What changed

B100291/2026

B100287/2026

European Parliament resolution on the political repression and humanitarian situation in Cuba

(2026/2735(RSP))

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Cuba, in particular its resolutions of 12 July 2023 on the state of the EU-Cuba PDCA in the light of the recent visit of the High Representative to the island, and of 29 February 2024 on the critical situation in Cuba,

– having regard to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights, and the EU’s commitment to effective multilateralism,

– having regard to the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Cuba, of the other part (PDCA), signed in December 2016 and provisionally applied since 1 November 2017, and in particular to Articles 1(5) and 85(3)(b) thereof,

– having regard to the joint hearing of its Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Human Rights on the current political and human rights situation in Cuba, held on 5 May 2026, and to the testimonies presented by the Rapporteur for Cuba of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’, Stuardo Ralón Orellana, and by Cuban opposition leader and former political prisoner José Daniel Ferrer,

– having regard to successive annual resolutions of the UN General Assembly on the necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba, first approved in 1992, and again in 2025 for the 33rd consecutive time, with the full support of the European Union and a total of 165 votes in favour, 7 against and 12 abstentions,

– having regard to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1984, to which Cuba has been a State Party since 1995, to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948, and to other international human rights treaties and instruments,

– having regard to the UN experts’ declarations of 26 May and 2 June 2026 condemning the United States’ threats, coercion and judicial weaponisation against Cuba and calling for an end to the unlawful energy blockade imposed on Cuba,

– having regard to the reports of the non-governmental organisation Prisoners Defenders on torture, on the structural violation of due process, on convictions for ‘pre-criminal social dangerousness’, on digital surveillance and on forced malnutrition in Cuban prisons,

– having regard to the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro and the 2024 UN General Assembly declaration adopting the Antigua and Barbuda Agenda for SIDS (ABAS), recognising the particular vulnerabilities of Small Island Developing States (SIDS), including Cuba,

– having regard to the new sanctions imposed in June 2026 by the United States against Miguel Díaz-Canel and members of his family, against relatives of Raúl Castro, and against entities of the regime’s military apparatus,

– having regard to the statements by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the World Health Organization (WHO), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and other international organisations concerning the situation in Cuba,

– having regard to the Freedom Accord, signed in Miami on 2 March 2026 by the two largest Cuban opposition coalitions, Pasos de Cambio and the Asamblea de la Resistencia Cubana (ARC),

– having regard to the UN Charter and the principles of international humanitarian law,

– having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2026 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2025, which, owing to an amendment tabled by the ECR Group, calls for the suspension of privileged cooperation with Cuba,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas more than five decades of political, economic and geopolitical choices made by the Cuban communist regime have led the country into a profound political, economic and social crisis, bringing Cuba increasingly close to having the characteristics of a failed state; whereas this situation is compounded by systematic and persistent violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the continuation of a one-party political system, the absence of free, fair and competitive elections, the prohibition of political pluralism and the denial of the right of citizens to freely associate for political purposes;

A. whereas on 29 January 2026, the US administration under President Donald Trump escalated sanctions against Cuba by threatening retaliatory tariffs against countries supplying oil to the island; whereas on 1 May 2026, a new US executive order also introduced sanctions targeting foreign operators maintaining economic relations with Cuba, particularly in the energy, security and financial sectors; whereas on 4 June, the United States announced a new round of sanctions, including sanctions on President Miguel Díaz-Canel and some of his immediate family, alongside members of the Castro family; whereas the US administration also threatened foreign countries or entities with sanctions, leading to the immediate interruption of credit card payments in Cuba;

B. whereas the communist regime in Cuba has grown more repressive and more destabilising in the region, having sustained the Chávez and, later, Maduro regimes in Venezuela and propped up the Ortega-Murillo dictatorship in Nicaragua; whereas the regime in Cuba has become more openly aligned with the enemies of Europe, despite the EU’s sustained political and financial openness and despite the PDCA, which entered into force almost 10 years ago; whereas the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has acknowledged that the agreement has not met its objectives; whereas the agreement is now under review;

B. whereas since then, Cuba has been experiencing its most severe socio-economic and humanitarian crisis in decades, marked by chronic shortages of food, medicines, fuel and essential goods, repeated nationwide power outages, high inflation, and a sustained decline in living standards; whereas UN experts, the OCHA and the WHO have warned that these measures are having serious humanitarian and human rights consequences, particularly for children, older persons, persons with disabilities and other vulnerable groups; whereas Cuba is especially vulnerable due to its status as a small island developing state;

