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B100475/2025
B100472/2025
European Parliament resolution on renewing the EU-Africa partnership: building common priorities ahead of the Angola Summit
(2025/2933(RSP))
– having regard to the EU-Africa partnership and the declaration adopted by the heads of state and government of the EU and the African Union (AU) at the 6th EU-AU summit in February 2022, entitled ‘A Joint Vision for 2030’,
– having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other part (Samoa Agreement), which was signed on 15 November 2023 and which provisionally entered into force on 1 January 2024,
– having regard to the EU’s Global Gateway strategy, the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI – Global Europe) and the Africa-Europe Green Energy Initiative,
– having regard to Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union and Articles 208 and 209 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular the principle of policy coherence for development (PCD) enshrined in Article 208 TFEU,
– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
– having regard to the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the African Union’s Agenda 2063,
– having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement) and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development,
– having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 68/304 of 9 September 2014, which called for a comprehensive and durable UN approach to sovereign debt restructuring,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on debt justice, trade, migration, environmental sustainability, human rights and EU-Africa relations,
– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas Africa and Europe are neighbouring continents whose futures are closely interlinked; whereas the EU should aim to be Africa’s leading partner in trade, investment, development aid, humanitarian assistance, peace and security, energy and digital transformation; whereas African countries together constitute the EU’s fourth-largest trading partner, while the EU is Africa’s largest export market;
A. whereas Africa is a continent of immense human, cultural and natural wealth, yet continues to bear the legacies of colonisation, structural economic dependency and asymmetric power relations with Europe;
B. whereas Africa is an indispensable partner in addressing global challenges, including ensuring sustainable access to critical raw materials, advancing green and digital transitions, strengthening global food security, supporting a dynamic labour market, preventing conflict, addressing insecurities and building peace; whereas increasing EU-Africa cooperation can unlock shared opportunities for innovation, industrial development, job creation, human development, achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and long-term prosperity on both continents;
B. whereas the neoliberal economic model promoted to date has failed to guarantee economic development and the reduction of inequalities in Africa;
C. whereas the Samoa Agreement provides a renewed and modernised foundation for relations between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific states, aiming to strengthen their capacity to address these global challenges together and to move decisively towards a partnership of equals grounded in mutual respect and shared interests;
C. whereas the Joint Vision for 2030 and the renewed EU-Africa partnership speak of prioritising cooperation on peace and security, trade and investment, migration and mobility, the green transition, digitalisation and human development, but many commitments remain insufficiently implemented or undermined by conditionality and unequal bargaining power;
D. whereas Africa’s growing global engagement reflects its increasing political and economic influence; whereas this underlines the importance of a principled, transparent and mutually beneficial partnership that supports both African and European priorities and promotes long-term stability and prosperity;
D. whereas the Samoa Agreement provides the current legal framework for cooperation between the EU and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS), but this must be implemented consistently on the basis of the principles of equality, transparency, democratic ownership and policy coherence for development;
E. whereas peace, security and good governance are prerequisites for prosperity, yet several African regions particularly those in fragile settings, continue to face instability, terrorism, unconstitutional changes of government, and humanitarian crises which have only been exacerbated by cuts in development spending by some EU Member States and the United States;
E. whereas Africa’s external debt burden remains a major constraint on development; whereas average external debt ratios, record debt service payments in recent years, and rising costs of borrowing have reduced the fiscal space for spending on healthcare, education and climate adaptation;
F. whereas China is seeking to expand support for its global initiatives, establish economic dependencies for political purposes, and broaden its influence on the continent, including in the media sphere, where it is acquiring local and regional media platforms to spread pro-Chinese and anti-Western propaganda;
F. whereas this debt is largely caused by economic, financial and tax policies and constraints imposed, including through foreign interference, by former colonial powers and Western-dominated institutions;
G. whereas the EU remains the largest development and humanitarian aid donor in Africa; whereas unfortunately, the global humanitarian system is currently facing an unprecedented funding crisis, with only 43 % of the USD 50 billion UN humanitarian appeal met in 2024 and only 13 % of the 2025 appeal met up to July 2025; whereas the situation has been further exacerbated by the dismantling of several programmes of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and by reductions in foreign aid from other key donors, including certain EU Member States, with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development projecting a 9 % to 17 % drop in official development assistance (ODA) in 2025, leading to more severe hunger and jeopardising critical humanitarian, health, gender equality and climate initiatives;
G. whereas International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank structural adjustment and austerity programmes have in many cases reduced public spending and restricted policy space, undermined social services and driven privatisation measures that fail to deliver equitable development outcomes;
H. whereas Africa’s population exceeded 1.5 billion in 2024 and is projected to reach 2.5 billion by 2050, with the majority of people being under 30 years of age; whereas this demographic dynamism presents both opportunities and challenges, requiring massive investment in education, employment, healthcare and infrastructure;
H. whereas food insecurity and famine are acute threats in multiple regions of Africa, driven by climate shocks, conflict, export-oriented agricultural models and trade practices that disadvantage smallholder farmers;
I. whereas Africa possesses vast potential for renewable energy, innovation and sustainable development; whereas despite contributing minimally to global emissions, the continent is actively pursuing climate resilience and green growth, and joint EU-African Union (AU) leadership can accelerate a just, inclusive and sustainable transition;
I. whereas EU trade relations with African countries remain skewed towards extractive sectors and low value-added exports; whereas economic partnership agreements (EPAs) and other preferential arrangements often fail to create the policy space needed for African industrialisation and value chain development;
J. whereas the African Continental Free Trade Area is a transformative project for Africa’s integration and economic sovereignty, yet Africa’s participation in global trade and investment remains limited;
J. whereas the EU’s migration policy towards Africa prioritises border control and the externalisation of asylum responsibilities over the promotion of safe and regular migration channels;
K. whereas migration and mobility between Africa and Europe are long-standing complex and dynamic realities that have fostered cultural, social and economic ties while also presenting challenges;
