provocation caused by Russia or part of a broader pattern of reckless and irresponsible conduct or a consequence of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, while Russia has persistently denied any responsibility;

L. whereas NATO is conducting ‘Northern Star’ exercises at the Vuosanka training ground in Kajaani, central Finland, approximately 30 kilometres from the Russian border, involving 9 000 personnel from seven allied nations – Finland, the United States, Poland, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Hungary – with live-fire artillery, infantry and helicopter drills; whereas the Norwegian-led Cold Response 26 exercise brought 25 000 soldiers from 14 countries to the northern areas of Finland, Norway and Sweden in March 2026 as part of NATO’s enhanced Arctic presence;

L. whereas civil protection infrastructure across the EU’s eastern flank remains critically underfunded and inadequate; whereas, according to data published by Romania’s General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations in late 2025, only 10 % of the country’s 5 770 air-raid shelters meet current safety standards, meaning that as little as 5 % of the Romanian population would be able to seek adequate shelter in the event of an aerial attack;

M. whereas the massive increase in EU defence expenditure, reaching an estimated EUR 381 billion in 2025 – a 63 % increase since 2020 – has not been accompanied by any autonomous EU diplomatic strategy capable of containing the conflict or reducing the risk of further escalation into EU territory;

M. whereas the Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 identifies drone defence and eastern flank security as strategic priorities, notably through the European drone defence initiative and the eastern flank watch, underscoring the urgency of building robust and interoperable capabilities to protect EU territory against aerial and hybrid threats;

N. whereas the increasing use of drones in border regions and near critical infrastructure highlights the need for the EU Member States to enhance defensive capabilities against unmanned aerial systems, including detection, monitoring and proportionate countermeasures, while ensuring that such measures are transparent, precautionary and do not contribute to unnecessary escalation or public alarm;

1. Reiterates its condemnation in the strongest possible terms of Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as Belarus’s complicity in it; strongly denounces Russia’s decision to continue its war of aggression while refusing any direct negotiation with Ukraine, despite the recent proposal by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy;

O. whereas Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union commits the EU to safeguard peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security through peaceful means;

2. Reiterates its call to urgently accelerate the production and delivery of priority military equipment to Ukraine, in particular air-defence systems, ammunition, drones and missiles, at a critical moment when acute shortfalls in air-defence capabilities leave Ukraine’s population and infrastructure increasingly exposed;

P. whereas a durable and sustainable peace cannot be achieved through militarisation, bloc confrontation or unilateral security arrangements, but requires a framework of inclusive and cooperative security, inspired by the Helsinki Final Act and the UN Charter;

3. Strongly condemns Russia’s deliberate, hostile actions against the Member States; condemns unequivocally the Russian drone strike on a residential building in Galați, Romania, which caused direct civilian casualties, constituting a grave and serious escalation; considers that repeated drone incursions and airspace violations into EU countries are not isolated incidents but an integral part of Russia’s broader strategy of intimidation directed against the EU and its allies;

1. Reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, of all violations of international humanitarian law and of all war crimes committed during the conflict; demands full accountability under international law; strongly condemns the Russian Federation’s continued violations of international law, including repeated cross-border drone activity, reckless military operations and hybrid actions that threaten the security of EU Member States and civilian infrastructure;

4. Reaffirms its full solidarity with Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, whose territory, airspace or critical infrastructure have been targeted by Russian hybrid warfare provocations; reaffirms that the EU will not be intimidated by Russia’s campaign of destabilisation and stands united in its determination to defend the security and sovereignty of all EU citizens and to continue to support Ukraine;

2. Reaffirms its unequivocal commitment to peace, international law and the primacy of diplomatic solutions to armed conflict, rejecting the normalisation of war as a policy tool;

5. Highlights that these hostile acts are compounded by an aggressive disinformation campaign seeking to terrorise local populations, spread fear, damage local economies and lay the groundwork for possible retaliatory actions, as in the case of unfounded allegations that the Baltic states allow Ukraine to use their territories and airspace for drone attacks against targets in Russia; condemns the targeting of public opinion in the EU’s eastern flank, particularly in Romania, the Baltic states and Finland, seeking to erode popular support for the EU, NATO and continued solidarity with Ukraine;

3. Condemns any deliberate violation of the Member States’ airspace and reaffirms that such actions constitute a breach of international law and a potential threat to European security;

6. Reiterates its call for the urgent establishment of a genuine European Defence Union, going beyond existing frameworks, including the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 and the subsequent Defence Readiness Roadmap; underlines that deeper integration, coordination and pooling of resources are indispensable to an effective EU response to Russia’s escalating threats; calls for the boosting of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base and its production capacity across the Union through enhanced EU-level coordination, maximising the use of national initiatives and EU instruments such as the European Defence Fund, European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCIs), and the proposed European Competitiveness Fund;

