On renewing the EU-Africa partnership: building common priorities ahead of the Angola Summit

B100472/2025

European Parliament resolution on renewing the EU-Africa partnership: building common priorities ahead of the Angola Summit

(2025/2933(RSP))

– having regard to the EU-Africa partnership and the declaration adopted by the heads of state and government of the EU and the African Union (AU) at the 6th EU-AU summit in February 2022, entitled ‘A Joint Vision for 2030’,

– having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other part (Samoa Agreement), which was signed on 15 November 2023 and which provisionally entered into force on 1 January 2024,

– having regard to the EU’s Global Gateway strategy, the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI – Global Europe) and the Africa-Europe Green Energy Initiative,

– having regard to Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union and Articles 208 and 209 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular the principle of policy coherence for development (PCD) enshrined in Article 208 TFEU,

– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

– having regard to the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the African Union’s Agenda 2063,

– having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement) and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development,

– having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 68/304 of 9 September 2014, which called for a comprehensive and durable UN approach to sovereign debt restructuring,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on debt justice, trade, migration, environmental sustainability, human rights and EU-Africa relations,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas Africa is a continent of immense human, cultural and natural wealth, yet continues to bear the legacies of colonisation, structural economic dependency and asymmetric power relations with Europe;

B. whereas the neoliberal economic model promoted to date has failed to guarantee economic development and the reduction of inequalities in Africa;

C. whereas the Joint Vision for 2030 and the renewed EU-Africa partnership speak of prioritising cooperation on peace and security, trade and investment, migration and mobility, the green transition, digitalisation and human development, but many commitments remain insufficiently implemented or undermined by conditionality and unequal bargaining power;

D. whereas the Samoa Agreement provides the current legal framework for cooperation between the EU and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS), but this must be implemented consistently on the basis of the principles of equality, transparency, democratic ownership and policy coherence for development;

E. whereas Africa’s external debt burden remains a major constraint on development; whereas average external debt ratios, record debt service payments in recent years, and rising costs of borrowing have reduced the fiscal space for spending on healthcare, education and climate adaptation;

F. whereas this debt is largely caused by economic, financial and tax policies and constraints imposed, including through foreign interference, by former colonial powers and Western-dominated institutions;

G. whereas International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank structural adjustment and austerity programmes have in many cases reduced public spending and restricted policy space, undermined social services and driven privatisation measures that fail to deliver equitable development outcomes;

H. whereas food insecurity and famine are acute threats in multiple regions of Africa, driven by climate shocks, conflict, export-oriented agricultural models and trade practices that disadvantage smallholder farmers;

I. whereas EU trade relations with African countries remain skewed towards extractive sectors and low value-added exports; whereas economic partnership agreements (EPAs) and other preferential arrangements often fail to create the policy space needed for African industrialisation and value chain development;

J. whereas the EU’s migration policy towards Africa prioritises border control and the externalisation of asylum responsibilities over the promotion of safe and regular migration channels;

K. whereas the EU’s externalisation of migration control – including the funding of retention, readmission and repatriation arrangements and ‘return hub’ models in non-EU countries – has generated serious human rights concerns and instrumentalised development cooperation for migration management;

L. whereas the Global Gateway strategy and other EU investment instruments claim to mobilise substantial financing for Africa, but are in reality highly focused on European economic, trade and geopolitical interests;

M. whereas illicit financial flows, tax avoidance and profit shifting by multinational companies continue to deprive African countries of essential revenues and undermine their prospects for inclusive development;

N. whereas the recent intensification of conflicts in the Sahel, Sudan, the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Horn of Africa demonstrates the link between insecurity, foreign military intervention and competition over access to raw materials and strategic resources;

O. whereas climate change, biodiversity loss and desertification are disproportionately affecting African populations, threatening livelihoods and exacerbating forced displacement and food insecurity;

P. whereas the EU must apply the principle of PCD (Article 208 TFEU) across trade, migration, security, climate and investment policies, and ensure that the Samoa Agreement and EU-Africa partnership frameworks are consistent with respect for human rights and sustainable development goals;

Q. whereas African countries are diversifying external partnerships and exploring alternative financing and cooperation arrangements because of perceived EU double standards and conditionalities;

