What changed

B100459/2025

B100465/2025

European Parliament resolution on the polarisation and increased repression in Serbia, one year after the Novi Sad tragedy

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Articles 2 and 6 thereof,

having regard to Serbia’s application for membership of the EU of 19 December 2009,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia, in particular that of 8 February 2024 on the situation in Serbia following the elections, and of 7 May 2025 on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 October 2011 entitled ‘Commission Opinion on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union’ (COM(2011)0668), the European Council decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia candidate status and the European Council decision of 27-28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,

– having regard to the previous EU statements on Serbia, in particular the open letter on Serbia of 5 February 2025 by the Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos,

– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part, which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

– having regard to the interim measure of 29 April 2025 issued by the European Court of Human Rights instructing Serbia to refrain from using sonic devices for crowd control,

– having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia and of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb,

– having regard to the statements made by several UN Special Rapporteurs on 4 August 2025 concerning the Serbian Government’s crackdown on the student movement,

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999, the International Court of Justice advisory opinion of 22 July 2010 on the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, and to UN General Assembly Resolution 64/298 of 9 September 2010, which acknowledged the content of the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion and welcomed the EU’s readiness to facilitate dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo,

– having regard to the numerous reports and statements by domestic and international human rights organisations, independent media and civic groups documenting systemic abuses in Serbia,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on Enlargement,

– having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

– having regard to the interim measure issued on 29 April 2025 by the European Court of Human Rights stating that the Serbian authorities must prevent the use of sonic devices for crowd control,

– having regard to the Charterreport of Fundamentalthe RightsCommittee ofon theForeign EuropeanAffairs Union,(A10-0072/2025),

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of December 2006, to the Council conclusions of March 2020 and to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia,

– having regard to Serbia’s status as a candidate country for EU membership, granted in March 2012,

– having regard to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) of 31 October 2003, to which Serbia is a signatory,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas on 1 November 2024, athe newly renovated concrete canopy atof Novithe Sadmain railway station collapsed,in Novi Sad collapsed onto a crowded pavement, killing 16 people;people whereasand theseverely Noviinjuring Sadone railwayperson; stationwhereas projectone formedyear partafter ofthe tragedy, the Belgrade-Budapestinvestigations high-speedhave railwaynot lineyet andyielded wastangible carriedoutcomes; outwhereas underthe avictims’ Serbia-Chinafamilies intergovernmentaland agreement,civil outsidesociety therepresentatives scopehave ofexpressed thefrustration EU’sover ordinarythe publiclack procurementof legislativetransparency framework;and accountability; whereas the 2024absence Commissionof reportcredible onand Serbiatransparent hadinvestigations alreadyundermines warnedpublic abouttrust in the circumventionrule of procurementlaw rulesand viaefforts suchto agreements;fight corruption;

B. whereas the canopy collapse triggered unprecedented nationwide protests led by students demanding accountability, the publication of documentation regarding the reconstruction of the Novi Sad railway station, which was not publicly available, respect for civil liberties, separation of powers, electoral integrity, media freedom and an end to systemic corruption;

B. whereas dozens of civilians and police officers were injured during protests in Belgrade and other cities following the tragedy; whereas independent media and human rights organisations have reported that law enforcement deployed a long-range acoustic device in Belgrade, raising serious concerns about the proportionality and legality of the use of force;

C. whereas from February to the end of September 2025, more than 10 700 protests took place across more than 630 municipalities and 1 200 local community assemblies, including the largest demonstration in Serbia’s history on 15 March 2025 and the secondlargest on 28 June 2025;

C. whereas all political and social actors in Serbia, including members of the student movement and opposition parties, should refrain from inflammatory and nationalistic rhetoric and contribute to fostering a climate of mutual respect, democratic dialogue and de-escalation;

D. whereas the protests organised by the student movement have been overwhelmingly peaceful, with only a few isolated violent incidents over the summer of 2025, which were preceded by violence perpetrated by supporters of the ruling party; whereas the media with close ties to the ruling party has relentlessly attempted to portray the protests as violent, including through the use of fake news since March 2025;