K. whereas the EU’s externalisation of migration control – including the funding of retention, readmission and repatriation arrangements and ‘return hub’ models in non-EU countries – has generated serious human rights concerns and instrumentalised development cooperation for migration management;
L. whereas 2025 marks the 25th anniversary of the formal Africa-EU Partnership, providing a historic opportunity to renew and elevate relations, putting the partners on an equal footing for the next generation;
L. whereas the Global Gateway strategy and other EU investment instruments claim to mobilise substantial financing for Africa, but are in reality highly focused on European economic, trade and geopolitical interests;
New strategic partnership of equals
M. whereas illicit financial flows, tax avoidance and profit shifting by multinational companies continue to deprive African countries of essential revenues and undermine their prospects for inclusive development;
1. Calls for a renewed and forward-looking Africa-EU partnership built on mutual respect, shared interests and the understanding that both continents need each other and are stronger together; notes that, in a time of shifting geopolitical dynamics, rising extremism and growing global insecurity, as well as cuts in development and humanitarian spending, closer cooperation between the EU and Africa is more essential than ever; underlines that genuine partnership and joint multilateral action are the most effective ways to promote peace, prosperity, sustainable trade and human development; stresses the importance of transparent, values-based engagement, in contrast with the influence of external powers, including China and Russia, whose opaque financial, security and disinformation activities risk undermining sovereignty, stability and democratic governance in Africa;
N. whereas the recent intensification of conflicts in the Sahel, Sudan, the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Horn of Africa demonstrates the link between insecurity, foreign military intervention and competition over access to raw materials and strategic resources;
2. Calls for the EU to step up its strategic communication and visibility across Africa, clearly demonstrating the tangible benefits of the EU’s partnership model, which is grounded in mutual respect, transparency and sustainability; stresses that the EU must ‘show its flag’ more effectively through coherent diplomacy, visible investment and closer coordination between the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), Parliament and the Member States, to project a united European voice;
O. whereas climate change, biodiversity loss and desertification are disproportionately affecting African populations, threatening livelihoods and exacerbating forced displacement and food insecurity;
3. Calls on the 22 EU Member States and the 66 African partners who have not yet ratified the Samoa Agreement to do so without delay, to move it from provisional application to full entry into force;
P. whereas the EU must apply the principle of PCD (Article 208 TFEU) across trade, migration, security, climate and investment policies, and ensure that the Samoa Agreement and EU-Africa partnership frameworks are consistent with respect for human rights and sustainable development goals;
4. Urges the Commission to conduct thorough impact assessments and stakeholder consultations, including with African counterparts directly affected by EU legislation, and to base its proposals on the full evidence available;
Q. whereas African countries are diversifying external partnerships and exploring alternative financing and cooperation arrangements because of perceived EU double standards and conditionalities;
Peace, security and good governance
1. Notes with concern that the current architecture of EU-Africa relations – including aid, trade preferences, and migration management – perpetuates asymmetries rooted in historical colonial power structures; stresses that terms such as ‘preference’ and ‘non-reciprocity’ mask a system in which Africa has historically been compelled to serve European economic interests;
5. Expresses deep concern at the spread of conflicts, jihadist terrorism, military coups and state collapses, democratic backsliding and violent extremism in several parts of Africa and calls for a comprehensive approach combining defence, peacebuilding, security measures, deradicalisation and socio-economic development;
2. Calls for an urgent fundamental reset of EU-Africa relations based on equality, solidarity, mutual respect and African sovereignty over, and ownership of, development priorities;
6. Expresses profound concern at the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation across the Sahel, in particular in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, where large areas remain under the control of armed groups, and civilians face widespread displacement and food insecurity; stresses that the crisis is spilling over into West Africa’s coastal democracies and generating dangerous power vacuums following the withdrawal of international missions; condemns Russia’s destabilising strategy in the region, including the transformation of the Wagner Group into Africa Corps, disinformation operations and predatory practices in relation to resources, and notes that reliance on such support by military juntas has failed to stabilise the situation and has enabled terrorist groups to regain ground; regrets that the EU Training Mission in Mali, the EU Military Partnership Mission in Niger and the EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger and other international deployments have not delivered lasting peace; calls for an evidence-based, in-depth assessment of mandates, roles and policies and for a profoundly revised, integrated EU common security and defence policy strategy for the Sahel that is coherent with development policy and informs the use of the European Peace Facility, prioritises humanitarian access and the protection of civilians, and conditions EU security assistance on full respect for international humanitarian and human rights law; supports the targeted prevention of spillover through the civilian-military EU Security and Defence Initiative in Support of West African Countries of the Gulf of Guinea to bolster the resilience of Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Benin in their northern border areas; calls for coordinated, principled EU-AU action grounded in democracy, human rights and the rule of law, including measures to counter foreign information manipulation and interference, disrupt illicit resource and criminal economies that finance armed groups, and invest in governance, service delivery and local economic opportunities to address structural drivers of instability;
3. Reiterates its support for African organisations and calls on the Commission and the Member States to support African integration, in particular the African Union;
7. Expresses deep concern at the continuing violence, political instability and humanitarian crises in several parts of Africa; recalls in particular the devastating conflict in Sudan, where fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has resulted in mass civilian casualties, displacement and widespread human rights violations; strongly condemns all atrocities, including the deliberate targeting of civilians and the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war, and calls for full accountability and unhindered humanitarian access; welcomes regional and UN-led diplomatic efforts and calls for the EU to intensify coordination with the AU and neighbouring states to support ceasefire negotiations and inclusive peacebuilding; notes with concern the persistent fragility and lack of national reconciliation in Libya, whose instability continues to affect both African and European security; calls for renewed EU engagement, in close cooperation with the UN, to promote a unified political process, transparent elections and the withdrawal of foreign mercenaries; welcomes the contribution of the EU Military Assistance Mission Mozambique to restoring security in Cabo Delgado while stressing the need to embed human rights, community resilience and principles of good governance to ensure lasting stability and local trust; underlines the role of the EU Capacity Building Mission in Somalia in reinforcing the capacities of the Somali police maritime security and the rule of law; calls for closer coordination with international partners and for the integration of the mission’s work within broader EU efforts to strengthen governance, justice and counterterrorism resilience in the Horn of Africa; remains alarmed by the situation in Ethiopia, including in the Tigray region, where serious human rights abuses have been reported; calls on the Ethiopian authorities to guarantee unrestricted humanitarian access, pursue genuine national dialogue and uphold the rule of law and fundamental freedoms; underlines that all EU engagement in conflict-affected and transitional contexts must promote democracy, accountability and African ownership, ensuring coordination with the AU and regional initiatives to foster reconciliation, stability and sustainable development across the continent;
