What changed

B100452/2025

B100449/2025

European Parliament resolution on the situation in Belarus, five years after the fraudulentstolen presidential elections

(2025/2900(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Belarus, in particular those adopted since the fraudulent presidentialUniversal electionsDeclaration of 2020,Human Rights,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 12 October 2020 and 19 FebruaryInternational 2024Covenant on BelarusCivil and to the European Council conclusions of 22 October 2021 onPolitical Belarus,Rights,

– having regard to the statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU of 17 September 2025 on the joint strategic military exercise ZAPAD-2025,

– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

– having regard to the joint statement by the High Representative of the UnionOrganization for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commissioner for EnlargementCo-operation ofin 9Europe August(OSCE) 2025reports on the fifth anniversarystate of thedemocracy fraudulentand presidentialelectoral electionsintegrity in Belarus,

– having regard to the statements by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 26 February 2024 on parliamentary and local elections and of 1 August 2024 on the release of a number of political prisoners, and the statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU of 8 August 2023 on the third anniversary of the fraudulent presidential elections,

– having regard to the resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of 24 June 2025 entitled ‘Legal and human rights issues in the context of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine’, which holds Aliaksandr Lukashenka responsible for the illegal transfer of Ukrainian children to Belarus,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other international human rights instruments to which Belarus is a party,

– having regard to Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s order of 10 October 2025 for the Belarusian Armed Forces to be placed on the highest level of combat readiness,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas more than five years after the fraudulent presidential elections of 9 August 2020 and the brutal crackdown on peaceful pro-democracy protests, the human rights situation in Belarus remains critical;

A. whereas elections in Belarus have consistently failed to meet international standards of transparency, fairness and democratic legitimacy, as highlighted by independent observers and the OSCE;

B. whereas the illegitimate regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka has conducted a relentless campaign of repression against peaceful protesters, opposition leaders, lawyers, journalists, athletes, trade unions, civil society actors and others;

B. whereas five years after the presidential elections of August 2020, the situation in Belarus remains marked by serious restrictions on free speech, political pluralism, media independence, trade union rights and civil society;

C. whereas, more generally, the 31-year authoritarian regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka has been characterised by the systematic repression of political opponents and dissent, including the enforced disappearance of Lukashenka’s critics;

C. whereas in recent months, Belarusian authorities have released a number of political prisoners – including prominent opposition figures, journalists, and activists such as Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Ihar Karnei, Mikola Dziadok, Ihar Losik and Natallia Dulina – often in connection with high-level international diplomatic contacts; whereas political arrests continue despite these pardons;

D. whereas, according to the Human Rights Center ‘Viasna’, over 8 900 individuals have faced politically motivated charges since 2020, with over 1 200 political prisoners remaining in detention, many of whom are in fragile health or are being held in conditions that put their lives at risk; whereas 96 cases of political repression were recorded in September 2025 alone, with 77 individuals being recognised as political prisoners that same month;

D. whereas despite these releases, over a thousand political prisoners remain detained on politically motivated charges, and there are frequent reports of torture, ill-treatment, solitary confinement, lack of fair trials and other serious human rights violations;

E. whereas several political prisoners have died in custody, including, most recently, Andrei Padniabenny, who died in penal colony No. 15 in Mahiliou in September 2025; whereas political prisoners face torture, denial of medical care, restricted access to visits from lawyers and family members, and solitary confinement;

E. whereas Belarus remains the only country in Europe to retain the death penalty, with its scope expanded in 2022 to include vaguely defined acts of terrorism and in 2023 to include ‘treason against the state’;

F. whereas, according to the Belarusian Association of Journalists, 33 media representatives, including journalists, reporters and bloggers, are currently imprisoned, and 83 media workers have been prosecuted over the past five years;

F. whereas sanctions and isolation, while aimed at pressuring the regime, have also had collateral negative effects on ordinary citizens, increasing economic hardship and limiting access to rights and services;

G. whereas more than 6 000 teachers have lost their jobs as a result of repression, more than 50 have been imprisoned, and education in the Belarusian language is being dismantled amid the increasing militarisation of schools;