C. whereas the Cuban regime co-founded, and remains a leading force within, the São Paulo Forum, a network of parties created to regroup the authoritarian left after the collapse of the Soviet bloc; whereas Cuba has used the São Paulo Forum to coordinate, legitimise and sustain authoritarian movements throughout Latin America;

C. whereas in March 2026 Cuba’s national electricity grid collapsed three times, leaving approximately 10 million people without power, following a succession of massive blackouts in the following months affecting millions of citizens, disrupting hospitals, schools, water supply systems, food preservation and economic activity; whereas in certain neighbourhoods blackouts can last more than 22 hours;

D. whereas the recent history of central and eastern Europe shows that communist dictatorships do not democratise in exchange for dialogue and subsidies, but yield only to firm pressure and solidarity with those they oppress;

D. whereas, following a visit to Cuba in May 2026, Edem Wosornu of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Altaf Musani of the WHO warned that prolonged blackouts, fuel shortages and shortages of medicines and medical supplies were severely disrupting healthcare services and placing vulnerable populations at increased risk;

E. whereas Cuba is in the grip of a compounding humanitarian and economic crisis, marked by power cuts of up to 22 hours a day, acute shortages of food, fuel and medicine, and frequent water shortages, thus meeting many of the criteria associated with a failed state; whereas the regime depends on imported fuels, but its traditional suppliers – Russia, Venezuela and Mexico – have halted or curtailed deliveries and US sanctions have further restricted Cuba’s access to resources;

E. whereas the EU released an additional EUR 2 million in humanitarian aid in April 2026 to support access to food and safe drinking water for the Cuban population, building on humanitarian assistance already provided earlier in the year and reinforcing the EU’s commitment to addressing humanitarian needs in Cuba;

F. whereas this collapse is the consequence of decades of economic mismanagement and of the militarisation of the economy, and not of external pressure; whereas GAESA, the holding company of the Cuban Armed Forces, is estimated to control around 40 % of the Cuban economy, including banking, fuel, food retail and tourism, while ordinary citizens are left without basic goods;

F. whereas the long-standing US embargo continues to have severely negative humanitarian and socio-economic consequences for the Cuban population, including through restrictions affecting financial transactions, access to credit, trade and imports of essential goods; whereas the United States’ designation of Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism has further restricted access to international financial services and transactions;

G. whereas the United States has adopted targeted sanctions against senior figures of the regime and against the institutions of its security and military apparatus, citing the regime’s repression of its own people and its hostile activities abroad;

G. whereas the EU has consistently opposed the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba and has repeatedly rejected the extraterritorial application of unilateral restrictive measures, including Titles III and IV of the Helms-Burton Act;

H. whereas a number of European companies have for years benefited from and operated within the economic structures controlled by the regime, thereby contributing directly or indirectly to the prolongation of the totalitarian system; whereas as sanctions tighten and the Cuban communist system appears to be approaching an inevitable collapse, the remaining European companies have begun to terminate or significantly reduce their presence in Cuba; whereas the Spanish hotel groups Meliá and Iberostar have withdrawn their management and branding from numerous resorts, while the French shipping company CMA CGM and the German carrier Hapag-Lloyd, together accounting for around 60 % of Cuba’s maritime traffic, have suspended their services to and from the island;

H. whereas Cuba has legally committed to upholding international human rights law and standards, including political and civil rights and freedoms; whereas independent observers from international organisations and human rights bodies, including UN bodies, have documented restrictions on freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, arbitrary detentions, harassment of activists and journalists, and the continued imprisonment of individuals detained in connection with peaceful protests, alongside restrictions on access to justice and judicial guarantees; whereas concerns persist regarding the situation of dissidents and vulnerable groups, including women, Afro-descendants and LGBTIQ+ persons; whereas Cuba has so far not undertaken meaningful democratic reforms to allow for political pluralism and the full exercise of fundamental freedoms;