D. whereas concerns have been raised by civil society organisations regarding the proposed draft law on amendments to the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code and the Law of 2005 on Juvenile Offenders and Criminal Protection of Juveniles, which introduce new offences and harsher penalties that could disproportionately restrict freedom of expression and assembly; whereas such provisions risk criminalising forms of peaceful protest or everyday civic behaviour that do not endanger public safety or constitutional order;

E. whereas there were several cases of radical symbols being displayed and extreme nationalist rhetoric being used during the mass protests organised by the student movement; whereas these protests reflect years of authoritarian consolidation, the capture of institutions and the erosion of electoral integrity, as repeatedly documented by domestic civil society and international observers;

E. whereas in recent years, serious concerns have persisted about the erosion of political pluralism, the rule of law and civic space in Serbia, including pressure on independent media, opposition actors and civil society organisations, and continuing challenges in the fight against corruption and in safeguarding the independence of the judiciary;

F. whereas elections in Serbia have been marred by systemic abuses, including irregularities in the voter register, vote buying, misuse of state resources, pressure and intimidation against voters and public employees, and the deployment of fake election observers; whereas independent observers reported that the recent local elections in Zaječar and Kosjerić were neither free nor fair;

F. whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) has been steadily declining since 2021; whereas Serbia has not imposed sanctions against Russia; whereas accession to the EU inevitably requires full alignment with the EU’s foreign policy objectives; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the CFSP dropped from 54 % in 2023 to 51 % in 2024, while most other candidate countries in the region achieved 100 % alignment; whereas this declining alignment raises questions about Serbia’s commitment to EU accession negotiations;

G. whereas by early 2025, repression had escalated, with police raids on civil society organisations, arbitrary arrests, politically motivated prosecutions, intimidation of journalists and mass surveillance of ordinary citizens;

G. whereas China’s presence and influence in Serbia have significantly increased in recent years through large-scale infrastructure investments; whereas Chinese companies have been involved in major construction projects, including the renovation of the Novi Sad railway station, raising concerns about transparency, adherence to EU standards, and environmental compliance; whereas Serbia has become the largest recipient of Chinese investment in the Western Balkans; whereas growing economic dependence on China may undermine Serbia’s alignment with EU values and foreign policy positions;

H. whereas in March 2025, during the largest protest in Serbian history, commemorating the victims of the Novi Sad tragedy, thousands of demonstrators in Belgrade were attacked by an unknown device – later identified as a sonic weapon – which caused panic and harm, and exposed demonstrators to grave risks; whereas doctors were prohibited from documenting injuries; whereas human rights organisations collected testimonies from 3 400 attendees impacted by the incident, despite official denials by the authorities; whereas the official investigation into the incident, which includes more than 170 witness statements, remains at an early stage, with no indictments;

H. whereas the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is a precondition for the progression of both countries towards EU membership;

I. whereas since late 2024, protests have been met with sustained repression, including beatings, arbitrary arrests, the use of tear gas, politically motivated detentions, deportations and mass surveillance; whereas more than 1 028 arrests and at least 340 violent incidents have been recorded, some involving serious injuries; whereas independent observers stress that this figure is not exhaustive, given the explosion of violence and police brutality during the summer of 2025, when simultaneous attacks and incidents within large groups made comprehensive monitoring impossible;

I. whereas democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights are among the core values on which the EU is founded, as enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union; whereas, in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria, candidate countries must fully respect and uphold these values to progress towards EU membership;

J. whereas since August 2025, violence has further intensified, including police brutality, torture and sexual violence against students, threats by JZO special police units, politically motivated prosecutions by the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office, and smear campaigns by pro-government media, including the broadcast of intimate images of a female student as an act of revenge pornography;

1. Demands a transparent and impartial investigation into the events leading to the collapse of the Novi Sad railway station canopy, ensuring that all those responsible are held accountable in accordance with the rule of law; calls for an independent technical examination of the structural failure, a comprehensive review of construction permits and oversight procedures, and a full assessment of potential corruption or negligence; urges the Serbian authorities to guarantee the victims’ families effective access to justice and adequate compensation;