Peace and security
8. Calls for the EU to step up its efforts to promote peace, security and stability across the African continent; calls for predictable, long-term financing of AU-mandated peace operations, including through UN-assessed contributions in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023); stresses the need for permanent African representation in the UN Security Council; supports African-led peace operations and mediation efforts under the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA);
4. Reiterates its unwavering support for the principles enshrined in the UN Charter, including respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, which constitute universal principles of international law and must be upheld by all countries;
9. Calls on the Council and the Commission to strengthen EU-Africa security and defence cooperation, including by establishing a rapid EU response capacity to counter terrorism, violent extremism and external interference, particularly in fragile states; underlines that such cooperation must complement and reinforce African-led efforts under the APSA and must fully respect international law, democratic oversight and the principles of a partnership of equals; emphasises that counterterrorism operations must fully respect international humanitarian and human rights law; supports EU programmes for community resilience, women and youth engagement and post-conflict reconstruction;
5. Strongly condemns foreign interference and ongoing violations of international law, international humanitarian law and human rights, particularly in Sudan and in the eastern provinces of the DRC;
10. Welcomes the recent peace agreement reached between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), but remains deeply concerned by the continuing violence and insecurity in eastern DRC, particularly in North Kivu and Ituri, which have caused immense human suffering and displacement; calls for the EU, in this context, to play an active and coordinated role in supporting implementation of the peace process, focusing on enhancing inclusivity and women’s participation, humanitarian access and the protection of civilians; stresses that, for lasting stability, the economic dimensions of the conflict need to be addressed, including the illegal exploitation of natural resources and raw materials, and justice needs to be ensured for victims of war crimes, including conflict-related sexual violence; calls for the EU to promote responsible sourcing, transparency in supply chains, and investment in value added in the DRC and the Great Lakes region;
6. Calls for the EU and its Member States to immediately end all forms of complicity in breaches of international law on the African continent, in particular by imposing a military embargo on Rwanda and by fully respecting the current arms embargo on Sudan; calls for an independent investigation into reports of Member States’ military equipment contributing to the war in Sudan, in defiance of the embargo;
11. Calls for enhanced cooperation on electoral observation and democracy building, in partnership with the AU and regional organisations;
7. Further recalls recent resolution 79/98 of the UN General Assembly’s Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) of 4 December 2024, which states that the question of Western Sahara, as the last colony in Africa, remains a decolonisation issue; urges the Council and the Member States to support the process initiated by UN Security Council Resolution 1754 (2007) of 30 April 2007 with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara;
12. Calls for dedicated funding for local women mediators and peacebuilders, young peacebuilders, community leaders, civil society organisations and women’s organisations; reaffirms the essential role of women and young people in peacebuilding and governance; calls for both unions to implement the Women, Peace and Security agenda and the Youth, Peace and Security agenda, ensuring full, equal and meaningful participation of women and young people in all stages of a peace process and in decision-making;
8. Condemns the decision to top up support for Rwanda’s deployment of its soldiers to Mozambique under the European Peace Facility (EPF), which has failed to demonstrate sufficient safeguards and has contributed to sending an inconsistent message to the Rwandan authorities;
13. Underlines the importance of institutionalising the parliamentary dimension of future EU-AU summits as an integral component of their framework, to ensure citizen representation, public oversight and a democratic contribution to the deliberations and outcomes of the partnership;
9. Condemns any violation of the sovereignty of African countries by Member States; insists that those Member States still maintaining a military presence in African countries must respect the sovereign decisions of the governments concerned;
14. Supports efforts to revitalise the Joint Parliamentary Assembly between the European Parliament and the Pan-African Parliament as a forum for democratic dialogue and oversight; encourages regular thematic meetings between parliamentary committees from both continents to ensure the partnership’s accountability;
10. Calls for the strict regulation and effective control of arms exports to Africa to ensure that EU Member States are not complicit in the proliferation of armed conflicts; reiterates its condemnation of the 2011 NATO-led intervention in Libya, which has contributed to lasting instability in the region;
15. Is concerned about China’s growing political influence in Africa and the expansion of its global initiatives, including the Belt and Road Initiative; notes that, while these projects have mobilised significant investment, they often lack transparency and can create economic dependencies; underlines that the EU offers a sustainable, values-based and transparent alternative, grounded in local ownership, fair competition and mutual benefit; calls for the EU to enhance its strategic communication and visibility, promote joint AU-EU projects in infrastructure, digitalisation and innovation, and support independent media and education initiatives to demonstrate the long-term advantages of the European model of partnership; recognises the strategic importance of critical raw materials for both Africa and Europe and stresses that cooperation in this field must be founded on mutual benefit, transparency and sustainability; calls for Europe’s resilience to be strengthened by moving away from excessive dependencies, particularly on China, through diversification into partnerships that promote responsible mining, local value added, and skills development; underlines that initiatives under the Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package should foster resilient, fair and environmentally responsible supply chains, ensuring that resource cooperation contributes to sustainable growth and economic diversification in African countries;
11. Calls on the Member States to align their arms export policies with the provisions of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, and to ensure the rigorous and transparent application of all criteria; calls for the establishment of effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to guarantee compliance;
Sustainable growth, trade and infrastructure
12. Firmly opposes the use of armed drones for extrajudicial or extraterritorial killings and calls for a ban on their use for such purposes;
16. Supports the full implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area as a driver of continental integration and calls for the EU to provide technical and financial assistance for its institutions, customs harmonisation and private sector readiness;
13. Expresses deep concern at the widespread and systematic use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and a tool of terror against women, girls and men; calls for accountability and for comprehensive support for survivors.