I. whereas ‘business as usual’ with such a regime legitimises the oppressor and betrays the oppressed;

I. whereas despite a moratorium on executions since 2003, Cuba still retains the death penalty;

J. whereas the number of political prisoners documented by independent organisations exceeds one thousand, including persons detained as minors; whereas the case of José Daniel Ferrer, founder of the Patriotic Union of Cuba and a prisoner of conscience whose release the European Parliament has repeatedly demanded, is emblematic of the regime’s methods; whereas José Daniel Ferrer was ultimately driven into exile in October 2025;

J. whereas the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is an integral part of the EU’s external policies, and is reflected in the PDCA between the EU and Cuba signed in December 2016;

K. whereas in a statistically representative study by Prisoners Defenders, every political prisoner examined, including minors, had suffered torture and was denied medical care; whereas abuse by state agents is excluded, in law and practice, from ordinary jurisdiction, leaving the Cuban Armed Forces and the Ministry of the Interior with effective impunity;

K. whereas recent announcements by the Cuban authorities concerning the release of prisoners, following mediation efforts by the Holy See, have been welcomed as a positive step; whereas concerns remain regarding the transparency of implementation and the Cuban authorities have continued to restrict former political prisoners and have re-arrested prominent opposition leaders, activists and artists;

L. whereas no systems are in place in Cuba to address the fact that liberty is currently being deprived; whereas the Cuban Constitution subordinates the judiciary, the prosecution and the legal profession to the President and the Communist Party, in clear breach of the rights to an independent tribunal and an effective defence;

L. whereas Cuba possesses significant reserves of critical raw materials, including nickel and cobalt, whose exploitation should contribute to the sustainable development and well-being of the Cuban people, while fully respecting Cuba’s sovereignty over its natural resources;

M. whereas vaguely defined offences, such as enemy propaganda, contempt, public disorder, sedition, resistance and disobedience, together with summary proceedings and the trial of civilians before military courts, are systematically used to criminalise the freedoms of expression, assembly, association and religion;

M. whereas no external actor should seek to impose political change through coercion, humanitarian crisis, military intervention or actions undermining sovereignty and territorial integrity;

N. whereas thousands of Cubans have been punished under the former offence of ‘pre-criminal social dangerousness’, without having committed or attempted a crime; whereas although the 2022 Penal Code formally abolished that category of offence, it preserves similar pre-criminal mechanisms by allowing authorities of the Ministry of the Interior to issue warnings to persons deemed ‘prone to commit crimes or to break the social and constitutional order’, with non-compliance punishable by imprisonment;

1. Expresses its utmost and urgent concern over the dramatic deterioration of living conditions in Cuba and the growing humanitarian impact of the lack of access to fuel, medicines, food and other essential goods and public services, particularly affecting vulnerable groups; recalls that civilians should never be victims of geopolitical conflicts and unilateral political decisions;

O. whereas reports indicate that tens of thousands of inmates endure forced malnutrition on rations providing barely a 10th of minimum daily energy needs, compounded by insanitary conditions and the denial of medical care; whereas the July 2021 protester Alexander Díaz Rodríguez, released in April 2026 with extreme malnutrition, anaemia and advanced thyroid cancer, is proof of the life-threatening conditions imposed on political prisoners;

2. Recognises that the current crisis results from a combination of internal and external factors, including structural weaknesses in economic and democratic governance, delayed reforms and policy failures, as well as the increasingly negative impact of the US embargo, extraterritorial sanctions and energy blockade imposed in January 2026;

P. whereas the regime runs a pervasive system of digital surveillance through the state telecommunications monopoly, with selective internet outages, blockages of services, interception of private communications and reprisals against dissenters’ families, generating fear and leading to self-censorship at home and in the diaspora;

3. Calls for full respect for the United Nations Charter, international humanitarian law and international human rights law on all sides;

Q. whereas these systematic and widespread practices, directed against the civilian population as a deliberate instrument of state policy, may amount to crimes against humanity;

4. Reaffirms its commitment to Cuba’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity in accordance with the UN Charter and rejects any attempt to impose regime or policy change from outside through military intervention, coercive action or other measures incompatible with international law;

R. whereas the Cuban democratic opposition and resistance, on the island and in exile, have united to an unprecedented degree behind a single Freedom Accord and a common transition plan, despite decades of dispersion; whereas this rare unity offers the EU a credible partner and structured roadmap for a free and democratic Cuba;

5. Strongly condemns the United States’ increasing economic coercion and judicial weaponisation against Cuba; deplores the threats and measures aimed at third-country operators, and rejects any attempt to impose regime change from outside through coercive measures incompatible with international law;