K. whereas security agencies (BIA) have unlawfully recorded and televised private conversations, some of which were then used to accuse nine students of preparing attacks against the constitutional order and security of Serbia; whereas the Cobras elite military unit has been deployed to respond to domestic clashes, even firing live ammunition;

2. Notes with concern the reports of the use of force against peaceful protesters in Novi Sad, Belgrade and other Serbian cities; expresses particular concern about the possible deployment of long-range acoustic devices and the extensive use of tear gas against civilians; condemns any excessive or unlawful use of force by law enforcement authorities against individuals exercising their fundamental rights to freedom of assembly and expression;

L. whereas pro-government mobs and prior convicts have been shielded by police during violent counter-demonstrations, while opposition figures, students and even members of Serbia’s parliament have been beaten and abducted by plainclothes officers;

3. Expresses concern about the intensifying political polarisation in Serbia; calls on all political actors to engage in constructive dialogue grounded in mutual respect and democratic principles; urges the Serbian Government to promote inclusive political participation and guarantee equal access to media for all political parties and candidates; stresses the importance of depolarising public discourse and fostering a political culture rooted in tolerance, compromise and respect for democratic institutions; calls on civil society, media and educational institutions to play an active role in bridging societal divisions and strengthening democratic resilience;

M. whereas between July and August 2025, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights urged the Serbian authorities to exercise restraint, halt their crackdown on the student movement and uphold human rights and academic freedom;

4. Expresses solidarity with the families of the victims of the Novi Sad tragedy and strongly supports the right of Serbian students and citizens to peaceful protest, calling for accountability and democratic reforms; stresses the importance of civic courage, creativity, commitment to non-violence, and youth engagement for the advancement of Serbia’s European path;

N. whereas dozens of journalists have been assaulted or denied protection while reporting on protests; whereas the pro-government media has been orchestrating campaigns portraying the protests as a Western-backed ‘colour revolution’ aimed at toppling a legitimate government, contributing to declining confidence in the EU in Serbia, as attested by the latest Eurobarometer survey; whereas senior officials are militarising political discourse by branding protesters as ‘terrorists’ or ‘Nazis’;

5. Reaffirms its longstanding commitment to Serbia’s European perspective and future EU membership, while clearly underlining that progress on EU accession depends on full respect for the EU’s values, a genuinely merit-based process, and adherence to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights;

O. whereas concerns persist about organised, government-sponsored, anti-European media campaigns in Serbia, including hate speech and public slurs also directed at Members of the European Parliament;

6. Regrets the fact that no substantial progress has been made on Chapter 31 of the negotiating chapters as Serbia’s pattern of alignment with EU foreign policy positions has remained largely unchanged, mainly owing to Serbia’s close relations with Russia; recalls that Serbia remains a notable exception in the Western Balkans regarding alignment with the CFSP;

P. whereas the government and the ruling elite have normalised repression through pardons for violent attacks committed by government supporters, the suspension of public transport to block protests, the politically motivated expulsion of foreign citizens and the occupation of central Belgrade by pro-government demonstrators with police protection;

7. Expresses disappointment with Serbia’s declining alignment with the CFSP; emphasises that progressive alignment with the CFSP is a key requirement for all EU candidate countries; calls on Serbia to demonstrate tangible commitment to its declared EU accession goal by substantially increasing alignment with EU foreign policy positions and restrictive measures; acknowledges Serbia’s complex regional circumstances, while stressing that EU membership requires full adherence to the EU’s values, principles and common policies;

Q. whereas these patterns reveal the systematic subordination of state institutions, including the police, prosecutors and courts, to ruling party control, amounting to a collapse in democratic standards;

8. Remains concerned about the presence of nationalistic narratives within parts of the protest movement, including statements made during the student gathering on 28 June 2025, Saint Vitus Day, referring to Kosovo and Metohija as an ‘inalienable part of Serbia’; underlines that such rhetoric risks undermining Serbia’s European path and the spirit of reconciliation in the Western Balkans;