17. Underlines the central role of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe as the EU’s main external financing framework supporting cooperation with Africa; stresses that the effective use of the NDICI and its successor instrument is essential to ensure coherence between policy priorities, Global Gateway investments and Team Europe initiatives, as well as to guarantee transparency, accountability and measurable results in EU development action, and to fulfil our EU Treaty obligations, including promoting poverty eradication, sustainable development, human rights and international cooperation;
14. Stresses that all EU policies in the field of peace and security must prioritise addressing the root causes of instability; underlines the importance of achieving the sustainable development goals (SDGs) of the UN’s 2030 Agenda as a means of building resilient societies, and calls for the EU and on local authorities to work together to this end through all relevant areas of cooperation;
18. Calls on the Member States, in this regard, to undertake a thorough assessment of shortcomings in their previous approaches to development cooperation with and external assistance for Africa, and to revise and readjust their Africa strategies with a view to fostering sustainable prosperity on the continent and achieving genuinely mutually beneficial partnerships;
15. Stresses that combating terrorism requires addressing the underlying causes of poverty, inequality and exclusion, and that cutting off the financing of armed groups is essential; emphasises that the use of mercenaries and private military or security companies cannot provide sustainable solutions to violence and insecurity;
19. Stresses the importance of ensuring policy coherence for development (PCD) across all EU external policies, taking into account trade, migration, climate and security concerns; highlights, in this regard, the importance of Parliament’s PCD Network in achieving better alignment of the EU’s external policies;
16. Condemns the proliferation and operations of private military and security companies across Africa, including entities such as Vectus Global, Frontier Services Group, the Wagner Group, Secopex, Aegis Defence Services, Erickson Inc., Omega Consulting Group and Berry Aviation, whose activities undermine peace, security and state sovereignty on the continent;
20. Underlines that ODA remains indispensable in fragile contexts and in least-developed countries; calls on the Member States to sustain and step up progress towards the long-standing UN target of allocating 0.7 % of gross national income (GNI) to ODA and to increase the share directed to least developed countries, in line with EU and international commitments; encourages the exploration of innovative and legally sound financing tools, including voluntary reallocation of the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights where feasible, and the use of structured and transparent debt-for-climate or debt-for-development swaps to strengthen funding for climate adaptation and resilience;
17. Expresses its concern that child marriage remains widespread across Africa, with the highest prevalence in West and Central Africa, where around four in ten girls are married before the age of 18; stresses that conflict, poverty and insecurity further exacerbate the risk of child marriage and other harmful practices; calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen efforts to eliminate such practices and to promote initiatives protecting girls’ rights within the EU-Africa partnership;
21. Welcomes efforts to make EU external action more coherent through the Global Europe instrument and the Global Gateway strategy, while stressing that flexibility must be matched by predictability, accountability, transparency and parliamentary oversight; expresses concern that ODA may be used for the purpose of private sector investment under the Global Gateway; calls on the Commission, the EEAS, the Council and the Member States to ensure that the Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package delivers tangible results, through its 360-degree approach, by aligning projects with African priorities and human development indicators, preventing unsustainable debt, supporting poverty eradication and promoting human development in line with the SDGs and Treaty obligations; recognises that large-scale investment initiatives alone cannot address the complex realities of fragile and conflict-affected settings, nor the vulnerabilities of least-developed and heavily indebted countries; calls therefore for a dedicated EU strategy for engagement in fragile contexts under the future Global Europe instrument, integrating political dialogue, peacebuilding, humanitarian aid and development action, while stressing the need for ring-fenced humanitarian aid in the next multiannual financial framework; underlines the need to improve the visibility and coordination of EU-funded projects through stronger EU delegations and genuine partnerships with African stakeholders;
Trade and investment
22. Calls for the creation of a dedicated EU-Africa industrialisation pact under the joint auspices of the AU, the EU and regional development banks, to mobilise public and private capital, which would ensure that Africa is not just a source of raw materials but a hub for processing, manufacturing and innovation, which will create jobs, build local industries and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and generate wealth locally while attracting European businesses, particularly SMEs; asks that, as part of this pact, an EU-Africa infrastructure fund is launched focusing on modern infrastructure, irrigation systems and renewable energy that can transform livelihoods and increase food, water and energy security, with the aim of promoting long-term investment in transport, energy, water and digital networks without trapping African nations in unsustainable debt; stresses that the fund must be Africa-led, transparent and free of political strings while supporting the strengthening of the rule of law; underlines that this initiative would be a tangible expression of a partnership of equals, fostering long-term growth and sustainable value chains on both continents;
18. Recalls that the doctrine of comparative advantage and free trade has often been used to lock African economies into commodity dependence, hindering industrialisation and diversification; underlines that other developing countries have successfully employed public and state-led industrial policies to foster their own economic development;
23. Voices its concerns about the withdrawal of the USAID and the scaling down of its programmes, which has created significant financing gaps in essential services; calls on the Commission and the Member States to realign NDICI – Global Europe and Team Europe programming, as well as the future Global Europe initiative, with the instruments’ officially agreed objectives and minimum spending targets for Sub-Saharan Africa and thematic programmes, and to use these instruments to bridge such gaps swiftly where appropriate, prioritising health, gender equality, education, food security and climate adaptation in the most vulnerable African countries; emphasises that the needs-based nature of humanitarian aid requires ring-fenced funding, distinct from other external action financing; calls on the Commission to balance the instruments’ new economic diplomacy focus with the EU’s long-standing treaty-based development and humanitarian objectives;
19. Highlights the fact that the EU maintains a significant trade surplus with the African continent, while African economies remain heavily dependent on the export of raw commodities, which represent over 70 % of their total exports; underlines that this structural imbalance hinders Africa’s industrialisation and sustainable development;
Investing in women, young people, human development and mobility
20. Calls for an EU trade policy that upholds public health, the right to food, decent work, fair wages and environmental protection; emphasises the need for full transparency, parliamentary oversight and democratic control in trade and investment agreements; calls for the introduction of sanctions against EU companies that commit human rights or environmental violations in the Global South, in cooperation with the authorities of the countries concerned, with priority given to repairing damage and compensating victims;
24. Stresses that African young people must be at the heart of a renewed EU-Africa partnership; underlines that bringing young people from both continents closer together, through greater mutual understanding and stronger bonds, is essential for a lasting and equal partnership; calls for the significant expansion of programmes such as Erasmus+, through the creation of a political EU-Africa youth exchange programme, Horizon Europe and the Intra-Africa Academic Mobility Scheme to reach many more EU and African students and researchers; calls, moreover, for increased support for African universities, vocational institutes and youth-led initiatives to strengthen skills, innovation and exchange;
21. Calls for the systematic inclusion of binding and enforceable mechanisms for the implementation of trade and sustainable development chapters on human rights, labour and environmental standards in all current and future EPAs; reiterates the need for an in-depth assessment of the impact of EPAs and other trade liberalisation agreements on African economies, intra-African trade and local livelihoods, and calls for these agreements to be made consistent with the SDGs and Article 208 TFEU on policy coherence for development;
25. Calls for a dedicated Africa-EU youth innovation fund to finance start-ups and community projects led by young entrepreneurs;