1. Notes with concern that the current architecture of EU-Africa relations – including aid, trade preferences, and migration management – perpetuates asymmetries rooted in historical colonial power structures; stresses that terms such as ‘preference’ and ‘non-reciprocity’ mask a system in which Africa has historically been compelled to serve European economic interests;

2. Calls for an urgent fundamental reset of EU-Africa relations based on equality, solidarity, mutual respect and African sovereignty over, and ownership of, development priorities;

3. Reiterates its support for African organisations and calls on the Commission and the Member States to support African integration, in particular the African Union;

Peace and security

4. Reiterates its unwavering support for the principles enshrined in the UN Charter, including respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, which constitute universal principles of international law and must be upheld by all countries;

5. Strongly condemns foreign interference and ongoing violations of international law, international humanitarian law and human rights, particularly in Sudan and in the eastern provinces of the DRC;

6. Calls for the EU and its Member States to immediately end all forms of complicity in breaches of international law on the African continent, in particular by imposing a military embargo on Rwanda and by fully respecting the current arms embargo on Sudan; calls for an independent investigation into reports of Member States’ military equipment contributing to the war in Sudan, in defiance of the embargo;

7. Further recalls recent resolution 79/98 of the UN General Assembly’s Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) of 4 December 2024, which states that the question of Western Sahara, as the last colony in Africa, remains a decolonisation issue; urges the Council and the Member States to support the process initiated by UN Security Council Resolution 1754 (2007) of 30 April 2007 with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara;

8. Condemns the decision to top up support for Rwanda’s deployment of its soldiers to Mozambique under the European Peace Facility (EPF), which has failed to demonstrate sufficient safeguards and has contributed to sending an inconsistent message to the Rwandan authorities;

9. Condemns any violation of the sovereignty of African countries by Member States; insists that those Member States still maintaining a military presence in African countries must respect the sovereign decisions of the governments concerned;

10. Calls for the strict regulation and effective control of arms exports to Africa to ensure that EU Member States are not complicit in the proliferation of armed conflicts; reiterates its condemnation of the 2011 NATO-led intervention in Libya, which has contributed to lasting instability in the region;

11. Calls on the Member States to align their arms export policies with the provisions of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, and to ensure the rigorous and transparent application of all criteria; calls for the establishment of effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to guarantee compliance;

12. Firmly opposes the use of armed drones for extrajudicial or extraterritorial killings and calls for a ban on their use for such purposes;

13. Expresses deep concern at the widespread and systematic use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and a tool of terror against women, girls and men; calls for accountability and for comprehensive support for survivors.

14. Stresses that all EU policies in the field of peace and security must prioritise addressing the root causes of instability; underlines the importance of achieving the sustainable development goals (SDGs) of the UN’s 2030 Agenda as a means of building resilient societies, and calls for the EU and on local authorities to work together to this end through all relevant areas of cooperation;

15. Stresses that combating terrorism requires addressing the underlying causes of poverty, inequality and exclusion, and that cutting off the financing of armed groups is essential; emphasises that the use of mercenaries and private military or security companies cannot provide sustainable solutions to violence and insecurity;

16. Condemns the proliferation and operations of private military and security companies across Africa, including entities such as Vectus Global, Frontier Services Group, the Wagner Group, Secopex, Aegis Defence Services, Erickson Inc., Omega Consulting Group and Berry Aviation, whose activities undermine peace, security and state sovereignty on the continent;

17. Expresses its concern that child marriage remains widespread across Africa, with the highest prevalence in West and Central Africa, where around four in ten girls are married before the age of 18; stresses that conflict, poverty and insecurity further exacerbate the risk of child marriage and other harmful practices; calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen efforts to eliminate such practices and to promote initiatives protecting girls’ rights within the EU-Africa partnership;

Trade and investment

18. Recalls that the doctrine of comparative advantage and free trade has often been used to lock African economies into commodity dependence, hindering industrialisation and diversification; underlines that other developing countries have successfully employed public and state-led industrial policies to foster their own economic development;

19. Highlights the fact that the EU maintains a significant trade surplus with the African continent, while African economies remain heavily dependent on the export of raw commodities, which represent over 70 % of their total exports; underlines that this structural imbalance hinders Africa’s industrialisation and sustainable development;