R. whereas the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia has convened for only 16 days in 2025;

9. Deplores the continued use of nationalist narratives, such as the ‘Greater Serbia’ and ‘Serbian World’ concepts, which have in the past been promoted by certain members of the Serbian Government; recalls that such rhetoric has no place in EU-Serbia relations and undermines regional stability; calls on the Serbian authorities to re-engage constructively in the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue with a view to reaching a comprehensive and legally binding normalisation agreement;

S. whereas freedom of assembly and expression, media freedom, judicial independence and an enabling environment for civil society and academia are fundamental democratic principles and essential conditions for Serbia’s accession to the EU; whereas the European Parliament has repeatedly underlined that the pace of accession negotiations depends on tangible progress in these areas;

10. Rejects unfounded allegations that the EU and certain Member States were involved in organising the student protests in Serbia with the aim of triggering a ‘colour revolution’; strongly condemns, in this context, the unlawful arrests and expulsions of EU citizens and the public disclosure of personal data of EU nationals by convicted war criminals; further condemns all forms of hate speech and incitement to hatred, particularly against national minorities;

T. whereas Commission President von der Leyen visited Serbia on 15 October 2025;

11. Warns against the misuse of criminal law to suppress civic participation; stresses that amendments to the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code and the Law of 2005 on Juvenile Offenders and Criminal Protection of Juveniles must not result in criminalising normal, peaceful behaviour or non-violent forms of protest; recalls that the proportional application of criminal sanctions is a cornerstone of the rule of law and of Serbia’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights;

1. Commemorates, almost one year after the tragedy, the 16 victims who lost their lives as a result of the collapse of the canopy of the Novi Sad railway station on 1 November 2024 and expresses its solidarity with those who were injured; reiterates its calls for full and transparent legal proceedings following the investigation by the authorities in order to bring those responsible to justice; underlines the need to examine more broadly the extent to which corruption led to the lowering of safety standards and contributed to this tragedy;

12. Reiterates that Serbia must refrain from any actions or statements aimed at influencing the domestic politics of neighbouring Western Balkan countries, including with regard to the unconstitutional celebration of Republika Srpska Day in Bosnia and Herzegovina and public questioning of the decisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s courts and constitutional institutions;

2. Is deeply concerned by the fact that the situation in Serbia remains fraught, with tensions and polarisation that could easily lead to violence; supports genuine attempts at dialogue on how the Serbian Government can meet student demands, including calls for early elections; notes, however, that students and protesters remain convinced that the recent calls for dialogue by the ruling party were not genuine;

13. Reiterates its strong support for Serbian civil society organisations, human rights defenders and independent activists working to strengthen democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; calls on the Commission to ensure adequate and accessible funding and effective protection mechanisms for civil society actors; condemns any form of intimidation, harassment or administrative pressure against non-governmental organisations and activists; emphasises the vital role of civil society in promoting transparency, monitoring democratic standards and holding public authorities accountable;

3. Condemns, in the strongest terms, the wave of state-sponsored violence and intimidation against and indiscriminate arrest of peaceful protesters, journalists, civil society organisations and opposition representatives in Serbia;

14. Acknowledges Serbia’s progress in certain areas, including economic growth, regional infrastructure connectivity and cooperation with the EU on migration management and energy security; welcomes Serbia’s participation in EU-funded projects under the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans and the Green Agenda for the Western Balkans; encourages Serbia to continue advancing reforms in alignment with EU standards, and reaffirms the EU’s readiness to support the Serbian people in their efforts towards a democratic, prosperous and European future;

4. Holds the Serbian leadership politically responsible for escalating repression, normalising violence and dismantling democratic institutions in the country; deplores the fact that the most senior state officials are actively spreading conspiracy theories about the collapse of the canopy being an act of sabotage or a terrorist attack, in a deliberate attempt to confuse the public as regards responsibility for the tragedy; is concerned about the lack of response from state institutions, including law enforcement and the judiciary, to refute these baseless claims;

15. Reaffirms that Serbia’s future ultimately lies within the EU, as a fully committed and values-based member; underlines, however, that genuine progress on EU accession depends on Serbia’s clear alignment with EU values, principles and foreign policy positions, and full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and the requirements of the accession process;

5. Is concerned about the potential political instrumentalisation of the criminal offences of ‘preparing actions against the constitutional order and security of Serbia’ and ‘calling for a violent change of the constitutional order’, and, in that context, about the arrests ahead of the protests of 15 March and 28 June 2025; notes that leaked recordings of the suspects’ conversations were published by pro-government media before the arrests took place; notes that several political activists and members of the Free Citizens Movement (PSG) opposition party were arrested on these grounds and that some remain under house arrest or in exile; condemns the pattern of escalating public attacks and smear campaigns, including by public officials, against members of the Serbian judiciary and other actions that further undermine the independence of the judiciary;

16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia.

