What changed

B100467/2025

B100466/2025

European Parliament resolution on the polarisation and increased repression in Serbia, one year after the Novi Sad tragedy

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia,

– having regard to the EU-Serbia Stabilisation and Association Agreement,

– having regard to the final report of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on the early parliamentary elections held in Serbia on 17 December 2023,

– having regard to the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia,

– having regard to the open letter on Serbia of February 2025 by the Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos, and to her subsequent visit to Serbia in April 2025,

– having regard to the statement of UN human rights experts of 4 August 2025 condemning the Serbian Government’s violent crackdown on peaceful protesters,

– having regard to the Council conclusions on Enlargement of 17 December 2024,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas on 1 November 2025, Serbia will commemorate the first anniversary of the Novi Sad tragedy in which 16 people were killed;

A. whereas Serbia’s continued democratic decline is manifest in worsening corruption, a deterioration in the rule of law and freedom of expression, insufficient judicial independence, and a lack of media pluralism and trust in state institutions, as well as in insufficient alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, which is hindering Serbia’s progress towards EU membership;

B. whereas on 16 September1 2025,November Serbian2024, prosecutorsthe filedconcrete ancanopy updatedof indictmentthe againstNovi 13Sad peoplerailway overstation thein fatalSerbia incidentcollapsed, inkilling which16 apeople railwayand stationinjuring roofseveral collapsed;others;

C. whereas protests taking place after the tragic event further exacerbated polarisation in the country;

C. whereas the station had been renovated under a publicly financed infrastructure project implemented by a consortium of Chinese state-owned companies as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative; whereas in the aftermath of the tragedy the debris of the canopy was carelessly discarded, thus destroying the evidence for the investigation;

D. whereas former Prime Minister Miloš Vučević, former Transport Minister Goran Vesić and the former Mayor of Novi Sad, Milan Đurić, all took responsibility and resigned from their roles;

D. whereas investigative reporting by the Serbian media has uncovered a pattern of politically connected contractors winning major state construction tenders; whereas such corruption practices resulted in a tragic, mass loss of life in Novi Sad train station;

E. whereas the Government of Serbia took numerous steps to address protestors’ demands;

E. whereas the Novi Sad tragedy has triggered a massive democratic civic protest movement in Serbia led by students, calling for accountability, transparency, justice and the rule of law; whereas the protests continue to the present day; whereas protests have spread to over 400 cities and towns, becoming the largest grassroots movement in decades; whereas on 1 October 2025 thousands of people marched in Belgrade in remembrance of the Novi Sad tragedy;

1. Expresses sincere condolences to the victims of the Novi Sad tragedy;

F. whereas in September 2025 the public prosecutor in Novi Sad re-indicted 13 individuals, including the former Transport Minister Goran Vesić, over the tragedy, after the initial indictment was rejected by the court and returned for further investigation;

2. Recalls the fact that the protests in wake of the tragic event, which began with demands for accountability, have reportedly since been instrumentalised by left-wing non-governmental organisations and political activists who see these protests as an opportunity to destabilise Serbia’s institutions;

G. whereas the victims of the Novi Sad tragedy and their relatives are still waiting for justice to be served, and for a transparent, accurate and timely investigation into the incident; whereas serious concerns persist regarding the independence of the investigation and the full disclosure of findings; whereas information on the contracting conditions and financing of the renovation of Novi Sad station has not been publicly disclosed; whereas such an approach by the Serbian authorities demonstrates a lack of transparency and an effort to obfuscate the investigation;

3. Recalls that any attempts to influence Serbia’s political future from the outside causes further polarisation and destabilisation in the country;

H. whereas the protest movement’s demands were initially met with a defensive reaction by the Vučić government, which rejected the allegation that systemic failures caused the tragedy and agreed only to cosmetic political reshuffles;

4. Fully stands by Serbia’s sovereignty and its ability to handle its internal affairs and calls on all parties interfering in Serbia’s internal affairs to refrain from doing so;

I. whereas the Vučić government and pro-government media then proceeded to demonise the protesters through smear campaigns and portrayed them as terrorists and foreign agents; whereas some activists were arbitrarily arrested, detained, interrogated and had their private communication monitored; whereas state intelligence agencies were involved in secret recordings of students, which were then released to the public in an effort to discredit them;

5. Welcomes the efforts that have been made thus far in taking accountability for this unfortunate tragedy and emphasises that local and sovereign leadership – and not foreign interference – is key to resolving the situation and stabilising the country, which was understandably shaken by this tragedy;

J. whereas the growing protests were met with excessive use of force, including the use of tear gas, stun grenades and batons to disperse them; whereas many activists, including high school students, were arbitrarily arrested during the protests, with some being detained for prolonged periods of time and being subjected to mistreatment and violence in detention, or being forced into to exile;

6. Emphasises that the protests and blockades of faculties, such as at the University of Belgrade and the University of Novi Sad, and numerous secondary schools are causing the suspension of lectures, the postponement or cancellation of exams, and the disruption of academic calendars; emphasises that these disruptions are depriving many students of their fundamental right to education;

K. whereas on 15 March 2025, during the largest rally in Belgrade in decades, the alleged illegal use of ‘sound cannon’ during a silent vigil for the victims of the disaster caused shock and a stampede; whereas the Serbian Government invited Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) to investigate the incident, which concluded that acoustic crowd dispersal devices were not used, and alleged that a ‘staged provocation’ was involved; whereas the human rights organisation Earshot, which specialises in sonic investigations, conducted a thorough investigation into the alleged sonic weapon attack and concluded that it was ‘very likely’ that protesters were targeted by a directed acoustic weapon;

7. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission and the authorities of the Serbian Government.