22. Believes that a key element of sustainable development and a fair partnership between Africa and the EU is to guarantee national and public control over common goods and natural resources, enabling African countries to mobilise domestic resources and invest in human development; calls on the Commission to include safeguard clauses in trade and investment agreements to prevent the privatisation of essential public services such as education, healthcare and water;
26. Calls for a positive, lucid, realistic and forward-looking approach to migration and mobility; calls therefore on the Commission to launch a safe mobility initiative, setting up one-stop shops in partner countries to streamline access to legal migration pathways, including resettlement, family reunification and labour migration, which includes but should not be limited to talent partnerships and labour mobility schemes, such as the EU Talent Pool initiative, that match skills to labour market needs in both continents; calls for sustainable voluntary return with possible reintegration programmes, effective cooperation on return and readmission, biometric travel document issuance, and border management support; urges the EU and the AU to step up the fight against irregular migration and to better address the root causes of irregular migration by creating jobs, fighting corruption, promoting good governance, the rule of law and education, and supporting climate resilience; recognises the significant burden that the increase in irregular migration, including from Africa, places on Europe; stresses that cooperation on migration must strike a balance between responsibility and solidarity, combining the fight against smuggling and trafficking with the creation of safe and legal mobility channels and full respect for international law and human rights; emphasises that the new Pact on Migration and Asylum, as a structural solution, should be fully implemented and evaluated before transitioning to a new strategy;
23. Stresses the inalienable right of peoples to self-determination without external interference; condemns economic and political interference and exploitation by former colonial powers; rejects any pressure by the EU or its Member States on African countries that choose independent paths in their economic or foreign policies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to fully respect African countries’ sovereign right to determine their own development models; supports popular calls for the abolition of the CFA (Communauté Financière Africaine – African Financial Community) franc and for the restoration of monetary sovereignty in the countries affected;
27. Calls for the EU and the AU to uphold and promote women’s rights and gender equality, ensure access to education and the fulfilment of sexual and reproductive health and rights, promote women’s full, equal and meaningful participation in decision-making and on the labour market and combat gender-based violence and harmful practices; reiterates that gender equality and women’s empowerment are prerequisites for inclusive growth and sustainable development; calls for the EU to ensure dedicated funding for gender equality programmes in line with its Gender Action Plan III;
24. Calls for an end to IMF-imposed austerity programmes and structural adjustment policies that have led to impoverishment and restricted access to basic rights; stresses that lack of access to essential public services such as water, sanitation, healthcare and education constitutes an unacceptable violation of human rights;
28. Emphasises that health security is a shared global challenge and expresses concern that significant budget cuts in the sector threaten to undo decades of progress in global health, putting millions of lives at risk; welcomes EU support for the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC), vaccine manufacturing hubs in Africa and the African Medicines Agency, and stresses the EU’s vital role in funding lifesaving health programmes, including HIV and AIDs prevention and treatment programmes and sexual and reproductive health and rights programmes; calls for continued cooperation on pandemic preparedness, local pharmaceutical production and universal health coverage;
25. Stresses the destabilising role of predatory extractive policies pursued by certain multinational corporations; reiterates the importance of Directive (EU) 2024/1760 on corporate sustainability due diligence and calls for the enforcement of binding corporate accountability measures for multinational companies, particularly those operating outside the EU, to ensure that they do not engage in human rights violations, exploitative labour practices, land-grabbing, forced displacement or environmental destruction;
Climate, the environment and multilateral cooperation
26. Calls strongly for the effective implementation of the corporate sustainability due diligence framework, including mandatory human rights and environmental due diligence, public country-by-country reporting, remediation mechanisms and sanctioning powers for violations;
29. Calls for joint progress on the African single electricity market, cross-border interconnections and sustainable urbanisation; calls for the EU to provide its fair share of climate finance for African climate adaptation and mitigation, supporting initiatives such as the Great Green Wall and NaturAfrica that combine environmental protection with jobs and rural development; recognises climate change as a shared challenge and an opportunity for Africa-EU cooperation; welcomes the Africa-Europe Green Energy Initiative to deliver 50 GW of renewable capacity and electricity access for 100 million people by 2030;
27. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen their engagement in the negotiations for a UN binding treaty on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, and to reinforce support for UN-led initiatives promoting global supply-chain transparency and people-centred, sustainable extractive industries;
30. Calls for stronger AU-EU action and joint advocacy at Conference of the Parties (COP) meetings to secure fair climate finance, technology transfer and funding for the Loss and Damage Fund; stresses that all major emitters, including G20 members, must lead on implementing the Paris Agreement; welcomes Africa’s permanent G20 membership and supports greater African representation in global governance; proposes an annual AU-EU dialogue on climate and sustainability to coordinate policies and track progress;
28. Emphasises that free trade agreements have often harmed the livelihoods and resilience of local communities in Africa; calls for a thorough review of current trade and investment agreements, including EPAs, to ensure that they contribute to equitable and sustainable development rather than deepen dependency;
Way forward
29. Notes with concern that the EU has systematically fragmented African unity, for example by maintaining the African, Caribbean and Pacific framework, negotiating separate EPAs with regional groupings, and excluding North African countries; stresses that such fragmentation is an obstacle to a unified African negotiating position in international forums;
31. Welcomes the seventh EU-AU Summit in Luanda as a significant opportunity for African and European leaders to reaffirm their commitment to the EU-AU partnership; calls on participants to seize this occasion to announce measurable commitments for the next five years, notably through the adoption of a joint action plan 2025-2030, a roadmap to double Africa-EU trade and investment by 2030, an agreement on mutual mobility and visa facilitation for students and researchers, and a renewed joint framework on digital transformation and green energy partnerships;
30. Condemns the effects of EPAs, which require African countries to open markets to EU goods while offering limited reciprocal benefits; stresses that these agreements undermine local industries and contradict the objectives of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA);
32. Stresses the importance of strengthening the parliamentary dimension of the Africa-Europe partnership; calls for the organisation of a pre-summit meeting between Members of the European Parliament and members of the Pan-African Parliament to ensure that the voices of elected representatives from both continents help shape the agenda, priorities and outcomes of the upcoming EU-AU summit; underlines that such dialogue would enhance democratic legitimacy, foster mutual understanding and ensure that the summit’s conclusions reflect the concerns and aspirations of citizens across Africa and Europe; stresses also the importance of the meaningful engagement of civil society in the partnership and at summits;
31. Calls for the EU to actively support the integration and development of African economies, provided that such frameworks protect workers’ rights, preserve policy space for industrial policy, and promote human development, social protection and environmental safeguards; underlines that the AfCFTA should foster integration that benefits all populations, including the most marginalised, and stresses that developmental disparities between African countries must be taken into account to avoid deepening inequalities;
33. Calls on its President to invite African heads of state to address Parliament on a more regular basis, ensuring balanced geographical representation and fostering deeper political dialogue between the two continents;
32. Calls, therefore, for a comprehensive revision of EU trade policy towards African countries, including the renegotiation or amendment of EPAs and related arrangements, in order to secure adequate policy space for industrialisation, value-added production and the protection of strategic sectors, and to prevent harmful agricultural dumping; stresses that trade rules must actively support regional value chains and sustainable development;
34. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the African Union Commission, the Pan-African Parliament, the governments and parliaments of the EU Member States and of the African Union member states, and to the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States.