6. Calls for urgent, impartial and transparent investigations into all allegations of unnecessary and disproportionate use of force and prohibited weapons, arbitrary arrests, detentions, torture, sexual violence against detainees, politically motivated prosecutions and other grave human rights abuses; recalls, in particular, the use of a sonic weapon during the March 2025 protests, the September 2025 case of student Bogdan Jovičić, the August 2025 case of student Nikolina Sinđelić, the July 2025 case of student Luka Mihajlović, as well as prior cases, such as the alleged police brutality against activist Ilija Kostić in November 2024; calls on the authorities to thoroughly examine allegations that these threats originated from high-ranking officials of the police protection service (JZO);

7. Notes the August 2025 arrest, and subsequent release, of former government ministers Tomislav Momirović and Goran Vesić on charges of abuse of office and suspicion of damaging the Serbian state budget by at least USD 115 million in relation to the reconstruction of the Belgrade-Budapest railway line, including the collapsed canopy of the Novi Sad railway station;

8. Condemns smear campaigns, intimidation of the media and the abusive use of personal data to discredit protesters, and urges the Serbian authorities to ensure media freedom; calls on senior officials to end inflammatory rhetoric that incites hostility or violence;

9. Condemns the Serbian Government’s retaliation against employees in the education and cultural sectors for supporting the protests; notes that more than 100 teachers have lost their jobs in recent months; condemns the repression against employees in the education and academic sectors, including salary reductions, the presence of the police on university campuses and the withdrawal of funding for public universities; insists that no disciplinary, administrative or criminal sanctions be used to intimidate or discourage lawful protests or academic activities;

10. Calls on the Serbian authorities to immediately restore funding to universities in accordance with Serbian legislation; calls on the competent institutions to ensure the unhindered participation of the academic and research community in projects funded by the EU;

11. Condemns the actions of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) in organising an illegal encampment in Pionirski park in front of the presidency building and its subsequent expansion into the square overlooking the National Assembly; is gravely concerned about multiple reports of individuals with criminal backgrounds being mobilised by the ruling party in counter-protest activities; recalls that reports of the SNS mobilising thugs and hooligans have a long and well-documented history;

12. Condemns the arbitrary and politically motivated use of presidential pardons for individuals convicted of or prosecuted for violence against students and other citizens participating in peaceful protests, considering such actions to be a direct interference with justice and seriously undermine the rule of law;

13. Calls on the Serbian authorities to enable the safe return of all citizens who have fled the country as a result of political repression, intimidation or fear of persecution, and to guarantee their full protection and reintegration in accordance with the law and Serbia’s international obligations;

14. Strongly condemns the unlawful arrest and expulsion of EU citizens who made statements in support of protesting students, and the public disclosure, by convicted war criminals, of the personal data of EU citizens; expresses concern about the rising number of detention cases involving EU citizens at Serbia’s borders;

15. Condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the verbal attacks on Members of the European Parliament by the most senior Serbian officials following their participation in, or statements made in the context of, the student protests;

16. Condemns the overt Russian interference in the Serbian protests through statements made by officials of the Russian Federation, including Vladimir Putin, alleging that the protests form part of a Western-backed ‘colour revolution’, and that the events of 15 March 2025 were a conspiracy orchestrated by protesters to spread panic; rejects, following these accusations made by Russian officials, all allegations by Serbian officials and pro-government media that the EU and some of its Member States were involved in organising the student protests with a view to triggering a ‘colour revolution’; calls on the Serbian authorities to take action against such malign propaganda in domestic media, instead of participating in its dissemination; calls on the Commission and the Commission President to clearly and publicly denounce such coordinated actions by Russian and Serbian state actors; notes the recent implementation by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control of sanctions against the Serbian NIS refinery; notes that in recent years, Serbia has chosen to deepen its energy dependence on Russia; considers that Serbia needs to make fundamental choices in this regard; welcomes the Commission President’s announcement of assistance to Serbia to enable it to become more energy independent from Russia, but underlines that any financial assistance must be linked to indisputable and transparent benchmarks towards achieving full energy independence from Russia;