G. whereas the Lukashenka regime granted Russian forces access to Belarusian territory to start the full-scale invasion of Ukraine;

H. whereas multiple international organisations, including the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, have documented systematic human rights violations in Belarus, including torture, arbitrary detentions, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty, enforced disappearances, forced labour, persecution on political or national grounds, deportation and suppression of fundamental freedoms, which amount to crimes against humanity as defined by international law;

H. whereas sustainable improvement in Belarus requires genuine internal dialogue, societal reconciliation, the restoration of democratic norms and institutions, and an end to foreign domination of domestic affairs;

I. whereas the penitentiary system functions as a network of slave-labour camps, with prisoners, including political detainees, being forced to work in unsafe and degrading conditions;

I. whereas Aliaksandr Lukashenka has been in power continuously for over 30 years, a unique case in contemporary Europe;

J. whereas the judiciary, prosecutors and law enforcement agencies have been instrumentalised to commit human rights violations and crimes against humanity;

1. Condemns the continued oppression of the Belarusian people by the Lukashenka regime, including widespread human rights violations, the systematic repression of political opposition, arbitrary arrests, torture, harassment and ill-treatment of detainees, persistent impunity and a structural lack of respect for due process and fair trials, and the use of violence against peaceful protesters;

K. whereas ‘extremism’ is the most common pretext for prosecuting political prisoners, and the regime’s ‘list of extremists’ now includes more than 5 800 people;

2. Denounces the fraudulent nature of elections in Belarus, which fail to meet basic democratic and international standards;

L. whereas at least four political prisoners are still being held incommunicado, namely Viktar Babaryka, Maksim Znak, Uladzimir Kniha and Aliaksandr Aranovich; whereas Maria Kalesnikava was long held incommunicado, with a letter from her recently reaching the outside world for the first time in 2.5 years; whereas Andrzej Poczobut remains imprisoned in harsh conditions, in an isolation cell; whereas Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ales Bialiatski is being subjected to forced labour and punishments while imprisoned;

3. Reiterates its full solidarity with the Belarusian people in their struggle for dignity, social justice, human rights and democratic participation;

M. whereas the Belarusian KGB and other security structures have intensified the cross-border repression and transnational intimidation of exiled Belarusians; whereas the Belarusian regime is among the top ten perpetrators of transnational repression;

4. Stresses that Belarus’s future must be determined by the will of its people, free from external pressure or interference; emphasises that Belarus’s sovereignty and political trajectory should reflect the aspirations of its citizens;

N. whereas Czech counterintelligence dismantled a Belarusian spy network that was operating under diplomatic cover, which allowed it unrestricted movement within the EU;

5. Reiterates its condemnation of Belarus’s involvement in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; calls on Belarus to refrain from complicity in or facilitating Russia’s war against Ukraine, and to work toward diplomatic solutions and peace in the region;

O. whereas in recent years, the Lukashenka regime has stepped up pressure on the staff of Western diplomatic missions accredited in Belarus and on other foreigners;

6. Welcomes the release of political prisoners Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Ihar Karnei, Mikola Dziadok, Ihar Losik and Natallia Dulina and of trade unionists Aliaksandr Yarashuk and Nikita Zolotorjev, as a positive but partial step; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all remaining political detainees, and for their rights to be restored;

P. whereas Lukashenka ‘pardoned’ over 200 political prisoners in 2024 in an attempt to have certain Western sanctions lifted; whereas political arrests continued despite these pardons, with at least 1 721 individuals convicted on political charges in 2024 alone; whereas the regime continued to release prisoners in 2025, but also arrested many others; whereas the regime is using political prisoners as bargaining chips to extort concessions from Western countries;

7. Urges the Belarusian authorities to respect their international obligations under human rights treaties and to engage in a genuine, inclusive dialogue with opposition forces and civil society and to stop all kinds of repression;

Q. whereas Siarhei Tsikhanouski, a laureate of Parliament’s Sakharov Prize, was released on 21 June 2025 after more than five years of imprisonment and solitary confinement, along with 13 other political prisoners, following diplomatic efforts by the United States;

8. Notes with great concern how the Belarusian Government refuses to respect the fundamental rights of the LGBTI+ community, ethnical minorities and other exploited and discriminated groups; calls in this regard for the full respect and integrity of sexual- and other minority rights;