20. Calls for an EU trade policy that upholds public health, the right to food, decent work, fair wages and environmental protection; emphasises the need for full transparency, parliamentary oversight and democratic control in trade and investment agreements; calls for the introduction of sanctions against EU companies that commit human rights or environmental violations in the Global South, in cooperation with the authorities of the countries concerned, with priority given to repairing damage and compensating victims;

21. Calls for the systematic inclusion of binding and enforceable mechanisms for the implementation of trade and sustainable development chapters on human rights, labour and environmental standards in all current and future EPAs; reiterates the need for an in-depth assessment of the impact of EPAs and other trade liberalisation agreements on African economies, intra-African trade and local livelihoods, and calls for these agreements to be made consistent with the SDGs and Article 208 TFEU on policy coherence for development;

22. Believes that a key element of sustainable development and a fair partnership between Africa and the EU is to guarantee national and public control over common goods and natural resources, enabling African countries to mobilise domestic resources and invest in human development; calls on the Commission to include safeguard clauses in trade and investment agreements to prevent the privatisation of essential public services such as education, healthcare and water;

23. Stresses the inalienable right of peoples to self-determination without external interference; condemns economic and political interference and exploitation by former colonial powers; rejects any pressure by the EU or its Member States on African countries that choose independent paths in their economic or foreign policies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to fully respect African countries’ sovereign right to determine their own development models; supports popular calls for the abolition of the CFA (Communauté Financière Africaine – African Financial Community) franc and for the restoration of monetary sovereignty in the countries affected;

24. Calls for an end to IMF-imposed austerity programmes and structural adjustment policies that have led to impoverishment and restricted access to basic rights; stresses that lack of access to essential public services such as water, sanitation, healthcare and education constitutes an unacceptable violation of human rights;

25. Stresses the destabilising role of predatory extractive policies pursued by certain multinational corporations; reiterates the importance of Directive (EU) 2024/1760 on corporate sustainability due diligence and calls for the enforcement of binding corporate accountability measures for multinational companies, particularly those operating outside the EU, to ensure that they do not engage in human rights violations, exploitative labour practices, land-grabbing, forced displacement or environmental destruction;

26. Calls strongly for the effective implementation of the corporate sustainability due diligence framework, including mandatory human rights and environmental due diligence, public country-by-country reporting, remediation mechanisms and sanctioning powers for violations;

27. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen their engagement in the negotiations for a UN binding treaty on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, and to reinforce support for UN-led initiatives promoting global supply-chain transparency and people-centred, sustainable extractive industries;

28. Emphasises that free trade agreements have often harmed the livelihoods and resilience of local communities in Africa; calls for a thorough review of current trade and investment agreements, including EPAs, to ensure that they contribute to equitable and sustainable development rather than deepen dependency;

29. Notes with concern that the EU has systematically fragmented African unity, for example by maintaining the African, Caribbean and Pacific framework, negotiating separate EPAs with regional groupings, and excluding North African countries; stresses that such fragmentation is an obstacle to a unified African negotiating position in international forums;

30. Condemns the effects of EPAs, which require African countries to open markets to EU goods while offering limited reciprocal benefits; stresses that these agreements undermine local industries and contradict the objectives of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA);

31. Calls for the EU to actively support the integration and development of African economies, provided that such frameworks protect workers’ rights, preserve policy space for industrial policy, and promote human development, social protection and environmental safeguards; underlines that the AfCFTA should foster integration that benefits all populations, including the most marginalised, and stresses that developmental disparities between African countries must be taken into account to avoid deepening inequalities;

32. Calls, therefore, for a comprehensive revision of EU trade policy towards African countries, including the renegotiation or amendment of EPAs and related arrangements, in order to secure adequate policy space for industrialisation, value-added production and the protection of strategic sectors, and to prevent harmful agricultural dumping; stresses that trade rules must actively support regional value chains and sustainable development;

33. Insists that all EU investment instruments – including the Global Gateway, the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus and other blended-finance facilities – be subject to mandatory debt-sustainability assessments, independent social, environmental and human-rights impact assessments, full disclosure of financing terms, and alignment with national and regional development plans; calls for the prioritisation of grant-based and concessional financing for social and climate infrastructure;