17. Notes with concern that, in parallel with the ongoing protests, the Serbian Government appears to have been negotiating with the owners of the United Media company, under which some of the last remaining media outlets independent of ruling party influence operate, in order to ‘weaken’ these media outlets; warns that, if confirmed, this would represent a serious blow to the already endangered media pluralism in Serbia; calls on all sides to refrain from such activities;

18. Is concerned about the serious risk that the results of the next national elections will not be accepted by all sides; calls for the immediate and full implementation of all recommendations of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) international election observation missions to ensure free and fair elections in Serbia, in particular those concerning an independent audit of the voter register, the transparent and pluralistic appointment of members of the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM) Council and the provision of fair and equal access to airtime on public broadcaster RTS for all political actors;

19. Calls on the Serbian authorities to conduct a fully transparent comprehensive technical safety inspection of all infrastructure facilities, including those on the railway line from Belgrade, through Novi Sad, to the border with Hungary, in order to ensure their structural integrity, safety and compliance with international standards; urges the Serbian authorities not to put into operation any infrastructure facilities that lack the necessary permits and certificates for safe and uninterrupted use, particularly those located on international and regionally important transport corridors;

20. Encourages Serbia to strengthen cooperation with the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and to fully implement its UNCAC obligations; calls for enhanced transparency of ownership and financing in public procurement for infrastructure projects;

21. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to closely monitor the implementation of reforms through the EU accession process and the Reform Agenda adopted under the Reform and Growth Facility;

22. Calls on the Serbian authorities to ensure that the policing of public gatherings strictly complies with international and European human rights standards; urges the adoption and implementation of clear protocols on lawful crowd control technologies and independent oversight mechanisms;

23. Reiterates that EU accession negotiations with Serbia should only advance on the basis of measurable and sustainable progress in the fundamentals cluster, particularly on the rule of law, the fight against corruption and organised crime, judicial independence, media freedom and public administration reform;

24. Supports the prompt deployment of an ad hoc EU fact-finding mission to Serbia, with the participation of the European Parliament, in order to assess, on the ground, the state of democracy, the ongoing protests, attacks on demonstrators and repression targeting students, academics, educators and public-sector employees;

25. Calls on the most senior EU officials to refrain from making unfounded statements praising the reform process in Serbia; calls on the Commission to instead clearly articulate its commitment to Serbia’s future within the EU and to underscore the necessity of genuine and comprehensive reforms, including restoring democratic institutions, strengthening the rule of law and fighting against corruption and organised crime; welcomes the shift in the Commission President’s tone during her recent visit to Serbia, which reflects a more accurate assessment of Serbia’s underlying problems and negative track record on fundamental reforms; calls on the Commission to ensure consistency between words and actions; notes the announced agreement in relation to independent verification of the voter registry and the REM Council media regulator, while underlining that progress is assessed based on implementation of reforms;

26. Invites the Commission to launch an initiative for targeted individual sanctions to be imposed against those responsible for serious violations of law and human rights in Serbia, including those who ordered and carried out violence against peaceful demonstrators, in line with the EU global human rights sanctions regime;

27. Calls on the EU Member States to strengthen protective measures for those at risk, including emergency visas and relocation programmes; urges the EU Member States to adopt a united response to Serbia’s democratic backsliding, including by considering targeted sanctions against individuals responsible for grave abuses;

28. Calls on all countries participating in the upcoming Expo 2027 in Serbia to take into account the serious concerns and evidence of widespread corruption linked to the ruling authorities, as well as the reported lack of compliance with basic construction standards and legal requirements in the organisation and construction of the exhibition;

29. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the VicePresident of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Serbia, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.