R. whereas the political prisoners who were released have shared accounts of torture; whereas 2020 Sakharov Prize laureate Mikalai Statkevich, who was among those released, refused to cross the border to Lithuania, was imprisoned again and is being held incommunicado;

9. Reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to simplify the procedures for obtaining visas and provisional identification documents for those fleeing Belarus, and providing rehabilitation, practical and financial support;

S. whereas the Lukashenka regime employs anti-extremism laws to obstruct media outlets, under which most independent media have been labelled ‘extremist’;

10. Calls for the EU to revise its sanctions policy to mitigate harm to ordinary citizens, while maintaining pressure on the regime; insists that any normalisation of relations between the EU and Belarus be conditional on credible progress in respect for human rights, the rule of law, press freedom, the civil society space, and justice for victims of repression;

T. whereas the Lukashenka regime has sought to intimidate Belarusian higher education institutions and academics operating in exile by declaring them ‘extremist organisations’;

11. Underlines that a peaceful, democratic, socially just Belarus is in the interest of stability in eastern Europe and the EU, and that isolation risks driving Belarus further into authoritarian dependency;

U. whereas more than 500 000 Belarusians have been forced to flee the country since 2020, with some continuing to face persecution from the Lukashenka regime, including through trials in absentia, threats from the security forces, pressure on relatives, confiscation of property and other restrictions; whereas it is dangerous for Belarusians in exile to return to their homeland, as many of those who have returned since 2020 have been convicted on politically motivated charges; whereas many hold passports on the verge of expiry, which the Lukashenka regime uses to pressure them into returning to Belarus, where they face imprisonment;

12. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the United Nations, the OSCE, and the Belarusian authorities.

V. whereas under Lukashenka, more than 250 people sentenced to death have been executed; whereas Belarus remains the only country in Europe and Central Asia to retain the death penalty, with its scope expanded in 2022 to include vaguely defined acts of terrorism and in 2023 to include ‘treason against the state’;

W. whereas the regime employs mass surveillance, censorship and disinformation, targeting both domestic audiences and the EU;

X. whereas the illegitimate regime held sham presidential elections on 26 January 2025, amid arrests and repression; whereas the sham elections were not observed by any official missions from any democratic countries, and the European Parliament and like-minded partners did not recognise them as legitimate;

Y. whereas the Lukashenka regime has enabled Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine by giving Russian forces access to Belarusian territory and supplying them with ammunition, fuel and other supplies; whereas it assists attempts by Russia and other actors to destabilise the EU and undermine European aspirations among the EU’s neighbours;

Z. whereas Montenegrin media report that Belarusian and Russian instructors in Serbia trained over 150 pro-Russian activists from the Republic of Moldova to destabilise Moldova after the recent elections there; whereas Moldova has refused entry to 195 Russian and Belarusian athletes and activists, including Dzmitry Shakuta, one of the suspects in the murder of Belarusian democratic activist Raman Bandarenka;

AA. whereas, according to the US State Department’s 2025 Trafficking in Persons Report, Belarus is one of the main hubs for human trafficking and continues to inflict forced labour on Belarusians and foreign citizens; whereas the Belarusian authorities have transferred more than 2 400 unaccompanied children from vulnerable Ukrainian communities to Belarus, placing them in institutions where many have been subjected to ‘re-education’ and military training;

AB. whereas Belarusian children are being groomed for military service under the guise of ‘patriotic education’, with thousands taking part in military-patriotic club activities; whereas the rhetoric of ‘patriotic education’ conceals the militarisation of minors, their training in the use of combat weapons and their indoctrination with pro-Russian narratives;

AC. whereas, according to data revealed by Cyberpartisans, an anti-regime group of Belarusian hackers, the majority of Belarusians fighting on the Russian side in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine are convicted criminals; whereas Article 133 of the Belarusian Criminal Code provides that mercenary activity is punishable by up to seven years’ imprisonment; whereas, however, no Belarusian has been convicted of this offence since Russia began its aggression against Ukraine in 2014;

AD. whereas the Lukashenka regime, with Russian assistance, circumvents certain sanctions through preferential market access and the use of Russian infrastructure;