34. Stresses the need for the EU to support African countries in strengthening and expanding public services such as free healthcare and education, as well as social protection; calls for the EU to assist in building Africa-based pharmaceutical production and medicine manufacturing capacity under public ownership;

35. Stresses that trade liberalisation can have a negative impact on deforestation and climate change, and can aggravate biodiversity loss and food insecurity; believes that future EU-Africa trade and investment relations must prioritise the protection of forests and biodiversity, promote local agriculture and producers, advance food sovereignty, and combat land-grabbing and deforestation driven by agricultural exports; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take into account the interests of the outermost regions when signing agreements with African countries;

36. Calls on the Commission to review restrictions on export taxes and intellectual property provisions (World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) in current and future EPAs and free trade agreements, so as to enable African countries to respond effectively to economic and health crises and to promote technology transfer for life-saving medicines through the suspension or limitation of intellectual property rights when necessary;

37. Calls on the Commission to redesign its investment strategies in the Global South – and in Africa in particular – to ensure that they are transparent, responsible and oriented towards addressing the region’s development challenges, rather than advancing the interests of EU-based multinational corporations; stresses that EU investment initiatives must empower African countries and peoples to build peace, infrastructure, education systems and self-reliant economies;

38. Is deeply concerned by the US policy of ‘peace for resources’, in particular in the DRC; considers that this policy constitutes the unacceptable blackmail of sovereign countries; calls for a reassessment of planned investments in critical raw materials under the EU’s Global Gateway initiative to ensure that these investments do not contribute to or facilitate the plunder of natural resources;

39. Urges the Commission and the Council to immediately suspend the EU-Rwanda Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on sustainable raw materials value chains until Rwanda proves that it is ceasing its interference and its exportation of minerals mined from areas controlled by the paramilitary group M23; calls on all actors to increase transparency and to effectively ban the entry of all blood minerals into the EU;

40. Regrets the fact that the EU has not taken appropriate measures to sufficiently address the crisis and effectively press Rwanda to end its support for M23, and that it has instead taken steps, including the signing in February 2024 of the MoU on sustainable raw materials value chains, encouraging the plunder of natural resources;

Energy and climate

41. Stresses the urgent need for large-scale investment in sustainable and resilient energy infrastructure across Africa, giving priority to renewable energy sources such as solar, wind and hydro power; underlines that access to affordable, reliable and clean energy is essential for human development, economic sovereignty and climate justice, and that such investment must primarily serve the development and electrification of the African continent;

42. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to support the establishment of an African climate and development fund, to be co-governed with the African Union and civil society organisations, with the aim of channelling grant-based finance towards adaptation, resilience and a just transition;

43. Calls strongly for EU-Africa cooperation on the energy transition to include support for regional interconnection projects, community-based mini-grids and technology transfer; recalls that sustainable infrastructure development must fully respect social and environmental safeguards and deliver tangible benefits to local populations;

44. Calls for the EU to promote and support public ownership and local control of key energy infrastructure, in order to avoid new forms of dependency arising from privatisation or corporate capture; stresses that energy partnerships should contribute to the strengthening of domestic industrial capacity, value-added production and local employment in Africa;

45. Stresses that the extraction and transport of energy resources have often resulted in severe environmental degradation, displacement and regional destabilisation; underlines that the EU’s efforts to diversify its energy supply must be fully consistent with respect for human rights, environmental protection and the development priorities of African countries;

46. Underlines that, despite their negligible contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions, West and Sahelian Africa are among the regions most severely affected by the impacts of climate change; highlights the historical responsibility of the world’s most polluting countries and calls for the provision of adequate, predictable and grant-based compensation and support to enable the countries of these regions to implement mitigation and adaptation measures effectively;

Debt and finance

47. Calls for a comprehensive review of the economic policies and so-called structural reforms promoted over recent decades by the IMF and the World Bank, as well as by African and European governments, which have deepened the dependence of African and other Global South countries on debt, led to the privatisation of common and strategic goods, weakened public sectors and increased social inequalities and labour precariousness;

48. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to work towards eliminating structural obstacles to sustainable development by cancelling odious and unsustainable debts, as well as interest payments that continue to burden African countries and divert resources from essential social investment;

49. Calls for the urgent establishment of a legally binding UN framework convention on sovereign debt, to provide a fair, transparent and rules-based mechanism for debt resolution, including:

a binding framework for comprehensive debt restructuring, encompassing all creditor types – bilateral, multilateral, private and non-traditional;

automatic and timely debt standstills in the event of systemic shocks such as pandemics, climate disasters or major price shocks;

the explicit exclusion of expenditure on social protection, healthcare, education, climate adaptation and resilience from debt sustainability calculations and conditionality triggers;

parliamentary and civil-society oversight of borrowing, debt contracting and restructuring processes;

mandatory participation of private creditors under enforceable timelines, with sanctions for non-cooperation;

50. Calls for public, transparent and participatory debt audits in African countries to identify illegitimate, odious or environmentally harmful debts; calls on the EU Member States, EU financial institutions and private creditors to cancel debt identified as illegitimate through such democratic audit processes;

51. Urges the Commission, the Member States, the G20, international financial institutions and other donors to take immediate and decisive steps towards comprehensive debt relief and full debt cancellation for African countries facing unsustainable debt burdens;

52. Recalls that many African economies currently spend up to five times more on debt repayments than on healthcare; calls strongly for the conversion of debt service obligations into investments in public goods – including healthcare, education, renewable energy and climate adaptation – co-designed with partner governments and local communities;

53. Calls for the EU and the Member States to actively support the reform of the global financial architecture, including:

transforming the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments into a transparent, binding and time-bound mechanism that includes all creditor categories and guarantees equal treatment of debtors;

supporting the establishment and strengthening of regional financial safety nets, including an African monetary fund, and debt-resolution facilities under African governance;

pressing for comprehensive IMF and World Bank governance reforms to enhance the representation and voting power of African countries and to eliminate austerity-driven conditionalities that undermine economic and social rights;

Tax and financial transparency

54. Notes with concern that between 1970 and 2018, five African countries – Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, Angola, and Morocco – collectively lost over USD 1.2 trillion through capital flight, exceeding total inflows of foreign aid and investment; stresses that this underscores the urgent need to tackle illicit financial flows in order to promote sustainable development, strengthen public services, and safeguard pension systems in African countries;

55. Strongly condemns the role of EU corporations and tax regimes in facilitating tax avoidance and evasion in Africa; calls for the EU and its Member States to prohibit financial transactions with jurisdictions identified as tax havens and to establish a robust, EU-wide blacklist of tax havens; stresses that such prohibitions should apply to all such transactions unless demonstrably justified by genuine economic activities, while purely financial operations should be automatically excluded;

56. Calls for the review and, where necessary, cancellation of bilateral tax and economic treaties with jurisdictions on the EU blacklist, while maintaining agreements solely for the purpose of tax information exchange; underlines that the prohibition should extend to all banking groups and auditing and consulting firms operating or maintaining branches in tax havens, to prevent the indirect facilitation of illicit financial flows; emphasises that the principle of free movement of capital may be subject to restrictions in line with Articles 64 and 65 TFEU where violations of tax law, threats to public order, or risks to national security are identified;

57. Calls for an urgent reform of the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes to ensure that it is effective, inclusive and addresses the root causes of tax avoidance; stresses the importance of beneficial ownership transparency to enforce transparency in company ownership, and combat corruption and illicit financial flows;

58. Calls on the Commission to support domestic resource mobilisation in African countries through technical assistance and cooperation in tax policy, including measures to promote fair taxation, end harmful tax incentives, implement public country-by-country reporting, enable automatic exchange of information, and adopt aggressive measures to curb illicit financial flows, including EU sanctions against tax havens and enablers;

59. Highlights the commitment laid down in Article 83 of the Samoa Agreement to undertake measures to tackle tax avoidance, tax evasion and harmful tax practices; calls for the EU to ensure that trade and investment agreements include concrete and enforceable measures to assist African countries in combating illicit financial flows and corporate tax evasion, guaranteeing that taxes are paid where profits and real economic value are generated, in order to prevent base erosion and profit-shifting;