33. Insists that all EU investment instruments – including the Global Gateway, the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus and other blended-finance facilities – be subject to mandatory debt-sustainability assessments, independent social, environmental and human-rights impact assessments, full disclosure of financing terms, and alignment with national and regional development plans; calls for the prioritisation of grant-based and concessional financing for social and climate infrastructure;
34. Stresses the need for the EU to support African countries in strengthening and expanding public services such as free healthcare and education, as well as social protection; calls for the EU to assist in building Africa-based pharmaceutical production and medicine manufacturing capacity under public ownership;
35. Stresses that trade liberalisation can have a negative impact on deforestation and climate change, and can aggravate biodiversity loss and food insecurity; believes that future EU-Africa trade and investment relations must prioritise the protection of forests and biodiversity, promote local agriculture and producers, advance food sovereignty, and combat land-grabbing and deforestation driven by agricultural exports; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take into account the interests of the outermost regions when signing agreements with African countries;
36. Calls on the Commission to review restrictions on export taxes and intellectual property provisions (World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) in current and future EPAs and free trade agreements, so as to enable African countries to respond effectively to economic and health crises and to promote technology transfer for life-saving medicines through the suspension or limitation of intellectual property rights when necessary;
37. Calls on the Commission to redesign its investment strategies in the Global South – and in Africa in particular – to ensure that they are transparent, responsible and oriented towards addressing the region’s development challenges, rather than advancing the interests of EU-based multinational corporations; stresses that EU investment initiatives must empower African countries and peoples to build peace, infrastructure, education systems and self-reliant economies;
38. Is deeply concerned by the US policy of ‘peace for resources’, in particular in the DRC; considers that this policy constitutes the unacceptable blackmail of sovereign countries; calls for a reassessment of planned investments in critical raw materials under the EU’s Global Gateway initiative to ensure that these investments do not contribute to or facilitate the plunder of natural resources;
39. Urges the Commission and the Council to immediately suspend the EU-Rwanda Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on sustainable raw materials value chains until Rwanda proves that it is ceasing its interference and its exportation of minerals mined from areas controlled by the paramilitary group M23; calls on all actors to increase transparency and to effectively ban the entry of all blood minerals into the EU;
40. Regrets the fact that the EU has not taken appropriate measures to sufficiently address the crisis and effectively press Rwanda to end its support for M23, and that it has instead taken steps, including the signing in February 2024 of the MoU on sustainable raw materials value chains, encouraging the plunder of natural resources;
Energy and climate
41. Stresses the urgent need for large-scale investment in sustainable and resilient energy infrastructure across Africa, giving priority to renewable energy sources such as solar, wind and hydro power; underlines that access to affordable, reliable and clean energy is essential for human development, economic sovereignty and climate justice, and that such investment must primarily serve the development and electrification of the African continent;
42. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to support the establishment of an African climate and development fund, to be co-governed with the African Union and civil society organisations, with the aim of channelling grant-based finance towards adaptation, resilience and a just transition;
43. Calls strongly for EU-Africa cooperation on the energy transition to include support for regional interconnection projects, community-based mini-grids and technology transfer; recalls that sustainable infrastructure development must fully respect social and environmental safeguards and deliver tangible benefits to local populations;
44. Calls for the EU to promote and support public ownership and local control of key energy infrastructure, in order to avoid new forms of dependency arising from privatisation or corporate capture; stresses that energy partnerships should contribute to the strengthening of domestic industrial capacity, value-added production and local employment in Africa;
45. Stresses that the extraction and transport of energy resources have often resulted in severe environmental degradation, displacement and regional destabilisation; underlines that the EU’s efforts to diversify its energy supply must be fully consistent with respect for human rights, environmental protection and the development priorities of African countries;
46. Underlines that, despite their negligible contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions, West and Sahelian Africa are among the regions most severely affected by the impacts of climate change; highlights the historical responsibility of the world’s most polluting countries and calls for the provision of adequate, predictable and grant-based compensation and support to enable the countries of these regions to implement mitigation and adaptation measures effectively;
Debt and finance
47. Calls for a comprehensive review of the economic policies and so-called structural reforms promoted over recent decades by the IMF and the World Bank, as well as by African and European governments, which have deepened the dependence of African and other Global South countries on debt, led to the privatisation of common and strategic goods, weakened public sectors and increased social inequalities and labour precariousness;
48. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to work towards eliminating structural obstacles to sustainable development by cancelling odious and unsustainable debts, as well as interest payments that continue to burden African countries and divert resources from essential social investment;
49. Calls for the urgent establishment of a legally binding UN framework convention on sovereign debt, to provide a fair, transparent and rules-based mechanism for debt resolution, including:
a binding framework for comprehensive debt restructuring, encompassing all creditor types – bilateral, multilateral, private and non-traditional;
automatic and timely debt standstills in the event of systemic shocks such as pandemics, climate disasters or major price shocks;
the explicit exclusion of expenditure on social protection, healthcare, education, climate adaptation and resilience from debt sustainability calculations and conditionality triggers;
parliamentary and civil-society oversight of borrowing, debt contracting and restructuring processes;
mandatory participation of private creditors under enforceable timelines, with sanctions for non-cooperation;
50. Calls for public, transparent and participatory debt audits in African countries to identify illegitimate, odious or environmentally harmful debts; calls on the EU Member States, EU financial institutions and private creditors to cancel debt identified as illegitimate through such democratic audit processes;
51. Urges the Commission, the Member States, the G20, international financial institutions and other donors to take immediate and decisive steps towards comprehensive debt relief and full debt cancellation for African countries facing unsustainable debt burdens;