AE. whereas, according to the Belarusian Investigative Center, a Belarusian company provided Russia with a sanctioned solvent that could be used to produce banned chemical weapons, and three businessmen close to Lukashenka were involved in its delivery;

AF. whereas from 12 to 16 September 2025, Belarus held the Zapad 2025 joint strategic military exercise with Russia, the first Zapad exercise since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022; whereas on 12 September 2025, Poland was forced to temporarily close all border crossings with Belarus, citing concerns over a possible escalation from Belarus;

AG. whereas the Astravets nuclear power plant, located on the border between Belarus and Lithuania, has been plagued by problems, and Belarus is now planning to build a nuclear waste dump near the Lithuanian border; whereas the Lukashenka regime also plans to build a second nuclear power plant in the east of the country to supply electricity, including to Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine;

AH. whereas Belarus continues to instrumentalise migration at its borders with Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, deliberately gathering migrants from the Middle East and forcing them to move towards the EU’s external borders; whereas following Lukashenka’s return from Moscow in September 2025, the Belarusian regime stepped up its hybrid actions by instrumentalising migration to destabilise the EU; whereas regime-sponsored contraband from Belarus continues to pose a serious threat to the EU’s security and economy, particularly given that the use of weather balloons to transport such contraband endangers aviation and has forced airports to close; whereas Poland, Lithuania and Latvia have had to step up security measures at their borders in response;

AI. whereas Belarus is experiencing an acute labour shortage as a result of repression, arbitrary detention and forced emigration; whereas the Lukashenka regime has concluded agreements with non-EU countries with the alleged aim of attracting labour; whereas these arrangements exacerbate the risk of migration being instrumentalised against the EU;

AJ. whereas the EU has mobilised EUR 170 million since 2020 to support Belarusian civil society, independent media and victims of repression, and has imposed targeted sanctions on Belarus in response to the 2020 fraudulent elections, human rights violations, and Belarus’s complicity in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including trade restrictions and sanctions on 310 individuals, among them Lukashenka, and 46 entities;

AK. whereas the announced cuts in US support for Belarusian independent media and non-governmental organisations could lead to some organisations losing all their funding; whereas European partners have only partly filled the gap;

1. Reiterates its strong condemnation of the repression in Belarus; reiterates its demand for the immediate and unconditional release of political prisoners and arbitrarily detained persons in Belarus, along with compensation and the restoration of their rights; condemns the instrumentalisation of the judiciary, prosecutors and law enforcement agencies to commit human rights violations and crimes against humanity;

2. Continues to expresses grave concern about the situation of political prisoners, including Ales Bialiatski, Maria Kalesnikava, Viktar Babaryka, Andrzej Poczobut, Mikalai Statkevich, Valiantsin Stefanovich, Maksim Znak, Uladzimir Matskevich, Marfa Rabkova, Uladzimir Labkovich, Anastasiya Loika, Yana Pinchuk, Mikalai Bankou, Andrei Navitski, Henrykh Akalatovich, Uladzimir Kniha and others, many of whom face severe health issues without access to proper medical care and are enduring isolation, ill-treatment and torture;

3. Reiterates its calls on the Belarusian authorities to respect detainees’ rights, provide medical care, and grant access to lawyers, families and international organisations;

4. Reiterates its call for the EU and its Members States to continue investigating human rights abuses and crimes against humanity in Belarus and to support measures to hold those responsible to account, including through extraterritorial and universal jurisdiction; calls for the EU and its Member States to support the Lithuanian Government’s referral of the situation in Belarus to the International Criminal Court in connection with the perpetration of transnational crimes against humanity; encourages the Member States to join the proceedings initiated by Lithuania before the International Court of Justice concerning Belarus’s instrumentalisation of migration;

5. Reiterates its call for the EU and the Member States to support political prisoners and their families, including by demanding proof of political prisoners’ whereabouts, requesting their release, simplifying the procedures for Belarusians to obtain visas and identity documents, and providing rehabilitation and other support;

6. Stresses the importance of protecting exiled Belarusians from persecution by the Lukashenka regime and of ensuring that they can access legal residence and employment in the EU;