Migration and asylum

60. Highlights that according to the UN International Organization for Migration and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the vast majority of migrants from Africa remain on the continent, often moving to neighbouring countries or other countries within their region, rather than crossing to Europe or other regions;

61. Recalls that armed conflict remains one of the principal drivers of forced displacement worldwide; notes that a large proportion of asylum seekers arriving in the EU are fleeing wars; underlines that these conflicts have, in part, been fuelled or exacerbated by external interventions, including by EU countries; stresses that addressing the root causes of forced displacement requires an honest reassessment of the EU’s foreign, security and trade policies;

62. Underlines that migration flows often reflect the consequences of external action; recalls, in this regard, the devastating consequences of the 2011 intervention in Libya, which contributed to instability in several African countries, including Mali, Chad and Niger; stresses that the EU should prioritise conflict prevention, mediation and regional peacebuilding efforts in its external relations;

63. Expresses concern that current EU economic policies and trade practices contribute to poverty and inequality in parts of Africa, which are among the main drivers of forced displacement; recalls, in particular, that EU-supported fisheries agreements have enabled large industrial vessels from EU Member States to exploit local fish stocks, undermining the livelihoods of artisanal fishers and driving migration; calls for the establishment of a sustainable and equitable fisheries policy that safeguards marine ecosystems and protects local communities;

64. Notes with grave concern the rapid increase in displacement linked to the effects of climate change, including drought, floods, hurricanes and other extreme weather events; stresses that countries of the Global South, though historically least responsible for greenhouse gas emissions, are disproportionately affected and bear the heaviest humanitarian and economic consequences;

65. Recalls that according to the World Bank, up to 216 million people could be displaced by climate-related factors by 2050; notes that in 2022 alone, over 32 million people were forced to flee due to climate-related disasters;

66. Underlines that many of those displaced initially seek refuge within their own countries or in neighbouring countries already under pressure from poverty, conflict or existing refugee populations; points out that in Africa, significant numbers of climate-displaced persons from the Sahel are moving towards West African countries such as Gambia, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, creating additional challenges for host communities;

67. Stresses that climate-induced displacement presents one of the major humanitarian and security challenges of the coming decades and calls for the EU and its Member States to:

recognise and protect persons displaced by climate-related disasters, in accordance with international human rights standards;

support affected countries and regions through targeted adaptation, resilience and relocation programmes;

integrate the issue of climate mobility into the EU’s external action, migration and development cooperation policies;

68. Condemns the fact that many women and girls are trafficked to the EU from African countries for sexual exploitation and forced labour; calls for the EU and its Member States to adopt effective regulations and provide adequate funding to strengthen reception and protection measures, to ensure that traffickers are promptly prosecuted, deported and reported to the authorities in the countries of origin, while reinforcing cooperation with origin and transit countries in full compliance with international human rights and refugee protection instruments;

69. Stresses that the principle of non-refoulement is a cornerstone of international refugee and human rights law and must be upheld under all circumstances; expresses deep concern about the negative consequences of EU migration and border policies in Africa, which have undermined the rights and safety of local populations, migrants and refugees; calls, therefore, for full respect of the right to freedom of movement and for migration governance based on solidarity, protection and human dignity;

70. Condemns the externalisation of EU border control to African countries, including the financing of detention centres, readmission or repatriation facilities, and non-EU-country processing schemes; recalls that all migration and border policies must be fully consistent with international human rights standards and refugee and asylum law, including the right to life, liberty and protection from arbitrary detention;

71. Calls for the replacement of externalised migration policies with joint governance frameworks, including the creation of legal migration pathways, diaspora engagement mechanisms and the recognition of remittances, in order to support the rights, development and agency of African migrants; calls on the Member States to review their visa policies with African countries accordingly;

72. Calls for the EU and the Member States to guarantee the right to seek and enjoy international protection and to ensure humane, adequate and rights-based reception conditions; reiterates that an increasing number of people are being forced to flee their homes due to drought, land degradation and other climate-related disasters; calls for the recognition and protection of climate-displaced persons within EU asylum and migration law;

73. Rejects any form of conditionality that ties development cooperation, investment or humanitarian assistance to migration control, border externalisation, security cooperation or the privatisation of public services;