S. whereas the regime has aligned itself with the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine and has become a source of recruits fighting on Russia’s behalf, thereby directly threatening European security; whereas, according to Ukrainian sources, Cuban nationals constitute the largest group of foreign recruits fighting alongside Russian forces in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

6. Reiterates its full support for the UN General Assembly resolution on the need to end the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba;

T. whereas the regime persistently refuses entry to delegations of the European Parliament, to UN special rapporteurs and to independent monitors, and insists on excluding the democratic opposition and independent civil society from any political dialogue;

7. Calls on the United States to immediately halt all illegitimate practices against Cuba, including the economic, commercial and financial embargo, unilateral coercive and extraterritorial measures, the designation of Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism and the energy blockade, which severely affect the humanitarian situation, development prospects and human rights of the Cuban population while also challenging the economic sovereignty of the EU and its Member States;

1. Condemns in the strongest terms the systematic and widespread repression carried out by the Cuban communist regime against its own people, including torture, arbitrary detention, forced malnutrition, mass surveillance, forced labour and judicial persecution;

8. Calls on the Cuban authorities to protect human rights and to guarantee the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression without discrimination based on political views; strongly condemns all violations of fundamental rights and freedoms, including arbitrary detention, ill treatment, torture, restrictions on freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, harassment of independent journalists, human rights defenders and civil society actors, as well as the disproportionate use of criminal sanctions against peaceful protesters; calls for the official abolition of the death penalty;

2. Recalls that independent investigations have concluded that the Cuban regime’s security apparatus has been responsible for assassinations of political opponents, including the deaths of Oswaldo Payá and Harold Cepero; further recalls that the United States has charged former Cuban Defence Minister Raúl Castro and other senior regime officials in relation to the 1996 destruction of two Brothers to the Rescue aircraft in international airspace, resulting in the deaths of four civilians;

9. Welcomes the mediation efforts of the Holy See that have led to Cuba’s announcement of the release of more than 2 000 prisoners; calls on the Cuban authorities to implement this decision transparently and to immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners and those detained for the exercise of their right of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly; urges the Cuban authorities to ensure full due process guarantees, judicial independence and respect for international human rights standards, to honour their international commitments and grant unhindered access to independent human rights and humanitarian organisations, particularly the UN agencies, including the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights;

3. Demands the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and of all persons arbitrarily detained for exercising their fundamental rights, and calls for full reparation to be made to the victims of torture and ill treatment;

10. Calls on the Cuban authorities to engage in a genuine and inclusive national dialogue involving civil society, religious organisations, independent social actors and citizens, with a view to promoting democratic participation, greater civic space and respect for fundamental freedoms;

4. Concludes that the PDCA has failed in its core purpose and that the regime’s conduct constitutes persistent and substantial violations of the agreement’s essential human rights provisions; calls, therefore, for Article 86(4) PDCA to be triggered without further delay, for the agreement to be suspended and for the procedure for its termination to begin;

11. Recalls that both Cuba and the EU have committed, within the framework of the PDCA, to cooperate in supporting social, economic and institutional reforms;

5. Reiterates its call on the Council to adopt targeted measures under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against those responsible, beginning with Miguel Díaz-Canel and the senior chain of command of the security, judicial and penitentiary apparatus;

12. Calls for the EU to ensure the full implementation of the PDCA and to mobilise all appropriate diplomatic, political, economic and financial instruments to support the Cuban people; highlights the importance of deepening mutually respectful and beneficial relations between the EU and Cuba; stresses the need to accompany and encourage governance reforms that strengthen democratic participation, the rule of law, transparency, accountability and sustainable development;

6. Welcomes the targeted measures adopted by the United States against named members of the regime’s leadership and against the entities of its security, military and surveillance apparatus; considers that sustained and coordinated international pressure on the dictatorship is the most effective means of advancing democratic change and is consistent with Parliament’s own calls for sanctions;

13. Calls on the High Representative and the Council to ensure that the EU-Cuba Human Rights Dialogue is preceded and followed by an inclusive dialogue with EU and Cuban civil society organisations and includes measurable benchmarks on human rights and civic freedoms, including progress on the release of political prisoners, guarantees for freedom of expression and association, access for international human rights mechanisms, and reforms enabling greater civic participation;