52. Recalls that many African economies currently spend up to five times more on debt repayments than on healthcare; calls strongly for the conversion of debt service obligations into investments in public goods – including healthcare, education, renewable energy and climate adaptation – co-designed with partner governments and local communities;
53. Calls for the EU and the Member States to actively support the reform of the global financial architecture, including:
transforming the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments into a transparent, binding and time-bound mechanism that includes all creditor categories and guarantees equal treatment of debtors;
supporting the establishment and strengthening of regional financial safety nets, including an African monetary fund, and debt-resolution facilities under African governance;
pressing for comprehensive IMF and World Bank governance reforms to enhance the representation and voting power of African countries and to eliminate austerity-driven conditionalities that undermine economic and social rights;
Tax and financial transparency
54. Notes with concern that between 1970 and 2018, five African countries – Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, Angola, and Morocco – collectively lost over USD 1.2 trillion through capital flight, exceeding total inflows of foreign aid and investment; stresses that this underscores the urgent need to tackle illicit financial flows in order to promote sustainable development, strengthen public services, and safeguard pension systems in African countries;
55. Strongly condemns the role of EU corporations and tax regimes in facilitating tax avoidance and evasion in Africa; calls for the EU and its Member States to prohibit financial transactions with jurisdictions identified as tax havens and to establish a robust, EU-wide blacklist of tax havens; stresses that such prohibitions should apply to all such transactions unless demonstrably justified by genuine economic activities, while purely financial operations should be automatically excluded;
56. Calls for the review and, where necessary, cancellation of bilateral tax and economic treaties with jurisdictions on the EU blacklist, while maintaining agreements solely for the purpose of tax information exchange; underlines that the prohibition should extend to all banking groups and auditing and consulting firms operating or maintaining branches in tax havens, to prevent the indirect facilitation of illicit financial flows; emphasises that the principle of free movement of capital may be subject to restrictions in line with Articles 64 and 65 TFEU where violations of tax law, threats to public order, or risks to national security are identified;
57. Calls for an urgent reform of the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes to ensure that it is effective, inclusive and addresses the root causes of tax avoidance; stresses the importance of beneficial ownership transparency to enforce transparency in company ownership, and combat corruption and illicit financial flows;
58. Calls on the Commission to support domestic resource mobilisation in African countries through technical assistance and cooperation in tax policy, including measures to promote fair taxation, end harmful tax incentives, implement public country-by-country reporting, enable automatic exchange of information, and adopt aggressive measures to curb illicit financial flows, including EU sanctions against tax havens and enablers;
59. Highlights the commitment laid down in Article 83 of the Samoa Agreement to undertake measures to tackle tax avoidance, tax evasion and harmful tax practices; calls for the EU to ensure that trade and investment agreements include concrete and enforceable measures to assist African countries in combating illicit financial flows and corporate tax evasion, guaranteeing that taxes are paid where profits and real economic value are generated, in order to prevent base erosion and profit-shifting;
Migration and asylum
60. Highlights that according to the UN International Organization for Migration and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the vast majority of migrants from Africa remain on the continent, often moving to neighbouring countries or other countries within their region, rather than crossing to Europe or other regions;
61. Recalls that armed conflict remains one of the principal drivers of forced displacement worldwide; notes that a large proportion of asylum seekers arriving in the EU are fleeing wars; underlines that these conflicts have, in part, been fuelled or exacerbated by external interventions, including by EU countries; stresses that addressing the root causes of forced displacement requires an honest reassessment of the EU’s foreign, security and trade policies;
62. Underlines that migration flows often reflect the consequences of external action; recalls, in this regard, the devastating consequences of the 2011 intervention in Libya, which contributed to instability in several African countries, including Mali, Chad and Niger; stresses that the EU should prioritise conflict prevention, mediation and regional peacebuilding efforts in its external relations;
63. Expresses concern that current EU economic policies and trade practices contribute to poverty and inequality in parts of Africa, which are among the main drivers of forced displacement; recalls, in particular, that EU-supported fisheries agreements have enabled large industrial vessels from EU Member States to exploit local fish stocks, undermining the livelihoods of artisanal fishers and driving migration; calls for the establishment of a sustainable and equitable fisheries policy that safeguards marine ecosystems and protects local communities;
64. Notes with grave concern the rapid increase in displacement linked to the effects of climate change, including drought, floods, hurricanes and other extreme weather events; stresses that countries of the Global South, though historically least responsible for greenhouse gas emissions, are disproportionately affected and bear the heaviest humanitarian and economic consequences;
65. Recalls that according to the World Bank, up to 216 million people could be displaced by climate-related factors by 2050; notes that in 2022 alone, over 32 million people were forced to flee due to climate-related disasters;
66. Underlines that many of those displaced initially seek refuge within their own countries or in neighbouring countries already under pressure from poverty, conflict or existing refugee populations; points out that in Africa, significant numbers of climate-displaced persons from the Sahel are moving towards West African countries such as Gambia, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, creating additional challenges for host communities;
67. Stresses that climate-induced displacement presents one of the major humanitarian and security challenges of the coming decades and calls for the EU and its Member States to:
recognise and protect persons displaced by climate-related disasters, in accordance with international human rights standards;
support affected countries and regions through targeted adaptation, resilience and relocation programmes;
integrate the issue of climate mobility into the EU’s external action, migration and development cooperation policies;
68. Condemns the fact that many women and girls are trafficked to the EU from African countries for sexual exploitation and forced labour; calls for the EU and its Member States to adopt effective regulations and provide adequate funding to strengthen reception and protection measures, to ensure that traffickers are promptly prosecuted, deported and reported to the authorities in the countries of origin, while reinforcing cooperation with origin and transit countries in full compliance with international human rights and refugee protection instruments;