7. Warns against Lukashenka’s instrumentalisation of political prisoners to extort concessions from the West; notes the release of dozens of political prisoners and encourages the EU, the United States and other like-minded partners to continue working for the effective release of all political prisoners in Belarus while further increasing pressure on the regime; reiterates that each time prisoners have been released, even more have subsequently been taken into captivity;

8. Expresses serious concern over the lifting of US sanctions on the Belarusian airline Belavia, which is complicit in the instrumentalisation of migration;

9. Reiterates that it does not recognise Aliaksandr Lukashenka as the legitimate president of Belarus and reaffirms its support for the Belarusian democratic forces led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and for the democratic aspirations of the Belarusian people; calls for the EU and its Members States to work with non-EU countries to strengthen the policy of the non-recognition of Lukashenka as Belarus’s president; stresses the importance of sustained EU engagement with Belarusian democratic actors, ensuring that their efforts have political, financial and security support;

10. Commends the resilience of Belarusian civil society and the Belarusian democratic forces; reiterates its solidarity with the people of Belarus and its support for their legitimate aspirations for a democratic and European future, and remains committed to working with Belarusian democratic forces, civil society and independent media for the benefit of the people of Belarus;

11. Welcomes the continued documentation of human rights violations by Belarusian non-governmental organisations such as Viasna; commends the work of Belarusian independent media in promoting freedom of expression, and emphasises the need to preserve their records for future judicial proceedings; calls on the EU and its Member States to provide concrete support for civil society organisations and human rights defenders working to collect and preserve evidence of the Lukashenka regime’s abuses and crimes against humanity, and to assist in transmitting such documentation to the competent international bodies, including the International Criminal Court;

12. Calls for the EU and its Member States to continue to support Belarusian democratic forces, civil society, students, journalists, trade union leaders, exiled professionals and others, including by providing them with visas, scholarships, grants, networking opportunities and measures to ensure their safety;

13. Calls for the EU and its Member States to launch thorough investigations into, and dismantle, Belarusian and Russian spy networks in the EU and the candidate countries, and stresses, once more, the need to impose restrictions on Russian and Belarusian diplomats in the Schengen area;

14. Reiterates that any future normalisation of relations between the EU and Belarus must be conditional on the release of all political prisoners, the cessation of repression, the decriminalisation of political activity, and the holding of new, free and democratic elections under the supervision of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe;

15. Expresses deep concern over Russia’s growing influence in Belarus, which threatens its existence as a sovereign state; denounces the Lukashenka regime’s complicity in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and condemns its deliberate subordination of Belarus to Moscow in a so-called union state encompassing political, geopolitical, economic, military and cultural spheres; denounces the militarisation of Belarusian territory by Russia, including though military exercises such as Zapad, and warns that the deployment of nuclear-capable systems undermines Europe’s security; reiterates the need to strengthen Belarusian national identity and the Belarusian language, and to combat the falsification of Belarusian history by the Lukashenka regime and the Kremlin and its proxies;

16. Urges the EU and international partners to strengthen sanctions against individuals and entities responsible for the evasion of sanctions, the undermining of democracy and the rule of law, repression, human rights violations and crimes against humanity and for Belarus’ participation in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, while also closing sanctions loopholes; calls for the EU to impose sanctions on Belarusian entities and individuals responsible for the forced labour of political prisoners and on goods produced through such forced labour;

17. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to impose targeted sanctions on intermediaries and enablers who knowingly evade Belarusian fertiliser sanctions, and on any persons or entities leasing production facilities, re-branding, re-packaging or falsifying the origin of Belarusian fertiliser, providing financing or insurance, or otherwise facilitating transit; urges stronger enforcement and enhanced cross-border information-sharing; notes the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project’s findings on EU routing and Lukashenka’s recent push to expand the use of crypto-assets and tokenisation as a sanctions workaround;

18. Reiterates its calls on EU and Western companies to cease their activities in Belarus;

19. Urges Belarus to commute all death sentences, impose a moratorium on capital punishment and move towards its permanent abolition;

20. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Union / High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the relevant EU institutions, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the representatives of Belarusian democratic forces and the Belarusian de facto authorities.