4. Reaffirms the right of the Member States to defend their airspace, borders and critical infrastructure and protect their citizens, using all necessary and proportionate means under international law; strongly warns that disproportionate or hasty reactions could dangerously escalate tensions; stresses that defensive measures must always be proportionate, evidencebased, transparent and coordinated;

7. Recalls the mutual assistance clause under Article 42(7) TEU and calls, as a matter of urgency, for its full operationalisation, including where a conventional or hybrid attack leads a Member State to invoke it;

5. Opposes the instrumentalisation of such incidents to argue for massive rearmament or unlimited increases in defence spending, at the expense of social, environmental and humanitarian priorities;

8. Emphasises the need for the coherent strengthening of the EU and NATO’s eastern flank along its entire length from the Arctic to the Black Sea, including land, maritime and air dimensions by building capabilities in frontline Member States to combat drones and meteorological balloons, and through the allocation of adequate resources for this purpose; calls for the EU and its Member States to urgently strengthen detection, jamming, interception and neutralisation capabilities along the EU’s eastern flank;

6. Stresses that irrespective of whether drone incursions into EU territory are caused by Russian drones, electronic warfare, autonomous targeting failures, or Ukrainian operational decisions, the launching state bears primary responsibility for ensuring that its weapons systems do not enter the territory of third states;

9. Reiterates its condemnation of Russia’s deliberate jamming of GNSS signals in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions, which poses serious safety risks for civilian aviation and maritime transport;

7. Condemns the Russian drone and missile campaign against Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure, which is deliberately depriving millions of civilians of electricity, heating and essential services; stresses that such attacks constitute a grave violation of international humanitarian law; calls on Russia to immediately cease all attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure;

10. Stresses that Russia’s deliberate incursions in the eastern flank of the EU and NATO is intended not only to provoke and destabilise Member States, but also to test and exploit weaknesses in NATO’s detection and response capabilities; recognises that Russia continues its destabilising activities in the Black Sea region, both through conventional and hybrid actions, including through the use of drifting mines, jamming operations and threats to freedom of navigation, making the strengthening of security in this region a strategic priority that must be addressed urgently as a threat to European security;

8. Condemns all attacks on civilian populations, civilian infrastructure and nuclear facilities, irrespective of the perpetrator; recalls that international humanitarian law is binding on all parties to a conflict without exception; recalls, furthermore, that the deployment of armed systems in the territory or waters of third states without their prior knowledge or consent is inadmissible under international law irrespective of the military objective pursued;

11. Underlines that the EU’s strategic approach to the Black Sea must become a reality, and calls to accelerate the creation of the Black Sea maritime security hub;

9. Highlights, furthermore, that Ukrainian women and girls, particularly those in caregiving roles, have been severely and disproportionately impacted by the war, with the first three months of 2026 marking the deadliest winter for women and girls in Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022;

12. Welcomes the recent approval of the 20th package of EU sanctions against Russia and the presentation of the 21st sanctions package; regrets that alumina was not included and calls for its inclusion in the next sanctions package; calls on the Council to swiftly adopt the new package of sanctions and to work on a next package; continues to call for a further strengthening of the EU sanctions on Russia in order to further undermine Russia’s ability to continue waging its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine and threaten the security of other countries; supports additional measures for the upcoming sanctions package targeting the Russian Federation’s energy and financial sectors, as well as a ban on entry into the EU for former Russian combatants who fought in Ukraine, and calls on Member States that continue to support the Russian Federation to cease such support;

10. Expresses the gravest concern at the repeated attacks on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant; underlines that a nuclear accident at Europe’s largest power plant would be a catastrophe with consequences that would be transboundary and irreversible; calls on all parties to unconditionally halt any and all military action that could endanger the power plant; calls on the EU Member States to support the deployment of UN peacekeepers to protect Ukraine’s nuclear reactors, in close cooperation with the IAEA; stresses that the UN General Assembly possesses subsidiary decision-making powers under Resolution 377 A in cases where the Security Council is unable to act;

13. Calls for the establishment of a horizontal EU sanctions framework specifically designed for hybrid threats, which would exist alongside the hybrid sanctions regime for Russia, to underscore Russia’s active engagement in hybrid operations globally while enabling faster and more systematic sanctioning of entities responsible for hybrid campaigns;

11. Calls for the immediate declaration, under IAEA auspices, of a legally binding exclusion zone around the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, prohibiting all military drone and missile activity within a defined perimeter; stresses that the plant’s proximity to active combat operations makes any incident an existential risk for the entire European continent;

14. Calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure appropriate funding for the construction and renovation of civil air-raid shelters in eastern fank Member States, and to carry out EU-wide information campaigns and civilian exercises to make citizens aware of how to act in the event of an air raid or similar crisis situation; considers that protecting EU civilian populations from aerial threats must be treated as an integral component of European defence readiness, preparedness and resilience; stresses the urgent need for increased financing for security and defence programmes and projects, with a special focus on the eastern flank countries, in the next multiannual financial framework;

12. Calls on all parties to exercise maximum restraint in the conduct of military activities near the territory of non-belligerent states; notes that large-scale military exercises in close proximity to active conflict zones, while legitimate under international law, carry an inherent risk of miscalculation and must be accompanied by enhanced transparency measures and communication channels between the parties;

15. Underlines that Ukraine has developed, unparalleled operational and industrial expertise in drone production and counter-drone systems; considers, therefore, that deepening EU-Ukraine defence industrial cooperation in this domain is a strategic imperative; calls for the EU and its Member States to fully integrate Ukrainian expertise and industrial capacity into the development of European capabilities to counter unconventional aerial threats; emphasises that in addressing the drone threats coming from Russia, cooperation with the Republic of Moldova – alongside Ukraine – is essential in terms of operational efficiency, situational awareness and the exchange of information; calls on the Member States, therefore, to increase funding for Moldova through the European Peace Facility, also in the light of repeated violations of Moldovan airspace by Russian drones and missiles; further calls on the Member States to include Moldova and Ukraine in joint acquisitions under the EDIP;

13. Warns that the risk of nuclear escalation, whether through deliberate decision, miscalculation or accident, is categorically unacceptable in the light of its potential consequences; calls on all nuclear-armed states to immediately resume arms control negotiations; rejects any proposal to expand European nuclear deterrence or to encourage nuclear latency among non-nuclear states;

16. Calls for the establishment of a European centre of excellence for drone warfare, where Ukrainian instructors pass on their expertise to the Member States;

14. Condemns Russian threats against EU Member States as illegal under international law; stresses that the appropriate response is not unlimited military build-up but the construction of a credible and autonomous European diplomatic alternative;

17. Welcomes the proposals of the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to launch the European drone defence initiative and the eastern flank watch as concrete and timely responses to the escalating threat of drone incursions and hybrid provocations along the Union’s eastern border; stresses that these initiatives are of immediate importance and must be implemented with rigorous political will, funding and urgency; calls on the Member States to actively engage in and contribute to both initiatives; stresses the importance of meeting, or even advancing, the agreed deadlines, namely full operationalisation of the European drone defence initiative by the end of 2027 and of the eastern flank watch by the end of 2028;

15. Stresses that the drone incidents affecting Romania, the Baltic states, Finland and Greece are not merely military accidents but also consequences of the absence of any functioning diplomatic framework capable of containing the conflict; recalls that wars without political tracks do not remain geographically or operationally constrained; warns that every week that goes by without a credible negotiation process is a week in which the probability of an uncontrolled escalatory incident increases;

18. Stresses the importance of ensuring full interoperability of the European drone defence initiative and the eastern flank watch with NATO’s integrated command and control structure to guarantee a coherent and effective Euro-Atlantic response to hybrid threats along the Union’s eastern flank;

16. Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission to appoint, without further delay, one or more EU special envoys for peace in Ukraine, with a clear mandate to engage all parties to the conflict, as well as key international actors; stresses that such an appointment must be accompanied by a structured negotiation brief, adequate resources and regular reporting to Parliament;

19. Acknowledges the latest developments in advancing EDPCIs aimed at strengthening European defence readiness, highlighting especially the importance of the plans to enhance drone and counter-drone protection and the strengthening of the eastern flank;

17. Recalls that effective mediation requires direct engagement with all parties to a conflict, including those whose conduct has been condemned;

20. Welcomes the Commission’s launch of the EU-Ukraine Drone Alliance as a concrete step towards deeper defence industrial cooperation, in line with the priorities set out in the Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030; stresses the need for Member States to swiftly operationalise this alliance and mobilise industrial actors, including system manufacturers and innovators, to build a comprehensive drone and counter-drone capability;

18. Reiterates its call for a ceasefire and for structured, inclusive and transparent negotiations under the auspices of the UN and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; calls for the EU to actively support the reconstruction of a pan-European security architecture based on the principles of the Helsinki Final Act;

21. Reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to act in line with the conclusions of the European Council of 19 March 2026;

19.22. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, theSecretary Chairperson-in-OfficeGeneral of NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, andthe Council of Europe, the PresidentPresident, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.Ukraine, and the Russian authorities.