69. Stresses that the principle of non-refoulement is a cornerstone of international refugee and human rights law and must be upheld under all circumstances; expresses deep concern about the negative consequences of EU migration and border policies in Africa, which have undermined the rights and safety of local populations, migrants and refugees; calls, therefore, for full respect of the right to freedom of movement and for migration governance based on solidarity, protection and human dignity;
70. Condemns the externalisation of EU border control to African countries, including the financing of detention centres, readmission or repatriation facilities, and non-EU-country processing schemes; recalls that all migration and border policies must be fully consistent with international human rights standards and refugee and asylum law, including the right to life, liberty and protection from arbitrary detention;
71. Calls for the replacement of externalised migration policies with joint governance frameworks, including the creation of legal migration pathways, diaspora engagement mechanisms and the recognition of remittances, in order to support the rights, development and agency of African migrants; calls on the Member States to review their visa policies with African countries accordingly;
72. Calls for the EU and the Member States to guarantee the right to seek and enjoy international protection and to ensure humane, adequate and rights-based reception conditions; reiterates that an increasing number of people are being forced to flee their homes due to drought, land degradation and other climate-related disasters; calls for the recognition and protection of climate-displaced persons within EU asylum and migration law;
73. Rejects any form of conditionality that ties development cooperation, investment or humanitarian assistance to migration control, border externalisation, security cooperation or the privatisation of public services;
74. Calls for the audit and suspension of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, given its damaging impact on the rights of local communities, migrants and refugees, and its lack of transparency and accountability; insists that all remaining and future funding be redirected towards tackling the root causes of forced displacement through programmes contributing to the achievement of the UN SDGs, including poverty reduction, peacebuilding, climate resilience and job creation;
Sustainable development goals and human development
75. Reiterates that sovereignty, human development, poverty eradication, and the achievement of the UN SDGs must be central to EU-Africa relations; stresses that priority should be given to human development, social inclusion, gender equality, climate change mitigation and adaptation, the fight against hunger, and the promotion of food sovereignty;
76. Believes that a renewed EU partnership with Africa must recognise and address Europe’s historical responsibilities for colonial exploitation and slavery; stresses that these responsibilities must inform policies to promote equitable development and justice;
77. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote a moratorium on austerity and privatisation measures imposed by international financial institutions and donors, which undermine access to education, healthcare, water and social protection; stresses the importance of addressing structural and external causes of insecurity and poverty, including conflicts, hunger, climate change, inequality, lack of basic services and inappropriate agricultural models, through political, inclusive and human rights-based solutions;
78. Calls strongly for the EU and the Member States to devote at least 0.7 % of their gross national income to official development assistance, delivered as predictable, grant-based support; stresses that official development assistance must be additional, and not be diverted from humanitarian or other critical budgets;
79. Demands that the principle of PCD (Article 208 TFEU) be made operational and binding across all EU-Africa frameworks and agreements; calls for annual independent public reporting assessing coherence across trade, migration, climate, security and development policies and their tangible impact on partner countries;
80. Calls for urgent action to promote food sovereignty and prevent famine, including scaling up investment in agroecology, local seed systems, smallholder extension services and rural infrastructure (irrigation, storage and transport); calls for a ban on the practice of dumping subsidised agricultural products, which undermines local production, and for support for regional markets, local farmers and resilience programmes, avoiding an exclusively export-oriented agricultural model that contributes to deforestation or land-grabbing;
81. Stresses the need to promote and reinforce public, universal and free education systems in African countries; calls for EU support for African schools, universities, research centres and youth organisations, fostering scientific cooperation, green innovation, local capacity building, and equitable access to knowledge and technology transfer, including by limiting intellectual property rights where necessary;
82. Calls for the full, meaningful and binding participation of African parliaments, civil society organisations, trade unions, women’s and youth organisations, and indigenous and rural communities in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the EU-Africa partnership and all structures relating to the Samoa Agreement;
83. Calls for the EU and its Member States to increase financial support and humanitarian aid for populations affected by war, climate change or other disasters, provided as grants rather than loans to avoid increasing the debt burden; stresses that health is a fundamental human right and a necessary condition for development, and calls for a partnership integrating nutrition, water, sanitation, hygiene and universal healthcare coverage, including primary healthcare in line with the Alma-Ata Declaration of 1978;
84. Stresses the importance of ensuring that girls and women have access to adequate menstrual hygiene, including affordable sanitary products, clean and private toilets and safe water, as a fundamental component of healthcare, education and human development; calls for the EU to support African countries in implementing programmes and policies that address cultural stigmas around menstruation and in providing comprehensive sexual and reproductive health education;
85. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to support and fund programmes in Africa promoting sexual and reproductive healthcare and rights, including initiatives aimed at eliminating female genital mutilation; stresses the importance of working in close cooperation with national governments, local communities and civil society organisations, and of adopting culturally sensitive approaches that empower women and girls, engage community leaders, and advance the protection of women’s health, rights and bodily integrity across the continent;
86. Believes that the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus should finance investment that promotes inclusive and sustainable economic and social development; regrets the absence of transparency and proper assessment of the fund’s impact, and stresses the need for independent evaluation to ensure that blended finance mechanisms genuinely benefit less developed countries;
87. Respects and considers fully legitimate the fact that the continuation of extractive plunder and other neocolonial policies and practices – including debt dependency, unfair trade, conditional aid and migration externalisation – will encourage African partners to look for alternative alliances;
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88. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the African Union and its agencies and institutions, the relevant multilateral development banks, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.