L. whereas over the summer, pro-government hooligans and thugs were deployed at many protests to attack demonstrators with pyrotechnics, further escalating tensions, violence and polarisation in the country; whereas incidents of violence were also reported against members of national minorities, including the Slovak minority in Bački Petrovac and across the province of Vojvodina, notably on 9 and 10 August 2025; whereas such repression of democratic protests is in clear breach of Serbia’s commitments under the EU accession negotiations;

M. whereas President Vučić is actively fostering a culture of violence by pardoning thugs accused of assaulting students, using aggressive and divisive language towards his citizens, justifying acts of violence and spreading conspiracy theories; whereas President Vučić has also been using dehumanising language towards EU politicians, including Members of the European Parliament;

N. whereas President Vučić has repeatedly accused the EU and the West of orchestrating a ‘colour revolution’ in Serbia, without evidence; whereas Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) has supported this narrative and accused the EU of carrying out ‘subversive activities’ to fuel the protests, with the goal of triggering a ‘colour revolution’;

O. whereas journalists covering the protests have been violently attacked by pro-government forces; whereas according to multiple reports the Serbian Government continues to use spyware surveillance on journalists, activists and political opponents;

P. whereas the Balkan office of Russia’s RT television network in Belgrade plays a key role in disseminating the Kremlin’s propaganda across south-eastern Europe, further increasing polarisation in Serbia;

Q. whereas the Serbian Government itself could be implicated in conducting and facilitating foreign interference operations, probably in coordination with Russia; whereas this concerns both candidate and potential candidate partners; whereas over 150 foreign nationals with pro-Russian leanings were given shooting training in Serbia with the intention of inciting unrest ahead of Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections; whereas perpetrators of this crime, one of whom was linked to a high-ranking Serbian official, were only arrested after a media outcry; whereas the Serbian Government exerted direct influence on the 2025 parliamentary elections in Kosovo;

R. whereas a group of Serbian citizens, later arrested by Serbian law enforcement at the request of foreign national authorities, have committed hate crimes among various ethnic and religious groups in France and Germany with the intention of inciting fear and violence;

S. whereas the long-running protest movement in Serbia demonstrates the public’s frustration with the culture of corruption and impunity, and the erosion of trust in Serbia’s institutions, including the courts, parliament and media; whereas the student movement is among the three finalists nominated for the 2025 Sakharov Prize;

1. Expresses deep sympathy and solidarity with the victims of the Novi Sad tragedy and their families; calls for an independent, timely, comprehensive and transparent investigation into the tragedy and for all those responsible for the disaster to be held to account;

2. Recognises the crucial role played by students and young people in courageously fighting for Serbia’s democratic values and freedoms;

3. Recognises that the democratic decline in Serbia under the government of President Vučić has been continuing for years and that the current situation demands a concrete response by the EU institutions;

4. Calls on the Commission and the Council to support the demands of students in Serbia, which are not only an expression of domestic discontent, but are also directly linked to the rule of law, with the aim of ensuring that institutions work effectively, within their mandate and with democratic accountability, standards which the EU expects of Serbia;

5. Condemns the Serbian authorities’ use of violence, intimidation, arbitrary detention, and illegal surveillance against the protesters; calls for the immediate release of all protesters in detention and under house arrest;

6. Calls on the Serbian Government to fully guarantee and respect its people’s right of assembly and freedom of expression in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights;

7. Calls on Serbia to align with EU policies in countering foreign interference and disinformation campaigns by implementing concrete regulatory measures in line with EU standards, such as the Digital Services Act and the Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising;

8. Expects the Serbian authorities to investigate and prosecute all instances of calls for violence, harassment and strategic lawsuits against the protesters and investigative journalists;

9. Regrets the continued decline in public support for EU membership in Serbia and the growing support for the Putin regime, which is the result of sustained anti-EU and pro-Russian rhetoric by the government-controlled media and government officials; calls on the Serbian authorities to foster a fact-based and open discussion on accession to the EU;

10. Encourages the EU and the Member States to systematically engage with Serbian civil society, youth movements and local actors, through financial, legal and security support to independent media, human rights activists and democratic civil society projects;

11. Underlines that EU accession is a voluntary merit-based process and commits itself to exerting further political pressure on the Serbian authorities to implement reforms with regard to judicial independence, transparent public procurement and the protection of fundamental rights;

12. Calls on the Commission and the Council to immediately re-evaluate EU financial assistance to Serbia, should its democratic backsliding continue, and for the implementation of sanctions against all individuals responsible for the violence and harassment campaigns against protesters;

13. Calls on the Commission to make a special assessment of Serbia’s compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and the EU’s values in the forthcoming progress report on Serbia;

14. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe and the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Serbia.