74. Calls for the audit and suspension of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, given its damaging impact on the rights of local communities, migrants and refugees, and its lack of transparency and accountability; insists that all remaining and future funding be redirected towards tackling the root causes of forced displacement through programmes contributing to the achievement of the UN SDGs, including poverty reduction, peacebuilding, climate resilience and job creation;

Sustainable development goals and human development

75. Reiterates that sovereignty, human development, poverty eradication, and the achievement of the UN SDGs must be central to EU-Africa relations; stresses that priority should be given to human development, social inclusion, gender equality, climate change mitigation and adaptation, the fight against hunger, and the promotion of food sovereignty;

76. Believes that a renewed EU partnership with Africa must recognise and address Europe’s historical responsibilities for colonial exploitation and slavery; stresses that these responsibilities must inform policies to promote equitable development and justice;

77. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote a moratorium on austerity and privatisation measures imposed by international financial institutions and donors, which undermine access to education, healthcare, water and social protection; stresses the importance of addressing structural and external causes of insecurity and poverty, including conflicts, hunger, climate change, inequality, lack of basic services and inappropriate agricultural models, through political, inclusive and human rights-based solutions;

78. Calls strongly for the EU and the Member States to devote at least 0.7 % of their gross national income to official development assistance, delivered as predictable, grant-based support; stresses that official development assistance must be additional, and not be diverted from humanitarian or other critical budgets;

79. Demands that the principle of PCD (Article 208 TFEU) be made operational and binding across all EU-Africa frameworks and agreements; calls for annual independent public reporting assessing coherence across trade, migration, climate, security and development policies and their tangible impact on partner countries;

80. Calls for urgent action to promote food sovereignty and prevent famine, including scaling up investment in agroecology, local seed systems, smallholder extension services and rural infrastructure (irrigation, storage and transport); calls for a ban on the practice of dumping subsidised agricultural products, which undermines local production, and for support for regional markets, local farmers and resilience programmes, avoiding an exclusively export-oriented agricultural model that contributes to deforestation or land-grabbing;

81. Stresses the need to promote and reinforce public, universal and free education systems in African countries; calls for EU support for African schools, universities, research centres and youth organisations, fostering scientific cooperation, green innovation, local capacity building, and equitable access to knowledge and technology transfer, including by limiting intellectual property rights where necessary;

82. Calls for the full, meaningful and binding participation of African parliaments, civil society organisations, trade unions, women’s and youth organisations, and indigenous and rural communities in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the EU-Africa partnership and all structures relating to the Samoa Agreement;

83. Calls for the EU and its Member States to increase financial support and humanitarian aid for populations affected by war, climate change or other disasters, provided as grants rather than loans to avoid increasing the debt burden; stresses that health is a fundamental human right and a necessary condition for development, and calls for a partnership integrating nutrition, water, sanitation, hygiene and universal healthcare coverage, including primary healthcare in line with the Alma-Ata Declaration of 1978;

84. Stresses the importance of ensuring that girls and women have access to adequate menstrual hygiene, including affordable sanitary products, clean and private toilets and safe water, as a fundamental component of healthcare, education and human development; calls for the EU to support African countries in implementing programmes and policies that address cultural stigmas around menstruation and in providing comprehensive sexual and reproductive health education;

85. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to support and fund programmes in Africa promoting sexual and reproductive healthcare and rights, including initiatives aimed at eliminating female genital mutilation; stresses the importance of working in close cooperation with national governments, local communities and civil society organisations, and of adopting culturally sensitive approaches that empower women and girls, engage community leaders, and advance the protection of women’s health, rights and bodily integrity across the continent;

86. Believes that the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus should finance investment that promotes inclusive and sustainable economic and social development; regrets the absence of transparency and proper assessment of the fund’s impact, and stresses the need for independent evaluation to ensure that blended finance mechanisms genuinely benefit less developed countries;

87. Respects and considers fully legitimate the fact that the continuation of extractive plunder and other neocolonial policies and practices – including debt dependency, unfair trade, conditional aid and migration externalisation – will encourage African partners to look for alternative alliances;

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88. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the African Union and its agencies and institutions, the relevant multilateral development banks, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.