7. Notes that, since February 2026, the United States has authorised exports of fuel and other essential goods to Cuba’s private businesses and households while excluding the regime, its armed forces and GAESA-controlled entities; calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop adequate humanitarian channels through which energy, food and medicine can be delivered directly to the Cuban people and to independent enterprises, bypassing the criminal Cuban state;

14. Urges the EU to further engage with the United Nations system and other relevant international and regional organisations, including the Organization of American States, international financial institutions and humanitarian partners to develop an emergency humanitarian roadmap for Cuba aimed at:

8. Calls on European companies to refrain from commercial dealings with Cuban state and military-controlled entities, in particular GAESA and its subsidiaries, as such revenues underwrite the regime’s apparatus rather than benefit the Cuban people;

(a) ensuring the rapid delivery of medicines, medical equipment and essential health supplies;

9. Affirms that EU policy should add to, not offset, pressure on the regime’s economic power base, and that the EU’s priority must be solidarity with the Cuban people rather than the protection of arrangements that benefit their oppressors;

(b) supporting the rehabilitation of electricity generation and distribution infrastructure;

10. Calls for the immediate suspension of all EU funds channelled to or through Cuban state entities, and for any future cooperation to be redirected exclusively to independent civil society, the democratic opposition or the Cuban people;

(c) improving access to water, sanitation and waste management services;

11. Recalls that engagement without conditionality has never reformed a dictatorship and serves only to prolong it; affirms that solidarity with Cuban democratic activists, not accommodation with their jailers, must guide EU policy;

(d) strengthening food security, particularly for children, pregnant women and vulnerable households;

12. Maintains that no political dialogue with Havana is acceptable if it excludes the democratic opposition and independent civil society, whose inclusion the PCDA itself requires;

(e) supporting schools, hospitals and community services affected by prolonged shortages;

13. Expresses its full support for the Freedom Accord and for the united Cuban opposition and resistance behind it; recognises Pasos de Cambio, the ARC and their partner organisations as legitimate voices of the Cuban people’s democratic aspirations; calls on the Commission, the Council and the Member States to engage with them directly and to treat their transition plan for the liberation, stabilisation, reconstruction and democratisation of the country as a reference framework for the EU’s policy towards a free Cuba;

(f) ensuring transparent monitoring and needs-based distribution of humanitarian assistance in accordance with international humanitarian principles;

14. Calls on the regime to abolish, in all its forms, the pre-criminal mechanisms that allow the state to silence and arbitrarily imprison citizens, and to release those convicted under it without having committed any crime;

15. Calls for the EU to support the reform of international financial institutions and debt restructuring mechanisms, taking account of the particular vulnerabilities of SIDS;

15. Demands an end to all forms of state-imposed forced labour, including within the medical brigades, the earnings of which are largely appropriated by the state;

16. Calls on the Commission to fully deploy and rigorously enforce all current EU instruments and protective measures to establish a credible deterrent framework capable of responding swiftly, effectively and proportionately to the extraterritorial application of US sanctions and other coercive measures targeting European operators, financial institutions, investors, and public or private entities engaged in lawful activities in Cuba, or otherwise adversely affecting the interests, sovereignty and economic autonomy of the EU and its Member States; calls on the Commission to modernise the EU blocking statute in order to ensure an effective response in that respect;

16. Calls for an independent international investigation into prison conditions, the regime of forced malnutrition and deaths in custody;

17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the European Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Government and National Assembly of Cuba, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Government of the United States of America, and the Holy See.

17. Condemns Cuba’s material support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including the recruitment of Cuban nationals to fight against Ukraine, and insists that this be treated as a matter of European security across all dimensions of relations with Havana; condemns the Cuban regime’s alignment with the Lukashenka regime in Belarus, which extends beyond political and economic cooperation to include close military and security ties; stresses that such cooperation undermines European security;

18. Demands that the regime grant immediate and unconditional access to delegations of the European Parliament, to UN special rapporteurs and to independent observers, and deplores its repeated refusal to do so;

19. Calls on the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to raise these violations of human rights consistently in all relevant forums and to support accountability and a peaceful, democratic transition in Cuba, led by citizens, in line with the principles and objectives set out in the Freedom Accord;

20. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Member States, the Organization of American States, the United Nations, and the authorities of the Republic of Cuba.